

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THE

HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

NAPOLEON;

FORMING A SEQUEL TO

"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY

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HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE.

BOOK I.

CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VIII.

ENTRANCE OF THE PROVISIONAL CONSULS UPON THEIR FUNCTIONS.—DIVISION OF DUTY BETWEEN SIEYÈS AND BONAPARTE.—BONAPARTE TAKES UPON HIMSELF THE ACTIVE ADMINISTRATION, AND LEAVES SIEYÈS TO PLAN THE CONSTITUTION.—STATE OF FRANCE IN BRUMAIRE, YEAR VIII.—DISORDER IN THE FINANCES.—DESTITUTION OF THE ARMIES.—TROUBLES IN LA VENDÉE.—MOVEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS IN SOME OF THE SOUTHERN TOWNS.—FIRST STEPS OF THE PROVISIONAL CONSULS FOR RESTORING ORDER IN THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.—NOMINATION OF CAMBACÉRÈS TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE; LA PLACE TO THE HOME OFFICE; FOUCHÉ TO THE POLICE; TALLEYRAND TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS; BERTHIER TO WAR; FORFAIT TO THE MARINE, AND GAUDIN TO THE FINANCES.—FIRST FINANCIAL MEASURES.—THE PROGRESSIVE FORCED LOAN SUPPRESSED.—CREATION OF AN AGENCY OF DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS, AND COMPLETION OF THE LISTS OF ASSESSMENT LEFT IN ARREAR.—INSTITUTION OF THE BILLS OF THE RECEIVER-GENERAL.—CONFIDENCE BEGINS TO BE RE-ESTABLISHED: THE BANKERS OF PARIS ADVANCE A LOAN TO THE STATE.—SUCCOUR SENT TO THE ARMIES.—POLITICAL ACTS OF THE CONSULS.—REVOCATION OF THE HOSTAGE LAW; DISCHARGE OF THE IMPRISONED PRIESTS, AND OF THOSE SHIPWRECKED AT CALAIS.—COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CHIEFS OF THE ROYALIST PARTY.—A SUSPENSION OF ARMS IN LA VENDÉE AGREED UPON WITH BOURMONT, AUTICHAMP, AND CHÂTILLON.—COMMENCEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN CABINETS.—STATE OF EUROPE.—AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND RESOLVE TO CONTINUE THE WAR.—PAUL OF RUSSIA, IRRITATED AGAINST HIS ALLIES, SHOWS AN INCLINATION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE COALITION, AND ATTACH HIMSELF TO THE SYSTEM OF NEUTRALITY ADOPTED BY PRUSSIA.—IMPORTANCE OF PRUSSIA AT THAT MOMENT.—BONAPARTE SENDS HIS AID-DE-CAMP DUROC TO BERLIN.—RUMOURS OF A PEACE.—SENSIBLE AMELIORATION IN THE MATERIAL AND MORAL STATE OF FRANCE, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PROVISIONAL CONSULS.—THE FORMATION OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION TAKEN IN HAND.—PROJECT OF SIEYÈS LONG MEDITATED.—LISTS OF NOTABILITY, THE CONSERVATIVE SENATE, THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, THE TRIBUNATE, THE GRAND ELECTOR.—DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN SIEYES AND BONAPARTE, RELATIVE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER.—DANGER OF A RUPTURE BETWEEN THE TWO CONSULS.—RECONCILEMENT THROUGH THEIR FRIENDS.—THE GRAND ELECTOR IS REPLACED BY THE THREE CONSULS.—ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VIII., AND ITS OPERATION FIXED FOR THE 4TH NIVÔSE, IN THE YEAR VIII.

The 18th of Brumaire had terminated the existence of the Directory.

The men who, after the stormy times of the Convention, had conceived a republic of this nature were not thoroughly convinced of the solidity and excellence of their work; but in the transition from the sanguinary path they had traversed, it was difficult for them to have done otherwise or better. Thus it was impossible for them to have looked towards the Bourbons, who were repudiated by the universal feeling; it was equally impossible for them to have flung themselves into the arms of a great general; because at that epoch, none of our soldiers had acquired sufficient glory to lead captive the popular mind. Besides this, all illusions were not yet dissipated by experience. After escaping from the Committee of Public Safety, nothing had been tried but the ferocious republic of 1793, consisting of a single assembly, exercising at once every species of authority. It remained to make a last attempt, that of a moderate republic, the powers of which should be wisely separated, and the administration confided to new men, strangers to the excesses that had filled France with dismay. Under these circumstances the Directory was conceived.

This new essay at forming a republic lasted four years, from the 13th Brumaire, year IV. to the 18th Brumaire, in the year VIII. It was undertaken with good faith and a hearty will, by men of whom the greater part were honest, and animated by right intentions. Some men of a violent character or of suspected probity, as the director Barras, had managed to mingle in the list of rulers, who during these four years transmitted the authority to each other; but Rewbell, La Reveillière-Lepeaux, Le Tourneur, Carnot, Barthélemy, Roger-Ducos, Sieyès, were upright citizens, all men of ability, and the last, Sieyès, possessed of a very superior intellect. Notwithstanding this, the dictatorial republic soon exhibited grievous confusion; less of cruelty, but more of anarchy:—such had been the character of the new government. The Directory did not guillotine, but it transported. It did not oblige assignats to be received as currency under the penalty of death; but it paid nobody.

Our soldiers, without arms and without bread, were vanquished in place of being victorious. To terror had succeeded intolerable public uneasiness; and as feebleness has its passions, this republic of mild intentions had finished by two measures altogether tyrannical, the progressive forced loan, and the law of the hostages. This last measure, above all, although it carried nothing sanguinary in its character, was one of the most odious vexations invented under the cruel and fertile imagination of parties.

Is it astonishing that France, to which the Bourbons could not be presented in 1799, after the ill success of the directorial constitution, began to have no faith in a republic? Is it astonishing that France flung itself into the arms of a young general, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, a stranger to every party, affecting to disdain all, endowed with an energetic will, exhibiting for both military and civil business an equal aptitude, and leaving to conjecture an ambition which, far from inspiring people with apprehension, was greeted then as a hope? Less glory than he had acquired might have sufficed any one to seize the government, since some time before General Joubert had been sent to Novi, that he might acquire the titles he wanted for operating the revolution, now called in our annals the 18th Brumaire. The unfortunate Joubert was conquered and slain at Novi; but young Bonaparte, then always fortunate and victorious, not less so in escaping the dangers of the sea than those of battle, had returned from Egypt to France in a manner almost miraculous; and at his first appearance the Directory had succumbed. Every party ran to meet him, and demanded from him order, victory, and peace.

Still it was not in one day that the authority of a single man could replace that demagogue rule in which all the world, alternately the oppressors or the oppressed, had possessed for a time the chief authority. It was necessary to regard appearances, and in order to bring fatigued France beneath absolute power, to make her pass, by regular gradation, through a government of glory, reparative and demi-republican. It wanted, in one word, the Consulate, to lead the way to the Empire.

It is this portion of our contemporary history that I enter upon at present. Fifteen years are rolled away since I traced the annals of our first revolution. These fifteen years I have passed in the bustle of public life; I have seen an ancient throne fall and a new throne elevated; I have seen the French revolution pursue its invincible career. Although the scenes in which I have borne a part have surprised me little, I have not the presumption to believe that my experiences of men and public affairs have taught me nothing. On the contrary, I believe I have acquired much, and that I am thus perhaps better qualified to seize and delineate the great things which our fathers performed during those heroic times. I am sure that experience has not cooled the generous sentiments of my youth; I am certain I love, as I have ever loved, the liberty and glory of France.

I resume my narration at the 18th Brumaire, in the year VIII. (November 9, 1799.)

The law of the 19th Brumaire, which established the provisional consulate, being perfected, the three new Consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger-Ducos, quitted St. Cloud for Paris. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, former members of the Directory, were already inhabitants of the palace of the Luxembourg. Bonaparte left his house in the street de la Victoire, and with his wife, his adopted children, and his aids-de-camp, took up his residence in the little Luxembourg. There surrounded by the fragments of the last government, and the elements of the new, and approximating to his two colleagues, he set his hand at work, with that just and rapid intelligence, that wonderful activity, which signalized his mode of action in war.

With him were associated as his colleagues Ducos and Sieyès, both formerly of the Directory; both had been busily employed in destroying the government they contemned. Sieyès particularly had been placed at the side of Bonaparte, because he was the second personage of the republic, author of the greatest and best conceptions of the revolution, such as the union of the three orders, the division of France into departments, and the institution of the national guard. Sieyès, destitute of eloquence, had rivalled Mirabeau in the first days of our revolution, at the time that oratory was esteemed the highest endowment; and now when universal war assigned the first place to military genius, Sieyès, who never had borne a sword, was nearly the equal of Bonaparte himself; so great is the power of mind, even without the talents that render it useful or applicable. But now that he must put his hand to business, Sieyès, who was idle, morose, imperious in his notions, irritated or upset by the slightest contradiction, was not able long to rival in influence his young colleague, who could work day and night, who was annoyed by no contradiction, who was blunt, but not morose; who knew how to succeed by pleasing when he was inclined, and when he did not see fit to give himself that trouble, had always the resource left of carrying his object by force.

There was still one function appropriated in the general way to Sieyès. This was the preparing the new constitution, which the provisional consuls had been charged to frame and to propose to the country at the earliest possible moment. People were at this time still somewhat imbued with the notions of the eighteenth century; they believed less, generally, but they still believed, that human institutions might be purely an operation of the mind, and that a constitution, adapted for the public rule, might start ready-made from the head of the legislator. Most assuredly if the French revolution had required a Solon or Lycurgus, Sieyès was worthy of being the man; but in modern times there is but one real legislator, and that is experience. They did not think so then, though we think so now; and it was universally agreed that Sieyès should be the maker of the new constitution. This was hoped, and reported. It was pretended that he was in possession of a plan long reflected upon, a profound and admirable work; that, disembarrassed from the obstacles which revolutionary passions had opposed to him before, he would now be able to bring it forward; that he would be the legislator, Bonaparte the administrator of the new government, and that between the two, France would be made powerful and happy. Every epoch of the revolution had its illusions; the present is not without its own; it is true, these will probably be the last.

It was agreed, then, by common accord, that Sieyès should be employed in framing the constitution, and Bonaparte in the government. It was urgent, in effect, that the country should be governed by some one, because under every aspect its situation was deplorable. Moral and material disorder was at its height.

The ardent revolutionists, beaten at St. Cloud, had still partizans in the society called the *Manège*[1], and in analogous societies scattered abroad throughout France. They had at their head few noted leaders from the two assemblies, but they numbered among them several officers who were much esteemed by their brethren in arms. Bernadotte, an ambitious man, who carried pretensions which his standing in the army did not justify; Augereau, a true soldier, very unreasonable, brave, but without influence; lastly, Jourdan, a good citizen, and a good general, whom his military disasters had soured and flung into increased opposition. It was to be feared that the fugitives from the Council of Five Hundred would unite together in some considerable place, form there a legislative body and directory, and rally around them the individuals who still preserved all their fervour of attachment to revolutionary sentiments; the first, because they were compromised by excesses, or were possessed of national property; the last, because they loved republican system on its own account, and feared to see it fall under the power of a new Cromwell. Such a movement would have been a great embarrassment in a situation already full of difficulty; and some inquietude was felt lest it should be attempted in Paris itself.

On the part of the opposite faction, it was also natural to feel serious fears, because La Vendée was on fire anew. Châtillon was on the right bank of the Loire, Autichamp on the left, Georges Cadoudal in the Morbihan, Bourmont in the Maine, Frotté on the coast of Normandy; all these were excited and sustained by the English, thus renewing the civil war. The law of hostages, the feebleness of the government, the defeats of the armies, were the motives that again urged them to take up arms. Châtillon suddenly occupied Nantes; he had not fixed his quarters there, but entered it and retired. This sufficed to make the larger communes in the disturbed country cover themselves with entrenchments hastily constructed, or surround themselves with palisades when they were unable to construct walls. Some of them, in order to provide for their own defence, retained the scanty funds that the insurgent provinces had paid into the public coffers, saying that when the government did not think of protecting them, they were bound to take that care upon themselves.

The Directory, although resolved to guard against the excesses of the Convention, had not been able to resist all the violent propositions that the renewed war in La Vendée might naturally inspire in the revolutionary party. Drawn in by the movement of these feelings, the Directory had made the law of hostages, in virtue of which all those who were relations or supposed accomplices of the Vendéans, were confined and rendered liable to certain penalties for the suppression of the acts of the insurrectionists committed in the localities for which they had been thus made answerable. This unjust and violent law had only irritated the passions without disarming a single hand in La Vendée, and it had roused against the Directory unappeasable incensement.

The war beyond the borders had been a little less unfortunate towards the close of the last campaign. The victory of Masséna at Zurich, and that of Brune at the Texel, had repulsed the enemy from the frontiers, but our soldiers found themselves in a state of utter destitution. They were neither paid, clothed, nor fed. The army in Holland which had vanquished the Anglo-Russians, having the advantage of being supported by the Batavian Republic, was less unfortunate than the others. The army of the Rhine, which had lost the battle of Stokach, and that of Helvetia, which had gained the battle of Zurich, were in the deepest misery. The army of the Rhine, on the soil of France, practised without limit and without success the system of requisitions. That of Helvetia lived by means of war contributions upon Bâle, Zurich, and Berne; contributions badly received, badly employed, insufficient for the nourishment of the soldiery, and mortifying to the independence and spirit of economy remarkable among the Swiss. The army of Italy, since the disasters of Novi and the Trebia, had fallen back upon the Apennines, on a sterile country, ravaged by war, and was a prey to disease and the most dreadful suffering. Those soldiers, who had sustained the greatest reverses with unshrinking heroism; they who had shown amidst misfortune unshaken constancy, covered with rags, consumed by fever and hunger, demanded alms upon the roads in the Apennines, and were reduced so low as to devour the indigestible fruits which are borne by the arid soil of that sterile region. Many deserted, or swelled the bands of robbers that in the south and west of France infested the high roads. Entire corps were seen quitting their posts without the orders of their generals, to occupy others where they hoped to sustain life with less misery. The sea, guarded by the English, showed no flag but that of an enemy; in this mode they received no resources. Certain divisions were deprived of all pay for eighteen months. Some requisitions were levied in the way of food; but of muskets, cannon, and munitions of war, which could not be procured in this way, the soldiers were in total want. The horses, already insufficient for the cavalry and artillery services, were nearly all destroyed by famine and disease.

Such were the results of a feeble, disordered, and frightful financial derangement. The armies of the republic had been sustained upon assignats and victory for several years. The assignats were now no more, and victory having all at once abandoned us, came just to show itself to our legions, without opening to them again the abundant plains of Germany and Italy.

It is here necessary to give an idea of our financial position, the principal cause of the suffering in our armies. The present ill situation of the finances far surpassed any that had been witnessed at an anterior epoch. The constituent assembly had committed two faults, which had been mended as far as a certain point by means of assignats; but for which there remained no palliative after the depreciation of that paper money. These two faults were, firstly,

[1] The "Society of the Riding-House."

the suppression of the indirect taxes imposed upon liquors, salt, and articles of general consumption; secondly, the leaving to the municipal administrations the power to assess the contributions upon lands, houses, and objects of direct taxation.

By the suppression of the indirect contributions the treasury lost, without compensation, a third of its revenues. The produce of the state domains being nearly destroyed by bad management, that of the registration through a deficiency in private transactions, and that of the customs owing to the war, the direct contributions formed nearly the sole resource of the treasury; but their receipts, which represented about 300,000,000f. in a budget of 500,000,000f., were in an extraordinary state of arrear. There were debts outstanding for the years V., VI., and VII. The assessments for the year VI. were not perfected; for the year VII. there remained a third to be completed; and for the current year, that is to say, for the year VIII. (1799), they were scarcely begun. Owing to this delay in the completion of the assessments, it was not possible to collect the current taxes, and the accumulation of those in arrear gave birth to new difficulties in collecting, because the taxes of successive years must too often be demanded of the payers at the same time. This state of things arose from the adoption of a principle, just in appearance, but in reality unfortunate,—the conceding to the local administrations the imposition of the public burdens, and to a certain extent permitting them to assess themselves. The departmental and municipal administrations were at that time united, as is well known. In the place of prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, who were instituted at a later period, there were joined with all these administrations, commissioners of the government, having a consulting voice, directed to request and urge the acceleration of the labours of the administrations, but not to execute these labours themselves. The system of cantonal municipalities, uniting the 44,000 communes of France into 5000 collective communes, had added to the disorder. Every local business was abandoned, while that which made the misfortune the greater was, that the two main objects, the recruiting of the army and the tax collections, were wholly neglected. To remedy this defect in the administrative action, 5000 commissioners were attached to the municipalities of the cantons, whose business was to hasten the completion of the lists of assessment; but they did not possess the power which could have alone made them efficient, that of acting themselves. Besides, divided between various occupations, they only gave a slight degree of attention to the completion of the lists of assessment. The sum paid them for their labours, much more expensive than it has been since the establishment of the administration of direct contributions, was a heavy drain upon the treasury, without any corresponding return.

Thus the direct taxes, the principal branch of the state revenue, were not received. Besides this permanent deficiency, proceeding from a default in the receipts, there was another, which arose from the extent of the expenditure at this time being greater than the revenue: the ordinary expenses were calculated to cover the return of a revenue of about 500,000,000f., but the war had carried them to 700,000,000f. There remained as a resource nothing but the national property, the larger part of which was already absorbed; besides, it was extremely difficult to sell this property to advantage, because the definitive triumph of the revolution was still very doubtful.

This state of things had caused revolting abuses, and led to a situation which ought to be known for the instruction of every people and government.

The assignats, we have said, had ceased to be in existence for a good while. The notes which replaced them had also disappeared. The paper money was thus completely abandoned, and however great the void might be, it was still better not to fill it yet, than to fill it as before with a forced paper issue, barely admitted even in forced payments, and thus give place uselessly for the rigors of the law in order to enforce its being circulated at all. The paper money thus suppressed was replaced in the following manner: First, the payment was dispensed with, even in paper, of the public functionaries, so that in Brumaire in the year VIII. they had not received anything for ten months. Still something must be given to the fundholders, and to the pensioners of the state; and these received "bills of arrear[2]," of which the only value was that they were always received in payment of the taxes. They did not pay the troops at all, but they acquitted the value of what the armies took on the spot for subsistence, by means of "bills of requisition," which were equally receivable in payment of taxes. The companies charged to provide for the wants of the soldiers, executed their duty ill, and sometimes not at all; and they received, in place of cash, orders upon the first receipts of the treasury, under this species of claim, given very arbitrarily, obtaining nearly all the money which got into the public exchequer. Finally, "rescriptions" or orders on the national domains, receivable in payment for the same, were another kind of paper added to those which have been enumerated, and contributed to the most fearful stockjobbing.

These various notes had not in effect a forced currency, as the assignats had before them; but thrown into circulation, and endlessly bought and sold in the Paris market, they became elevated or depressed in value upon every good or bad rumour, and were thus the subject of a ruinous speculation for the state, and of lamentable demoralization with the public. The men of business, the depositories of all the wealth in specie, were able to procure them at a very advantageous rate. They purchased them from the fundholders, the contractors, and others, at the lowest cost, and got them presented at the treasury in payment of the taxes, turning for a hundred francs what had cost them eighty, or sometimes only fifty or sixty. The collectors gave themselves to this kind of speculation; and while they received money from one part of the tax-payers, they turned at par into the state-coffers the paper which they had acquired at the lower price. Therefore few payed their taxes in specie; there was a much greater advantage in acquitting them with paper. In this mode the treasury did not receive the real value to which it was entitled, and its distress daily augmented.

In the same way that anger against the Vendéans

[2] Bons d'arrèrage.

produced the hostage law, that against the dealers in money gave the idea of the progressive forced loan, designed to reach the larger capitalists, and make them bear a part in the expenses of the war. This tax was called in France during the days of terror, the tax upon the rich, being analogous to that called the "income-tax" in England—imposed by Pitt in order to sustain the remorseless war which he was waging against France. This tax, not proportioned to the extent of fixed property, which affords a certain basis, but to the supposed wealth of individuals, was practicable in England, although under much discontent—a state where order prevailed, and where the fury of party did not make the estimate of incomes an instrument of vengeance. But it was impracticable in France, because in the midst of the disorders of the time the assessing jury was a species of revolutionary committee, imposing wealth or poverty upon individuals as its caprices or its passions inclined; and never credited to be just even when it was so, which is nearly equivalent to its not being just at any time. They did not dare to present this measure to the country as formerly, under the simple shape of a tax; dissimulating its true nature; it bore the name of a "forced loan[3]," repayable, it was said, in national property, and imposed, according to the supposed ability of those who were to pay, by a jury of assessors. Thus the measure became one of the calamities of the day, and formed with the hostage law the two heavy grievances afterwards alleged against the Directory. This was not the cause, as some asserted, of the straitness of the treasury, an evil owing to a complexity of circumstances; it drove away the wealthy speculators, whose help was indispensable to the government, and through whom it should have aided itself, if only for the moment, in order to be able to do without them at a later period.

This financial situation was, as already said, the principal cause of the distress and the reverses of our armies. Perfectly well understood by foreign powers, it filled them with the confidence of vanquishing us by a little perseverance. Without doubt the two victories of the Texel and Zurich removed further off the object which they sought, but it did not turn them aside from the pursuit. Austria, proud to have reconquered Italy, decided to combat to the uttermost sooner than resign it again. She already conducted herself there as an absolute sovereign. Occupying Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman states, she neither recalled the king of Sardinia to Turin, the grand-duke of Tuscany to Florence, nor the pontifical government to Rome. The defeat of Korsakoff and Suwaroff at Zurich affected her less than might be believed. It was in her view a check for the Russian arms, not for those of Austria; a fault of the generals Korsakoff and Suwaroff; a military mischief easily reparable, and only vexatious in case it disgusted the Russians with the war. But she hoped, with the influence of British subsidies, to recal them again to the field of battle. As to England, enriched by the income-tax, which produced already more than 200,000,000f. a-year; blockading Malta, which she soon hoped to take by famine; intercepting the conveyance of succour to our army in Egypt, that she hoped soon to subdue by privation and by force—England was resolved to follow out all these results, which her policy flattered itself with gaining, before she laid down her arms. Moreover she counted upon a sort of social dissolution in France, which would soon change it into an open country, accessible to whoever might choose to enter it. Prussia, the only one of the northern powers that had taken no part in the war, observed a cold reserve in regard to the French government. Spain, obliged by the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonzo to make common cause with France, appeared to be mortified at their community of interests. None seemed to care much about keeping up relations with a government ready to fall. The victories of Zurich and the Texel had conferred upon it the show of external respect, but not the confidence of the cabinets with which it was at peace or in alliance.

Thus at home La Vendée anew in insurrection, and abroad the principal powers of Europe in arms, made the peril of the war doubly pressing and onerous. It was necessary, by the creation of some financial means, to supply the first necessities of the famished armies. It was necessary to re-organize them, to carry them in advance, to command them ably, to add new victories to those which had been gained at the end of the last campaign; above all, it was necessary to take away from foreign cabinets the idea of the approaching social dissolution of France, which rendered some so confident in the result of the war, others so guarded in their relations with her. All this could only be obtained through a strong government, perfectly able to restrain party, and impress upon the general mind that oneness of impulse, without which, in its efforts to save itself, there could neither be unity, energy, nor success.

The disease had arrived at that point of access which often brings the return of health, on the condition, it is true, that the strength of the sick man is sufficient to last out the cure. Happily the strength of France was still great. The revolution, although decried by those that it had wounded, or whose illusions it had not realized, was not the less after all the cause of justice and reason, and it still inspired that attachment which a grand cause is always sure to do. It had, besides, numerous interests bound up in its fate, in all those who had acquired new situations, purchased the property of emigrants, or played any character in it that compromised them. Finally, the nation was not so exhausted, morally and physically, as to see with resignation the Austrians and Russians invade its territory: on the contrary, it was indignant at the idea. Its armies abounded with good soldiers, experienced officers, and excellent generals, who had only need of a good direction. All these forces were ready to unite spontaneously in the grasp of a single hand, if that hand were capable of directing them. These circumstances favoured the man of genius who was about to present himself, for even genius itself has need of the aid of circumstances.

Had young Bonaparte, in 1789, for example, offered himself with his talents and glory to seize upon social France, then tending in all parts to dissolve, because its elements were become incompatible, and had he attempted to restrain it with

[3] Emprunt forcé.

his powerful arm, a human arm could have effected nothing against the power of nature. At this time, on the contrary, when an old society, broken up, as it was necessary it should be, before it was reconstructed upon a new model, presented no more than scattered elements, but tending in themselves to approximate, it was ready to lend itself to the efforts of the able hand that knew how to grasp it. Bonaparte had with him, then, both his genius and the favour of circumstances. He had an entire society to organize, a society that was willing to be organized, and willing it should be done by him, because in him it had the limitless confidence inspired by unequalled success.

The law which decreed the provisionary consulship, conferred great powers on the three consuls. This law invested them with the plenitude of the "directorial power;" especially charging them to "re-establish order in all branches of the administration; to re-establish interior tranquillity, and to procure for France a peace solid and honourable." This law also joined with them two legislative commissions, of twenty-five members each, chosen out of the Council of the Ancients and that of the Five Hundred, in order to replace the legislative body, and give a legal character to the acts of the consuls. It authorized these two commissions to decree all needful measures on the proposition of the executive authority. It confided to them, besides, the important duty of preparing the new constitution. Nevertheless, as it was not possible to confer such powers for an unlimited time, the same law enacted that on the 1st of Ventôse next, the two councils of the Ancients and of the Five Hundred should in full right meet together again, if a new constitution were not promulgated and accepted in the mean time. In this case the members of the actual legislative body should be considered re-invested with their powers, save sixty of their number erased from the list of the councils by an extraordinary provision. The re-assembling eventually being fixed for the 1st Ventôse, the dictatorship confided to the provisional consuls was limited to three months. It was in effect a true dictatorship which had been conceded, because these commissions deliberated with closed doors; divided into different sections of finances, of legislation, of the constitution; only meeting to legalize what the government proposed to them; they were the surest and most facile instruments for acting with promptitude. There was no ground to fear that they would abuse these powers, because when there is much good to be done quickly, people do not lose time in doing evil.

The day of their entry into the Luxembourg, the three provisional consuls assembled to deliberate on the more pressing affairs of the state. It was the 11th of November 1799 (the 20th Brumaire). It became necessary to choose a president, and the age and situation of Sieyès seemed to demand that distinction. Ducos, although his friend, as if operated upon by the feeling of the moment, said to Bonaparte, "Take the chair, and let us deliberate." Bonaparte took the chair at the moment. Still the appointment of the provisional consuls made no mention of a president. A first examination, in summary, of the situation of the country was then made. Young Bonaparte was ignorant of many things, but he readily divined what he did not before know. He had made war, provided for numerous armies, governed conquered provinces, negociated with Europe: his was the best apprenticeship in the art of government. For superior minds, but for superior minds alone, war is an excellent school: command is learned there, decision, and above all, government. Thus the new consul appeared to have in all things an opinion ready-formed, or an opinion that was formed with the rapidity of lightning; particularly after having heard practical men, who were the only men he would hear, and those upon the subject alone which was connected with their special calling.

A species of knowledge, the deficiency of which is to be regretted in one who exercises the supreme authority, was at this time wanting to him—not the knowledge of men, but of individuals. As to men in general, Bonaparte knew them profoundly; but having always lived with the armies, he was a stranger to those who had figured in the revolution. He therefore asked and was aided by the testimony of his colleagues; and owing to his quick penetration and prodigious memory, he soon came to know the individuals belonging to government offices as well as he knew those of his army.

At this first conference, the parts were chosen and accepted. The young general, without attending to the opinions of his colleagues, gave his own at the moment, taking up and regulating every point of business with the decision of a man of action. It was evident the impulse would come from himself. They retired after having settled on the things most urgent to be done. Sieyès, with a resignation which did honour to his sense and patriotism, said in the evening to Talleyrand and to Rœderer, "We have a master who knows how to do every thing, is able to do every thing, and who will do every thing." He therefore wisely concluded that it was better to permit him to act, because at that moment personal rivalry in the consuls would have ruined France. It was agreed anew by a kind of voluntary division of duty, that during the dictatorship, which must be short and busy, Bonaparte should govern, and Sieyès employ himself in preparing the constitution. This was, as has been already said, a duty that public opinion adjudged to Sieyès, and in the accomplishment of which his colleague was not disposed to give him much contradiction,—one point excepted, the organization of the executive power.

The most urgent object was the composition of the ministry. In a monarchy the first men of the country are called to office: in a republic the chief men having themselves become the heads of the government, there remains for the ministry only men of the second class in ability, mere clerks; officials without responsibility, because the real responsibility is seated higher. When such persons as Sieyès and Bonaparte were consuls, a class of persons very distinguished for talent like Fouché, Cambacérès, Reinhart, and Talleyrand, could not be real ministers. Their choice had no other weight attached to it than a certain public effect and a good despatch of official business. In this light only the choice offered an interest.

The lawyer Cambacérès, a learned and philosophic man, as will be seen hereafter, was retained without opposition as minister of justice. Fouché, after a lively discussion among the consuls, re-

mained minister of police. Sieyès was against him, because he said Fouché was a man not to be relied upon and the creature of the director Barras. Bonaparte supported his cause and kept him in his post. He engaged thus in his behalf from a regard to services Fouché had rendered him during the events of the 18th Brumaire. More than this, Fouché joined to an acute mind a profound knowledge of men and things connected with the revolution. He was marked out for minister of police; as Talleyrand, with his court-habits, practised in important state-business, his mind subtle and conciliatory, was the minister indicated as best fitted for foreign affairs. Though Fouché continued in his office, the anger of the revolutionists was so great against Talleyrand, whether because of his connexions among the moderate party, or on account of the part he had played in the late events, that he was obliged to defer for some weeks his return to the ministry for foreign affairs. Reinhart was for a fortnight longer continued in his post. General Berthier, the faithful companion of the conqueror of Italy and of Egypt, his inseparable chief of the staff, who so well understood and delivered his orders, received the war portfolio, in place of Dubois-Crancé, who was judged to be too strong in his opinions. In the ministry of the interior, Quinette was replaced by an illustrious man of science, De la Place. This was a great and just homage paid to science, but it was of no service to the government; his noble and elevated genius being little fitted for the petty details of state business. Forfait, an able engineer, well skilled in naval construction, replaced Bourdon, of the Oise, as minister of the marine.

At this time, perhaps, the most important selection to be made was that of the minister of finance. To the departments already indicated, the consuls were able to supply by themselves two of the most considerable, those of war and foreign affairs. Bonaparte himself could perform the duties both of Berthier and Reinhart. It was not so with the finances. This was a department of the state in which experience and knowledge were indispensable. There had not been in the late Directory any person who was able to labour usefully at the re-organization of the finances, though so urgent and necessary. There was, however, a first clerk, with a mind not so brilliant as solid, and of long experience, who had rendered under the old government, and during the early days of the revolution, those administrative services little known, but extremely valuable, which the heads of affairs cannot do without, and consider of great importance. The first clerk, of whom mention is thus made, was Gaudin, afterwards Duke of Gaëte. Sieyès, well able to judge of men, although little capable of controlling them, had known Gaudin before, and had willingly offered him the portfolio of finance towards the end of the Directory. Gaudin, an excellent financier, but a timid citizen, was unwilling to accept the office thus tendered to him under an expiring government, wanting the joint conditions of credit, strength, and the aspect of stedfastness. But when power appeared, without contest or opposition, to fall into able and strong hands, he no longer felt the same repugnance to office. Bonaparte, having a decided predilection for practical men, partook at once in the opinion of his colleague Sieyès, and offered to Gaudin the administration of the finances; which he accepted, and in which office for fifteen years he rendered the state the most important services.

The ministry was thus complete. One only nomination was added to those already recorded, it was that of Maret, afterwards Duke of Bassano, who became secretary to the consuls under the title of "Secretary of State." Ordered to prepare for the consuls the elements of their labours, often to put in order their resolutions, to communicate them to the heads of the different departments, and to keep all the state secrets, he held a species of ministry, destined at times to supply, complete, and control all the others. A cultivated mind, a certain knowledge of Europe, with which he had already conducted negociations, principally at Lille with Lord Malmesbury, an accurate memory, a fidelity above all proof, formed him to become near Bonaparte, one of his companions in labour the most serviceable, and the most constantly employed. Bonaparte preferred near him those who displayed in service exactness and intelligence, rather than brilliancy of mind. This is the taste of superior genius, ever desiring to be comprehended and obeyed, not to be supplanted. Such was the cause of the great favour of Berthier during twenty years. Maret, not equalling Berthier on the whole, had, in the civil line of duty, most of the merits of that illustrious chief of the staff in the military career.

General Lefebvre was placed in command of the seventeenth military division. It will be recollected that at first he had shown hesitation on the morning of the 18th Brumaire, and that afterwards he blindly threw himself into the arms of the new dictator. He was recompensed by the seventeenth military division, and by the government of Paris. His fidelity might afterwards be safely counted upon.

Members of the two councils, who were signalized by their co-operation on the 18th Brumaire, were sent into the provinces, to explain and justify that event; and in case of necessity, to replace those agents in authority who might show themselves refractory or inefficient. The result of the 18th Brumaire was every where received with joy; still the revolutionary party had, in men compromised by their excesses, friends that might become dangerous; above all, in the direction of the southern provinces. There when they showed themselves, the youth who were styled the "gilded youth," or *dorée*, were ready to come to blows with them. The defeat or victory of one or the other party would have produced serious inconveniences.

Certain changes were brought about in the distribution of the great military commands. Moreau, deeply angry at the Directory, which had so ill recompensed his patriotic devotion during the campaign of 1799, had consented to act as the lieutenant of Bonaparte, in aiding him to consummate the revolution of the 18th Brumaire. At the head of three hundred men, he descended to the character of guardian of the Luxembourg, in which palace the directors found themselves prisoners, whilst their doom was decided at St. Cloud. Bonaparte, who, in flattering with skill the pride and resentment of Moreau, thus led him to accept so

singular a part, owed him an indemnity. He, therefore, united the two armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia in one, and conferred upon Moreau the command. It was the most numerous and finest army of the republic, and it was impossible to be placed in better hands. Moreau had gained little fame in the last campaign. His sterling services, above all, when with a handful of men he stopped the victorious march of Suwaroff, were, notwithstanding, deemed no victories, and had not been appreciated at their just value. At this epoch the battle of Zurich effaced every other deed. Again, the political conduct of Moreau in the affair of the 18th Fructidor, when he denounced Pichegru, either too soon or too late, had cast a cloud upon him in the general opinion, and caused him to be esteemed a feeble character every way unworthy of himself, when he was absent from the field of battle. Bonaparte re-elevated him in giving him so extensive a command, which besides involved another very wise determination. The legions of the Rhine and of Helvetia comprehended in their ranks the warmest republicans of the whole army, very jealous of the glory acquired in Italy and Egypt. Masséna, who commanded them, had little love for Bonaparte, although he was subdued by his genius. He passed by turns from admiration to ill humour in regarding him. Some vexatious demonstration too was to be feared on the part of Masséna, in consequence of the 18th Brumaire. The choice of Moreau cut short every possible chance of this nature, and took from a discontented army an ill-disposed general. The choice was equally good in a military sense, because this army of the Rhine and Helvetia was destined, in case of the renewal of hostilities, to operate in Germany, and no one had so well studied as Moreau that part of the theatre of the war.

Masséna was sent to the army of Italy, to the places and among the soldiers that were perfectly well known to him. It was also honourable to himself that he should be chosen to repair the faults committed in 1799, and be the continuator of the exploits of Bonaparte in 1796. Separated from the army in the midst of which he had conquered and obtained supporters, he was now transported to the midst of a new army, to which the Directory was odious, and where none were found who did not approve of the 18th Brumaire. This selection, like the preceding, was perfectly wise in a military point of view. The Apennines were to be disputed with the Austrians, and for a war of such a nature on this theatre of operations Masséna had no where his equal.

After having agreed upon these indispensable appointments, the consuls continued to apply themselves to a business not less urgent, that of the finances. Before obtaining money from capitalists, it was necessary to afford them satisfaction, by suppressing the forced progressive loan, which, like the hostage law, had incurred universal reprobation. The forced loan, as well as the hostage law, was far from having produced all the evil attributed to it. But these two measures, scanty in utility, bore the mischief, under a moral sense, that they recalled the most odious recollections of the reign of terror. Every body agreed in condemning them. The revolutionists themselves, who in their patriotic ardour had demanded them of the Directory, by a reaction, very common to party, suddenly denounced the measures of which they saw the bad success in the unpopularity.

Only just installed in office, the minister Gaudin, at the command of the consuls, presented to the legislative commissions a resolution, the object of which was the suppression of the law of the forced progressive loan. This suppression gave rise to universal plaudits. The loan law was replaced by a war tax, consisting of an addition of 25 centimes to the principal of the "foncial" taxes, or those on land, moveable, and personal property. This was payable in the same way as the other taxes, in money or paper of any kind; but in consequence of the exigency of the moment, it was settled that half the amount should be paid in specie.

The war tax, thus substituted for the forced progressive loan, could not yield immediate returns, because it could not be collected but through the lists of assessment of the direct contributions, to which contributions, at the same time, it was in reality no other than an augmentation of one-fourth. For the current service—above all, for the use of the armies—it was necessary to have funds in the treasury immediately. Gaudin, under the new measures, that pleased in a particular manner the great capitalists, made an appeal to the principal bankers of Paris, soliciting that aid, the necessity of which struck every body. Bonaparte himself, too, intervened with them directly, and the sum of 12,000,000f. in specie was immediately advanced to the government. The debt was to be repaid out of the first receipts of the war tax.

This aid was a great advantage, and did honour to the public spirit of the bankers of the capital; but it was no more than a subsistence for a few days; more durable resources were necessary.

It has been seen at the commencement of this chapter, how the suppression of the indirect contributions, decided upon at the beginning of the revolution, had reduced the treasury to the sole revenue derived from the direct taxes; how this revenue was itself nearly annulled by the retardation of the completion of the lists of assessment; how, in fine, the assignats, the ordinary means adopted to cover all deficiencies, having totally disappeared, their service was replaced with paper of different kinds, which, though not having in currency the power of money, did not straiten private transactions more than the paper which was in use before, but left the government without resources, and gave birth to the most hideous stock-jobbing. It was necessary to get out of such a state of things, and to reorganize the collection, or, what is the same thing, to re-open with the sources of the revenue those of public credit.

In every country where taxes exist on property and person, named in France "direct contributions," there must be a list of property returned with an estimate of its product, and a list nominating individuals, with the value of their pecuniary ability. Every year this list or statement must be modified, according to the transmission of property from hand to hand, or according to accidents in birth, death, or removal. Every year there must be repartitioned between property and person the amount decreed as the impost; and lastly, there must be a collection made exact and prudent at the same time; exact to insure the receipts,

prudent to spare the persons taxed. Nothing of all this existed in the year VIII. (1799.)

The cadastre, or register of property, the labour of forty years, had not then been commenced. There were in some communes old roll-books, and a general statement of their property, undertaken in the time of the Constituent Assembly. These, given with little correctness, were still turned to some account. But the operations, which consist in revising the lists of property and of persons following their incessant changes, and in repartitioning annually between them the taxation decreed under each impost—these operations, which properly constitute that which is denominated the making up of the assessment lists, were delivered over to the municipal administrations, of which the disorganization and inefficiency have been already explained.

The collection was not in less disorder. The office was adjudged by abatement of the charge, that is, to those who would collect at the smallest expense. The persons appointed gave the money collected into the hands of receivers, who acted intermediately between them and the receiver-general. They were both one and another in arrear. The disorder that governed every thing, at the time, permitted but a slight examination into their accounts. Moreover, the non-completion of the lists of assessment always furnished a plausible excuse for retarding the payments, and stock-jobbing gave a means of acquitting them in depreciated paper. In a word, they received little and paid in less.

On the advice of Gaudin the consuls were not fearful of returning to certain practices under the old system, which experience had proved to be sound and useful. Upon an ameliorated model of the old administration of the twentieths (*Vingtièmes*), there was an agency for direct taxes formed, a plan always until now rejected, from the unhappy idea of leaving to the local administrations the care of taxing themselves. A director and inspector in each department, eight hundred and fifty comptrollers spread in a larger or smaller number over the arrondissements, were themselves to frame the lists of assessment, or, in other words, draw up the lists of properties and persons, stating the changes occurring annually, and charging the proper proportions of the impost. Thus in place of five thousand cantonal commissioners, who were obliged to solicit from the communes the perfecting of the assessments, there were to be ninety-nine directors, ninety-nine inspectors, and eight hundred and forty comptrollers, doing the duty themselves, and costing the state but 3,000,000 f. in place of 5,000,000 f. It was hoped that in six weeks this administration would be perfectly organized, and that in two or three months it would achieve the remaining third, yet unmade, of the lists of the year VII., or the past year, all those of the year VIII., the current year, and lastly all those of the year IX., the next year.

Courage was demanded to overcome certain prejudices; Bonaparte was not a man to stand still before any prejudices. The legislative commissioners, debating with closed doors, adopted the proposed scheme after a few observations. Guarantees were granted to those of the tax-payers who had reclamations to urge,—guarantees since rendered more secure by means of the institution of the councils of the prefecture. The base of every regular constitution being thus well re-established, and this task completed, it was required to organize the collection, and to carry the product into the treasury.

Now, thanks to the perfect order that the empire and the subsequent governments have successfully introduced into the finances, the collection of the treasury funds is executed with a facility and regularity which leave nothing to wish. The collectors receive, month by month, the "direct" contributions, that is, the taxes levied upon lands, houses, and persons. They hand them over to the particular receiver in each chief place of the arrondissement, and he to the receiver-general in the chief town of the department. The collectors of "indirect" taxes, composed of the produce of the customs established on the frontiers, arising out of foreign merchandise, the duties of registry on the transfer of property or on judicial acts, lastly, the dues payable upon articles of consumption of all kinds, such as liquors, tobacco, salt, &c.—the collectors of these pay, as fast as they are taken, to the particular receiver, and this last into the hands of the receiver-general, who is the real state banker. It is his office to centralize the public money, and set it in movement, according to the orders he receives from the treasury.

The equal re-partitions of public duties, and the general prosperity, have rendered the acquittance of the taxes easy at the present time; and still more the accountability, which is but the summary of the operations of receipt and disbursement. The last are become so clear, that the taxes are paid on the given day, often sooner, and besides this the precise date of the receipt and appropriation is known. It was time to establish a system founded on the truth of facts, as they are themselves accomplished. It is in the nature of the "direct taxes," raised upon property and person, to be as a species of rent, fixable in advance both in amount and term of payment. They are demanded in monthly twelfths. The collectors or receivers are debited or made debtors for them every month. But it is presumed that they have not received the amounts due for two or three months after each twelfth payment thus due has expired, in order to leave the collectors a means to spare the payers, and also to create in themselves a motive for getting the impost paid early. Thus, if they received it before the term when the tax was due, they gathered by interest a profit proportioned to the celerity of the payment. It is on the contrary in the nature of the "indirect" taxes, that they are known and paid as fast, and in the same proportion, as the entry into France of foreign productions, and the amount of the duties on the property, or on the goods of all kinds for consumption that arrive irregularly; and they follow the movement of that on which they are dependent. The receivers are debited; that is to say, they are constituted debtors, accountable at the moment when the goods arrive, and not by twelfth payments monthly, as is practised in case of the "direct" taxes. Every ten days the receiver-general is constituted debtor for the amount entered in the ten days just expired.

From the time that he is debited, no matter for

what kind of contribution, the receiver-general pays interest upon the sums for which he is debited, until the day when he converts them for the acquittal of the public service. The day when he pays, on the contrary, any sum whatever on account of the state, and before he is in debt to it, the state in turn allows a credit for the interest. The interests due by the receiver-general and treasury are afterwards balanced upon the sums left in his hands beyond the time prescribed, and the interest due by the treasury on the sums which have been advanced to it by him. This is done in such a mode as that not a day's interest is lost either by one or the other; and the receiver-general becomes a real banker, in account current with the treasury, obliged to keep always at the disposal of the government the funds which the necessities of the state may require, no matter to what amount.

Such is the system that experience on one part, and growing ease among the tax-payers on the other, have successively wrought out in collecting and applying the money of the public.

But at the period of which the history is now narrating, the imports were most irregular in return, and the accounts obscure. The collector who had not paid up, was able to allege delay in perfecting the lists of assessment, or the distresses of the tax-payers; he could deceive in the amount of his receipts, owing to the confusion in the returns of the operations. The government never knew then, as it knows now, what passes every hour in the coffers of several thousand receivers composing the great exchequer of the nation.

Gaudin proposed, and Bonaparte adopted, an ingenious system, in a great part borrowed from that under the old monarchy, which led almost insensibly to the organization actually in existence. This system was that of the bills of the receivers-general. The receivers, the real bankers of the treasury, as we have already styled them, were bound to give bills, which fell due monthly, for the entire value of the direct taxes, or for 300,000,000 f. upon 500,000,000 f., which then composed the state budget. When these bills became due they were paid at the receiver-general's office. In order to meet the delay conceded to the tax-payer, each twelfth part was supposed to be paid about four months after it became due. Thus the bills for the taxes due January 31, were drawn payable on May 31, in such a way that the receiver-general, having before him a term of four months, had at the same time a means to indulge the payer, while he was himself stimulated, for the sake of the interest, to collect it in earlier. Thus if he could get in the tax at the end of two months, he secured the two additional months' interest.

This system had not only the merit of sparing the payer and interesting the collector in obtaining the payment; but it had the advantage of preventing the receiver-general from delaying the payment to the state, because the treasury had in its chests the bills of exchange to be paid at a fixed period, obliging them to be taken up under the penalty of being protested, if not regularly met. Such a combination as this was not to be contemplated, it is true, until after the lists of assessment were rendered perfect as well as the collection. The receivers-general could not pay with exactitude if they did not receive. That being done in the mode already stated, the system of giving bills was of easy fulfilment, and had the advantage, independently of those already enumerated, of putting, on the first day of the year, at the disposal of the treasury 300,000,000 f. in bills from the direct taxes, which it was not difficult to get discounted.

To establish credit for this paper, designed to fulfil the office of the royal notes in France and the exchequer bills in England, the sinking fund [4] was invented. This, which was before long to receive the contents of the whole of the public debt, had at first no other object to answer than to guarantee the bills of the receivers-general. It was thus managed. The collectors of taxes, as a security for their trust, gave it in immoveable property. This sort of guarantee, in case of default, placing the state in the difficulties of enforcing an ejectment, when it was obliged to come upon the security, was found not to fulfil satisfactorily the object of its institution. Security in money was therefore required to be given. The receivers-general were making so great a profit by jobbing with the tax itself, that they submitted most willingly to the condition rather than lose their posts.

These securities paid into the sinking fund were devoted as a guarantee to the bills of the receivers-general. Every bill on falling due was to be paid at his office, or, in case of non-payment there, at the office of the sinking fund, the moment it was protested, and paid out of the security of the defaulter. Such a bill, therefore, was rendered, in this way, as valuable as the best commercial paper. This was not the sole advantage of the plan. It was probable that a very small amount of the security monies would suffice to support the credit of the bills, because few indeed of the receivers-general would ever suffer their paper to be protested; the surplus, therefore, would remain at the disposal of the treasury, which might arrange for its use with the sinking fund, by ceding to it immoveable or funded property.

By this institution the advantage was obtained of giving a secure currency to the bills, and of realizing at any moment a certain sum of money,—a resource at that period most seasonable.

Such was the mode of collection and payment which placed the treasury in a short time at perfect ease. It consisted, as shown above, in perfecting the lists of assessment and putting them in collection with rapidity and exactness; next, in drawing upon the principal receivers for the total amount of the tax bills easily discounted through the means devised to enable the receivers-general to discharge their responsibilities themselves, or which the sinking fund would discharge for them.

We have only spoken of the direct taxes. As to the indirect, which neither came in regularly nor by twelfths, the receivers-general, after their receipt, but not until then, were to forward to the treasury bills payable at sight at their office. Thus the indirect taxes were not available until the amounts had been received. This part of the service, which left in the receiver-generals' hands too large an enjoyment of the funds, was afterwards rendered more perfect.

There are naturally, upon the introduction of any

[4] Caisse d amortissement.

new system, difficulties of transition, arising from the labour of adjusting the present state of things to that which is about be created. Thus the bills of arrear delivered to the fundholders, those of requisition to the farmers, from whom their goods had been taken off the premises, and, lastly, the commission on the funds to be paid into the coffers, delivered with culpable license to contractors, it was possible might derange all the calculations. Different modes were taken to meet such inconveniences as might result from the pressure of all these kinds of paper in circulation. The bills of arrear paid to the fundholders had alone the favour to be received still in payment of the taxes; but the amount of them for the current year being ascertained, by that amount the sum which the receivers-general were to pay was diminished.

The bills of requisition and of commission, paper of doubtful origin and unknown amount, were all submitted to a peculiar liquidation. They were paid later than the former, part out of the national property, and part in value received of a different nature, but with a proper regard to equity.

In paying the fundholders in money, as it was proposed to do as soon as the receipt of the taxes was secured; in providing for the army and dispensing with the system of requisitions; in firmly refusing to contractors the irregular commissions which they had received on the treasury receipts; the sources of the paper issues could not fail to be quickly dried up, and the collection of the taxes to be every where re-established in specie.

To these means, thus had recourse to for securing the state revenues, were joined certain measures, some legitimate at all times, but others carrying only the character of expediency or the excuse of necessity. Those who had acquired any of the national domains, doing what every body did at that time, namely, without regarding the law, holding back the price at which they had made their purchases, were compelled to pay up in four months under the penalty of forfeiture. This necessity could not fail to bring in a great part of the out-standing paper which was specially receivable in payment for the national domains. There were classes of purchasers who were bound to acquit their debts in specie, who for this purpose were forced to subscribe negotiable obligations. Such paper was good and easy to dispose of, because it was issued by persons who were menaced with the loss of their purchases in case of their paper being protested.

There still existed unsold national domains to the value of 300,000,000 f. or 400,000,000 f. This value was founded hypothetically on the estimates made in 1790, and would, if more flourishing times were awaited, be doubled, tripled, and still more augmented in value. It would have been better not to dispose of them, had not the necessities of the moment obliged that step to be taken. It was settled that bills of rescription, representing the sum at which it was proposed to tender the sale of the property, should be negotiated among those inclined to speculate in them to the extent of 150,000,000 f. It was fortunate that only a small part of this amount was put into circulation.

A plan was conceived, lastly, to represent by paper of the same nature, the capital of certain ground-rents belonging to the public, of which the former laws had permitted the redemption by the debtor. This resource amounted to about 40,000,000 f. in value. The holders of the property still owing the rents, had left off paying them, although they had not effected their redemption. There was made, in consequence, a paper issue representing this capital of 40,000,000f., negotiable, like that upon the national domains, through the agency of money-brokers.

These creations of artificial wealth were the last concessions to the necessities of the hour. Circulated among speculators, they were applied to procuring resources until the re-establishment of the finances, which there was reason to hope would take place upon the accurate completion of the lists of assessment and the bill system of the receivers-general. This paper was issued with great caution, and had not, as we shall see, the common inconvenience of depreciation and the alienation at a low value of the state resources.

These different schemes, although good in themselves, depended for their benefit upon the strength of the government itself. Established upon the supposed return of order, they could only answer their expected end, if order were really restored; if the executive displayed vigour and constancy in following out its plans; if it organized quickly and well the new administration of the direct taxes; if it directed constant care to the accuracy of the assessment lists within the time prescribed for the collection, in order that the bills of the receivers-general might be subscribed and paid when they fell due; if the securities promptly paid in should be deposited in the sinking fund coffers in sums sufficient to sustain the credit of the bills; if, finally, it for ever abandoned those ruinous expedients, the bills of arrear, bills of requisition and commissions, which it now proposed to renounce—if all this were realized the state was certain of a happy result awaiting the new financial system. It was further reasonable to hope much from the personal intelligence and firmness of Bonaparte. All the foregoing plans he had himself discussed, approved, and frequently modified and ameliorated; he was sensible of their merit and importance, and was fully determined to watch over their strict execution. As soon as they were agreed upon they were sent to the legislative commissions, which formed them into laws without the loss of a moment. Twenty days sufficed to project, consider, and give them the full legal character, so as that they might commence to be in force. Bonaparte himself worked with the minister of the finances several times a week, thus taking the best method of putting an end to those mischievous commissions which were too often granted at the instance or through the corrupt influence of the contractors. Every week he made the ministers bring him a statement of their required expenditure, which he compared himself with the probable receipts of the treasury, and made in proportion to the necessities of each a distribution of the actual assets. He thus disposed of that only which was certain to be received, and by this firmness of purpose, the principal abuse, that of the contractors' commissions, was soon seen to disappear.

In awaiting the completion of the assessments, the time of their collection, and until the bills of the receivers-general could be remitted to the

treasury and discounted, the government had for present use, besides the 12,000,000f. lent by the bankers, the payment of the new securities, the negotiation in the market of the resources recently created, and the current collection of the taxes, which last, imperfect as it was, had sufficed the state until that time. The confidence imparted by the provisional consuls satisfied the men of business; and means were taken to negotiate among them new securities, at which a few days before nobody would have looked.

By the union of such means it was that the government was able to relieve the naked and starving armies, and to procure them the first supplies, of which they were in such urgent need. The disorder that reigned was so great in the office of the minister-at-war, that he had no returns of the condition of the soldiers, their number, or quarters. The artillery alone possessed such returns as far as related to its own particular corps. As the army was neither clothed nor fed; as the battalions of conscripts, raised in the departments and fitted out by means of bills of equipment, had been often organized without the intervention of the principal authority, the last knew next to nothing about them. Bonaparte was obliged to send staff-officers to the different armies to procure the documents which he required. At the same time he sent a few supplies to the suffering corps, but too small in the aggregate to meet their great necessities; and he addressed them in a proclamation, couched in those terms which he so well knew how to render impressive to the soldiers, conjuring them to have patience but for a few days longer, and to display amid their sufferings the same fortitude which they had shown in battle. He said to them:—

"Soldiers, your necessities are great—measures are taken to supply them. The first quality of a soldier is fortitude in supporting fatigue and privation; valour is but the second. Corps have quitted their posts; they have been deaf to the voices of their officers. The 17th light infantry is of the number. Are they then all dead! the heroes of Castiglione, of Rivoli, of Newmarck! They would have perished sooner than quit their colours—*they* would have recalled their young comrades to honour and duty. Soldiers! Say you your rations are not regular! What would you have done, if, like the 4th and 22nd light, and the 18th and 32nd of the line, you found yourselves in a desert, without bread and water, feeding upon horses and mules! 'Victory will give us bread,' they exclaimed; but you—you quit your colours!

"Soldiers of Italy! a new general commands you; he was ever, in the brighter days of your glory, in the vanguard. Surround him with your confidence; he will restore you to victory!

"A daily account will be sent me of the conduct of each corps, and more especially of that of the 17th light, and of the 63rd of the line; they will remember the confidence I once had in them!"

The administration of the finances and also of the army were not the only branches of the government which pressingly demanded the attention of the new consuls. It was necessary to recal the severe measures, so unworthy a wise and humane administration, which had been snatched by the violence of party-feeling from the weakness of the expiring directory. It was also needful to maintain the order threatened by the armed Vendéans here,—there by the revolutionists exasperated at the affair of the 18th Brumaire.

The first political measure of the new consuls related to the law of the hostages. This law, which made the relations of the Vendéans and of the Chouans responsible for the deeds committed in the revolted provinces, inflicted on some imprisonment, on others transportation. It partook of the public censure, with the law of the forced progressive loan, though with a better title. It could only be under the influence of the blind passions of the time, that men could have dared to render the relations of revolters responsible for acts of which they had not been guilty, even if they had wished them success. The consuls treated this law as they treated that of the forced loan; they proposed its repeal to the legislative commissioners, and it was directly decreed. Bonaparte went himself to the prison of the Temple, where many of the hostages were in captivity, to break their chains with his own glorious hands, and to receive those reiterated benedictions which the healing acts of the consulship so constantly and so justly effected.

To this measure were joined others of the same kind, which marked with a parallel character the policy of the provisional consuls. Many priests, although they had taken the oath required to their civil constitution, which became the cause of the schism, had nevertheless been persecuted. These priests, who were distinguished by the epithet of "sworn," were some of them fugitives or concealed, others were imprisoned in the islands of Ré and Oléron. The consuls ordered the enlargement of all that remained in custody. This step caused the return to France or the re-appearance in open day of all the priests of that class who had sought security in flight or concealment.

Certain emigrants, shipwrecked in the neighbourhood of Calais, had been for some time past objects of lively public interest. These unfortunate men, placed between the horrors of shipwreck and those of the law of emigration, had flung themselves upon their native shore, little thinking that their country could be less merciful to them than the tempest. The supporters of rigorous measures said, that these emigrants were going into La Vendée to take a part in the renewal of the civil war,—the fact was nearly certain,—and that thence it was perfectly right to enforce against them the terrible emigration laws. Public humanity, happily revealed at that moment, opposed this mode of reasoning. The question had been several times reversely decided. The new consuls determined that these emigrants should be enlarged, and conveyed out of the territory of the republic. Among them were members of the greatest families in France; one was the Duke de Choiseul, whom we have always found since in the number of those attached to a rational freedom, the only freedom that good men can love and uphold.

These acts were universally applauded. Let us admire the difference between one government and another. Had such acts as these emanated from the directory, they would have been esteemed unworthy concessions to the emigrant party. Emanating from the new consulate, at the head of which stood a great general, whose presence, wherever he appeared, indicated strength and

power; such actions were taken for symptoms of a strong, but moderate policy. Thus true is it, that to be moderate with honour and good effect, it is necessary to be powerful.

At the first moment it was alone in regard to the revolutionary party, that the policy of the provisional consuls was wanting in moderation. It was with this party that the contest had occurred on the 18th and 19th of Brumaire. Against it very naturally a degree of mistrust and anger might be felt; still amidst acts of conciliation and reparation, that only was destined to feel the severity of the new rulers. The news of the 18th Brumaire struck into the patriots of the south a deep sensation. The societies affiliated to the mother society in Paris, or the *Manège*, exhibited still stronger indignation. It was reported that the deputies, deprived by the law of the 19th Brumaire of the rank of members of the legislative body, had determined to meet at Toulouse, there to reinstall a species of directory. Bonaparte, now he had the supreme command of the army, was not afraid of any thing. He had shown on the 13th Vendémiaire, that he knew how to suppress an insurrection; and he did not trouble himself about all that a few hot-headed patriots were able to do without soldiers. But his colleagues, Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, did not feel his confidence. Several of the ministers joined them in opinion, and persuaded the first consul to adopt precautions. Inclined himself, for that matter, to energetic measures, although moderate from motives of policy, he consented to pronounce a decree of banishment against thirty-eight members of the revolutionary party, and to the detention at Rochelle of eighteen others. Among this number there were some vile wretches; one of them had been heard to boast of having been the assassin of the Princess de Lamballe: but in the number there were good men as well, members of the two councils, and above all a distinguished and respectable personage in General Jourdan. His public opposition to the 18th Brumaire had, at the moment, inspired some degree of fear. To include the name of such a man in such a list was a fault upon a fault.

Public opinion, although not well disposed towards the revolutionists, received this proceeding with coldness, almost with censure. It feared so much rigour and re-action; the step was disapproved even when exerted against those who had been guilty of the same rigour. Remonstrances were sent from all parts, some of them in a very high tone, in favour of names that were found on the list of the proscribed. The Court of Cassation remonstrated regarding one of its members, named Xavier Ardouin, who had not deserved that such a precaution should be taken against him. Talleyrand, always mild in character, always adroit in his conduct—Talleyrand, whom the revolutionary party had, from its aversion, contributed to keep out of the ministry for foreign affairs, had the good feeling to remonstrate in favour of one Jorry, who had publicly insulted him. He did it, he said, for fear they should attribute to his own revengeful motives the insertion of this vulgar man's name upon the proscribed list. His published letter on the subject did him high honour, and saved the individual from the sentence. In compliance with the public feeling, the name of General Jourdan was also erased. Fortunately the turn taken by public affairs permitted the revocation of an act, which was but an accidental deviation from a march otherwise just and straightforward.

Bonaparte had sent General Lannes, his most devoted lieutenant, to Toulouse. At the simple appearance there of this officer, all the preparations for re-action disappeared at once. Toulouse was tranquillized, and the societies attached to that of the *Manège* in the capital, were silenced in the south. The ardent revolutionists saw that public opinion was in opposition to them, having ceased to favour their views; and they saw too at the head of the government one whom nobody had the means to resist. The most reasonable among them could not forget that he was the same man who, on the 13th Vendémiaire, had dispersed the royalists of the Paris sections, who were armed against the convention, and who, under the directory, in lending his strong hand to the government, had furnished it with the means to bring about the 18th Fructidor. They, therefore, submitted: the more violent, venting their rage in exclamations, were soon silenced; the others hoping that at least under the military government of the new Cromwell, as they styled him, the revolution and France would not be vanquished for the gain of the Bourbons, the English, the Austrians, and the Russians.

One act of resistance, not by force, but by legal means, was offered to the 18th Brumaire. The president of the criminal tribunal of the Yonne, named Barnabas, imitated the example of the old parliaments, and refused to register the law of the 19th Brumaire, constituting the provisional government. This president's audacity was brought before the legislative commisioners; he was accused of having refused to execute his duty, suspended, and then removed. He submitted to his sentence with resignation and dignity.

The speedy end of every attempt at resistance enabled the government to abrogate a measure which was in opposition to its prudent course of policy. Upon the report of Cambacérès, the minister of justice, that order was re-established in the departments, and that the laws were every where executed without any obstacle, the sentence of transportation pronounced against the thirty-eight revolutionists, and the detention of the eighteen others at Rochelle, was altered to a simple surveillance. Soon afterwards this surveillance was removed.

This act of indulgence was speedily eclipsed by a series of others, wise, able, and vigorous, signalizing in a particular manner the bias of the new government. La Vendée had, in turn, attracted its whole attention. A rising had been lately attempted, just at the close of the reign of the directory. The elevation of Bonaparte to power changed the face of things there altogether, as well as the direction of the public mind in every part of the republic. The chiefs of the new royalist insurrections had been excited to take up arms as much by the later severity of the directory, as by the hope of the approaching overtures of the government: but on one side the revocation of the hostage law, the setting the priests at liberty, the grant of their lives to the shipwrecked emigrants at Calais, tended to cause a reconciliatory spirit; while on the other side, the presence and power of Bona-

parte tended more than ever to stifle all hope of seeing the dissolution of that order of things effected which had been caused by the revolution. The 18th Brumaire had modified the ideas in La Vendée, as well as elsewhere, and given birth to new inclinations.

The royalist party, some of whom combated in La Vendée, while others were in Paris occupying themselves with political intrigues, delivered itself, like every party which seeks to overturn a government, to continual mental activity, and, without cessation, went in quest of new combinations to ensure the triumph of their cause ; it now imagined that perhaps there was some means in its power of coming to an understanding with Bonaparte. Its chiefs thought that one so eminent had no great taste for figuring for a few days in the changing scenes of the French revolution, to disappear, like his predecessors, in the abyss opened before their steps ; and that he would prefer to take his place under a peaceable and regularly constituted monarchy, of which he might be both the support and ornament. They were, in one word, credulous enough to imagine that the character of Monk suited a personage who did not think the character of Cromwell great enough for his ambition. They in consequence obtained the mediation of one of those ministers of the foreign diplomacy, who, under the pretext of studying the country where they are accredited, have a hand in every party intrigue, and they thus obtained an introduction to Bonaparte. Hyde de Neuville and D'Andigné were the parties that took this step.

It is not needful to show how very erroneous was the judgment thus formed of Bonaparte. This wonderful man, sensible now of his own power and greatness, would not be servant to any party. If he had no love for disorder, he loved the revolution ; if he did not credit freedom to its full extent for all it had promised, he desired in entirety that social reform, which it was his object to accomplish. Therefore he desired to see the revolution triumphant ; he desired the glory of terminating it, and to make it lead to a quiet and regular course of things ; he desired to be its head, no matter under what name nor what form of government—but he did not desire to be the instrument of any other power save Providence ; he had already too much glory and too much conscious strength to consent to that !

He received De Neuville and D'Andigné, heard their insinuations, more or less clear, and declared to them frankly his intentions, which were to put an end to persecution, to rally all parties around the government, but to suffer none save that of the revolution, to be master—of the revolution understood in its better sense. He declared to them his willingness to treat with the Vendéan chiefs on reasonable terms, or his determination to exterminate them to a man. This interview effected nothing, except that it made the royalist party better instructed in the character of Bonaparte.

Whilst these negotiations were proceeding in Paris between Bonaparte and the friends of the Bourbons, there were others begun in La Vendée itself, between the chiefs of the revolt and those of the republic. Towards the end of the directory, when nobody knew who they were to obey, a kind of relaxation, very closely approximating to treason, had crept into the army occupying that country. More than one officer of the republican forces, imagining the republic could not much longer exist, had turned his eyes towards the party of the royalists. The elevation of Bonaparte to the state changed this position of things, which was about to become very dangerous ; but now, upon the contrary, the communications to which they gave rise, and the interchanges between parties, took a new direction. The royalist chiefs, who drew to them at first the officers of the republican army, were themselves attracted in their turn to the side of the republican officers and their government. It was represented to them how slight a chance they had of overcoming the conqueror of Italy and of Egypt, and the hope they might indulge of obtaining under the first consul a mild and restorative system of government, which would render the condition of every party agreeable and peaceable. This language was not destitute of use. There was at that moment at the head of the army of the west, a conciliatory, judicious, and trustworthy officer, general Hédouville, who had seen much service under general Hoche, at the time when the first peace was brought about in La Vendée. He mastered all that was proceeding between the two parties, saw its worth, and offered to send the result to the new consul.

Bonaparte instantly availed himself of this opening for a negotiation, confiding full powers to general Hédouville for treating with the chiefs of the insurgents. These chiefs felt the strength of Bonaparte in office, and showed a disposition to come to terms. It was not easy to sign a capitulation at once, and to agree in a moment upon articles for such a purpose; but a suspension of arms did not include the same obstacles. The insurgent chiefs offered to sign one immediately. The offer was accepted on the part of the government, and in a few days, De Châtillon, D'Autichamp, and De Bourmont, signed a suspension of arms for La Vendée and a part of Brittany. It was settled that Georges Cadoudal and De Frotté should be invited to adopt the same course in the Morbihan and in Normandy.

This act of the new government was not long delayed, for it was accomplished at the commencement of Frimaire, in twenty days after the installment of the provisionary consuls. It inspired general satisfaction, and made the entire pacification of La Vendée be thought nearer than it was possible to be.

Rumours of the same kind, relative to foreign powers, led to the hope that, under the fortunate star of Bonaparte, there would be seen the prompt re-establishment of European peace.

As before observed, at the commencement of this book, Prussia and Spain alone were in bonds of amity with France ; the first always showing coolness, the second embarrassed by its community of interests with her. Russia, Austria, England, and all the little powers in their train, whether in Italy or in Germany, sustained an unrelenting contest with the Republic of France. England, with whom the war was merely a question of finance, had resolved that question for herself in the establishment of the income-tax, which already produced a great revenue. She wished for the continuance of hostilities, in order to have time to gain

Malta, which she had blockaded, and also to reduce the French army of Egypt to surrender by the same means. Austria, in possession of all Italy, was determined to risk everything rather than resign the conquest; but the chivalrous Paul I. who had thrown himself into the war under the impulse of a foolish enthusiasm, saw his arms humbled at Zurich, and from thence imbibed a feeling of lively resentment against everybody, but above all against Austria. He had been persuaded that this power was the sole cause of his misfortune; because the Austrian army, bound, in virtue of a concerted movement, to advance to the Rhine, and cede Switzerland to the Russians, had too quickly abandoned the position of Zurich, leaving Korsakoff exposed to Masséna's attack, who having beaten him, had afterwards given a good account of Suwaroff. Paul I. saw in this as he imagined an act of treachery on the part of a faithless ally, and suspicion being once excited, every thing appeared in a mistrustful light. He had only taken up arms, he said, to protect the feeble against the strong, and to replace on their thrones those princes who had been hurled from them by the French republic. Austria too had kept her flag every where flying in Italy, and had not recalled to their places any of the dethroned princes. He asserted, that having acted out of pure generosity he was made the dupe of the allied powers, who were moved solely by self-interest. Fickle in the extreme, he gave himself up entirely to his new opinions as violently as he had before delivered himself to those opposite. A recent occurrence exasperated him to the highest pitch: this was the pulling down the Russian flag at Ancona, and its replacement by that of Austria. The circumstance arose from the error of an inferior officer: but that did not matter, the act was keenly felt, however it originated.

The sentiments of absolute sovereigns, despite their efforts at secrecy, explode as quickly as those of a free people; the one will not be much longer repressed than the other. This new consequence of the battle of Zurich got wind all over Europe, and was not unfortunate for France.

Austria and England at the news redoubled their attentions to Paul I. They loaded Suwaroff, the "invincible Suwaroff," as he was called before he was encountered by Masséna, with all sorts of distinctions. But they had no more soothed the grief of the Russian general than they had disarmed the czar's resentment. An entirely new incident on the part of Paul I. gave reason for the apprehension that he would soon abandon the coalition.

In the first glance of his zeal for the coalition he had declared war against Spain, because she made a common cause with France, and he had very nearly declared against Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, because those powers had remained neuter. He had broken off his relations with Prussia entirely. Since the recent events he appeared to be much mollified in his disposition towards the courts against which he so lately felt a bitter animosity; and he now sent M. Krudener to Berlin, an envoy in whom he had great confidence. Krudener was desired to proceed thither as a simple traveller, but had a secret mission to re-establish relations between the two courts.

France had then at Berlin an able and clever agent in M. Otto, who was subsequently connected with the more important proceedings of that period. He apprised his government of the new state of affairs. It was evident, that if we were inclined to peace rather than war, the key of the position for that end was Berlin. Spain, flung to the extremity of Europe by her geographical position, and to that of politics by the feebleness of her government, could be of no utility. But Prussia, placed in the centre of the belligerent powers, remained neuter in spite of their liveliest solicitude: thought ill of at first by all the cabinets in the heat of the coalition, but thought better of when that became cooler, Prussia grew into a centre of influence, above all when Russia appeared to court her alliance. That which had been denominated pusillanimity on her part now appeared to be wisdom. If she were to adopt energetically the character which events seemed to assign her, she might serve for the link connecting France and Europe; she might be able to appear in season among weary opponents intermediately; a method subsequently employed with great success, and thus to gather the fruits of the war which one party had not made, and of the peace which the other had dictated. If Prussia had ventured to do this, the character she would have played would have been the most important since the time of the great Frederick.

There was then upon the throne of Prussia a young king, sincere, and possessing good intentions, loving peace as a passion, and never ceasing to lament the fault which his father had committed in scattering upon a foolish war against the French republic, the military fame and treasures accumulated by the great Frederick. Replaced at this time in pacific relations with the French republic, the king availed himself of the opportunity to relieve by economy the losses of the treasure left by his great uncle and squandered by his father. He possessed near his person an able and wise minister, experienced in a high degree, with the skill of evading difficulties; a partisan, like his master, of a pacific policy, but more ambitious than he was, in believing that a neutrality well directed would obtain for Prussia greater aggrandisements than war itself. At that time this might have been correct. He urged on his sovereign, therefore, to take upon himself the character of an active mediator and pacificator of the continent. To play this part was no doubt a very grand one for the young and timid Frederick-William: but this prince was able to fill, more or less, a portion of the character, if he were unequal to the whole.

Bonaparte, perceiving all this, immediately directed his attention to please the court of Prussia. It had formerly been convenient for him to be a member of the institute, that he might appear by that title at some particular ceremonies where he could not be seen in his political character, more especially at the fêtes given on the 21st of January: it was now equally convenient for him to be a general, and to have aids-de-camp to send wherever he saw it was required. This idea was derived from the example of princes, who on mounting the throne announced the event by sending dignitaries as envoys for that purpose. He did the same thing, though with less parade, and dispatched

to Berlin one of his aids-de-camp, which, as military head of a state, most assuredly was a proper act without going out of his character. Among those who bore the title there was one, wise, discreet, and prudent, joining to an agreeable exterior of person perfectly good manners; this was Duroc, who returned from Egypt with his general, and bore a reflection around his brow of the glory of the Pyramids. The first consul ordered him to proceed immediately to Berlin, to compliment the king and queen of Prussia, and present himself as bearing a mission of respect and compliment; while at the same time he was to profit by the occasion to explain the result of the last revolution in France, to represent it as a return to order, to a healthy state of things, and, above all, to pacific ideas. Duroc was directed to flatter the young king, and to show him, that if he pleased he might become the arbitrator of peace. The republic, reposing upon the victories of the Texel and Zurich, and on all those for which the name of Bonaparte was a pledge in future, was well able, without wounding her dignity, to present herself with the olive-branch of peace in her hand.

While he dispatched Duroc to Berlin, Bonaparte performed several acts under the provisionary consulship calculated to produce an effect abroad. Having for some time delayed the entry of Talleyrand upon the ministry for foreign affairs, he at length placed him in that office. It was impossible to place there a more conciliatory person, more proper to treat with the European powers, more willing to please, even to flatter them, without depressing the dignity of the French cabinet. We shall have other opportunities for painting this singular and remarkable character; it suffices to say now, that the choice of this minister alone clearly proves, without passing from strength to weakness, that the policy of the passions was moving into that of calculation. There was nothing, down to that elegance of manners peculiar to Talleyrand, which was not of some advantage in the new aspect which the government wished to assume towards foreign powers.

Bonaparte made other diplomatic arrangements, conceived in the same spirit. Although M. Otto, chargé d'affaires at Berlin, after Sieyès had quitted that post, was an excellent envoy, he was no more than a simple chargé d'affaires in rank. To him was assigned another destination, in which he soon made himself very useful. The appointment of minister at Berlin was given to General Beurnonville, the old friend of La Fayette, long imprisoned in Austria, and one of those members of the minority of French nobles, who had in 1789 embraced with sincerity the side of the revolution. General Beurnonville was a frank soldier, loyal, above all disguise, of moderate opinions, and perfectly well adapted to represent the new government. Austria, where he had been so long detained a prisoner, filled him with the hatred which was a sort of passport to Berlin, where, towards that power, there was the same feeling prevalent which had existed in the time of the great Frederick.

The representative of France at Madrid was an old demagogue, destitute of all influence, and who having no name in the diplomatic career, had been flung where he was by the chance of events. He was replaced by one of the Constituent Assembly, M. Alquier, a clever man, lively and intelligent, who had begun with credit in the diplomacy of that time. Finally, at Copenhagen, where the principles of maritime neutrality, openly violated by England, were likely to work out our advantage upon being cultivated, M. Bourgoing was nominated in place of a creature of the directory, named Grouvelle. Each of these selections was excellent, and perfectly indicative of that spirit of moderation and prudence which had begun to prevail in the relations of France with foreign powers.

To the choice of these individuals the consuls wished to make the addition of some acts which might serve as an answer to a reproach widely circulated throughout Europe, that the French republic violated incessantly the rights of nations and the treaties they concluded with them. Most assuredly France had been guilty of less violation of the rights of nations than the Austrians, the English, and all the courts at war with her. It was the custom to pretend that it was not possible to have any relations with an unstable, passionate government, represented continually by new men, who never regarded themselves as bound by any treaty or by the traditions of European public law. This reproach might have been returned with more justice upon the cabinets of Europe, that had done so much worse, without the excuse either of revolutionary passions or of continual changes in government. To give a better idea of the policy of the consuls, Bonaparte performed a first act of justice towards the unfortunate knights of Malta, to whom he promised, on taking possession of the island, that they should not be treated in France as emigrants, at least those among them who belonged to the French language. They had not until now been benefited by this article in their capitulation, neither in respect of goods nor person. Bonaparte gave to them the full and entire terms to which they were entitled.

In respect to Denmark, the first consul adopted a measure both excellent in itself, kind, and equitable. There were in the ports of France a number of Danish vessels, stopped by the directory in consequence of reprisals under the law of neutrals. They were accused of not respecting the law of maritime neutrality, of submitting to be searched by the English, and of permitting goods that were French property to be seized on board of them. The directory had declared that it would make them subject to the same violence which they suffered from the English, in order that they might uphold with more energy the principles of the rights of nations, under virtue of which they navigated. This would have been but just, if they, having the power to make themselves respected, submitted to it; but these unfortunate men did all they could do, and it was hard to punish the violence of one party by the violence of another. In consequence of this system, a number of their merchant-vessels being detained, Bonaparte released them, in order to exhibit the sign of a more equitable and moderate policy.

Duroc arrived promptly at Berlin, and was presented by M. Otto, who was still there. According to rigorous etiquette, Duroc, a simple aid-de-camp, could not be put in immediate communication with the court, but these regulations were laid aside to receive an officer attached to the person of Bona-

parte. He was well received by the king and queen, and immediately invited to Potsdam. Curiosity had as much to do as policy with these attentions, since glory has, in addition to its own brilliancy, a considerable advantage in affairs of state. To see and hear the aid-de-camp Duroc, resembled an approach, though distant, to the extraordinary man of whom the world was full. Duroc had taken a part in the battles of the Pyramids, Mount Tabor, and Aboukir. A thousand questions were addressed to him, which he answered without exaggeration, in truth and simplicity. He appeared polished, mild, modest; profoundly submissive to his superior, and gave a most advantageous idea of the manner of bearing which that officer imposed upon those nearest him. The success of Duroc at Berlin was complete. The queen testified for him the greatest kindness; and people began to talk afterwards in a much better strain of the French republic. Duroc found the young king was pleased to discover that a strong and moderate government was at last established in Paris, and felt flattered to be at the same time courted both by Russia and France. He desired much to act the part of a mediator, but had more the wish than the talent for such a purpose, without being at all deficient in the ardour and zeal requisite for its performance.

The success of Duroc engaged the attention of Europe, and was re-echoed to Paris itself. The idea of an approaching peace soon took possession of every mind. A specious circumstance, in itself of small moment, singularly contributed to propagate this idea. The French and Austrian armies were in presence of each other along the Rhine and on the coasts of the Alps and Apennines. On the Rhine they were stayed by an obstacle sufficient to hinder any serious operations, since the passage of that river was a task too great for either army unless for the purpose of opening the campaign. It was now Frimaire or December, the passage could not therefore be contemplated; skirmishes along the river became under such circumstances a useless effusion of blood, and therefore on that frontier an armistice was agreed upon. In the Alps and Apennines circumstances were different; there, where the country was so varied, a movement well combined might procure to the successful party a good position for the commencement of operations. The belligerents, therefore, would not bind themselves there in a similar manner, and no armistice took place. But the public attention was directed to that signed upon the Rhine; and among the number of fortunate changes which attended the course of the new government, people classed the possibility and even probability of an approaching peace.

There are always in public evils one that is real and one that is imaginary, while one contributes to render the other insupportable. It is a main point to do away with the imaginary evil, because by that means the sentiment of the real evil is diminished, and he who suffers from it is inspired with the hope of a cure, or, above all, with the disposition to accept it. Under the directory, it was decided that there was nothing to be expected of a feeble, disreputable government, which to repress faction adopted violence without attaining any of the effects of energy. Every thing it did was regarded as bad; nobody would credit good of it, nor believe it when by chance some little good was done. Even victory, which seemed to return to it near the close of its existence—victory, which to others would have brought glory, conferred no honour upon it.

The elevation of Bonaparte, of whom the world was in the habit of expecting every thing successful, changed this disposition. The evil in imagination had ceased; confidence was abroad; every thing was understood in good part. Most assuredly the things performed were good in themselves, since it was good to release the hostages, to set the priests free, to show pacific dispositions to Europe; but people, above all, were inclined to consider that they were good. A token of approach in feeling, such as the welcome given to an aid-de-camp, an armistice signed that really meant nothing, such as that upon the Rhine, passed already as pledges of peace. Such is the prestige of confidence! It is every thing with a beginning government, and to that of the consuls it was of immense advantage. Thus money came into the treasury, from the treasury it went to the armies, that, content with the first succours, waited with patience for those that were to come afterwards. In presence of a power, the strength of which was reputed superior to all resistance, parties submitted: the oppressor party without any power to oppress again; the party oppressed, with the confidence that oppression would no more be exercised upon it. The good accomplished was thus great, and hope added all that time had not yet permitted to be done.

One thing was already rumoured in all quarters, on the daily report of those who transacted business with the young consul. It was said that this soldier, above whom no general of modern times can be ranked, and but few in those which are passed, was a consummate ruler, a profound politician. All the practical men by whom he was surrounded, whom he heard with attention, whom he even enlightened by the justness and promptitude of his views, and whom he protected from opposition of all kinds, never left him without being subdued and filled with admiration. They said this the more willingly, because it became the fashion to think and say so. Sometimes false merit is seen to captivate the public for a time, and command extravagant praise; but it also sometimes happens that true merit, even genius itself, inspires this sort of popular caprice, and then the caprice becomes a passion. It was only a month since Bonaparte had taken the direction of affairs, and the impression around him, produced by his powerful intellect, was deep and general. The good-tempered Roger-Ducos spoke of nothing else; the humoursome Sieyès, little inclined to stoop to the fashion of the hour, especially when he was not its favourite, acknowledging the superiority, the universality of the governing genius, paid it the purest homage, by conceding to it the entire power of action. Those who were panegyrists from conviction joined those who were such only from interest, and all seeing in Bonaparte the evident head of the new republic, set no limit to the measure of their enthusiasm. Bonaparte had among his admirers, and in truth very sincere admirers, Talleyrand, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Rœderer, Boulay (de la Meurthe), Defermon, Réal, Dufresne,

and others, who every where said that they had never seen any one of such promptitude, such decision, such extent of mind, such prodigious activity. It is true, the business he had accomplished in one month in every branch of the government was enormous, and, which seldom happens, that the flattery bestowed did not, in this instance, exceed the reality.

It was every where considered that he was the man on whom the new constitution must bestow the larger part of the executive power. A Cromwell was not desired by the people, for this must be conceded in honour of the men of that time. The friends of Bonaparte said aloud that the parts of Cæsar and Cromwell were wholly "played out," and were not worthy of the genius and virtues of the young saviour of France. Still, they desired that there should be a sufficient authority placed in his hands, to secure their heads, or the national property which they had obtained: and that he might have time enough left him to repel the Bourbons and Austrians. The royalists hoped he would save them from the revolutionists, and re-instate the old absolute power, with a wild wish that after he had reinstated it, he would hand it over to them; in which case they were disposed to make him a good bargain for the restitution; they would even go so far as to confer upon him the dignity of constable to Louis XVIII., if it were positively necessary.

Thus, every body awarded to him the supreme power, in more or less of integrity, for a longer or shorter term, though with different objects. The new legislator, Sieyès, thus had to make a place for him in the new constitution which he was preparing; but Sieyès was a dogmatical legislator, working on behalf of the nature of things, at least he conceived so, and not according to existing circumstances, still less for any single man, no matter whom. This may easily be judged from what followed.

Sieyès, while his indefatigable colleague governed, was occupied with his own assigned task. To give to France not one of those ephemeral constitutions, provoking ridicule from ignorance of passions and parties, but a wise constitution, founded on observations of society, and on the lessons of past experience; this had been the waking dream of his whole existence. Amid his solitary and morose meditations he laboured without cessation. He had weighed it in the midst of the sincere and inconsiderate proceedings of the constituent assembly, in the midst of the frantic gloom of the convention, and in the midst of the feebleness of the directory. At each period he had new-modelled his labour; at last it was fixed, and once fixed he would not alter his plan. He would sacrifice nothing to the circumstances of the moment, to the principal of these circumstances, to Bonaparte, for whom it was evidently necessary to find a post, adapted to the genius and character of him who was to fill it.

This singular legislator, always meditating, always writing, but not writing much more than acting, had never yet written out the scheme of his constitution. It was in his head, and he must now bring it out. This was to him a task by no means easy, however much he wished to see it produced and embodied as a law. He was much pressed to make it known, and at last decided to communicate his ideas to one of his friends, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who took upon himself the trouble of transcribing it as fast as it was delivered in the conversations they might have with each other. It was thus that this remarkable conception was correctly obtained, and preserved for that posterity of which it was worthy.

Sieyès made a powerful mental exertion to unite the republican and the monarchical principles, in order to borrow what was useful or necessary from each; but in borrowing he showed a strong distrust of both. He had taken great precautions against the demagogue spirit on one hand, and against the power of the crown on the other. He had thus produced a clever and complicated work, but one in which every thing was balanced; so that if this constitution, modified by and for Bonaparte, were deprived of one or the other of its counterpoises, it might, against the intentions of its framer, lead on to despotism.

The first care of Sieyès was, amid his combinations, to guard against the influence of demagogue passions. Without denuding the nation of that large participation in public affairs, which unhappily for itself it had before enjoyed, he wished to leave it a power which it could not abuse. A phrase, which, for the first time, perhaps, was in every body's mouth, that of "a representative government," gives an exact idea of the state of the public mind at the moment. By that word was understood that the nation ought to have a share in its own government, only through intermediate means, that is to say, that it should be represented; and, as we shall see, it was, indeed, very indirectly that such a representation was intended.

The elections under the directory had been drawn by degrees into the hands of the royalists at one time, and of the Jacobins at another, and violence had been deemed expedient to exclude the first of these on the 18th Fructidor, the second, on the 22nd Floréal. Thus the election system, and, above all, that of the direct elections, had become highly suspicious in the public view. Perhaps, had they dared to reduce the number of the electors to a hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand, the attempt to meet again the agitation of the elections might have been ventured upon; but the electoral body, reduced to about the present proportion, would have imparted offence rather than security. Two hundred thousand electors only attached to a nation, which so recently possessed universal suffrage, would have appeared an aristocratic allowance; at the same time that the electors, however small their number, nominating directly their representatives, with the power to yield to the passions of the hour, would have borne the appearance of being but the renewal of the continual reactions which had been witnessed under the directory. Direct election restricted, such as exists at present was thus out of all the combinations. Sieyès, with his habitual dogmatism, had made the maxim for himself, that "confidence should come from below, and power from above." He therefore conceived, in order to realize this maxim, the system of national representation which is about to be described.

Every individual of the age of twenty-one, having a French birthright, was obliged, if he desired to enjoy his rights, to inscribe his name in a register

called the "civic register." This list might hold five or six millions of citizens' names admitted to the exercise of political rights. The persons thus inscribed were to meet in their arrondissements; this limit, which did not then exist, was to be proposed; they were then to choose a tenth of their number. This tenth would produce a primary list of five or six hundred thousand; and these numbers, meeting in turn in their departments, and again choosing a tenth among themselves, would form a second list of fifty or sixty thousand. These last proceeded to a third and last list limited to five or six thousand, and the three lists were denominated the "lists of notability."

The first list of five or six hundred thousand individuals was called that of the communal notability; from it were to be taken the members of the municipal bodies, those of the councils of the arrondissements, and others on a par in equality with them; such were the mayors, the officers since styled sub-prefects, the judges of the first instance, and others. The second list of fifty or sixty thousand citizens, was denominated the list of the departmental notability; and it was from it that the members of the councils of the departments, the functionaries since styled prefects, the judges of appeal, and similar officials, were taken; in a word, all of that class. Finally, the last and third list of five or six thousand persons, constituted the list of national notability, from whence all the members of the legislative body must be taken, all the higher functionaries, counsellors of state, ministers, judges of the tribunal of cassation, and the like. Sieyès, borrowing a geometrical figure to give an idea of the national representation, called it a pyramid, broad at the base, and narrow at the apex.

It is thus seen, that without conceding to the nation the right to select itself the national delegates, or the government functionaries, Sieyès reduced himself to the formation of a list of candidates, from which were to be selected the representatives of the nation and the agents of government. Every year the mass of citizens was to meet for the purpose of excluding from the lists the names which were not deemed worthy to continue there, and to replace them with others. It is observable, that if, on one part, the power of designation was very indirect; on the other it embraced not only the members of the deliberative assemblies, but the functionaries of the executive themselves. It was at once more and less than ordinarily exists in the system of a representative monarchy. The agents designed for special offices, and who were not supposed to possess any of the public confidence, such as those belonging to the finances, for example, or persons called to fulfil offices so difficult, that merit, when it could be met with, ought to be chosen, no matter where found—such as generals or ambassadors; such agents it was not obligatory to select from the lists of notability.

We have shown how Sieyès realized his maxim of making "confidence come from below," we will now show how he made "power come from above."

He dreaded elections, under the influence of the feeling of the time, because he had witnessed how the electors chose representatives as headstrong as themselves. He therefore renounced elections, and decided, that out of those on the lists of notability framed by public confidence, the legislative and executive powers should be enabled to choose their own members, and thus to constitute themselves. He laid no other obligation upon them, than that they should select from the lists of notability. But before stating the mode in which the powers were formed, it is necessary to describe their organization.

The legislative power was to be organized thus: First, the legislative body, properly speaking, placed between the tribunal and the council of state: secondly, above and apart, the conservative senate.

The legislative body was to be composed of three hundred members, designed to hear the discussion of the laws, not to discuss them itself, and to vote silently. How and among whom the discussion was to take place, will be here shown.

A body of one hundred members, styled the tribunate, empowered to represent in this constitution the spirit of free, innovating examination, received the communication of the laws, discussed them publicly, and put them to the vote, merely to decide whether or not it should support their adoption or rejection. It then appointed three members of its number to support its private opinion before the legislative body.

The council of state, the origin of that which now exists, but more considerable in its importance and duties, was connected with the government for the purpose of embodying proposed laws; it was to present them to the legislative body, and to send three of its number to discuss them in opposition to the speakers in the tribunate. Thus the council of state pleaded for, the tribunate against, the proposed law, if the last disapproved it. The legislative body then voted silently either on one side or the other, as to the rejection or acceptance of the measure. Its vote alone gave the character of a law to the proposition of the government. The council of state besides had the duty of completing the laws by attaching to them the regulations necessary for their execution.

Last of all came the senate, composed of one hundred members, that took no part in the legislative labour. It was deputed on the denunciation of the tribunate, or of its own accord, to cancel every law or act of the government to which, in its own view, any thing unconstitutional might be attached. It was on this account that it bore the name of the "conservative senate." It was to be composed of individuals who were of ripe years, deprived from the circumstance of belonging to the senate of all active functions, being exclusively confined to their character of conservators, and being interested in attending well to their duties, because Sieyès intended that a good income should be attached to the place.

Such were the offices of the deliberative functionaries. The mode of their formation was as follows:—

The senate completed itself by electing its own members, out of the list of notability formed by the nation. It named also the members of the tribunate, of the legislative body, and of the tribunal of cassation, choosing them by the scrutiny or ballot from the same list of national notability.

The executive power was thus the author of its own formation, from choosing all its agents out of the three lists of notability, which corresponded to

the functions which were to be executed. It took the ministers, the councillors of state, and all the superior officers from the list of national notability. It took from the list of the departmental notability, first, the councillors of the department, who, the same as with the council of state, were considered purely administrative authorities; it took from them, besides these, the prefects and all the functionaries of the same particular order; and lastly it searched in the list of communal notability for the municipal councillors, the mayors, and the functionaries belonging to their class.

Thus, as Sieyès would have it, "Confidence came from below, power came from above."

But as above the legislative power there was a head or creator in the senate, so there was wanting above the executive power a supreme creator to name the ministers of state, who were then to nominate the subordinate officials down to the lowest in the hierarchy. At the head of the executive power there must also be a generative power. Sieyès had given the holder of this power a name analogous to his function, he had entitled him the grand elector. This supreme magistrate's duty was reduced to one single exclusive act; he was to elect two superior agents, alone in their species and rank, one called the peace, the other the war consul. These nominated the ministers immediately; they, under their personal responsibility, selected from the list of notability all the agents of power, governed, administered, directed in a word all the affairs of state.

A great and brilliant career was destined for the grand elector. He was the generative principle of the government, and he was also its external representative. That inaction, to which Sieyès desired to confine the senators in order to secure the just and impartial fulfilment of their duties, and to whom he assigned an annual revenue of 100,000f. from the national domains; that inaction imposed also upon the grand elector from a similar motive, was yet more richly endowed, because he represented the entire republic. Sieyès, therefore, assigned to him a revenue of 6,000,000fs. and sumptuous palaces, such as those of the Tuileries at Paris, and Versailles in the country, with a guard of three thousand men. In his name justice was to be administered, the taxes promulgated, and the acts of the government executed. To him the foreign ministers were to be accredited, and the signatures to all treaties between France and foreign states were to be his execution. In a word, he joined to the important act of observing the two more active heads of the government, the éclat, vain though it might be, of external pomp. In him was to glitter personified all the luxury of an elegant, polished, and magnificent people.

The grand elector himself, was he to be an elected or an hereditary potentate? In the last case he must be in every sense a king, and thus would monarchy be re-established in France. This, whether or not he wished it, Sieyès would not dare openly to propose. He, therefore, assigned to the senate, the most impartial of the public bodies in the government, the choice of that supreme magistrate, who was himself thus elevated that he might be as impartial as possible in his selection of the two heads whom he was to appoint.

A last and most extraordinary provision finished this complex labour.

The senate, which had the power of abrogating any unconstitutional act or law of the government, received, besides, the power to deprive the grand elector of his functions by nominating him a senator in despite of his own will. This Sieyès denominated "absorption." The senate had the power to do the same thing in respect of any citizen, of whom the talents might cause a jealousy in the republic. Thus there was given to the citizen, that had been reduced to forcible inactivity by absorbing him into the senate, the penalty of the importance, of the rich idleness, of the members of a body, which could not act by itself, but still was able, by its *veto*, to stop every kind of action in others.

In this singular but profound idea, who does not recognise the image in design, obscure and indistinct as it may be, of a representative monarchy? The legislative body, the senate, the grand elector, are but commons, peers, and king; all reposing upon a sort of universal suffrage, but with such precautions, that democracy, aristocracy, and royalty, admitted into the constitution, are admitted, then annulled by its operation. The lists of notability, from which the deliberative bodies and the executive functionaries are to be chosen, are universal suffrage, nullified, because they formed a circle of candidateship so extensive that the obligation to choose in such a circle is an absolute power of election conferred upon the government and senate. The dumb legislative body, listening to the discussion of the law, and not discussing the law itself, having by its side the tribunate, that is to oppose it in the council of state, is but a species of house of commons cut in two, one-half having the vote, the other half the debate, and both annulled by the separation; for the first is exposed to the chance of falling asleep amid its own silence, the second to waste itself in a useless agitation of the question. The senate nominating itself and all the deliberative bodies, appointing the head of the executive power, and, when necessary, absorbing him into its bosom; the senate being able to do this, but deprived of active functions, taking no part in making a law, but bound to cancel it if unconstitutional; the senate reduced thus to a sort of inaction, that it may be more disinterested, and solely animated with the idea of conservatism, this senate is but a clever exaggerated imitation of an aristocratical peerage, taking little part in the progress of affairs, stopping it sometimes by its *veto*, and receiving into its bosom those who, after a wild career, come voluntarily to repose in the midst of a grave, influential, and honoured body of men. The grand elector, lastly, is no more than royalty reduced to the inactive, but considerable office, of choosing the chief actors in the government; it is royalty, but with wonderful precautions against its origin and duration, since it issued from the senatorial urn, into which, upon occasions, it may be returned. In a word, this universal suffrage, this legislative body, this tribunate, this senate, this grand elector, thus constituted, weakened, neutralized the one by the other, attested a prodigious labour of the human mind, to unite in one constitution all the known forms of government, only to annul them all afterwards by the energy of its precautions.

It must be admitted that representative mon-

archy, with less trouble and effort, by trusting more to human nature, has procured for two centuries a lively liberty, not subversive, for one of the first nations in the world. Simple and natural in its means, the British constitution admits of royalty, aristocracy, and democracy; and these being admitted, leaves them to act freely, imposing upon them no other condition than to act in unison with the common will. It does not limit the king to such and such an act; it does not advance him by election to swallow him up afterwards; it does not interdict to the peerage its active functions, nor does it deprive of speech the elective assembly; it does not grant universal suffrage to annul it by rendering it indirect; it permits royalty and aristocracy to take their natural hereditary course; it admits of a king, and of a succession in the peerage, but it leaves the nation, in return, the care of selecting directly, according to its own taste and the feelings of the day, an assembly, that, master of the power of giving or refusing to royalty the means of governing, obliges it to take for ministers the men who possess the public confidence. All that the legislator Sieyès sought was here almost infallibly accomplished. Royalty and aristocracy do no more than he wished them to do; they are merely the moderators of a too rapid progress; the elective assembly, full of the feeling of the country, but restrained by the other two powers, in reality chooses the heads of the government, carries them into their post, maintains them there, or overturns them, if they cease to respond to its sentiments. Here is a simple, true constitution, because it is the product of nature and time; and not, like that of Sieyès, the clever artificial work of a mind disgusted at monarchy from the reign of the later Bourbons, and fearful of a republican government from ten years of storms.

But supposing a period more calm, and imagining the constitution of Sieyès to be put quickly into practice at a time when a powerful hand, such as that of Bonaparte, was not wanted, and therefore did not overrule all other motives; supposing that enormous notability established, the senate freely giving out from its own body the other governing bodies and the head of the state, what would then happen? Before long the nation would get to feel little interest in the renewal of the lists, which could very inefficiently express its sentiments; the lists would become nearly permanent; the senate would have chosen from them the state bodies, and the grand elector, and naming the chief of the executive power, being able at any moment to remove him, would keep him in dependence: the senate would be every thing—it would be what?—the aristocracy of Venice, with its book of gold, its weak and pompous doge, every year bade to marry the Adriatic—a curious sight, and worthy of being contemplated! Sieyès, with an elevated and deeply reflective mind, sincerely attached to his country's freedom, had, in ten years, run round the entire circle of political agitation, of terror, and disgust, which led most of the republics of the middle ages, and that of Venice, the more celebrated of them, to the golden book and the nominal chief. He had at last arrived at the Venetian aristocracy, constituted for the advantage of the men of the revolution, as it gave for ten years to those, who had exercised political functions since 1789, the privilege and right of being upon the lists of notability; and he proposed to keep for himself, and the three or four of the more noted individuals of the day, the power of making, for the first time, all the bodies that were to exercise the state government.

An aristocracy is not to be made off-hand; despotism alone is to be improvised. The tortured social state could only find ease in the arms of a powerful man. Every thing was admired, and every thing admitted in this excellent constitution,—every thing except the grand elector, so richly endowed and so idle in his post. The grand elector's place was supplied by one sufficiently energetic and active in Bonaparte; and by a single change this constitution was doomed, without any participation in the result on the part of its author, to lead to the imperial despotism, that, with a conservative senate and a dumb legislative body, we saw govern France for fifteen years in a glorious but despotic manner.

When Sieyès, with great effort on his part, had drawn these combinations from the profound of his mind, where they had long lain buried, he explained them to his friend M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who wrote them down, and to members of the two legislative commissions; they communicated them to others around. The two legislative commissions were divided into sections, and in each of the two there was a constitutional section. It was to these sections in union that Sieyès, when he had become master of his idea, explained his system. It seized upon every mind by its novelty, its singularity, and the infinite art of its combinations.

In the first place, the interests of the auditors of Sieyès were fully met; for he had, as will be seen, adopted a transitory disposition of things which was in every respect necessary. With the object of preserving the revolution, by keeping in power those who had been its actors, he proposed a resolution, much resembling that by which the national convention had perpetuated itself in the two councils of the ancients and of the five hundred. He desired that all who since 1789 had exercised public functions, who had been members of different assemblies, legislative, departmental, or municipal, should have a right to inscription on the lists of notability; and that these lists should not be made up for ten years. Further, that Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, and Bonaparte, were to nominate for the first time the various members of the state bodies, in virtue of the right which they attached to themselves of framing the new constitution. This was a bold but requisite provision, because it must be remarked, that all the new men who would come in through the elections, moved by the spirit of reaction then abroad, and yielding to the common inclination to blame that which they had not done themselves, would openly exhibit hatred both against the acts and actors in the revolution, even when they partook of the same sentiments. Sieyès, therefore, had taken these precautions against the necessity for any renewal of the 18th Fructidor, by thus for ten years keeping the working of his constitution in hands of which he was sure. The ideas of Sieyès were thus suited to every interest. Every body thought that he was himself certain of being a senator, legislator, counsellor of state, or

of the tribunate, for to these duties liberal appointments were attached.

Leaving out interest, the combinations appeared to be skilful as well as new. Men enthusiastically imbued with admiration for military genius, discover an enthusiasm with equal readiness for what seems to arise from profound mental research. Sieyès had his enthusiasts as well as Bonaparte his. The lists of notability appeared the happiest of all combinations, and yet more from the state of discredit into which the elective system had fallen since the elections in which the "Clichyens[5]" were returned, who were excluded by the revolution of Fructidor, and the Jacobins excluded by means of the "scissions" (sections of Paris). The counsel of state and the tribunate pleading *pro* and *con* before a dumb legislative body, were amusing to those whose minds were fatigued with discussions and pressingly in need of repose. The senate, placed so high and so useful for the preservation of unity, getting rid by ostracism of eminent or dangerous citizens,—all these things found admirers.

The grand elector alone appeared a singularity to the men who, not having reflected much on the English constitution, could not comprehend a magistracy reduced to the single function of choosing the superior agents of the government. They found he possessed too little power for a king, and too much state for the simple president of a republic. Nobody in fact could find the place adapted for him who should fill it, or in other words, for Bonaparte. The elector had too much of the appearance without the reality of power: too much of appearance, because it was necessary to avoid awaking public apprehension, and rendering too manifest the return to monarchy: not enough of real power, because an authority almost without limit was required by the man who had the task of re-organizing France. Some persons,—incapable of comprehending the impartiality of a profound thinker, who never dreamed but of making his ideas accord with themselves, not binding up the objects of a constitution in personal interest,—some affirmed that the grand elector could never have been invented to suit a character so active as Bonaparte, and that therefore Sieyès had invented it for himself, and that he reserved the place of war consul for his young colleague. This was a malevolent and pitiful conjecture. Sieyès joined to great strength of thought a remarkable acuteness of observation, and he too well judged his own personal position and that of the conqueror of Italy, to believe that he was able to be, himself, this species of elective king, and Bonaparte simply his minister. He had obeyed merely the spirit of his system. Other interpreters, less malevolent, believed in their turn, that Sieyès destined the place of grand elector for Bonaparte, with the view of tying up his hands, and above all making him speedily become "absorbed" in the conservative senate. The friends of freedom did not on that account regard him with ill will. The partisans of Bonaparte were unable to speak of the character of the grand elector without crying out loudly against it, and among them was Lucien Bonaparte, who by turns served or opposed the head of his family, as he was prompted by caprice, without discretion or measure; playing at one time the brother, passionately anxious for the aggrandisement of his relative, at another the citizen who was opposed to all despotism. Lucien declaimed violently against the project of Sieyès. He declared loudly that a president of the republic was wanted, with a council of state, and very little besides; that the country was tired of vain talkers, and wanted men of action alone. These inconsiderate speeches were of a nature to produce a very ill effect; but happily few attached any importance to the sayings of Lucien.

Bonaparte, in the midst of incessant toils, gathered up the rumours circulated around respecting the project of Sieyès. He had left his colleague to proceed, according to a species of division of their duties between them, declining to interfere with the constitutional scheme, until the time should arrive when it came to be definitively considered, no doubt promising himself to adapt his taste to the place it assigned him. Nevertheless the rumours which reached him from every side at length irritated him, and he expressed his displeasure with his ordinary warmth of language, a warmth to be lamented, but of which he was not always the master.

The disapprobation he expressed at some parts of the constitutional scheme reached its author, who was much hurt by it. He was afraid, in fact, that having lost, by the ignorance and violence of past times, the occasion of being the legislator of France, he should again lose it through the despotic humour of the colleague he had given himself in effecting the 18th Brumaire. Although destitute of intrigue, and inactive, he made himself busy to gain over one by one the members of the two legislative sections.

In the interim, his friend Boulay de la Meurthe, and two intimate friends of Bonaparte, Rœderer and Talleyrand, were desirous of maintaining harmony between men of such importance, and employed themselves actively to bring about accord. Boulay de la Meurthe had accepted the office of transcriber of the ideas of Sieyès, and he was thus become the confidant of his scheme. Rœderer was one of the old constituent assembly, a man of sound mind, a true politician after the fashion of the eighteenth century, fond of reasoning on the organization of social bodies, and of framing projects of constitutional government, joined to very decided monarchical predilections. Talleyrand, capable of comprehending and judging of minds the most opposite to his own, was equally affected by the genius of young Bonaparte for action, and the speculative mind of the philosophic Sieyès, and he had a great regard for both. He besides believed that each had need of the other; all three strove with sincerity to promote the success of the new government. All three, therefore, employed themselves in reconciling the soldier and the legislator. An interview was planned to take place at the residence of Bonaparte, in presence of Rœderer and Talleyrand. It took place, but did not at first succeed. Bonaparte was under the influence of the reports which had been made to him of a grand elector, inactive, and liable to be absorbed by the senate. Sieyès was full of the expressions attributed to Bonaparte, condemning his

[5] The members of the club of that name.

plan—expressions no doubt greatly exaggerated. They parted in bad humour, using bitter language. Sieyès, who required calmness to express his ideas, did not explain them in the lucid manner and order of delivery which was most adapted to his purpose. Bonaparte was, on the other side, impatient and blunt. They inveighed against each other, and parted very nearly enemies.

The mediators were alarmed, and now set to work to remedy the ill success of this interview. They told Sieyès that he ought to have had patience in the discussion, and taken some trouble to convince Bonaparte, and above all, made him some concessions. They told Bonaparte that he wanted in the matter more caution than he had shown; that without the support of Sieyès and his authority in the Council of the Ancients, he would not have obtained, on the 18th of Brumaire, the decree which had placed the power in his hand; that Sieyès, as a political character, had an amazing influence over the public feeling; and that in case of a conflict between the legislator and himself, a great many persons would pronounce themselves for the legislator, as the representative of the revolution, and of liberty endangered by the man of the sword. The first moment was not favourable for effecting a reconciliation; it was better to wait a little. Boulay de la Meurthe and Rœderer planned fresh schemes for the fulfilment of the executive power, that might remove the two difficulties upon which Bonaparte appeared inflexible—the inaction of the grand elector, and the menace of ostracism suspended over his head. They first imagined a consul with two colleagues for his assistance; then a grand elector, as Sieyès wished, who named the peace and war-consuls, assisted at their deliberations, and decided between them. This was not enough for Bonaparte's satisfaction, and it was too much for Sieyès, whose plan was thus reversed. Every time it was proposed to Sieyès to make the chief of the executive participate in the government, he said, "That is the old monarchy which you would give,—I won't have it." He would hear of no royalty but that of England without the title of king, immobility, and hereditary succession. This was not the thing; and Sieyès, with that promptitude of discouragement attached to speculative minds when they encounter obstacles which are placed in their way by the very course of things, Sieyès said he would give up the whole, quit Paris for the country, and leave young Bonaparte with his budding despotism bare to every eye. "He means to go," said Bonaparte; "let him; I will go and get a constitution planned by Rœderer, propose it to the two legislative sections, and satisfy public opinion that demands the settlement of the question." Here he deceived himself by speaking in such a mode, for it was yet too early to exhibit his drawn sword to France; he would have met on every side an unforeseen resistance.

Nevertheless these two men, who, despite their instinctive repugnance, had agreed for a moment, in order to consummate the 18th Brumaire, were still designed to meet again to draw up a constitution. The reports in circulation had awakened the legislative commission; they knew well what doctrine Lucien held, what a decided tone Bonaparte took in the matter, and what a disposition Sieyès showed to abandon the whole affair. They said with reason that, after all, the care of framing a constitution belonged to them definitively, being specially confided to them; that they would accomplish their duty, prepare the plan, present it to the consuls, and force them to agree, after bringing about a rational compromise between them.

They set to work in consequence; and many of the members composing their body having had communicated to them the ideas of Sieyès, they adopted his scheme as the basis of their plan. The man who works upon a system, feels that the adoption of all his ideas save one, occasions him as much vexation as if the entire system were rejected. The adoption of the scheme of Sieyès for a basis of the new constitution was still an important point gained by himself. He grew a little calmer, and Bonaparte, seeing the commissions proceed right earnestly and resolutely, became sensibly milder in his expressions upon the subject. The moment was seized in order to attempt a reconciliation between the two great men. A second interview took place between Bonaparte and Sieyès, in presence of Boulay de la Meurthe, Rœderer, and Talleyrand. This time the two interlocutors were less passionate and more disposed to mutual comprehension. In place of annoying each other by dwelling upon those points on which they disagreed, and placing their differences foremost, they tried, on the contrary, to reconcile their differences, and to show where they agreed in their opinions. Sieyès was moderate and full of tact; Bonaparte displayed his great good sense, and his ordinary originality of mind. The subjects of the conversation were the state of France, views of the former constitutions, and the precautions to be taken in a new constitution, to prevent the recurrence of the disorders of the past. On all this they could not fail to be in accord. They retired satisfied, and promised, as soon as the sections had completed their labours, to unite their own, and adopt or modify the propositions, and to abandon, as soon as possible, the provisionary system, which began to displease the public. Sieyès had from that time the certain knowledge, that except the grand elector, and some attributes attached to the conservative senate, his constitution would be adopted in entirety.

In the ten first days of Frimaire, or between the 20th of November and the first of December, the sections had finished their project. Bonaparte then summoned them to his house, to a meeting at which all the consuls were present. Some of the members of the sections thought this proceeding was little in conformity with their dignity; and yet, having determined to overlook many difficulties, and to concede much to a man who was so necessary to them, they attended on the occasion.

The sittings immediately commenced. Sieyès was in the first instance requested to disclose his plan, as that was the foundation of what had been done by the commissions. He did this with a strength of thought and of language, which produced a strong impression on his hearers. "All this is very fine and very profound," said Bonaparte, "yet there are some points which deserve very serious discussion. Let us proceed in an orderly manner, and treat each part of the project consecutively, first choosing a secretary. Citizen Daunou,

take the pen!" Thus it happened that M. Daunou became the drawer up of the new constitution. The work was continued for numerous sittings, and the resolutions following were immediately agreed upon.

The lists of notability, communal, departmental, and national, were adopted successively. They were but too well fitted to suit the apprehensions of the moment and the ideas of Bonaparte, by negativing the popular influence, from rendering it indirect. Two accessory resolutions, one agreeable to, the other contrary to the ideas of Sieyès, were agreed upon. It was settled that the functionaries of all kinds should not be necessarily chosen from the lists of notability, save when the constitution should have nominally designated them. No objection was made to the selection of the deliberative bodies, of the consuls, ministers, judges, and administrators, from the lists, but that of the generals and ambassadors seemed to be going too far. This point was conceded. The second provision or resolution bore relation, not to the main ground of the plan, but to the necessity of its adaptation to the present state of things. In place of putting off the reformation of the lists for ten years, it was postponed to the year IX. or only for one year, and it was resolved that all the members of the great bodies of the state should, by an act of constituent power, be nominated at once, and that those who were so nominated should have the right of being entered upon the lists. The revision of the lists, instead of being annual, was to be triennial.

The organization of the great powers came next to be considered. Sieyès' maxim, "that confidence ought to come from below, power from above," prevailed every way. On high was placed the right to elect, but with the obligation to choose from the lists of notability. The senate of Sieyès was adopted, as well as the legislative body placed between the council of state and the tribunate. The senate was to choose from the lists of notability; first the senators themselves, next the members of the legislative body, of the tribunate, of the court of cassation, of the commission of accounts, since called the court of accounts, and finally the head or heads of the executive power. The senate was to nominate the members of its own body only upon the presentation of three candidates, presented respectively by the consuls, the legislative body, and the tribunate; this was a considerable limitation of its attributes. The council of state, being a part of the executive power, was to be nominated by that power. Independently of possessing the right to make the more important nominations, the senate received the supreme attribute of abrogating any laws or acts of the government that might be deemed unconstitutional. In no respect was it to have any part in making the laws, nor could its members exercise any active function.

The duty of the legislative body, silent, agreeably to the plan of Sieyès, was to listen to the opposing arguments of the three councillors of state and three tribunes, and to vote afterwards, without debate, upon the propositions of the government.

The tribunate alone had the faculty of publicly discussing the laws, but it could only vote for the purpose of deciding what opinion it should sustain before the legislative body. In case of its negative vote, it could not prevent the passing of a law if it were adopted by the legislature. The tribunate had not the power of initiating any legal proposition, but might express its desires, and receive petitions, which it might transmit to the different authorities with which they were more immediately connected. The members of the senate were to be eighty, in place of one hundred, as Sieyès had at first designed; and sixty were to be immediately nominated, the other twenty in the course of the following ten years. The legislative body was to consist of three hundred members, and the tribunate of one hundred. The senators were to have a fixed salary of 25,000f. each, the legislators 10,000f., and the members of the tribunate 15,000f. Thus far, therefore, the original plan of Sieyès might be considered, with a trifling difference, respecting the more limited power of the senate, as having been adopted. In the organization of the executive power, the alteration made was, on the other hand, very considerable.

Here was the great point upon which Bonaparte was inflexible. Sieyès, who was fully prepared to meet the rejection of this part of his plan, was asked nevertheless to state his ideas. He in consequence proposed the institution of the grand elector. Nobody, it must be granted, not even Bonaparte himself, had at that time sufficiently reflected on the nomination and organization of the head or chief power in a free government, to understand the depth of the character conceived, or to discover the analogy it exhibited with the king at the head of the English monarchy. Bonaparte, had he considered and perfectly understood the character thus conceived, would on no account have assented to its adoption, from motives easy to be comprehended, and altogether personal. He criticised the grand elector severely. He said of his wealthy idleness as all kings would say, only with less wit than he spoke and less ground to go upon, because amid an upturned society to be organized, sanguinary factions to subdue, and a world to conquer, the wish was perhaps excusable to have the exercise of his talents and genius unfettered. But if in those first days of the consulate he were right when he had reason to wish his genius unfettered, there being so much to be done; afterwards, the sublime victim of St. Helena, he might have regretted the power that was thus conceded to him to exercise it so freely. More confined in the employment of his faculties, he might not have accomplished such great things; but he would have been prevented from attempting those of so much extravagance, and his sceptre and his sword would have most probably rested in his own glorious hands until his death. "Your grand elector," he said to Sieyès, "is a lazy king, and the time for lazy kings has passed away. What man of spirit and intellect would submit to a do-nothing life for 6,000,000f. and a habitation in the Tuileries? What, nominate those who act, and do nothing oneself! It is inadmissible. Then you imagine by this means that your grand elector will be prevented from interfering in the government. Were I your grand elector, I would be bound, notwithstanding, to do all you desired me not to do. I would say to the consuls of peace and war, 'If you do not choose such a person, or if you do not perform such or such an act, I will turn you out!' I would soon oblige them to act as I desired. I

would make myself master again only by going roundabout to my end."

Bonaparte, with his wonted sagacity, penetrated here into the truth, discovering as he did that the grand elector was not an absolute nonentity, since, as supreme magistrate, he had the power and means, at certain times, of appearing again all potent upon the arena, where party was squabbling for power, and of taking it from one that he might confer it upon another. This lofty surveillance of English royalty over the administration was not adapted for the ardour of young Bonaparte; he may be pardoned for it, because this was neither the time nor place for constitutional royalty.

Thus the grand elector fell under the sarcasm of the young general, and under a power still greater than that of his sarcasm; that of the existing necessity. A dictatorship was at the time really required, and the authority to be conferred upon a grand elector was very inadequate to meet the necessities of the moment.

Another part of the plan of Sieyès was objected to by Bonaparte in the most decided manner, because he regarded it as a snare, it was the power of "absorption" attached to the senate, not only as it affected the grand elector, but every citizen of note, whose greatness might give offence.

Bonaparte would not consent that, after years of toil and service, any one should have the right to bury him alive in the senate, and for a pension of 25,000 f. constrain him to idleness. This point was conceded, and the executive power was organized in the following manner:

The adoption of a first consul was decided upon, and he was to be accompanied by two others; in order to conceal somewhat the great power of the first functionary. The first consul had the direct and only nomination of the members of the republican administration generally; of the members of the councils of departments and municipalities; of the official persons since called prefects, sub-prefects, municipal agents, and the like. He nominated all the officers in the naval and military services, the counsellors of state, and the ambassadors, the judges, civil and criminal, except the justices of the peace, and those of the court of cassation. He could not remove the judges who were once appointed; their immutability being substituted in place of election as a guarantee for their independence.

Besides the nomination of the administrative offices, judicial and military, the first consul held the full and entire government of the country, the direction of war and of diplomacy; he signed treaties, without prejudice to their discussion and adoption by the legislative body, according to the legal forms. In his various functions he was to be aided by the other two consuls, who had only a consulting voice in the matter, but who could place their opinions in a register kept for the purpose of recording their deliberations. The other two consuls were clearly appointed for the purpose of masking the enormous authority confided to Bonaparte. This authority, given for a term of considerable duration, it was possible might become perpetual after the ten years, for which the consul was at first elected, should expire; the consuls, too, were all perpetually re-eligible. One vestige alone of the "absorption" of Sieyès remained. The first consul, on vacating office, from whatever cause, became a senator in plenitude, and was thenceforward excluded from public functions. The other two consuls, not having attained the highest office in the state, were free to accept, on retiring, this well-endowed neutralizing appointment, but they were not obliged to become senators against their inclinations.

The allowance made to the first consul was 500,000 f., and to each of the others 150,000 f. They were all to reside in the Tuileries, and to have a consular guard.

Such were the principal provisions of the celebrated constitution of the year VIII. Thus Sieyès saw the attributes of the senate abridged, and a powerful head of the state substituted for his idle grand elector, a circumstance which a few years afterwards caused his constitution, in place of leading to the rule of an aristocracy, to become the instrument of a despotism.

No declaration of rights distinguished this constitution, although by means of certain provisions of a general character it guaranteed individual liberty, the inviolability of the citizen's house, the responsibility of ministers, and that of their inferior agents, except, without prejudice in the case of the last, to the previous approbation of the council of state. The constitution stipulated that a law in any department, under extraordinary circumstances, might suspend the constitution in its regard, a proceeding now denominated "putting in a state of siege." Pensions were secured to the widows and children of soldiers; and finally, by a species of return to ideas for a long time proscribed, it acknowledged as a principle that national rewards might be accorded to those who had rendered eminent services to their country. This was the dawn of the institution once so celebrated —the legion of honour.

The constitution of Sieyès contained two strong and excellent ideas, which have been both retained in our administration, namely, the division of the country into arrondissements, and the council of state.

Sieyès was thus the author of all the boundaries adopted in France for the purposes of the government. He had before invented the departmental divisions, and obtained their adoption; and on the present occasion he desired that the cantonal governments, which were no less in number than five thousand, should be superseded by those of arrondissements, which, less numerous, were far more convenient, from being intermediate between the commune and the department. No more than the principle of this change was to be traced in the constitution; but it was agreed that before long a reform of the existing law in the administrative principle of France should take place upon this point, and terminate the anarchy of the communes, of which a painful picture has been given above. A tribunal of the first instance was to be fixed in each arrondissement, and for a certain number of united departments there was to be a tribunal of appeal.

The second of Sieyès' creations, and belonging to himself exclusively, was the council of state, a deliberative body attached to the executive power, preparing the laws, and sustaining them before the legislature, adding to them the regu-

lations that must accompany the laws, and rendering the laws administrative. It is the most practical of his inventions, and with the preceding just described, must survive the present and pass into future times. To the honour of this legislator, be it spoken, time has swept away all the ephemeral revolutionary constitutions, and the only fragments of those constitutions which have survived have been the work of his hands.

But to settle the distribution of the new constitution was not enough, it was indispensable to add to it those who were to wield its powers, to seek for them in the men of the revolution, and to designate the whole in the constitutional act. It was necessary also, after completing all the dispositions that have been stated, to direct attention to the selection of the individuals.

Bonaparte was nominated consul for ten years. It was impossible to say that he was chosen, so forcibly did the situation indicate the person who was best fitted to fill it; he was accepted from the hands of victory and necessity. His appointment fixed, the next thing to do was to find one for Sieyès. This great personage had not much love for business, and still less for playing a secondary part. He did not feel himself inclined to become the assistant of young Bonaparte, and he in consequence refused to be the second consul. It will be seen presently what place more suitable to his character was assigned to him. Cambacérès was chosen second consul, a lawyer of eminence, who had acquired great importance among the political personages of the time by his deep knowledge, prudence, and tact. He was at that moment minister of justice. Lebrun, a distinguished writer, who was editor of the Maupeou edicts, and belonged under the old government to the party that was disposed to reform; attached to the cause of moderate revolutions, well versed in matters of finance, and too mild to contradict in any troublesome degree, Lebrun was made third consul. Cambacérès was an able assistant to Bonaparte in the administration of justice, and Lebrun was equally useful in the administration of the finances, both being of essential aid to him without crossing any of his intentions. The men intended to form the new government could not have been better associated, while from these appointments all others in the organization of the executive were necessarily to flow.

Proceeding next to the appointment of the deliberative bodies, the part for Sieyès indicated itself. It was written down in the constitution that the members of all the deliberative bodies were to be elected by the senate. The point now to be arranged was who should compose the senate for the first time. It was settled by a particular article of the constitution, that Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, who were about to cease from being consuls, unitedly with Cambacérès and Lebrun, who were about to become so, should nominate the absolute majority of the senate, or thirty-one members of the sixty of which it was composed. The thirty-one senators elected in this mode were afterwards to elect by ballot the twenty-nine senators wanting to complete the total number. The senate, when completed, was to nominate the legislative body, the tribunate, and the court of cassation.

By these various combinations Bonaparte found himself at the head of the executive power, while at that moment a proper delicacy was observed, by his exclusion from the formation of the deliberative bodies called upon to control his acts. This care was left mainly to the legislator of France, Sieyès, whose active duties then ceasing, he would receive the presidency of the senate as his retiring post. Appearances were thus preserved, and the respective positions of each individual conveniently arranged.

It was decided that the constitution should be submitted to the national sentiment, through registers opened at the mayoralties, at the offices of justices of peace, the notaries' offices, and those of the registers of the tribunals; and that till its acceptance, which was not doubted, the first consul, the consuls going out of office, and the two coming in, should proceed to make the required appointments, in order that, on the 1st Nivôse, the great powers of the state might be ready to put in force the new constitution. It had become absolutely needful to put a termination to the dictatorship of the provisional consuls, which began to cloud the minds of some persons, and also in order to satisfy the general impatience to see a definitive government. In fact, every body now wished to see a just and stable administrative system established, which might insure strength and unity of power without extinguishing all freedom, and under which honest and capable men of every rank and party might find the place which was their due. Those desires, it must be acknowledged, it was not impossible to gratify under the constitution of the year VIII. That constitution might even have given them perfect satisfaction, but for the violence which was done to it at a later period by an extraordinary genius, that, favoured as it was by circumstances, could have overturned far stronger barriers than those which the labour of Sieyès could oppose to it, or any other which it was possible to imagine for such a purpose.

This constitution, decreed in the night of the 12th and 13th of December (21 and 22 Frimaire), was promulgated on the 15th of December, 1799 (24 Frimaire, year VIII.), to the high satisfaction of its framers and of the public.

It charmed the minds of all by the novelty of the conceptions and the artificial skill it displayed. Every body began to feel confidence in it, and in those who were about to carry it into execution.

It was preceded by the following preamble:—

"CITIZENS! A constitution is now presented to you. It terminates the uncertainty caused by the provisional government in regard to foreign relations, and the interior and military situation of the republic.

"It places in the institutions which it establishes the first magistrates, of whom the devotedness has appeared necessary to its activity.

"The counstitution is founded on the three principles of representative government, on the sacred rights of property, equality, and liberty.

"The powers which it establishes will be strong and durable, as they must be, in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens and the interests of the state.

"Citizens! The revolution is fixed to the principles which commenced it; IT IS FINISHED!"

Men like Bonaparte and Sieyès proclaiming in

1800, "the revolution is finished!" What a singular proof does it disclose of the illusions of the human mind! Still it must be acknowledged that something was finished, and that was anarchy.

The pleasure felt by all those who had a hand in that work, when they saw it terminated, was indeed great. It is true some of the ideas of Sieyès had been rejected, yet nearly his entire constitution had been adopted. Without absolute power, such as Solon, Lycurgus, or Mahomet possessed, a power that in our times of distrust, by which every individual prestige is destroyed, no man can obtain—without absolute power, it was hardly possible to infuse a larger part of any individual conception into the constitution of a great people. If the victor of Marengo had not subsequently made two very considerable changes in it, the imperial hereditary accession, in addition, and the excision of the tribunate, such as it was, this constitution would have had a career which might not have ended in the triumph of absolute power.

Sieyès having put the sword which had overthrown the directory into the hands of Bonaparte, and having framed a constitution, was about to deliver France to the activity of the young consul, and, as far as he was himself concerned, to retire into that meditative state of idleness, which he preferred before the turmoil and stir of business. The new first consul, wishing to confer on the legislator of France some testimonial of the national gratitude, the consideration of the estate of Crosne as a gift, was, by his proposition, laid before the legislative commissions for their sanction. The estate was decreed, and the announcement of the gift made to Sieyès with noble expressions of the national gratitude. Sieyès expressed high gratification, for, despite incontestable probity, he had a regard for the enjoyments of fortune, and he could not but be affected with the delicate and dignified way in which this national recompense was awarded to him.

Every thing was now disposed so as to put the constitution in the full vigour of activity during the first days of January, 1800 (Nivôse, year VIII.), that is, in the first days of the year which was about to close that wonderful century.

BOOK II.

GOVERNMENT OF THE INTERIOR.

THE CONSULAR GOVERNMENT DEFINITIVELY ESTABLISHED.—COMPOSITION OF THE SENATE, OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, OF THE TRIBUNATE, AND OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE.—MANIFESTO OF THE FIRST CONSUL TO THE EUROPEAN POWERS.—PUBLIC TENDERS OF PEACE TO ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA.—PROCLAMATIONS ADDRESSED TO LA VENDÉE.—OPENING OF THE FIRST SESSION.—RISING OPPOSITION IN THE TRIBUNATE.—SPEECHES OF THE TRIBUNES DUVEYRIER AND BENJAMIN CONSTANT.—A CONSIDERABLE MAJORITY APPROVES THE MEASURES OF THE CONSULS.—NUMEROUS LAWS FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC BODIES.—INSTITUTION OF PREFECTURES AND SUBPREFECTURES.—CREATION OF TRIBUNALS OF THE FIRST INSTANCE, AND OF APPEAL.—CLOSE OF THE LIST OF EMIGRANTS.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHT OF MAKING WILLS AND DISPOSING OF PROPERTY.—LAW OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE.—BANK OF FRANCE.—SEQUEL TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EUROPE.—REFUSAL OF ENGLAND TO LISTEN TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.—WARM DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.—AUSTRIA REFUSES IN MILDER BUT NOT LESS POSITIVE TERMS THAN THOSE OF ENGLAND.—NECESSITY FOR RECOMMENCING HOSTILITIES.—UNABLE TO SUCCEED WITH THE BELLIGERENT POWERS IN BRINGING ABOUT PEACE, THE FIRST CONSUL ENDEAVOURS TO ATTACH PRUSSIA TO FRANCE, AND EXPLAINS HIS VIEWS TO HER IN A FRANK MANNER.—HE APPLIES HIMSELF TO TERMINATE THE WAR IN LA VENDÉE BEFORE OPENING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1800.—SITUATION OF PARTIES IN LA VENDÉE.—CONDUCT OF THE ABBÉ BERNIER.—PEACE OF MONTFAUCON.—AUTICHAMP, CHÂTILLON, BOURMONT, AND GEORGES CADOUDAL, PROCEED TO PARIS AND SEE THE FIRST CONSUL.—DE FROTTÉ IS SHOT.—FINAL SUBMISSION OF LA VENDÉE.—TROOPS PUT IN MOTION FOR THE FRONTIERS.—THE SESSION OF THE YEAR VIII. CLOSES IN TRANQUILLITY.—REGULATIONS OF THE POLICE IN REGARD TO THE PRESS.—FUNERAL CEREMONY ON THE OCCASION OF THE DEATH OF WASHINGTON.—THE FIRST CONSUL TAKES UP HIS RESIDENCE IN THE PALACE OF THE TUILERIES.

The day appointed for the entrance of the consuls upon their functions, and for the first sitting of the conservative senate, was the 4th Nivôse in the year VIII., or the 25th of December, 1799. It being necessary to organize both the executive power and the senate before they could perform their duties, numerous public appointments necessarily took place before that day.

Bonaparte, whose business it was to nominate the agents of the executive power, and Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, Cambacérès, and Lebrun, entrusted with the choice of the members of the senate, that in its own turn had to select the members of the legislative body and of the tribunate, were besieged with solicitations from all quarters. Appointments were sought to the senate, to the legislative body, the tribunate, the council of state, and the prefecture. It must be confessed that such offices, yielding no slight emoluments, all to be filled up at one time, were well calculated to tempt ambition. Many of the more ardent revolutionists, enemies of the 18th Brumaire, were already become wonderfully reconciled to the new state of things. Waverers, of whom there were many that took this side as soon as success had declared itself, began to express their opinions aloud. An expression at that time current, as particular expressions at such times are certain to be, depicted perfectly the state of the public mind. "We must show ourselves," was the phrase in every mouth. "We must prove, that far from desiring to create obstacles in the way of the new government, we are

ready to assist in overcoming those which encircle it;" thus signifiying how much they wished to attract towards themselves the attention of the five personages who possessed the power of nomination to the good things of the state. There were some among the applicants who, in order to obtain an appointment to the tribunate, promised their devoted support to the consular government, having already resolved to direct towards it the most annoying opposition.

When in a revolution the flame of the passions begins to lower itself, cupidity succeeds to violence, and fear is suddenly metamorphosed into disgust. If actions of the greatest virtue, and if heroic deeds, did not cover by their brightness the melancholy details,—above all, if the great and beneficial results which nations obtain from social revolutions, did not compensate the present evil by the immensity of the future good, it would become us to turn away our eyes from the spectacle they offer to mankind. They are the trials to which providence submits human society in order to effect its regeneration. It is, therefore, our duty to study with care, profitably if we can, the picture, repulsive and sublime by turns, which is thus presented to us.

The impulse at this moment imparted to the ambition of all classes was, it appears, very considerable indeed, fully strong enough to attract the attention of the writers of the day, and to afford a subject for their animadversion. The *Moniteur*, not at that moment the official organ, though in a few days afterwards, on the 7th Nivôse, it became such, stigmatized the baseness of the period. It said: "Since the constitution has created a number of well-paid places, how people bestir themselves! How many unfamiliar visages are now forward in showing themselves! How many forgotten newly-revived names bustle about amid the dust of the revolution! How many fierce republicans of the year VII. humiliate themselves, that they may be heard by the man of power, who can bestow places upon them! How many Bruti are begging appointments! How many men of small abilities are extolled to the skies! What trivial services are exaggerated! What stains of blood are concealed from view! This astonishing shift of scenery has happened in an instant. It is to be hoped that the hero of liberty, who has been hitherto marked in the revolution by the benefits which he has conferred, will see these manœuvres with the disgust they must excite in every lofty mind, and that he will not tolerate, in a crowd of obscure or disreputable persons, their envelopement in the rays of his glory [1]."

But let the good be separated from the evil; let us not believe that such a picture was exhibited by the whole nation. If there were persons who degraded themselves, there were others who, without self-degradation, came forward, waiting not unworthily the appeal that the government would make to their zeal and intelligence. If Benjamin Constant, for instance, sought admission to the tribunate, with great earnestness and assurances of devotion to the family of Bonaparte, De Tracy, Volney, Monge, Carnot, Ginguené, and Ducis made no such applications, but left to the free will of the constituent power the act of including them or not in that extended nomination of public functionaries.

On the 24th of December, being the 3rd Nivôse, the new consuls met for the purpose of proceeding to the composition of the council of state, so that the installation of the government might be effected on the day following, or on the 25th of December, the 4th Nivôse. Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, the retiring consuls, with Cambacérès and Lebrun, who were about to enter upon office, proceeded to the Luxembourg in order to nominate the half, and an additional one of the members of the senate, so as to constitute the majority; this being done, it enabled the portion of the senate elected to complete itself on the morrow, and proceed to the composition of the great deliberative bodies of the state.

The council of state was divided into five sections, namely, those of the finances, of civil and criminal legislation, of war, of the marine, and of the interior. Each section had a councillor of state for president, and over all the first consul presided in person, or when absent, one of his colleagues, Cambacérès or Lebrun, took his place.

Each of the sections was to draw up the proposed bills and the regulations which might belong to matters within its own competency. These bills and regulations were to be afterwards discussed in a general assembly of the united sections. The council of state was charged besides with the decision of all the points in those administrations which might chance to be contested, and also was to settle questions of competency, whether between the civil tribunals and the administration, or among the tribunals themselves. These are the self-same powers which it exercises at the present time, but it then possessed alone the privilege of drawing up the laws, as well as the exclusive right to discuss them before the legislative body; and still further, the great questions that arose in the government were communicated to it, sometimes even to the extent of those involving foreign policy, of which instances will appear hereafter. At this time, therefore, the council of state was not merely a council of administration, but, in the full sense of the term, a council of government.

Some of the members of the council were charged in the different departments of the ministry with any special services to which more than common importance was attributed, or that required more than extraordinary attention. These departments were those of public instruction, of the national domains, the treasury, the colonies, and the public works. The counsellors of state, to whom the charge was committed of the management of these different branches, were placed under the control of the proper minister. The members of the council of state were well paid, receiving each 25,000 f. annually, and their president 35,000 f. These sums, it should be recollected, were more considerable at that time than they would be now. The post of a councillor of state was an object of higher ambition than a senatorial seat, because, with emoluments equal to those of senators, and with equal public consideration, the members of that body were admitted as fully as the ministers themselves to the management of the most important public business.

The principal members of the council of state

[1] *Moniteur*, 3d Nivôse.

were, for the section or department of war: Brune, Lacuée, and Marmont; for that of the marine, De Champagny, Ganteaume, and Fleurieu; that of finances, Defermon, Duchâtel, Dufresne; of justice, Boulay de la Meurthe, Berlier, Réal; of the interior, Rœderer, Cretet, Chaptal, Regnault St. Jean d'Angely, Fourcroy. The five presidents were: Brune, Ganteaume, Defermon, Boulay de la Meurthe, and Rœderer. It would not have been possible to select individuals of greater note, nor possessing more various and sterling talents. Here it is but just to remark, that the French revolution showed itself wonderfully prolific in men of ability of every kind; and that if no attention were paid to exclusions dictated by party feeling, either on one side or on the other, there were the means at hand for composing a most able, varied, and it may be said, glorious government, as far as concerned individual talent. The course pursued by the first consul was marked by this feeling. M. Devaisnes, censured loudly for his royalism, but professionally a man of practical knowledge in finance, was appointed to office, in which he proved himself afterwards highly useful.

On the same day, December 24th, or 3d Nivôse, Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, Cambacérès, and Lebrun, met together in order to nominate the twenty-nine senators, who, with the consuls about to vacate office, should number in all thirty-one of the members. As may be supposed, the list had been drawn out previously, and contained names of high repute, such as those of Berthollet, Laplace, who had recently quitted the ministry of the interior, Monge, Tracy, Volney, Cabanis, Kellerman, Garat, Lacépède, and Ducis, but the last declined accepting the honour.

Upon the morrow, December 25th, or Nivôse 4th, the council of state met for the first time, the consuls being present, accompanied by the ministers. The subject of their deliberations was a proposed law to settle the relations of the great bodies of the state towards each other. Various projected measures to be presented to the legislative body in the approaching session were also agreed upon.

On the other hand, the senate met at the palace of the Luxembourg, and elected twenty-nine new members, which carried up the senators to sixty. It will be remembered that this number was afterwards to be increased to eighty. In this additional list were comprehended very distinguished names: Lagrange, Darcet, François de Neufchâteau, Daubenton, Bougainville, Perrégaux, the banker, and De Choiseul-Praslin, an individual of very ancient family.

The formation of the legislative body and of the tribunate by the senate, occupied several successive days. The men of the most moderate character were preferred for the legislative body, out of those who had been so distinguished in the constituent and legislative assemblies, in the national convention, and council of five hundred. Care was taken to choose from these different bodies men who had been regardless of making a stir in public affairs, who had not sought popularity too much, and had shown little inclination to be distinguished; those of a contrary character were reserved for the tribunate. In consequence, the names that were enrolled in the legislative body were not remarkable for brilliancy, so that it would be a difficult task to point out in the three hundred of which that body consisted, only two or three names known at the present time. The modest and brave Latour d'Auvergne was, it is true, one of them, a hero worthy of antiquity for his virtues, his actions, and his noble end.

The hundred individuals of the tribunate were selected with the natural object of affording active, stirring minds, emulous of renown, an opportunity for the display of their abilities, an object afterwards bitterly repented of. Some of their names may be faded a little in remembrance, but are not forgotten at the present time. Among them were Chénier, Andrieux, Chauvelin, Stanislas de Girardin, Benjamin Constant, Daunou, Riouffe, Bérenger, Ganilh, Ginguené, Laromiguière, Jean-Baptiste Say, and others.

As soon as the formation of these bodies had terminated, the places for their meeting were assigned. The Tuileries was reserved for the three consuls; the Luxembourg was appropriated to the senate; the Palais Bourbon to the legislative body, and the Palais Royale to the tribunate.

The Tuileries was rendered habitable at the expense of some hundred thousand francs; and while this was achieving, the consuls lived in the Petit-Luxembourg.

Since his return from Egypt, Bonaparte had already effected a good deal. He had overthrown the directory, and had acquired an authority inferior in appearance, but in reality superior to a constitutional monarchy. But scarcely was he in possession of this authority before it was necessary for him to legitimatize its possession by useful labours, and the performance of great actions. He had still a vast deal to accomplish; his first essays at re-organization were but as a single effort, beyond doubt fortunate so far, but they left the nation still in great disorder, suffering grievously with a straitened treasury, misery in the armies, and the flame of civil war in La Vendée, hesitation among the neutral powers, and a relentless struggle determined upon on the part of the belligerent powers. Nevertheless, the possession of authority, coming after his first labours, and preceding the mighty task which he felt a confidence of very soon performing, gratified his ambitious spirit.

In order to celebrate his installation in the government, he performed a series of acts accumulated with that design, in which deep policy may be perceived, heartfelt pleasure, and that generous feeling which satisfaction affords to every benevolent and sensitive mind. These were made known in succession, between the 25th of December, the 4th of Nivôse, the day of the installation of the consular government, and January 1st, 1800, the 11th Nivôse, the day of the opening of the first legislative session.

A judgment of the council of state in the first place, under date of the 27th December, or 6th Nivôse, decreed that the laws which excluded the relations of emigrants and the former nobility from public functions, should die as a thing of course, because they were contrary to the principles of the new constitution.

A number of persons attached to the revolutionary party, had been sentenced, as already stated, to transportation or imprisonment, in consequence of a step taken under too little reflection, shortly after

the 18th Brumaire. The transportation and imprisonment had been before changed to a surveillance of the high or political police. A decree was now issued, dated the 5th of Nivôse, for the termination even of this surveillance. Having made reparation thus far to those who were so near experiencing his severity, the first consul fulfilled a more important and necessary act of justice towards the victims of the directory and the governments which preceded it. These unfortunate persons, who had been sent off without a trial, were permitted to return home under the obligation of residing in the places assigned to them. This permission included individuals proscribed at every period, but in a particular manner those banished on the 18th Fructidor. Boissy d'Anglas, Dumolard, and Pastoret, thus recalled, were authorized to reside, the first at Annonay, the second at Grenoble, and the third at Dijon. Carnot, Portalis, Quatremère-Quincey, Siméon, Villaret-Joyeuse, Barbé-Marbois, and Barrère, were also recalled, and ordered to reside in Paris. The care to place in the capital, which was not their native place, such men as Carnot, Siméon, and Portalis, plainly showed that the government had its eyes upon them, and intended to make use of their talents.

Other measures were taken relative to public worship and its free exercise. On the 28th of December, or 7th Nivôse, it was decreed that the buildings devoted to the ceremonies of religion should continue to be set apart for that purpose, or should be again appropriated to that use, in case they had not been restored already to the ministers of the various persuasions. Some of the local authorities having a desire to obstruct the Catholic worship, forbade the opening of the churches except upon the "decadi" in place of the Sunday. The consuls reversed these decisions of the municipalities, and in addition to the free use of the religious edifices, they added the right of opening them on the days customary in the particular form of worship to which they belonged. They did not yet venture to interdict the ceremonies of the Theophilanthropists, which took place in the churches on particular days of the week, and were regarded by the Catholics as profanations.

The form of the civil engagement required from the priesthood or clergy, was modified by the consuls. They had been compelled before to take an especial oath to a civil constitution of the priesthood, an oath which obliged them to acknowledge a legislation at variance, as some of them contended, with the laws of their church. It was conceived best to impose upon them only a simple asseveration of obedience to the state, which could not raise a just scruple in any of them, unless indeed they refused that "obedience to Cæsar," which is so rigorously commanded by the Catholic religion. This was afterwards styled, "the promise," as contradistinguished from "the oath," and it recalled to their religious duties, almost immediately, a great number of the priesthood. Those who had taken the oath before, styled the "sworn[1]," were already reconciled with the government; the others who were styled "unsworn[2]," were now in their turn received into favour.

To measures similar with the preceding, the first consul added one which in a peculiar manner attached to himself, because it recalled things which were in some sort personal to him. He had negociated with the defunct Pope Pius VI., and signed the treaty of Tolentino, at the gates of Rome. From the year 1797, he had affected to show great regard for the head of the Catholic church, having received marked testimonies of the kindness of his holiness. Pius VI. died at Valence, in Dauphiné, but had not at that time received the rites of sepulture. His mortal remains were deposited in a sacristy. Bonaparte, on his return from Egypt, met Cardinal Spina, at Valence, became acquainted with the circumstances, and determined to make early compensation for the unseemly neglect which had occurred.

On the 30th of December, 9th Nivôse, he got the consuls to join in a decree founded on the highest considerations.

The decree was as follows:—

"The consuls reflecting that the body of Pius VI. has been left in the city of Valence without having had granted to it the rites of sepulture:—

"That though this old man may have been the enemy of France for a moment, from being misled by the counsels of those who were around him in his advanced age:—

"That it is worthy the dignity of the French nation, and in conformity with its character, that respect should be shown to him who occupied one of the first offices upon earth: the consuls therefore decree," &c. Then followed the provisions, ordering at the same time funeral honours to the pontiff, and that a monument should be erected as a record of the dignity and rank of the deceased.

This demonstration of respect for the mortal remains of the Pope, produced, perhaps, a greater effect than the most humane measures would have done, because it struck the public mind habituated to different spectacles. A vast number of persons flocked in consequence to Valence, to take advantage of the authority thus given for a manifestation of a religious character.

The catalogue of the revolutionary festivals contained one conceived in the worst possible spirit, celebrated on the 21st of January[3]. Whatever might be the opinions of men of every party in regard to the tragical event which connected itself with that date, it was a barbarous festival, kept to commemorate a sanguinary catastrophe. Bonaparte had exhibited a great dislike to attend it in the time of the directory, not that by doing so he had any notion of paying honours to the royalty he was afterwards to establish for his own advantage, but because he was fond of publicly defying similar feelings in which he did not share. Now become the head of the government, he obtained the decision of the legislative commission, that there should be no more than two festivals, that of the first day of the revolution kept on the 14th of July, and the festival of the 1st Vendémiaire, the anniversary of the first day of the republic. "These days," said he, "are imperishable in the minds of the citizens; they have been greeted by every Frenchman with unanimous transports, and arouse no recollections tending to carry divisions among the friends of the republic."

[1] Assermentés. [2] Non-assermentés. [3] Death of Louis XVI.

It required all the power and resolution of the chief of the new government to hazard a series of measures, which, though in themselves just, moral, and politic, appeared to hot-headed persons but as so many precursory acts to a counter-revolution. But, in effecting all this, Bonaparte took care to give himself the foremost example of the forgetfulness of political animosity, to awaken at times with éclat that sentiment of glory by which he led captive the men of that time, and snatched them away from the base fury of party feeling. Thus he appointed general Augereau, who had offended him by his conduct on the 18th Brumaire, to the command of the army in Holland. "Show," he wrote him in a letter, which was published, "show in all the acts that your command will give you occasion to perform, that you are above all these wretched party dissensions, the recoil of which has been so unfortunate for ten years past in tearing France to pieces. * * * * * If circumstances force me to take the field in person, you may rest assured that I shall not leave you in Holland, and that I can never forget the glorious day of Castiglione."

At the same time he instituted the presentation of "arms of honour," the prelude to the establishment of the legion of honour. French democracy, after having displayed a horror of personal distinctions, could barely tolerate at that time rewards for military exploits. In consequence of an article of the constitution, the first consul caused a resolution to be passed, that for every distinguished action, a musket of honour should be presented to the infantry soldier, a carabine of honour to the cavalry, grenades of honour to the artillery, and swords of honour to the officers of all ranks. The first consul carried out this resolution, which was decreed on the 25th December, or 4th Nivôse, by positive acts. On the following day he presented a sword to general St. Cyr, for a brilliant affair by which that general distinguished himself in the Apennines; "Receive," said he, "as a testimony of my satisfaction, a handsome sabre, which you will wear on the day of battle. Make known to the soldiers under your command, that I am satisfied with them, and that I hope to be so still more."

By these acts that announced the taking possession of power, he marked the character of his government, and showed his determination to be above the feelings of party. The first consul added immediately to these, proceedings of still more importance in regard to La Vendée and the foreign powers of Europe.

A truce had been signed with the Vendéans, conferences had commenced, and yet peace had not been concluded. Bonaparte had left no doubt in the minds of the royalists, who had applied to him with the view of discovering his intentions as to whether he would be satisfied with being the restorer and supporter of the house of Bourbon. He had undeceived them by showing himself irrevocably attached to the cause of the revolution, and this frankness in his declarations had not tended to aid the work of conciliation which had been begun. The Vendéan chiefs hesitated, being placed between the fear inspired by the rigour of the new government and the instances of the emigrants in London, authorized by Pitt to promise them arms, money, and men.

It was on a new insurrection in La Vendée that England particularly calculated. She proposed making upon this part of our coast an attempt similar to that which she had attempted in Holland. The ill success of the last attempt did not discourage her, and she requested, with great earnestness, of the emperor Paul, the assistance of his troops, though without much chance of obtaining it. Prussia, which began to testify a species of interest for the consular government, never ceased repeating to the aid-de-camp Duroc, and M. Otto, chargé d'affaires of France, "Finish the business of La Vendée, for it is there that you will receive the most serious blow."

Bonaparte was well aware of this. Independently of the mischief that was done by La Vendée occupying a part of the military force of the republic, a civil war seemed in his view not only a misfortune, but a species of dishonour to the government, as it bespoke a deplorable internal condition of the country. He had therefore taken the most effectual measures to put an end to it. He had recalled from Holland a part of the army, that under general Brune had beaten the Anglo-Russians, and had joined to that force a part of the garrison of Paris, which he was able to diminish considerably without any apprehension, supplying the diminution by the influence of his own name. By this means he was able to assemble in the west an army of 60,000 men. General Brune was placed at its head, with the recommendation to retain as his principal lieutenant the wise and conciliatory Hédouville, who held all the threads of the negociation with the royalists. The name of general Brune was a reply to those who counted upon a new Anglo-Russian descent. But before striking the decisive blow, if the conditions of the pacification were not finally accepted, the first consul believed it his duty to address the Vendéans on the very day of his installation.

On the 29th of December, 8th Nivôse, he addressed to the departments of the west a decree of the consuls, accompanied by a proclamation, to the following effect:—

"An impious war threatens for the second time to set the western departments on fire. The duty of the supreme magistrates of the republic is to hinder the spreading of the conflagration, and to extinguish it in its focus; but they are unwilling to use force until they have exhausted the means of persuasion and justice."

Distinguishing between guilty men sold to the foreigner, for ever irreclaimable with the republic, and the misguided who had joined in the civil war to resist cruel persecution, the first consul recalled every thing which was likely to gain the confidence of the last, and bring them beneath the rule of the new government; such as the revocation of the law of the hostages, the restoration of the churches to the priesthood, the liberty granted to all for the observation of Sunday; he promised, lastly, a full and entire amnesty to those who submitted, and delivered up the arms furnished them by England. He added, that the most severe measures would be taken against those who persisted in the insurrection. He announced the suspension of the constitution; in other words, the employment of extraordinary jurisdictions in those places where insurgent bodies continued to show themselves in arms. "The government," said the conclusion of

the proclamation of the consuls, "will pardon, it will show favour to the repentant; its forgiveness shall be entire and absolute; but it will strike down whoever after this proclamation shall dare to resist the national sovereignty. But no, we will acknowledge only the sentiment—the love of our country. The ministers of a God of peace will be the first means of conciliation and concord. Let them speak to all hearts the language which they learned in the school of their Master; let them visit those temples which are re-opened for them to offer the sacrifice which shall expiate the crimes of the war and the blood which has been spilled!"

This manifesto, having at its back a formidable force, was calculated to produce an effect, above all, as proceeding from a new government, a perfect stranger to the faults and excesses which had served as the pretext for civil war.

Having acted thus in regard to the enemy within, the first consul next addressed himself to the enemy without the frontiers, fully resolved to take a formal step towards the only two powers that had not shown any sign of desiring amicable relations with France, but, on the contrary, were obstinately bent upon war, namely, Austria and Great Britain.

Prussia, it has been seen, had received Duroc in a very flattering manner, and daily gave fresh testimonies of her sympathy with the first consul. Satisfied as to her existing relations with his government, Prussia wished him success against anarchy, success against the forces of Austria. As to offering herself as a mediatrix, she still nourished the thought, but dreaded to take the first step, thinking that peace was yet far off, and unwilling too soon to engage herself in a course of which it was impossible to foresee the tendency. In fact, whoever at that time observed closely the state of things in Europe, might easily see that to unloose the ties between England and Austria would require another campaign. The court of Madrid had seen with equal satisfaction the accession of Bonaparte to the consulship, since with him the alliance between Spain and France seemed both more honourable, as well as more profitable. But the horizon was not completely clear. Bonaparte resolved, therefore, on the same day that the constitution invested him officially with new authority, to address himself to those powers who were decided enemies, to offer them peace, and thus to place them in the wrong if they refused it. After that he could appeal to arms, with the opinion of the world upon his side.

First he gave orders to all the agents of France, already appointed, who had not quitted Paris, because it was deemed right they should be accredited from the government definitively constituted; General Beurnonville to set out for Berlin, M. Alquier for Madrid, M. de Sémonville for the Hague, M. Bourgoing for Copenhagen. General Beurnonville was ordered to compliment adroitly the king of Prussia, by requesting from him a bust of the great Frederick to place in the grand gallery of Diana in the Tuileries. The first consul was at this time arranging there the busts of the great characters whom he held in particular admiration. M. Alquier, in bearing to Madrid the kindest assurances to the king and queen, was charged to add to them a present for the Prince of Peace, who exercised considerable influence in the court, although he was no more minister. The present consisted of some beautiful arms from the manufactory of Versailles, then noted all over Europe for the perfection to which the manufacture there was carried.

This being done, the first consul took the step he had projected in regard to the two courts of England and Austria. It is the general custom to disguise such proceedings by previously making side-long overtures, in order to spare the humiliation of a refusal. Bonaparte, in communicating thus with England and Austria, intended to address the whole world; for which purpose he wanted a serious overture out of the way of accustomed forms, addressed to the hearts of the sovereigns themselves, and thus either to flatter or embarrass them. In consequence, he did not transmit a note to Lord Grenville or M. Thugut, but he wrote two letters directly to the king of England and the emperor of Germany, which the ministers at those courts were requested to present to their respective sovereigns. That addressed to the king of England was as follows:—

Paris, 5th Nivôse, year VIII.
(Dec. 26, 1799.)

"Sire,—Called by the desire of the French nation to fill the chief magistracy of the republic, I think it fitting, on entering upon office, to make a direct communication on the subject to your majesty.

"Is the war which, for eight years, has ravaged the four quarters of the globe, to be eternal? Is there, then, no mode of coming to an understanding?

"How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, stronger and more powerful than their safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the blessings of commerce, internal prosperity, and domestic happiness? How can they help feeling that peace is the first of wants, as well as of glories?

"These sentiments cannot be strange to your majesty, who governs a free nation, with the sole aim to render it happy.

"In this overture, your majesty will discover only my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to the general pacification by a prompt procedure, entirely confidential, and divested of those forms which, necessary perhaps for disguising the dependence of weak states, betray only in strong states a mutual desire to deceive each other.

"France, England, by the abuse of their strength, may, for a long time to come, to the misfortune of all nations, retard its exhaustion; but I dare assert, the lot of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which has thrown the whole world into a conflagration.

(Signed) "BONAPARTE,
"First consul of the French republic."

On the same day the first consul addressed the following letter to the emperor of Germany:—

"On returning to Europe, after an absence of eighteen months, I find the war rekindled between the French republic and your majesty.

"The French nation calls me to occupy the chief magistracy.

"A stranger to every feeling of vain-glory, the first of my wishes is to stop the effusion of the blood that is about to be spilt. Every thing proclaims that, in the next campaign, numerous and ably directed armies will triple the number of the victims hitherto sacrificed, by the resumption of hostilities. The known character of your majesty leaves me no doubt respecting the wish of your heart. If that wish alone is consulted, I perceive a possibility of reconciling the interests of the two nations.

"In the communications which I have previously had with your majesty, you have personally testified some regard for me. I request you to consider the step which I am taking as proceeding from a wish to make a return for it, and to convince you more and more of the very high respect which I entertain for your majesty.

(Signed) "BONAPARTE,
"First consul of the French republic."

Such was the mode in which the first consul announced his accession, both to the domestic parties that divided France, and to the foreign cabinets which coalesced against her. In offering to make peace, he was prepared to secure it by conquest if it could not be got by amicable negociation. His intention was to employ the winter in making a short and decisive campaign in La Vendée, that in the following spring he might be able to send over the Rhine and Alps the troops which at the termination of the war at home might become disposable for foreign operations.

While awaiting the result of these proceedings, he opened the legislative session on the 1st of January, 1800, the 11th Nivôse, year VIII., and he determined to devote this session of four months to perfect the administrative organization of France, which had scarcely commenced, by means of wholesome legislation. He substituted his brother Lucien for the scientific La Place, in the ministry of the interior; and M. Abrial for the ministry of justice, in place of Cambacérès, now become consul. The new minister of justice was an upright man, much attached to business.

On the 1st of January, 1800, the senate, legislative body, and tribunate assembled. The senate elected Sieyès president; the legislative body Perrin des Vosges; the tribunate Daunou. Numerous outlines of proposed laws were immediately laid before the legislative body.

A sort of anxiety was exhibited to witness the new meeting of these deliberative assemblages. The people were tired of agitation, and desired repose; they possessed no more that strong love for political oratory which they showed in 1789, when Mirabeau, Barnave, Maury, and Cazalès, opened a new career of glory—that of the tribune. The animosity against the bar was universal, and men of action alone found favour, who were capable of procuring victory and peace for the country. Still the public had not yet decided upon the establishment of absolute power, nor did they desire that all freedom, all rational discussion, should cease. If the power of action which a new legislator had planted in the constitution by creating the first consul, and by choosing for the magistracy the greatest captain of the age, if this power were incompatible with freedom, they were ready to sacrifice it; although every body would have been pleased at the reconciliation of freedom with substantial strength, if it were possible. Those who thought so were not the vulgar agitators and obstinate republicans; for there were eminent men, of enlightened, sober minds, who would have felt pain to see the revolution belie itself so soon, and so completely.

Meanwhile the neutral party inquired with curiosity,—the well-disposed with real anxiety,—how the tribunate, the only body which had the power of speaking, would conduct itself towards the government, and how the government would bear an opposition, if any resulted from it.

When a reaction comes on, however general it may be, it cannot carry every one along with it; while it irritates as well as annoys those whom it does not. Chénier, Andrieux, Ginguené, Daunou, and Benjamin Constant, who had seats in the tribunate, De Tracy, Volney, and Cabanis, who were members of the senate, while they all deplored the crimes of the reign of terror, were not disposed to think that the French revolution was wrong in its conduct towards its adversaries.

The monarchical and religious doctrines, which were beginning to show themselves once more, nettled them, the more especially from the precipitancy and want of moderation with which this return to ancient ideas was coming into action; and they felt a discontent which they were at no pains to conceal. The majority of them were sincere. Strongly attached to the revolution, they desired to preserve it nearly entire, save its blood and rapine; and they by no means desired what they thought they could discover in the secret intentions of the first consul. To stop the persecution of the priests was well; but to favour them to the extent of restoring them to their altars, was too much for these faithful followers of the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Again, it was good to give greater unity and strength to the government; but to push the wish for this to the extent of re-establishing a monarchical unity for the advantage of a soldier, was also, in their eyes, going too far. For the rest, as always happens, their motives were different. If these were the opinions of Chénier, Ginguené, Daunou, Tracy, and Cabanis, such could not be those of M. Constant, who certainly, in the society of the Necker family, in which he lived, had imbibed neither an aversion to religion, or a special taste for the French revolution. Placed in the tribunate at the solicitation of his friends, he became in a few days the most active and talented of the new opposition, a course to which he was inclined by the natural bent of his disposition towards raillery, but more especially by the discontent of the Necker family, of which he himself partook. Madame de Staël, who then represented in herself alone that illustrious family, had been a great admirer of Bonaparte; nor would it have cost him much trouble to make a conquest of one, whose imagination was sensibly alive to all that was great; but, though endowed by nature with a mind as noble as his genius, by some expression not too delicate, he had offended a woman, whose pretensions beyond her sex displeased him; and had thus excited in her heart an angry feeling

against himself, which, even if not formidable, might be annoying. Every fault, however slight, has its fruits; and the first consul was soon to reap the fruits of his, in meeting with an inconvenient opposition from those who were placed under the attractive influence of Madame de Staël—of this number was Benjamin Constant.

The tribunate had been located at the Palais Royal, certainly without any intention, and solely from necessity; the Tuileries had been restored to the head of the government; the Luxembourg, in former times belonging to the council of ancients, had naturally been given to the senate; the Palais Bourbon was set aside for the legislative body; there remained then only the Palais Royal to be appropriated to the tribunate. Such was the disposition in certain minds to take in bad part, acts the most simple, that they complained bitterly of a wish to depreciate the tribunate, by placing it in this general haunt of disorder and debauchery. In the discussion of some formal matters on the 2nd and 3rd of January, one of the members, M. Duveyrier, suddenly rose to speak, and complained of certain measures, which he said were injurious to many proprietors of establishments that had for years existed in the Palais Royal. Now the interest of these claimants was but trifling, and more than this, they had already been indemnified; nevertheless, the tribune, Duveyrier, eagerly inveighed against this pretended injustice, and said that the national representatives ought not to be rendered unpopular by being made responsible for acts of severity committed in their name. Then passing on to the choice of situation, "I am not," he said, "of the number of those who are offended that it has been chosen to place the tribunate here, in a place usually the theatre of disorders and excesses of every kind. I see in this neither danger nor disrespect to us; on the contrary, I give its due to the patriotic intention of those who desire that the tribunes of the people should hold their sittings in the midst of the people; that the defenders of liberty should be placed in a place which witnessed the first triumph of that liberty. I thank them that they have given us to see from this very tribune, the spot where the noble-spirited Camille Desmoulins gave the signal for our glorious movement, and displayed the national cockade, that most glorious of our trophies and our rallying sign for ever; that cockade which has given birth to so many prodigies, to which so many heroes owe the honour of their arms, and which we never will lay down but with life. I thank them that we can see that spot, where, if we wished to raise an idol of fifteen days, we could call to mind the fall of an idol of fifteen centuries."

So rough an attack naturally created a lively sensation in the assembly, and quickly after in Paris. The tribunate passed on to the order of the day, the majority of the members disapproving such a sally, but its effect was not thereby lessened. It was a bad beginning for an assembly, which, if desirous of preserving liberty from the dangers by which it was menaced in so general a reaction, needed to use much circumspection, both in regard to the readiness of many minds to take alarm, and to the head of a government easily irritated.

A scene like this could not fail of consequences. The first consul was much enraged, and the humble worshippers of his rising power were loud in their exclamations. Stanislas de Girardin, de Chauvelin, and some others, who, without wishing to surrender their independence to the new government, yet disapproved of so ill-timed an opposition, spoke at the next sitting; and, to correct the effect of the discourse of the tribune Duveyrier, they proposed the taking a kind of oath to the constitution. "Before we proceed to our labours," said M. de Girardin, "I think that we ought to give the nation some striking evidence of our attachment to the constitution. I do not propose to you that we swear to maintain it; I know, and so do you, the inutility of oaths; but I believe it to be useful that, when we assume duties, a promise should be given to perform them faithfully. Let us follow the example of the conservative senate, and of the council of state: in so doing, we shall confirm the opinion that should be entertained of us, and silence the malevolence which now gives out that the tribunate makes an organized resistance to the government. No! the tribunal is no focus of opposition, it is a focus of intelligence. No! it is not the wish of the tribunate to be ever attacking the measures of the government; on the contrary, it is ready to welcome with pleasure whatever may be conformable to the interests of the public. The tribunate will apply itself rather to calm passions than seek to irritate them. Its moderation will place it between all the factions, to reunite and break them up. It was the moderate party who brought about the 18th Brumaire, that day of safety and of glory which preserved France from domestic anarchy and foreign invasion. Let us return, in order to save the republic, to the principles on which it was founded; but let us avoid a return to those excesses which have too often brought it to the verge of destruction. If we can see from this place the spot where, for the first time, was displayed the signal of liberty, from hence, too, we can equally see the place in which were conceived those crimes which have fixed the stain of blood on our Revolution. Myself, I am far from applauding the choice that has been made of this palace for our sittings; on the contrary, I regret it; but, for the rest, the memories which it recalls are happily far away from us. The time has gone by for vehement harangues or appeals to the seditious groups of the Palais Royal; nevertheless, if a certain style of declamation can no longer destroy us, it may retard our progress towards prosperity; resounding from this tribunate through Paris, from Paris through all Europe, it may awaken alarm, and furnish a pretext for delaying that peace which we all desire. Peace," added M. de Girardin, "peace should occupy our minds unceasingly; and when this great interest shall be always present, we shall not permit ourselves any more expressions such as the other day escaped one of our colleagues, and which none of us took up, since there was no one to apply them to, for we know of no idol in France."

The speaker concluded by moving, that each tribune should make a declaration as follows: "I promise to perform with fidelity the functions which the constitution has assigned to me."

This proposition was adopted; and M. Duveyrier, annoyed at the scandal his speech had excited,

attempted to excuse it, expressing his wish to be the first to make the declaration suggested by M. de Girardin. All the members of the tribunate hastened to repeat it after him.

The effect, then, of the first scene, was somewhat remedied; nevertheless, the first consul conceived an insurmountable aversion to the tribunate, which, indeed, he would have equally felt for any free assembly using and abusing the liberty of speech: he caused, therefore, the insertion in the *Moniteur* of some very bitter remarks on the tribunes of France and Rome.

The sittings that followed were distinguished by fresh manifestations, as much to be regretted as the preceding. The first measure proposed by the government had for its object the regulation of the forms to be followed on the introduction, the debating, and the passing of the laws. This had been one of the subjects neglected in the constitution of the year VIII., and had been left to the legislature. In the proposed arrangement, not much regard was had to the tribunate. The plan of the government settled that the laws were to be brought in to the legislative body by three counsellors of state; that they were to be thence communicated to the tribunate; and that, on a day fixed by the government, the tribunate was to be prepared to discuss them by its three orators before the legislative body: the tribunate, however, might require a delay from the legislative body, whose duty it was to decide whether such delay should be accorded. It must be confessed, that a great slight was here shown towards the tribunate, since the government wished it to fulfil its task by a day fixed, a thing which it dared not have required of a section of the council of state or a ministerial department. No one, at this day, would venture to fix a day for a deliberative assembly so as to limit its discussion; this is a point which is left to its own understanding, and in case of urgency to its zeal. But the courtesies of parliament, like politeness, are the growth of usage, and could not with us precede the actual practice of representative government. From the violence of the revolution we passed almost without transition to military roughness. The commissions which, during a month, exercised the legislative power, by their discussions with closed doors, and their carrying laws through in four and twenty hours, had fully shown the taste of the first consul, which desired to be served and satisfied at once. This may suffice to explain, though not to excuse, the otherwise singular details of the government plan.

The new-born opposition in the tribunate was right, then, in combating this proposition; but it was unfortunate, after its indecorous commencement, that it should have to oppose the first proposition emanating from the consuls, as it gave rise to a notion that it was ever on the watch to attack; while to this misfortune was added the defect of the vexatious manner of the opposition. The most violent attack came from Constant, who, in one of those witty and ironical speeches for which he was famous, demanded that the tribunate should have some time allowed it for an examination of what laws were submitted to it, nor be expected to go through them at a gallop. He recalled to the consideration of this subject, the memory of those "laws of urgency" which were brought in during the revolution, and which had always led to most disastrous results: he demanded why there was such an anxiety to have done with the tribunate; why was it already considered as so hostile, that the passage of the laws through it must be cut as short as possible? "All this," added he, "is in accordance with the false idea that the tribunate is only a body in opposition, destined to do nothing more than unceasingly run contrary to the government; this is what it is not, this is what it shall not be, this it is which lowers us in the opinion of the public. This false idea has stamped on every article of this bill a restless and unreasonable impatience; we shall have bills presented to us, as it were, on the wing, in the hope that we may not catch them; they will traverse our examination like an enemy's army, to be made into laws before we can come up with them."

Many such cutting reflections were in this long speech; and it produced a sufficiently great sensation. Constant took great pains to maintain that the tribunate was not a body especially devoted to contradiction, and that it only opposed when compelled to do so by the public interest; but these protestations were delivered in a manner and a tone which gave them little credit, and rendered it evident that he all the while intended that systematic opposition which he took such pains to deny.

The tribune Riouffe, conspicuous for his faithful and generous friendship to the proscribed Girondists, was one of those whom the horrors of 1793 had so powerfully affected, that they were ready to throw themselves blindly into the arms of a new government, whatever that government might do. He was, therefore, desirous of repelling the attacks of Benjamin Constant, which, in his opinion, were indecorous.

"Suspicions," said he, "so injurious as those shown here yesterday, would be enough to break off all further communication in the relations between man and man; and it will be impossible for authorities, destined to live and act together, long to have intercourse with each other, if mutual respect be not regarded as a sacred duty with which they must never dispense."

He went on to say that he had, as far as he was concerned, an absolute confidence in the government; and here he undertook to deliver an eulogium on the first consul, which, though true, was too long, and couched in too strong terms: "When this orator," said he, "praises Camille Desmoulins, and that, the national convention, I will not shut myself up in the silence of conspiracy; I, too, will praise him, whom the whole world praises; and having hitherto confined myself in this place to celebrating proscribed virtue, I will assume a boldness of a different kind, and speaking the praises of genius in the bosom of power and victory, I will congratulate myself on seeing at the head of the republic the man who has obtained for the French nation the title of the Great Nation; I will proclaim him grand, element, just." M. Riouffe went on to compare Bonaparte to Cæsar and Hannibal; and by these expressions of an admiration, just, but unreasonable, provoked a manifestation sufficiently vexatious. He was frequently interrupted by cries of "question."—"I wish," replied M.

Riouffe, "to speak of the man whom all the world admires."—"Speak of the law," repeated his interrupters; and he was compelled to return to the subject.

Whether this lengthy and ill-timed, though sincere, expression of Riouffe's sentiments provoked the impatience of his interrupters, or whether the admiration he showed, was not shared in the same degree by the tribunate, the effect of this speech was by no means happy. Chauvelin endeavoured to remove it, by a speech in favour of the bill before them.

He confessed its faults, but "the circumstances," said he, "the circumstances which surround us, the condition of many of the departments, which require prompt as well as urgent measures; powerful political considerations; the calumny which watches our every action; the divisions which it is pleased to find amongst us; the pressing need of union between the powers of the state; all call upon us to pass the bill which is brought before us."

The bill was, in fact, put to the vote, and passed by a majority, which ought to have assured and tranquillized the government: a majority of fifty-four against twenty-six, decided that the orators of the tribunate should be commissioned to speak in the legislative body, in support of the proposed law. The legislative body received it with still greater favour, and passed it by a majority of two hundred and three against twenty-three. Nothing more could be wished, since, after all, a majority of two-thirds of the tribunate (a body whose opposition decided nothing, as they did not pass the laws), and a majority of nine-tenths of the legislative body, the only body whose vote was decisive, ought to have satisfied the first consul and his adherents, and have inclined them, by this exhibition of a spirit of liberty, to look with indulgence on these faults of manner, which, after all, were merely a right of that same liberty. But the first consul, though he could not be seriously alarmed, seemed, nevertheless, sorely mortified, and expressed himself in no measured terms. He began to make a frequent use of the press, which though by no means partial to, he yet knew how to turn to his own advantage. He caused to be inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 8th of January, the 18th Nivôse, a highly improper article, in which he undertook to show the little weight of this opposition, and to make it appear as no part of a settled plan to run counter to the government; imputing it to that desire, in some minds, of a perfection impossible in human laws, and to a wish in others to make a noise. "Thus," added the official journal, "every thing allows us to conclude that there does not exist in the tribunate an opposition combined and systematic; in a word, a real opposition. But every one has his thirst for glory; every one wishes to commit his name to the hundred tongues of fame; and some persons have yet to learn that they arrive less surely at distinction by an ambition of fine speeches, than by a perseverance in duties useful, though obscure, which the public applauds and values."

This manner of treating a great body of the state was by no means decorous, and evinced, on the part of the first consul, an intention to do as he pleased; while, on the part of France, it showed an inclination to put up with it.

These impressions, however, soon gave place to others. The vast labours of the government, in which the legislative body and the tribunate were called upon to take their share, soon attracted the attention of all minds, and occupied them to the exclusion of all other considerations. The first consul caused two bills of the greatest importance to be brought into the legislative body. One had for its object the departmental and municipal administration, and became the famous law of the 28th Nivôse, year VIII., which established an administrative centralization in France; the object of the other was an organization of justice, an organization which exists to the present time. To these two bills others were added—on the emigrants, whose condition it was pressing to settle; on the right of bequeathing by will, of which all families called for the re-establishment; on the tribunal of prizes, which it was necessary to erect from our relations with the neutral powers; on the creation of new officers of account, who were known to be required; and, lastly, on the receipts and expenses of the year VIII.

The administration of France, as we have shown above, found itself, in the year 1799, in a state of frightful disorder. There are in all countries two kinds of business to be dispatched: that of the state, which consists in recruiting, taxation, works of general utility, and the application of the laws; that of the provinces and communes, which consists in the management of the local interests of all kinds. If a country be left to itself, that is to say, if it be not ruled by a general administration at once strong and intelligent, the first part of this business, that of the state, is not done at all; the second meets with, in the provincial or communal interest, a principle of zeal, but of a zeal capricious, unequal, unjust, and seldom intelligent. The provincial or communal administrations, assuredly, seldom fail in inclination to busy themselves in what concerns them particularly; but they are extravagant, meddling, and always opposed to the common rule. The tyrannical peculiarities of the middle age in Europe, had no other origin. From the time that the central authority withdraws itself from a country, there is no kind of disorder to which the local interests will not give themselves up, even to their own ruin. In 1789, wherever the communes enjoyed any liberty, they were in a state of bankruptcy; and most of the free cities of Germany, when suppressed in 1803, were completely ruined; thus, without a strong general administration, the business of the state is not done at all, and local business is badly done.

The constituent assembly and the national convention, after they had successively re-modelled the administrative organization of France, arrived at a state of things which was anarchy itself. Collective administrations, at every step, perpetually deliberating and never acting, having at their side commissioners of the central government, charged to urge them, either to the dispatch of the business of the state, or the execution of the laws, but deprived of the power of acting themselves,—such was the departmental and municipal regime on the 18th Brumaire. As to the municipal regime in particular, there had been devised a kind of cantonal municipalities, which added still further to this administrative confusion. The number of the cantonal municipalities was

found to be too large, as it amounted to forty thousand; and certainly the superintendence of such a number of small local governments, in itself sufficiently difficult at all times, became impossible for authorities constituted as they were at that time. At present, the prefects, with the assistance of the sub-prefects, are adequate to it, provided they be sufficiently assiduous. But let any one suppose the prefects without sub-prefects, and in their place petty deliberative assemblies, and it will be easy to see the disorder which must reign in such administrations. These forty and odd thousand communes were reduced to five thousand cantonal municipalities, composed of a re-union of several communes into one. It was thought that this uniting several communes under the same government would, besides giving them a governing power, place them nearer to the central authority, and more under its superintendence; but it resulted in a disorder even more frightful than that to which it sought to put an end. These five thousand cantonal municipalities were too numerous, and too far removed from the central authority, to be under its eye, and were vexatiously placed at a distance from the population they were intended to rule, without being brought sufficiently near to the government. A communal administration is made to be placed as near as possible on the spot: the magistrate who takes account of the births, deaths, and marriages, who watches the police and the health of a city, who has the care of the fountains, the church, the hospital of a village, should reside in the village or the town itself; in short, live in the midst of his fellow-citizens. These cantonal municipalities, then, had resulted in uselessly displacing the domestic authority, without bringing the local affairs sufficiently near for the eye of the government to observe them: add to this, (thanks to the disorder of the times,) that nothing was done properly, and it will be understood how much confusion was brought about by the vice of the institution, added to the vice of circumstances.

A last cause of disorder was added to all the others. There is not only a necessity for an administration on account of the state and the communes, but also of a court for judgment; since the citizens may have reason for complaint, either that their property has been encroached upon in marking out a road or way, or that in rating them to the taxes, the rating has been made unjustly. Under the old regime, the ordinary justice[6], then the only restraint on the executive authority—which well explains the resistance of the parliaments to the court—the ordinary had claimed for itself authority in all cases that are called disputes with the administrative justice[7]. This was a grave inconvenience; as civil judges, from their want of knowledge on the subject, are bad dispensers of administrative justice. Our first legislators of the revolution, rightly appreciating this inconvenience, thought they could resolve the difficulty by abandoning all administrative disputes to the petty local assemblies, to which they had handed over the administration. When we imagine, then, these collective administrations in the place of those whom we now call prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, and charged with the duties of all these, with the jurisdiction besides of the councils of prefecture, we can form an idea of something approaching to the confusion which then reigned. Even with the spirit of order which prevails at this day, the result would be a chaos; add to this the passions of the revolution, and what an extra chaos would ensue! It was thus that the returns of the contributions were never completed, that the receipt of the taxes was many years in arrear, that the finances were in ruin, and the armies in misery. The recruiting alone was occasionally carried out,—thanks to the passions of the revolution, which, having done the mischief, contributed in part to repair it; for having as its principle a love, disorderly but ardent, of France, its greatness, and its liberty, it forcibly urged on the population to arms.

It was in such a state of things that the first consul was, it may be said in truth, an envoy from Providence. His mind, simple and just, under the guidance of a character active and resolute, was formed to lead him to the right solution of these difficulties. The constitution had placed at the head of the state a legislative power and an executive power; the executive concentered almost in a single chief, and the legislative, divided amongst many deliberative assemblies. It was only following the natural order of things, to place at each degree of the administrative scale one who should represent the executive power, specially charged to act, and at his side, to control or to furnish him with information only,—not to act in his place,—a small deliberative assembly, such as the council of the department, of the arrondissement, or of the commune. We have in this simple, clear, fruitful idea,—the excellent administration which exists to this day in France. It was the wish of the first consul to have in each department a prefect charged, not with urging on a collective administration to despatch the business of the state, but to do it himself; he was also to be charged with carrying on the departmental business, but jointly with the council of the department, and with resources to be voted by that council. As the system of cantonal municipalities was universally condemned, and as Sieyès, the author of all the local divisions of France, had in the new constitution laid down the principle of the division by arrondissement, the first consul determined to employ it as a means of doing away with the cantonal administrations. The communal administration was first of all replaced where it ought to be, that is, in the commune itself, town, or village; and between the commune and the department, an intermediate administrative degree, that is to say, the arrondissement. Between the prefect and the mayor it was thought necessary to have the sub-prefect, charged, under the superintendence of the prefect, with the direction of a certain number of communes, sixty, eighty, or a hundred, more or less, in proportion to the importance of the department. Lastly, in the commune itself, there was to be a mayor, who was also an executive power, having at his side a deliberative power in a municipal council,—a mayor, the agent for the despatch of the business of the state, directly dependent on the general authority,—an agent of the commune as regarded its local affairs, managing its interests in conjunction with it, under the super-

[6] Justice ordinaire.
[7] Contentieux administratives.

intendence, however, of the prefect and the sub-prefect, and by consequence of the state.

Such is this admirable hierarchy to which France is indebted for an administration incomparable for its energy, the precision of its working, and the exactness of its accounts, and which is so excellent, that it was sufficient, in six months, as we shall soon see, to restore order in France, under the impulse, it is true, of the extraordinary genius of the first consul, and favoured by circumstances as extraordinary; for there was every where a horror of disorder, a thirsting after order, a disgust with idle babbling[8], a taste for prompt and positive results.

There remained still the question of the administrative disputes,—that is to say, the administrative justice[9], charged with the care, that those liable to be taxed should not be rated beyond their means; that those holding property on a river-bank or on the side of a street, should not be exposed to encroachments, and that the contractor for the works of a town or of the state might not find a judge of his contract with the commune or the government a difficult question, as the ordinary tribunals were known to be improper for dispensing justice of this kind. The principle of a wise division of power was again employed here with great advantage. The prefect, the sub-prefect, and the mayor, charged with the actual administration, were open to the suspicion of partiality, as if inclined to enforce their own will, for it was usually of their own acts that those seeking justice would have to make complaint; the councils of the department, the arrondissement, and the commune, were also properly liable to suspicion of the same kind, as their interest too often ran contrary to that of the complainant. The administration of justice is, besides, a long and continuous operation, and there was no desire to see the councils either of the department or the commune made permanent, since the first consul only required their attendance for fifteen days in the year, just time enough for them to go through their business, give their advice, and vote their expenses. On the other hand, there was need of a tribunal to sit without interruption. A special court of justice was therefore established, a tribunal of four or five judges, having their seats by the side of the prefect, and judging conjointly with him; a species of council of state assisting the administration of the laws by the prefect, as the council of state enlightens and supervises that of the ministers; and subject, moreover, by way of appeal, to this supreme council. These are the tribunals now called the councils of prefecture, whose equity has never been disputed.

Such was the principal and communal government of France—a single head, in a prefect, a sub-prefect, or mayor, for the despatch of all business; a deliberative council, in the council of the department, of the arrondissement, or of the commune, to vote the local expenses; next, a small judicial body, placed by the side of the prefect only to carry on the administrative justice; a government entirely subordinate to the general government in all matters of state, and under its supervision and direction, but having its own proper views, in the management of the affairs of the departments and the communes. Order has never ceased to reign, as well as justice, during the time this excellent institution has existed among us, that is to say, for nearly half a century; it being well understood that the expressions order and justice, like all other words of human language, have only a relative meaning, and signify that there has been in France, in the administrative department, as little of disorder, and as little of injustice, as it is possible to hope for in a great state.

It was naturally the wish of the first consul that the nomination of the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, should rest with the executive power; for since they were its direct agents, they ought to be endowed with its spirit; and as regarded local matters, which they had to conduct according to local views, that they should conduct them in accordance with the general spirit of the state. But it would not have been in due course of the nature of things for the executive to name the members of the councils of departments, of arrondissements, and of communes, whose duty it was to control the agents of administration, and to vote their expenses. The constitution led to this pretension, and also justified it. "Confidence must come from below," said Sieyès; "power must come from above." According to this maxim, the nation showed its confidence by the inscription on the lists of notability; the superior authority conferred the power, by choosing its agents from these lists. The senate was charged with the election of all the political deliberative bodies; but as the councils engaged in the conduct of local interests were reckoned part of the general administration of the republic, it devolved upon the executive power, according to the constitution, to nominate them by a choice from the lists of notability. By virtue, then, of the spirit as well as of the letter of the constitution, it devolved upon the first consul to choose, from the lists of notability of the departments, the members of the councils of the departments; from the lists of the notability of the arrondissements, the members of the councils of the arrondissements; and, lastly, from the lists of the notability of the communes, the members of the municipal councils. This power, in ordinary times excessive, was at that moment necessary. An election, in fact, for the formation of these local councils was altogether as impossible as for the formation of great political assemblies. It would only have given rise to the most dangerous agitations, to petty triumphs to the extreme parties, alternately, on one side or the other, in place of a peaceable and hopeful fusion of all moderate parties—a fusion which was indispensable in thus founding a new society from the reunited fragments of the old.

The judicial organization was equally well-planned. It had the double object of placing justice near those who required it, and of giving them an assurance, nevertheless, beyond the local justice, if they desired to have recourse to it, of a court of appeal, at some distance certainly, but in a high position, and possessed of enlightenment and impartiality by reason of that very height of position.

Our first legislators of the revolution, from the aversion they were inspired with against parliaments, suppressed all the tribunals of appeal, and

[8] Bavardage. [9] Justice administrative.

placed one tribunal only in a department, to afford the first degree of jurisdiction to complainants in the department; and a second degree of jurisdiction, a tribunal of appeal for the neighbouring departments. This appeal took place, then, not from an inferior tribunal to one superior, but from one neighbouring tribunal to another. Below were the justices of the peace, the tribunal of cassation above. The single tribunal for each department being found to be too far from those seeking redress, the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace had been extended so as to dispense with the citizens having to travel too often to the chief town. There had also been created three or four hundred correctional tribunals, charged to repress small crimes. The criminal jury held its sittings at the principal town near the central tribunal.

This judicial organization had very slight success in the municipal cantonments. The justices of the peace, whose jurisdiction had been extended, were not competent to the task. The justice of the first degree found itself placed too far off by residing in the chief town; the justice of appeal had become nearly illusory; for appeal does not hold, unless it be made to men of superior minds. The supreme courts, like the parliaments formerly, and like the royal courts of our day, numbering amongst them eminent magistrates, and about them a renowned bar, exhibit a superiority of knowledge, to which a man might be tempted to have recourse; but no one would think of appealing from one tribunal of the first instance to another tribunal of the first instance. The tribunals of correctional police were also too numerous, and limited, moreover, to a single object. It was necessary to reform this judicial organization. The first consul, adopting the ideas of his colleague Cambacérès, to which he gave the support of his own good sense and courage, caused that organization to be adopted, which exists to this day.

The limit of the arrondissement planned for the departmental administration, offered great convenience for the judicial administration. It presented a means of establishing a primary local justice, placed sufficiently near to litigants, without interfering with the recourse to tribunals of appeal placed far from it, and much higher. There was established, therefore, a tribunal of the first instance for the arrondissement, forming the first step of jurisdiction; next, without the dread of seeming to re-establish the old parliaments, it was resolved to establish a tribunal of appeal. One for each department would be too many in number, too little for the importance and elevation of the jurisdiction. Twenty-nine were established, which gave them nearly the importance of the old parliaments; and they were placed in spots which had formerly enjoyed the presence of those supreme courts. There was an advantage in restoring them to places which had been thus deprived: they were the old depositories of judicial traditions, the ruins of which deserved to be collected. The bars of Aix, of Dijon, of Toulouse, of Bordeaux, of Rennes, and of Paris, were the hearths of science and of talent which it was necessary once more to kindle.

The tribunals of the first instance, already established in each arrondissement, were charged, at the same time, with the correctional police; a plan which, while it doubled their usefulness, placed in the arrondissement the administration of civil justice, and that of the repressive in the first degree. The criminal justice was always to be confided to a jury, and have its seat only in the chief town of the department, by means of judges coming from the tribunals of appeal, whose office it was to direct the jury; in a word, to hold assizes. This part it took some time to complete.

In accordance with these arrangements, it became necessary to reduce within more restricted limits the department known as the justice of the peace; but, as it was impossible to do all at once, the law for the remodelling of these courts was postponed until the following session. The wish of the legislature, however, was to preserve, while it improved, the paternal spirit of a system, so especially popular, so expeditious, and so cheap.

As the crown and coping-stone of this edifice of justice, there was maintained, with some modifications, and a restraining jurisdiction over all the magistrates, the tribunal of cassation, one of the finest institutions of the French revolution; a tribunal, whose scope is not the judging a third time what the tribunals of the first instance and of appeal have already twice given their judgments upon, but which, putting on one side the facts of the case, interposes only when a doubt has been raised in the meaning of the law, determines that meaning by precedents, and thus adds to the unity of the text as emanating from the legislature, a unity of interpretation as issuing from the supreme jurisdiction, and so common to the whole country.

It is, therefore, from this year 1800, a year so fruitful in events, that we date our judicial organization; since which time it has consisted of nearly two thousand justices of the peace[1], a magistracy for the people, rendering justice, at a small expense, to the poor; of nearly three hundred tribunals of the first instance, one for each arrondissement, that administer civil and correctional[2] justice, in the first degree; of twenty-nine supreme[3] tribunals[4] administering the department of civil justice as courts of appeal and criminal justice by judges sent out from it who hold assizes at the chief town of each department; lastly, of a supreme tribunal, placed at the head of this judicial hierarchy, to interpret the laws, and complete the unity of the legislature by the unity of jurisprudence.

The two laws for these purposes were of too pressing a necessity, and too complete in their plan, to meet with any serious obstacles; yet they nevertheless had to sustain more than one attack in the tribunal. Objections the most trifling were raised against the proposed system of administration. There was not much complaint of the authority placed in the hands of the prefects, subprefects, or mayors, as that was in accordance with the notions of the time, and was in imitation of the constitution, which placed one person as chief at the head of the state; but a grievance was found in

[1] Juges de paix. [2] Police. [3] Souverains.

[4] We give here only round numbers, as the number of the tribunals has constantly varied, in accordance with the different changes of territory which France has undergone; at present, for instance, there are no more than twenty-seven *cours royales*, or tribunals of appeal.

the creation of three degrees in the scale of administration—the department, the arrondissement, and the commune. The opposition went so far as to assert that the communes must be reconstituted, as it would not be possible to find men of sufficient enlightenment for mayors. It was, however, a restoration of self-government, of domestic authority, and in this view the plan was more popular than can even be imagined. As regarded the judicial organization, some cried out against it as a restoration of the parliaments; others complained of the jurisdiction over the inferior magistrates which was given to the tribunal of cassation, with other such objections; all of the most worthy of mention, since, in spite of all, the two proposed laws were passed.

Twenty or thirty votes, the main body of the opposition in the tribunate, were given against those laws, but three-fourths voted in their favour. The legislative body adopted them almost unanimously. The law relating to the departmental administration bore the date since celebrated, of 28th Pluviôse, year VIII., that relating to the judicial organization was dated 27th Ventôse, year VIII.

The first consul, determining not to leave them a dead letter in the list of laws, appointed forthwith the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors.

He was liable of course to many mistakes, as generally happens where a number of functionaries have to be appointed at once; but an enlightened and vigorous government can speedily rectify any error of its first choice. It is enough that the general intention of it be good, and in this instance the intention shown in the choice was excellent; it was at once firm, impartial, and conciliatory. The first consul sought out in all parties men of reputed honour and capacity, excluding none but the violent, and even adopting some of these last, if experience and time had reduced them to such a moderate tone as then formed the essential characteristic of his policy.

To the prefectures, offices of importance and high salary,—the prefects then received 12,000, 15,000, and up to even 24,000f. of income, being in value double what these amounts now are,—he appointed personages who had figured with honour in the great political assemblies, and whose appointment would most clearly show the intention of his choice; for men, though they be neither actions nor principles, yet represent them in the eyes of the people. To Marseilles, for instance, the first consul named M. Charles Lacroix, ex-minister of foreign affairs; to Saintes, M. Français, of Nantes; to Lyons, M. Verninhac, formerly an ambassador; to Nantes, M. Letourneur, formerly a member of the Directory; to Brussels, M. de Pontécoulant; to Rouen, M. Beugnot; to Amiens, M. Quinette; to Ghent, M. Faypoult, formerly minister of finance. All these men, and others, who were found in the Constituent Assembly, the Legislative Assembly, the Convention, and the Five Hundred, and who were taken from amongst the ministers, the directors, and the ambassadors of the republic, were ready to give a fair start to the new administrative functions, and to confer on the government of the provinces the importance which it deserved. The greater part of them retained their offices during the reign of the first consul and of the emperor. One of them, M. de Jessaint, was a prefect within the last four years. For the prefecture of Paris, the first consul made choice of Frochot, and gave him for a colleague at the prefecture of police, M. Dubois, a magistrate whose energy was useful in purging the capital of those ill-doers whom faction had thrown within its bosom.

The judicial appointments were made in the same spirit. Men of honoured name, acquired in the former bar and the former magistracy, were associated, wherever it could be done, with new men of renown and probity. Wherever he could throw a lustre on these offices by noble names, the first consul failed not to do so, for he liked *éclat* in all things; and the time had come when, without danger, something might be borrowed from the past. A magistrate named Aguesseau headed the list of judicial appointments, as the chief of the tribunal of appeal of Paris, now the "Royal Court." These functionaries received instructions, immediately on their appointment, to depart on the instant, for the purpose of taking possession of their seats, and of contributing their part to that work of re-organization which formed the constant occupation of the young general, out of which he wished to create his fame, and which, after so many prodigies of victory, has remained, in fact, the most stable of his glories

Where society had been turned so completely topsy-turvy, it became necessary to handle every matter at the same time. The emigration, at once so blameable and so pitiable,—a just object alike of sympathy and aversion, since in its ranks were to be found men cruelly persecuted, and bad Frenchmen who had conspired against their country,—the emigration required the earnest attention of the government. According to the last law, a decree, either of the directory or of the administration of the department, was in itself sufficient to place any absent individual on the list of emigrants, from which moment his goods became confiscated, and the law pronounced his death if he were again found on the territory of the republic. A great number of individuals, who were actually emigrants, or had only secreted themselves, and who had not been inscribed on the fatal list, either because they had escaped notice, or no one had been found to denounce them, were, however, still liable to be placed upon it; and thus there were numbers of Frenchmen who were living in a continual anxiety. It wanted but an enemy to meet them, and they might be instantly on the list, and subject to the laws and penalties of proscription. As regards those who had been already placed on the list, justly or not, they were arriving in great numbers to have their names struck off. Their eagerness, and their very rashness, showed their confidence in the humanity of the government; but was rather annoying to certain of the revolutionists, some of whom were conscious of excesses committed against the returning emigrants, others of having obtained possession of their property. This was a new source of difficulty in the arrangements; for while it was necessary that proscription should cease, it was also necessary not to expose to continual uneasiness those who had taken a part, especially a violent one, in the conflicts of the revolution, which owed to those who had compromised themselves for it a complete security; since, unfortunately, men in general are either cold and selfish, or passionate partisans of

the cause they take up; in which latter case they can ordinarily claim little merit for their moderation.

To such a state of things it was urgent to apply a remedy; and the government introduced a bill, whose first enactment was to close the famous list of emigrants. On and after the 4th Nivôse, year VIII., or December 25, 1799, the day on which the constitution came in force, the list of emigrants was declared to be closed; that is to say, the fact of absence posterior to that date was no longer to be construed as emigration, or to be liable to the same punishment: liberty was granted to come and go, to travel from France to a foreign country, and from a foreign country to France, without committing a punishable offence; for it is a fact, that for ten years absence had been a crime. The liberty, then, of coming and going was thus restored to every citizen.

To this first enactment a second was added: individuals more or less liable to the charge of emigration, whether from having left the country for a short time, or simply concealed themselves, to keep out of the way of persecution, and who by good fortune had been omitted in the proscription list,—were now no longer to be placed upon it but by authority of a decision of the ordinary tribunals; that is to say, of a jury. This was tantamount, in some measure, to closing the list for them also, as there was little risk that many names would be added to it in the then spirit of the tribunals.

Lastly, while the handing them over to the tribunals insured to those whose names had not been inscribed, the guarantees of the common law, those who had been unjustly placed on the list, or who pretended to be so, in their wish to have their names struck off, were referred to the administrative authority. The intended indulgence of the new government in favour of these parties was evident in this; for the new administrative authorities, created by it, and imbued with its spirit, could not fail to lend a ready ear to claims of this nature: the presenting a certificate of residence in any part of France (and there was no difficulty about false certificates) was all that was necessary to prove that the party had been wrongfully declared absent, and to cause him to be erased from the list of emigrants. With the general good-natured inclination to violate tyrannical laws, this means of obtaining their erasure seldom failed those who sought it. More than this, emigrants who wished to procure their erasure, were allowed to re-enter France "under surveillance" of the chief police; in the language of the times, this was called "obtaining surveillances;" they were given in great numbers, so that those of the emigrants who had most need of it, were enabled thus to anticipate the moment of their erasure; and, indeed, many of them went no further, but made use of these "surveillances" as a definitive recall.

Emigrants, however, there were, whose names could not be cut out from that fatal list, because of the notorious scandal of their emigration. In respect of these the existing laws were still maintained. The spirit of the times was such, that it was not possible to do otherwise. For the unfortunate there was pity; but anger only for the guilty who had quitted the territory of France to bear arms against their country, or invite against her the arms of the foreigner. For the rest, whether erased or not, no man could recover his property if sold. All sales were irrevocable, both by virtue of the constitution, and the enactments of the new law; those only who, after their erasure, found their property had not been sold, though sequestered, were enabled to indulge the hope of recovering it for themselves.

Such was the law as proposed and adopted by an immense majority, despite objections made in the tribunate, on the part of some, who found shown in it either too much or too little favour towards the emigrants.

Among the legal enactments then in force, there was one which appears insupportably tyrannical—a restraint on the power of bequeathing by will. As the laws stood, no man at his death could dispose of more by will than a tenth portion of his property if he had children; of a sixth if he had none. These enactments resulted from the first indignation of the revolution against the abuses of the old state of French aristocratic society, where paternal vanity, sometimes from a desire to aggrandize an elder son, sometimes to force the affections of children to ill-assorted marriages, would despoil some for the benefit of others. Under the natural influence of anger thus aroused, in place of reducing the power of a father within due limits, the revolution completely fettered it. It was no longer in the power of a parent to reward or punish. If he had children, there was nothing, or little more than nothing, which he could leave in favour of the child that merited all his affection; and, what is more extraordinary, if he had only nephews, whether nearly or distantly related to him, he could only leave them a portion of his property the most insignificant, that is to say, a sixteenth. This was in truth an attack on the rights of property, and, of all the rigorous enactments of the revolution, the one most keenly felt; for the hand of death strikes down every day its victims; and thousands who died, breathed their last sigh in regret at an inability to obey the last dictates of their hearts towards those who had served them, cared for them, and consoled them in their old age. A reform like this could not possibly wait the drawing up of the civil code. A law to re-establish the right of bequeathing by will, within certain restrictions, was at once brought in. By virtue of this law, a father who had less than four children was empowered at his death to bequeath a fourth of his property; if less than five, a fifth; and so on in the same proportion. He might dispose of a half if he had neither ascending nor collateral relations, and of the whole when he had no kindred qualified to succeed him.

This measure was much attacked in the tribunate; above all, by the tribune Andrieux, a man of honesty and sincerity, but with more enthusiasm than judgment. He spoke of it as a return to the abuses of primogeniture, to the violent injustice of the *ancien régime*, in the case of the children of men of rank; but this law, like the others, was passed by an immense majority.

By another law the government instituted a tribunal of prizes, which had become indispensable for rendering impartial justice to the neutral powers, and conciliating them towards France by better treatment. The attention of the two assem-

blies was, lastly, invited to the laws respecting the finances.

The government had but little to address to the legislative body on this subject, as the two legislative commissioners had already returned the necessary laws. What had been done by the government in working out the administration of those laws, was scarcely a matter for discussion. It was, however, necessary to decree, if only as a matter of form, the budget of the year VIII. Had the taxes been regularly collected, had the regular imposts been exactly paid, and not only regularly paid by the contributors, but duly handed over by those who received the public monies, the finances of the state would have been in a tolerable condition. The ordinary taxes would give about 430,000,000 f., to which amount the government hoped to reduce the public expenses in time of peace; indeed they promised themselves to bring them down still lower. Experience soon proved that this was not possible even in time of peace, but it has also shown that it was easy to bring up the receipts from the taxes to this amount, without increasing the rate of taxation. We exclude from this calculation the expense of collection, and local expenses, which, reckoning them as they are reckoned now, would bring the budget of this date up to 600,000,000 f. or 620,000,000 f.

The great and certain insufficiency of the receipts was only apparent in the expenses of the war —a result not to be wondered at, as it always must be the case. In no country can a war be supported on the ordinary revenues of peace. If this were the case, it would sufficiently prove that the taxes were too great in a time of tranquillity. But, thanks to the disorder of the past, no one could tell, whether with a war the budget would rise to 600,000,000 f., 700,000,000 f, or 800.000,000 f. One party said 600,000,000f., the other 800,000,000f. Every one had a different conjecture on this subject. Experience here also proves that about 150,000,000 f. added to the ordinary budget, are enough to furnish the expenses of a war, especially with an army always victorious, and living on the enemies' country. The budget for the year was, therefore, made out at 600,000,000f. of expences and receipts; and as the ordinary revenues amounted to 430,000,000 f., there was, therefore, a deficiency of 170,000,000 f. This, however, was not the real difficulty. It would have been too much to pretend, on just emerging from a financial chaos, to aim at an immediate equalization of the receipts with the expenditure. What was first necessary was to get in the ordinary taxes. If this first result could be reached, the government was sure to have resources soon to meet the most pressing wants; for credit would quickly feel the effect; and with the different bills and securities, the creation of which we have elsewhere enumerated, it would have, in its hands, means of obtaining from capitalists the necessary funds for every department. For this M. Gaudin worked unremittingly; seconded, in all the difficulties which he met, by the firm and sustained purpose of the first consul. The board of direct constitution, recently established, displayed the greatest activity. The assessment papers were well sent out, and already in course of collection. The bills of the receivers-general began to find their way into the treasury, and were discounted at a rate of interest not too usurious. The difficulty in establishing this system of bills consisted always in the amount of paper in circulation, which it is difficult to fix, especially as regarded each general receipt. A receiver, for instance, who should collect 20,000,000 f., could not sign bills for that amount, if he was liable to be called upon for six or eight millions of dead securities, either bonds of arrearage, bonds of requisition, or similar obligations.

The minister applied himself to retiring these obligations, and when he had made an estimate how much they would enter into of each general receipt, he drew upon the receivers-general for the amount which he calculated would come into their coffers.

There were created, in the same session, a new class of accountable officers, whose duty it was to bring about greater exactness in the transmission of monies to the treasury; these were the receivers for the arrondissement. Hitherto there had been no intermediate officer between those who collected from the tax-payers, and the receiver-general placed in each chief town, than the clerk of the receipts, the receiver-general's own agent, dependent upon him, and telling the truth to him alone. This was exactly one of the points at which the entry of the money into the public coffers could be best noted and ascertained, and this very point was miserably neglected. Special receivers were now appointed to each arrondissement, who were dependent on the state, owing to it an account of what they received and handed over to the receivers-general; they were thus well-informed and disinterested witnesses as to the progress of the sums collected, since to them no advantage could arise from a stagnation of the public monies in the coffers of the accountable officers. By these appointments the government obtained the advantage of knowing the exact state of the receipts, and of having in its hands new securities in cash; a matter of indifference now, but not so just then; it had, lastly, the advantage of finding a new employment for the lately devised division into the arrondissements. The courts of civil and correctional justice, and a great portion of the communal administration, had already been established in the centre of the arrondissement; by fixing also a part of the financial administration in the same place, a still further usefulness would be given to this division, which the malicious were attempting to disparage as being only an arbitrary subdivision of the country. And since for particular reasons it had been considered a necessary step, there could be nothing better than to multiply its uses, and so render real what was charged with being artificial. The prefects and sub-prefects received orders to visit the receivers, and themselves to watch, by an inspection of the books, over the exactitude of their transactions. Fortunately it is not so in our time; but at that moment, when the whole plan was but as it were a rough sketch, the sending a prefect and sub-prefect to inspect their accounts, was by no means a useless stimulant to employ with accountable officers.

The re-organization of the finances thus went on with all possible rapidity; but assemblies can only understand results when they are realized. They could not perceive how much that was actually useful was doing in the interior of the administra-

tion. In the tribunate they were eloquent without end on the great question of the equalization of receipts with expenses; they complained of the deficit; they brought forward a thousand plans; and there were some persons so senseless as to incline to a rejection of the finance laws until the government should propose some means of bringing the expenses and receipts to a balance. But all these propositions led to no result; the proposed laws were passed by a great majority in the tribunate, and almost unanimously by the legislative body.

An institution, worthy of mention in history, was added next to those of which we have just recounted the foundation; this was the bank of France. The old establishments for discount had fallen in the midst of the disorders of the revolution; it was impossible, however, that Paris could remain without a bank. In every centre of commerce, where any activity exists, there must be a money convenient for payments, or, in other words, a paper-money, and an establishment to discount on a large scale the drafts of commerce. These two branches afford to each other a mutual assistance; for the funds deposited against bills in circulation, serve at the same time to aid commercial transactions in the way of discount. In fact, where any business is stirring, however inconsiderable, a bank cannot fail to make a profit, if it discount good bills only, and do not issue more notes than are required; in a word, if it proportion its operations to the true wants of the place where it is established. This is what was wanted in Paris, and its success was certain if it were properly constituted. The new bank, besides transactions with private individuals, was to have transactions with the treasury, and consequently, while making profits, it had to give services in return. The government consulted the principal bankers of the capital, at the head of whom M. Perrégaux placed himself, a financier whose name connects itself with all the great services rendered at that time to the state; and there was soon formed an association of rich capitalists for the creation of a bank, called the bank of France, the same which is in existence at this day. Its capital was settled at 30,000,000f.; it was to be governed by fifteen directors and a managing committee of three persons, which committee afterwards gave place to a governor. It was, by its statutes, to discount commercial bills representing legitimate not fictitious transactions, to issue notes circulating as money, and was interdicted from engaging in any business foreign to discounts and dealing in bullion. Faithful to its statutes, it has grown up into the finest establishment of this kind in the world. It will be seen presently what was done by the government to push on the operations of this bank with a speed which made it prosperous in the earliest days of its existence.

Pending these great operations for the improvement of the internal administration, to which the consular government, in concert with the legislative body, sedulously applied itself, negotiations with foreign powers, friendly or belligerent, were carried on without interruption. The letter of the first consul to the king of England was followed by an immediate answer. The first consul had written on the 26th December, the 5th Nivôse; he was answered on the 4th January, the 14th Nivôse: indeed, the resolution of the English cabinet had been taken beforehand, and it had no necessity for deliberation. England, in 1797, when her finances were in a state of embarrassment, and when Austria had been compelled to sign the treaty of Campo Formio, had been inclined to think of treating, and sent Lord Malmesbury to Lille; but now that the income-tax had restored ease to her exchequer,—now that Austria, placed again in a state of war with us, had carried her arms to our very frontiers,—now that England was strenuously occupied in wresting from us our important positions in Malta and Egypt, and in avenging the affront of the Texel,—peace was but little to the taste of that power. She had, besides, another reason for this refusal, which was, that war was suited to the passions and the interests of Mr. Pitt. This illustrious head of the British cabinet had made a war with France his object, his glory, and the basis of his political existence. If peace were necessary, possibly he must retire. He brought to the conflict that firmness of character, which, united to his talent as an orator, had made him a statesman, powerful, though not enlightened. The answer could not be a matter of doubt; it was discourteous, and in the negative. The English cabinet did not do the first consul the honour of addressing the answer directly to him, but keeping up the custom, in most respects an excellent one, of communicating from minister to minister, they replied in a note addressed by Lord Grenville to M. de Talleyrand.

In this note, with some want of skill, the chagrin was allowed to be seen which this challenge to peace, not to war, addressed to England by the first consul, had occasioned to Mr. Pitt. It contained a recapitulation of the original causes of the war, eternally reproduced, year after year. It imputed the first aggression to the French republic; reproached it in violent terms for the ravages committed in Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, making especial mention of the rapine carried on by the generals in the latter country; it added to this charge that of a desire to overthrow the throne and the altar every where; and then, coming to the last overtures of the French consul, the English minister said that these feigned demonstrations of pacific intentions were not the first of the same kind, for that the different revolutionary governments, successively raised up and pulled down within ten years, had more than once made similar proposals; that his majesty the king of Great Britain could not yet observe, in what was passing in France, any change of principles capable of giving satisfaction and tranquillity to Europe; that the only change which could thoroughly re-assure it, would be the restoration of the house of Bourbon, since then only would social order appear to be no longer endangered; that, nevertheless, the re-establishment of that family was not made an absolute condition of peace with the republic of France; but that until there were new symptoms more significant and more satisfactory, England would continue the contest, as well for her own safety as that of her allies.

This discourteous note was disapproved of by sensible men in all countries, and reflected little honour on Mr. Pitt, as showing him more in anger than

he was wise. It showed that many indeed are the victories required by a new government before it can be respected; since, though the government then existing had already won victories both numerous and brilliant, it was evident that more were still wanted. The first consul was not disconcerted, and in his desire to profit by the good position which the moderation of his conduct gave him in the eyes of the world, he prepared an answer at once mild and firm, not in the form of a letter to the king, but as a despatch addressed to the minister of foreign affairs, Lord Grenville. Recapitulating in a few words the first events of the war, he proved, in very guarded language, that the sole object of France in taking up arms had been to resist an European conspiracy directed against her safety; granting the misfortunes which the revolution had brought upon the whole world, he insinuated, in a passing way, that those who had persecuted the French republic with such eager hate, might possibly reproach themselves deservedly with being the true causes of the violences so often deplored. "But," added he, "to what good are these remembrances? Behold, now, a government disposed that war should cease. Shall this war have no end, because the one party or the other was the aggressor? and if it be not to endure for ever, should we not put an end to these incessant recriminations? Surely there can be no hope of obtaining from France the re-establishment of the Bourbons; is it then suitable to the purpose to throw out hints such as those which have been allowed? Nay, what would be said if France in her communications were to call upon England to re-establish on the throne that family of the Stuarts, which only left it in the last century? But to pass over such irritating questions," added the note dictated by the first consul, "if you deplore, as we do, the evils of war, let us agree to a suspension of arms; let us fix a town, Dunkirk for instance, or any other of your own choice, where negotiations may be carried on; the French government will place at the disposal of Great Britain passports for the ministers she may invest with proper powers."

The very calmness of this attitude produced the usual effect which coolness has upon angry men. It provoked a reply from Lord Grenville, more angry, more bitter, and even worse in reason than his first note. In this answer, the English minister, seeking to palliate the fault which he had committed in speaking of the house of Bourbon, responded, that it was not for that family the war was carried on, but for the safety of all governments; and he declared anew that hostilities would be continued without relaxation. This last communication bore the date of the 20th January or 30th Nivôse. Nothing more could be said. Bonaparte had done enough; confiding in his glory, he had not feared to offer peace; he had made the offer with not much of hope, but in good faith; and had gained by this step the double advantage of unveiling to the eyes of France, as well as to those of the English opposition, the unreasonable passion of Mr. Pitt. Fortunate would it have been, if at all times he had united with his power, so skilfully calculated, the same moderation of conduct.

The communications of Austria were more courteous, but gave no greater hope of peace. This power, convinced that the intentions of the first consul, however pacific, would not go to the extent of abandoning Italy in her favour, was resolved to continue the war; but, having some experience of the conqueror of Castiglione and of Rivoli, and knowing that with such an antagonist victory could not altogether be considered a certainty, she was desirous of not closing every path to ulterior negotiation.

As if Austria and England had an understanding about formalities, the answer of the emperor to the first consul was by a despatch from M. de Thugut to M. de Talleyrand, dated 15th January, 1800, or 25 Nivôse. In substance it was the same as the English notes. Both only made war, they said, to guaranty Europe against a general overturn; there was nothing they more desired than to see France disposed towards peace: but what guarantee could be given of this new disposition? The cabinet of Vienna admitted that there was hope, under the first consul, of greater moderation at home and abroad, more stability in purpose, and greater fidelity to engagements entered into, and that from these might in time result the chance of a solid and lasting peace. This happy change they expected from his great talents; but without saying it in words, they gave him to understand that when the change was completely brought about, it would be time enough to negotiate.

Dealing with Austria as he had done with England, the first consul did not let the matter rest with this evasive exposition. Not discouraged by the vagueness of the answer, he felt inclined to put the cabinet of Vienna under the necessity of explaining itself positively, and of either refusing or accepting peace in a categorical manner. On the 28th February, or 9th Ventôse, Talleyrand was instructed to write to M. Thugut, and to offer him the adoption, as the basis of a negotiation, of the treaty of Campo Formio. This treaty, he observed, was an act of great moderation on the part of Bonaparte towards the emperor of Austria, since—when in 1797 he had it in his power, from the menacing position of the French army at the gate of Vienna, to require from that prince great sacrifices—he had, in the hope of a lasting peace, preferred moderate advantages to those of a more extensive nature; he had even, added the French minister, incurred, by his conduct to the imperial court, the blame of the directory. Lastly, M. de Talleyrand declared that the house of Austria should receive in Italy the indemnification which, by the treaty of Campo Formio, had been promised to it in Germany.

To comprehend the bearing of these proposals of the first consul, we must recall to mind that the treaty of Campo Formio ceded to France, Belgium and Luxemburgh; to the Cisalpine Republic, Lombardy, Mantua, and the Legations; and that Austria received as an indemnification, Venice and a great portion of the Venetian states. As regards the line of the Rhine, embracing between Belgium and Luxemburgh the country comprised within the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine,—in a word, those we now call the Rhenish Provinces,—Austria was to use her mediation to have them ceded to France by the Germanic empire. Austria, at the time, ceded, on her own part, the countship of Falkenstein, lying between

Lorrain and Alsace, and engaged to open to the French troops the gates of Mayence, which she occupied as a count of the empire. As a compensation, Austria was to receive the bishopric of Saltzburg, contiguous to Bavaria, as soon as the ecclesiastical provinces were secularized. These different arrangements formed the subject of negotiations at the congress of Rastadt, which terminated so tragically in 1799, by the assassination of the French plenipotentiaries. Such was the treaty of Campo Formio.

In offering this treaty as the basis of a new negotiation, the first consul did not surrender the question of the frontier of the Rhine, as far as concerned the Rhenish provinces: he only decided the question of Belgium, which had been irrevocably conceded to France, while he left that of the Rhenish Provinces to ulterior negotiation with the empire; and by offering in Italy the indemnification formerly stipulated for in Germany, he insinuated that the success obtained in Italy by Austria might be taken into consideration, and place her in a more advantageous position in that country. He added, that for the secondary powers of Europe there should be stipulated a system of guarantees, proper to re-establish in all its force that law of nations on which the security and well-doing of nations so essentially depend. This was an allusion to the invasion of Switzerland, of Piedmont, of Tuscany, the Papal States, and Naples, which had afforded matter for a heavy charge against the directory, and had been taken as the pretext for the second coalition; it was a sufficiently clear offer to re-establish those states, and to give Europe an assurance against the pretended usurpations of the French republic. To such offers no addition could be made; and the necessity of peace for France could have alone induced the first consul to make them. Not to do things by halves, he addressed to Austria, as well as to England, a formal proposal for a suspension of arms, not only on the Rhine, where such a suspension already existed, but also on the Alps and the Apennines, where it was not yet in being.

On the 24th of March, the 3rd Germinal, M. Thugut replied in terms, otherwise very moderate, that the treaty of Campo Formio, which had been violated as soon as concluded, did not comprise a system of pacification, which could give assurance to the belligerent parties; that the true principle adopted in all negotiations was to take as a basis the position in which the success of their arms had left each power, and this was the sole basis to which Austria could agree. M. Thugut added, that previous to going any further, he had to demand an explanation relative to the form of the negotiation; that it behoved him to know if France were willing to admit negotiations from all the states engaged in the war, for the purpose of arriving at a general peace,—the only peace which would be fair and prudent, and to which alone Austria would accede.

This language proved two things. Firstly, that Austria, by wishing to take as a starting-point the actual position [1], that is to say, the situation in which the last campaign had left each power, fostered great pretensions in regard to Italy. Secondly, that she would not separate herself from England, to whom treaties of subsidy closely bound her. This fidelity to England was, on her part, a duty made necessary by her position; and influenced, as will be seen before long, the fate of the negotiations and the war.

Such an answer, however civil its terms, left little hope of an understanding, especially as it made the conduct of a power disposed to listen to some mention of peace, dependent on that of another, resolved not to listen to any. Nevertheless, Bonaparte sent a new reply, in which, while offering in Italy the compensation before stipulated in Germany, he proposed implicitly to take the starting-point of the treaty, not from the *status ante bellum*, but from the *status post bellum;* that is to say, to take into account the success of Austria in Italy. He further observed, that the overtures he had made to England showed his desire for a general peace; that there was little to be hoped from a negotiation common to all the belligerent powers, since England would not hear of an accommodation; that he had admitted plainly and simply the proposals of Austria; that he waited, in consequence, the fixing a place where they might treat; but that, as they wished to go on fighting, it must be settled for some place beyond the theatre of war.

Austria declared, that as such were the intentions of the French cabinet, she must communicate with her allies, but that, until she had consulted them, it was impossible for her to name any place positively. This was postponing the negotiations to an indefinite period.

In making these overtures to England and Austria, the first consul never deceived himself as to the result; but he was inclined to try pacific steps, firstly, because he had a desire for peace, regarding it as necessary to the organization of his new government; secondly, because he judged such a step would place him better in the public mind of France and Europe.

His calculations were completely justified by what passed in the parliament of England. Mr. Pitt, by his brutal [2] manner of replying to the overtures of France, had brought upon himself attacks the most vehement, as well as justly grounded. The opposition of Fox and Sheridan had never felt a nobler inspiration, never had shed such glory, or more justly deserved the esteem of honourable men in all countries.

There was, in fact, a great dearth of motives for the continuance of the war; since England was then in a position to obtain all she could reasonably desire. She would certainly not have obtained the abandonment of Egypt; but as she, four months later, offered to resign it altogether and leave us to do as we liked with it, as the subsequent negotiations will prove, she might have consented to this at once, and at that price have preserved her conquests, the Indies included. She would thus have been spared the immense danger to which her obstinacy afterwards exposed her. It was therefore, at bottom, nothing but the interest of the ministers which induced the British cabinet to support the war with such eagerness. The remonstrances of the opposition were strong and unceasing. They demanded and obtained the papers relating to the negotia-

[1] L'état actuel.

[2] Brutale.

tions, and these led to the most violent debates. The ministers maintained that it was not in their power to negotiate with the French government, since there could be no certainty in entering into a treaty with it; that it had drawn upon itself, by its breach of faith, a war with the whole world, Denmark and Sweden alone excepted, and that even with the latter of these two countries its relations were much impaired; that peace with such a government would be treacherous and fatal, as evidenced in the Italian States; that, after having been the aggressor against every sovereign in Europe, it desired to dethrone them all, devoured as it was by an incessant craving after destruction and conquest; that Bonaparte offered no more guarantees than his predecessors; that if the new French government were no longer terrorist, it was equally revolutionary, and that with the French revolution neither truce nor peace could be hoped for; and that if it could not be totally annihilated, it might at least be so worn out, as to become at last, from its weakness, no longer an object of terror. In regard to the first consul the English ministers, and especially lord Grenville, made use of language the most outrageous; indeed they spoke of him as they might of Robespierre.

Fox, Sheridan, Tierney, the duke of Bedford, and Lord Holland, replied with much reason to all these allegations,—"Do you ask who was the aggressor?" said they; "of what importance is that? You say France; France says England. Must we go on destroying each other until this historical point is settled? And what matters it who was the aggressor, if he, whom you call so, offers first to lay down his arms? You say it is impossible to treat with the French government; you sent, yourselves, Lord Malmesbury to Lille, to treat with the directory! Prussia and Spain have had treaties with the French republic, and make no complaint of it. You talk of the crimes of this government; but your ally, the court of Naples, commits crimes which are more atrocious than those of the convention, while it has not the excuse of popular fury. You talk of ambition; but Russia, Prussia, and Austria have shared Poland amongst them, and Austria is aiming to reconquer Italy, without restoring their states to the princes whom France has dispossessed of them; for yourselves,—you have made yourselves masters of India, of a part of the colonies of Spain, and of all the Dutch colonies. Who will have the audacity to proclaim himself more disinterested than the rest in the struggle of anger and greediness, in which all the states are engaged? Either you will never treat with the French republic, or you will never find a moment more favourable than the present, since a man of power and authority has taken the reins of government, and seems disposed to use it with justice and moderation. Is it worthy of the English government to heap abuse on an illustrious personage, the head of one of the first nations of the world, and who, at least, is a great soldier, whatever may be the vices or virtues which time may bring to light in him? Unless we are prepared to say that we will exhaust Great Britain, her blood, her treasures, her most precious resources, in re-establishing the house of Bourbon, it will not be easy to assign a good reason for refusing to treat at this time." To arguments so pressing and so true there was no replying. Mr. Tierney, taking advantage of the fault committed by the English minister, in speaking, in his note, of the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, made a special motion against that family. He proposed the adoption of a formal resolution, declaring that the cause of England was distinct from that of the Bourbons,—a family so fatal to the two countries, "to Great Britain," exclaimed he, "as well as to France." "I have heard," he continued, "many partisans of the administration of Mr. Pitt say, that as the French government had not proposed a joint negotiation, there was good reason for refusing to negotiate separately, as it would weaken us, by alienating our allies; but I have not seen the man who has not severely blamed thus fixing the termination of the war at the date of the re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne!" It is true, as Mr. Tierney said, that every one blamed this error; and that the cabinet of Vienna, less actuated by passion than that of Great Britain, took care not to follow its example. The English ministers replied, that they had never proposed this condition as one absolute and indispensable; but they were met with the rejoinder, that the very mention of it was a sufficient violation of the rights of nations, and an outrage on their freedom. "And what would you say," exclaimed Mr. Tierney, repeating here the argument of the French cabinet, "what would you say, if general Bonaparte, in an hour of victory, were to declare to you, that he would not treat but with the Stuarts? Moreover," added he, "is it from gratitude to the house of Bourbon that you are thus prodigal of our blood and treasures? Do you remember the American war? Or rather, is it for the principle which that house represents? Are you then about to let loose against yourselves those passions which raised up all France against the Bourbons? Are you about to have upon your hands all those who desire no more nobles, who wish for no more tithes nor feudal rights; all those who have purchased national property; all those who for ten years have borne arms for the French revolution? Do you then wish to drain France of her blood to the very last drop, before you think of peace? I make a formal motion," said Mr. Tierney, in conclusion, "that England do separate her cause from that of the house of Bourbon."

On another motion, the celebrated Sheridan, always the boldest and most sarcastic of orators, turned the debate on a very tender point for the British cabinet, the expedition to Holland, at the close of which the English and Russians, after a defeat by general Brune, had been reduced to capitulate.

"It would seem," said Sheridan, "that our government, if it cannot conclude treaties of peace with the French republic, can at any rate conclude capitulations. I ask it to explain to us the motives of that which it has signed for the evacuation of Holland." Mr. Dundas, thus called upon, assigned three reasons for the expedition to Holland. The first, to detach the united provinces from France; the second, to diminish the maritime resources of France and to increase those of England, by taking the Dutch fleet; the third, to create a diversion

which might be useful to the allies; and he added, that the British cabinet had succeeded in two objects out of three, as it had taken the fleet, and had contributed to the gaining the battle of Novi, by drawing upon Holland the forces destined for Italy. The minister had scarcely ended, when Sheridan, rushing to the attack, retorted with unequalled point, "Yes, you have listened to the accounts of emigrants, and you risked on the continent an English army to cover it with disgrace; you wished to detach Holland from France, and you have attached it just so much the more, by filling the whole country with indignation at your iniquitous robbery of its fleet and its colonies. You have seized, as you say, the Dutch fleet, but by what unheard of, by what odious proceedings! by exciting their crews to revolt, and presenting the most terrible of all spectacles, that of sailors in mutiny against their officers, in violation of that discipline which constitutes the strength of naval power and the greatness of our own nation. You have carried off this fleet, to the disgrace of the name of Britain; not for England, but in any case for the stadtholder; for you were obliged to declare it was for him, and not for England. Lastly, you rendered a service to the Austrian army in Italy. It may be so; but do you, the ministers of the king of Great Britain, boast of having saved an Austrian army by giving up an English army to slaughter?"

These attacks, however virulent, did not prevent Pitt from obtaining immense financial resources, about 1100,000,000 f.[1], or nearly double the budget of France at that period; with an authorization for subsidizing Austria and the states of the south of Germany; important additions to the income-tax, which already produced 180,000,000 f.[2] a year; a new suspension of the *habeas corpus* act; and, lastly, the grand measure of a union with Ireland. But the public mind of England was deeply excited by so much reason and eloquence. All reasoning men throughout Europe were struck with the wrong done towards France; and victory ere long siding with justice, Pitt was destined to expiate, by cruel humiliations, the haughtiness of his policy towards the first consul. Meanwhile Pitt had to furnish the coalition with means for a new campaign,—the last campaign, it is true, for all the parties were exhausted; but the more fiercely fought, for the very reason that it was the last.

In this grave conjuncture, the first consul was desirous of making as much use of the court of Prussia as was to be expected at the moment. It was not in the power of this court, in the face of such powerful adversaries, to bring about a peace, unless through an armed intervention; a part not impossible for it to play, but at present unsuited to the views of the young king, who applied himself to recruiting his treasury and his army, while all the nations around him were exhausting themselves. This prince had already sounded the belligerent powers, and, as he found them so out of reason, had given up all idea of interposing between them. The Prussian cabinet itself, moreover, had its own interested views. It had a great desire to see Austria weakened by France, and that she should exhaust herself in the long struggle; it also wished that France should renounce a part of the frontier of the Rhine, and that, contenting herself with Belgium and the Luxemburgh on that side, she should not require the Rhenish provinces. Prussia strongly pressed this advice upon the first consul, dropping a hint, that France and Prussia would agree the better for not being too close to each other; and that the cabinets of Europe, feeling re-assured by this moderation, would be the more inclined towards peace. But though the first consul was very reserved in explaining his intentions on this point, there was at the bottom but little hope of inclining him to such a sacrifice; and the Prussian cabinet could not see, in all this, a peace which would satisfy it for meddling too much in the question. It continued, therefore, to give a quantity of advice, clothed in a dogmatic style, yet in a very friendly manner; but it did nothing.

But still this cabinet might be useful in maintaining the neutrality of the north of Germany, in obtaining the association of as great a number possible of the German princes in that neutrality; lastly, in entirely detaching the emperor Paul from the coalition. As far as this, it acted with zeal, especially as its own wish was to preserve and aggrandize the neutrality of northern Germany; and, above all, bring over Russia to this system. Paul, who carried every feeling to excess, grew more irritated every day against Austria and England; he declared loudly that he would compel Austria to replace the Italian princes on their thrones in Italy, which she had reconquered with the arms of Russia; and oblige England to replace the order of Malta on that island fortress, of which she was just about to make herself master: he showed a remarkable affection for this ancient order, and caused himself to be made grand master. He blamed the manner in which the overtures of the first consul had been received in Vienna and London; and in his despatches to Prussia, now grown confidential, he allowed it to be seen that he wished similar overtures had been addressed to himself. The first consul, in fact, had not ventured to do so, from distrust of the consequences with such a character as the czar. Prussia, advised of all these particulars, gave information to the French cabinet, which made advantageous use of them.

Before opening the campaign, as the season for military operations was approaching, the first consul sent for M. de Sandon, the minister of Prussia, and had with him, on the 5th March, or 14th Ventôse, a positive and complete explanation. After recapitulating at length all that he had done to re-establish peace, and the discourtesy and invincible obstacles that had been brought to bear against him, he stated in their full extent his military preparations, and, without disclosing the secret of his profound combinations, he suffered the Prussian minister to obtain an insight into the greatness of the resources yet remaining to France. The first consul also told M. de Sandon that he had full confidence in Prussia, and expected it to make new efforts to reconcile the belligerent powers, while they should be engaged in fighting; that in default of a general peace, of which there was little probability before a new campaign, he hoped for two services from King Frederic-William,—the re-

[1] £44,000,000. [2] £7,500,000.

conciliation of the republic with Paul I., and an effort made in regard to the elector of Bavaria to break away that prince from the coalition. "Bring about an accommodation between us and Paul," said Bonaparte; "decide, at the same time, the elector of Bavaria to refuse his soldiers and his territory to the coalition, and you will render us two services which we will not forget. If the elector accede to our proposals, you may promise him that all the consideration he desires shall be shown him during the war, and the best treatment at the peace."

The first consul now laid before the Prussian envoy his ulterior views. He told him that as the treaty of Campo Formio was offered as the basis of future negotiation, the Rhenish frontier would afterwards form a question for a treaty with the empire; and that the independence of Holland, of Switzerland, and of the Italian states, should be formally guarantied. Without entering into explanations as to the point where the Rhine would cease to be the French frontier, he only said, that no person could imagine that France would require less than as far up as Mayence; but that down from Mayence, the Moselle or the Meuse might possibly serve her as a boundary. Belgium and Luxemburgh he considered as beyond all question. He added, in conclusion, that if Prussia rendered France the services which she was in a position to render, he would pledge himself that the cabinet of Berlin should exercise a considerable influence in the negotiations for peace. This, in fact, was the point which Prussia held most in regard, as she was desirous of taking a part in any such negotiations, for the purpose of having the German frontiers defined in the manner which best agreed with her own views.

A communication, so frank and well-timed, had the best effect at Berlin. The king replied, that as respected the emperor Paul, he had already employed his good offices, and would do so still to reconcile him to France; that as regarded Bavaria, surrounded as it was on every side by Austria, he could do nothing; but that if the emperor Paul should declare himself, it might be possible, with the double assistance of Prussia and Russia, to withdraw the elector from the coalition.

After these prudently concerted steps, there remained nothing but to commence hostilities with all possible promptitude. However, as the season for them had not yet arrived, and was likely to be later than usual, since France had to re-organize her armies, in part disbanded, and Austria to fill up the chasm left by Russia, in the ranks of the coalition, the first consul thought the time had arrived when the war in La Vendée was to be finished: in order, firstly, to put an end to the odious spectacle of a civil war; secondly, to render disposable, and transport upon the Rhine and the Alps, those excellent troops which La Vendée detained in the interior of the republic.

The intimations which he had caused to be addressed to the insurgent provinces, concurrently with his overtures for peace to the foreign powers, had produced amongst them a very great effect, supported as they were by an imposing force of nearly sixty thousand men brought together from Holland, from the interior, and from Paris itself. The first consul ventured so far as to leave Paris, which at that moment was crowded by the refuse of all the factions, with a garrison of two thousand three hundred men; and he even went to the extent of making this fact public. As an answer to the English ministers, who pretended that the consular government was not more stable than those which preceded it, he caused a comparative statement of the forces in London and Paris to be printed, the result of which showed that London was guarded by fourteen thousand six hundred men, Paris by two thousand three hundred,—a number scarcely sufficient to furnish the guards, which for merely police purposes are stationed at the great public establishments, and the residences of the chief officers of the state. It could be plainly seen that in Paris the name of Bonaparte was sufficient guard.

But however this was, the insurgent provinces found themselves on a sudden surrounded by a formidable army, and placed between the option of a peace immediate and generous, or a war of extermination. In such a choice there could be no delay. D'Andigné and Hyde de Neuville, after an interview with the first consul, had entirely got rid of their illusions, and no longer believed that he had any inclination to restore the Bourbons, or supposed any more that they could conquer such a man. Hyde de Neuville, who had been commissioned by the Count d'Artois to give an opinion on the state of affairs, decided on returning to London; not that he wished to abandon the cause of the Bourbons, but that he saw the impossibility of continuing the war. He left his advice with the chiefs to do what the necessity of time or place might urge them. D'Andigné returned to La Vendée, to report what he had seen.

The duration of the cessation of arms was on the point of expiring, and it became incumbent on the royalist chiefs either to sign a definitive peace, or at once to enter upon a war to the death, against a formidable army. In 1793, in the first enthusiasm of the insurrection, they had not been able to conquer sixteen thousand men of the garrison of Mayence, nor had they obtained any results save those of engaging in combats, certainly heroic, but bloody, only to succumb at last. What, then, could they effect at this period against sixty thousand of the first troops in Europe, one-half of whom had sufficed to drive the Russians and the English into the sea? Clearly nothing; and this opinion was general in the insurgent provinces, or in any case, more or less, in each of them. On the left bank of the Loire, between Saumur, Nantes, and Sables,—in a word, in old La Vendée,—they felt wearied of the war, from the exhaustion of men and means; while they regarded as a folly, its right value, the late taking up arms, which never would have happened but for the weakness and severity of the directory. On the right bank, about Mans, which had been the theatre of a desperate struggle, these sentiments predominated. In Lower Normandy, where the insurrection was of recent date, and where de Frotté, a young chief, active, subtle, and ambitious, was the leader of the royalists, they showed more disposition to continue the war. This was the case also in Morbihan, where the distance from Paris, the vicinity of the sea, and the nature of the country, gave them greater resources, and where Georges Ca-

doudal, a chief of a ferocious and indomitable energy, kept up their courage. In these two last countries a very frequent communication with the English contributed to render their resistance more obstinate.

From one end of La Vendée and Britany to the other, they were discussing what part they should take. The emigrants in the pay of England, whose devotion consisted in continually coming and going, and who had not to suffer all the consequences of the insurrection, were in angry dispute with the people of the country, on whom the burden of the civil war fell without relief. The former contended that the struggle must be continued; the latter, on the contrary, that it must be brought to a close. These representatives of an interest rather English than royalist, declared that the consular government would come to an end like all the other revolutionary governments after some days of imposing appearance; that it would fail from the disorder of the funds and the administration; that detachments of the Russian and English armies would be sent to La Vendée to give a helping hand to the French royalists; that it only required a few days' patience to reap the fruits of eight years' labour and fighting; and that by holding out they would probably have the honour of conducting the Bourbons in victory to Paris. The insurgents, men who did not go habitually to seek refuge in London and live there upon English pay, who remained in the country with their peasantry, who beheld their lands ravaged, their houses burnt, their wives and children exposed to famine and hunger,—these said that Bonaparte had never yet failed in what he had undertaken; that at Paris, in place of thinking that all was going to pieces, they believed all was reorganizing under the fortunate hand of the new chief of the republic, the consul Bonaparte; that this republic, which was said to be exhausted, had just sent them an army of 60,000 men; that the Russians and the English, of whom there was so much boasting, had just laid down their arms before the half of this very army; that it was easy for the emigrants in London to lay down fine plans, and talk of devotion and of constancy, when they were far from the country, from events and their consequences; that on this account they should use some restraint in what they said before men, who, for eight years, had endured alone the ills of civil war in all their horrors. Amongst the worn-out royalists, there were some who went so far as to insinuate, that Bonaparte, in his inclination towards the good cause, would, after he had re-established peace, put an end to persecution, and restored their altars, raise up the throne again. They repeated these fabulous tales, which after the interviews of Andigné and Hyde de Neuville with the first consul no longer found admission amongst the principal royalists, but which still had some credit in the lower ranks of the insurgent populace, and contributed to draw them towards the government.

There lived in the heart of old La Vendée, a simple priest, the abbé Bernier, curé of Saint-Laud, destined ere long to take a part in the affairs of the republic and the empire. The abbé, from his great intelligence and natural capacity, had acquired a powerful influence over the royalist chiefs. From attentive observation of that protracted insurrection, which had resulted only in calamities, he regarded the cause of the Bourbons as lost, for a time at least, and was of opinion that out of the general confusion of the French revolution, nothing more could be saved than the ancient altar of Christianity. Feeling clear on this point from the acts of the first consul and frequent communications with general Hédouville; he no longer hesitated, but calculated that by submission they would obtain peace, an end to their persecutions, and toleration at least, if not protection, for public worship. He advised, therefore, all the chiefs on the left bank to submit, and he silenced by his influence the harangues of those who came backwards and forwards between London and La Vendée. A meeting took place at Montfaucon, at which in a council of the officers the abbé Bernier decided M. D'Autichamp, a gentleman young and full of bravery, but open to conviction from superior minds, to lay down his arms on the part of the province. The capitulation was signed on the 18th January, or the 28th Nivôse. The republic promised an entire amnesty, respect for religious worship, an abandonment of taxation on the ravaged provinces for some years, and that the names of the chiefs should be erased from the list of proscriptions; the royalists on their part undertook for a complete submission, and an immediate surrender of their arms.

On the same day, the 18th January, the abbé Bernier wrote to general Hédouville: "Your wishes and mine are accomplished. At two o'clock this day the peace has been accepted at Montfaucon with thankful acknowledgment by all the chiefs and officers of the left bank of the Loire. The right bank without doubt will follow this example; and the olive of peace will replace on both sides of the Loire the mournful cypress, planted there by war. I charge MM. de Baurollier, Duboucher, and Renou, with the bringing to you these happy tidings, and recommend them to the kindness of yourself and of the government. Falsely inscribed on the fatal list of 1793, they have seen themselves despoiled of all their property. They make this sacrifice to the necessity of circumstances, and are not the less desirous of peace. This peace is your work: maintain it then, general, by justice and good deeds; your glory and your happiness are combined with it. I will do all in my power to carry out your excellent views; prudence commands it, humanity wills it: my heart is with the country in which I dwell, and its happiness is the first of my wishes. BERNIER."

This example produced its effect. Two days afterwards, the insurgents on the right bank, who were commanded by an old and brave gentleman, M. de Châtillon, and disgusted, like him, with serving England more than the cause of royalism, surrendered. All of the old La Vendée was thus in a state of peace. The joy was extreme, whether in the country places where royalism reigned, or in the towns where reigned, on the other hand, the spirit of the revolution. In many towns, such as Nantes and Angers, the royalist chiefs, bearing the tricolor cockade, were received in triumph, and feasted as brothers. On all sides they began to give up their arms, and to submit in good faith, under the influence of an opinion, which was gradually becoming general, that the war, without

bringing back the Bourbons, would have no other end than bloodshed, and the ravaging of the country, while submission, on the contrary, would procure for them repose, security, and the re-establishment of their religion, which, beyond all other things, they desired.

The obstacles to pacification were greater in Britany and Normandy. In these places the war, as we lately observed, was more recent, and had less exhausted their courage; moreover, in these parts, it brought with it certain infamous emoluments, while in La Vendée it produced nothing but suffering. The Chouans, a set of scoundrels whom insurrection had accustomed to robbery, and who knew no other method of getting a living, had all of them taken refuge in the centre of Britany, and towards Normandy. These men always made war on the tax-gatherer's chest, on the diligences, or on those who had possessed themselves of the national domains, and were in communication with a party of bad characters at Paris, receiving from them intelligence which served to guide them in their expeditions. In Morbihan, lastly, where the insurrection had the most obstinate hold, Georges, the only implacable chief of the Vendéans, received money and supplies from the English, which seconded his resistance, and he was thus little disposed to submission.

But preparations were made to crush the chiefs who still held out. On the 24th of January or 1st Pluviôse, general Chabot broke the suspension of arms, and marched upon the bands in the centre of Britany, under the command of Bourmont and De la Prévalaye. Near the commune of Mélay he came up with Bourmont, who, at the head of a thousand Chouans, defended himself vigorously, but was nevertheless compelled to give way to the republican soldiers, accustomed to conquer far different troops to peasantry. He himself escaped with great difficulty, after incurring the greatest danger; and being soon after obliged to acknowledge that he could do no more for his cause, he gave up his arms on the 24th of January or 4th Pluviôse.

General Chabot next marched upon Rennes, on his way thence to the extremity of Britany, where General Brune was concentrating a great force. On the 25th January or 5th Pluviôse, a number of columns, despatched from Vannes, D'Auray, and D'Elven, under generals Harty and Gency, met with the bands of Georges at Grandchamp. The two republican generals were escorting to Vannes convoys of grain and cattle, raised in the insurgent country; and the Chouans, while endeavouring to retake these convoys, were surrounded by the columns of the escort, who, in spite of their vigorous resistance, slew four hundred men and many of the chiefs, putting them completely to the rout. Two days after, on the 27th, a very smart engagement at Hennebon caused the slaughter of three hundred Chouans, and served completely to destroy all the hopes of the insurgents. Off the coast were lying an English eighty-gun ship and some frigates, which could see how chimerical were all those hopes with which the British government had been deluded. As far as this, both parties had mutually cheated each other; the British government in promising another new expedition like that to Holland, the Bretons in announcing a general rising. The royalists, so recently landed, had much trouble in getting back to the English squadron in a small vessel, where they met with the reception of emigrants who have promised much and performed little. Georges found himself reduced to lay down his arms, and delivered up twenty thousand muskets and twenty pieces of artillery, which he had just received from the English.

In Lower Normandy, De Frotté, a young chief strongly devoted to his cause, had been, like Georges, very resolute in continuing the war. He was followed up by generals Gardanne and Chambarlhac, with detachments from the garrison at Paris. Many sharp engagements took place between them on different points. On the 25th January, or the 5th Pluviôse, general Gardanne came up with De Frotté at the forges of Cossé, near De la Motte-Fouquet, and destroyed great part of his force. On the 26th or 6th Pluviôse, one of the chiefs, named Duboisgny, was attacked at his chateau of Duboisgny, near Fougères, and sustained, like De Frotté, a considerable loss. Lastly, on the 27th, or the 7th Pluviôse, general Chambarlhac, in the environs of Saint Christophe, not far from Alençon, surrounded some companies of Chouans, and put them to the sword.

De Frotté saw, like the others, but unfortunately too late, that all resistance was vain against the numerous columns which were thrown upon the country, and thought it time to surrender. He wrote to general Hédouville to ask for peace, and proposed, while awaiting an answer, a suspension of arms to general Chambarlhac. This officer replied, that as he had no power to treat, he would apply to the government for them, but that he could not take upon himself to suspend hostilities in the interval, unless De Frotté would consent immediately to deliver up the arms of his troops. This was exactly what De Frotté most dreaded. He readily consented to submit, and to sign a pacification for the moment, but on condition of remaining armed, so as to seize without delay the first favourable occasion for recommencing the war. He even wrote to his lieutenants letters, in which, while enjoining them to surrender, he advised them to keep their muskets. In the mean while, irritated by the obstinacy of De Frotté, the first consul had given orders that no quarter should be shown him, and that an example should be made in his person. De Frotté, uneasy at not receiving an answer to his proposals, was desirous of placing himself in communication with general Guidal, who was in command of the department of the Orne; and, while seeking an interview with him, was arrested with six of his companions. The letters found upon him, containing the order to his officers to surrender but to preserve their arms, sufficed for a charge of treason. He was conducted to Verneuil, and handed over to a military commission.

When the news of his arrest reached Paris, a crowd of intercessors surrounded the first consul, and obtained from him a suspension of the proceedings, which was equivalent to a pardon. But the courier who carried the order of the government, arrived too late: for, as the constitution was suspended in the insurgent departments, De Frotté had been tried summarily, and by the time the order to suspend the proceedings had arrived,

this young chief had already suffered the penalty of his obstinacy. The duplicity of his conduct, however clearly proved, nevertheless is not sufficiently culpable to prevent our deeply regretting such an execution,—the only one, it must be stated, which stained with blood that fortunate termination of the civil war.

By this time the departments of the west were entirely pacified. The prudence of general Hédouville, the vigour and promptitude of the means employed, the exhausted condition of the insurgents, the mixture of confidence and fear which the first consul inspired, effected this rapid pacification. It was brought to a perfect termination by the end of February 1800 or 1st Ventôse. The disarming was complete; there remained only highway robbers, whom justice, active, and without mercy, would quickly overtake. The troops who had been employed in the west, began their march towards Paris, to take their part in the great designs of the first consul.

The constitution, which had been suspended in four departments, the Loire-Inférieure, the Ille-et-Vilaine, Morbihan, and the Côtes-du-Nord, was again put in force; and the majority of the chiefs, who had just laid down their arms, were, in succession, induced to visit Paris, and report themselves to the first consul. He well knew that it was not enough to pluck arms from their hands, but that he must make himself master of minds so enthusiastic, and direct them towards some noble object. He desired to carry these royalist chiefs along with him, in the extensive career at that moment opened to all Frenchmen; to lead them to fortune, and to glory, by that path of danger which they were accustomed to tread. He invited them to an interview. His renown, which made all, who had an opportunity, desirous of approaching him, and his beneficence, so celebrated at that time throughout La Vendée, which they had to invoke in favour of many victims of the civil war, were honourable motives for the royalist chiefs to pay him this visit. The first consul graciously received, first, the Abbé Bernier, next Bourmont, D'Autichamp, and Châtillon, and, lastly, Georges Cadoudal himself. He paid marked attention to the Abbé Bernier, and determined to attach him to himself, and employ him in difficult affairs connected with the church. He held frequent conversations with the military chiefs, whom his lofty language affected, and some of them he decided to serve in the armies of France. He succeeded even in gaining the heart of Châtillon, who retired from public life, took to himself a wife, and became the ordinary and successful mediator for his fellow-citizens, whenever they had any act of justice or humanity to solicit from the first consul. Thus it is by glory, clemency, and beneficence, that men must put an end to revolutions.

Georges alone bore up against this high influence. When he was conducted to the Tuileries, the aid-de-camp, who had to introduce him, conceived such alarm at his looks, that he would not close the door of the first consul's cabinet, and went in every now and then to steal a glance at what was passing. The interview was a long one. The consul Bonaparte tried vainly on the ears of Georges Cadoudal the words "country" and "glory;" in vain he essayed even the bait of ambition on the heart of this savage soldier of the civil war; he made no impression, and felt himself convinced that he had not, when he looked on the countenance of him whom he addressed. On quitting him, Georges departed for England with Hyde de Neuville, and often, while recounting this interview to his travelling companion, he held out his vigorous arms, exclaiming, "What a blunder I made in not strangling the fellow within these arms!"

This prompt pacification of La Vendée produced a great effect on the public mind. Certain of the evil-disposed, who did not wish to explain it by natural causes, the energetic physical means employed, the prudence of the policy, and, above all, the influence of the great name of the first consul, pretended that there was a secret connexion with the Vendéans, in which a promise was given them of some important satisfaction. They did not say plainly, but insinuated, that there might possibly be something, even more than a restoration of the principle of the old regime, than even of the Bourbons themselves. These ridiculous fables were spread about by the newsmongers of the revolutionary party. But men of sense, with a better appreciation of the acts of Bonaparte, said that no man would do such great deeds for another to reap the fruits; and expressed their belief, that if his labours were not solely for France, they were at least for himself, and not for the Bourbons. For the rest, the pacification of La Vendée was, in the eyes of all, a very fortunate event, as presaging that peace, the most important and difficult—a peace with Europe.

Before opening the campaign of this year the consul, in his haste to close the session of the legislative body, pressed on the passing of the numerous bills which had been introduced. Some of the members of the tribunate complained of the rapidity with which they were called upon to discuss and vote. "We are," said the tribune Sedillez, a man of impartiality and moderation—"we are carried along in a whirlwind of hurry, which moves rapidly in the direction of our wishes. Is it not better to yield to the impetuosity of this movement, than to risk impeding its progress? We can next examine with more mature deliberation the bills presented to us, and correct them where it may be necessary." In fact, all went rapidly on, as the first consul wished. The laws were put into operation as soon as passed; the functionaries appointed repaired to their posts. The new prefects entered on their charge, and the administration assumed, in every part, a unison of action and an activity hitherto unseen. The taxes in arrears came into the treasury, since the completion of the assessment enabled the collectors to call upon the tax-payers with a legal right. Every day some new measure gave clearer evidence of the direction of the government policy. A second list of the proscribed obtained the benefit of a recall. A great number of writers who figured on this list, De Fontanes, De la Harpe, Suard, Sicard, Michaud, and Fiévée, were either recalled from their exile, or authorized to come forth from their retreats. The members of the constituent assembly, known for having voted the abolition of feudal rights, were exempted from all the severities which

had been inflicted on them by the convention and the directory. A famous proscript of the 18th Fructidor, Barthélemy, the ex-director, who negotiated and signed the first treaty of peace for the republic, was named a senator at the instance of the consuls; and, lastly, another of the proscribed of the same date, Carnot, but recently brought back from exile, and appointed inspector of reviews, was called to the office of minister of war, in place of general Berthier, then on the point of departing to take the command of one of the armies of the republic. The name of Carnot was, at that day, one of great military reputation, to which attached the recollection of the victories under the convention in 1793; and while the name of general Bonaparte was sufficient alone to make the coalition tremble, the addition to it of that of Carnot produced, in truth, a remarkable sensation in the foreign staffs.

As the session was tending to its close, the opposition in the tribunate made a last effort, which created some excitement, though defeated by a large majority. The legislative body sat for four months only, but no term had been assigned to the sittings of the tribunate. The latter might thus assemble, though the vacation of the legislative body left it without business. It was proposed that it should make some employment for itself out of the petitions, which it was alone empowered to receive, and the expression of its wishes on matters of public interest, for which it had authority. Benjamin Constant moved that the petitions should be handed over to separate committees, that they should be kept constantly at work, and should contrive by this means, not only a discussion of all the acts of the government (a thing in itself legitimate), but their permanent discussion through the twelve months of the year. All that was really important in this proposition was negatived. It was decided that the tribunate should meet once a fortnight to receive petitions, and that this should be done through a bureau of the assembly, composed of a president and secretaries. Reduced within these limits, the proposition no longer gave occasion for uneasiness.

Saving this last effort, the end of the session was perfectly peaceable, even in the tribunate. So large had been the majority in favour of the government, that it required some touchiness to be displeased with an opposition not numbering more than twenty members. The first consul, though little disposed to put up with it, determined to make no account of it; and thus this first session of the year VIII. by no means corresponded with the fears to which certain propagators of bad news affected to give utterance. If, at a later period, matters had remained in this state, people would have accommodated themselves to this last semblance of a deliberative assembly, and it would have been supported equally by that alarmed generation, and the chief whom it had chosen.

A short time before the closing of the session, the first consul adopted a measure in regard to the periodical press, which at present would be little else than an impossible phenomenon, but which, at that time, from the silence of the constitution, was a measure perfectly legal, and, from the spirit of the time, was almost insignificant. The constitution, in fact, said nothing of the press. It may seem surprising that so important a point of liberty as that of writing was not even specially mentioned in the fundamental laws of the state; but at that time the tribune, as well of the assemblies as of the clubs, was, owing to the passions of the revolution, the favourite means of publishing opinion; and there had been so much use made of the right of speaking, that there was no thought of that of writing. At the epoch of the 18th Fructidor, the press had been rather more made use of, but as it was so by the royalists in particular, it created an irritation against itself among the revolutionists, which afterwards sunk into indifference. They suffered it, therefore, to be proscribed at the 18th Fructidor; and when the constitution was framed in the year VIII., it was omitted, and thenceforth left to the pleasure of the government.

The first consul, who had endured with much impatience the attacks of the royalist journals, while he was merely a general of the army of Italy, began now to feel annoyed at the indiscretions committed by the press respecting his military operations, and the virulent attacks which it permitted itself to make on some foreign governments. Applying himself specially to reconcile the republic with Europe, he feared that the bitter invectives of the republican press against the cabinets, particularly since the refusal of the overtures made by France, would render vain all his efforts for an arrangement. The king of Prussia, in particular, had made a complaint against some of the French journals, and expressed his displeasure at their attacks. The first consul, in his desire to efface completely all traces of violence, and, moreover, unrestrained in regard to the liberty of the press by a firm and established public opinion, such as at this day exists, came to a resolution by which he suppressed a great number of journals, and pointed out those which should have the privilege of appearing. The journals allowed to remain were thirteen in number. These were, the *Moniteur Universel*, the *Journal des Débats*, the *Journal de Paris*, the *Bien-informé*, the *Publiciste*, the *Ami des Lois*, the *Clef du Cabinet*, the *Citoyen Français*, the *Gazette de France*, the *Journal des Hommes Libres*, the *Journal du Soir*, the *Journal des Défenseurs de la Patrie*, the *Décade Philosophique*.

These favoured journals moreover received notice, that whichever of them should publish articles against the constitution, or the armies, their glory or their interests, or promulgate invectives against foreign governments, the friends or allies of France, would be immediately suppressed.

This measure, which now-a days would appear so extraordinary, was received without murmur or surprise, so true is it that the value of things depends on the spirit of the times.

The votes required from the citizens on the subject of the new constitution were taken and counted, and the result of the casting up communicated to the senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate by a message from the consuls. No one of the former constitutions had been accepted by so great a number of suffrages.

In 1793, for the constitution of that epoch, there had been given one thousand eight hundred suffrages in its favour, eleven thousand against it; in 1795, for the constitution under the directory, one

million fifty-seven thousand suffrages in its favour, and forty-nine thousand against it. On this occasion more than three millions of voters presented themselves, of whom three millions voted in favour of the constitution, and only one thousand five hundred opposed it[1].

It is true, that such empty formalities have no import with thinking men: it is not from such vulgar and often counterfeited demonstrations, but from its moral aspect, that we form a judgment of the feeling of society; yet the difference in the number of the voters bore, in this instance, an incontestable signification, and proved, at least, how general was the sentiment which called for a strong and restorative government, competent to give assurance of order, victory, and peace.

Before departing for the army, the first consul decided upon an important step: he established himself at the Tuileries. With the disposition of some minds to see in him a Cæsar or a Cromwell, whose destiny it was to terminate a reign of anarchy by one of absolute power, this taking up his abode in the palace of the kings, was a step of boldness and delicacy, not because of the resistance it might provoke, but from the moral effect which it might perhaps produce.

The first consul caused this to be preceded by an imposing and well-imagined ceremony. Washington had just died; and the decease of this illustrious personage, who had filled with his glory the close of the last century, formed a subject of regret to all the friends of liberty in Europe. The first consul, judging that some manifestation on this subject would be opportune, addressed to the army the following order of the day:—

"Washington is dead! That great man fought against tyranny, and consolidated the independence of his country. His name will be always dear to the people of France, as well as to all free men of the two worlds, and especially to the soldiers of France, who are fighting, like him and the soldiers of America, for equality and liberty."

Ten days of mourning were directed in consequence, which consisted in all the colours of the republic being hung with black crape; nor did the first consul stop here. He directed a fête, at once simple and noble, to be got up in the church of the Invalides, a church named, in the fugitive nomenclature of the time, the temple of Mars. The colours taken in Egypt had not yet been presented to the government. General Lannes was charged to receive them on this occasion, by direction of the minister of war, under the magnificent dome raised by the great king for his aged warriors.

On the 9th of February or 20th Pluviôse all the authorities being assembled at the Invalides, general Lannes presented to the minister of war, Berthier, ninety-six flags, taken at the Pyramids, at Mount Tabor, and at Aboukir; and pronounced a brief and martial harangue, to which Berthier responded in the same style. The latter was seated between two invalids, each a hundred years old, and had in front of him a bust of Washington, over-shadowed by a thousand flags, won from Europe by the armies of republican France.

Not far from this spot a tribune was erected, and this was ascended by one of the proscribed, who owed his liberty to the policy of the first consul. This was De Fontanes, a pure and brilliant writer, the last who made use of that French language, once so perfect, but which in the eighteenth century has gone into the abyss of the past. De Fontanes, in studied and profound language, pronounced the funeral oration of the hero of America. He celebrated the warlike virtues of Washington, his valour, his wisdom, his disinterestedness; he placed far above the military genius, whose knowledge is that of gaining victories, the genius which can restore, which knows how to put an end to civil war, to close the wounds of a country, and give peace to the world. By the side of the shade of Washington he evoked those of Turenne, of Catinat, and of Condé; and speaking after a figure, in the names of these great men, he gave utterance to encomiums which were as full of noble spirit, as they were replete with lessons of wisdom and prudence.

"Yes," he exclaimed at the close of his speech, "yes, thy counsels shall be attended to, O Washington, O warrior, O legislator, O citizen without reproach! He who, while yet young, surpasses thee in war, like thee, shall close, with his triumphant hands, the wounds of his country; soon—we have assurance in his will, and his genius for war, should it unhappily be necessary,—soon shall the hymn of peace resound in this temple of war; then shall one universal sentiment of joy efface the memory of all injustice and oppression, then may even the oppressed forget their wrongs, and look forward with confidence to the future. The applause of every age will accompany the hero who confers this blessing upon France, and upon that world which she has too long thrown into commotion."

At the close of this discourse, black crape was attached to all the colours, and the French republic was considered to be in mourning for the founder of the American republic, as monarchs put themselves in mourning for each other.

And what was there wanting in this ceremony that was present to those funeral scenes where Louis XIV. came to listen to an eulogium on one of his warriors, from the lips of Fléchier or of Bossuet! Certainly not the grandeur of the occasion or the men, for the speech was of Washington, in the presence of Bonaparte, and delivered in the midst of men who had seen a Charles I. ascend the scaffold, and even crowned women following him there. The words Fleurus, Arcola, Rivoli, Zurich, the Pyramids, could at that time be pronounced; and those magnificent words would assuredly shed as great a lustre on the discourse as those of Dunes and Rocroy! What then was wanting in this ceremony to make it completely great? There wanted what the greatest of men could not bring there, there wanted especially religion; not such as men labour to affect, but what they really feel, and without which a funeral is but a cold solemnity: there wanted also the genius of Bossuet; for there is a greatness which comes not again in nations, and if Turenne and Condé have had their successors, Bossuet has not: there wanted, lastly, a certain sincerity; for this homage to a hero,

[1] The exact numbers were: in 1793, 1,801,918 in favour, and 11,610 against; in 1795, 1,057,390 in favour, and 49,955 against; in 1800, of 3,012,569 voters, 3,011,007 in favour, and 1562 against.

renowned especially for the disinterestedness of his ambition, was too visibly an affectation; yet let us not believe, with the vulgar crowd of thinkers, that all in this instance was mere hypocrisy; doubtless there was some, but there were also the ordinary illusions of the time, ay, and of all times! Men cheat themselves oftener than they cheat others. There were many Frenchmen, who, like the Romans under Augustus, believed still in the republic, because they heard its name diligently pronounced; and it is by no means certain, that he who directed this funeral ceremonial, that even Bonaparte did not deceive himself in celebrating Washington, and that he did not imagine, that it was possible to be the first man in France as in America, without becoming a king or an emperor

This ceremony was the prelude to the installation of the three consuls at the Tuileries. The necessary repairs had been for some time going on at this palace; the traces left there by the convention were effaced, and the red caps, which it had placed in the centre of the gilded ceilings, removed. The first consul was to occupy the apartments on the first floor, the same as the royal family, now reigning, occupy for evening parties. His wife and her children were to be lodged over him, in the entresol. The gallery of Diana was, as now, the vestibule which leads to the apartment of the head of the state. The first consul caused it to be decorated with busts, representing a succession of great men, and endeavoured to mark in his choice of these busts the bent of his own genius; there were Demosthenes, Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Brutus, Cicero, Cato, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Duguai-Trouin, Marlborough, Eugene, Marshal Saxe, Washington, Frederick the Great, Mirabeau, Dugommier, Dampierre, Marceau, Joubert,—in a word, warriors and orators, the defenders of liberty and conquerors, heroes of the ancient monarchy and of the republic,—lastly, four generals of the revolution, who had fallen on the field. To assemble round him the glories of every time, of every country, in the same manner as he desired to assemble round his government men of all parties, such was on every occasion the inclination he loved to manifest.

But he was not to occupy the Tuileries alone. His two colleagues were to reside there with him. The consul Lebrun was lodged in the pavilion of Flora. As for the consul Cambacérès, who ranked with the consul Lebrun, he refused to take up his quarters in the palace of the kings. This personage, a man of consummate prudence, possibly the only man of his time who did not give himself up to any illusion, remarked to his colleague Lebrun, "We must not go and settle ourselves in the Tuileries; it is not at all suitable for us; and, as for me, I shall not go. Bonaparte will soon want to live there by himself, and we shall have to go out; it is better not to go in at all." Nor did he go, but had a handsome house given him in the Place du Carrousel, which he kept as long as Napoleon kept the empire.

When all was in order, and some days after the funeral ceremony at the Invalides, the first consul resolved to take possession publicly of the Tuileries, and did so in great state.

On the 19th February, the 30th Pluviôse, he left the Luxembourg to repair to his new palace, preceded and followed by an imposing cortége. The fine regiments which had passed from Holland to La Vendée, from La Vendée to Paris, and which were about to render themselves illustrious for the hundredth time on the plains of Germany and Italy, led the way under the command of Lannes, Murat, and Bessières. Next came, in carriages (almost all of them hired), the ministers, the council of state, and the public authorities; lastly, in a splendid carriage, drawn by six white horses, the three consuls themselves. These horses were especially appropriate, from the circumstance of their having been presented to Bonaparte by the emperor of Germany, on the occasion of the peace of Campo-Formio. He had also received from the same prince a magnificent sabre, which he took care to wear on this day. He had thus about him all that recalled to mind the warrior and peacemaker. The crowd collected in the streets and on the quays leading to the Tuileries greeted his presence with loud cheers. These acclamations were sincere, for in him they hailed the glory of France and the commencement of her prosperity. On its arrival at the Carrousel, the carriage of the consuls was received by the consular guard, and had to pass between the two guard-houses, erected the one on the right, the other on the left of the court-yard of the palace. On one of these yet remained this inscription, "ROYALTY IS ABOLISHED IN FRANCE, AND SHALL RISE UP NO MORE."

On entering the court-yard, the first consul mounted a horse, and passed in review the troops drawn up in front of the palace. When he came in front of the colours of the 96th, the 43rd, and the 30th demibrigades, all blackened as they were with smoke, and torn by balls, he saluted them, and was saluted in his turn by loud huzzas from the soldiers. Having gone through the ranks, he took up a position in front of the pavilion of Flora, and saw them defile before him. Over his head, in the balcony of the palace, were the consuls, the principal authorities, and, lastly, his own family, who now began to hold a rank in the state. The review over, he proceeded to his apartments, where the minister of the interior presented to him the civil authorities; the minister of war, the military authorities; and the minister of marine, all the officers of the navy then in Paris. In the course of the day entertainments were given at the Tuileries and at the houses of the ministers.

The service of the consular palace was regulated as follows: Bénezech, a councillor of state, and formerly minister of the interior, was charged with the general administration of this palace. The aids-de-camp, and especially Duroc, were to do the honours, in place of that multitude of officers of every kind, who ordinarily throng the vast apartments of European royalty. Every fortnight, on the 2nd and 17th of each month, the first consul received the diplomatic corps. Once in the décade, on different days but at certain fixed hours, he received the senators, the members of the legislative corps, the tribunate, and the tribunal of cassation. Functionaries desirous of an audience had to address themselves to the ministers of their department, to be presented. On the 2nd Ventôse or 24th February, two days after his installation at the Tuileries, he gave audience to the diplomatic

body. Surrounded by a numerous staff, and with the two consuls at his side, he received the envoys of the states who were not at war with the republic: having been introduced by Bénezech, and presented by the minister for foreign affairs, they delivered their credentials to the first consul, who handed them to the minister, somewhat in the manner of a sovereign in a monarchical government. The foreign agents who figured in this audience were M. de Musquiz, ambassador of Spain; M. de Sandoz-Rollin, minister of Prussia; M. de Schimmelpenninck, ambassador from Holland; M. de Serbelloni, the envoy of the Cisalpine republic; and lastly the *chargés d'affaires* of Denmark, of Sweden, of Switzerland, of Hesse-Cassel, of Rome, of Genoa, and others. (*Moniteur*, 4 Ventôse, year VIII.)

After this presentation the different ministers were presented to madame Bonaparte.

Every five days the first consul passed in review the regiments marching through Paris on the route to the frontiers. It was here that he could be seen by the troops and the multitude, who were ever eager to run after him. Thin, pale, stooping on his horse, he impressed and interested them by a severe and melancholy beauty, and by an appearance of ill-health, which began to occasion much anxiety; for never was the preservation of any existence so much to be desired as his.

After these reviews the officers of the troops were admitted to his table. To these repasts, where reigned a decent luxury, were invited also the foreign ministers, the members of the assemblies, the magistrates, and the functionaries. There were not yet at this nascent court either ladies of honour or chamberlains. The tone of it was severe, but yet somewhat refined: it purposely avoided the usages of the directory, under which a ridiculous imitation of antique costume, united to a dissoluteness of manners, had banished all dignity from the external representation of the government. Silence was observed, and men regarded and followed with their eyes the extraordinary personage who had done such great things, and who gave hope of still greater. They waited his questions, and replied to them with deference.

The day which followed his establishment at the Tuileries, Bonaparte, while going over the palace with his secretary De Bourrienne, said to him, "Well, Bourrienne, here we are at the Tuileries! and we must now stop here."

BOOK III.

ULM AND GENOA.

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.—FORCES OF THE COALITION IN 1800.—ARMIES OF THE BARON DE MÉLAS IN LIGURIA, OF MARSHAL KRAY IN SWABIA.—AUSTRIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.—IMPORTANCE OF SWITZERLAND IN THIS WAR.—PLAN OF BONAPARTE.—HE RESOLVES TO MAKE USE OF SWITZERLAND TO COME DOWN ON THE FLANK OF KRAY, AND IN THE REAR OF MÉLAS.—WHAT PART HE INTENDED FOR MOREAU, AND WHAT FOR HIMSELF.—CREATION OF THE ARMY OF RESERVE.—INSTRUCTIONS TO MASSÉNA.—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.—THE BARON MÉLAS ATTACKS THE ARMY OF LIGURIA ON THE APENNINES, AND DIVIDES IT INTO TWO PARTS, THE ONE OF WHICH IS DRIVEN BACK ON THE VAR, THE OTHER ON GENOA.—MASSÉNA BEING SHUT UP IN GENOA PREPARES FOR AN OBSTINATE DEFENCE THERE.—A DESCRIPTION OF GENOA.—HEROIC ENGAGEMENTS OF MASSÉNA.—THE FIRST CONSUL URGES MOREAU TO SET ABOUT COMMENCING OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, TO BE ABLE THE SOONER TO SUCCOUR MASSÉNA.—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE AT FOUR POINTS.—MOREAU SUCCEEDS IN UNITING THREE DIVISIONS OF HIS ARMY OUT OF FOUR, AND FALLS UPON THE AUSTRIANS AT ENGEN AND STOCKACH.—BATTLES OF ENGEN AND MŒSSKIRCH.—RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIANS ON THE DANUBE.—AFFAIR OF ST. CYR AT BIBERACH.—KRAY ESTABLISHES HIMSELF IN AN ENTRENCHED CAMP AT ULM.—MOREAU MANŒUVRES TO DISLODGE HIM.—MANY FALSE MOVEMENTS OF MOREAU, WHICH HAPPILY ARE ATTENDED BY NO BAD RESULTS.—MOREAU SHUTS UP MÉLAS IN ULM, AND TAKES UP A STRONG POSITION IN ADVANCE OF AUGSBURG, INTENDING TO AWAIT THE EVENTS IN ITALY.—A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIONS OF MOREAU.—CHARACTER OF THAT GENERAL.

After all the earnest solicitations he had addressed to Europe for peace—solicitations hardly to be expected from a general covered as he was with glory, nothing was left to the first consul but to make war, for which he had been preparing during the whole of the winter of 1799—1800 (year VIII). This war was at once the most legitimate, and the most glorious of all in those heroic times.

Austria, all the while she observed in matters of form more moderation than England, had nevertheless arrived at the same conclusion, and refused peace. The vain hope of preserving in Italy the advantageous position which she owed to the victories of Suwarrow, the English subsidies, the erroneous impression that France was exhausted of men and money, and could not furnish means for another campaign, but, above all, the fatal obstinacy of Thugut, who represented the war party at Vienna with as great a degree of prejudice as Pitt did in London, and who brought to this question much more of personal feeling than of true patriotism; all these causes combined, led the Austrian cabinet into committing one of the gravest political faults,—that of not profiting by a good position to negotiate. It required a great degree of blindness to expect that the successes which it owed to the incapacity of the directory, it could again obtain in the face of a new government, already completely reorganized, active to a prodigy, and under the direction of the first captain of the age.

The archduke Charles, who united with his true military talents much moderation and modesty, had pointed out the danger attached to a con-

tinuance of the war, and the difficulty of making head against the celebrated adversary who was about to enter the lists. His only answer was the withdrawal of the command of the Austrian armies, by which they deprived themselves of the only general who was able to direct them with any chance of success. His disgrace was masked under the title of governor of Bohemia. The imperial army bitterly regretted this prince, even though there was given them as his successor baron Kray, who had greatly distinguished himself in the last Italian campaign. Kray was an officer of bravery, competency, and experience, and showed himself not unworthy of the command with which he was entrusted.

To fill up the void left by the Russians in the ranks of the coalition, Austria, by the aid of subsidies from England, obtained a sufficiently large supply of forces from the states of the empire. A special treaty, signed on the 16th of March, by Mr. Wickham the British minister, with the elector of Bavaria, bound that prince to furnish a supplementary corps of twelve thousand Bavarians beyond his legal contingent as a member of the empire. A treaty of the same kind, signed on the 20th of April, with the duke of Wurtemberg, procured another corps of six thousand Wurtembergers for the army of the coalition. Lastly, on the 30th April, the same negotiator obtained from the elector of Mayence a corps of from four to six thousand Mayençais on the same financial conditions. Beyond the expenses of recruiting, equipping, and maintaining their troops, England guarantied to the princes of the German coalition, not to treat with France without them, and pledged herself that their states should be restored to them, whatever might be the result of the war, making them promise in return not to listen to any proposal for a separate peace.

Of these German troops the best were the Bavarians; next to those came the Wurtembergers; but the troops of Mayence were militia, without discipline or valour. Independently of these regular contingents, the peasantry of the Black Forest had been roused to arms by the terrible accounts of the ravages committed by the French, who at that time caused much less devastation than did the imperial armies, on the cultivated plains of unhappy Germany.

The imperial army of Suabia, all the auxiliaries included, amounted very nearly to one hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were in garrison, and one hundred and twenty thousand present on active service. It was provided with a numérous artillery, good, though inferior to that of France; and, above all, with a superb cavalry, as is usual in the armies of Austria. The emperor had above one hundred and twenty thousand men in Lombardy under Mélas. A great number of English ships assembled in the Mediterranean, and, cruising incessantly in the gulf of Genoa, supported all the operations of the Austrians in Italy. They were to transport an auxiliary corps consisting of English and emigrants, already assembled at Mahon, and amounting, as was said, to twenty thousand men; it was arranged that this corps should even be landed at Toulon, in case the imperial army, charged with the operations against the Apennine frontier, should succeed in forcing the line of the Var.

There had been a hope of a junction of some Russian troops with those of England, to be landed on the coast of France, for the purpose of exciting insurrections in Belgium, Britany, and La Vendée; but an inaction on the part of Russia, beyond doubt voluntary, and the pacification of La Vendée, caused a failure of this plan, on which the allies had greatly counted.

It was, then, a mass of three hundred thousand men, or thereabouts; one hundred and fifty thousand in Suabia, one hundred and twenty thousand in Italy, and twenty thousand at Mahon, seconded by the marine power of England, which was to prosecute the war against France. Such a force, it must be confessed, would have been exceedingly insufficient against France, reorganized, and in possession of all her resources: but against France just emerging from the chaos into which she had been cast by the weakness of the directory, it was a considerable force, and one with which great results might have been achieved, had the enemy known how to use it. It must be added, that this was the actual force, liable to very little deduction, since the three hundred thousand men who composed it were inured to hardships, and were already upon the very frontier they were to attack; a circumstance of importance, inasmuch as every army, at its first campaign, can with difficulty endure the early trials of war; and if it has a long march to make before joining battle, grows less in number, in proportion to the distance it has to traverse.

We have now to ascertain the distribution of the troops of the coalition, and the plan on which they were about to act.

Kray, at the head of the one hundred and fifty thousand men under his command, occupied Suabia, taking up a position in the middle of the angle formed by the Rhine in that country, when after running from east to west, from Constance down to Basle, it turns sharply towards the north, running from Basle to Strasburg. In this position Kray, having Switzerland on his left flank, and Alsace on his right, could watch all the passes of the Rhine by which the French army might penetrate into Germany. He made no show of forcing the line of this river, and invading the territory of the republic; the part he had to play in opening the campaign, was to be of a less active kind. The commencing operations was reserved for the army of Italy, one hundred and twenty thousand strong, and already, in consequence of the advantages which it gained in 1799, almost at the foot of the Apennines. It was to blockade Genoa, to carry it if possible, then cross the Apennines and the Var, and show itself before Toulon, where the English and the emigrants of the south, under the command of general Willot, one of those proscribed in Fructidor, had arranged to meet the Austrians. Another invasion of that province of France which contained our greatest marine establishment, was so especially agreeable to the English, that it is to them we must, in great part, attribute this plan, that was afterwards so severely criticised. When the Austrian army of Italy, which, owing to the climate of Liguria, could commence the campaign before that of Suabia, should

have penetrated into Provence it was supposed that the first consul would withdraw his troops from the Rhine to cover the Var, and that Kray would then have an opportunity for action. Switzerland, when she found herself thus outflanked, and, as it were, strangled between two victorious armies, would fall, as a matter of course, without there being any necessity to renew against her the fruitless efforts of the preceding campaign. The exploits of Lecourbe and Masséna in the Alps had given Austria a strong distaste for any great operation specially directed against Switzerland, and they were desirous to confine themselves to a mere observation as regarded that country. The extreme left of Kray was charged with this duty in Suabia; the cavalry of Mélas, useless in the Apennines, was to undertake the same duty in Lombardy. The plan of the Austrians consisted, then, of temporizing in Suabia, and carrying on the operations with all speed in Italy; to advance on this side as far as the Var, and then, as soon as the French being drawn upon the Var should leave the Rhine unprotected, to cross the river, and thence advance in two great divisions, the one upon Basle, the other to the south by Nice, and so reduce, without attack, the formidable barrier of Switzerland.

Practical judges of military operations have greatly blamed Austria for its neglect of Switzerland, which allowed Bonaparte to open a way there for himself, and fall on the flank of Kray, and on the rear of Mélas. We believe, as will soon appear from the facts, that it was impossible for any plan to be quite certain in the presence of Bonaparte, and with the irreparable inconvenience of Switzerland being in the hands of the French.

To form a just comprehension of this memorable campaign, and a sound judgment on the plans of the belligerents, we must figure to ourselves exactly the position of Switzerland, and the influence which it must have on the military operations, especially at the point to which they had arrived.

Towards the eastern frontier of France, and in the centre of the European continent, the Alps take their rise; whence stretching towards the east, they separate Germany and Italy, throwing from the one side the Danube and its tributaries, from the other the Po and all the rivers of which that noble stream is composed. That part of the Alps nearest to France forms Switzerland; further on they constitute the Tyrol, which for ages has belonged to Austria.

When the Austrian armies are advancing towards France, they are compelled to ascend the valley of the Danube on one side, the valley of the Po on the other, being separated in two masses, acting on the long chain of the Alps. So long as they are in Bavaria and in Lombardy, these two masses can communicate across the Alps, by the Tyrol, which belongs to the emperor; but when they reach Suabia, on the upper Danube, and Piedmont, on the upper Po, they find themselves separated one from the other, without the power of communication across the Alps; since Switzerland, being independent and neuter, is usually to them forbidden ground.

This neutrality of Switzerland is an obstacle which the policy of Europe has wisely placed between France and Austria, to diminish the points of attack between those two formidable powers. Thus, if Switzerland be open to Austria, the latter can advance her armies, with a free communication between them from the valley of the Danube to the valley of the Po, and menace the frontiers of France from Basle as far as Nice. This, a serious danger for France, would oblige her to be always in readiness from the mouths of the Rhine to those of the Rhone; whereas, whilst the Swiss Alps are closed, she may concentrate all her forces on the Rhine, careless of attack from the south, seeing that no operation on the Var has ever been successful with the Imperialists, because of the length of the circuit. There is, then, a great advantage to France in the neutrality of Switzerland. But it is not the less important to Austria, perhaps even more so; in fact, if Switzerland became the theatre of hostilities, the French army can invade it the first; and as its foot-soldiers are intelligent, agile, and brave, and as well adapted to a mountain warfare as to that of plains, it has every chance of being able to maintain itself there, as was proved in the campaign of 1799. If, in fact, the Alps are attacked by the great chain from the side of Italy, they oppose a resistance such as Lecourbe showed to Suwarow in the passes of St. Gothard; if attacked on the side of Germany, by the lower ridge, they oppose, behind their lakes and rivers, a resistance such as that of Masséna behind the lake of Zurich, which ended in the famous battle of that name. Thus, whenever the French army is master of Switzerland, it commands a very threatening position, and one of which it can take advantage to bring about results the most extraordinary, as we shall soon see in reciting the operations of Bonaparte. In fact, when two Austrian armies are the one in Suabia, the other in Piedmont, separated by the massive rocks of Switzerland, they have no means of communication between them; while the French, making their way by the lake of Constance on the one side, and the great Alps on the other, can throw themselves either on the flank of the army of Suabia, or the rear of the army of Italy. This danger it is impossible to avoid, whatever be the plan adopted, without going back for fifty leagues, by retrograding as far as Bavaria on the one side, and, on the other, to Lombardy.

It was, then, necessary for the Austrians to do one of these things; either that, losing their advantages in their last campaign, they should abandon to us at one time both Suabia and Piedmont; or that, refusing to make such sacrifices, they should endeavour to carry Switzerland by a main attack—in which they could not hope for success, as it was to attack in front an obstacle almost insurmountable, before which they had already been baffled; or, lastly, that they should divide themselves into two grand armies, as they did, being separated by Switzerland, which was thus placed on their flank and rear. They were thus enabled, it is true, by following this last course, to diminish to some extent one of their two armies for the purpose of increasing the other; to leave, for instance, Mélas with but small means, sufficient merely to keep Masséna in check, and to raise the army of Suabia to two hundred thousand men; or to do the contrary, by uniting their principal forces in Piedmont. But, in the one case, this was to desert Italy—Italy, the only object and the so ardently

desired prize of the war;—in the other, it was to abandon, without a battle, the Rhine, the Black Forest, and the sources of the Danube, and to shorten, besides, the road of the French to Vienna: it was, lastly, in both cases, to do that which was most to our advantage; since, by bringing up either one of the two armies to the number of two hundred thousand men, the victory was given to that one of the two powers which had Bonaparte on its side; for he was, in fact, the only general who could, at that day, command two hundred thousand men at one time.

There was then no plan for Austria which could be perfectly sure of success, so long as the French were masters of Switzerland, which, to speak in passing, is a proof that the Swiss neutrality is a most important device for the interest of these two powers. It adds, in fact, to their means of defence, while it diminishes their means of offence; that is, it gives to their safety what it takes from their powers of aggression. Nothing could be better conceived for the interests of a general peace.

The Austrians then had little choice in taking their course; and whatever may be said, they took perhaps the only possible one, of deciding to temporize in Suabia, and carry on active operations in Italy, remaining separated by the obstacle of Switzerland, which it was impossible for them to displace. But there was even in this position, more than one manner of conducting their operations, and it must be acknowledged that they did not adopt the best, nor even cast a glance before them at the dangers with which they were menaced. Obstinate in believing the French armies exhausted; not supposing that of Germany was capable of assuming the offensive and passing the Rhine in the face of the one hundred and fifty thousand Austrians posted in the Black Forest; thinking still less that they could cross the Alps, without a road, and in the season of snow-storms; not seeing, moreover, the third army which might be tempted to cross them; they gave themselves up to a confidence which proved fatal. In justice to them, it must still be acknowledged, that most men would have been deceived as they were, since their security was based on obstacles apparently insurmountable. But experience soon disclosed to them, that before such an adversary as Bonaparte, all security, though founded on barriers insurmountable, rivers, or mountains of ice, was deceitful, and might become fatal.

France had two armies; that of Germany, which amounted, by the junction of the armies of the Rhine and Helvetia, to one hundred and thirty thousand men; and that of Liguria, reduced to forty thousand at most. In the troops of Holland and La Vendée she had the scattered and disjointed elements of a third army. None but a capacity for administration of the very highest order could bring this together in time, and, above all, unexpectedly, at the point where its presence was required. These were the means which it was the plan of Bonaparte to employ as follows:—

Masséna, with the army of Liguria, not augmented, but with fresh stores only of provision and ammunition, was ordered to maintain his position on the Apennines, between Genoa and Nice, and to maintain it like a Thermopylæ. The army of Germany, under Moreau, augmented as much as possible, was to make pretended demonstrations on the banks of the Rhine from Strasburg to Basle, from Basle to Constance, as if about to pass over; then to march rapidly forward in a parallel course with the river, ascend it to Schaffhausen, throw over it four bridges at the same moment, open at once on the flank of Kray, take him by surprise, drive him back in disorder on the upper Danube, outstrip him if possible, cut him off his road to Vienna, surround him if practicable, and cause him to suffer one of those memorable disasters of which there is not more than one example in the present age. If the army of Moreau did not succeed so far as this, it would at any rate drive Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, constrain him thus to descend the Danube, and separate him from the Alps, so that it would be out of his power to send succours in that direction. This done, it was ordered to detach its right wing towards Switzerland, to second there the perilous operation, the execution of which Bonaparte reserved for himself. The third army, called the reserve, the very elements of which could scarcely be said to exist, was to form itself between Geneva and Dijon, and await the issue of these first events, in readiness to succour Moreau if there was necessity. But if Moreau succeeded, in one part at least of his plan, this army of reserve, marching under Bonaparte to Geneva, from Geneva to the Valais, joining there the detachment taken from the army of Germany, and next passing the St. Bernard over the ice and snow, was by a prodigy greater than that of Hannibal, to fall on Piedmont, take Mélas in the rear, while he was occupied with the siege of Genoa, surround him, engage him in a decisive battle, and, if it won the victory, compel him to lay down his arms.

Assuredly, if the execution did but correspond with such a plan, never had a finer conception reflected honour on the genius of a soldier of ancient or modern days. But it is the execution only which gives their value to grand military combinations; for, deprived of this merit, they are nothing but vain chimeras.

The execution here lay in conquering an infinity of difficulties, in the reorganization of the armies of the Rhine and Liguria, in the creation of the army of reserve, in keeping the secret of its creation and destination; finally, in the double passage of the Rhine and the Alps, the second equal to the most extraordinary efforts ever attempted in the art of war.

The first care of Bonaparte was especially to recruit the army. Desertion to the interior, sickness, and battle had reduced it to two hundred and fifty thousand men, a number scarcely credible at a time when France had to make head against a general coalition, were it not proved by authentic documents. Happily, these two hundred and fifty thousand men were seasoned warriors, all of them able to contend against an enemy double their number. The first consul had demanded one hundred thousand conscripts from the legislative body, and it had granted them with an enthusiasm truly patriotic. The war was so legitimate, so evidently necessary, after the rejection of the offers of peace, that merely to hesitate would have been criminal.

But there was nothing of this kind to fear, and the eager haste of the legislative body and the tribunate amounted to enthusiasm. These one

hundred thousand young conscripts, combined with two hundred and fifty thousand old soldiers, would form the materials of an excellent army. The prefects newly appointed, and first arrived at their posts, impressed an activity on the recruiting department hitherto unseen. But these conscripts could not be with their regiments, drilled and ready to serve under the period of six months. The first consul adopted the plan of retaining in the interior the regiments which had been exhausted, and employing them as skeletons, which he filled up with the new levy. He moved, on the other hand, towards the frontier the regiments which were competent to the field, taking care to transfer, from the ranks of those which were to stop in the interior, to the ranks of those which were about to march to the field all the soldiers who were in a fit state for service. By so doing, he could scarcely muster two hundred thousand men to place immediately in line. But in powerful and competent hands these were sufficient.

He appealed at the same time to the patriotic sentiment of France. Applying himself to the soldiers of the first requisition, whom the general discouragement, consequent on our reverses, had drawn back to their homes, he compelled by force to rejoin their regiments all those who had left them without permission; he laboured besides to reawaken the zeal of those who had regular furloughs. He tasked himself to arouse a military spirit among the young, whose imagination was inflamed by the name of Bonaparte. Greatly as the enthusiasm of the first days of the revolution had cooled down, the sight of the enemy on our frontiers reanimated all hearts; and the succour which might possibly be again procured from the devotion of the volunteers was by no means to be despised.

To the attention bestowed on recruiting, Bonaparte added other useful reforms in respect to the administration and composition of the army. He first created inspectors of reviews, whose duty it was to keep account of the number of men present under arms, and to take care that the treasury did not pay for soldiers who were only present upon paper. In the artillery he made a change of very great importance. The carriages of the artillery were at that day under the conduct of drivers belonging to the waggon train, who not being under any restraint from a feeling of honour, like the other soldiers, cut the traces of their horses, at the very first danger, and fled, leaving their guns in the hands of the enemy. The first consul considered, that the conductor charged to bring a piece to the place of battle, was rendering a service as great as the cannoneer charged to fire it off; that he ran the same danger, and stood in need of the same moral motive—the same honour. He therefore converted the drivers of the artillery into soldiers, wearing the uniform, and forming a portion of that arm. There were thus ten or twelve thousand horsemen who were to show as much zeal in bringing their guns up to the enemy, or rapidly carrying them off, as those whose duty it was to load, point, and fire them. This reform had been only just made, and all its useful consequences were not developed until a later period.

The artillery and the cavalry were thus in want of horses. The first consul having neither time nor means to make purchases, decreed a forced and extraordinary levy of every thirteenth horse. This was a hard but inevitable necessity. The armies were to provide themselves from their own vicinity in the first instance, and then, go further and further, from the surrounding provinces.

The first consul had sent to Masséna what funds he had at his disposal, to succour the unhappy army of Liguria. From sixty thousand men, of which it was composed by the junction of the army of Lombardy with that of Naples, after the bloody battle of Trebia, it was reduced, by privation, to forty thousand at the most, not mustering more than about thirty thousand fighting men. Corn, as it could not come either from Piedmont, which the Austrians occupied, or by the sea, which the English guarded, was very scarce. The unhappy soldiers had nothing for their support but the crops of the Alps, which, as every body knows, are next to nothing. They would not go into the hospitals where there was a want of the chief articles of food, and were to be seen along the road from Nice to Genoa, devoured by famine and fever, presenting the most pitiable of all spectacles, that of brave men left to die of want by the country they are defending.

Masséna, when furnished with the funds sent him by the government, made some purchases at Marseilles, bought up all the corn in that town, and sent it to Genoa. Unluckily, during this winter, the winds, as rigorous as the enemy, blowing contrary without cessation, prevented their arrival at Marseilles, and replaced in some sort the blockade which the English could not keep up at that bad season. Nevertheless, as some cargoes succeeded in getting in, the troops of Liguria had bread once more dealt out to them. Arms, shoes, some clothing, and—hopes were sent to them. As for military energy, there was no need to inspire them with that; for never had France seen her soldiers endure such reverses with so much firmness. These conquerors of Castiglione, of Arcola, and of Rivoli had borne, without being staggered, the defeats of Cassano, of Novi, and of Trebia; the temper they had acquired could not be changed by the strokes of fortune. Moreover, the presence of Bonaparte at the head of the government, and of Masséna at the head of the army, would have put them in heart again, if there had been necessity. They wanted but food, clothing, and arms, to perform the greatest services. In this respect the best that was in their power was done by the government. Masséna, by some acts of severity, re-established discipline, which was shaken amongst them, and assembled above thirty thousand men, impatient to march once more under his orders on the road to fertile Italy.

The first consul prescribed to this general an ably conceived plan for the conduct of his operations. Three narrow passes lead across the Apennine from the inland side to the maritime: these are that of the Bocchetta, opening upon Genoa; that of Cadibona, upon Savona; that of Tende, upon Nice. The first consul enjoined Masséna to leave only weak detachments in the pass of Tende, and that of Cadibona—altogether just enough to watch them—and to concentrate his force of twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand men upon Genoa.

This town being strongly occupied, an invasion of the south of France became less probable, and in any case less to be feared; since the Austrians would not be so rash as to advance beyond the Var upon Toulon and the mouth of the Rhone, with Masséna left in their rear. Besides, Masséna could, with his thirty thousand men in one body, fall upon any corps which was crossing the defiles of the Apennines. It would be difficult for him, seeing the narrow and steep nature of the country, to meet with more than thirty thousand at one time. He had, then, the means of making head every where against the enemy. This excellent plan was unhappily not capable of execution but by a general who had the prodigious dexterity of the conqueror of Montenotte. For the rest, the first consul felt assured of having in Masséna an obstinate defender of the heights of the Apennine, and of preparing employment for Melas, which would detain him in Liguria during all the time necessary for the skilful combinations of his plan for the campaign.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that the army of Liguria was in some little degree treated as a sacrificed army; not one man more was sent to it, only supplies, and, as respects these, no more than was just necessary. The principal efforts of the government were directed to another quarter, for it was in another quarter that the grand blow was to be struck. The army of Liguria was exposed to the risk of perishing, that others might gain time to be victorious. Such is the stern fatality of war, which passes from one head to another, compelling these to die that those may live and triumph.

The army to which the most special care was devoted was that, which, under the orders of Moreau, was destined to act in Suabia. All the men and *materiel* possible were sent there. The greatest efforts were made to ensure it a complete artillery, and large means of passage, that it might find itself in full possession of resources for crossing the Rhine on a sudden, and, if possible, at one point. Moreau, of whom men said the first consul was so jealous, was to have under his orders the finest and most numerous army of the republic, about one hundred and thirty thousand men, while Masséna was to have thirty-six thousand, and the first consul forty thousand at the most. This was not, however, an empty compliment addressed to the pride of Moreau. Such a distribution of the forces had been decided upon the most serious motives. The operation, whose object was to drive Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, was of the very highest importance to the general success of the campaign; since, in the presence of the two powerful armies of Austria which were advancing upon our frontiers, it was necessary first to drive one off, before being able to cross the Alps to fall upon the rear of the other. The first operation, then, must be carried out by decisive means, which placed its success beyond doubt. The first consul, with all his estimation of Moreau, esteemed himself still higher; and if one of the two could dispense with great means, he thought that he could do better without them than Moreau. The feeling that actuated him on this occasion is better in great affairs of state than generosity itself, it was a love of the public weal; this he placed above all private interest, whether that of others or his own.

This army of the Rhine was a superb one, though, like the other armies of the republic, it wore the tatters of privation. The few conscripts who had joined were just enough to give it the spirit of youth. It was composed of an immense number of veterans, who, under the orders of Pichegru, Kléber, Hoche, and Moreau, had conquered Holland and the banks of the Rhine, had crossed full many a time this river, and had shown themselves on the Danube. It would be an injustice to say that they were braver men than those of the army of Italy; but they exhibited all the qualities of accomplished troops. They were prudent, sober, observant of discipline, well-drilled, and intrepid. The chiefs were worthy of the soldiers. The formation of this army into detachments, complete in every branch of the service, and acting in separate corps, had, by that means, developed in a greater degree the talents of the generals of division. These generals were men of a merit equal, yet different. There was Lecourbe, the most able officer of his time in mountain warfare—Lecourbe, whose glorious name the echos of the Alps still repeat; there was Richepanse, who united with an audacious bravery a rare intelligence, and who to Moreau, soon after, rendered on the field of Hohenlinden the greatest service that a lieutenant ever rendered to his general; there was St. Cyr, cold in disposition, but profound, a character of little social feeling, but endowed with all the qualities of a general-in-chief; there was, lastly, the youthful Ney, whom his heroic courage, directed by a happy instinct of war, afterwards rendered popular in all the armies of the republic. At the head of these lieutenants was Moreau, a man of a slow mind, occasionally indecisive, but solid, and one whose indecisions ended in a wise and firm resolution as soon as he was face to face with danger. Practice had, to a singular extent, formed and extended his military glance. But while his warlike genius every day grew greater under the trials of war, his civil character weak, and open to every influence, had already succumbed, and would yet succumb still more, to the trials of politics, which minds truly elevated alone soar above. For the rest, the unhappy passion of jealousy had not yet altered the purity of his heart, and corrupted his patriotism. From his experience, from his habit of command, his high renown, he was, after Bonaparte, the only man then competent to the command of one hundred thousand men.

The details of the plan which the first consul had prescribed for him, consisted in entering into Suabia at a point which would allow him best to act on the extreme left of Kray, so as to outflank him, to cut him off from Bavaria, and to enclose him between the Upper Danube and the Rhine; in which case the Austrian army in Suabia was destroyed. To succeed in this, the Rhine was to be crossed, not at two or three points, but at one only, as near as possible to Constance; an operation of singular boldness and difficulty, since it consisted in transporting across a river, and in the presence of an enemy, one hundred thousand men at one time with all their *materiel:* and it must be granted that, previous to Wagram, no general had

passed a river under such an assemblage of circumstances and with such resolution. It wanted also much address to deceive the Austrians as to the place chosen; with great address, much boldness in the execution of the passage over; and, lastly, what is always necessary, great good fortune. The first consul had directed the collecting together on the rivers flowing into the Rhine, especially on the Aar, of a great quantity of boats, that three or four bridges might be thrown across at once, at a distance of a hundred fathoms from each other. It remained to find admission for these combinations into the cold and cautious mind of Moreau.

After this attention to the troops of Liguria and Germany bestowed with unremitting zeal, the first consul applied himself to form, almost out of nothing, an army which, under the title of the "army of reserve," afterwards accomplished the greatest achievements.

That it might fulfil its object, it was necessary not only to create this force, but to do so without any one crediting the possibility of its being effected. It will be shown what mode Bonaparte took to obtain that double result.

The first consul had found in Holland, and in the troops accumulated in Paris by the directory, the means to pacify La Vendée in good season: and he also contrived to discover in La Vendée, as soon as it was restored to peace, the necessary resources for creating an army, which, thrown on a sudden upon the theatre of military operations, might change the destiny of the campaign. In writing to general Brune, who had the chief command in the west, he addressed him in these beautiful words, so well expressing his own manner of operating, and that of other grand masters in the art of administration and of war: "Let me know if, independently of those five demi-brigades which I have requested from you by my last courier, you will be able to dispose of one or two more, on the condition of their being sent back in three months. We must resolve to stride over France as we did formerly over the valley of the Adige; it is only bringing the decade into a day[1]."

Although the English must have felt a distaste for new expeditions upon the continent, since their adventure at the Texel, and more than all since the separation of the Russians from the coalition, the vast extent of our coasts, from the Zuyder-Zee to the gulf of Gascony, could not be abandoned without some means of defence; the pacification of La Vendée had been too recent. The first consul left in Holland a force, half French, half Dutch, to guard this valuable country, and gave the command of it to Augereau. It was formed into divisions for active service, ready-armed and prepared to march. When it seemed certain that by the course of operations there was no descent to be feared, this force under Augereau's command was to march up the Rhine, and cover the rear of Moreau in Germany. Out of the sixty thousand men drawn from the coasts of Normandy and Britany, the first consul chose the weakest demi-brigades, and left them to watch the country of the insurrection. He reduced their strength yet further by sending to the army in actual service the soldiers best capable of duty; thus rendering them fitter for receiving conscripts, whom they were to instruct, while they guarded the coast. He formed of these men five small encampments, uniting cavalry, infantry, and artillery, ready to march at the first signal, and commanded by good officers. There were two of those encampments in Belgium, one at Liege, another at Maestricht, both designed to secure the country kept in disturbance by the priests, and, if required, to aid in the defence of Holland. Another of those camps was formed at Lisle, ready to fling itself upon the Somme and Normandy, a second at St. Lo, and a third at Rennes. The last was the most numerous, and numbered from seven thousand to eight thousand men; the others from four thousand to five thousand, and all the camps together about thirty thousand. These would soon be doubled, at least, by the arrival of the conscripts, and all were intended to do the duty of police in the countries recently subdued, such as Belgium, and the provinces of Normandy, Britany, and Poitou. The first consul ordered a search to be made for arms concealed in the woods, and began to form, through the attraction of high pay, three or four battalions out of the men who had contracted adventurous habits in the civil war, intending them for the army in Egypt. Their leaders had residences assigned them at a distance from the scene of civil war, and received pensions amply sufficient to maintain them in comfort.

The arrangements completed, there remained about thirty thousand excellent soldiers out of sixty thousand, collected for the pacification of the interior of the country; they were embodied in the demi-brigades which had suffered least. Some had returned to Paris after the operations were completed in Normandy against De Frotté; others were in Britany and La Vendée. They were formed by the first consul into three fine war-divisions, two in Britany, at Rennes and Nantes, and one in Paris. These divisions were to prepare themselves for service with the utmost speed, providing themselves with such appointments as were at hand, and procuring the rest on their march, by means which will be presently explained. They had orders to repair to the eastern frontier, with rapid "strides," to use the words of the first consul "as the army of Italy once strode over the Adige." Their arrival in Switzerland in the month of April was certain.

There was yet another resource in the depôts of the army of Egypt stationed in the south of France, which had never been able to forward recruits to their corps, it having been impossible for them to pass the sea in consequence of its being continually watched by the English. Fourteen fine battalions ready for service were drawn from those depôts by adding a few conscripts to them. The order was given for them to march to Lyons, where they would be completed. This was a fourth and a capital division, capable of performing good service.

The most difficult and longest task in the formation of an army is the organization of the artillery. The first consul having resolved to form the army of reserve in the east, had in the depôts of Auxerre, Besançon, and Briançon, the means of collecting in men and appointments a force equal to sixty pieces of cannon. Two able artillery

[1] From the Dépôt de la Secrétairerie d'Etat, 14 Ventôse, an VIII. (5th March, 1800.)

officers, who were greatly attached to him, Marmont and Gassendi, were sent from Paris, with orders to get ready sixty pieces of cannon in the different depôts, without saying where they were to be united or concentrated.

It was necessary to point out some place where all these corps were to be collected together. If an attempt had been made to conceal the preparations by silence about them, it would have had a wrong effect, and spread an alarm. The first consul deceived the enemy by the very bustle of his preparations. In the *Moniteur*, a decree of the consuls was inserted by his orders, for the formation of an army of reserve at Dijon, to be composed of sixty thousand men. Berthier went post-haste to Dijon, for the purpose of commencing its organization, his duty now drawing less upon his time by the entry of Carnot upon the ministry of war. An exciting appeal was made to the old volunteers of the revolution who after one or two campaigns had retired to their homes, beseeching them to repair to Dijon. A small quantity of the munitions of war, and a few conscripts, were sent there with much parade. The old officers despatched to that city gave the idea of being sent to commence the instruction of the skeleton battalions of conscripts. The newspaper writers, who were only permitted to interfere with military matters in the most circumspect mode, had full liberty to write what they pleased about the army at Dijon, and to detail in their columns whatever concerned it. This was enough to attract all the European spies to that quarter, where there was no want of them, since they repaired thither in great numbers.

If the divisions formed at Nantes, Rennes, and Paris, and the troops drawn from La Vendée; and if the division formed at Toulon, Marseilles, and Avignon, with the depôts of the army of Egypt; and the artillery prepared at Besançon, Auxerre, and Briançon, with the materials in their arsenals, had been united at Dijon, the secret of the first consul would have been out; all the world would have believed in the existence of the army of reserve. But he took good care not to act in that manner. The divisions were sent towards Lausanne and Geneva by different roads, in such a way that the public attention was not particularly attracted to any point. They passed for reinforcements going to the army of the Rhine, which, being spread over the country from Strasburg to Constance, might well appear to be the point to which they were all proceeding. The munitions for the war, ordered from the arsenals of Auxerre and Besançon, passed for supplemental artillery destined for the same army. Those collecting at Briançon were in the same way supposed to be for the army of Liguria. The first consul sent a quantity of spirits to Geneva; but this did not indicate its real destination, since the German army of France had its base of operations in Switzerland. Four millions of rations of biscuit were ordered to be made in the departments on the banks of the Rhone, destined to feed the army of reserve, amid the sterility of the Alps; and one million eight hundred thousand were secretly sent up the Rhone to Geneva, while two hundred thousand were ostentatiously sent down to Toulon, in order that it might be supposed they were intended for the naval service at that port. Lastly, the divisions were marched slowly, and without fatiguing them, in the direction of Geneva and Lausanne. They had the half of March and the whole of April to complete the distance, receiving as they proceeded shoes, clothes, muskets, horses, and the necessaries of which they might stand in need. The first consul having arranged in his own mind the route which the troops were to follow, and having carefully made himself acquainted with the nature of whatever they wanted, sent to every place through which they were to march, sometimes one thing, and sometimes another, of such kinds as were necessary, taking care not to raise suspicion by too large a collection of stores at one place. The correspondence relating to these preparations was kept back from the war office, and confined between himself and the commander of the troops, being sent by trustworthy aids-de-camp, who travelled backwards and forwards by post, saw every thing themselves, and did every thing immediately, possessing the irresistible order of the first consul, ignorant themselves all the time of the general plan which they were carrying out.

The real object, confined to the first consul, Berthier, and two or three generals of engineers and artillery, to whom it was absolutely needful to communicate the plan of the campaign, was kept a profound secret. None of them would betray it, because secrecy is an act of obedience that governments obtain in proportion to the ascendancy which they possess. Upon this ground the first consul had no indiscretion to fear. The foreign spies who flocked to Dijon, seeing only a few conscripts, volunteers, and old officers, thought themselves wonderfully acute in discovering that there was nothing serious to be apprehended; that the first consul evidently made all the stir to terrify Mélas, and prevent him from penetrating the Jura by the mouths of the Rhone, under the belief that he would find in the south an army of reserve capable of stopping him. This was the comprehension of the business by such as deemed themselves excellent judges; and the English newspapers were soon filled with thousands and thousands of jests upon the subject. Among the caricatures designed on the occasion, was the army of reserve represented by a child leading a wooden-legged invalid.

The first consul desired nothing better than to be jested upon at such a moment. In the mean time his divisions were marching, and his warlike stores were preparing on the eastern frontier. In the beginning of May, an army formed in a moment would be ready either to second Moreau, or to throw itself over the Alps, and change the face of events in that quarter.

The first consul had not neglected the navy. After the cruise which had been made, during the preceding year, in the Mediterranean by Admiral Bruix, with the combined fleets of France and Spain, this fleet had entered Brest. It was composed of fifteen Spanish and about twenty French, in all, nearly forty sail. Twenty English men-of-war blockaded it at the moment. The first consul availed himself of the first financial resources which he had succeeded in creating, to send some provisions and a part of the pay that was in arrear to this fleet. He urged it not to suffer itself to be

blockaded, but if it had only thirty sail against twenty, to put to sea at the first moment, even if it were forced to give battle; and, if unable to keep at sea, to pass the straits, sail to Toulon, assemble there some vessels charged with stores for Egypt, and then go and raise the blockade of Malta and Alexandria. The way thus cleared, commerce would of itself victual the French garrisons on the coasts of the Mediterranean.

Such were the attentions he directed to military affairs, at the same time that with Cambacérès, Sieyès, Talleyrand, Gaudin, and others, who shared in his labours, he was employed in the reorganization of the government, in re-establishing the finances, in creating a civil and judicial administration, and in negotiating with Europe. But it was not sufficient to conceive plans and prepare for their due execution; it was necessary to imprint his own ideas on the minds of his lieutenants, who, though answerable to his consular authority, were not then so perfectly subordinate as they afterwards became, when under the title of "marshals of the empire" they obeyed him as emperor. The plan prescribed to Moreau more particularly, had upset his cold and timid head; he was alarmed at the boldness of the operations he was ordered to perform. The country has been spoken of already in which he was about to operate. The Rhine, we have said, runs east and west from Constance to Basle, and turns to the north at Basle, passing by Brisach, Strasburg, and Mayence. In the angle which it thus describes, is situated the tract called the Black Forest,—a woody and mountainous region, intersected by defiles, which lead from the valley of the Rhine to that of the Danube. The French and Austrian army occupied, to a certain degree, the three sides of a triangle. The French army held two sides, from Strasburg to Basle, and from Basle to Schaffhausen. The Austrian army occupied one side only, or from Strasburg to Constance. The last had therefore the advantage of a more easy concentration. General Kray had his left, under the prince de Reuss, in the environs of Constance, his right in the defiles of the Black Forest, nearly as far as Strasburg, his centre at Donau-Eschingen, at the point where all the roads intersect, and thus could concentrate his army rapidly before the very spot where Moreau wished to cross the Rhine, either between Strasburg and Basle, or between Basle and Constance. This position was the subject of uneasiness to the French general. He feared that Kray, presenting his whole force at the place where he crossed, would render the passage impossible, perhaps disastrous.

The first consul thought nothing of the kind, believing, on the contrary, that the French army would be able to concentrate itself with ease on the left flank of Kray and overwhelm it. To that end he wished, as we have already seen, that profiting by the river-curtain, or in other words, by the Rhine, which covered the French army, he should ascend that river on a sudden, should unite his forces between Basle and Schaffhausen, and with boats provided secretly in the tributary waters of that river, throw over four bridges the same morning, by which he might pass across eighty thousand or one hundred thousand men between Stockach and Donau-Eschingen, coming upon the flank of Kray, cutting him off from his reserves and his left wing, and driving him in confusion upon the upper Danube. The first consul thought that by this operation, executed with vigor and promptitude, the Austrian army of Germany might be destroyed. That which he proposed at a later period around Ulm, and that which he did the same year, by Mount St. Bernard, showed that this plan had nothing in it but what was practicable. He thought that the French army not having to move in an enemy's country, as it would ascend the Rhine by the left bank, having only to move without fighting, might steal two or three marches upon Kray, and be at the point of crossing before that general could assemble means sufficient to prevent it.

This was the plan that troubled so much the mind of Moreau, little habituated to such bold combinations. He was fearful that Kray, learning his object time enough, would bring down the mass of the Austrian army to encounter him, and drive the French into the Rhine. Moreau preferred to avail himself of the bridges already existing at Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, to pass in several columns over to the right bank. In this manner he should divide the attention of the Austrians, and drive them principally towards those defiles of the Black Forest which were correspondent to the bridges of Strasburg and Brisach; then, after having lured them into the defiles, he proposed to steal away of a sudden, pass parallel with the Rhine those of his columns that had crossed the river, and post himself before Schaffhausen to cover the passage of the rest of the army.

This plan of Moreau was not destitute of merit, nor was it without serious inconveniences. Although it might tend to the escape of the danger following a passage in one place executed with the whole body of the army, it had, by dividing the operation, the inconvenience of dividing his forces, of throwing upon an enemy's territory two or three detached columns, and of making them perform a hazardous flank march as far as Schaffhausen, where they would have to cover the last and most dangerous passage of the river. Lastly, the plan had the disadvantage of giving few or no results, because it did not throw the French army entire and at one time upon the left flank of Kray, which would have been the only means to overthrow the Austrian general and cut him off from Bavaria.

It is a spectacle well worthy of historical regard, to see two men, thus opposed to each other on a question of great moment, bringing out so well their differences in spirit and character. The plan of Moreau, as it often happens with the plans of second-rate men, had only the appearance of prudence. It might succeed in the execution; for it is right to repeat continually that the execution redeems all—sometimes causing the best combinations to fail, and the worst to succeed. Moreau persisted in his own idea. The first consul wishing to act upon him by persuasion, through an intermediate agent, carefully selected, summoned general Dessoles to Paris. This officer was chief of the staff in the army of Germany, and possessed an acute, penetrating intellect, well worthy of serving as a link between two susceptible and powerful men, having that desire to conciliate his superiors not always found in subordinate officers. The first consul sent for him to Paris about the middle of March, the end of Ventôse, and kept

him there some days. Having explained his ideas to general Dessoles, he made him perfectly understand them, and prefer them even to those of Moreau. The general did not in consequence less persist in advising the first consul to adopt the plan of Moreau; because, in his opinion, it was better to leave the general who was to act, to do so agreeably to his own character and ideas, especially when he is worthy of the command with which he is entrusted. "Your plan," said general Dessoles to the first consul, "is grander, more decisive, probably more certain; but it is not adapted to the genius of him who is to execute it. You have a mode of making war which is superior to any other, and Moreau has his, which, without doubt, is inferior to yours, but yet excellent. Let him act; he will act well; slowly, perhaps, but surely; and he will obtain all the results which you will require for the success of your general combinations. If, on the other hand, you impose your ideas upon him, you will annoy him; you will offend him, and will obtain nothing from him by the desire of obtaining too much[1]."

The first consul, as deeply versed in the knowledge of men as in his own profession, appreciated the soundness of the advice given by general Dessoles, and yielded. "You are in the right," he observed; "Moreau is not capable of catching and executing the plan which I have conceived. He may do as he sees fit, provided he will throw Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and then send back his left wing in seasonable time upon Switzerland. The plan which he does not understand, and dares not execute, I will carry into effect in another part of the theatre of war. What he will not dare on the Rhine, I will do on the Alps. He may possibly, by-and-by, regret the glory which he abandons to me." Proud words, of deep meaning, containing a whole military prophecy, as it will soon be easy to discover.

The mode of crossing the Rhine thus left to Moreau himself, there still remained another point to arrange. The first consul had a strong desire that the right wing, commanded by Lecourbe, should remain in reserve on the Swiss territory, ready to second Moreau if he required it, but not to penetrate into Germany unless its presence there was indispensable, in order that it should not have to retrograde for the purpose of co-operating in the Alps. Still he knew how difficult it is to take from a general-in-chief a detachment of his army, when operations have commenced. Moreau insisted on having Lecourbe, engaging to send him back to Bonaparte as soon as he had driven Kray upon Ulm. The first consul agreed to his request, determined to concede every thing to promote harmony; but he requested that Moreau should sign an agreement, by which he promised, after driving back the Austrians upon Ulm, to detach Lecourbe, with twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand men, towards the Alps. This agreement was signed at Basle between Moreau and Berthier, the last being considered as acting officially in his character of general-in-chief of the army of reserve.

General Dessoles left Paris, after having settled completely every point of discussion with the first consul. All was in accord, and every thing ready to open the campaign, and it was of importance to commence operations immediately, in order that Moreau having executed as early as possible that part of the plan arranged in which he was concerned, the first consul might be able to throw himself on the other side of the Alps, and disengage Masséna before he was crushed, fighting with only thirty-six thousand men against one hundred and twenty thousand. The first consul wished that Moreau should commence operations by the middle of April, or at the latest by the end of that month. His wishes were vain; Moreau was not ready; he had neither the activity nor the mind capable, out of its own resources, of supplying the insufficiency of his means. While he thus deferred commencing operations, the Austrians, faithful to their plan of taking the initiative in Italy, flung themselves upon Masséna, and commenced a struggle with that general, which the disproportion of strength between the two renders worthy of immortal remembrance.

The army of Liguria at most numbered about thirty-six thousand men, in a fit state for active service, distributed in the following manner:—

Thirteen or fourteen thousand men under general Suchet formed the left of that army, occupying the Col de Tende, Nice, and the line of the Var. A detached corps from this wing, of about four thousand men, under the orders of general Thureau, was posted on Mount Cenis. Consequently there were eighteen thousand men engaged in guarding the French frontier, from Mount Cenis to the Col de Tende.

Ten or twelve thousand men under general Soult, forming the centre of the army, defended the two principal passes of the Apennines,—that which coming down from the Upper Bormida, descends on Savona and Finale, and that of the Bocchetta, which comes down upon Genoa.

About seven or eight thousand men, under the intrepid Miollis, kept Genoa, and a pass which opens near that city on the side opposite to that of the Bocchetta. Thus the second moiety of this army, in number about eighteen thousand men or nearly, under the generals Soult and Miollis, defended the Apennines and Liguria. The danger of a separation between these two portions of the army, that occupying Nice, and that which held Genoa, was very evident.

These thirty-six thousand French had opposed to them Mélas, the Austrian general, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, refreshed, well-fed, and re-victualled, owing to the abundance of everything in Italy, and to the subsidies which Austria received from England. General Kaim, with the heavy artillery, the cavalry, and a body of infantry, in all thirty thousand men, had been left in Piedmont to serve as a rear-guard and watch the approaches from Switzerland. Mélas, with seventy thousand men, the greater part consisting of infantry, had advanced towards the openings in the Apennines. Besides his superiority in numbers, he had the advantage of a concentrical position; Masséna was obliged to occupy thirty thousand men in guarding the semicircle, forty leagues in extent, formed by the maritime Alps and the Apennines, from Nice to Genoa, the surplus of his force occupying Mount Cenis. Mélas, on the contrary, placed

[1] In my youth I had the honour to receive this recital from the mouth of general Dessoles himself.

on the other side of the mountains, in the centre of this semicircle, between Coni, Ceva, and Gavi, had but a short distance to go before he could reach any point of his opponent's line which he might choose to attack. He was also able to make false demonstrations upon any one of these points, and then, rapidly moving upon another, act against it with his whole force. Masséna, menaced in this way, had no less than forty leagues to march from Nice to the succour of Genoa, or from Genoa to succour Nice.

It was upon considering all these circumstances that the first consul grounded the instructions he had given to Masséna,—instructions already alluded to in a general manner, but which it is now necessary to re-state in a more particular way. Three roads, adapted for artillery, led from one side of the mountains to the other: that which by Turin, Coni, and Tende, opened upon Nice and the Var; that which ascending the valley of the Bormida conducted by the defile of Cadibona to Savona; lastly, that of the Bocchetta, which by Tortona and Gavi descended on the left of Genoa into the valley of Polcevera. The danger to be apprehended was, lest Mélas should be seen bringing down his whole force by the second of these openings, and thus, by cutting the French army in two parts, fling one half upon Nice, and the other half upon Genoa. Seeing this hazard, the first consul wrote Masséna instructions in a correspondence displaying admirable foresight, under date of the 5th and 12th of March, instructions of which the following is the substance: "Take care not to have a line too extended. Keep few men upon the Alps and the Col de Tende; the snow will defend you there. Leave detachments near Nice and in the surrounding forts. Have four-fifths of your troops at Genoa and its environs. The enemy will march upon your right towards Genoa, upon your centre towards Savona, very probably upon both points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and fling yourself with your whole force upon one of the enemy's columns. The ground will not allow him to avail himself of his superiority in cavalry and artillery; he can only attack you with his infantry; yours is infinitely superior to his, and, favoured by the nature of the ground, that will supply the place of numbers on your side. In this rugged country, if you manœuvre well, you will be able with thirty thousand men to beat sixty thousand. To carry into Liguria sixty thousand infantry, Mélas must have ninety thousand, which supposes a total army of at least one hundred and twenty thousand; Melas has neither your activity nor your talents; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear towards Nice, while you are at Genoa, let him march on; he will not dare to advance, while you are in Liguria, ready to fall upon his rear, or upon the forces he will have left behind in Piedmont."

More than one cause operated to prevent Masséna from following this sagacious advice. First, he was surprised by a sudden irruption of the Austrians, before he had time to perfect the disposal of his troops and effect his definitive arrangements; secondly, he had not sufficient provisions in Genoa, to concentrate his whole army there. Fearful of consuming those of which the city stood in need in case of a siege, he rather desired to secure the resources of Nice, which were much more abundant. Finally, Masséna did not appreciate sufficiently the deep wisdom of the instructions of his superior, to disregard the real inconveniences of a concentration upon Genoa. Masséna, on the field of battle, was, perhaps, the first of his contemporary generals; in character equal to the most resolute soldier of any age: but though he had a great deal of natural talent, the extent of his views by no means equalled his mental energy and the promptitude of his visual glance.

Thus, for want of time, provisions, and a sufficient impression of the importance of the measure, he did not concentrate his forces upon Genoa with sufficient rapidity, and he was surprised by the Austrians. Mélas opened the campaign on the 5th of April, or 15th Germinal, which was much earlier than it was expected active hostilities would be resumed. Mélas advanced with seventy thousand or seventy-five thousand men, in order to force the chain of the Apennines. His lieutenants, Ott and Hohenzollern, directed twenty-five thousand men upon Genoa. Ott, with fifteen thousand ascending the Trebia, approached by the defiles of Sceffera and Monte-Creto, which open upon the right of Genoa. Hohenzollern, with ten thousand men, threatened the Bocchetta. Mélas himself, with fifty thousand, ascended the Bormida, and attacked simultaneously all the positions of what has been called above the "middle road," which led by Cadibona to Savona. His intention, as the first consul had foreseen it would be, was to force the French centre and separate general Suchet from Soult, who were in communication at this point. A violent struggle ensued, from the sources of the Tanaro and of the Bormida, as far as the scarped hill-summits that overlook Genoa. The Austrian generals, Mélas and Elsnitz, carried on a fierce encounter with Suchet at Rocca-Barbena, Sette-Pani, Melogno, and Santo-Jacobo; and with Soult at Montelegino, Stella, Cadibona, and Savona. The republican forces, profiting by the mountainous nature of the country, and covering themselves well by the rugged and broken character of the ground, combated with incomparable courage, and caused to the enemy a loss three times greater than they themselves sustained, by reason that their fire plunged into dense and deep masses of men; but they were obliged to fight ceaselessly against numbers continually renewed, and were worn out by fatigue at last, rather than beaten by the Austrians. Suchet and Soult were constrained to separate, the first retiring upon Borghetto, the second upon Savona. As was easy to be foreseen, the French line was broken, one half of the Ligurian army being thrown upon Nice, the other half compelled to shut itself up in Genoa.

On the side of Genoa the success had been balanced with tolerable equality. The attack of Hohenzollern on the Bocchetta was made with too few troops to overcome the French, there being but ten thousand Austrians against five thousand French. The Austrians were repulsed by Gazan's division. On the right of Genoa, towards the positions of Monte-Creto and Scoffera, which afford access to the valley of Bisagno, general Ott, having beaten the division of Miollis, who had but four thousand men to oppose to his fifteen thousand, descended the reverse side of the Apennines, and surrounding

all the forts which cover the city, displayed the Austrian colours to the terrified Genoese. The English squadron at the same time hoisted the British flag. If the inhabitants of Genoa itself were patriots and partisans of the French, the peasantry of the valleys, attached to the aristocratic party, like the Calabrians of Naples were to queen Caroline, or the Vendéans in France to the Bourbons, rose at once at the sight of the soldiers of the coalition. The alarm-bell was rung in the villages. A certain baron, named D'Aspres, attached to the imperial service, and having some influence in the country, excited the revolt. In the evening of the 6th of April, the unfortunate people of Genoa, seeing the Austrian fires on the hills around them, and on the sea the flag of England, began to fear lest the oligarchy, already full of joy, should again quickly establish its detestable power.

But the intrepid Masséna was among them. Separated from Suchet by the attack directed upon his centre he had still from fifteen thousand to eighteen thousand men ; and with such a force he could defy any enemy whatever to force the gates of Genoa in his presence.

In order to understand perfectly the operations of the French general during this memorable siege, it is needful to describe the theatre where it happened.

Genoa is situated at the bottom of a beautiful bay, which bears its name, at the foot of a spur of the Apennine mountains. This spur projecting from north to south down to the sea, before it plunges in, separates into two ridges, one turning to the east, the other to the west, and thus forming an inclined triangle, of which the summit is in connexion with the Apennines, while the base rests upon the sea. It is at the base of this triangle, and be it understood, with the usual natural irregularity, that Genoa displays itself in long streets, lined with magnificent palaces. Both nature and art have done much to aid in its defence. On the side next the sea, two moles carried out in a direction that nearly cross the one with the other, form the port, and defend it against a naval attack. On the side of the land, a rampart with bastions surrounds the part of the city which is built upon and peopled. An outer rampart of great extent, and bastioned like the first, is carried along the heights, which, as before observed, describes a triangular figure around the city. Two forts, disposed in terraces, one above the other, called the Spur and the Diamond forts, are placed at the apex of this triangular configuration of the hill summits, and cover with their fire the centre of the fortified works.

But this was not all that had been done to keep an enemy at a distance. On turning the back to the sea, and regarding Genoa, the east will be on the right hand, and the west on the left. Two small rivers, the Bisagno on the right hand or east, and that of Polcevera on the left or west, bathe the two sides of the exterior ramparts. The Bisagno descends from the mountain heights of the Monte-Creto and of Scoffera, which must be passed when coming from the back of the Apennines in ascending the Trebia. The side of the valley of the Bisagno which is opposite to the city is called Monte-Ratti, and presents several positions from which much injury might be inflicted upon Genoa, if they were not occupied. Care had been taken, therefore, to crown them with three forts, namely, those of Quezzi, Richelieu, and St. Tècle. The valley of Polcevera, on the contrary, lying on the left of Genoa, offered no dominant position which it was necessary to occupy in order to protect the city. A large suburb on the sea-shore, that of San Pietro d'Arena, presented a mass of building useful and easy to defend.

The fortifications of Genoa thus presented a triangle, inclined to the horizon about 15°, being about nine thousand fathoms in extent, connected by its summit with the Apennines, its base washed by the sea, and bordered upon its two sides by the Bisagno on the east, and the Polcevera on the west. The Spur fort, and above that Fort Diamond, covered the summit. The forts of Richelieu, St. Tècle, and Quezzi prevented a destructive fire being poured from Monte-Ratti on this city of marble palaces.

Such was Genoa then, and such were its defences, which art, time, and contributions imposed upon France have since greatly improved.

Masséna had still under his command about eighteen thousand men. If with such a garrison, in so strong a place, he had possessed a sufficiency of provisions, he would have been impregnable. It will be seen how much character can effect in warfare towards repairing a fault in foresight and combination.

Masséna was resolved to oppose to the enemy a most energetic resistance, and he proposed immediately to execute two very important things ; the first was to drive back the Austrians who had pressed too closely upon Genoa beyond the Apennines ; the second was to effect a junction with Suchet by a combined movement with that general along the line of the Corniche.

To execute his first design it was necessary that he should drive the Austrians from the Bisagno on the one hand, and from the Polcevera on the other, and that he should drive them by the Monte-Creto and the Bocchetta to the other side of the mountains, from whence they had come. Without the loss of a day, on the very morrow of their first appearance, being the 7th of April, or 17th Germinal, Masséna sallied forth from Genoa, and traversed the valley of the Bisagno, followed by the brave divisions of Miollis, which ten days before had been obliged to retire before the very superior force of general Ott. He was now reinforced with a part of the reserve, and marched in two columns. That of the right, under general Arnaud, marched by the sea towards Quinto; that of the left, under Miollis, directed itself towards the declivities of Monte-Ratti. A third column, under general Petitot, followed, marching up the bottom of the valley of Bisagno, which winds at the foot of Monte Ratti. The precision in movement of the three columns was such, that the fire of all three was heard upon every point at the same moment. General Arnaud by one slope, and general Miollis by another, forced their way with great vigour to the heights of Monte-Ratti. The presence of Masséna himself, and the desire to revenge the surprise of the preceding day, animated the soldiers. The Austrians were driven into the torrents, and lost all their positions. General Arnaud marched on, following the mountain

crest, and reached the extreme summit of the Apennines at the pass of Scoffera. Masséna followed with some reserve companies, and descended into the valley of Bisagno, to join the column of general Petitot. The last thus reinforced repulsed the enemy upon every point, and, remounting the river, seconded the movement of Arnaud upon Scoffera. Precipitated into these tortuous valleys, the Austrians left Masséna one thousand five hundred prisoners, and at their head the instigator of the revolt of the peasantry at Fonte-Buona, the baron d'Aspres. On entering Genoa in the evening, Masséna was heartily welcomed by the patriotic Genoese, whom he had delivered from the sight of the enemy. Bringing with him as a prisoner the very officer whose speedy triumphant announcement had been before made to the population, it could not conceal its joy, and the commander of the French was received with loud acclamations, while the inhabitants provided litters to carry the wounded, and wine and broth for their refreshment, the citizens disputing the honour of receiving them into their houses.

After this energetic action on the left, by far the most important to be performed, because upon that side alone the city was closely pressed by the enemy, Masséna determined, after the respite he had obtained by his recent success, to make an effort on the left towards Savona, and thus to re-establish his communication with Suchet. In order to secure Genoa from attack during his absence, he divided his forces into two bodies, the one on the right under Miollis, the other on the left under Soult. The corps of Miollis was to guard Genoa in two divisions. The division of Arnaud was to defend the east facing Bisagno, and that of Spital the west, facing Polcevera. The corps upon the left under Soult was ordered to take the field with the two divisions of Gardanne and Gazan. With this last force of about ten thousand men, Masséna proposed to approach Savona, to open his communication with Suchet, to whom he had secretly sent notice of his intention, with orders to attempt a similar movement simultaneously upon the same point. Gardanne's division proceeded by the sea shore, and that of Gazan along the crests of the Apennines, with the intention to induce the enemy, at the sight of the two separate columns, to divide his own forces. Manœuvring with great rapidity directly afterwards upon ground of which he had a perfect knowledge, Masséna intended, according to circumstances, to unite his two divisions in such a manner as to destroy, either on the heights of the Apennines or by the sea-shore, that division of the enemy which might be most exposed to his attack. Masséna was in person with Gardanne's division, and confided that of Gazan to Soult. His design was to follow the coast by Voltri, Varaggio, and Savona; his lieutenant Soult had orders to ascend by Aqua-Bianca and San Pietro del Alba, upon Sassello.

On the 9th of April, in the morning, the troops commenced their march. Mélas, after dividing the French army into two parts, intended to shut up Masséna in Genoa, and contract his own line, which was too extended. It embraced from the valley of the Tanaro to that of the Trebia, a space of no less than fifteen leagues at least. The two armies met in their respective movements upon ground very rugged and broken; a desperate but confused conflict ensued. Masséna had marched in two columns, Mélas in three, while Hohenzollern, with a fourth, made an attack upon the Bocchetta, ten thousand French being opposed to above forty thousand Austrians. Soult, filing by Voltri, perceived the Austrians upon his right. They had passed the Bocchetta, and crowned the surrounding heights. On reaching a place called Aqua Santa, it was in their power to threaten the rear of the French columns, and cut off their return to Genoa. Soult thought it would be the most prudent step to drive them back; a brilliant combat ensued, in which Colonel Mouton, since a marshal, and count Lobau, commanding the third demi-brigade, were greatly distinguished. Soult took some cannon and prisoners; and, despite his numerous enemies, gained the mountain-road to Sassello. The time consumed in this action, which could not prevent the advance of the Austrians upon the rear of the French columns, prevented Soult from arriving at Sassello, on the other side of the Apennines, at the moment that Masséna waited for his junction. The last had marched by the sea-side, and on the following day, April 10, he was at Varaggio, in two columns, endeavouring to form a communication with Soult, whom he supposed to be at Sassello. The Austrians, whose force was ten times as great as his, endeavoured to envelope his two little columns, particularly the left, which he commanded in person. Masséna, trusting to his right column and the movement of Soult towards Sassello, resisted for a good while a corps of eight or ten thousand men with no more than twelve hundred, displaying extraordinary firmness. He was, at last, obliged to retreat, having lost sight of his right column, which had fallen behind in consequence of a tardy deliverance of provisions; but he went in search of it among fearful precipices and bands of peasants in revolt. He found it, and, ordering it back, united it with the rest of Gardanne's division, which had not quitted the sea-side by Varaggio and Cogoletto. The difficulty of combining movements in the midst of such a crowd of enemies in so rugged a country, having hindered the junction in time with Soult, Masséna resolved to rally his troops, to ascend the crest of the Apennines, rejoin his lieutenants, and fall upon the Austrian corps dispersed about the valleys. But the harassed troops had dispersed upon the roads, and could not be collected in time. Masséna then resolved to send to Soult such of his forces as were able to march, to serve him as a reinforcement, and with the remainder, composed of wounded and exhausted men, to regain, by following the sea-side, the approaches to Genoa, in order to cover the retreat of the corps, and insure an entrance into the place. With only a handful men he had to sustain several most disproportioned actions, and in one of them, a French battalion having given way before a charge of the hussars of Seckler, he charged the hussars with only thirty horse, and drove them off. He posted himself at last in Voltri, to await the return of Soult. This officer was in the mountains among the enemy's detachments five or six times superior in number to himself. He there encountered great hazards, and must have finally surrendered but for the help so seasonably sent to him by Masséna.

Being thus reinforced at the critical moment, he was able to regain the road to Genoa, having maintained, without disadvantage, an arduous and most unequal contest. Rejoining the commander-in-chief, they both entered Genoa, bringing in four thousand prisoners. Suchet had on his part endeavoured to rejoin his commander, but found it impossible to force his way through the enormous mass of the Austrian army.

The Genoese were delighted to see the French general enter the city again, preceded by columns of prisoners. The ascendency of Masséna became all-powerful, both the army and population obeying him with perfect submission.

From this moment, Masséna might consider himself shut up in Genoa, but he had no intention to suffer the enemy to press him too closely. His intention was to keep Mélas at a distance from the walls, to fatigue him with continued combats, and so to occupy his attention that he should not force the Var, enter Lombardy, nor oppose the march of the first consul over the Alps.

No sooner had he entered the city, on the 18th April or 28th Germinal, than he organized a police for the purpose of provisioning the place. Apprehensive of treachery from the Genoese nobles, he took his measures so as to guard against a surprise from them. The national guard, composed of Ligurian patriots, supported by a French force, was encamped in the principal square of the city, with matches ready lighted at their guns. The national guard was to assemble whenever the drums should beat to arms. Such of the inhabitants as did not belong to it were ordered at the signal to return to their homes. Armed troops alone were permitted to traverse the streets. At ordinary times the inhabitants were commanded to be at home by ten o'clock at night; and assemblages at any hour were strictly forbidden.

Masséna gathered together all the corn to be found in the city, promising to pay for it when it was brought voluntarily, and paying on such occasions. When it was only obtained by domiciliary visits, the owners refusing to give it up, it was seized. The corn being all secured, both the population and army were supported upon rations; and what was thus procured was sufficient to sustain the army and poor inhabitants during the first fifteen days of the siege. These fifteen days being nearly passed, provisions were still left, which many of the rich procured for themselves, at a high rate of payment, from stores that had been concealed for their sole use. By order of Masséna a second search was made, and enough of the common kind of grain, such as rye and oats, were found for a fortnight's supply more of coarse bread to the army and population. It was hoped that a gale of wind might arise and drive off the English fleet, and thus a few cargoes of provisions might enter the harbour. Assistance was expected from Corsican and Ligurian privateers, which had received letters of marque for the capture of vessels laden with corn. In the mean while, Masséna was resolved to hold out to the last extremity. It was determined, rather than submit, to feed the troops with cacao, with which the warehouses of Genoa were well provided. Having at his command some money sent him by the first consul, Masséna hoarded it for extreme cases, or made use of it for affording occasional relief to his unfortunate soldiers under their cruel sufferings. Already, in the different encounters, several thousand men had been killed or disabled, and a great number were in the hospitals. In the forts, upon the two ramparts, and in the reserve, there was an active force of about twelve thousand men still left.

In this horrible position Masséna exhibited every day a calm and serene countenance, communicating to others that courage which animated himself. His aid-de-camp, Franceschi, embarked in a small boat to proceed by the coast to Nice, in order to repair to the first consul and make known to him the hardships, exploits, and danger of the Ligurian army.

On the morning of the 30th of April or 10th Floréal, a general cannonade was heard on all points at the same time; on the east towards the Bisagno, on the west in the direction of the Polcevera, and, lastly, along the coast itself, from a division of gun-boats, all announcing some general attempt of the enemy. The Austrians on that day displayed themselves in great force. Count Hohenzollern attacked the little plain of the Two Brothers, on which fort Diamond stood. After a fierce struggle the Austrians gained the ground, and summoned the fort. The officer in command replied, that he would not surrender a post entrusted to his honour until compelled by main force. This fort was of great importance, since it commanded that of the Spur, and, in consequence, the entire ramparts. The Austrian camp of Coronata, situated on the banks of the Polcevera towards the west, opened a heavy fire upon the suburb of San Pietro d'Arena, and several attacks were at the same time made for the purpose of narrowing the space which the French still possessed in that quarter. On the opposite side of the city, towards the Bisagno, the enemy surrounded fort Richelieu, and unfortunately took fort Quezzi, which was not completely finished when the siege commenced. In the last place, he took the village of San Martino d'Albaro, under the fort of Mount Tècle, and was very near getting that formidable position the Madona del Monte, from which Genoa might be commanded. The soldiers of general d'Arnaud had already quitted the last houses of the village of Albaro; they scarcely any of them kept in their ranks, many having dispersed in parties, and some were scattered like tirailleurs. Masséna hastened to the spot, rallied them, renewed the fight, and dispersed the enemy.

Half the day had gone by; it was high time to repair the mischief. Masséna entered Genoa instantly and made proper dispositions. He confided to Soult the 73rd and 106th demi-brigades, and ordered him to retake the plain of the Two Brothers; but first wishing to recapture fort Quezzi and force the enemy to evacuate the village of Albaro, he himself led the division of Miollis against those points, after it was reinforced by battalions borrowed from the 2nd and 3rd of the line.

D'Arnaud's division coming to the charge turned San Martino d'Albaro, and repulsed the enemy who had occupied it into the ravine of Sturla, took some prisoners, and thus covered the right of the French columns advancing from fort Quezzi, while the brave colonel Mouton, at the head of two battalions of the 3rd, attacked fort Quezzi in front.

Adjutant-general Hector was directed to turn the Monte-Ratti by the heights of fort Richelieu. But, despite every effort, colonel Mouton was repulsed; though he did not yield until a ball pierced through his chest, and he was left for dead on the field of battle. Masséna, who had only two battalions remaining, pushed one on the right flank of the position of the enemy, and directed the other upon the left. A fierce combat now took place round fort Quezzi. Too near one another to fire, the combatants fought with stones and the butt-ends of their muskets. The French were on the point of giving ground before numbers, when Masséna led up a demi-battalion that remained with him, and decided the victory; the fort was captured. The Austrians, driven from position to position, left a great number of killed, wounded, and prisoners. At this moment Masséna, who had deferred the attack on the little plain of the Two Brothers, profiting by the effect of this success, commanded Soult to take it. General Spital was induced to make the attack; the ground was warmly disputed, but taken by the French at last.

Thus after a whole day's fighting the fort of Quezzi was taken, the posts of San Martino and of the Madonna del Monte, as well as the plain of the Two Brothers, in fine, all the decisive positions, without which the siege of the city by the Austrians could never be successful. Masséna entered the city in the evening, bringing in with him the scaling-ladders which the enemy had prepared for mounting the walls. The Austrians lost in that day one thousand six hundred prisoners, and two thousand four hundred killed or wounded,—about four thousand men, in all. Including these last, Masséna had killed or taken from twelve thousand to fifteen thousand men subsequent to the opening of hostilities, and, what was of far more consequence, he had depressed the moral courage of their army by the great efforts which he forced them to make.

Not a moment was lost in putting fort Quezzi into repair. The work which seemed likely to occupy a month, was finished in three days, by means of five or six hundred barrels of earth which were brought by the soldiers, and served for the formation of the intrenchments. On the 5th of May, or 15th Floréal, a small vessel entered the port with a supply of grain for five days. This was a valuable addition to the stock of provisions, which had become very low. Still it was necessary to relieve the city, otherwise it could not hold out much longer, for it was likely in a short time to be entirely destitute of bread.

General Suchet on his side finding himself overpowered from the crests of the Apennines, was obliged to quit his position at Borghetto, to abandon even the Roya, no longer tenable, as the enemy marched freely by the Col de Tende and threatened Nice and the Var. Even Nice was occupied by Mélas, who entered the place in triumph, proud to tread the soil which had been declared a part of the French territory by the republic. Suchet rallied behind the Var, in a position long studied by the French officers of engineers. The bridge of St. Laurent over the Var, covered by a fortified work, presented a defile of four hundred fathoms to be traversed, and was considered an insurmountable obstacle to an enemy. The whole right bank was covered with battalions, and guarded by the French from the mouth of the river to the mountains. The forts of Montalban and of Vintimille, placed in advance of the Var, had been garrisoned by French at the moment Nice was evacuated. The fort of Montalban, situated in the rear of the Austrians, at such an elevation that it was visible from the French camp, was surmounted by a telegraph, through which means Suchet was made acquainted with every movement of the Austrians. All the disposable troops from the neighbouring departments had been concentrated under Suchet, so that his army numbered fourteen thousand men, sheltered behind good entrenchments, in a position very difficult to be taken by storm.

On receiving intelligence of what was going on in Liguria, the first consul addressed the most pressing communications to Moreau, urging him to commence active hostilities. A month had passed since every thing had been settled between them, and no further difficulties attaching to the French government impeded the movements of Moreau in that quarter. But this general was by nature somewhat slow, and would not compromise himself on an enemy's territory without a certainty of success; thus delaying, until it was mischievous, the commencement of operations. Every delay in his commencing the campaign was a delay in the entry of the army of reserve upon another campaign, and a cruel prolongation of the sufferings of Masséna and his brave soldiers. "Hasten, hasten," wrote the first consul to Moreau from Paris, "hasten, that by your success the moment may arrive when Masséna may be relieved. That general wants provisions; for fifteen days he has sustained with his exhausted soldiers a despairing conflict. I address myself to your patriotism, to your own self-interest; because if Masséna surrenders, it would be necessary to take from you a part of your army, and hurry to the Rhone, to the aid of the southern departments." At last a formal telegraphic order was given him to pass the Rhine.

The reasons which hindered Moreau from entering upon action had been valid in circumstances less urgent. Alsace was exhausted. Switzerland, as badly off, had been for two years crowded with the armies of all Europe, and was entirely destitute of resources. The inhabitants, unable to feed their children, were obliged to emigrate with them in troops from the poor into the rich cantons; and the ruined families there delivered them over to the charity of the families that had still some means of subsistence left. Nothing in the way of provisions could be got out of such a country, of which to make an enemy would not be provident, because it was the point of support to two of the French armies. Moreau, as we have before said, lived upon the stores provided in the French fortresses of the Rhine for use in case of siege. This was, however, not the real motive of his delay; it might have been a motive, on the contrary, to hasten as soon as possible into an enemy's country, that he might support himself upon it; the truth was, both his artillery and cavalry were in want of horses. He had no camp equipages, no implements; if he had enough materials to throw a bridge over a river, it was the utmost. Still, considering how urgent circumstances at that moment were, he at last consented to do the best he could

with what he possessed, in the hope of procuring what he wanted as he proceeded. His army was so well composed, that it would be able to supply itself with what it required as it passed along, or else to do so by conquest. By the end of April, the first days of Floréal, the general had decided to commence the campaign, the finest in his life, and one of the most memorable in the annals of France.

Moreau had at his disposal, as we have seen, about one hundred and thirty thousand men, rather more than less: of these, thirty thousand were occupied as garrisons in Strasburg, Landau, Mayence, at the bridge-forts of Basle, Brisach, Kehl, and Cassel. Of these thirty thousand, too, six or seven under general Moncey guarded the village of the St. Gothard and the Simplon in order to close them against the Austrians. With Moreau therefore there remained one hundred thousand men fit for the field. The infantry, above all, was superb, numbering eighty-two thousand; the artillery mustered five thousand, having one hundred and sixteen pieces of cannon; the cavalry was thirteen thousand. As will be seen, the artillery and the cavalry were below the usual proportions; but they were excellent of their kind, and the character of the infantry enabled the commander the better to accommodate himself to his deficiency in the auxiliary services.

Moreau divided his army into four corps. Lecourbe commanded the right, twenty-five thousand strong. It was stationed from the lake of Constance as far as Schaffhausen. The second corps, denominated the reserve, consisted of thirty thousand men, or nearly that number. It was directly under the command of Moreau himself, and occupied the territory of Basle. The third, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, forming the centre under St. Cyr, was quartered about Old and New Brisach. Lastly, general St. Suzanne, at the head of about twenty thousand, after ascending from Mayence nearly to Strasburg, occupying Strasburg and Kehl, formed the left of the army.

Moreau had a long while before adopted this kind of arrangement, dividing his army into separate corps, each complete in infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Thus each corps was able to act by itself, under whatever circumstances it might be. This mode of formation had the inconvenience, as experience soon demonstrated, of leading the corps to separate too readily, and to act by themselves, more especially when the commander-in-chief did not exercise a sufficient authority, so as at all times to enforce their co-operation in one common end. This inconvenience was yet more aggravated by a particular step which Moreau adopted in this campaign. This was the assuming to himself the immediate command of one of the corps of the army, under the appellation of "the reserve." St. Cyr, who had served with Moreau a good while, and who possessed much influence over him, strongly opposed this combination[1]. St. Cyr alleged that it absorbed the attention of the commander-in-chief, and made him lower himself to a duty foreign to his post; more than all, that it was an injury to the other corps of the army, who were seldom so well treated as those more immediately under the general staff. These objections, the justice of which was proved more than once in the course of this campaign, had no weight, Moreau continuing to persist in his resolution out of complaisance to the interests of a party. Having already conferred the direction of his staff upon general Dessoles, and still desirous of making an appointment for general Lahorie, one of the dangerous friends who subsequently contributed to his ruin, he gave him the second command of the reserve. This circumstance caused a coolness between Moreau and St. Cyr, which at length came to an open quarrel.

Kray, the Austrian general, opposed to Moreau, had, as we have before said, one hundred and fifty thousand men under his command, of which number forty thousand were in fortresses upon the Rhine and Danube, and one hundred and ten thousand in the field. The infantry, mingled with Bavarians, Wurtembergers, and Mayençais, was ordinary; the cavalry was fine, and numbered twenty-six thousand; the artillery, numerous and well-appointed, numbered three hundred pieces of cannon. The right of the Austrians, which was commanded by general Sztarray, observed the course of the Rhine, between Mayence and Rastadt, connecting itself with the levies of the Mayence peasantry, under the baron d'Albini. General Kienmayer covered the opening upon Strasburg in advance of Kinzig. Major Giulay, with one brigade, held the Val d'Enfer, and observed Old Brisach. The main body of the Austrian army was encamped behind the defiles of the Black Forest, at Donau-Eschingen and Willingen, at the junction of the roads conducting from the Rhine to the Danube. On this point forty thousand men were collected. Kray had placed in the forest-towns a strong advance-guard under the archduke Ferdinand, with orders to watch the Basle road; and he left a numerous rear-guard, under prince Joseph of Lorraine at Stockach, to cover his magazines established in that town, to guard the roads of Ulm and Munich, and to keep up his communication with the Lake of Constance, where Williams, an Englishman, commanded a flotilla. In the last place, prince de Reuss, at the head of thirty thousand men, partly Austrians, and partly Tyrolese militia, were in occupation of the Rheinthal, from the Grisons to the Lake of Constance. This was considered the left of the imperial army. Kray, in the centre of this web extending around him, flattered himself that he should be informed of the least movement on the part of the French.

The plan of Moreau, before stated, consisted in passing over the three bridges of Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, and then in stealing away and ascending the Rhine as far as Schaffhausen; he adopted it without modification[2]. Moreau set his troops in motion on the 25th of April. He proceeded himself to Strasburg, where he joined the corps of St. Suzanne, in order to make it more readily be supposed, by his presence there, that his intention was to act by the direct road from Strasburg

[1] See the Memoirs of St. Cyr, Campaign of 1800.

[2] Here St. Cyr in his Memoirs seems to be in error. The first consul adopted the plan entire. This is attested by a letter of general Dessoles, contained in the *Mémoires de la Guerre*, and by manuscript correspondence.

across the Black Forest. He took another precaution for masking his objects still further, for he did not unite his forces beforehand. The demi-brigades marched out of their cantonments to the place where they were to cross the Rhine, joining in their march the corps of which they formed a part. Every thing being thus arranged, three imposing heads of columns, acting simultaneously, over a space of thirty leagues, passed the bridges of Strasburg, Old Brisach, and Basle at the same moment, on the 25th of April.

General St. Suzanne, who commanded the extreme left at Strasburg, drove all before him that he found in his way. Here and there he fell in with detached corps; they made but a slight resistance. Not wishing to involve himself in any serious affairs, he halted between Renchen and Offenburg, menacing, at the same time, the two valleys of Renchen and of Kinzig, but endeavouring to make the Austrians believe that he was trying to reach the Danube by the Black Forest in following the valley of the Kinzig. At the same time as St. Suzanne had advanced from Strasburg, St. Cyr marched from Old Brisach upon Friburg, driving the enemies' detachments rapidly before him; but, like St. Suzanne, taking care not to push on too far in advance. He met some resistance before Friburg. The Austrians had entrenched the heights surrounding the town, and placed behind them a great number of the peasantry raised in the mountains of Suabia, under the plea of defending their homes against the ravages of the French. They could not maintain their ground, and Friburg was taken possession of in a moment. Some of the unfortunate peasantry were sabred, and no more was seen of any of them during the remainder of the campaign. St. Cyr took up his ground in such a manner as to induce a belief that he intended to engage in the Val d'Enfer, or, as the Germans call it, the Höllengrund.

The reserve on the same day passed over the bridge of Basle without meeting any obstacle, and sent a division, that of Richepanse, towards Schliengen and Kandern, to communicate with St. Cyr's corps, which was to ascend the Rhine in two days' time.

During the whole of the 26th of April, or 6th Floréal, St. Suzanne remained in his position before Strasburg, and St. Cyr in advance of Brisach. The reserve, which had passed over the Rhine at Basle, completed its development; awaiting the movement of the two corps, intended to ascend the Rhine until they were in a line with itself. Moreau quitted Strasburg to reach the head-quarters, which was placed in the middle of the reserve.

The 27th of April was still employed in deceiving the enemy as to the direction of the French columns. The Austrians might well expect a decided movement by the Val d'Enfer and Kinzig. These defiles are the most direct road for an army marching on the Danube from the Rhine, since they open at some distance one from the other, running in the same direction, and at length uniting between Donau-Eschingen and Hüfingen, not far from Schaffhausen, at which point was the corps of general Lecourbe. It was natural to suppose that these two strong columns, from twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand men each, presenting themselves at the entrance of these defiles, were going in reality to communicate with Lecourbe. In order, therefore, to guard them more securely, Kray detached twelve squadrons and nine battalions from Willingen, as a reinforcement for general Kienmayer. He was thus obliged to weaken Stockach, to replace in Willingen the troops he had sent away from that place.

In the night of the 27th and on the 28th of April, while Kray was thus ensnaring, the direction of the French columns was suddenly changed. St. Suzanne fell back upon Strasburg, repassing the Rhine with his entire corps, and ascending the river by the left bank, in order not to expose himself on an enemy's ground by a flank movement too much prolonged. Upon reaching New Brisach, he crossed again to the right bank, and occupied the position of St. Cyr before Friburg, as if with the intention of entering the Val d'Enfer. St. Cyr, on his part, turned off to the right without quitting the German side of the river, which he coasted with his artillery, cavalry, and baggage; and thus, as his heavy *materiel* followed the level country, a large proportion of his infantry marched along the flank of the mountains, by St. Hubert, Neuhof, Todnau, and St. Blaise. By this course Moreau avoided encumbering the banks of the Rhine, cleared the heights of the Black Forest, full of Austrian detachments, and was able to pass the rivers nearer their sources, that from these heights descending into the Rhine traverse the territory of the forest towns. These rivers are called the Wiesen, the Alb, and the Wutach. Unfortunately roads were supposed to exist where there were none. St. Cyr was obliged to traverse a horrible country, without artillery, and almost always near the enemy. Still his delay was not so great as to prevent the possibility of his arrival at St. Blaise, on the Alb, upon the appointed day.

Moreau, at the same time, ascended the Rhine with the reserve, remaining, like St. Cyr, on the German side. Richepanse, who commanded the advance-guard, after he had seen the artillery and cavalry of St. Cyr pass by, which had followed the bank of the Rhine, set out himself for St. Blaise, in order to connect himself with the infantry of the same corps. Generals Delmas and Leclerc, who commanded the two extreme divisions of the reserve, were marched upon Söckingen, and then upon the Alb, before the bridge of Albruck. This bridge was covered by entrenchments. The adjutant-general Cohorn, at the head of a battalion of the 14th light, and two battalions of the 50th and the 4th hussars, advanced in columns upon the entrenchments, and carried them. Cohorn jumped upon the shoulders of a grenadier, and crossed the Alb, not leaving the enemy time to destroy the bridge. Some cannon and prisoners were captured.

On the 29th of April, or 9th Floréal, the centre under St. Cyr, and the reserve under Moreau, were in line on the Alb, from the abbey of St. Blaise as far as the union of the Alb and Rhine. St. Suzanne arrived at New Brisach by the left bank. On the French extreme right Lecourbe assembled his whole corps between Diesenhofen and Schaffhausen, ready to pass across as soon as St. Cyr and Moreau should have ascended the Rhine to a parallel height with himself. On the 30th of April St. Suzanne passed the Rhine at New Brisach,

and showed himself at the entrance of the Val d'Enfer. St. Cyr remained in the vicinage of St. Blaise, and Moreau marched in advance towards the Wutach.

On the 1st of May, the 11th of Floréal, the army successfully made its more decided and final movement. Kray now began to see his error, and recalled those of his corps which had advanced too far into the Black Forest. St. Suzanne, who had to pass through the Val d'Enfer, which opens upon the positions the French army was to occupy when it had completed its movement, found the troops of Kienmayer in retreat, and closely followed them. St. Cyr hung on the rear of the corps of the archduke Ferdinand, and pushed it from Bettmaringen to Stühlingen on the Wutach, where he arrived in the evening. The troops of Moreau crossed the Wutach without meeting much resistance, repaired the bridge, which wanted scarcely any thing but a few planks to make it good; and tried to connect themselves by the right with Schaffhausen, where they found Lecourbe, and by the left with Stühlingen, where they found St. Cyr. This was the moment that Lecourbe, already upon the Rhine, was to cross that river. On the 1st of May thirty-four pieces of artillery were placed on the heights upon the left bank of the river, so as to command, by their fire, the environs of the village of Richlingen. Twenty-five boats carried general Molitor across to the right bank, with two battalions, to protect the establishment of a bridge some time before prepared in the Aar. In an hour and a half this bridge was thrown across, General Vandamme passed over with a great part of the corps of Lecourbe, and instantly occupied the roads leading to Engen and Stockach, two points of importance on the enemy's line. He took the little town of Stein and the fort of Hohentwiel, reputed impregnable, and well furnished with provisions and stores. Goulu's brigade, crossing at the same moment towards Paradis, encountered in the village of Busingen an obstinate resistance, which it soon overcame. In the last place the division of Lorges entered Schaffhausen in the evening, and effected a junction with the troops of Moreau.

On the 1st of May, in the evening, the entire army had thus passed the Rhine. The three principal corps, under St. Cyr, Moreau, and Lecourbe, forming in all a body of seventy-five thousand or eighty thousand men, occupied a line which passed through Bondorf, Stühlingen, Schaffhausen, Radolfzell, to a point on the lake of Constance. They were ready to march upon Engen and Stockach, threatening at the same time the line of retreat and the magazines of the enemy. St. Suzanne, with the left, of twenty thousand men, followed the Austrians in the defile of the Val d'Enfer, waiting to march upon the Upper Danube, and to unite himself to the main body of the French army, as soon as it should have cleared the mouth of the defile by its advance.

The entire movement was thus effected in six days in the most successful manner. Moreau, presenting three heads of columns, by the bridges of Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, had attracted the enemy towards those three openings; then stealing off suddenly, and marching by the right along the Rhine, two of his corps on the German side, he had ascended the river to the height of Schaffhausen, where he had covered the passage of Lecourbe. He had made one thousand five hundred prisoners, taken six field-pieces, with their horses, and forty pieces of heavy cannon in the fort of Hohentwiel, together with several magazines. The troops had in all instances shown a firmness and resolution which was worthy of veterans, full of confidence in their leaders and in themselves.

All the objections made to the plan of Moreau on this occasion are hushed by its success. It is seldom, indeed, that such complicated movements succeed so well, that an enemy falls into a snare with such credulity, or that the heads of different corps co-operate with so much exactness. Still this plan of the prudent Moreau carried with it as much of danger as that of the first consul, which he rejected as being too full of temerity. St. Cyr and Moreau had exposed their flanks for several days in their march along the Rhine, shut in between mountains and the river; St. Cyr had been separated from his artillery; and St. Suzanne was at last left alone against the enemy in the Val d'Enfer. If marshal Kray, inspired by a sudden impulse, had flung himself upon St. Cyr, Moreau, or St. Suzanne, he must have crushed one of these detached corps, and hence forced a retrograde movement upon the whole French army. Moreau, on the other hand, had two evident advantages; first, he had acted on the offensive, which always disconcerts an enemy; and secondly, he had excellent troops, which were adequate to repair any unforeseen accident by their firmness, and who actually did repair by their steadiness, as we shall soon see, more than one fault of their commander-in-chief.

The moment now approached when the two armies, after having manœuvred, the one to pass the Rhine, the other to impede the passage, were to meet beyond that river. On the 2nd of May, the 12th Floréal, Moreau prepared himself for the struggle; but not imagining it was so near as it really proved to be, he omitted to take measures sufficiently prompt and perfect for the concentration of his forces. He determined to send Lecourbe with his corps of twenty-five thousand men upon Stockach, where the rear-guard of the Austrians was, together with their magazines, and by which they had their communications with the Vorarlberg and prince de Reuss. The vigorous execution of this attack had been concerted with the first consul; because Kray, cut off from Stockach, would be separated from the lake of Constance, and, in consequence, from the Alps. Moreau ordered Lecourbe to march on the 3rd of May in the morning, or on the 13th of Floréal, to take Stockach from the prince of Lorraine-Vaudemont, who with twelve thousand men held that important post. Moreau himself advanced with all the reserve upon Engen, keeping Lecourbe in view, and ready to afford him aid if necessary. St. Cyr was directed to advance and occupy a position extending from Bettmaringen and Bondorf as far as Engen, in such a manner as to be in connexion with him on the one part, and to hold himself, on the other, ready to communicate with St. Suzanne as soon as he should issue from the Val d'Enfer.

Moreau thus proceeded in order of battle with his back to the Rhine, his right to the lake of

Constance, and his left to the openings of the Black Forest; presenting a front of fifteen leagues in extent, parallel to the line on which the Austrians must retreat if they retired from Donau-Eschingen to Stockach, where many reasons seemed to demand their presence. It was a position very extended, and, in particular, so near to the enemy, that before an active and enterprising fire the French might have been exposed to considerable danger. Fortunately, the Austrian army under Kray was less concentrated than the French. Kray's primary position had been better than that of the French for a rapid concentration, since he occupied from Constance to Strasburg, the base of a triangle, of which the French held the two sides. Kray, surprised by the movement of Moreau, having already on his left flank the united French forces to two-thirds of their total number, all having passed over the river, felt himself in a situation of difficulty. He had given to the detachments of his army hurried orders to fall back upon the Black Forest, upon the higher Danube; but a prompt and well-concerted operation could alone extricate them. This may be better understood, as well as the accompanying manœuvres, by a survey of the theatre of these operations.

The wooded and mountainous territory called the Black Forest, around which runs the Rhine, for, without entering it, that river pursues a northerly course; this territory contains a small spring, very insignificant at its head, although destined to become one of the larger rivers on the globe; that river is the Danube. It sends forth its stream eastward, and so continues to flow, except with a slight inclination to the north for a short distance, occasioned by the foot of the Alps, which it borders all the way to Vienna, collecting in its course the waters descending from a long mountain-chain, the cause of its sudden increase so soon after its insignificant origin.

The Austrian generals who defend the valley of the Danube against the French, the common road as it is to their country, have two plans to follow. They are able, if the French succeed in penetrating into it by Switzerland and the Black Forest, to pass along the foot of the Alps, resting their left on the mountains, and their right on the Danube, thus defending successively all the rivers which fall into it, such as the Iller, Lech, Isar, and Inn; or they may abandon the Alps, place themselves on each side of the Danube, and descend with its course, making a resistance at all the good positions which it offers, such as those of Ulm, Ratisbon, and others, ready to cover themselves with its stream, which gradually widens, or to fall upon the imprudent adversary who shall make a false manœuvre. This last course has generally been that preferred by the Austrians.

Kray was able to choose either the one or the other of these modes, to sustain his left on the Alps, or to manœuvre on the Danube. By sustaining himself upon the Alps, he would unknowingly have contravened the scheme of the first consul, who, in descending in safety from those lofty mountains upon the rear of general Mélas in Italy, wished to keep the Austrian army in Suabia away from Switzerland and the Tyrol. But here he would sacrifice his right wing, too far advanced upon the Rhine, without knowing what would become of it. By manœuvring on the Danube he would assuredly rally his right wing, but become separated from his left under the prince de Reuss; though not sacrificing it, because it would find in the Tyrol a place of security and employment. Kray would fall in with the designs of the first consul by moving far from the Alps; but this was a minor evil; for even if he were to support himself upon them, it was not probable he would think of throwing himself into Lombardy to save Mélas. The plan which presented the fewest inconveniences, and that most in unison with the course previously pursued by the Austrian armies, was to concentrate his forces upon the Upper Danube, although, in order to succeed it was necessary to act promptly and resolutely. Unhappily for himself, Kray had immense magazines at Stockach, near the lake of Constance, with a strong rear-guard of twelve thousand men, under the prince of Lorraine-Vaudemont. It was necessary that he should recall his rear-guard immediately from Stockach to the higher Danube, and that he should march thither himself, sacrificing his magazines, which he would not have, in any case, the time to remove. He did not do this; but still, with the intention of afterwards manœuvring on the Danube, he sent general Nauendorff with the centre of the Austrian army upon Engen, to succour Stockach. He ordered prince Ferdinand, who was in the Black Forest, to repair to the same place; and his right, under the generals Sztarray and Kienmayer, to quit the Rhine and rejoin him with all speed.

A vast inconvenience attaches to the enormous magazines of provisions customary among the Germans, in that the army must be regulated by them in its movements. The French dispense with magazines altogether, and, by spreading themselves over the country, procure subsistence without the discipline of the troops suffering from the practice. They are active, industrious, and know how to be marauding and at the same time remain near their colours. The German troops are rarely exposed to the same practice without becoming disorganized and dispersed. There is the advantage in possessing magazines, that the war presses with less severity upon a country that is the seat of hostilities, and thus they prevent the people from becoming exasperated against the invaders.

Moreau, marching with his right upon Stockach and his reserve upon Engen, while the corps of St. Cyr extended itself to communicate with St. Suzanne, was therefore very likely to meet with the rear-guard of Kray at Stockach, his centre at Engen, and to be on the heels of prince Ferdinand, who was on his way to rejoin the main body of the Austrian army. An unexpected combat must be the result of such a meeting,—a circumstance often occurring in war, when its plans have not been conducted by superior minds capable of foresight as well as direction.

Lecourbe had been on his march to Stockach since the morning, having thrown out on his left the division of Lorges to communicate with Moreau, pushing straightforward before him the division of Montrichard with the reserve cavalry of Nansouty, on the high road from Schaffhausen to Stockach. Lastly, sending the divisions of Vandamme to the

right, between Stockach and the lake of Constance. The force of the last was divided into two brigades: one, manœuvring in such a manner, under general Leval, as to cut off the Austrian communication by Bodmann and Sernadingen with the lake of Constance, met with no obstacle, because the prince of Reuss, who might have appeared there, gave himself little trouble about keeping up a communication with his commander-in-chief; the other brigade, under general Molitor, directed by Vandamme in person, marched to the rear of Stockach by a cross road, while Montrichard and Nansouty proceeded by the high road from Schaffhausen. In the thick of the woods infantry was perceived falling back as well as cavalry, the last reconnoitring as they retired. At last the troops arrived at the ground, which the Austrians seemed determined to defend. Montrichard found them in order of battle beyond the village of Steusslingen, covered by a strong body of cavalry. The French infantry passed through the village in two columns, opening out to the left and right, and threatening the enemy's flanks. At the same moment the cavalry of Nansouty, coming out of Steusslingen, charged vigorously, and overthrew the Austrians, who retreated upon Neuzingen. This was the second and principal position covering Stockach; it was supported upon that of Wahlwyes, which at the same moment Vandamme threatened with Molitor's brigade. A numerous infantry were seen barring the extremity of the village of Neuzingen, resting its right and left on the woods, and covered by cannon. A vigorous effort was required to dislodge the enemy; Montrichard, however, was successful in turning it, by a height called the Hellemberg, while Vandamme, having passed Wahlwyes, opened upon the rear of Neuzingen. The position was carried, and the whole corps of Lecourbe, being now united, poured in a mass upon Stockach, which was instantly taken. The Austrians endeavoured to make a resistance beyond Stockach, and thus to check the French. They exhibited about four thousand infantry in order of battle, and covered by all their cavalry. The regiments of Nansouty, charging the enemy's horse, threw them into disorder back upon their infantry, which now only thought of surrendering. Lecourbe made four thousand prisoners, captured eight pieces of cannon, five hundred horses, and the immense magazines of Stockach. It could not have terminated otherwise. Lecourbe, with soldiers capable of fighting an enemy having numbers greatly superior, had on the ground twice the number of men that the prince of Lorraine had, although he had detached the division of Lorges to form a connexion with Moreau. Lecourbe finished his task at an early hour; and if a direction equally vigorous had marked the whole of the operations, together with proper unity of design, he might and ought to have been employed elsewhere, as will be seen presently.

The division of Lorges, destined to serve intermediately between Lecourbe and Moreau, was divided into two brigades. That of Goulu had marched upon Aach to scour the country between Stockach and Engen, but, finding no enemy in sight, had turned off towards Stockach, where it was of no use. General Lorges, with the rest of his division, having joined Moreau's corps, accompanied it towards Engen.

Moreau, with what was styled the corps of reserve, had been all the morning marching upon Engen. Kray, at the same time, was traversing that place on his way to Stockach, to save his magazines. He soon saw that, from the French force displayed before him, there would be a battle in place of a reconnoitring, and he halted for the purpose of giving it, relying upon his superior force of forty thousand men at hand, and the strength of the position to which he had been by chance conducted.

Leaving towards Schaffhausen the banks of the Rhine for those of the Danube, in a rugged, broken, irregular country, where the declivities are uncertain, the small valley of the Aach is met with, which conveys to the lake of Constance those waters which neither fall into the Rhine nor Danube. In this valley is the small town of Engen. To descend to Engen it is necessary first to climb a number of wooded heights very difficult of access. Those heights were occupied by the Austrian infantry; their cavalry was in the plain of Engen. Moreau would be obliged to dislodge the Austrians from those heights before he could descend into the plain and attack the cavalry. He marched, himself, at the head of the divisions of Delmas and Bastoul, and half of that of Lorges. He directed Richepanse's division, the left, along the Blumenfeld road. This road led through a series of valleys, and the division was to turn the enemy's position by less defended approaches; all, being successful, were then to descend in a body upon Engen.

Lorges, who had got a little in advance of the reserve, found a large body of troops near Waterdingen, and, before attacking them, awaited the division of Delmas, which quickly arrived. They then charged and dislodged the Austrians. Arrived at this point, they had next to surmount the heights which surround Engen, and for that purpose it was required to cross some steep-sided table-ground, commanded on the right by a position called the Maulberg, and on the left by a very elevated peak having the name of the Peak of Hohenhewen. Lorges was ordered to attack the Maulberg. After a slight cannonade he advanced, and the enemy gave way. Then Delmas, passing to the left, directed his force upon a wood which encircled the peak of Hohenhewen, occupied by eight of the enemy's battalions of infantry. Two battalions of the 46th advanced upon this wood without firing, while general Grandjean and adjutant-general Cohorn turned it with a detachment. As soon as the 46th had received the fire of the enemy, they rushed upon him with fixed bayonets. The eight Austrian battalions, finding themselves so vigorously attacked in front and turned on the right, abandoned the wood. The French, having taken the principal positions which defended the approaches to the valley of Engen, had no more to do than to descend into that valley, which was traversed by a considerable rivulet. The enemy had retired to the peak of Hohenhewen, placed his artillery and infantry on the declivities, and drawn up his cavalry, twelve thousand men, in the plain of Engen. Moreau had the intention at first to take the peak, and ordered Delmas to attack it. His division, on leaving the wood, was exposed to a very destructive fire, which it sustained bravely. General Jocopin,

placing himself at the head of the infantry, received a ball in the thigh; but general Grandjean turned the position. The adjutant-general Cohorn, who, as before mentioned, had crossed the Alb on the shoulders of a grenadier, mounted to the summit with a battalion, and the Austrians were driven down. The troops of Moreau were now in possession of all the heights commanding Engen and its plain, and were able to open out unmolested, the enemy having retired to the other side of the plain beyond the rivulet, which passes through it, to the foot of a chain of hills which form the opposite boundary. Here the Austrians were drawn up: in front was their numerous cavalry and the greater part of their artillery; and in their rear, in the hollow part of a valley, at the entrance of which stands the little village of Ehingen, was a strong reserve of grenadiers. Such was the mass of force to be overcome before the battle could be decided to the advantage of Moreau.

During this time a sharp fire was heard on the other side of the peak of Hohenhewen, and a good distance beyond along the girdle of woody heights which surround Engen. This proceeded from the division of Richepanse engaged with the troops that Kray had placed on that part of the field of battle. Richepanse had been obliged to separate his division into two brigades to take two different positions, one called Leipferdingen, the other Waterdingen at the extremity of the valleys into which he had entered. There he was obliged to maintain a very obstinate conflict with varied success, when very fortunately for him the advance-guard of St. Cyr's corps began to appear. These troops arrived very late in consequence of a want of unity in the dispositions of Moreau. St. Cyr ought to have aided St. Suzanne with one of his divisions, but he had been obliged to wait for Ney, who was hindered by want of provisions, and he was even delayed for his artillery, which had been in the rear ever since the passage of the Rhine; moreover he had been in an incessant encounter with prince Ferdinand during his march, and had been obliged to advance with the utmost caution, having only one of his divisions, out of three, present to oppose to his enemy. At last he had come up to the assistance of Richepanse at the moment when Kray was making a vigorous effort to prevent him from marching upon Engen. Moreau, judging from the vivacity of the fire that Richepanse was in danger, determined to draw the Austrian attention towards their left, and for this purpose thought it right to attack the village of Ehingen, which formed the chief support of their position on the other side of the plain. Here it has been seen that the enemy had posted at the foot of a chain of hills his artillery, cavalry, and yet more a reserve of grenadiers, the last in the valley of which Ehingen formed the entrance. General Bontemps proceeded there with the 67th demi-brigade, two battalions of the 10th light, and two squadrons of the 5th hussars. General Hautpoul followed with the reserve of cavalry. These troops, marching in column on the plain under the fire of a battery of twelve pieces of cannon, arrived and took the village of Ehingen in a gallant manner. On a sudden eight battalions of grenadiers, in reserve, charged them in turn, and obliged them to give up the village. Hautpoul's cavalry was repulsed by that of the Austrians, and the brave general Bontemps was severely wounded in the confusion that ensued. At the same moment the firing on the left beyond the peak of Hohenhawen redoubled in activity, announcing the danger of Richepanse's position, who persisted, but so far vainly, in attempting to force that belt of heights.

Moreau, who in difficult movements had the firmness of the truly martial soul, saw in a moment the seriousness of his situation, and determined upon a vigorous effort to be master of the field. He made the remnant of Bastoul's division advance, placed himself at the head of some companies of grenadiers that were near at hand, inflamed their courage by his example, led them forward to the charge, and restored Ehingen to the French army. While Moreau was thus deciding the day on the field, Richepanse was, on his part, performing prodigies of courage. St. Cyr, rejoined by marshal Ney, and definitively delivered from the attacks of the archduke Ferdinand, sent forward Roussel's brigade, which vied in courage with the troops that had been so long and vainly engaged, and aided them in storming the heights thus long and vigorously disputed. The action was over every where against the Austrians, but thus decided at the price of much labour and bloodshed. The 4th demi-brigade lost in this combat from five hundred to six hundred men. Night came on; the ardour of the French increased, as the courage of the Austrians fell, when they learned the news of the ruin of the prince de Lorraine-Vaudemont at Stockach. Kray, fearing to be turned by Stockach, ordered a retreat. He then hastened to regain the Danube by Tuttlingen and Liptingen.

The loss of the French army in this succession of obstinate combats was considerable, not less than two thousand men killed and wounded. That of the Austrians was three thousand, but four thousand or five thousand prisoners remained in the hands of the French. The French troops by dint of extraordinary bravery had corrected the defects in the plan of their general. This plan was by no means perfect, and its weak points can now be fully appreciated. The results themselves show, in the first place, how inconvenient it was to pass the Rhine at several points. Owing to this mode of operation no more than three corps were ready to march together. Then the third or St. Cyr's was paralyzed by the necessity of waiting to open the communication with the fourth, which remained in the rear. To this system was attributable the delay in bringing up St. Cyr's artillery, which not a little contributed to delay succour reaching Richepanse. Then, as to the main battle; Moreau with twenty-five thousand men was obliged to combat forty thousand at Engen, while Lecourbe with twenty thousand had only twelve thousand to fight at Stockach, and St. Cyr was nearly unoccupied or confined to the duty of observation. St. Cyr, accused of having arrived too late, affirmed that he did not receive a single aid-de-camp from head-quarters during the whole day. We shall never see such things occur, or very rarely indeed, on battle-fields where the first consul commanded. Still a general to act as Moreau did must possess high merit. Once in the presence of danger he comported himself with an energy and calmness which never abandoned him, and, seconded by the valor of his

troops, he, after all, bore away the victory, and acquired a decided superiority over the enemy.

Moreau encamped upon the field of battle. If on the following day he had closely pursued Kray, on the road from Stockach to the Danube, it is probable he would have thrown him into disorder. But he had not enough ardour of character, and was too sparing of his troops, to execute rapid movements, which are no doubt fatiguing to the soldiers at the moment, but in reality save both their blood and strength by an acceleration of the results. The 4th of May, the 14th Floréal, was employed in rectifying the position of the army, and in marching slowly upon the Danube. St. Cyr marched by Tuttlingen, Moreau and Lecourbe by Möskirch, looking sharply to their right and to the openings of the Vorarlberg, by which the prince de Reuss might make his appearance.

Kray was not yet resigned to quit the ground without a battle. His army, lessened by nearly ten thousand men, was also disheartened. It was an error in him to persist in exposing himself to a new encounter with the French, before he had passed the Danube and been joined by generals Kienmayer and Sztarray, who, returning from the Rhine, were traversing the Black Forest, at the same time with the French corps of St. Suzanne. He required the shelter of a great river, some days' rest, and reinforcements, that the moral power of the Austrian army might recover itself. The position of Mösskirch, which Moreau allowed him time to occupy, inspired Kray with the imprudent but bold resolution to risk another battle.

The situation of Mösskirch is a very strong one. The high road, going to the Danube by Engen and Stockach, passes a short distance, before arriving at Mösskirch, under the fire of some large and elevated table-land, called the plain of Krumbach. This is on the left of the road which now enters a long woody defile. It opens afterwards upon cleared ground, at the extremity of which, on the right, the little town of Mösskirch is perceived, and on the left the village of Heudorf. Behind Mösskirch rises a line of heights which continue from Mösskirch to Heudorf, then from Heudorf they connect that place in the rear, and on the left with the table-land of Krumbach, so that the road, going at first under the table-land, buries itself in a wood, and opens at last under fire of the heights extending from Mösskirch to Heudorf.

Kray crowned this position with a formidable artillery. The prince of Lorraine, commanding the Austrian left, occupied Mösskirch and the surrounding eminences. Nauendorf, commanding their centre, was drawn up above Heudorf, having a reserve of grenadiers in his rear. Baron Wrede with the Bavarians, the archduke Ferdinand, and general Giulay united, composed the right of the imperial army, on the table-land of Krumbach.

Moreau did not much more calculate upon a battle at Mösskirch than he had done at Engen. Having some expectation of meeting with resistance at Mösskirch, he acquainted Lecourbe with his suspicion, by saying it was probable an effort would be made there, without giving any precise orders for that concentration which indicated the near chance of a great battle. Lecourbe kept at the head of the army, and marched in three divisions, having thrown off Vandamme's division some distance to the right, in order to watch the movements of prince de Reuss towards the Vorarlberg. A part of this division, under general Molitor, was to direct itself by the road of Pfullendorff and Klosterwald, on the flank of Möskirch. Lecourbe, with the divisions of Montrichard and Lorges, with the reserve of cavalry, was to advance by the high road that has been described, and which, after passing under Krumbach, upon traversing the woods, opens in face of Mösskirch. Moreau followed the same road, keeping some distance in the rear. St. Cyr, at a considerable distance, flanked the left of Moreau, occupying both banks of the Danube towards Tuttlingen. Such were not, surely, the dispositions for a great battle. Vandamme ought not to have been thrown with his half division upon the flank of the position of Mösskirch. Lecourbe ought to have been sent with his whole force upon that point. Moreau should not have set out so tardily, nor have crammed himself and Lecourbe on the same road into a woody defile. St. Cyr, lastly, ought not to have been left so far off.

However this may be, Lecourbe went forward in the morning conformably to the arrangements made previously. On reaching the height of Krumbach he kept the table-land upon his left, and entered the woody defile. Some advance-guards, met with in this defile, were driven back, and Lecourbe arrived at the opening. It was then seen that the naked ground which reached from the opening of the road out of the wood all the way to Mösskirch was on every side bordered with heights crowned with Austrian artillery. As soon as the heads of the columns appeared, five pieces of artillery fired from the front towards Mösskirch, while twenty pieces on the flank, from the side of Heudorf, vomited forth a shower of balls and grape. Two battalions of light infantry posted themselves on the skirts of the wood, and three regiments of cavalry, the 9th hussars, the 12th chasseurs, and the 11th dragoons, passed rapidly to the front, in order to protect the placing of the artillery; but under the fire of those twenty-five pieces, which thundered upon them in every possible sense of the word, these squadrons were obliged to retreat. Fifteen pieces of cannon that general Montrichard had opposed to the Austrian artillery were partly dismounted. The light infantry were obliged to cover themselves in the woods. The Austrian cavalry attempted to charge in turn, but were quickly repulsed; yet as often as general Montrichard attempted to come out of the wood, a terrible fire stopped his columns. It soon became evident that this was not the true point for an attack upon Mösskirch; that, on the contrary, this point was upon the right, following the cross-road of Klosterwald, by which Vandamme advanced. He had not yet arrived, on account of the distance of ground he had to pass over. In the mean time Lecourbe resolved to attack Heudorf, by filing on his left along the edge of the wood. The 10th light, despite a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, entered the village of Heudorf, but was repulsed by superior numbers; and while the cavalry was moving forward to sustain it, the Austrian artillery behind Heudorf compelled it to move back. Thus the second attempt to open upon the left was not more successful than that made more directly upon Mösskirch.

Encouraged by the check thus given to the French, the Austrians now took the offensive, and tried to move from the village of Heudorf upon Lorges' division. This was taking too great a freedom with such brave troops. The 38th formed in column and advanced. Eight pieces of artillery poured grape-shot upon them. Onward they moved with admirable coolness into the village of Heudorf, bayonets at the charge. On a steep rising ground behind Heudorf were woods filled with dense masses of Austrian infantry. Superior numbers rushed upon this gallant demi-brigade; overwhelmed by them it fell back; the 67th came to its assistance, and it quickly rallied. Both regiments then charged. The entire division hastened to the spot, carried the village, and mounted the formidable heights whence the enemy had poured upon them such a terrific fire. Whilst this was proceeding upon the left around the village of Heudorf, Vandamme on the right opened at last upon Mösskirch, at the head of Molitor's brigade. He skilfully arranged it for the attack, in spite of the Austrian infantry, which made a destructive fire from the suburbs of that town upon the French column. The brave men of Molitor's division pressed forward and made a furious charge into Mösskirch, while two battalions turned the Austrian position on the heights. Montrichard, still shut up in the woods, chose the same moment for moving out upon the open ground, which had been so fatal to him at the commencement of the affair. He threw himself upon four columns in the face of the Austrian artillery, somewhat disconcerted at the sight of these simultaneous attacks. His own four columns came up, and, passing a ravine at the foot of the heights, gained the table-ground of Mösskirch at the moment when Vandamme's troops, which had entered Mösskirch, were beginning to come out of it. The Austrians were every where put to the rout. Their reserve, placed a little in the rear of Rohrdorf, would now have acted in its own turn, but was kept in check by the divisions of Vandamme and Montrichard that had united.

From this moment we were masters of the whole of the Austrian line, from Mösskirch to Heudorf. Kray, then, judging with admirable correctness of eye the vulnerable point of the French position, moved part of his army in the direction of the table-ground of Krumbach, on the left of the French, where he could threaten both their flank and rear. The division of Lorges, which occupied Heudorf, was in danger of being overpowered. The whole of the Austrian reserve of grenadiers had attacked that unfortunate division, which, after having taken and retaken Heudorf several times, was worn out with fatigue. It was crushed under the mass of Austrian infantry and the fire of their artillery. Fortunately Moreau, apprised by the violence of the cannonade, hastened his march, and arrived at length at the entrance of the wood with his corps, formed of Delmas', Bastoul's, and Richepanse's divisions. He sent instantly to the left upon Heudorf, Delmas' division to the aid of that of Lorges. That brave body of men soon changed the face of things, routed the Austrian grenadiers, and retook Heudorf as well as the woods above it. But if the French had their reinforcements, so had Kray. His right, composed of the archduke Ferdinand and of general Giulay, that St. Cyr had followed step by step since the commencement of operations, but at too great a distance—his right brought rapidly upon the field of battle was directed against Heudorf and Krumbach, on the very flank of Delmas' division, which was in danger of being surrounded. A part of the latter immediately faced to the left. The 57th, which had earned in Italy the name of "the terrible," formed in order of battle, and for more than an hour fought against the Austrian masses, exposed to the fire of sixteen pieces of cannon, to which general Delmas could only reply with five, which were soon dismounted. This heroic regiment, undismayed under the merciless fire, succeeded in stopping the enemy, until Moreau, hastening from one corps to another, to place or support them, brought Bastoul's division to the help of that of Delmas. He arrived at the moment when the Austrians, unable to defeat the division of Delmas, sought to deprive it of the aid of Bastoul's, by opening out upon the level of Krumbach, in order to intercept the communication, and they were already descending for the purpose to the road, and beginning to mingle with the waggon column. Thus the battle, after beginning at Mösskirch, extended itself to Heudorf, and from Heudorf to Krumbach, embracing the entire angle of this vast position, and covering it with blood, fire, and devastation. At this important moment the division of Bastoul worthily supported the efforts of Delmas' division; but it was likely to be surrounded, if the enemy should succeed in descending from the tableland of Krumbach, and should get possession of the high road by which the French troops were arriving. Richepanse's division, most fortunately brought up at the moment to the decisive point, formed in columns of attack, climbed the heights of Krumbach under a plunging fire, and overwhelmed the archduke Ferdinand. After this effort Kray had no force left to meet Richepanse, and was forced to give the order to retreat. From Krumbach to Heudorf, and from Heudorf to Mösskirch, the French were victorious.

At this time the corps of St. Cyr was at some leagues' distance, at Neuhausen-ob-Eke. If he had appeared, the Austrian army would have been wholly undone; and in place of an ordinary victory, one of those brilliant successes would have been gained which terminate a campaign. What fatal inaction, then, kept him useless, so near the place where he might have decided the destiny of the war? This is a question difficult to answer. St. Cyr pretended the next day that he had received no order. Moreau replied, that he had sent orders by several aids-de-camp. St. Cyr replied, he was so near the field of battle, that if a single officer had been sent to him, the officer could not fail to have arrived where he was. The coterie who surrounded Moreau declared that St. Cyr, a bad companion in arms, had left his comrades to be crushed at Mösskirch, as he had at Engen.

Thus in the military as in civil life there is jealousy, calumny, and hatred. Human passions are every where the same, and war is not very likely to be the state most capable of cooling them, or giving them a sense of justice. The truth is, that St. Cyr, discontented with the coterie which had the ear of Moreau, affected to confine himself

to the command of his own corps, at the head of which he operated in great perfection; but he never made amends for any oversight in the commander-in-chief, and waited, before he acted, for orders, which a lieutenant ought to be able to anticipate, especially when he hears cannon. St. Cyr, in alleging his proximity, in order to prove that orders had not been sent to him, or he must have received them, accuses himself; since that very proximity made his not arriving inexcusable, at least with one division of his corps, to a spot where a tremendous cannonade indicated a violent combat, and, it was not improbable, great danger to the rest of the army. But the faults he committed upon this occasion were soon to be redeemed by most essential services.

French and Austrians alike were, at the close of the day, completely exhausted. In the confusion of battle the number of the killed and wounded is never accurately known, but at Mösskirch the number must have been great; three thousand of the French, and nearly double that number of Austrians. But the French army was full of confidence; for it was victor upon the field of battle, which it intended to quit the next day, to follow up the series of combats which, without having yet produced a decided result, had still sustained its superiority over the enemy. The Austrian army, on the other hand, was incapable of supporting such a contest much longer.

Every body may guess, after the recital just given, what censures were passed upon the operations of Moreau [1]. He had marched upon the field of battle without reconnoitring in advance; he had directed too small a part of his force upon the true point of attack, which was on the road from Klosterwald to Mösskirch, opening upon the flank of that small town. He had marched late, and made all his divisions follow each other through a wood, out of which it was impossible to come forth without losing a great many men; finally, he did not bring St. Cyr upon the ground where his presence would have decided every thing. Kray, on his part, after having well directed his strength upon the left, which was the vulnerable point, had committed the error of suffering Mösskirch to be taken; though it may be said in his behalf, that his troops were far from equalling the French in intelligence and firmness. Besides this, they began to lose confidence, and it was no longer easy to make them bear the sight or sustain the attack of their enemies.

On the morrow, May 6, or 16th of Floréal, Kray set out to get behind the Danube, that he might connect himself with the great line of operations at last. This was the moment to follow him up closely, so as to render the passage of the river impracticable or very difficult. Moreau marched in line with his left to the Danube, very near the spot where the Austrians were crossing, so that he had it in his power to crush them by suddenly wheeling to the left. St. Cyr formed at the same moment the wing which rested upon the Danube. St. Cyr, not having been engaged on the preceding day, was ready to act, and desirous of so doing. He himself saw distinctly the imperial troops precipitately crowding upon the point of Sigmaringen. There the Danube, by making an elbow, formed a sort of promontory, upon which the Austrians had crowded together, pressing forward to pass over to the other bank. St. Cyr perceived it at the distance of a short cannon-range, crowded in a space scarcely sufficient for a single division, and so much surprised at the sight of the French, that before Ney's brigade alone it suspended its passage across, drew up in order of battle, and covered itself with the fire of sixty pieces of cannon. St. Cyr, observing it thus alarmed and huddled together, was certain he could have driven it into the Danube by a single charge of his corps. He ordered forward a few pieces of cannon, every discharge of which swept off whole files, but these could not be expected to remain in battery before Kray's sixty pieces. St. Cyr hoped by his cannonade to excite the attention of Moreau, and so bring him from the corps of reserve to the left wing. On finding he did not come, St. Cyr sent an officer to him, to state what was going on, and obtain leave to attack the enemy. But union no longer existed between these two officers. The officers of the staff believed that St. Cyr had a wish to move to the left, in order still further to detach himself, and to act alone. The reply given to him was an order to move to the right, and connect himself more closely than was his custom with the right of the army and corps of reserve, which formed the centre. He was told, the measure was indispensable, that the general might, in case of necessity, have it in his power to dispose of the troops in case of necessity[2]. The nature of this order exhibited very plainly the feeling of the general-in-chief and of those who surrounded him. It was evident that Moreau had suffered himself to be taken up wholly with a single corps, and that the feebleness of his character had given birth to intestine divisions, bad enough any where, but worse in armies than in any other place.

Kray was thus enabled to retreat without danger, and to rally his army on the other side of the Danube. Kienmayer joined him there again with the troops arriving from the shores of the Rhine, and Stzarray followed him very closely.

The army of Moreau had discovered immense magazines at Stockach and Donau-Eschingen, so that it wanted for nothing. It was in high spirits from its successes, and from continually acting upon the offensive. The 7th and 8th of May, or 17th and 18th of Floréal, Moreau continued his march with his left to the Danube, presenting too extended a line, and frequently halting to give time for the corps of St. Suzanne to rejoin him.

On the 9th of May, the 19th of Floréal, Moreau, knowing that St. Suzanne, who, coming by the left bank of the Danube, was at length opposite to the army, quitted the head-quarters for a day, and crossed the Danube to inspect the troops just arrived. These now formed his left wing, St. Cyr became the centre, and the reserve corps was kept conformably to its denomination as the real reserve.

In all probability Kray, retiring his army, would continue beyond the Danube, and the French

[1] See the Memoirs of St. Cyr, p. 215 et seq., tom. vii. campaign of 1800.

[2] St. Cyr, tom. vii. p. 201.

might safely make on the 9th another march without encountering the enemy. Moreau commanded Lecourbe, with the right wing, to proceed on the 9th between Wurzach and Ochsenhausen; the reserve to advance to Ochsenhausen, while the centre, under St. Cyr, was to pass Biberach, the left being in observation on the Danube. In this order the army advanced near the Iller, in a line parallel with this tributary of the Danube. Moreau set out on the morning of the 9th, believing he should be able to devote the whole day to the corps of St. Suzanne.

Kray had, in the mean while, been induced to adopt a new and unexpected resolution through the advice of the council of war, which had judged it proper to preserve the immense magazines of Biberach, and not abandon them to the French, as was done at Engen and Stokach. He therefore crossed over to the right bank of the Danube by Riedlingen with his whole force, and posted himself in front and behind Biberach. This place had already been the scene of a battle gained by Moreau in 1796, thanks to St. Cyr more particularly, and it was now about to witness again the success of our troops and of St. Cyr himself.

Biberach is situated in a valley inundated by the Riess. This valley is so full of marshy ground, that a person on horseback cannot pass through it without being lost, so that people are obliged to go through the town itself, and over the little bridge contiguous to it. Penetrating into the valley, a species of defile, between the heights of Galgenberg on one side and Mittelbiberach on the other, must be passed. This defile being cleared, Biberach suddenly comes upon the view. On crossing the marsh of the Riess over the bridge adjoining the town, and beyond the marsh, a superb position is seen, called the Mettenberg, upon which an army, well provided with artillery, may make a firm resistance. Kray could not place himself in advance of the defile, having so narrow an outlet by which to effect a retreat; he could only place himself behind Biberach, beyond the Riess on the Mettenberg; but then he could not leave Biberach uncovered. In consequence of this he placed a corps, consisting of eight or ten battalions and a dozen squadrons, in advance of the defile of Mittelbiberach, to retard the march of his opponents, and at the same time to have leisure for evacuating or destroying the larger part of his magazines.

It was a perilous step, more than all with an army demoralized as his was. St. Cyr, having received an order to go and pass the night a little beyond Biberach, soon discovered the position the Austrians had taken. He was much hurt not to have had near him the commander-in-chief, or at least the head of his staff, that he might obtain the needful orders, and make something of his discovery. Moreau was absent; general Dessoles was not on the spot. If St. Cyr had had with him his whole corps, he would not have hesitated to attack the Austrians with that alone. Unhappily his own corps was dispersed. Being obliged to watch the Danube on his left, he had devoted to that object the best of his divisions, that commanded by Ney, of whom he despatched several officers in search; but in consequence of Ney having followed the winding shores of the river, and from the bad state of the roads, it was not easy to reach and bring him back. St. Cyr, to attack a mass of sixty thousand men at least, had but the two divisions of Thareau and Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and the cavalry of reserve of general Sahuc, attached to his corps. The demoralized state of the enemy was a great temptation to attack him, but the disproportion of force made him hesitate. All at once the firing of general Richepanse was heard, who having orders to maintain his communication with St. Cyr, and to cross the Riess by the bridge of Biberach, had arrived at the same point by a transverse road, or that of Reichenbach. St. Cyr, having thus at his disposal the fine division of Richepanse, and being enabled to fill the void left in his corps by the absence of Ney and his division, no longer hesitated. He thought that if the detachment left in advance of the defile which was before Biberach were overthrown, the defeat of this body of eight thousand or ten thousand men would be something more serious than the defeat of a simple advance-guard, and that by its effect the moral courage of the enemy would be deeply shaken. Therefore, without as much as halting to form his troops for the attack, he gave orders to the eighteen battalions and twenty-four squadrons under his command to advance at quick time, and charge the Austrians who barred up the defile. Overthrown by the sudden shock, the Austrians rushed pell-mell into Biberach and the valley of the Riess. It would have been no difficult matter to take almost all of them, but St. Cyr would not attempt it, fearing, if he permitted his soldiers to pursue the enemy, he might not be able to rally them, and thus be deprived of their services in the main operation. He was, therefore, content to enter Biberach, establish himself, and secure the safety of the magazines. Having strongly occupied the town, and taken steps to provide a retreat in case of necessity, he crossed the Riess.

Richepanse had just arrived on his right by the Reichenbach road. Reinforced by this division, St. Cyr crossed the river by the bridge of Biberach, and advanced himself to observe the enemy's position. At the same moment the Austrians, who had been so suddenly thrown into the Reiss, were mounting through the ranks of their own army, which opened to let them pass. At the sight of St. Cyr it was easy to discover how much the army of the enemy was alarmed. St. Cyr ordered forward a number of skirmishers, who approached and insulted the enemy, none of whose force came to meet them, and fling them into the ravine. These detached men were answered by general discharges, evidently from men in alarm, who endeavoured to regain their courage by the noise. St. Cyr was, when upon the field, one of the ablest tacticians of whom we have ever been able to boast. Observing this state of the Austrian army, he decided in a moment his course of action. He drew up Thareau's and Baraguay's divisions in two columns, formed a third of Richepanse's, and placed his cavalry in *échelon* on the wings. These arrangements being completed, he set all his columns in motion at once. They ascended the acclivity of the Mettenberg with unparalleled steadiness. The Austrians, at the sight of the French climbing the formidable position with such coolness, whence an army three times their number might have pre-

cipitated them into the marshes of the Reiss, were struck with astonishment and fear. Kray ordered a retrograde movement; but his troops did not execute the order as he intended they should do; for after some firing they abandoned the field of the Mettenberg, and finished in a disorderly flight, leaving to St. Cyr many thousand prisoners and immense magazines, which served the French army for a long time afterwards. Night stopped the pursuit. In the midst of the affair Moreau arrived; and, notwithstanding the coolness between him and St. Cyr, on the morrow, in presence of Carnot, the minister of war, he stated to him his high satisfaction at his conduct. Moreau, disembarrassed for a moment from the mischief-making friends who surrounded him at head-quarters, could thus be just to a lieutenant who had fought and conquered in his absence and without orders.

The French army completely victorious, the Austrians were no more able to resist, and it might now march forward without opposition. Kray had sent—it is difficult to comprehend for what reason—a detachment to defend the magazines of Memmingen. Memmingen was in the route of Lecourbe. That place was taken, the detachment routed, and the magazines secured. This was on the 10th of May, or 20th Floréal. The 11th and 12th, Kray definitively retired upon Ulm. Moreau continued his march in a long line, nearly perpendicular to the Danube. The 13th of May he was beyond the Iller, without encountering any serious resistance to the passage of that river. The right and the reserve were at Ungerhausen, Kellmüntz, Iller-Aicheim, Illertissen. St. Cyr was placed at the confluence of the Iller and Danube, across the Iller, occupying the bridge of Unterkirchberg, and connecting himself with St. Suzanne, who was advancing along the left bank of the Danube. From the head-quarters of St. Cyr, where Ney's division was placed, in the abbey of Wiblingen, the Austrian troops might be distinctly seen afar off, in their vast intrenched camp of Ulm.

The two armies were now rejoined by all their detached corps. Kray had recalled to himself Kienmayer but a few days before, and afterwards Sztarray. Moreau, having close at hand the corps of St. Suzanne, was now in full strength. Both armies had sustained losses, but those of the Austrians were far more considerable than those of the French. They were estimated at thirty thousand men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. Upon this matter history is reduced to conjecture, because, on days of battle, generals always diminish their losses; and when they want reinforcements from their governments, they constantly exaggerate the numbers of the dead, the sick, and the wounded. No one knows with perfect accuracy the total number of soldiers really present under arms. Kray commenced the campaign with one hundred and ten or one hundred and fifteen thousand efficient men; and reckoning thirty-five or forty thousand in fortresses, he could have now but eighty thousand at most, these worn out with fatigue, and completely demoralized.

The loss of the French army was estimated at four thousand killed, six or seven thousand wounded or dead of fever, and some made prisoners; in the whole, twelve or thirteen thousand rendered unfit for service, four or five thousand of whom might again return to duty after a little rest. This calculation reduces Moreau's active force for the moment to ninety thousand men, or somewhat less. But he was soon about to part with a considerable detachment, consonant to an agreement with general Berthier at the opening of the campaign. It was stipulated in that agreement, that as soon as Kray was driven to the distance of eight or ten marches from the Lake of Constance, Lecourbe should fall back upon the Alps, to join the army of reserve. The position of Masséna rendered the fulfilment of this engagement urgent; and it was not any silly desire to check Moreau in the midst of his successes, that caused the demand to be made for the corps of Lecourbe, but the most legitimate of reasons—that of saving Genoa and Liguria. The army of reserve, collected with so much labour, consisted of no more than forty thousand men inured to war. It needed a reinforcement in order to place it in a condition to attempt the extraordinary operations beyond the Alps in which it was about to be employed.

The first consul, impatient to act in the direction of Italy, and wishing at the same time to avoid offending Moreau, and yet to secure the due execution of his orders, made choice of Carnot, the war minister himself, for that purpose, sending him to the head-quarters of the army of the Rhine, with the formal injunction to detach Lecourbe towards the St. Gothard. The letters accompanying this order were cordial in manner and irresistible in argument. The first consul well knew that it was not Lecourbe and twenty-five thousand men that would be sent to him; but if he obtained fifteen or sixteen thousand he would feel satisfied.

Moreau received Carnot with chagrin; still he executed faithfully the orders which were brought him by the war minister, who took care to remove any feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the feeble-minded general, who was easily deceived; and that confidence in the first consul was thus revived which detestable mischief-makers were striving to destroy.

Some historians, who flatter Moreau, but only his flatterers since 1815, have elevated the detachment taken from the army of Germany to twenty-five thousand men. Moreau himself, in his reply to the first consul, did not estimate it at more than seventeen thousand eight hundred, and this number was exaggerated; not more than fifteen or sixteen thousand entered Switzerland to climb mount St. Gothard. After that, Moreau had about seventy-two thousand men left; and soon afterwards, by the recovery of the sick and wounded, seventy-five thousand [1]. This number was more than sufficient to beat eighty thousand Austrians. Kray had no more, and those were dispirited and incapable of standing the least serious rencounter with the French.

[1] It is from Moreau's own correspondence that I state these numbers. All the calculations are exaggerated on the side of Moreau. He estimates the battalions retained by him at 650 men, and those sent to Italy at 700 each. This calculation cannot be correct; for if he sent the corps just as they were, and the battalions in his army were reduced to 650 men, there could not be 700 in those which were detached from him.

In order that the enemy might remain ignorant of this diminution of his force, Moreau determined not to alter the position nor the existing distribution of his battalions. He took the sixteen thousand men which he designed for the first consul out of all the existing corps. Each of these corps furnished its contingent; and thus the diminution of his force was concealed in the best mode possible. Moreau wished to keep Lecourbe, who was worth in value more than some thousands of men. Lecourbe was accordingly left to him, and the brave general Lorges had the command of the detachment which marched for Switzerland. Carnot immediately set out for Paris after he had seen on their way the troops destined to pass the St. Gothard.

This operation occurred on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of May, being the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of Floréal. Moreau's army was now seventy-two thousand strong, or nearly so, without counting the garrisons in the different fortresses, the Helvetian divisions, or those who might return to service from the hospitals. It was still of the same strength as before the arrival of the corps of St. Suzanne, a strength which had sufficed to make it uniformly victorious.

Kray had established himself at Ulm, where for a long time an entrenched camp had been prepared as a stronghold for the imperial troops. Of the two modes of defence of which mention has been made, that of retreating by the foot of the Alps, thus covering the army by the tributary waters of the Danube, or keeping on both sides of that river in order to operate on both banks, the Aulic council of Vienna decided for the last, and Kray followed his orders with considerable skill. The first mode would have been the best, had it been necessary to keep up a permanent communication between the two armies of Germany and Italy. In the first stages of retreat its positions offered no great strength, because the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, and the Inn, are the only obstacles of moment coming in succession; and the Inn alone offers very considerable impediments, for invincible obstacles no longer present themselves in war. But an army which is free from every communication with Italy should be placed upon the Danube itself, having all the bridges at its command, destroying them in succession as it retires, while still possessing the means of crossing from one bank to the other, the enemy being confined to one bank. It is thus able, if the enemy go forward direct upon Vienna, to follow him under the shelter of the Danube, and fling itself upon the invader's rear, to punish him for the first fault he may commit. Thus placed, an army has been generally thought in the best position for covering Austria.

Kray was posted at Ulm, where extensive works had been carried on for his support. At this point it is well known that the left bank of the Danube is formed by the first declivities of the mountains of Suabia, which are always dominant over the right bank. Ulm is on the left side of the river at the foot of those heights, and upon the Danube itself. The walls had been repaired, and a redoubt had been constructed, to defend the bridge on the opposite or right bank. All the heights behind Ulm, more especially the Michelsberg, had been covered with artillery. If the French appeared on the right bank, the Austrian army having one of its wings resting upon Ulm and the other upon the lofty convent of Elchingen, covered by the Danube, and its artillery sweeping the low level ground on the right shore, it was in a position impossible to be assailed. If the French presented themselves on the left bank, the Austrians were in a position equally strong. In order to comprehend this, it is right to recollect that the position of Ulm is covered on the left bank by the river Blau, which descends from the mountains of Suabia, and falls into the Danube close to Ulm, its bed forming a deep ravine. If the French crossed the Danube to attack the Austrians by the left bank, they would change their position, and, in place of facing the Danube, would turn their back upon that river, and cover their front by the Blau. Their left wing would be in Ulm, their right at Lahr and Jungingen, and their centre at Michelsberg. It would require several marches on the Danube to turn this position, abandoning wholly the right bank, which might frustrate all the previous combinations for the campaign, since it would uncover the Alps, and leave the road open to Italy. Into such a secure camp Kray now marched his exhausted army.

St. Cyr was at the convent of Wiblingen, and from its windows could distinctly see the Austrian position without the aid of a telescope. Relying upon the confidence and boldness of the troops, he offered, and several generals offered with him, to storm the enemy's camp. They would, they said, answer for the success of the effort with their lives; and it must be acknowledged that if the daring of some of them, such as Ney and Richepanse, excited some doubts of the success of such an effort, the opinion of St. Cyr, a cool methodical tactician, merited regard. But Moreau was too prudent to venture upon an assault of such a nature, and give Kray the choice of winning a defensive battle. It was true that if the French were victors, the Austrian army flung into the Danube would be half-destroyed, and the campaign would be ended. On the other hand, if the attack failed, Moreau would be obliged to fall back; the campaign in Germany would be endangered, and, worse than all, the decisive campaign in Italy would be rendered impracticable. Moreau acted in war with safety rather than boldness. He suffered the brave soldiers who offered to throw the Austrians into the Danube, to talk on about it, but he refused to suffer such an attempt to be made. A war of manœuvres alone remained. It was possible to pass the Danube to the left bank above Ulm, as already described; but then, in order to turn the Austrian position, the French would be obliged to proceed so far along the left bank, that Switzerland would be opened, and the detachment sent towards the Alps would be endangered. By remaining on the right bank, they might descend the Danube some way below Ulm, cross it out of the way of the Austrians, and master their position by cutting them off from the Lower Danube. By descending the river, the rear of the army would be exposed, and the road to Switzerland. Moreau therefore gave up all idea of dislodging Kray from Ulm. Though with such an army as his he might have hazarded any attempt against the enemy, he was right in his caution, and fully justified in pursuing the plan which securely covered the operations of the first consul, his superior and rival.

Moreau resolved to execute a manœuvre, which was very right under his circumstances. This was to march upon Augsburg, or, in other words, to abandon the course of the Danube, to cross its tributary waters, and render useless all the Austrian lines of defence by a direct march into the heart of the empire. This movement would inevitably oblige Kray to leave the Danube and his camp at Ulm, and draw him after the French army. The idea was a bold one; and it did not uncover the Alps, Moreau being constantly at their foot. He had, under the circumstances, no half measures to pursue. He must either remain inactive before Ulm, or march boldly upon Augsburg and Munich. A single demonstration would not deceive Kray, and only expose to danger the corps of observation necessarily left at Ulm. Here Moreau committed an error which was nearly productive of serious consequences.

On the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May, Moreau crossed the Iller, leaving St. Suzanne alone on the left bank of the Danube, and St. Cyr at the confluence of the Iller and Danube: he pushed forward a corps of reserve on the Guntz, towards Babenhausen. Lecourbe he pushed beyond the Guntz to Erkheim, and sent out a corps of flankers to Kempten, on the road to the Tyrol. In this singular position, extending twenty leagues, touching Ulm on one side and menacing Augsburg on the other, he could not instil into Kray the smallest apprehension of his marching upon Munich, nor do more than tempt him to throw himself in full force upon St. Suzanne, whose corps remained alone on the left bank of the Danube. Had Kray given way to the temptation, and attacked St. Suzanne with his entire masses, the French would have been entirely destroyed.

The orders given to St. Cyr on the 15th or 25th Floréal were executed on the morning of the 16th, when St. Suzanne was attacked at Erbach by an enormous mass of cavalry. His right division, commanded by general Legrand, was at Erbach and Papelau, along the Danube; his left division, commanded by Souham, was at Blaubeuren, on both sides of the Blau; the reserve, under general Colaud, was a little in rear of the two divisions. The action began by a vast number of horse surrounding the French columns on every side. While the troops of St. Suzanne were charged by numerous squadrons, masses of infantry, sallying out of Ulm, and ascending the Danube, gave fears of a still more serious attack. Two columns of infantry and one of cavalry advanced, the one upon Erbach, to attack and surround the two brigades, which composed Legrand's division; the other upon Papelau, to separate the division of Legrand from that of Souham. Legrand made his troops fall back. They retired slowly through the woods, and then had to come out on the level ground between Donaurieden and Ringengen. The troops executed this retreat with great steadiness. They were some hours yielding a small space of ground, halting every moment, forming in squares, and annoying the cavalry sent in pursuit of them with a tremendous fire. Souham's division, attacked on both flanks, was obliged to execute a similar movement and to concentrate itself upon Blaubeuren, behind the Blau, driving into the deep ravine of that river such of the Austrians as pressed them too closely.

It was the division of Legrand which encountered the greatest danger, from its having been placed nearest the Danube; and for that reason the Austrians wished to overwhelm it, in order to intercept all succour that might arrive from the other side of the river. The two brigades of which it was composed defended themselves with great resolution, until at the moment when the infantry was retreating, and the light artillery was replacing its guns on the fore part of the carriages to retreat also, the enemy's cavalry, returning to the charge, dashed suddenly upon the unfortunate division. The brave adjutant-general Levasseur, who had been dismounted in a charge, sprung upon a horse, gallopped to the 10th regiment of horse, which was some distance from the field of battle, brought it up against the enemy, charged the Austrian squadrons ten times their number, and checked them. The artillery had thus time to carry off their guns, take a position in the rear, and protect in turn the cavalry which had rescued it.

During this interval, general St. Suzanne had arrived with a part of the division of Colaud to the aid of Legrand. General Decaen, with the remainder, had gone to Blaubeuren to succour Souham's division. The action was renewed, but it might still end in a disastrous manner, since there was every reason to fear that the Austrian army would fall in a body upon the corps of St. Suzanne. Fortunately, St. Cyr, who was posted on the opposite side of the Danube, did not leave his comrades to be routed as he had before been accused of doing; he hastened to them with all speed. Hearing the cannonade on the left bank of the river, he sent off aids-de-camp on aids-de-camp to bring his divisions from the banks of the Iller to those of the Danube. He ordered not a moment to be lost in making the advanced corps fall back immediately, and the main body of the troops to be despatched without waiting for their out-posts, a corps being left behind to collect them. He placed himself on the bridge of Unterkirchberg, upon the Iller, and as soon as one corps arrived, infantry, cavalry, or artillery, as it might chance to be, he sent it towards the Danube as quickly as possible, preferring the disorder of a moment to a loss of time. He then went himself to the banks of the Danube. The Austrians, not doubting but that St. Suzanne would receive assistance, if practicable, destroyed all the bridges as high up as Dischingen. Seeing St. Cyr endeavouring to cross by a ford, or to re-establish a bridge, the enemy drew up a part of his forces facing those of St. Cyr on the right bank, and commenced a heavy cannonade, to which St. Cyr lost no time in responding. The fire of artillery on both sides the river made the Austrians who had sallied out of Ulm begin to fear that their retreat would be cut off, and caused them to fall back some distance; this disengaged St. Suzanne a little, and diffused a feeling of joy in his ranks as soon as it was known, as for twelve hours they had kept up a contest almost hopeless; their ardour revived once more. They cried out for permission to advance, which was granted them. All the French divisions then moved on together, and drove the Austrians under the batteries of Ulm; but in traversing the field of battle, which they were so overjoyed to recover,

they found it covered with their own dead and wounded. The loss of the Austrians had not been less than that of the French. Only fifteen thousand of the latter had fought all day against thirty-six thousand Austrians, of whom twelve thousand were cavalry. Kray was himself present the whole time on the field of battle.

But for the extraordinary courage of the troops, with the energy and talent of the officers, the fault which Moreau had committed would have been punished by the loss of his left wing. Moreau immediately went to that wing himself, and, as if his thoughts had been only drawn to that quarter by pure accident, he resolved to pass his entire army over to the left bank of the Danube.

On the 17th, or 27th Floréal, leaving St. Suzanne to rest in the position of the day before, he led the corps of St. Cyr back between the Iller and the Danube. The reserve, under his own command, he sent in advance to Unterkirchberg, on the Iller, and commanded Lecourbe to fall back between the Guntz and Weissenhorn. On the 18th, the army made a second movement to the left. St. Suzanne moved beyond the Blau, St. Cyr beyond the Danube, and the reserve to Gocklingen, on the Danube itself, ready to cross over. On the 19th the manœuvre was still more developed, St. Suzanne had turned Ulm completely, having his head-quarters at Urspring; St. Cyr was on both banks of the Blau, with his head-quarters at Blaubeuren; the reserve had passed the Danube between Erbach and the Blau; and Lecourbe was ready to cross that river.

Every thing now denoted an attack upon the entrenched camp of Ulm. In this new position Kray had his left at Ulm, his centre on the Blau, and his right at Elchingen. Thus he had his back to the Danube, and defended the reverse of the position of Ulm. Moreau, having reconnoitred the whole attentively, disappointed his lieutenants, who imagined that they saw in the movement of the left a serious operation in progress, and were desirous of a bold attack on the camp of Kray, because they believed the success of such an attempt was certain. St. Cyr insisted again upon its practicability, but he was not heard. Moreau determined to retire, unwilling to risk an attack by hard fighting along the Blau, and not willing to turn the position by the left, for fear of uncovering Switzerland too much. He ordered the army therefore to return once more to the right bank of the Danube. On the 20th of May and the following days the army decamped, to the great displeasure of the officers and men, who calculated upon the assault being made, and equally to the astonishment of the Austrians, who were in dread of it.

These false movements were attended with the great inconvenience that they elevated the courage of the Austrian army, although they did not shake that of the French, which felt too conscious of its own superiority. Moreau might then have attempted the movement which has been already mentioned, and which, afterwards executed, obtained for him such a signal triumph. This movement was to descend by the Danube, threaten Kray to pass below Ulm, and thus oblige him to decamp by disquieting him about the line of his communications; but Moreau was always fearful of uncovering the road of the Alps. He had thought of making a second demonstration upon Augsburg, and thus once more of endeavouring to deceive the Austrians and to persuade them, that leaving Ulm behind him he was going definitively upon Bavaria, probably upon Austria. On the 22nd of May, or 2nd Prairial, all the French army repassed the Danube. Lecourbe with the right wing threatened Augsburg by Landsberg; St. Suzanne with the left wing kept himself at some distance from the Danube, between Dellmensingen and Achstetten. The same day prince Ferdinand with twelve thousand men, half of whom were cavalry, either with the view of keeping the French near Ulm, or to discover their intentions, made an attack upon St. Suzanne, which was warmly repulsed, the troops acting with their customary vigor, and general Decaen distinguishing himself greatly. The following days Moreau continued his movements. On the 27th May, or 7th Prairial, Lecourbe with equal skill and courage made himself master of the bridge of Landsberg, over the Lech, and on the 28th entered Augsburg. Still Kray was not to be moved by this operation, and remained immovable in Ulm. This was the best of all his resolutions, and did most honour to his firmness and judgment.

From that time Moreau remained inactive, calculating events in Italy. He rectified his position, and greatly improved it. In place of forming a long line, one extremity of which touched the Danube, a position which exposed his left corps to unequal conflicts with the entire of the Austrian forces, he executed afterwards a change of front facing the Danube, ranging himself parallel with that river, but at a considerable distance, his left resting upon the Iller, his right upon the Guntz, his rear-guard in Augsburg, and a corps of flankers observing the Tyrol. Thus his army formed a mass sufficiently dense to fear nothing from any isolated attack upon either of his wings, and it had nothing to risk but a general engagement, which was all that it desired, because such a contest could not fail to terminate in the utter ruin of the Austrian army. In this unapproachable position, Moreau determined to await the result of the operations which Bonaparte was at the same moment carrying on upon the other side of the Alps. His lieutenants pressed him to abandon his inaction, but he persisted in replying that it would be imprudent to do more until he received intelligence from Italy; but if Bonaparte succeeded in that part of the theatre of war, they would then try a decisive movement against Kray; for that if the French army on the other side of the Alps was not fortunate, they would be greatly embarrased by any progress they should now make in Bavaria. The enterprise of Bonaparte, the secret of which was known to Moreau, carried something very extraordinary in it to a mind constituted like his; and therefore it is not at all improbable that he felt inquietude, or that he was unwilling to advance without knowing for a certainty the fortunes of the army of reserve.

Moreau, in consequence of these resolutions, had warm altercations with some of his lieutenants, and more immediately with St. Cyr. This officer complained of the inactivity in which meau while they were kept, and still more of the partiality that was prevalent in the distribution of the rations to the different corps of the army. He communicated to

Moreau that his division was frequently without bread, while that of the commander-in-chief close by it was in want of nothing. There was no lack of resources since the capture of the enemy's magazines, but only of the means of conveyance. St. Cyr had upon the same subject more than one dispute; there was evidently a difference between him and the staff that surrounded Moreau; and this was the real cause of these unfortunate disputes. General Grenier had just joined the army, and St. Cyr wished moreover to give him the command of the reserve, that Moreau might be free from the occupations and partialities which are the inevitable consequences of holding so particular a command. Moreau unfortunately would do nothing of the sort. St. Cyr then retired, and thus the army was deprived of the ablest of its general officers. St. Cyr was himself made more to command than obey another. General St. Suzanne retired too in consequence of similar misunderstandings. The last was sent to the Rhine to form a corps, designed to cover the rear of the army of Germany, and to keep the forces of baron D'Albini in check. Grenier succeeded to the place of St. Cyr, and Richepanse to that of St. Suzanne. Moreau, who was strongly established in his new position, and whose troops wanted for nothing, determined to wait where he was, and wrote to the first consul, well expressing his situation and intentions, as follows:—

Babenhausen, 7 Prairial, an VIII.
(May 27, 1800.)

"We wait with impatience, citizen consul, for the tidings of your success. Kray and I are groping about here—he to keep near Ulm, I to make him quit that post.

"It would have been dangerous for you in particular, if I had transferred the war to the left bank of the Danube. Our present position has forced the prince de Reuss to move off to the openings of the Tyrol and to the sources of the Lech and Iller; so that he cannot inconvenience you.

"Give me, I beg you, news of yourself, and let me know how I can serve you

"If M. Kray moves in advance, I shall fall back as far as Memmingen; there I shall make general Lecourbe join me, and we shall fight. If he marches upon Augsburg, I shall do the same; he will lose his support of Ulm, and then we shall see what is to be done to cover you.

"It would be more advantageous to make the war upon the left bank of the Danube, and to force Wurtemberg and Franconia to contribute to our support; but this would not suit you, since the enemy might send detachments into Italy, while leaving us to ravage the territory of the empire.

"Be assured of my attachment.

"(Signed) MOREAU."

A month and two days had now elapsed, and if Moreau had not obtained those prompt and decisive results which terminate a campaign at a blow, as he might have done by passing the Rhine at a single point towards Schaffhausen, throwing his entire force upon the left of Kray, and fighting the battles of Engen and Mösskirch with undivided forces; or as he might have done by throwing the Austrian army into the Danube at Sigmaringen, dislodging it by main strength from the camp at Ulm, or obliging it to decamp by a decided movement upon Augsburg; still he had fulfilled the more essential conditions of the plan of the campaign,—he had passed the Rhine without accident, in presence of the Austrian army; he had fought two great battles, and, though the concentration of his forces had been defective, he had gained both battles by his firmness and good generalship on the field of action; lastly, despite his "gropings" about Ulm, he had, notwithstanding, shut up the Austrians around that place, and kept them blockaded there, cutting them off from the route to the Tyrol and Bavaria, still having himself the power to await in a good position the result of events in Italy. If we do not find in him those superior talents and that decision which distinguish the greatest soldiers, we discover a calm, prudent mind, repairing by its coolness the faults of an intelligence too narrowed, and of a character somewhat irresolute: we find, in fact, an excellent general, such as nations often wish to possess, and such as Europe had none to equal. It was the fortune of France to possess at this time—of France which already possessed Bonaparte—to possess also Moreau, Kléber, Dessaix, Masséna, and St. Cyr, in other words, the best second-rate generals; and it must be recollected that she had already produced Dumouriez and Pichegru. Time of wonderful recollections! which ought to inspire us with some kind of confidence in ourselves, and prove to Europe that all our glory in the present century is not due to a single man, that it is not the result of that rare fortune which produces such men of genius as Hannibal, Cæsar, or Napoleon.

What might be chiefly alleged against Moreau was a want of vigour in commanding; above all, his suffering himself to be surrounded and controlled by a military circle, his permitting misunderstandings to have birth around him, thus depriving himself of his best officers; and his not correcting, by the force of his own will, a bad organization of the army, which tended to make his lieutenants isolate themselves, and be guilty of acts importing bad military brotherhood. Moreau erred in character, as we have before observed several times, and as we shall too often have to repeat. We would there were a veil to hide from us, and as well conceal from others, the sad sequel time discloses; and that we might be permitted to enjoy, without any thing to make the feeling painful, the noble and prudent achievements of the soldier, whose heart jealousy and exile had not yet altered.

We must now transport ourselves to a different theatre, to witness a scene of a very different kind. Providence, that is exuberant in contrasts, will there exhibit another mind, a different character, and a different fortune; and, for the honour of France, soldiers still the same, that is to say, always intelligent, devoted, and intrepid.

BOOK IV.

MARENGO.

THE FIRST CONSUL IMPATIENT FOR NEWS FROM GERMANY.—RECEIVES INTELLIGENCE OF MOREAU'S SUCCESS, AND RESOLVES TO DEPART FOR ITALY.—EXTREME SUFFERINGS OF THE GARRISON OF GENOA.—MASSÉNA'S FORTITUDE.—THE FIRST CONSUL HASTENS TO HIS RELIEF, AND EXECUTES HIS GRAND DESIGN OF CROSSING THE HIGH ALPS.—BONAPARTE SETS OUT AND MAKES A FEINT OF APPEARING AT DIJON, ARRIVES AT MARTIGNY, IN THE VALAIS.—CHOOSES ST. BERNARD TO PASS OVER THE ALPINE CHAIN.—MEANS ADOPTED FOR TRANSPORTING ARTILLERY, AMMUNITION, PROVISIONS, AND MATERIEL OF THE ARMY.—COMMENCEMENT OF THE PASSAGE.—THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES SURMOUNTED BY THE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS.—UNFORESEEN OBSTACLE IN THE FORT DU BARD.—SURPRISE AND GRIEF OF THE ARMY AT THE SIGHT OF THE FORT.—THOUGHT AT FIRST TO BE IMPREGNABLE.—THE INFANTRY AND CAVALRY MAKE A CIRCUIT, AND AVOID THE OBSTACLE.—THE ARTILLERY DRAWN BY HAND UNDER THE FIRE OF THE FORT.—IVRÉA TAKEN, AND THE ARMY ARRAYED IN THE PLAINS OF PIEDMONT BEFORE THE AUSTRIANS ARE AWARE OF ITS EXISTENCE OR MARCH.—PASSAGE SIMULTANEOUSLY OF THE ST. GOTHARD BY THE DETACHMENT FROM GERMANY.—PLAN OF BONAPARTE WHEN DESCENDED INTO LOMBARDY.—HE DETERMINES TO PROCEED TO MILAN, TO RALLY THE TROOPS FROM GERMANY, AND ENVELOPE MÉLAS.—THE LONG ILLUSIONS OF MÉLAS DESTROYED AT A SINGLE BLOW.—MORTIFICATION OF THE OLD GENERAL.—ISSUES ORDERS FOR EVACUATING THE BANKS OF THE VAR AND THE ENVIRONS OF GENOA.—LAST EXTREMITY OF MASSÉNA.—ABSOLUTE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUPPORTING LONGER THE SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE OF GENOA: HE IS FORCED TO SURRENDER.—HONOURABLE CAPITULATION.—THE AUSTRIANS, GENOA BEING TAKEN, CONCENTRATE IN PIEDMONT.—IMPORTANCE OF THE ROAD FROM ALEXANDRIA TO PIACENZA.—EAGERNESS OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES TO OCCUPY PIACENZA.—THE FRENCH ARRIVE THERE FIRST.—POSITION OF LA STRADELLA CHOSEN BY THE FIRST CONSUL FOR ENVELOPING MÉLAS.—HALT IN THAT POSITION FOR SOME DAYS.—BELIEVING THAT THE AUSTRIANS HAVE ESCAPED, THE FIRST CONSUL GOES TO FIND THEM, AND ENCOUNTERS THEM UNEXPECTEDLY IN THE PLAIN OF MARENGO.—BATTLE OF MARENGO LOST AND GAINED.—HAPPY IMPULSE OF DESSAIX, AND DEATH.—REGRET OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—DESPAIR OF THE AUSTRIANS, AND CONVENTION OF ALEXANDRIA, BY WHICH ALL ITALY AND ITS FORTRESSES ARE DELIVERED OVER TO THE FRENCH ARMY.—THE FIRST CONSUL REMAINS SOME DAYS AT MILAN, TO REGULATE AFFAIRS.—CONCLAVE AT VENICE, AND ELEVATION OF PIUS VII. TO THE PAPAL CHAIR.—RETURN OF THE FIRST CONSUL TO PARIS.—ENTHUSIASM EXCITED BY HIS PRESENCE.—SEQUEL OF OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE.—PASSAGE OF THE RIVER BELOW ULM.—VICTORY OF HOCHSTEDT.—MOREAU CONQUERS ALL BAVARIA AS FAR AS THE INN.—ARMISTICE IN GERMANY AS WELL AS IN ITALY.—COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.—ST. JULIEN SENT BY THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY TO PARIS.—FÊTE OF THE 14TH OF JULY AT THE INVALIDES.

THE first consul waited only for news of the success of the army of the Rhine, in order to descend into the plains of Italy; for, unless Moreau were fortunate, he would not be able to spare the detachment of his troops; besides, Kray was not so far separated from Mélas, as to make it safe to manœuvre freely on the rear of the last. The impatience of the first consul was great, being resolved to quit Paris, and take the command of the army of reserve the moment he was certainly assured of the success of the army of Moreau. Time pressed, seeing that Masséna, in Genoa, was reduced to the most cruel suffering. We left him there, contending against the whole Austrian force, with an army worn out by fatigue, yet daily inflicting considerable loss upon the enemy. On the 10th of May general Ott indulged in an unseemly bravado, informing Masséna that he should fire his guns for a victory obtained over Suchet—a piece of news utterly destitute of truth; the gallant defender of Genoa replied to some purpose. He sallied out of the city in two columns. The column on the left, commanded by Soult, ascended the Bisagno, and turned the Monte-Ratti; that under Miollis attacked Monte-Ratti in front. The Austrians, thus vigorously assailed, were precipitated into the ravines, and lost that important position, with fifteen hundred men made prisoners. Masséna entered Genoa triumphant the same evening, and the next morning wrote to general Ott, that he would fire his cannon for the victory of the preceding day; an heroic revenge, worthy a great soul.

This was the last of his successes: his soldiers could scarcely sustain the weight of their arms, they were so debilitated by famine. On the 13th of May, or 23d Floréal, this energetic officer, yielding to the advice of his generals, consented, in spite of himself, to an operation, the result of which was exceedingly disastrous. This was, to storm the Monte-Creto, an important post, which it would, no doubt, have been most desirable to take from the Austrians, because they would, by this means, be removed to a considerable distance from Genoa. Unhappily, there was but little chance of success in such an undertaking. Masséna, who had the greatest confidence in his army, for he daily required and obtained from it the most strenuous efforts, did not think it was capable of carrying a position which the enemy could defend with all his strength. He would have preferred an expedition to Porto Fino, along the coast, to seize a considerable quantity of provisions, which were known to be in that quarter. He gave way, however, contrary to his custom, and on the morning of the 13th marched upon the Monte-Creto. The battle at first was brilliant: but, unfortunately, a violent storm, which lasted for some hours, broke down the strength of the soldiers. The enemy had concentrated upon this point a large body of troops, and drove back the French, who were dying of fatigue and hunger, into the valleys.

Soult, making it a point of honour to succeed in an expedition which he had advised, rallied the third demi-brigade, and led it back against the enemy. He had, perhaps, been successful, but a ball, having fractured his leg, extended him on the field. His men would have carried him off, but they had not time. Thus the general, who had so well seconded Masséna throughout the whole siege, was left in the hands of the enemy.

The troops entered Genoa with deep mortification, bringing in some prisoners. While they were absent, the women in the city had become riotous. These unhappy creatures, driven by want, ran through the streets, ringing bells and calling for bread. They were very quickly dispersed; but the French commander was thenceforward almost wholly occupied in providing support for the population of Genoa, which showed, in all other respects, the most devoted conduct. There had been corn procured, as already said, for a fortnight at first, and afterwards for a second term of the same length. After this a vessel brought in enough to last for five days: thus supplies had been obtained for more than a month. Blockaded from the 5th of April, these resources had lasted to the 10th of May. Seeing the provisions diminish, the daily rations had been reduced both to the military and to the inhabitants. Soup made with herbs and a little meat still left in the city, were substituted for bread. The richer inhabitants found means to supply themselves with victuals at an enormous price, out of those which had escaped the search of the police for the purpose of applying them to the general use. Thus Masséna had only to trouble himself about the poor, by whom the famine was severely felt. He had imposed a contribution upon the rich in their behalf, and had thus won the hearts of the poor to the French side. The majority of the population, dreading the Austrians, and the political system of which they were the supporters, determined to second Masséna in this emergency. Struck with the energy of his character, their obedience to him was equal to their resignation. Still the aristocratical party endeavoured, by every possible means, to embarrass and annoy him, by making tools of some hungry wretches for that purpose. To overawe them, he made his troops pass the night in the principal streets at their guns, with matches lighted. But the bread on which they still supported themselves, made of oats, beans, and any grain that could be procured, was very nearly exhausted; of meat, too, the city was as near being destitute. On the 20th of May there would be only such things as it would be almost impossible to use for human sustenance. It was therefore necessary to relieve the place before the 20th of May, unless Masséna and his whole army were allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy, when Mélas would thus be able to dispose of thirty thousand men more, who might return into Piedmont, and block up the passages of the Alps.

The aid-de-camp Franceschi, who had gone to state to the government the position of the garrison, had succeeded by boldness and address in passing through the Austrians and the English, and he had communicated to the first consul the deplorable situation of the city. The first consul, in consequence, neglected nothing to put the army of reserve in a state to cross the Alps. It was for this end he had sent Carnot to Germany with the formal order of the consuls, to send the detachment forward which was to pass over Mount St. Gothard. For himself, he laboured night and day with Berthier, who organized the divisions of cavalry and infantry, with Gassendi and Marmont, who organized the artillery, and with Marescot, who was busy reconnoitring along the whole line of the Alps. He urged them all forward with that power of persuasion which enabled him to lead the French from the banks of the Po to those of the Jordan, and from the banks of the Jordan to those of the Danube and Borysthenes. He did not mean to quit Paris until the last moment, being unwilling to relinquish the political government of France longer than he could help, and thus leave free quarters for intriguers and plotters. In the mean time the divisional troops from La Vendée, Britany, Paris, and the banks of the Rhone, were traversing the whole extent of the republican territory. Already the heads of the columns had made their appearance in Switzerland. There were always at Dijon, the depôts of different corps, certain conscripts and volunteers, who had been sent there to spread abroad the opinion, that the army of Dijon was a mere fable, solely destined to alarm Mélas. Thus far, then, all had succeeded to admiration—the delusion of the Austrians was complete. The movement of the troops towards Switzerland was scarcely noticed. In consequence of these troops being widely dispersed, they passed for no more than reinforcements intended for the army of Germany.

At length every thing was ready, and the first consul made his final arrangements. He received a message from the senate, the tribunate, and the legislative body, conveying to him the wishes of the nation, that he might soon return as "conqueror and peace-maker." He replied to them with studied solemnity. His reply was intended to agree with the articles in the *Moniteur*, proving that his journey, about which so much parade was made, like the army of reserve, was a feint, and nothing better. He charged Cambacérès, the consul, to preside in his place over the council of state, which was at that time in a good measure the entire government. Lebrun was commissioned to superintend the administration of the finances. He said to each of them: "Be firm; if any event happens, be not troubled. I will come back like lightning, to crush the audacious persons who shall dare to lay their hands upon the government." He particularly charged his brothers, who were bound to him by a more personal interest, to make known every thing to him, and to give him the signal to return, should his presence be required. While he was thus publishing his departure with so much ostentation, the consuls and ministers, on the contrary, were to let the newsmongers know that the first consul had quitted Paris for some days, merely to review the troops ready to take the field.

He himself set off, full of hope and highly satisfied. His army contained a good many conscripts, but it contained soldiers inured to war in a far greater number, accustomed to conquer, and commanded by officers formed in his own school. He had also, in the deep conception of his plan, a full and entire reliance.

According to the latest information, Mélas ob-

stinately continued to push his troops deeper into Liguria, half towards Genoa, the other half towards the Var. The first consul at this moment doubted less than ever the success of his enterprise; already seeing, in his ardent imagination, the very place where he should meet and destroy the Austrian army. One day, before he set out, laying open his maps, and placing upon them marks of different colours, to represent the positions of the French and Austrian corps, he said, in the presence of his secretary, who heard him with curiosity and surprise, "That poor Mélas will pass by Turin—will fall back upon Alexandria: I shall pass the Po—encounter him on the road to Piacenza, in the plains of the Scrivia, and I shall beat him there—there!" On saying this he placed one of his marks on San-Giuliano. It will soon be easy to appreciate what an extraordinary glance into futurity prompted these words.

Bonaparte quitted Paris on the 6th of May before daybreak, taking with him his aid-de-camp Duroc and his secretary Bourrienne. On arriving at Dijon he passed the conscripts in review, assembled there without stores, or any of the appointments necessary to take the field. After this, which was only intended to confirm the spies in the belief that the army of Dijon was no more than a fiction, he proceeded to Geneva, and from thence to Lausanne, where every thing bore a serious aspect. There was sufficient to undeceive the most incredulous there, but too late for the information to be sent off and made available at Vienna.

On the 13th of May Bonaparte reviewed a part of the troops, conferring with the officers, who received orders to meet him, in order to state what they had done, and receive his final commands. To general Marescot had been committed the duty of reconnoitring the Alps, and the first consul was most impatient to hear him. On a comparison of all the passes, that of St. Bernard was considered the most favourable by this engineer officer, but even here the operation he thought would be extremely difficult. "Difficult! is it possible?" inquired Bonaparte. "I think so," replied the general of engineers, "but with extraordinary efforts." "Then let us start!" replied the first consul.

It is proper to explain the motives which decided the first consul in choosing the passage by Mount St. Bernard. The St. Gothard pass was reserved for the troops that were on the march from Germany, of which general Moncey had the command. This passage lay in their way, and was only capable of furnishing subsistence at most for fifteen thousand men, because the higher Swiss valleys had been entirely ruined by the presence of belligerent armies. The passages of the Simplon, of the Great St. Bernard, and of Mount Cenis were left, but these were not, as in the present time, crossed by high roads. It was necessary to dismount the carriages at the foot of the mountain, and to send them forward upon sledges, remounting them on the other side. These passages presented all three nearly the same difficulties. Mount Cenis, being more frequently crossed and the track better beaten than on the others, was perhaps the most easy of access of all three; but then the road by that mountain opened upon Turin, in the midst of the Austrians, and consequently was not well adapted to the plan for enveloping them. The Simplon, on the other hand, was the furthest of the three from the point of departure, presenting reverse inconveniences: it opened, it is true, the road to Milan, in a fine, rich country, far from the Austrians,—in fact, quite in their rear; but the distances were too great; and even to get to it the ascent of the whole Valais would have been necessary, together with conveyances for the stores of the army, none of which could be obtained. Amid the desolate and ice-covered valleys to be travelled every individual must carry his own baggage, and a score of leagues more to march was a matter of great consideration. In regard to the passage by the St. Bernard, there was only the distance to pass from Villeneuve to Martigny, or from the extreme end of the lake of Geneva, the point where navigation ceases, to the foot of the mountain. The distance across was very small. The St. Bernard road, besides, opened into the valley of Aosta upon Ivréa, between the roads of Turin and Milan, in a very favourable direction for coming upon the Austrians. More difficult, and perhaps more dangerous, it deserved the preference on account of the shortness of the passage.

The first consul determined therefore to lead the main body of his army over the St. Bernard. He took with him the best men of the army of reserve, in all, about forty thousand, five thousand being cavalry and thirty-five thousand artillery and infantry. Wishing, at the same time, to distract the attention of the Austrians, he conceived the idea of sending some detachments through other passes, that could not be connected with the main body of his army. Not a great way from the Great St. Bernard is the passage of the Little St. Bernard, which opens also into the valley of Aosta from the heights of Savoy. The first consul directed the 70th demi-brigade to proceed by that pass, and some battalions from the west, consisting principally of conscripts, all under the command of general Chabran. This division mustered five or six thousand men, and at Ivréa it was to rejoin the principal column. Lastly, general Thureau, who with four thousand men defended the pass of Mount Cenis, had orders to attempt to penetrate to Turin. Thus the French army was to descend from the Alps by four passes at one time, by the St. Gothard, the Great and Little St. Bernard, and Mount Cenis. The principal body, forty thousand strong, acting in the centre of this semicircle, was certain of being joined by the fifteen thousand men coming from Germany, as well as by the troops of general Chabran, and perhaps those of general Thureau, which would compose a total force of about sixty-five thousand men,—a force that would not fail to disconcert the enemy, who could not know, from the appearance of all these corps, on what point to direct his means of resistance.

The choice of the passes over the mountains being fixed upon, it became necessary to attend to the operation itself—an operation which consisted in throwing sixty thousand men with all their appointments, to the other side of the Alps, destitute of beaten paths, over rocks and glaciers, at the worst season of the year—on the thawing of the snows. It is never a pleasant thing to have a park of artillery to drag along, since every gun requires several

waggons after it ; thus, for sixty pieces three hundred waggons were required : but in those high valleys, many of them sterile from the reign of an eternal winter, others scarcely extensive enough to furnish the means of livelihood to their scanty inhabitants, it is necessary to carry the bread for the troops, as well as the forage for the horses. The difficulty therefore was enormous. From Geneva to Villeneuve all was easy, thanks to Lake Leman and a navigation of eighteen leagues equally speedy and commodious. But from Villeneuve, the extremity of the lake to Ivréa, the opening by which the rich plains of Piedmont are entered, there are forty-five leagues to pass over, of which ten are over the rocks and glaciers of the great chain. The route to Martigny, and from Martigny to St. Pierre, was good for carriages. At St. Pierre they would begin to ascend paths covered with snow, and bordered by precipices scarcely more than two or three feet wide, exposed in noon-day heat to the fall of frightful avalanches. There was nearly ten leagues to be travelled over these paths, to arrive on the other side of the St. Bernard, at the village of St. Remy, in the valley of Aosta, where a road practicable for carriages would be found, leading through Aosta, Châtillon, Bard, and Ivréa, to the plain of Piedmont. Of all these points there was but one supposed likely to offer a difficulty—it was Bard, where it was said there was a fort of which some Italian officers had been heard to speak, but which was not supposed capable of offering any serious obstacle. There were then, as we have said, forty-four leagues to be passed over, the troops carrying every thing with them, from the lake of Geneva to the plain of Piedmont, and of these forty-five leagues, ten were destitute of roads, and not practicable for carriages.

The following were the dispositions made by the first consul for the transport of the *matériel* of the army, and carried into effect by generals Marmont, Marescot, and Gassendi. Immense stores of grain, biscuit, and oats, had been sent to Villeneuve, by the lake of Geneva. Bonaparte, well knowing that for money the assistance of the hardy mountaineers of the Alps might be easily obtained, had sent to the spot a considerable sum in specie. All the *chars-à-banc* of the country, all the mules, had been drawn at a high price to the spot, but only during the last days. By these means bread, biscuit, forage, wine, and brandy, had been conveyed from Villeneuve to Martigny, and from thence to St. Pierre, at the foot of the pass. A sufficient quantity of live cattle had also been conducted thither, and the artillery with its waggons. A company of workmen, established at the foot of the pass of St. Pierre, was employed in dismounting the guns, and taking the carriages themselves to pieces, that they might be carried by mules, the pieces being marked with numbers. The guns, separated from their carriages, were placed upon a species of sledge with low wheels, previously prepared for the purpose at Auxonne. For the convenient carriage of the ammunition of the infantry and artillery, there had been provided a great number of small boxes, easily placed upon mules, for the purpose of transportation by the beasts of burden used in that country, in the same way as the other articles were to be conveyed. A second company of workmen, provided with camp forges, was to pass the mountains with the first division, and establish itself in the village of St. Remy, where the beaten track on the route began again. There the guns and carriages were to be re-united. Such was the enormous task that had been undertaken. There had been united to the army a ponton company, who, though destitute of materials for the construction of bridges, were ready to avail themselves of such as might be obtained from the enemy in Italy.

The first consul had besides taken care to obtain the assistance of the monks resident in the hospital of the Great St. Bernard. It is well known that this pious cenobitical community had been established for ages in that fearful solitude, above the habitable region of the earth, in order to give their aid to travellers overtaken by storms or buried in the snow. The first consul, at the latest moment, had sent them a sum of money, in order that they might collect together a large quantity of bread, cheese, and wine. A hospital was got ready at St. Pierre, close to the foot of the pass, and another on the reverse side of the mountain, at St. Remy. These two hospitals were to receive and forward the sick or wounded, if there should happen to be any, to larger hospitals at Martigny and Villeneuve.

These arrangements being completed, the troops began to make their appearance. Bonaparte placed himself at Lausanne, to inspect the men ; he spoke to them, infused into them a portion of the ardent spirit which animated himself, and prepared them for that immortal enterprise which will be ranked in history with that of the grand expedition by Hannibal. He had taken care to appoint two inspections, the first at Lausanne, the second at Villeneuve. There every soldier of the infantry and cavalry was passed in review, and by means of magazines temporarily formed in those places, they were furnished with such clothing, shoes, and arms, as were required. This was a good precaution ; because, in spite of the trouble he had already taken, the first consul often saw old soldiers arrive, whose clothes were worn out, and their arms unfit for service. He made heavy complaints upon this head, and caused the omissions, arising from the haste or negligence of the agents, always to a certain extent inevitable, to be supplied. He carried his foresight to such an extent, that he placed saddlers' workshops at the foot of the pass to repair the artillery harness. He himself wrote letters upon a subject apparently of such small moment : the incident being mentioned here for the instruction of those generals and governments to whom men's lives are confided, and who often, from idleness or vanity, neglect similar details. Nothing that can contribute to the success of the operations or the safety of the soldiers is beneath the genius or rank of officers who command.

The divisions marched in *échelon* from the Jura to the foot of Mount St. Bernard, in order to avoid embarrassment. The first consul was at Martigny in a convent of Bernardins. From thence he directed every thing, and continued in constant correspondence with Paris and with all the armies of the republic. He received intelligence from Liguria, by which he found that Mélas, always under the greatest illusions, directed all his efforts to take Genoa, and force the bridge of the Var. Well satisfied upon this important subject, he gave

orders at last for the passage to begin. He himself remained upon this side of the St. Bernard, in order to correspond as long as possible with the government, and to expedite every thing himself across the mountain. Berthier, on the other hand, proceeded to the opposite side of Mount St. Bernard, to receive the provision and *matériel* which were sent over.

Lannes went first at the head of the advance-guard, in the night between the 14th and 15th of May, or 24th and 25th of Floréal. He commanded six regiments of chosen men, that, perfectly armed, gaily set out on their adventurous march under their fiery leader, who was sometimes insubordinate, but always valiant and able. They set out between midnight and two in the morning, in order to pass before the time when the sun's heat dissolving the snow brings down mountains of ice on the heads of the rash travellers who enter among these frightful gorges. It required eight hours to reach the summit of the pass as far as the hospital of St. Bernard, but only two to descend to St. Remy. There was time enough, therefore, to escape the greatest danger. The troops surmounted with spirit all the difficulties of the road. They were heavily laden, being obliged to carry biscuit for some days, and in addition a large quantity of cartridges. They climbed the steep rocks, singing amid the precipices, dreaming of the conquest of Italy, where they had so often tasted the pleasures of victory, and having a noble presentiment of the immortal glory they were on the point of acquiring. For the infantry the toil was not so great as for the cavalry. These last walked, leading their horses by the bridle. In ascending there was no danger; but in the descent, the path being very narrow, they were obliged to go before their horses, and thus, if the animal made a false step, they were exposed to be dragged with him down the precipices. There were a few accidents of this kind, but very few; some horses were lost, but scarcely any of the men. Towards the morning they reached the hospital, and there a surprise, provided by the first consul, renewed the strength and good temper of the soldiers. The monks, furnished before with the necessary provisions, had prepared tables, and served out to every soldier a ration of bread, cheese, and wine. After a momentary rest they proceeded on their route, reaching St. Remy without any disagreeable accident. Lannes instantly established himself at the foot of the mountains, and made all the needful disposition for the reception of the other divisions, and more particularly for the munitions and stores.

Ever day one of the divisions of the army passed over; an operation which occupied many days, because of the *matériel* which it was necessary to take over with each division. While the troops were ascending in succession, others were set at work. The provisions and ammunition were first sent off; as this part of what was to pass could be divided and placed in boxes upon mules, the difficulty was not so great as for some other things. Then there was not a sufficiency of the means of conveyance; for, notwithstanding the money prodigally expended, the mules required for the conveyance of the enormous weights to be transported over, could not be procured in a sufficient number. Still the provisions and ammunition having crossed along with the divisions, by the help of the soldiers, the artillery was the last to occupy attention. The gun-carriages, taken to pieces, as already said, were placed on the backs of mules. The guns themselves remained, and their weight could not be lessened by dividing the burden. With the twelve-pounders and the howitzers the difficulty was still greater than had been imagined. The sledges, constructed partly upon wheels, could not be used. A mode was thought of, and directly adopted on being found to answer. It consisted in splitting the trunks of fir-trees in two, hollowing them out, and encasing between every two demi-trunks a single gun, which might, thus encased, be drawn along the ravines. By this means the gun was secured from harm; no shock could injure it. Mules were harnessed to this odd burden, and thus drew several pieces to the summit of the pass. But the descent was more difficult, and could only be effected by strength of arm, running at the same time great danger, because it was necessary to hold the gun back, that it might not fall over the precipices. Unfortunately the mules began to get weak, and the muleteers, of whom a large number were required, became equally exhausted. Other means were then had recourse to. The peasants were offered a thousand francs for every gun which they would agree to draw from St. Pierre to St. Remy. It required a hundred men to every gun; one day to draw it up, and another to make it descend. Some hundreds of the peasantry came forward and transported several pieces of cannon across, directed by the artillerymen; but even the stimulus of gain was not powerful enough to make them renew their labour. They all disappeared; and notwithstanding officers were sent in search of them, and large offers of money made to induce them to return, it was in vain. It was then found necessary to request of the soldiers themselves to drag the artillery of the divisions. From such devoted men any thing was obtainable. In order to encourage them, they were promised the money which the disheartened peasantry declined to earn; but they refused it, saying it was the duty of the troops to save their guns, and they took hold of the forsaken pieces. Bodies of a hundred men came successively out of the ranks, and each dragged them in turn. The music struck up animating airs in the most difficult passes, and encouraged them in surmounting obstacles of such a novel nature. On arriving at the summit of the mountain, they found refreshments prepared for them by the monks of St. Bernard, and took rest, before commencing the descent which required their greatest and most perilous efforts. Thus it was that Chambarlhac's and Monnier's division dragged their artillery themselves; and as the day was too far advanced to permit them to descend, they preferred to pass the night in the snow, rather than separate themselves from their cannon. Happily the sky was serene, and they had not to sustain besides that of the place, the additional rigor of bad weather.

During the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th of May, the divisions continued to cross with provisions, ammunition, and artillery. The first consul, still stationed at Martigny, pushed on the conveyance of the *matériel*, which was received by Berthier on the other side of St. Bernard, and put in order by the workmen. The first consul, whose foresight

never rested, thought immediately of pushing forward Lannes towards the opening from the plain, in order to secure it; his division being united, and having some four-pounders all ready to move. He ordered that officer to advance as far Ivréa, and to take that town in order to secure the entrance into the plain of Piedmont. Lannes moved on the 16th and 17th of May, upon Aosta, where he found some Croats, whom he drove into the bottom of the valley, after which he marched towards the little town of Châtillon, where he arrived on the 18th. A battalion of the enemy, which he found there, was routed, and lost a number of men, who were made prisoners. Lannes then entered the valley, which, as the troops descended, enlarged considerably, and exhibited to the delighted eyes of our soldiers, habitations, trees, and cultivated fields, all the forerunners of Italian fertility. These brave fellows marched along in high spirits, when the valley, again becoming narrower, presented a contracted gorge, closed in by a fort bristling with cannon. This was the fort of Bard, already mentioned as an obstacle by several Italian officers, but still as an obstacle that might be overcome. The engineer officers attached to the advance-guard went forward, reconnoitred the place, and, after a short examination, declared that it completely obstructed the road through the valley, which could not be passed without forcing it, a task that seemed impossible to execute. The intelligence circulated through the division caused a painful surprise. The nature of this unforeseen obstacle was as follows:

A river flows through the valley of Aosta, which receives all the waters of the St. Bernard, and under the name of the Dora Baltea falls into the Po. In approaching Bard the valley becomes more narrow; the road running along between the foot of the mountains and the bed of the river gradually contracts, and a rock, which appears to have fallen from the neighbouring heights into the middle of the valley, closes it up almost entirely. The river runs on one side of this rock, the road passes on the other. This road, lined with houses, constitutes the whole town of Bard. On the summit of the rock a fort, impregnable from its position, although badly constructed, commands with its fire, on the right the course of the Dora Baltea, and on the left the long street which forms the little town of Bard. Drawbridges close the entrance and the outlet of this solitary street. A garrison, not numerous, but well commanded, occupied the fort.

Lannes, who was not a man to be thus stopped, immediately sent a few companies of grenadiers, who let fall the drawbridge, and entered the town in spite of a brisk fire. The commandant of the fort then poured a shower of balls, and particularly shells, upon the unfortunate town; but at last stopped, out of consideration for the inhabitants. Lannes stationed his division outside the place. It was clearly evident, that under the fire of the fort it would be impossible to pass the *matériel* of the army, as its fire swept the road in all directions. Lannes instantly made his report to Berthier of the circumstance, and the latter hastened to the spot, and saw with apprehension how difficult the object thus suddenly disclosed would be to overcome. General Marescot was sent for; he examined the fort, and at once pronounced it to be impregnable, not on account of its construction, which was very indifferent, but from its being wholly insulated. The steepness of the rock almost forbade an escalade, and the walls, although not covered by earth-works, could not be battered in breach, because there was no means of establishing a battery in a place where the guns could be effective. Still it was possible to haul by main strength a few guns of small weight of metal upon a neighbouring height, and orders were given by Berthier to that effect. The soldiers, who were made for difficult enterprises, laboured hard to haul up two four and two eight-pounders. They succeeded at last in getting them on the mountain of Albaredo, which commands the rock and fort of Bard, and a downward fire suddenly opened, and caused great surprise in the garrison. Still it was not discouraged; it replied, and dismounted one of our guns which was of small weight of metal.

Marescot declared he had no hope of taking the fort, and that it would be necessary to find some other mode of overcoming the obstacle. The long sinuosities of the mountain of Albaredo on the left were reconnoitred, and at last a path was found, which having many difficulties, much more than the St. Bernard itself presented, led to the high road of the valley, which it rejoined at St. Donaz below the fort. After traversing a mountain of the secondary order as difficult to pass as the St. Bernard, if it should be required to perform the operations a second time, which the army had gone through on Mount St. Bernard, by again dismounting and remounting the artillery, and dragging it along with the same efforts, the strength of the army might not be adequate to the performance, and this *matériel* itself, so many times taken to pieces and put together again, might be rendered unserviceable. Berthier, in a state of alarm, immediately issued counter-orders to the columns, which were arriving in succession, to suspend the forward movements every where, both of troops and stores, in case of its being ultimately necessary to return. The alarm immediately spread over the rear, and all believed that they were stopped in their glorious enterprise. Berthier sent off several couriers to the first consul, to make known to him their unforeseen disappointment.

The first consul was still at Martigny, not having an intention of crossing the St. Bernard, until he had himself seen the last of the stores belonging to the expedition sent forward. The announcement of an obstacle deemed insurmountable staggered him at first; but soon recovering himself, he refused, in the most determined manner, to admit the thought of a retrograde movement. Nothing upon earth should make him submit to such an extremity. He thought that if one of the highest mountains on the globe had not arrested his design, a secondary rock could not overcome his genius and courage. "They will take the fort," he observed, "by a bold dash; or if not taken, they will turn it. Besides, if the infantry and cavalry can pass with a few four-pounder guns, they will proceed to Ivréa, at the entrance towards the plains, and halt there until the heavy artillery can follow them. If the heavy guns cannot pass free of the obstacle thus presented, and if to replace them that of the enemy must be captured, the French

infantry is both sufficiently brave and numerous to fall upon the Austrian artillery and supply themselves."

Bonaparte then studied his maps anew, questioned a great many Italian officers, and finding from them that other roads led from Aosta to the surrounding valleys, he wrote again and again to Berthier, forbidding the interruption of the forward movement of the army, and indicating to him, with wonderful precision, the observations necessary to be made around the fort of Bard; satisfied that no serious danger could arise except from the arrival of a body of the enemy. To close up the outlet at Ivréa, he enjoined it upon Berthier to send Lannes to Ivréa, by the way of Albaredo, and to make him take up a strong position, covered from the Austrian artillery and cavalry. "If Lannes," added the first consul, "will guard the entrance of the valley, it little matters what may happen; it can only be a small loss of time at most. We have provisions in a sufficient quantity to allow of waiting; and we shall come round in the end, either by turning or vanquishing the impediment which delays us at this moment."

These instructions being sent to Berthier, he addressed his last orders to general Moncey, who was to cross by the St. Gothard; to general Chabran, who, taking the pass of the Little St. Bernard, would come direct upon the fort of Bard, and then, at last, he determined himself to cross the mountain. Before he departed, he received news from the Var, that on the 14th of May, or 24th of Floréal, Mélas was still at Nice. As it was now the 20th of May, it was not to be imagined that the Austrian general could have hurried from Nice to Ivréa in six days. He therefore set out to cross the mountains on the 20th, before daybreak. His aid-de-camp Duroc, and his secretary Bourrienne, accompanied him. The artists have painted him clearing the Alpine snows upon a fiery charger. The truth is, that he crossed the St. Bernard mounted upon a mule, dressed in the grey great-coat which he commonly wore, conducted by a guide belonging to the country. He exhibited, even in the most difficult passes, the abstraction of a mind otherwise occupied; then conversing with the officers on the road, then questioning his guide, and making him relate the history of his life, of his joys and troubles, just as an idle traveller would do who had nothing better with which to beguile the time. The guide, who was young, gave him a simple narrative of the particulars of his obscure existence, and, more than all, of his vexation, because, from want of the small means, he was unable to marry one of the girls of the valley. The first consul, listening at one time, and at another questioning the passengers with whom the mountain was covered, arrived at the hospital, where the good monks gave him a warm reception. Scarcely had he descended from his mule, when he wrote a note, which he gave to his guide, desiring him to be very careful of its delivery to the quarter-master of the army, who remained on the other side of the St. Bernard. In the evening, the young guide, on returning to St. Pierre, discovered with surprise who the great traveller was whom he had escorted in the morning, and that Bonaparte had ordered that a house and piece of ground should be immediately given to him, with the means of marrying and realizing all the dreams of his modest ambition. This mountaineer died recently in his own country, proprietor of the land bestowed upon him by the ruler of the world. This singular act of kindness, at a moment when his mind was filled with such weighty occupations, is worthy of remark. If it were no more than the caprice of a conqueror, flinging good and evil about at random, by turns oversetting an empire or building a cottage, such a caprice it may be useful to record, if only to tempt the lords of the earth to imitate similar actions: but actions such as this reveal something besides. The heart of man in those moments, when it experiences strong desires, tends to kindness, doing good in the way of meriting that which it solicits of Providence.

The first consul stayed a little time with the monks, thanked them for their attentions to his army, and made them a magnificent present towards the relief of the poor and of travellers.

He descended the mountain rapidly, and following the custom of the country, he suffered himself to slide down over the snow. The same evening he reached Etroubles. On the following day, after having directed his attention for a short time to the park of artillery and the stores of provisions, he departed for Aosta and Bard. Having found that all he had been told was correct, he determined to send on his infantry, cavalry, and four-pounders, by the way of Albaredo, which was possible, if the path were made good. All the troops were to march forward, and to take possession of the mountain opening in advance of Ivréa, the first consul in the mean time intending to make an attempt to take the fort, or find some means of turning it, by getting his artillery over the neighbouring passes. He ordered general Lecchi, at the head of the Italians, to mount on the left, and penetrate by the way of Grassoney into the valley of the Sesia, which terminates near the Simplon and Lago Maggiore.

The object of this movement was to keep open the Simplon road, communicate with the detachment which was descending from thence, and, finally, to observe all the roads that were capable of admitting carriages to pass over them.

The first consul then directed his attention to the fort of Bard. The army was in possession of the only street composing the town, but they must pass through it under such a shower of balls, that there was scarcely any possibility of getting along with artillery, though the distance was not more than two or three hundred fathoms. The commander was summoned, but he firmly replied, as fully sensible of the importance of his post, that force alone should make the French masters of the pass. The artillery, which had been placed upon the mountain of Albaredo, produced no important effect. An escalade was attempted on the outer-work of the fort, but some brave grenadiers and an excellent officer, Dufour, were uselessly killed or wounded. At the same time the troops had been moving forward over the path on the Albaredo. Fifteen hundred workmen having completed the most urgent repairs, enlarged the places that were too narrow, by removing banks, diminishing the slopes that were too rapid, cutting steps for the feet, and in some places throwing the trunks of trees in the way of bridges over ravines too difficult to cross

without. The troops advanced in succession, one after another, the cavalry leading their horses. The Austrian officer commanding in the fort of Bard began to despair at seeing the columns pass, without power to stop their march, and wrote to Mélas, that he had seen a whole army, cavalry and infantry, march on, without being able to obstruct them; but he would engage his head for it, that they would arrive without a single piece of cannon. The artillery, in the mean time, made the bold attempt to take on a piece of cannon in the night, under the fire of the fort. Unluckily, the enemy, discovering by the noise what was passing, threw light-balls, which made the road as visible as if it had been noon-day, and enabled them to cover the ground with a hail-shower of projectiles. Of thirteen gunners, who were so adventurous as to draw the piece, seven were killed or wounded. This was enough to put out of heart the boldest men, until an ingenious mode, but still exceedingly dangerous, was conceived. The street was covered with straw and stable dung, and bands of tow were placed round the gun in such a manner as to prevent the least clash of the mass of metal upon the carriage. The horses were detached, and bold artillerymen dragged them by main strength, venturing to pass under the batteries of the fort, along the street of Bard. The plan perfectly succeeded. The enemy, who occasionally fired in a precautional way, struck some of the gunners; but in no long time, in spite of the fire, the heavy artillery was removed to the other side of the defile, and this formidable difficulty, which had caused the first consul more anxiety than the passage of the St. Bernard itself, was thus overcome. The artillery horses had been taken round by the Albaredo path.

While this bold plan was in execution, Lannes, marching in advance at the head of his infantry, had, on the 22d of May, carried the town of Ivréa, that had not been repaired since the wars of the time of Louis XIV., but which, from a presentiment much too late, the Austrian staff had just began to arm. The defensive works of Ivréa consisted of a citadel unconnected with the body of the place, and of bastioned walls. The brave general Watrin, at the head of his division, assaulted the citadel, while Lannes advanced against the body of the place, and both were taken by escalade. There were about five or six thousand Austrians in the town, half of which were cavalry, who retreated in a great hurry. Lannes made some prisoners, drove the Austrians out of the valley, and took up a position at the opening upon the plains of Piedmont, at the point designated by the first consul. A few days later, Ivréa, defended by the Austrians, would have become, though not an insurmountable obstacle, a serious embarrassment. Cannon and provisions were found in the town. Lannes completed its armament, and victualled it in such a manner, that, in case of a check, it might become one of the supports of the line of retreat.

While these things were performing, general Chabran descended with his division by the Little St. Bernard. As his division contained a good many conscripts recently incorporated, the blockade of the fort of Bard was confided to his hands; for it could not be long before it surrendered when it saw itself cut off from all resources, and the artillery, which it could not stop, gone beyond its reach. General Thureau, at the head of a corps of four thousand men, carried the outlet of Suza, making one thousand five hundred prisoners, and taking several cannon. He was obliged to halt at the entrance of the valley between Suza and Bussolino. General Lecchi, with the Italians, turned the valley of the Sesia, repulsed Rohan's division, taking some hundreds of prisoners, disengaged the outlet of the Simplon, and connected itself to a detachment of the division left in Switzerland at the commencement of the campaign. Finally, the corps of general Moncey, in *échelon* over a great length of the valley of St. Gothard, clambered up the heights to the summit.

Thus the general movement of the army was every where effected with perfect success. It was at last necessary to quit the valley of Aosta: Lannes, always in the advance-guard, left the valley on the 26th of May, or the 6th of Prairial, no longer hesitating to show himself in the plain. The Austrian general Haddick had the charge of closing this outlet of the Alps, with some thousand infantry and his numerous cavalry; he was covered by the little river Chiusella, which falls into the Dora Baltea. A bridge crossed this stream, to which Lannes briskly pushed with his infantry. The fire of artillery, well-pointed and sudden, greeted the French, but did not stop their advance. The gallant general Macon entered the bed of the river with his demi-brigade, and crossed both above and below the bridge, clambering up the opposite bank. The Austrian cavalry, commanded by General Palfy, charged the demi-brigade; but the general fell dead, and his cavalry were dispersed. The French, rejoined by the rest of Lannes' division, advanced in pursuit of the enemy with their accustomed spirit. General Haddick, profiting by the disorder of the pursuit, pushed on his squadrons at a very favourable moment: the 6th light was obliged to halt; but the 22d, in close column, repulsed solely by its fire this new charge of the Austrian cavalry. Some thousand horse then dashed on at once to make a last effort against the French infantry. The 40th and 22d demi-brigades, formed into a square, sustained the formidable charge with wonderful firmness; they were thrice charged, and as many times they repulsed the cavalry with their bayonets. Haddick, finding himself incapable of resisting the advance-guard of the French, gave the order to retreat, after losing a great many men, killed and wounded, and others made prisoners; thus relinquishing the plains of Piedmont to Lannes, and retiring behind the Orco. Lannes continued his march, and on the 28th of May, or 8th of Prairial, he advanced towards Chivasso on the banks of the Po. The Austrians, alarmed at this unexpected invasion, quickly evacuated Turin. Lannes seized a numerous convoy of barques descending the Po, having on board corn, rice, ammunition, and wounded men. The abundance designed by the Austrians for their army was thus soon affording resources to the French.

Thirteen days were now over, and the stupendous enterprise of the first consul had fully succeeded. An army of forty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, had passed by unbeaten paths over the highest mountains in Europe; dragging its

artillery by main strength along the snow, or pushing it forward under the murderous fire of a fort, almost close to the muzzles of its guns. One division of five thousand men had descended the Little St. Bernard; another of four thousand had passed over Mount Cenis; a detachment occupied the Simplon; and lastly, a corps of fifteen thousand men, under general Moncey, was on the summit of St. Gothard. There were thus sixty thousand soldiers and more about to enter Italy, still, it is true, separated from each other by considerable distances, but assured of soon rallying round the principal mass of forty thousand, who had come by Ivréa, in the centre of the semicircle of the Alps. Nor was this extraordinary march the whim of a general who, in order to turn his enemy, exposed himself to be turned in a like manner. Master of the valley of Aosta, of the Simplon, and of St. Gothard, Bonaparte had the certainty, that if he lost a battle, he should be able to return to the point whence he had set out, at the utmost by the sacrifice of some part of his artillery, in case of being closely pressed on his retreat. Having now no movement to conceal, the first consul went to Chivasso, harangued the troops, congratulated them upon their firmness before the Austrian cavalry, announced to them the great results which he saw approaching, and showed himself, not only to his own troops, but to the Italians and Austrians, that he might alarm, by the knowledge of his own formidable presence, the enemy whom a little before he wished to remain in the profound repose of their own self-assured security.

What in the mean while was Mélas about? Continually by the cabinet of Vienna and by his own generals made easy on the subject of the fabulous army of reserve, he pushed the siege of Genoa and the attack of the bridge of the Var. He had suffered considerable losses at both these points, but still persisted in thinking that the levies assembled at Dijon were composed of no more than a body of conscripts, destined to fill up the vacancies in the regimental skeletons of the two armies of the Rhine and of Liguria. Some news that reached him about the middle of May was calculated to create an uneasiness about the position of affairs in his rear, but he soon recovered from his apprehensions, and cherished the notion, that the troops collected at Dijon were intended to descend the Rhone directly, in order to join the corps of Suchet on the Var. In place of sending his forces by the Col de Tende into Piedmont he kept them all with him before the bridge of the Var. Nevertheless, the French columns issuing from all the valleys of the Alps at once, seen and recognised with perfect certainty by general Wukassowich, at length roused him from his illusions, but still without wholly convincing him. He left general Ott with thirty thousand men before Genoa, and general Elsnitz with twenty thousand before the bridge of the Var. The last were to be reinforced by the troops under general St. Julien, which had become disposable by the reduction of Savona. Mélas now returned with ten thousand men across the Col de Tende toward Coni. On the 22d of May he entered that place, and, until that moment, really believed that the French troops which had shown themselves were only conscripts employed to make a demonstration in the rear of his army, in order to induce him to raise the siege of Genoa, and he could scarcely credit even now that it was Bonaparte at the head of a great army. But this illusion was soon dissipated. One of his officers, who knew the person of the French commander-in-chief perfectly well, was sent to Chivasso on the banks of the Po. There he saw with his own eyes the conqueror of Castiglione and Rivoli, made his commander acquainted with the whole extent of his danger, and that it was not an assemblage of conscripts of which the first consul had deigned to take the command. This was not all; for, it having been doubted whether the French had cannon, the noise of their artillery was now distinctly heard at Chiusella. This estimable old officer, Mélas, who had displayed superior military qualities in the preceding campaign, was thus subjected to the most cruel anxieties. Every day added to his troubles, since he soon learned that the heads of the columns of general Moncey were descending the St. Gothard.

Mélas was in an extremely critical situation. Of one hundred and twenty thousand men he recently commanded, he had lost at least twenty-five thousand before the Var and Genoa. Those which he had left were dispersed; Otto, with thirty thousand, was before Genoa; Elsnitz, with twenty-five thousand, before the bridge of the Var; general Kaim, guarding the outlets of Suza and Pignerol with about twelve thousand men, had lost Suza, and retired upon Turin. Haddick, who had about nine thousand, watched the valleys of Aosta and Sesia, and was now retiring before Lannes; Wukassowich, who had ten thousand men, was in observation of the valleys of the Simplon and St. Gothard; what would be his fate before Moncey? Mélas himself was at Turin with ten thousand falling back upon Nice. Was it not Bonaparte's intentions to throw himself among all these dispersed corps, and beating them one after another, to destroy them? There was yet time, perhaps, to take safe steps, provided they had been executed as soon as they were conceived; but the Austrian general lost some days in coming to himself, and forming a definitive opinion regarding the plans of his opponent, then in forming his own, and, last of all, in resigning himself to the sacrifices attending the concentration of his forces; since it was necessary for him to abandon at the same time the Var, probably Genoa, and, most assuredly, the larger part of Piedmont.

While Mélas was deliberating, Bonaparte had made his determinations with his customary promptness and resolution. His determinations were not less grave than those of his enemy. If the Austrians were dispersed, the French were so too, since they descended by Mont Cenis, the Great and Little St. Bernard, the Simplon, and the St. Gothard. It was afterwards necessary they should unite and cut off all retreat from Mélas, or, lastly, set Massena free, who at this moment was reduced to the last extremity.

Having descended the St. Bernard, Bonaparte had upon his right mount Cenis and Turin, on his left the St. Gothard and Milan, fifty leagues in his front Genoa and Masséna. What course would he now take? Inclining to the right upon mount Cenis, to rally the four thousand men under general Thureau, would be of little moment. He would

thus expose himself to an encounter with Mélas immediately, though in the present dispersed state of his forces this would not be very hazardous; but by inclining to the right he must relinquish to the Austrian general on the left, the roads of Milan or Piacenza, by which he might effect a retreat. It was little worth his while, having made such great efforts to cross the Alps and throw himself upon the communications of the enemy, if after thus occupying them, he were to leave them free. To proceed straightforward, pass the Po, fly to Genoa among the dispersed corps of the Austrian army, neglecting general Thureau on his right and general Moncey on his left, and compromising every one of his own communications, was not consistent with that great prudence which had combined all the parts of the plan thus far followed with so much reflection and boldness. He was ignorant what number of troops might be met with upon that route; he would sacrifice his line of retreat upon the Alps, by abandoning generals Thureau and Moncey to themselves, and, in all probability, reducing them to the alternative of falling back upon Mount Cenis and St. Gothard, Who shall say after what adventures! It would have been better to succour Masséna direct by Toulon, Nice, and Genoa. Under all these circumstances, there evidently remained but one part to take; and this was to incline to the left towards St. Gothard and Milan, and form a communication with the fifteen thousand men commanded by general Moncey. In this mode he would unite himself to the principal detachment of the army, which would carry up the number to sixty thousand fighting men; he would occupy the capital of upper Italy; he would raise the population in the Austrian rear; he would take all their magazines; he would become master of the line of the Po, and of all the bridges on that great river; and, finally, by thus putting it in his power to attack the enemy upon either bank, he would stop Mélas by whichever road he might attempt an escape. It was true, that by this plan no succour could, for eight or ten days, be sent to Masséna, which was to be regretted; but Bonaparte thought that his own presence in Italy would suffice to disengage the army of Liguria, because he supposed Mélas would lose no time in hastening to collect around him the corps that were investing Genoa and the bridge of the Var. In any case, the generals Masséna and Suchet had fulfilled the object which was assigned to them, had retained Mélas on the Apennines, fatiguing and exhausting him, above all, preventing his closing up the outlets of the Alps. If the defender of Genoa must yield, it would but consummate the long series of sacrifices imposed upon the noble and unfortunate army of Liguria for the success of a vast combination.

His resolution formed, Bonaparte made his arrangements with the greatest promptitude, directing his entire army on the left bank of the Po. He assembled his park of artillery which had just been put in an efficient state; he enjoined Lannes to collect all the boats taken at Chivasso, to dispose of them in such a manner as if he was about to throw a bridge across, and to pass into Piedmont. His object was a second time to deceive Mélas in regard to his intentions, and in this he was as successful as he had been before. On observing the movements of Bonaparte, Mélas, trying to flatter himself to the last moment, indulged the hope that the French had only descended the Alps in a small number. He believed that Bonaparte, as every thing induced him to think, had only passed the Po to enter Turin, and communicate towards Mount Cenis with general Thureau, and imagined he could make head against him, by destroying the bridges and disputing the passage of the Po with about thirty thousand men. He had thus the hope that he should be able to defend himself on this line, without making the double sacrifice of the positions occupied on the Var, and the advantages obtained before Genoa. In consequence, Mélas united general Haddick, who had returned from the valley of Aosta, general Kaim before posted at the outlet of Susa, the ten thousand men he had himself brought from Nice, with a new detachment from the Var, thus forming, together, a force of thirty thousand men, and, thinking the French were not more numerous, he trusted to dispute with this number, the river which separated the two armies.

The first consul did not seek to destroy this new illusion of his enemy, and leaving him to employ himself towards Turin, in this partial concentration of his forces, fell back suddenly himself upon Milan. Lannes, who was apparently about to ascend the Po in order to march from Chivasso upon Turin, on the contrary suddenly descended the river. He advanced by Crescentino and Trino on Pavia, where the Austrians possessed immense magazines of provisions, ammunition, and artillery, and still more the most important of their communications, for it commanded at the same time the passage of the Po and the Tessino. Murat marched by Verceil on the point of Buffalora. The whole army followed the general movement upon Milan. On the 31st of May it arrived at the Tessino. This river is large and deep; there were no boats to pass over; and on the opposite side a numerous cavalry appeared, belonging to the corps of Wukassowich, which guarded the Simplon and that part of the opening of the Alps. Behind the Tessino ran the Naviglio-Grande, a broad canal which crosses the country as far as Milan. This canal for some distance runs a parallel course with the river from which it branches, and approximates to it very closely. The enemy's cavalry, cooped up on a narrow tongue of land between the Tessino and the canal, was extremely confined in its movements, and could scarcely make use of its strength. The adjutant-general Girard took some of the small boats which the peasantry of the vicinity had concealed near Galiate, with which they were desirous of furnishing the army, crossed with a few troops, and fell upon the Austrian advance-guard. Successively reinforced by these boats, which were kept continually passing and repassing, and supported by the fire of the artillery, the general repulsed the cavalry, which dared not advance upon a ground so unfavourable, and obliged it to repass the Naviglio-Grande at a place called the bridge of Turbigo. Thus he cleared at once the Naviglio and Tessino. But general Wukassowich brought up Laudon's infantry-brigade, and attempted to penetrate into the village of Turbigo. The adjutant-general Girard had but a few hundred men to oppose to this force. He defended himself for

several successive hours with great spirit and courage, finally succeeding in saving the bridge of Turbigo, the loss of which might have thrown the French on this side of the Naviglio-Grande, and perhaps of the Tessino itself. While he thus gallantly defended himself, general Monnier, who had contrived to cross a little below, came to his aid, fell upon the troops of Laudon, and drove them from Turbigo. The line which was to check the French army was thus passed at the cost of a simple skirmish of the advance-guard.

The next day, the 1st of June, or 12th Prairial, Boudet's division crossed near Buffalora, and the whole army advanced upon Milan. Wukassowich, fearful of being entrapped between the main army while advancing in Lombardy, and the corps of Moncey descending from the St. Gothard, retired with great haste, and commanded Dedovich's brigade, which was at the foot of the mountains, to fall back behind the Adda at Cassano. He himself went to seek shelter behind the Adda by Milan and Lodi, after leaving a garrison of two thousand eight hundred men in the citadel of Milan.

There was now nothing to impede the progress of the French army. It could enter freely into the capital of Lombardy, which had groaned for above a year under the yoke of the Austrians. Thus far the unhappy Italians had heard of nothing but the successes of Mélas and the distress of the French. Caricatures of the army of reserve had been circulated in Milan as well as in London and Vienna. They represented it as a rabble of boys and old men, armed with sticks, mounted upon asses, and having for their artillery a couple of blunderbusses. At the same time the derision of the French republic, inoffensive enough, was thus poured out, the Italians were the victims of grievous oppression. All the men in Lombardy, any way distinguished by talents or fortune, were imprisoned or exiled, particularly if they had been at all concerned in the affairs of the Cisalpine republic. It was not a little remarkable that the persecution fell less heavily upon the infuriated patriots who corresponded with the French Jacobins, than upon moderate men, whose examples might be more catching among the people. Excepting a few who were the creatures of the Austrian government, and some of the nobles attached to the oligarchy, every body sighed for the return of the French. Yet for this they could scarcely venture to hope, particularly when they saw Mélas advanced so far in Liguria, so near the capture of Genoa and the passage of the Var, and the first consul so occupied, at least as far as appearances went, with the dangers of the invasion which threatened France upon the side of the Rhine. A report had been circulated among the people, that Bonaparte, so well-known in Italy, had died in Egypt; that, a new Pharaoh, he had been engulfed in the Red Sea; and that he who figured in Paris, bearing the same name, was one of his brothers.

The surprise of the Italians, when they were suddenly told that a French army had shown itself at Ivréa, may be easily divined; that it was issuing forth below that town, that it was in march for the Tessino; and, lastly, that it had passed that river. It may be imagined what agitation prevailed in Milan! The affirmations, the contradictions, that for forty-eight hours succeeded each other; and, last of all, the delight that appeared when the news was confirmed by the presence of Bonaparte himself, marching with his staff at the head of the advance-guard. On the 2nd of June, or the 13th Prairial, the entire population came out to meet the French army, and recognise the illustrious general, whom they had so often seen within their walls, welcoming him in transports of enthusiasm, and receiving him like a saviour from heaven. The feelings of the Italians, always lively and demonstrative, had never broken out with such force, because so many circumstances had never, until now, concurred to render the joy of the people so quick and deep. The French general, on entering Milan, hastened to open the prisons, and to restore the government of the country to the friends of France. He gave a provisional administration to the Cisalpine republic, and composed it of the most respected men. Still faithful to the same principles in Italy to which he adhered in France, he would neither allow violence nor re-action; and in restoring the power to the Italians of his own party, he did not permit them to exercise it against those who were of the contrary side.

After having thus first taken care of the Milanese, he made haste to push out columns in every direction, on the lakes, on the Adda, and on the Po, so as to extend the rising in favour of the French, seize the enemy's magazines, cut off their communications, and shut up every road in their retreat. Up to this point every thing went well, as Lannes, who had been ordered upon Pavia, had entered that town on the 1st of June, and carried off immense magazines. This general found in Pavia, the Austrian hospitals, a large store of grain, forage, ammunition, arms, and especially three hundred pieces of cannon, one-half being field-pieces. He was able also to procure thence many materials for making bridges, which the pontoon companies, who had been started off without *matériel*, could usefully employ on the Po. The division of Chabran, which had been left before the fort of Bard, captured it on the 1st of June, and found there eighteen pieces of cannon. General Chabran, leaving a garrison there, as well as at Ivréa, went on to occupy the course of the Po from the Dora Baltea to the Sesia, beyond which point to Pavia it was occupied by Lannes.

The corps of general de Béthencourt, which had marched from the Simplon, took up a position before Arona, towards the point of Lago Maggiore. The Italian legion was despatched from Brescia to follow up the Austrians who were retreating in all haste. At the same time the Duhesme and Loison divisions passed the Adda, and appeared at Lodi, Crema, and Pizzighittone. General Wukassowich, giving up all pretence of guarding the Adda, retreated behind the Mincio, under the cannon of Mantua.

There was nothing to check the progress of general Moncey, always excepting the difficulty of finding subsistence in the barren valleys of upper Switzerland. His first columns were just making their appearance, but it was necessary to wait some days yet for the others, and this, as things stood, was a most convenient point, for it became important to press on, lest Genoa should fall into the hands of the Austrians. Bonaparte was now certain

of bringing all his columns together, with the exception of one only, that of general Thureau, which, in entrenchment at the fort of mount Cenis, was unable to proceed. In all other respects, the army was strongly posted in the centre of the Milanese, having its retreat assured by mount Cenis, the St. Bernard, the Simplon, and St. Gothard, in possession of the Adda, the Tessino, and the Po, victualled from the magazines of the Austrians, whom it cut off on every road, and could bring to a decisive engagement, after which they would have no other resource, if beaten, than to lay down their arms. The surrender of Genoa, if it took place, would be a vexatious circumstance; vexatious, first, because of the brave army who were its defenders, and secondly, because the body of Austrians engaged at present in the siege would not fail to re-inforce Mélas, and so render more arduous the great battle which was to put an end to the campaign. But if Bonaparte carried off the victory, Genoa and Italy were reconquered at the same blow. Nevertheless he placed a high value on the preservation of Genoa; but there was scarcely a hope of assembling the corps of Moncey before the 5th or 6th June, and no one could flatter himself that Genoa would hold out to that time.

Mélas, whom the last news had thoroughly enlightened, and who saw his adversary entering into Milan and joining all his columns as they successively came down from the Alps, now comprehended the vast plan which had been projected against him. To increase his misfortune, he just now received intelligence of the ill-fortune of Kray, and his retreat upon Ulm. He threw away at once his system of half measures, and issued imperative orders to general Elsnitz to abandon the bridge of the Var, and to general Ott to give up the siege of Genoa, and concentrate both their forces at Alexandria. It was in this that Bonaparte had placed his hope for the safety of Genoa. But it was fated that the noble and unfortunate army of Liguria should pay to the last, with its blood, its sufferings, and finally with the mortification of a surrender, for the triumphs of the army of reserve.

Masséna to the last supported his great reputation. "He will make us eat his very boots," said the soldiers, "before he surrenders." When the butchers' meat was consumed, they ate their horses, and when these had gone they fed upon animals the most unclean. The sorry bread, made of oats and beans, had been already devoured. From the 23d May, or 3d Prairial, Masséna had collected the starch, linseed, and cacao which were in the magazines of Genoa, and caused them to be made into a bread, which the soldiers could hardly swallow, and very few digest. Nearly all of them crowded into the hospitals. The people, reduced to soup of herbs for their only aliment, experienced all the agonies of famine. The streets were strewed with the bodies of men dying from inanition, and emaciated women, who exposed to charity the children whom they could no longer nourish. A spectacle of another kind created terror in the city and the army; it was that of the numerous prisoners whom Masséna had made, and to whom he had no food to give. He was not inclined to dismiss them on their parole, since he had seen those to whom he did so again appear in the ranks of the enemy. He proposed to general Ott, and then to admiral Keith, to furnish the provisions necessary for their daily consumption, on his giving his word of honour that they should not be misapplied for the support of the garrison. The word of such a man might certainly have been taken; but so inveterate were the enemy, that they resolved to impose upon Masséna the charge of supporting his prisoners. The enemy's generals had thus the barbarity to condemn their soldiers to the horrible sufferings of famine, for the purpose of augmenting the dearth in Genoa by leaving him some thousand more mouths to provide for. Masséna supplied these prisoners with the herb-soup which he gave the inhabitants; but this was not sufficient for robust men accustomed to the plenty of the rich plains of Italy. They were continually on the point of breaking out into revolt; and to prevent any fear of this, Masséna had them shut up in the old hulks of some vessels, which he placed in the middle of the port, and on which a numerous artillery was constantly pointed, in readiness to pour forth death. These wretched men kept uttering a hideous howling, which deeply moved the population of the city, even in the midst of their own sufferings.

The number of our soldiers each day diminished. They might be seen expiring in the streets; and such was their weakness, as to render it necessary to allow them to sit while mounting guard. The Genoese were too discouraged to perform any longer the duties of a national guard, believing that they would be compromised, as the Austrians would soon restore the aristocratic party. From time to time vague rumours gave token that the despair of the inhabitants was about to break out; and to prevent an explosion, the principal places were occupied by battalions with loaded cannon.

Masséna imposed awe on the people and the army by his imperturbable attitude. The respect which this hero inspired—eating the vile bread of the soldiers, living with them under the fire of the enemy, and enduring, besides their physical sufferings, with undaunted firmness the anxieties of his command—the respect which he inspired controlled all men; and in the midst of desolated Genoa he exercised the ascendancy of a great mind.

Yet a feeling of hope still supported the besieged. Several aids-de-camp from the general, by efforts the most courageous, had passed the enemy's lines, and brought in news. Colonels Reille, Franceschi, and Ortigoni had passed in and given information: at one time that the first consul was on his way; at another, that he was passing the Alps; one of them, Franceschi, had left him descending the St. Bernard. But since the 20th of May there had been no more news. Ten or twelve days passed in such a situation appeared like ages, and men began to ask in despair, how it could be possible, that in ten days Bonaparte had not crossed the space between the Alps and the Apennines. "They knew the man," they said; "and by that time he was either victor or vanquished; if he had not arrived, it was because he had failed in this daring enterprise. If he had succeeded in coming out upon Italy, he would have already pounced upon the Austrian general, and forced him from the walls of Genoa." Others asserted that Bonaparte had regarded the army of Liguria in the light of a corps to be sacrificed to a

grand operation; that all he wanted was to detain Mélas on the Apennines; and that, this effected, he gave himself no further care to raise the siege, but marched on to carry out grander objects. "Well," added the Genoese, and our soldiers also, "we have been sacrificed to the glory of France: so be it; but now that object is attained, are we to die to the last man? If it were in battle, with arms in our hands, we should give death a welcome; but of famine, of sickness,—we cannot bear it! The time has come for a surrender." Many of the soldiers in their desperation went so far as to break their muskets. About the same time information was given of a conspiracy of several persons who were irritated by suffering. Masséna addressed them in a fine proclamation, in which he reminded them that the duties of a soldier consist as much in the endurance of privations and of sufferings, as in the braving of danger; he also pointed out to them the example of their officers, who ate the same food, and were killed or wounded each day at their head. He told them that the first consul was advancing with an army to their deliverance, and that to capitulate now would be to lose in one instant the result of two months of exertion and devotion. "A few days more, perhaps a few hours," said he, "and you will be delivered, and have rendered eminent service to your country."

Accordingly, at every sound, every echo in the air, they thought they heard the cannon of Bonaparte, and ran towards it with enthusiasm. One day they persuaded themselves of the sound of cannon at the Bocchetta; a madness of joy broke out on all sides. Masséna himself went to the ramparts. Vain illusion! it was the sound of a storm in the gorges of the Apennines, and they relapsed into a still deeper depression.

At last, on the 4th June, there remained no more than two ounces for each man of the wretched bread, made of starch and cacao. The place must be surrendered; for it was impossible to reduce our unfortunate soldiers to devouring each other, and there was thus, in the actual impossibility of subsisting, an inevitable limit to the resistance. Moreover, the army had a feeling that it had done all that could be expected from its bravery. It felt an internal conviction, that it was no longer covering the Thermopylæ of France, but that it was subservient to a manœuvre which must, at the time, have either succeeded or failed. It began to suspect, in addition, that the first consul thought more of extending his combinations than of affording them succour. In these sentiments Masséna shared, though he did not avow them; but he regarded his duty as not entirely completed until he had reached the last possible limit of resistance. When these two miserable ounces of bread which remained for each man were consumed, he was forced to surrender. He resigned himself to this at last with bitter sorrow.

General Ott sent a flag of truce to him; for the Austrians were as much pressed to terminate the siege as the French themselves. Ott had received the most peremptory orders to raise the siege and fall back upon Alexandria. These offers coming from an enemy, some historians say, ought to have opened the eyes of Masséna. There is no doubt that the general knew if he waited a day or two more he might perchance be relieved, but those two days were not at his disposal. "Only give me," he said to the Genoese, "two days' provision—only one day's—and I shall save you from the yoke of the Austrians,—I shall save my army, too, from the mortification of surrendering."

At last, on the 3rd of June, Masséna was obliged to negotiate. His enemies spoke of a capitulation, but he rejected the proposal in such a manner as did not allow them to renew it. He would have for his army the permission to retire freely, with arms and baggage, their colours flying; he would be at liberty to commence active service the moment he should have passed beyond the lines of the besieging army. "If this cannot be," said Masséna to the Austrians, "I will sally from Genoa, sword in hand, with my eight thousand famished men, I will come to your camp, and will fight until I shall force my way through." The Austrians then permitted the garrison to march out, but desired that their commander should himself remain a prisoner, fearing lest, with such a leader, the garrison proceeding from Genoa to Savona might unite itself with the troops of Suchet, and then make a formidable attack upon the rear of Mélas. To tranquillize the indignation such a wish must excite, they stated to him the motive of the condition, which was in every way so honourable to himself. He would not listen to it: they then insisted that the garrison should retire by sea, that it might not have time to join the corps of Suchet; to this he still replied that he would cut his way through them. At last they agreed to suffer eight thousand men to depart by land, or, in other words, all who were not too enfeebled to support the weight of their arms. The convalescent were to be successively embarked and conveyed to the head-quarters of general Suchet. There were left behind four thousand sick, whom the Austrians agreed to supply with provisions, to take care of, and restore to the French army. Of these general Miollis was left in the command. Masséna also stipulated, in behalf of the Genoese, that none should be molested for the expression of opinions exhibited during the French occupation of the city, and that persons and property should be faithfully respected. A distinguished citizen of Genoa, M. Corvetto, subsequently minister of France, was admitted to the conferences, that he might witness the efforts made in favour of his countrymen. Masséna wished to obtain for them the existing form of government, for which they were beholden to the French revolution, but on this head the Austrian generals refused to concede any thing. "Very well," replied Masséna, "do as you please; but before fifteen days are past, I assure you that I shall again return to Genoa;" a prophetic speech, to which an Austrian officer, M. St. Julien, made the delicate and noble reply: "You will leave in this place, general, men whom you have taught how to defend it."

The definitive conference took place on the morning of the 4th of June, in a chapel at the bridge of Cornegliano. The article which provided that a part of the army should retire by land gave place to a last difficulty. Masséna leaving the Austrian generals the alternative to consent to what he desired, or to expect a desperate battle the next day, they gave up the point. It was stipulated that this convention of evacuation, from which the word

capitulation had been carefully excluded, should be carried into effect the same evening. The officers of the Austrian forces, struck with admiration for the French general, showed him marks of the highest respect and attention.

Evening came; Masséna still felt reluctant to sign, indulging to the last moment the hope of deliverance. At last, when without breaking his word it was impossible to avoid doing so, he set his signature to the document. On the morrow the French troops marched out with general Gazan at their head, and found rations provided for them at the advanced posts. Masséna embarked in order to reach the head-quarters of Suchet more expeditiously. He left Genoa in a vessel carrying the tricoloured flag, and within reach of the guns of the English squadron.

Thus finished this memorable siege, during which the French army distinguished itself by such important services and such distinguished victories. This army had taken more prisoners and killed more of the enemy than the amount of its own numbers. With fifteen thousand men, more than eighteen thousand Austrians had been killed or taken. It had more particularly destroyed the confidence of the imperial army in itself, and constrained it to make continual and extraordinary efforts. But at what cost did the brave garrison of Genoa perform all these things! Of fifteen thousand soldiers it had lost three thousand killed; four thousand were lightly or severely wounded; eight thousand only remained fit for service. The second in command, general Soult, remained in the hands of the enemy with a broken leg. Out of three generals of division, one had died of an epidemic disease, general Marbot; another, general Gazan, was severely wounded: out of six generals of brigade, four were wounded, Gardanne, Petitot, Fressinet, and Arnaud: of twelve adjutants-general, six were wounded, one taken, and one killed. Two officers of the staff were killed, seven taken, and fourteen wounded; eleven colonels out of seventeen were killed or made prisoners, and three-fourths of the officers had met the same fate. Thus it may be seen that it was by giving an example of their own devotion that the leaders of this brave army supported it in the midst of such severe trials. It proved how worthy it was of those who led it; the French soldier never on any occasion displaying greater constancy or heroism. Let there be honour, then, given to that unfortunate courage which, by a devotedness without limit, contributed to the triumph of that more successful courage, the exploits of which it will be our province to recount.

While thus urged to raise the siege of Genoa, and while general Ott was granting to Masséna the honourable conditions just recounted, general Elsnitz, recalled by the order of Mélas, abandoned the bridge of the Var. The Austrian attacks upon this point had been tardy, because their heavy artillery had been long on the passage. Attempts had been successively made on the 22nd and 27th of May to carry this object. The last attack was a despairing effort on the part of general Elsnitz, who was desirous before he retreated not to spare any efforts. These attacks were bravely repulsed; and general Elsnitz, knowing he had no chance of success, began to think of crossing the mountains. Suchet, judging promptly and rightly the intentions of the Austrian general, made his arrangements so as not to permit him to retire in security. He saw plainly enough, that by manœuvring with his left wing along the mountains, he could place the Austrians in a perilous situation, and probably might be able to cut off from them some of their detachments. In fact, beyond the line of the Var which had stopped the invaders, the line of the Roya ran in a parallel, the source of which river is in the Col de Tende itself. If the French went beyond the Var, and preceded the Austrians at the sources of the Roya, they would oblige them to avoid the Col de Tende, and force them to move along the coast of the Apennines to find a passage. This happy idea, vigorously executed, was productive to general Suchet of the happiest results. He began by dispossessing general Gorupp of Ronciglione; then continuing to march rapidly by his left on the right of the Austrians thus shaken, he took in succession the Col de Rauss, which affords a passage from the valley of the Var into that of the Roya, the famous camp of Mille Fourches; and being master of the Col de Tende, found himself on the 1st of June upon the line of retreat of general Elsnitz. General Gorupp, thrown in confusion upon the Upper Roya, had yet time to gain the Col de Tende, but left on the way a number of dead and of prisoners. General Elsnitz, with the rest of his army, had no other resource than to follow the turn of the maritime Apennines as far as Oneglia, and to return by Pieva and St. Jacobo into the valley of Tanaro. He had to traverse frightful mountains with troops already demoralized by this kind of flight, and having close behind him an enemy full of joy at passing from the defensive to the offensive. During five entire days the Austrians were pursued without intermission, receiving continual checks. At length, on the 6th of June, general Elsnitz arrived at Ormea, his force not numbering more than ten thousand men. On the 7th he was at Ceva, and general Gorupp had retired upon Coni with a very weak division. The loss sustained by the Austrian forces since they left the Var was considered to be not less than ten thousand men.

General Suchet, so long separated from Masséna, found him once more in the environs of Savona. The twelve thousand French from the Var, united with those from Genoa, eight thousand in number, composed a body of twenty thousand men, very well placed for falling upon the rear of Mélas. But Masséna had received upon landing a very severe wound, so that he was unable to mount his horse; the eight thousand men who were with him were worn out with fatigue; and it must be admitted, that all the defenders of Genoa felt a secret irritation against the first consul, who was known to have been triumphant in Milan, while the army of Liguria was so reduced as to be obliged to capitulate. Masséna was not willing that general Suchet should run the risk of a descent into Italy, while in ignorance of the movements about to be made beyond the Apennines by the two generals opposed to each other. Mélas, joined by his lieutenants, Haddick, Kaim, Elsnitz, and Ott, at the head of a very formidable force, might fling himself upon general Suchet, and crush him before he went to engage Bonaparte. Masséna,

therefore, permitted Suchet, his lieutenant, to pass the Apennines, and place himself in advance of Acqui, but to remain in that position, observing, disquieting the Austrian army, and hanging over its head like the sword of Damocles. It will presently be seen what service the army of Liguria rendered merely by its presence on the summit of the Apennines.

Masséna thought, this brave army, in terminating by a menacing movement the memorable defence of Genoa, had done enough for the triumph of the first consul; and that without great imprudence it could do no more. This great soldier was correct. He had delivered over to Bonaparte the exhausted Austrians reduced one-third. Of seventy thousand men who had passed the Apennines, there returned no more than forty thousand, including the detachment brought back to Turin by Mélas. The fifty thousand that remained in Lombardy were much reduced, and dispersed about. Generals Haddick and Kaim, who guarded the one the valley of Aosta, the other that of Suza, had sustained considerable losses. General Wukassowich, thrown beyond the Mincio, and separated from his commander-in-chief by the French army which descended from Mount St. Bernard, was paralyzed for the rest of the campaign. A corps of some thousand men had ventured into Tuscany. By uniting at once with the troops of generals Haddick and Kaim, who were coming from the valleys of Aosta and Suza, those of generals Elsnitz and Ott, who were returning from the banks of the Var, Mélas might form a body of seventy-five thousand men. But it was necessary to leave garrisons in the fortresses of Piedmont and Liguria, such as Genoa, Savona, Gavi, Acqui, Coni, Turin, Alexandria, and Tortona. There would remain to him after this no more than fifty thousand men, a thousand or two more perhaps to place in line on the day of battle, if it be supposed that he did not sacrifice too many to keep the fortresses, and that the generals formed a junction without accident.

The situation of the Austrian general, therefore, was very critical, even after the surrender of Genoa. It was so not only by reason of the dispersion and diminution of his forces, but under the aspect of the route he must follow to get clear of the confined limits of Piedmont in which Bonaparte had enclosed him. He would be obliged to cross the Po in the face of the French, and to regain, by traversing Lombardy, which they occupied, the great road of the Tyrol, or of Friuli. The difficulty was enormous, from the presence of an adversary who excelled in war principally in the art of great movements.

Mélas had preserved the Upper Po from the source as far as Valenza. It was easy for him to cross that river at Turin, Chivasso, Casale, or Valenza, it was no matter which; but in passing at one of these points he would fall upon the Tessino, which was occupied by Bonaparte, and upon Milan, the centre of all the French forces. He had but little chance for an escape in that direction. He might still incline to his right in order to proceed towards the lower part of the Po; in other words, to march on Piacenza and Cremona in order to gain the great road to Mantua. If he did thus, Piacenza would become for both the contending parties the grand point to occupy. For Mélas it was almost the only way of escape from the Caudine Forks; for Bonaparte it would be the means of gathering up the price of his audacious march across the Alps. If Bonaparte suffered the Austrians to escape, though he had delivered Piedmont, the result would be little, compared to the perils which he had braved: he would even incur ridicule in the eyes of Europe, that were so attentive to this campaign, since his manœuvre, the intention of which was at present so manifest, would be defeated. Piacenza was consequently the key of Piedmont. It was necessary equally for him who wanted to get out of that country, and for him who desired to shut up his enemy there.

Under these motions Mélas fixed two points for the concentration of his troops; Alexandria, for the troops stationed in Upper Piedmont, and Piacenza, for those that were in the vicinity of Genoa. He commanded generals Kaim and Haddick to march from Turin by Asti upon Alexandria; general Elsnitz, retiring from the banks of the Var, was to proceed by Ceva and Cherasco. These three corps, when united, were to march from Alexandria to Piacenza. General Ott, returning from Genoa, was ordered to descend directly by the Bocchetta and Tortona to Piacenza. A body of infantry, disembarrassed of all the incumbrances of a military body, was ordered to proceed more directly still by the route of the Bobbio, which runs along the valley of the Trebia. Lastly, general O'Reilly, who was already about Alexandria with a strong detachment of cavalry, received instructions not to wait for the concentration of the troops of Upper Piedmont, but to go to Piacenza at the utmost speed of his horses. The small corps which had ventured into Tuscany was commanded to repair to the same place through the duchy of Parma, and by the route of Fiorenzuola. Thus as the principal part of the Austrian army was concentrating itself at Alexandria, to march from thence to Piacenza, the corps nearest to that place had orders to march thither immediately on a direct line.

It was doubtful whether it could be possible to anticipate Bonaparte in so important an object. He had lost five or six days in Milan, to wait for the troops coming by the St. Gothard; a time most valuable, seeing that in the interval Genoa had surrendered. But now that general Moncey, with the troops drawn from the army of Germany, had passed the St. Gothard, he was not to lose another moment. Placed on the road of the couriers that came from Vienna to Mélas at Turin, and from Mélas at Turin to the imperial government, he had become well acquainted with all the ideas of the court of Vienna. He had read, for example, singular despatches, in which M. de Thugut reassured the Austrian general, recommending him to be easy in mind, and not to be turned aside from his objects by the fable of the army of reserve; to take Genoa as quickly as possible, as well as the line of the Var, that he might be able to spare a detachment for the aid of marshal Kray, driven back upon Ulm. Bonaparte had also read the despatches of Mélas, at first brimful of confidence, and soon afterwards of anxiety and inquietude. The pleasure he felt at this news was troubled, when he found on the 8th of June, through this same correspondence, that Masséna had

been obliged to surrender Genoa on the 4th. This intelligence, however, did not change in any thing the plan of the campaign. Having fixed to get into the rear of the enemy, in order to envelope him and make him lay down his arms, Italy and the city of Genoa would be reconquered at a single blow. The real inconvenience that arose from the surrender of Genoa was the setting free the troops of general Ott, whom he should have in addition to contend with. But the intercepted despatch carried with it the consolation that Masséna's forces were not prisoners of war. So that if on one part a more considerable body of Austrian troops were about to descend from the Apennines; on the other, the French troops, on which he could not at first calculate, were to descend too at the heels of the Austrians.

Now that Genoa had fallen, the first consul was in a less hurry to encounter Mélas. But he was extraordinarily pressed to occupy the line of the Po from Pavia as far as Piacenza and Cremona; he therefore made his dispositions with as much activity as Mélas, in order to possess himself of points of such importance. While he was occupied at Milan in collecting the troops which had come from the different points of the Alps, he placed upon the Po the forces which had come with him by the St. Bernard. Lannes had already taken possession of Pavia with Watrin's division. That general was ordered to pass the Po a little below its union with the Tessino, or, what is the same thing, at Belgiojoso. Murat, with the divisions of Boudet and Monnier, had orders to pass at Piacenza; Duhesme, with the division of Loison, to cross at Cremona.

On the 6th of June, Lannes, having assembled at Pavia on the Tessino all the disposable boats, brought them into the Po, and on arriving between Belgiojoso and San Cipriano commenced the passage. General Watrin, who was placed under his orders, crossed with a detachment. He was no sooner arrived on the right bank than he was attacked by the Austrians which had come from Valenza and Alexandria, and were hastening to Piacenza. He was in danger of being thrown into the river, but he held firm until the boats, passing and repassing, brought him reinforcements, and he remained at last master of the field. The remainder of Watrin's division, led by Lannes, passed the Po afterwards, and took a position a little further on, menacing the high road from Alexandria to Piacenza.

Murat arrived before Piacenza the same day. All the Austrian stores, guarded by some hundreds of men, together with the different army administrators, were in the town. On the approach of danger the Austrian commander there ordered cannon to be planted at the head of the bridge on the left bank of the Po, and endeavoured to defend himself until the troops, which were advancing from all sides, should arrive to his support. The advanced guard of Monnier's division, which conceived it was moving upon an undefended position, was received with a horrible fire of grape-shot, and could make no impression on the post by a front attack. The further attempt upon it in form was postponed until the next day.

On the 7th of June, the following day, general O'Reilly, who had received orders from Mélas to ride full speed to Piacenza, arrived with his cavalry. The other Austrian corps, that which ascended from Parma by Fiorenzuola, that which descended with general Gottesheim by Bobbio, and that which was coming with general Ott by Tortona, were not yet arrived. General O'Reilly was scarcely equal with his squadron alone to defend Piacenza. The few hundreds of men who had offered resistance at the head of the bridge had lost one-fourth of their strength. Under these circumstances the Austrian commandant ordered the artillery to be taken away, and the bridge, which was of boats, to be divided; thus when general Boudet attempted to remedy his repulse of the day preceding, he found the work at the bridge head evacuated and the bridge destroyed. A part of the boats of which it had been constructed yet remained. Murat took possession of these, and made use of them for transporting Monnier's brigade to the other side of the Po, at Nocetto, a little lower down, by repeated trips across. This brigade then attacked Piacenza, and got in after a sharp contest. General O'Reilly retrograded in haste, that he might be in time to save the park of artillery in its way from Alexandria; because if it came on to Piacenza, it would be in danger of falling into the hands of the French. He proceeded with such speed as to effect his object, and thus prevented the park from getting into the possession of Murat or Lannes. He had to make more than one charge of cavalry against the advanced troops of Lannes, which had passed the Po at Belgiojoso; but he disengaged himself from it, and giving counter-orders to the park, it sought refuge in Tortona. While general O'Reilly, almost untouched in passing through the French advanced posts, was on his way to Alexandria, the advanced guard of general Gottesheim, which had descended the Trebia by Bobbio, appeared before Piacenza. It was the regiment of Klebeck which thus came upon Boudet's entire division, and was severely handled. This unlucky regiment, attacked by superior numbers, lost a good many prisoners, and fell back in disorder upon Gottesheim's principal corps, of which it was in advance. General Gottesheim, taking alarm at this rencontre, ascended the slope of the Apennines in great haste, in order to reach Tortona and Alexandria, which caused him to lose his way for several days. Lastly, the regiment returning from Tuscany, by the route of Parma and Fiorenzuola, arrived the same day in the suburbs of Piacenza. Here happened another rout of a detached corps, which fell on a sudden into the midst of an enemy's army, and was repulsed in disorder upon the road to Parma. Of four corps, three which marched upon Piacenza, those the least important, it is true, had been overthrown, had fled, and left prisoners behind them. The fourth, that of general Ott, having a longer circuit to march, was still behind, and was about to encounter Lannes in front of Belgiojoso, near Pavia. From this time the French were masters of the Po, and had in their possession the two principal passages of Belgiojoso, near Pavia, and that of Piacenza itself. They very soon too got possession of a third; for on the following day, general Duhesme, at the head of Loison's division, took Cremona from a detachment that general Wukassovich had left in retiring.

He took two thousand prisoners and a good many military stores.

Bonaparte directed all these operations from Milan. He had sent Berthier to the banks of the Po; and day by day, often hour after hour, he prescribed, in a continual correspondence, the movements to be executed.

Though he was master of the line of retreat that Mélas would most probably be tempted to follow, in possessing himself of the Po from Pavia to Piacenza, still all was not yet considered, since that which made the route of Piacenza the true line of retreat for the Austrians, was the presence of the French behind the Tessino and around Milan. The French, in fact, from their position, shut up close the passage which the Austrians would have been able to open in crossing the Po between Pavia and Valenza; but if now the French, for the purpose of going to meet Mélas, crossed the Po between Pavia and Piacenza, and thus abandoned Milan and weakened the Tessino, they might again tempt Mélas to cross at Turin, at Casale, or at Valenza, traverse our undefended rear, enter the city of Milan itself, and serve the French just as they had served him in descending from the Alps.

It was not impossible either for Mélas, determining to sacrifice a part of his baggage and his heavy artillery, which indeed he might leave in the fortresses of Piedmont, to retire upon Genoa, then again remounting by Tortona and Novi, as far as the Bocchetta, and there throwing himself into the valley of the Trebia, to fall upon the Po below Piacenza, in the vicinity of Cremona or Parma, and thus reach Mantua and the Austrian states by a round-about way. This march across Liguria, and along the projections of the Apennines, was the same as that which had been marked out for general Gottesheim, and was the least likely to be attempted, because it offered extraordinary difficulties, and would cost the sacrifice of a good deal of the *matériel* of the army; but it was still possible, strictly speaking, and it was needful therefore to provide against its execution, as well as against other plans. The entire attention of Bonaparte was now employed against these chances. There is not perhaps in all history an example of dispositions more able, more profoundly conceived, than those which he devised upon this decisive occasion.

It was necessary, to resolve this triple problem, to close by a barrier of iron the principal road, or that which goes directly from Alexandria to Piacenza; to occupy that which, by passing along the Upper Po, falls upon the Tessino in such a mode as to be able to hasten there in case it be requisite; lastly, to have the power of descending in time upon the Lower Po, if the Austrians, seeking to fly by the reverse side of the Apennines, should try to cross that river below Piacenza, towards Cremona or Parma. Bonaparte meditating incessantly over the map of Italy, to find a point where all these three conditions might be fulfilled, made a choice worthy of high admiration.

If the direction of the Apennine chain be examined, it will be seen that in virtue of the curve that it forms to embrace the gulf of Genoa, it remounts to the northward, and throws out buttresses, which approach to the Po very closely, from the position of Stradella to the vicinity of Piacenza. In all this part of Piedmont and of the duchy of Parma, the base of the heights advances so near the river, as to leave a narrow place only for the high road to Piacenza. An army stationed in advance of Stradella, at the entrance of a sort of defile many leagues in length, the left to the heights, the centre on the road, and the right along the Po and the marshy ground on its bank, would be difficult to dislodge. It must be added, that the road is thickly strewn with hamlets and villages, built of stone and capable of resisting cannon. Against the imperial forces, strong in cavalry and artillery, this position, independently of its natural advantages, afforded that of rendering null those two military arms.

It had yet other peculiar advantages. It is near this position that the tributary streams on the other side of the Po, the most important to occupy, such as the Tessino and the Adda, form their junction. Thus the Tessino falls into the Po a little below Pavia, and above Belgiojoso, nearly opposite to Stradella, or, at most, not more than two leagues off. The Adda, running beyond a long way before it unites with the Po, falls into that river between Piacenza and Cremona. It will be at once understood, that placed at Stradella, and master of the bridges of Belgiojoso, of Piacenza, and Cremona, Bonaparte would be in possession of the most decisive points; because he would thus bar the principal road, or that from Alexandria to Piacenza, and he would at the same time have it in his power, by a long march, either to hasten to the Tessino, or to redescend the Po as far as Cremona, and to fly towards the Adda, which covered his rear against the corps of Wukassowich.

It was in this sort of net, formed by the Apennines, the Po, the Tessino, and the Adda, that he distributed his forces. He at first resolved to proceed to Stradella himself, with the thirty thousand best soldiers of his army, the divisions of Watrin, Chambarlhac, Gardanne, Boudet, and Monnier, placed under Murat, Victor, and Lannes, in the position already described, the left to the mountains, the centre on the great road, and the right along the Po. The division of Chabran, which came by the Little St. Bernard, and was first ordered to occupy Ivréa, was afterwards ordered to Verceil, but commanded to retreat upon the Tessino in case of the approach of the enemy. Lapoype's division, which descended the St. Gothard, was posted upon the Tessino itself, in the environs of Pavia. These numbered from nine thousand to ten thousand men, who were to fall back one upon the other, to dispute the passage of the Tessino to the last, and thus afford Bonaparte one day to come to their assistance. The detachment of the Simplon, under general Béthencourt, guarded the route of the St. Gothard towards the Arona, the retreat of the French army in case of a reverse. The division of Gilly was to guard Milan, rendered necessary by the presence of an Austrian garrison in the citadel. There were three or four thousand men appropriated to this double purpose. Finally, the division of Loison, which made a part of the army of reserve, coming from Germany, had a commission under the orders of general Duhesme, to defend Piacenza and Cremona; there was another corps, from ten to

eleven thousand strong, employed on these two last points.

Such was the distribution of the fifty and some thousand more soldiers, which Bonaparte had at that moment at his disposal: thirty-two thousand were at the central point of Stradella; nine or ten thousand on the Tessino; three or four thousand at Milan and Arona; finally, ten or eleven thousand on the inferior course of the Po and of the Adda, all placed in such a manner as to sustain each other reciprocally with extreme promptitude. Thus in effect, on a notice from the Tessino, Bonaparte could in a day fly to the succour of the ten thousand French who guarded it. On an alarm from the Lower Po, he was able in the same space of time to descend on Piacenza and Cremona, while general Loison, in defending the passage of the river, would give him time to come to his aid. Each and all of these, on their part, could march upon Stradella, and thus reinforce Bonaparte in as small a space of time as it cost him to proceed to them.

In this case Bonaparte seemed to abandon his usual custom of concentrating his troops on the eve of an important battle. If such a concentration pass for a great performance in the art of war, when it is executed properly at the moment of a decisive action, in the circumstance of two adversaries marching one against the other, it is a different affair, one of the two being desirous of escaping, and the chief skill consisting in stopping him before fighting. Such was the case here. It was necessary that Bonaparte should extend a net around the Austrian army, and that this net should be strong enough to hold it; because if there had been on the Tessino and Lower Po advanced guards only, as most proper to give notice, but not to close a road against an enemy, the object would have wholly failed. There must be on all points posts capable at the same time of giving notice and of checking the enemy, while a principal body is retained in the centre, ready to hasten to any quarter with adequate means. It was impossible to combine with deeper art the employment of his force, and to modify more skilfully the application of his own principles, than Bonaparte did upon this occasion. It is in their manner of the application of a just but general principle according to circumstances, that we acknowledge the men of superior power in action.

The plan settled, Bonaparte issued corresponding orders. Lannes, with the division of Watrin, had been moved to Stradella by Pavia and Belgiojoso. It was of moment that Chambarlhac's, Gardanne's, Monnier's, and Boudet's divisions should support him with their strength before the Austrians, who, repulsed from Piacenza, joining general Ott towards Tortona, should be able to press upon him. This had been foreseen by Bonaparte with wonderful sagacity. Not able himself to quit Milan before the 8th, to reach Stradella by the 9th, he sent to Berthier, Lannes, and Murat the following instructions: "Concentrate at Stradella. On the 8th or 9th, at the latest, you will have fifteen or eighteen thousand Austrians on your backs coming from Genoa. Encounter and rout them. There will be so many the less to fight in the decisive battle which awaits us with the whole army of Mélas." Having issued these orders he left Milan on the 8th, to cross the Po in person, in order to be at Stradella the next day.

It was impossible to divine with more exactness the movements of the enemy. We have just before said that three Austrian detachments had uselessly shown themselves before Piacenza; that the detachment arrived from Tuscany by Fiorenzuola had been driven back; that the corps of general Gottesheim, which had descended with infantry by the valley of the Trebia, had been repulsed into that valley; finally, that general O'Reilly, hastening from Alexandria with his cavalry, had been forced to return towards Tortona. But general Ott, on his side, marching with the principal corps by the road of Genoa upon Tortona, arrived at Stradella on the 9th of June, in the morning, as had been foreseen by Bonaparte. He brought in his advance generals Gottesheim and O'Reilly, whom he had met on their retreat; and he determined in consequence to make a very vigorous attack upon Piacenza, not dreaming that the French army could be almost entirely stationed in *échelon* in the defile of Stradella. He had, counting the troops that had joined him, seventeen or eighteen thousand men. Lannes was unable to unite on the morning of the 9th more than seven or eight thousand; but in consequence of the reiterated orders of the commander-in-chief five or six thousand were to join him during the day. The field of battle was that which we have described. Lannes presented himself, with his left, on the heights of the Apennines, his centre in the high road towards the little town of Casteggio, and his right in the plains of the Po. He committed the error of proceeding a little too much in advance of Stradella towards Casteggio and Montebello, where the road ceases to form a defile owing to the extent of the plains. But the French, full of confidence, although inferior in numbers, were capable of doing great service under such a leader as Lannes, who had the art of drawing his troops any where after him.

Lannes, pushing Watrin's division upon Casteggio with vigour, drove back the advanced posts of O'Reilly. His plan was to take the hamlet of Casteggio, situated on the road before him, either by attacking it in front or turning it by the declivities of the Apennines. The numerous artillery of the Austrians, in position on the road, commanded the ground in all directions. Two battalions of the 6th light endeavoured to capture this murderous artillery by turning to the right, while the 3rd battalion of the 6th and the entire 40th tried to gain the neighbouring hills on the left; the division of Watrin marched upon Casteggio itself, where it met with the main body of the enemy. A fierce combat ensued on every point. The French were near carrying the positions they had attacked, when general Gottesheim hastened with his infantry to support O'Reilly, and overthrow the battalions which had surmounted the heights. Lannes, amidst a tremendous fire, supported his men, and prevented their yielding to numbers. Still they were on the point of giving way when the division of Chambarlhac arrived, and a part of the corps of general Victor: general Rivaud, at the head of the 43rd, climbed the heights anew, rallied the French battalions on the point of being repulsed, and, after unheard-of efforts, succeeded in maintaining him-

self. At the centre on the high road, the 96th went to the assistance of general Watrin in his attack upon Casteggio; and there the 24th, extending itself to the right on the plain, attempted to turn the enemy's left, in order to stop the fire of his artillery. During this combined effort on the wings, the gallant Watrin had to sustain an obstinate conflict in Casteggio; he took and lost the place several times. But Lannes, present every where, gave the decisive impulse. By his orders, general Rivaud on the left, having become master of the heights, crossed them, and descended in the rear of Casteggio. The troops, sent on the right into the plain, turned the place so hotly contested, and both marched to Montebello; while general Watrin, having made a last effort on the enemy's centre, broke through, and at last proceeded past Casteggio. The Austrians, finding themselves thus repulsed at all points, fled to Montebello, leaving in the hands of the French a considerable body of prisoners.

The conflict lasted from eleven o'clock in the morning until eight in the evening. The Austrians were the same troops that had besieged Genoa, and had been hardened by Masséna to the most furious fighting, as they showed by their desperation in the plains of Piedmont, when endeavouring to force their way through. They were supported by a numerous artillery, and displayed more than ordinary bravery. The first consul arrived at the moment when the battle was concluding, the time and place of which he had so well foreseen. He found Lannes covered with blood, but intoxicated with delight, and the troops overjoyed at their success. They had, as he afterwards said, the consciousness that they had admirably comported themselves. The conscripts showed that they were worthy to rival the older soldiers. Four thousand prisoners were taken, and three thousand of the enemy killed and wounded. The victory was difficult to gain, since twelve thousand combatants had to encounter eighteen thousand.

Such was the battle of Montebello, that gave to Lannes and his family the title which to this day distinguishes it among the French people,—a glorious title, that its sons may well be proud to bear.

This rencontre was a good commencement, and announced to Mélas that the road would not be easily opened to him. General Ott, weakened to the extent of seven thousand men, retired in consternation upon Alexandria. The courage of the French was now elevated to its highest point.

The first consul hastened to unite his divisions, in order to occupy the road from Alexandria to Piacenza, which it was probable Mélas would take. Lannes being too much advanced, the first consul fell back a little to the point called Stradella, because the defile, narrower in that place by the approximation of the heights to the river, renders the position more safe.

The 10th and 11th of June were passed in watching the Austrian movements, concentrating the army, giving it rest after its hasty marches, and organizing, as well as it was possible, the artillery, since, till now, no more than forty field-pieces could be reunited on the spot.

On the 11th there arrived at head-quarters one of the most distinguished generals of that period, Desaix, who, perhaps, equalled Moreau, Masséna, Kleber, or Lannes, in military talents, but in the rare perfection of his character surpassed them all. He had quitted Egypt, where Kleber had committed political errors that we shall shortly have the irksomeness of detailing. Desaix had in vain endeavoured to prevent them, and had fled to Europe to avoid the painful sight. These errors he afterwards gloriously repaired. Desaix, stopped by the English on the coast of France, had been treated by them in a disgraceful manner. He arrived full of indignation, and asked for the opportunity of avenging himself sword in hand. He loved the first consul with a sort of passion; and Bonaparte, touched by the attachment of such a noble heart, returned it in the warmest friendship which he ever felt in his life. They passed a whole night in relating to each other the events which had occurred in Egypt and France, and the first consul immediately gave him the command of the divisions of Monnier and Boudet united.

The next day, which was the 12th of June, Bonaparte was surprised to see no appearance of the Austrians, and could not help being under some apprehensions. Astonished that in such a situation Mélas should waste time and suffer every outlet to be closed against him, judging his opponent too much by his own feelings, he said that Mélas could not have wasted hours so precious, and that he must surely have made his escape, either by remounting towards Genoa, or by crossing the Upper Po under the notion of forcing the Tessino. Tired of waiting for him, he left his post at Stradella on the afternoon of the 12th, and advanced, followed by his entire army, to the height of Tortona. He ordered that fortress to be blockaded, and established his head-quarters at Voghera. On the 13th, in the morning, he passed the Scrivia, and marched forth on the immense plain which stretches between the Scrivia and the Bormida, that at the present time has no other name than the plain of Marengo. It was the very same place on which, but a few months before, his prescient imagination had represented to him a great battle with Mélas. On this plain the Po runs at a distance from the Apennines, and leaves large open spaces, across which the Bormida and Tanaro roll their waters less rapidly, mingling near Alexandria, and then flowing into the bed of the Po together. The road that skirts the foot of the Apennines as far as Tortona, separating from it at that place, turns off to the right, passing the Scrivia, and, opening on a vast level, goes across this to a first village called San Giuliano, to pass a second called Marengo; finally, it crosses the Bormida, and leads to the celebrated fortress of Alexandria. "If the enemy intended to follow the high road from Piacenza to Mantua, it is here he would wait for me," said Bonaparte to himself; "here his numerous artillery, his fine cavalry, would have great advantages, and he would fight with his united means." Making this reflection, and in order to judge of the correctness of his conjecture, he ordered his light cavalry to scour the country, but not a single Austrian soldier was seen. Towards the fall of day he sent on Victor's corps, composed of the divisions of Gardanne and Chambarlhac, as far as Marengo. A detachment of Austrians was found there, the corps of O'Reilly, which at the mo-

ment defended the village of Marengo, but immediately abandoned it and repassed the Bormida. Reconnoitring before, without proper care, it was believed that the Austrians had not passed the bridge over the Bormida.

From all these circumstances Bonaparte had no doubt, to use his own expression, "that Mélas had escaped." He would not have abandoned the plain, and, above all, the village of Marengo, which is its entrance, if he intended to give battle, and acquire by conquest the road from Alexandria to Piacenza. Cheating himself by a reflection so well founded, Bonaparte left Victor with his two divisions at Marengo; he placed Lannes in *échelon* on the plain, with the division of Watrin, and hastened to his head-quarters at Voghera, to obtain some intelligence of general Moncey, who was stationed on the Tessino, and of Duhesme on the Lower Po; and to discover whether they knew any thing of Mélas. Officers of the staff, setting out from all points, were directed to come to him at head-quarters. But the Scrivia had overflowed, and he was fortunately obliged to stay at Torre di Garofolo. The intelligence from the Tessina and Po, intelligence of the same day's date, announced that all was tranquil in that direction. Mélas had attempted nothing upon that side: what had become of him? Bonaparte thought that he had marched back to Genoa by Novi, in order to pass into the valley of the Trebia, and so fall upon Cremona. It seemed that if he were not in Alexandria, nor on the march for the Tessino, he could not have taken any other direction. It was possible that, following the example of Wurmser at Mantua, he had gone and shut himself up in Genoa, where, fed by the English, and having a garrison of fifty thousand men, he would have the means of protracting the war. These ideas had taken a strong hold upon the mind of the first consul. He ordered Desaix to march upon Rivalta and Novi, with the division of Boudet only. It was by Novi that Mélas must pass to march on Genoa from Alexandria.

However, by a happy presentiment, he kept the division of Monnier, Desaix's second, in reserve at head-quarters; and he provided, as far as possible, for every thing, by leaving Victor at Marengo with two divisions, Lannes with one on the plain, and Murat at his sides with all his cavalry. If the distribution of the French force at this time be reflected upon, their dispersion is very striking; scattered, a part on the Tessino, a part on the inferior Po and Adda, and another part on the route to Genoa. This was the necessary consequence of the general situation, and of the circumstances of the moment.

On the evening of the 13th, that preceding one of the grandest days in history, Bonaparte, in the village of Torre di Garofolo, lay down and fell asleep, expecting to receive news of the Austrians on the morrow.

In the mean time confusion prevailed in Alexandria. The Austrian army was in despair. A council of war was held; but none of the resolutions of which the French commander was fearful, were adopted. There had been some conversation about retreating by the Upper Tessino and the Po, and also of shutting themselves up in Genoa; but the Austrian generals, brave men as they were, had preferred following the dictates of honour. "We have been fighting for these eighteen months like good soldiers, after all," they said; "we have reconquered Italy; we were in march on the frontiers of France; our government urged us onwards; it gave us those orders but yesterday; it ought to have advised us of the dangers which threatened our rear. If any blame belongs to our position, it is the fault of our government. It was the duty of that government to announce the danger which threatened us. All the means of evading an encounter with the French army are complicated, difficult, and hazardous; there is but one fair and honourable way, that is, to break through. To-morrow we must open a road at the expense of our blood. If we succeed, we shall rejoin, after a victory, the route from Piacenza to Mantua; if not, after having done our duty, the responsibility of our disaster will press on other shoulders than ours." The first consul never conceived that they would have lost so much time in deliberation in a similar conjuncture. But no one equalled him in promptitude of determination; and Mélas was in a situation sufficiently unfortunate to obtain pardon for the cruel perplexity which retarded his definitive resolutions. In his decision to fight, the Austrian general conducted himself like a soldier of honour; but he is to be censured for leaving twenty-five thousand men in the fortresses of Coni, Turin, Tortona, Genoa, Acqui, Gavi, and Alexandria; more than all, after the loss that general Ott sustained at Montebello. With twenty-five thousand men in these places, three thousand in Tuscany, twelve thousand between Mantua and Venice, he had at most but forty thousand to bring into the field where the issue of the war was to be decided. To this number had fallen the fine army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, which, at the commencement of the campaign, was to force the southern frontier of France. Forty thousand had perished, forty thousand were scattered, forty thousand were about to fight in order to escape the Caudine Forks; but among the last was a powerful cavalry, and two hundred pieces of cannon.

It was agreed upon, for the following day, that the entire army should issue forth by the bridges of the Bormida; for there were two bridges protected by the same redoubt, despite the false account given of them to Bonaparte: general Ott, it was also decided, should, at the head of ten thousand men, half cavalry and half infantry, leave the Bormida, and, taking the left, direct himself upon the village called Castel Ceriolo; that generals Haddick and Kaim, at the head of the main body of the army, about twenty thousand men, should carry the village of Marengo, which affords the entrance to the plain; and that general O'Reilly, with five or six thousand men, should take the right, and ascend the Bormida; a powerful artillery sustaining the movement. A considerable detachment, principally cavalry, was left in the rear of Alexandria upon the road of Acqui, to observe the troops of Suchet, of the arrival of which they had heard some floating rumours.

The vast plain of Marengo has been described; the great road from Alexandria to Piacenza traverses through its entire length, inclosed between the Scrivia and Bormida. The French, marching from Placenza and the Scrivia, came in the first instance to San Giuliano, and in three quarters of

a league further to Marengo, which nearly touched the Bormida, and formed the principal outlet that the Austrians had to acquire in coming out of Alexandria. Between San Giuliano and Marengo there proceeded in a right line the road which was about to be contested, and on both sides extended a plain covered with vineyards and cornfields. Below Marengo on the right of the French and on the left of the Austrians was Castel Ceriolo, a large hamlet, by which general Ott would pass, to turn the corps of general Victor that was stationed in Marengo. Upon Marengo there was to be directed the principal attack of the Austrians, since that village commanded the entrance to the plain.

At break of day the Austrian army passed over the two bridges of the Bormida, but its movement was slow, because it had but one issue in the work that covered the bridges. O'Reilly went first, and encountered Gardanne's division, that general Victor, having occupied Marengo, had placed in advance. The division consisted of the 101st and 44th demi-brigades only. O'Reilly, supported by a numerous artillery, and having double the number of men, obliged the division to retreat and shut itself up in Marengo. Fortunately O'Reilly did not follow it into the place, but waited until he was supported by the centre under general Haddick. The slowness of their march in passing the defile caused by the bridges, made the Austrians lose two or three hours. At length generals Haddick and Kaim formed in the rear of O'Reilly, and general Ott crossed the bridges to proceed to Castel Ceriolo. General Victor immediately united his two divisions for the defence of Marengo, and sent off to inform the first consul that the Austrian army was advancing in its entire force with the clear intention of giving battle.

An obstacle in the nature of the ground seconded very appropriately the courage of the French soldiers. In advance of Marengo, between the Austrians and French, there was a deep and muddy rivulet called Fontanone. It ran between Marengo and the Bormida, and emptied its contents a little lower down into the Bormida itself. Victor placed towards his right, that is, in the village of Marengo, the 101st and 44th demi-brigades, under general Gardanne; on the left of the village the 24th, 43rd, and 96th, under general Chambarlhac; a little in the rear, general Kellermann with the 20th, 2nd, and 8th cavalry, and one squadron of the 12th. The rest of the 12th was on the Higher Bormida observing the distant movements of the enemy.

General Haddick advanced to the rivulet, covered by twenty-five pieces of cannon, which opened upon the French. He threw himself gallantly into the bed of the Fontanone at the head of Bellegarde's division. General Rivaud, leaving the shelter of the village with the 44th and 101st, opened a direct fire upon the Austrians, who were trying to issue out. A violent conflict ensued along the Fontanone, Haddick making many attempts; but Rivaud [1], holding himself firm under the Austrian battery, stopped, by the fire of his musketry, given at a very short distance, the corps of Haddick, and repulsed it in disorder to the other side of the rivulet. The unfortunate general Haddick received a mortal wound, and his soldiers retreated. Mélas then made the troops of general Kaim advance, and ordered O'Reilly to proceed along the Bormida, and ascend it as far as a place called Stortigliona, in order to execute a charge on the French left with the cavalry of Pilati. But at the same moment general Kellermann was mounted at the head of his division of cavalry, observing the motion of the Austrian squadrons; while Lannes, who had remained the night before on the left of Victor, in the plain, placed himself in line between Marengo and Castel Ceriolo. The Austrians then made another effort. Gardanne's and Chambarlhac's divisions, drawn up in a semi-circle along the semi-circular bed of the Fontanone, were placed in such a manner as to be able to pour a converging fire on the point of attack. They made dreadful work with their musketry among the troops of general Kaim. During this time general Pilati, ascending higher, succeeded in crossing the Fontanone at the head of two thousand horse. The brave Kellermann, who on this day added greatly to the glory attached to his name at Valmy, dashed upon the squadrons of Pilati as soon as they attempted to open out, sabreing and precipitating them into the muddy bed of that stream, which could not have been better traced by art for covering the French position.

Up to this moment, though the French, surprised, had only the two corps of Victor and Lannes in line, or about fifteen or sixteen thousand men to resist thirty-six thousand; still owing to the fault of the Austrians, in not on the day before taking possession of Marengo, a fault which gained for them some advantage, by leading Bonaparte into error, the French had gained time to wait the arrival of the commander-in-chief and of the reserves remaining behind or despatched on the road to Novi.

Such was the state of things, when Mélas decided on making the last effort to save the honour and freedom of his army; and bravely seconded by his soldiers, who were all veterans, whose victories in the preceding campaigns had heightened their courage, he made another attack upon the French line. General Ott, who had taken much time to file off, now began to be able to act towards the Austrian left. He manœuvred with the design to turn the French, and, traversing Castel Ceriolo, attacked Lannes, who being placed beside Victor, between Marengo and Castel Ceriolo, formed the right of the French line. While Ott occupied the attention of Lannes, the corps of O'Reilly, Haddick, and Kaim united, were anew directed on the Fontanone, in front of Marengo. A formidable artillery supported all their movements. The grenadiers of Lattermann entered the rivulet, and, passing it, gained the other side. The division of Chambarlhac, placed on the left of Marengo, began a most destructive fire upon them, yet still a battalion of these grenadiers continued to keep its ground beyond the Fontanone; Mélas redoubled his cannonade on the division of Chambarlhac, which was not covered by the houses of the village, as those that defended Marengo were. In the mean time the Austrian pioneers hastily constructed a bridge of trestles. The gallant Rivaud, at the head of the 44th, sallying from the village of Marengo, and march-

[1] Oliver Rivaud.

ing upon the enemy in spite of the grape-shot, was on the point of driving them into the Fontanone, but the murderous discharge of artillery stopped the 44th, thinned by this obstinate struggle, and Rivaud was himself wounded. Seizing the opportune moment, Lattermann's grenadiers advanced in a body and penetrated into Marengo. Rivaud, covered with blood, placed himself again at the head of the 44th, and, making a vigorous charge on the grenadiers, drove them out of Marengo; but, on leaving the shelter of the houses, they were received with such a dreadful fire of artillery, that he was unable to force them back over the brook, which had so far well protected the French army. Enfeebled by loss of blood, this brave officer was obliged to submit to be carried off the field. The Austrian grenadiers remained masters of the position which they had carried. At this instant the division of Chambarlhac, which, as has been observed, was unprotected by any shelter from the grape-shot, and wholly uncovered, was nearly destroyed. General O'Reilly repulsed the 96th, placed at the extreme left of the French, and then began to assume the offensive. Towards the right, Lannes, who at first had only the single corps of general Kaim to oppose, was on the point of driving it into the bed of the Fontanone, when he discovered that he was suddenly turned by general Ott, who was issuing from Castel Ceriolo with a large body of cavalry. Champeaux's brigade of cavalry, drawn up in the rear of Lannes' corps, as Kellermann's was in rear of Victor's, made in vain several brilliant charges, while the unfortunate Champeaux himself received a mortal wound. Our army, on both wings severely handled, separated itself from Marengo, by which it had so tenaciously held, and then had nothing to sustain it. It ran the hazard of being forced into the plain in the rear, without any support, against two hundred pieces of cannon and an immense cavalry.

It was now ten o'clock in the morning; the carnage had been horrible. A considerable number of wounded encumbered the road between Marengo and San Giuliano. Already a part of Victor's corps, overpowered by numbers, was retreating, crying that all was lost. All must have been lost too, without a reinforcement of troops which had not been wearied out, and, more than all, without a great soldier capable of regaining the victory wrested from his troops.

Bonaparte, in receiving intelligence that the Austrians, who he feared would escape him, had taken his army by surprise in the plain of Marengo, so deserted on the previous day, hastened from Torre di Garofolo, congratulating himself upon the lucky inundation of the Scrivia, which had prevented his going on to Voghera to pass the night. He brought with him the consular guard, a body of men not numerous, but of unequalled courage, which subsequently became the imperial guard: he also brought Monnier's division, composed of three excellent demi-brigades, and was followed at a short distance by a reserve of two regiments of cavalry: he, lastly, sent orders for Desaix to march in all haste upon San Giuliano.

The first consul, at the head of the reserve, proceeded in a gallop to the field of battle. He found Lannes attacked on the right by the cavalry and infantry of general Ott, endeavouring still to support himself on the left about Marengo. Gardanne was defending himself in the hedges of that village, the object of such a furious contest; and on the other side, Chambarlhac's division, thundered upon by the Austrian artillery, was dispersing.

Over this scene he judged, with a military glance, what was most needful to be done, to re-establish the state of affairs. The broken left was in a state of utter rout, but the right still maintained its ground, being only threatened,—and that was the point, therefore, which it was proper to reinforce. By holding firmly on Castel Ceriolo, he would have a point of support in the middle of that vast plain; he would be able to pivot upon that point his strengthened wing, and bring his beaten wing into the rear out of reach of the enemy. If he should, by this movement, lose the high road from Marengo to San Giuliano, the mischief would be reparable; because behind the new position there passed another road, which led to Salé, and from Salé to the banks of the Po. Thus his line of retreat to Pavia would still be secure. Placed besides on the right of the plains, he would be on the Austrian flank, since they would take the great road from Marengo to San Giuliano, if they intended to turn their victory to any profit.

These reflections were made with the rapidity of lightning: Bonaparte instantly put into execution the resolution he conceived in consequence. He sent forward in the plain to the right of Lannes the eight hundred grenadiers of the consular guard, and ordered them to stop the Austrian cavalry, until the arrival of the three demi-brigades of Monnier. These brave men formed themselves into a square, and received with admirable coolness the charges of the Lobkowitz dragoons, standing unbroken by the reiterated assaults of a multitude of horse. A little to their right, Bonaparte ordered two of Monnier's demi-brigades, that arrived at that moment, to direct themselves upon Castel Ceriolo. These two demi-brigades, the 70th and 49th, conducted by general Carra St. Cyr, marched in advance, and sometimes formed in a square to resist the cavalry, sometimes in columns to charge the infantry. They at length succeeded in regaining the ground lost, and posted themselves in the hedges and gardens of Castel Ceriolo. At the same moment Bonaparte, at the head of the 72nd, went to the support of the left under Lannes, while Dupont, the chief of the staff, set out to rally in the rear the wrecks of Victor's corps pursued by O'Reilly's horse, but protected by Murat with the cavalry reserve. The presence of the first consul, and the sight of the main corps of the horse-guards, reanimated the troops, and the battle was renewed with great fury. The gallant Watrin, of Lannes' corps, with the 6th of the line and the 22nd, drove the soldiers of Kaim at the point of the bayonet into the Fontanone. Lannes, infusing into the 40th and 28th the fire of his own heroic soul, pushed forward both regiments upon the Austrians. Over the immense extent of that plain of Marengo the battle raged with intense violence. Gardanne endeavoured to retake Marengo; Lannes to make himself master of the rivulet, that on the commencement of the battle had so well covered the French troops; the grenadiers of the consular guard, continuing in square, a living citadel in the middle of the battle-field, filled up the void be-

tween Lannes and the columns of Carra St. Cyr, which were in possession of the first houses of Castel Ceriolo. Mélas, with the courage of despair, bringing his united masses upon Marengo, issued at length from the village, driving back the worn-out soldiers of Gardanne, who in vain took advantage of every obstacle to aid their resistance. O'Reilly continued to overwhelm with grape-shot the division of Chambarlhac, so long exposed to the fire of his immense artillery.

But there was no longer any possibility of making head; they must yield up the ground. Bonaparte ordered them to fall back by little and little, at the same time keeping up a firm front. Then, while his left, separated from Marengo, and thus deprived of support, fell back rapidly as far as San Giuliano, where it went to seek a shelter, he continued to keep the right of the plain, and to maintain himself in slow retreat,—thanks to Castel Ceriolo, the bravery of the consular guard, and, above all, to Lannes, who made unequalled efforts. If he could not support the right, the first consul had still a certain line of retreat by Salé towards the banks of the Po; and if Desaix, who was sent on the preceding day upon Novi, should return in time, the field of battle might yet be reconquered, and victory come back to the side of the French.

At this moment it was that Lannes and his four demi-brigades exhibited efforts worthy of the plaudits of posterity. The enemy, who had issued out of Marengo upon the plain in one solid mass, poured forth from eighty pieces of cannon a continued shower of round and grape shot. Lannes, at the head of his demi-brigades, was two hours in retreating three-fourths of a league. When the enemy, coming too near, pressed upon him, he halted and charged him with the bayonet. Although his guns were dismounted, a few light field-pieces, drawn by the better horses, were brought up and manœuvred with the same skill and boldness, assisting by their fire the demi-brigades that were too much pressed; and they even dared to place themselves in battery against the Austrian artillery. The consular guard, which the Austrians were unable to break by their charges of cavalry, was now assailed by cannon. The Austrians strove to batter it in breach like a wall, and then it was charged by Frimont's horse. It sustained considerable loss, but retreated unbroken. Carra St. Cyr also retreated, and abandoned Castel Ceriolo, but he still had a last support in the vineyards in the rear of that village. The French also remained masters of the road from Ceriolo to Salé. Every where the plain exhibited a vast pile of carnage, upon which continual explosions were added to the thunder of the artillery; for Lannes, in his retreat, blew up such of the artillery-waggons as he was unable to bring away.

Half the day was over. Mélas made sure of the victory which he had purchased so dearly. The old soldier, who at least for courage showed himself worthy of his adversary on that memorable day, re-entered Alexandria worn out with fatigue. He left general Zach, the chief of his staff, in command, and sent off couriers to all parts of Europe to announce the defeat of general Bonaparte at Marengo. The chief of the staff, then in full command, formed the greater part of the Austrian army in a marching column on the great road from Marengo to San Giuliano. He placed at the head two regiments, then a column of Lattermann's grenadiers, and after them the baggage. He disposed on the left general O'Reilly, on the right the corps of generals Kaim and Haddick, and in this order he sought to gain the great road to Piacenza, the object of so many efforts, and of the safety itself of the Austrian army.

It was three o'clock: if no new event occurred, the contest might be considered lost to the French, unless they could, the next day, with the troops drawn from the Tessino, the Adda, and the Po, repair the misfortunes of that hour. Desaix was still absent with the entire division of Boudet,—would he come up in time? Upon this depended the fate of the battle. The aids-de-camp of the first consul had been all the morning in search of him. But before these messengers could reach him, Desaix, on the first sound of a cannon in the plain of Marengo, had instantly stopped his march. The sound of distant cannon, thus heard, made him conclude that the enemy, of whom he was going in search at Novi on the Genoa road, was at Marengo itself. He had instantly sent Savary with some hundred [1] cavalry to Novi, to observe what passed there, and with his division had awaited the result, continually hearing the cannon of the French and Austrians, which always resounded in the direction of the Bormida. Savary having seen no one in the direction of Novi, Desaix was more than ever confirmed in his conjectures; and without waiting a moment longer, he marched upon Marengo, preceded by aids-de-camp, whom he sent forward to announce his arrival to the first consul. He had marched all the day, and at three o'clock the heads of his columns began to show themselves in the vicinity of San Giuliano. Advancing himself at full gallop, he came up to the first consul,—happy impulse of a lieutenant so intelligent, and so full of devotedness,—happy fortune of youth! If, fifteen years afterwards, the first consul, so well seconded here by his generals, had found a Desaix on the field of battle at Waterloo, he would have preserved the empire, and France have kept her dominant position among the powers of Europe.

The presence of Desaix went to change the face of things. He was surrounded, and the fortunes of the day related to him. The generals formed a circle about him and the first consul, and the seriousness of their situation was warmly discussed. The greater part of those present advised a retreat. The first consul was not of that opinion, and pressed Desaix forcibly to state what his might be. Desaix glanced over the devastated field of battle, then taking out his watch, and looking at the hour, replied to Bonaparte, in these fine yet simple terms: "Yes, the battle is lost: but it is only three o'clock; there is yet time enough to gain one." Bonaparte, highly pleased at the decision of Desaix, so disposed affairs as to profit by the resources which the general had brought with him, and of the advantages insured to him by the

[1] Savary himself says only fifty horse. M. Thiers differs, too, with the same writer about a bridge on the Bormida, one of which, lower down than Alexandria, ought to have been destroyed, but was not. (See Savary's Memoirs, vol. i.) —*Translator.*

position taken in the morning. He was in the plain on the right, whilst the enemy were on the left in marching columns on the great road to San Giuliano. Desaix arriving at San Giuliano with six thousand fresh men, and presenting his front to the Austrians, might stop them, while the main body of the army might throw itself on their flank. The dispositions were instantly made in consequence.

The three demi-brigades of Desaix were formed in advance of San Giuliano, a little to the right of the high road; the 30th formed in line; the 9th and 59th in close columns on its wings. A small undulation of the ground concealed them from the enemy. On their left were the wrecks of Chambarlhac's and Gardanne's troops under general Victor, a little recovered. On their right in the plain was Lannes, whose retreat was suspended, then the consular guard, then Carra St. Cyr, who had kept as near as possible to Castel Ceriolo; and between Desaix and Lannes, but a little in the rear, the cavalry of Kellermann was placed in an interval. A battery of twelve cannon, all that remained of the artillery of the army, was placed along the front of Desaix's corps.

These dispositions being made, the first consul rode through the ranks of the soldiers, and spoke to the different corps. "My friends," said he, "we have retreated far enough; do you recollect that I am in the habit of lying on the field of battle." After reanimating the soldiers, who had gathered fresh spirits from the arrival of the reinforcements, and were burning with impatience to conquer, he gave the signal. The charge was beaten along the whole line.

The Austrians, rather in the order of march than the order of battle, were proceeding along the high road; the column led by general Zach, the commander, being in front; a little behind that, the centre partly formed on the plain, and showing its front to Lannes.

General Marmont at the same moment suddenly unmasked twelve pieces of cannon. A shower of grape-shot fell upon the head of the surprised Austrian column, that expected no more resistance, because they thought the French were in full retreat. It had scarcely recovered from this sudden alarm, when Desaix moved on the 9th light, and said to his aid-de-camp, Savary, "Go, and tell the first consul that I am charging, and shall want to be supported by the cavalry." Desaix, on horseback, led on the demi-brigade. He ascended with it the slight rising ground which concealed his advance from the view of the Austrians, and revealed himself to them at once by a discharge of musketry at the distance of only a few paces. The Austrians returned the fire, and Desaix fell, a ball having entered his breast. "Conceal my death," he exclaimed to general Boudet, the chief of his division, "for it may disconcert the troops,"—a useless caution of the hero! He was seen to fall; and his soldiers, like those of Turenne, demanded vengeance for the loss of their chief with loud shouts. The 9th light, which gained that day the title of the "incomparable," and bore it to the end of our wars,—the 9th light, after pouring in their fire, formed in column, and rushed upon the solid Austrian mass. At this sight, the two first regiments that stood in their way, in consternation fell back disordered upon the second line, and disappeared in its ranks. The column of Lattermann's grenadiers then became alone in the front, and received the shock of the light troops. They kept firm. The battle extended to both sides of the high road. The 9th light was supported on the right by the rallied troops of Victor, on the left by the 30th and 59th demi-brigades of Boudet's division, which had followed the movement. The grenadiers of Lattermann defended themselves with difficulty; when on a sudden an unforeseen storm burst upon their heads. General Kellermann, who at the demand of Desaix had received orders to charge, set off at a gallop, and, passing between Lannes and Desaix, placed a part of his squadrons *en potence* to face the Austrian cavalry which he saw before him; with the rest he dashed upon the flank of the grenadiers that were already attacked in front by Boudet's infantry. The charge, executed with extraordinary force, cut the column into two parts. Kellermann's dragoons sabred to the right and left; so that, pressed on all sides, the unfortunate grenadiers were obliged to lay down their arms. Two thousand of them were made prisoners. At their head, general Zach himself was obliged to deliver up his sword. The Austrians were thus deprived of direction at the conclusion of the battle; for Mélas, as we have seen, believing the victory certain, had entered Alexandria. Kellermann did not halt here; he darted upon the dragoons of Lichtenstein, and put them to flight; they fell back upon the Austrian centre, which was formed in the plain in face of Lannes, and put it into disorder. Lannes then advanced upon the Austrian centre, while the grenadiers of the consular guard and Carra St. Cyr moved anew upon Castel Ceriolo, from which they were not far off. On all the line from San Giuliano to Castel Ceriolo the French had adopted the offensive; they marched forward intoxicated with joy and enthusiasm at seeing victory return to them. The surprise and discouragement had gone over to the Austrians.

How admirable is the power of the determined will, that by perseverance in determination brings back fortune! The oblique line of the French from San Giuliano to Castel Ceriolo advanced at the charge, driving back the Austrians, who were astounded at having a new battle to fight. Carra St. Cyr soon reconquered the village of Castel Ceriolo; and general Ott, who had been the first to advance beyond that village, fearing to be overpowered, thought of retrograding, to prevent his communication from being cut off; a panic seized upon his cavalry, which fled at full gallop, crying, "To the bridges!" All tried to reach the bridges of the Bormida. General Ott, repassing by Castel Ceriolo with the troops of Vogelsang, was obliged to force through the French. He succeeded, and regained in a hurry the bank of the Bormida, where all the Austrians hurried with headlong precipitation.

The generals Kaim and Haddick strove to keep the centre firm in vain. Lannes did not permit them the means, but drove them into Marengo, proceeding to push them into the Fontanone, and from the Fontanone into the Bormida. But the grenadiers of Weidenfeld made a momentary resistance, to give O'Reilly time to return, he having

advanced as far as Cassina Grossa. The Austrian cavalry, too, attempted several times to stop the advance of the French. It was driven back by the horse grenadiers of the consular guard, led by young Beauharnois and Bessières. Lannes and Victor, with their connected forces, fell at last upon Marengo, and threw O'Reilly's, as well as Weidenfeld's grenadiers into disorder. The confusion on the bridges of the Bormida every moment increased. Infantry, cavalry, artillery, were all crowded together there. The bridges could not hold them; and numbers threw themselves into the Bormida to ford it. An artillery conductor endeavoured to cross with his gun, and succeeded. The entire artillery tried to imitate his example, but a part of the carriages remained in the bed of the river stuck fast. The French, in hot pursuit, captured men, horses, cannon, and baggage. The unfortunate Mélas, who, two hours before, had left his army victorious, hurried out at the news of the disaster, and could scarcely credit what he saw. He was in utter despair.

Such was the sanguinary conflict of Marengo; which, as will soon be seen, exercised a vast influence upon the destiny of France, and of the world; it gave peace to the republic at the moment, and a little later the empire to the first consul. This battle was cruelly contested, and it was worth the contest; since no result was ever of more importance to one or the other of the combatants. Mélas fought to avoid a fearful capitulation; Bonaparte staked on that day his entire fortunes. The number lost, considering the total of the combatants, was immense, and out of the usual proportion. The Austrians lost eight thousand killed and wounded, and more than two thousand prisoners. Their staff was cruelly decimated. General Haddick was killed; generals Vogelsang, Lattermann, Bellegarde, Lamarsaille, and Gottesheim were wounded; and with them a great number of officers. They lost in men killed, wounded, or taken, one-third of their army; if this army was thirty-six thousand, or forty thousand strong, as was generally said. Then, as to the French, they had six thousand killed and wounded, and about one thousand made prisoners, which shows a loss of one-fourth of their force out of twenty-eight thousand present in the field. Their staff was as badly treated as the Austrian. Generals Mainony, Rivaud, Malher, and Champeaux were wounded, the last mortally; but the greatest loss was Desaix. France had not lost one more regretted during ten years of war. In the view of the first consul this loss was great enough to diminish the pleasure of the victory. His secretary, Bourienne, congratulating him upon his miraculous success, said to him: "What a glorious day!" "Yes," replied Bonaparte, "it would have been indeed glorious, if I could have embraced Desaix this evening on the field of battle. I was going to make him minister of war," he added. "I would have made him a prince if I could." The conqueror of Marengo had yet no idea that he should, at a time not distant, be able to give crowns to those who served him.

The body of the unfortunate Desaix was lying near San Giuliano, amidst the vast field of slaughter. His aid-de-camp, Savary, who was a long time attached to him, searched for his body among the dead; and, recognizing it by the abundance of the hair, removed it with great care, wrapped in a hussar's cloak, and, placing it on his horse, took it to the head-quarters at the Torre di Garofolo.

Although the plain of Marengo was inundated with French blood, joy reigned in the army. Soldiers and generals felt how meritorious had been their conduct, and appreciated fully the great importance of a victory gained on the rear of an enemy. The Austrians, on the contrary, were in a consternation; they knew that they were enveloped and forced into submission to the will of the victor. Mélas, who had two horses killed under him during the day, conducted himself, in spite of his age, as well as it was possible for the youngest and most valiant soldiers in his army to have done; he was plunged in the deepest sorrow. He had gone into Alexandria to take a little rest, believing himself the conqueror. Now he saw his army half destroyed, flying by every outlet, abandoning its artillery to the French, or leaving it in the marshes of the Bormida. To finish his misfortune, the chief of his staff, Zach, who enjoyed his entire confidence, was a prisoner with the French. He went from one of his generals to the other in vain; none of them would give an opinion; while all cursed the cabinet of Vienna, which had kept them under such fatal illusions, and precipitated them into an abyss. Still, something must be decided upon—but what? To cut his way through the enemy—that had been attempted, and had not succeeded. Should he retire upon Genoa, or pass the Upper Po, in order to force the Tessino? These resorts, difficult before a battle, were impossible, since battle had been given and lost. General Suchet was only some leagues in the rear, towards Acqui, with the army of Liguria. Bonaparte was in front of Alexandria, with the victorious army of reserve. Both might form a junction, and cut off the road to Genoa. General Moncey, who, with the detachment from Germany, guarded the Tessino, could be succoured by Bonaparte in as little time as it would require to march upon Moncey. He had no hope of safety on any side; and it was necessary to adopt the idea of a capitulation, happy if, in abandoning Italy, he insured the liberty of the Austrian forces, and attained from the generosity of the conqueror, that this unfortunate army should not be prisoners of war. It was in consequence resolved, to send a flag of truce to Bonaparte, in order to commence a negotiation. The prince of Lichtenstein was chosen to proceed on the following morning, being the 15th of June or 26 Prairial, to the French head-quarters.

On the other side, the first consul had many reasons for treating with the Austrians. His principal end was gained, for Italy was delivered by a single battle.

After the victory which he had thus gained, that enabled him to invest the Austrians on every side, he was certain of obtaining the evacuation of Italy. He might also rigorously demand that the vanquished should lay down their arms and surrender themselves prisoners. But in wounding the honour of brave men he might perchance force them into some desperate act. This would occasion a useless effusion of blood, and would more particularly be attended with a loss of time. Absent from Paris above a month, it

was important that he should return there as soon as possible. There was a prisoner in the hands of the French, general Zach, who might be made a valuable intermediate agent. The first consul opened his mind to him, and expressed in his presence how sincerely he felt desirous of peace; that he felt every wish to spare the imperial army and to grant it the most honourable terms. The Austrian flag of truce having arrived, he manifested to the officer thus sent the same disposition that he had exhibited to general Zach, and requested them to return with Berthier to general Mélas to arrange the basis of a capitulation. Following his usual custom under similar circumstances, he declared the irrevocable conditions under which he would treat, these being already settled in his own mind, and announced that no modification of them could happen. He consented that the Austrian army should not be declared prisoners of war; he was willing that it should pass out with the honours of war; but he insisted that all the fortresses of Liguria, Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Legations should be immediately given up to France, and that the Austrians should evacuate Italy as far as the Mincio. The negotiators immediately proceeded to the Austrian head-quarters.

Although rigorous, the conditions were such as were but natural, it may be said, generous. One alone was painful, almost humiliating; it was the surrender of Genoa, after so much blood spilled, and after an occupation of only a few days; but this was a point from which the conqueror would not depart. Still Mélas sent his principal negotiator to remonstrate against some of the conditions in the proposed armistice. "Sir," said the first consul with a little warmth, "my conditions are irrevocable. I did not begin my military life yesterday; your position is as well known to me as to yourselves. You are in Alexandria, encumbered with dead, wounded, and sick, destitute of provisions, deprived of the best soldiers in your army, surrounded on every side. I am in a position to demand any thing; but I respect the grey hairs of your general and the courage of your soldiers.—I demand nothing that is not justified by the present situation of affairs. Return to Alexandria; do as you please, you will have no other conditions."

The convention was signed on the same day, the 15th of June, at Alexandria, on the basis proposed by Bonaparte. It was in the first place arranged that there should be a suspension of arms in Italy until the reception of a reply from Vienna. If the terms of the treaty were sanctioned, the Austrians were to be free to retire with the honours of war behind the line of the Mincio. They engaged upon retiring to give up into the hands of the French all the strong places which they occupied. The citadels of Tortona, Alexandria, Milan, Arona, and Piacenza were to be remitted between the 16th and 20th of June, or 27th of Prairial and 1st of Messidor; the citadels of Cevi, Savona, the fortresses of Coni and Genoa, between the 16th and 24th, and that of Urbino on the 26th. The Austrian army was to be divided into three columns, to retire one after another as fast as the places were delivered up. The immense stores of provisions accumulated by Mélas in Italy were to be equally divided between the French and the Austrians; the artillery of the Italian foundries to go to the French, that of the Austrian foundries to the imperial army. The Austrians, after the evacuation of Lombardy as far as the Mincio, were to retire behind the following boundary:—the Mincio, the Fossa-Maestra, the left bank of the Po, from Borgo-Forte as far as its mouth in the Adriatic, Peschiera, and Mantua remained in possession of the Austrians. It was verbally agreed without any explanation, that the detachment of the army at that time actually in Tuscany should continue to occupy that province. Respecting the states of the pope, and those of the king of Naples, nothing was stipulated, as those princes were foreign to the events in the north of Italy. If this convention should not be ratified by the emperor, ten days were allowed for the resumption of hostilities. In the meanwhile neither party was to send any detachments into Germany.

Such are the main points of the celebrated convention of Alexandria, which in one day obtained for France the restitution of Upper Italy, and involved the restitution of the whole. Mélas was afterwards too much censured for the campaign and treaty. It is proper to be just towards the unfortunate, when, more than all, it is redeemed by honourable conduct. Mélas was deceived regarding the existence of the army of reserve by the cabinet of Vienna, which never ceased to mislead him with the most fatal illusions. When he was undeceived, he may perhaps be justly reproached for not having united his troops quickly and completely enough, and with having left too many men in the fortresses. It was not behind the walls of fortresses, but on the battle-field of Marengo, that these were to be defended. This being admitted, it must be acknowledged that Mélas conducted himself as a brave man should do when he is surrounded, he endeavoured to cut his way out sword in hand. He attempted it bravely, and was defeated. After that he had but one thing left to do, which was to secure the liberty of his army, because Italy was irrevocably lost to him. He was unable to get better terms than he obtained; he might have been obliged to submit to worse humiliations had it been the desire of his conqueror. The conqueror himself did well not to require more, since had he determined on more, he would have run the chance of driving brave men to sanguinary extremities, and himself to lose most precious time, his presence in Paris being indispensable. Mélas deserves pity, and the conduct of the victor admiration, who owed the result of the campaign not to hazard, but to the most profound combinations, most marvellously executed.

Some, fond of detraction, have pretended that the victory of Marengo was due to general Kellermann, and that all the consequences were but natural results. Why then, if Bonaparte must be robbed of his glory, not attribute it to that noble victim of a happy impulse, Desaix; who guessing, before having received them, the orders of his commander, came to bring him victory and his life? Why not attribute it to the intrepid defender of Genoa, who, in retaining the Austrians on the Apennine, gave Bonaparte time to descend the Alps, and delivered them up to him half destroyed? Some say that generals Kellermann, Desaix, and Masséna are the real conquerors of Marengo, any one except Bonaparte. But in this

world the voice of the public always decrees glory, and the voice of the public has proclaimed the conqueror of Marengo to be him who, with the quick glance of genius, discovered the use that might be made of the Higher Alps to pour down on the rear of the Austrians, having for three months together deceived their vigilance; to be him who created an army that did not before exist; rendered its creation incredible to all Europe, traversed the St. Bernard over an unbeaten track, appeared unexpectedly in the midst of Italy that was confounded with astonishment, enveloped with wonderful skill his unfortunate adversary, and having fought a decisive battle with him, lost it in the morning and regained it in the evening. The battle was certain to be regained on the following, if it had not on the same day; for besides the six thousand men under Desaix, ten thousand on the way from the Tessino, and ten thousand posted on the Po, presented infallible means to destroy the army of the Austrians. Let us suppose the Austrians victors on the 14th of June, entering into the defile of Stradella, finding at Piacenza generals Duhesme and Loison with ten thousand men ready to dispute the passage of the Po, having behind them Bonaparte reinforced by the generals Desaix and Moncey—what could the Austrians have done in such a dangerous place, stopped by a river well defended, and pursued by an army superior in number? They must have fallen more disastrously than they fell in the field of the Bormida. The real conqueror of Marengo then was he who mastered fortune by combinations, so profound, so admirable, as to be without equals in the history of the greatest soldiers.

In other respects he was well served by his lieutenants, and there is no need to sacrifice the glory of any to construct his. Masséna by an heroic defence of Genoa, Desaix by the most happy resolve, Lannes by incomparable firmness on the plain of Marengo, Kellermann by his fine charge of cavalry, concurred towards his triumph. He recompensed all in the most signal mode; and in regard to Desaix, he felt for him the greatest sorrow. The first consul ordered the most magnificent honours to be paid to the man who had rendered France such eminent services. He even took care of his military family, and placed about his own person the two aids-de-camp of Desaix, thrown out of employment at the general's decease, colonels Rapp and Savary.

Before he quitted the battle-field of Marengo, the first consul wrote another letter to the emperor of Germany, although he only obtained an indirect answer to the first, addressed by M. Thugut to Talleyrand. Bonaparte conceived that his victory permitted him to renew his repelled advances. At that moment he wished ardently for peace. He felt that to pacify France without, as he had pacified her within, was his real vocation, and that having accomplished this task, his present authority would be legitimatized better than it would be by new victories. Susceptible, besides, of the keenest impressions, he was deeply affected at the sight of the plain of Marengo, on which lay a fourth of two armies; and under the influence of these feelings he wrote to the emperor of Austria a singular letter:

"It is on the field of battle, amid the sufferings of a multitude of wounded, and surrounded by fifteen thousand dead, that I conjure your majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, and not to permit two brave nations to slaughter each other for interests to which they are strangers. It is for me to urge your majesty; since I am nearer than you to the theatre of war, your heart cannot be so strongly impressed as mine."

This letter was long; the first consul discussed, with an eloquence which was peculiar to himself, and in language which was not that of diplomacy, the motives which France and Austria could have for continuing still to arm against each other. "Is it for religion that you combat?" said he, "in that case make war upon the Russians and English, who are the enemies of your faith; be not their ally. Is it to guard against revolutionary principles? The war has extended them over one-half of the continent in extending the conquests of France, and it must extend them still further! Is it for the balance of power in Europe? The English threaten more than we do that equilibrium, because they have become the masters and the tyrants of commerce, and no body can now control them; whereas Europe will always be able to control France, if she desires to threaten seriously the independence of nations," a proposition unfortunately but too well founded, as fifteen years of war fully proved. "Is it," added the soldier-diplomatist, "is it for the integrity of the German empire? But your majesty has given up to us Mayence and the German states on the left bank of the Rhine—besides, the empire is demanding peace of you. Is it, lastly, for the interests of the house of Austria? Nothing is more natural: but let us carry out the treaty of Campo Formio, which secures to your majesty large indemnities in compensation for the provinces lost in the Netherlands, and insures them to you where you would rather obtain them—in Italy. Let your majesty send negotiators wherever you wish, and we will add to the treaty of Campo Formio stipulations capable of satisfying you in relation to the existence of the secondary states, which the French republic is charged with having disturbed."

The first consul alluded here to Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, the Roman states, Tuscany, and Naples, which the directory had revolutionized. "On these conditions," he continued, "peace is made; let us extend the armistice to both armies and enter into immediate negotiations."

M. St. Julien, one of the generals in the emperor's confidence, was to be the bearer of the letter and of the convention of Alexandria to Vienna.

Some days afterwards, when his former impressions were somewhat blunted, the first consul felt a little of that regret which he often experienced when he wrote an important document at the first impulse, and without consulting colder minds than his own. Giving an account to the consuls of the step he had thus taken, he said, "I have sent a courier to the emperor with a letter that the minister for foreign relations will communicate to you. YOU WILL FIND IT A LITTLE ORIGINAL; but it is written on the field of battle. June 22nd."

After taking leave of his army he set out for Milan, on the 17th of June, or 28th of Prairial, in the morning, three days after the victory of Ma-

rengo. He was expected there with the greatest impatience. He arrived in the evening at dark. The population of the city, aware of his coming, were in the streets, to see him pass. They raised shouts of joy and threw flowers into his carriage. The city was illuminated with that brilliancy which the Italians alone know how to display in their fêtes. The Lombards who had been ten or twelve months under the yoke of the Austrians, rendered more grievous by the war and the violence of circumstances, trembled to be replaced under their insupportable authority. They had, during the various chances of this short campaign, experienced the most painful anxiety, through the contradictory reports which they had received, and they were now delighted to see their deliverance secured. Bonaparte immediately proclaimed the re-establishment of the Cisalpine republic, and hastened to restore order in the affairs of Italy, of which his last victory had completely changed the aspect.

We have already said that the war undertaken between the Russians, the English, and the Austrians, to re-establish in their states the princes overthrown by the encroachments of the directory, had not restored one of them. The king of Piedmont remained at Rome, the grand duke of Tuscany in Austria; the pope had died at Valence, and his territories were invaded by the Neapolitans. The royal family of Naples, delivered entirely into the hands of the English, was alone in its dominions, where it permitted the most sanguinary reactions. The queen of Naples, the minister Acton, and lord Nelson, allowed, if they did not command, the most abominable cruelties. The victory of the French republic changed all this: humanity was as much interested in the matter as policy.

The first consul instituted a provisional government at Milan, until the Cisalpine could be reorganized, and definitive limits assigned to it, which was not possible to be done until the peace. He did not consider that he was bound to regard the king of Piedmont more than Austria had done, and he was in consequence in no hurry to re-establish him in his dominions. He substituted a provisional government, and named general Jourdan the commissioner charged with its directions. For a good while the first consul wished to employ and separate from his enemies an honest and clever man, little fitted to be at the head of the French anarchists. Piedmont was thus kept in reserve with the intention of disposing of it at the peace, to the advantage of the French republic, or as the price of reconciliation with Europe, in constituting the secondary states destroyed under the directory. Tuscany was occupied by an Austrian force. The first consul had watched, ready to seize it if the English landed there, or it continued to raise men for the service of the enemies of France. As for Naples, he said and did nothing, waiting to see the effect of his victory upon the court. Already the queen of Naples, in fear, was about to set out for Vienna, to ask the support of Austria, and more particularly of Russia.

The court of Rome remained; there temporal were complicated with the most serious spiritual interests. Pius VI., as already seen, had died in France, the prisoner of the directory. The first consul staunch to his political system, had rendered funeral honours to his remains. A conclave had assembled at Venice, and with much trouble had obtained from the Austrian cabinet the permission to nominate a successor to the deceased head of the church. Thirty-five cardinals attended the conclave. A prelate was secretary, Gonsalvi, a Roman priest, young, ambitious, remarkable for the suppleness, penetration, and agreeable qualities of his mind, who has since mingled in most of the more important public affairs of the time. The conclave, as usual on every political or religious question was divided. Twenty-two of the members took the side of cardinal Braschi, nephew of the last pope, and supported cardinal Bellisomi, bishop of Cesena, in his pretensions. Those who were against supporting at Rome the domination of the family of Braschi, supported cardinal Antonelli. This cardinal was for bringing in cardinal Mattei, who signed the treaty of Tolentino, but he only obtained thirteen votes. For many months the contest had been silently but obstinately carried on. Neither of the two candidates had as yet gained over the vote of an opponent. At last the learned cardinal Gerdil was thought about; he had figured in the controversies of the last century. This new candidate was a Savoyard, who had become, through the late victories of the republic, a subject of France. Austria put in force against him her right of exclusion. To put an end to the affair, two of the voices detached themselves from cardinal Mattei, and promised to support cardinal Bellisomi, which assured to him twenty-four voices, the number required, or two-thirds of the suffrages, as rigorously demanded by the ecclesiastical laws to make the election valid. As it was in the dominions of Austria that the conclave was held, it was thought proper in the first place to submit to her the nomination in order to obtain her tacit agreement. The court of Vienna had the want of courtesy to suffer a month to pass away without returning any answer. The sensitiveness of the princes of the church was wounded, while at the same time all the parties were put out of joint, and the election of cardinal Bellisomi became impossible. It was this moment of disorder and fatigue that the able secretary of the conclave had awaited to start a new candidate, the object of his long and secret meditations. Speaking to all parties the language most likely to move them, he demonstrated to some the inconvenience of the domination of the Braschi, to others the small reliance that could be placed on Austria or any of the Christian courts; then addressing himself to the old profound and sagacious Roman interest, he uncovered before their astonished eyes a perspective view wholly new to them. "It is from France," said he, "that we have for ten years seen persecution proceeding—very well, it is from France that we may be able to derive succour and consolation. France, ever since Charlemagne, has been for the church the most useful and the least annoying of protectors. A most extraordinary young man, very difficult at present to judge of, governs there now. He will, no doubt, very soon reconquer Italy (the battle of Marengo had not then been fought). Recollect that in 1797 he protected the priests, and that he has rendered formal honour to Pius VI. Singular speeches which he has been heard to make on religion, and on the court of Rome, have been repeated to us by persons who

heard them, well worthy of credit. Neglect not the resources which offer on that side. Let us make a choice that cannot be considered hostile to France, or that may, to a certain extent, be agreeable to her, and we shall perhaps do a thing more useful to the Church than in demanding candidates of all the Catholic courts of Europe.

This was undoubtedly a coruscation from the genius of the Roman court, which subsequently cast out other bright flashes at the commencement of the century. Cardinal Gonsalvi then brought forward cardinal Chiaramonti, a native of Cesena, aged fifty-eight years, a relation of Pius VI., and by him elevated to the purple, who enjoyed by his intellect, learning, and mild virtues, the general esteem. To these attractive qualities he added great firmness. He had been seen struggling at an anterior period against the bickerings of his order, that of St. Benedict, and against the persecutions of the holy office, with victorious fortitude. His more recent and more noted act was a homily, made in his character of bishop of Imola, when his diocese was united to the Cisalpine republic. He had then spoken of the French revolution with a moderation which had pleased the conqueror of Italy, and scandalized the fanatics of the old order of things. Still, respected by everybody, he was agreeable to the Braschi party, and not disliked by his opponents; he suited all the cardinals who were wearied by the protracted length of the conclave; and he was deemed a fortunate selection by those who hoped much from the good-will of France in future. The adhesion, totally unexpected, of an illustrious personage, decided his election, which was met by no real difficulty, except in his own personal reluctance to accept the honours. The adhesion alluded to was that of cardinal Maury. This celebrated champion of the old French monarchy had retired to the Roman court, where he lived, recompensed with a cardinal's cap for his contests with Barnave and Mirabeau. He was an emigrant, but an emigrant endowed with a remarkable mind and extraordinary intellect; entertaining with secret satisfaction the idea of again attaching himself to the government of France, since glory had redeemed the novelty of that government. He had six votes at his disposal, and gave them to cardinal Chiaramonti, who was elected pope a little after the arrival of Bonaparte at Milan by the route of the St. Bernard.

The new pontiff was at Venice, having been unable to obtain of the court of Vienna permission to be crowned at St. Mark's, or from the court of Naples the possession of Rome. Having gone suddenly to Ancona, he negotiated in that city the evacuation of the states of the Church, and his own return to the capital of the Christian world. In this precarious situation, France, that had become friendly towards the holy see, was able to render him useful support; and the singular foresight of cardinal Gonsalvi received its accomplishment in a very sudden manner. The meeting of cardinal Chiaramonti and the first consul, the one raised to the pontificate, and the other to the republican dictatorship, nearly at the same time, was not one of the least extraordinary events of the century, nor the least fertile in results.

Young Bonaparte, in 1796, the submissive general of the directory, unable yet to dare every thing, and not having the assumption to give lessons to the French revolution, had maintained the pope by the treaty of Tolentino, and had taken from him only the Legations for the purpose of transferring them to the Cisalpine republic. Become now first consul, and able to do as he pleased, he determined to put in order a large part of the measures accomplished at the French revolution, and could not hesitate in his conduct towards the pope just elected. Scarcely had he returned to Milan when he saw cardinal Martiniana, bishop of Venice, the friend of Pius VII., and declared to him that he desired to live in a good understanding with the holy see, to reconcile the French revolution to the Church, and to support it against its enemies, if the Church showed itself reasonable, and well understood the actual position of France and of the world. This conversation in the ear of the old cardinal was not lost, and soon brought forth abundant fruit. The bishop of Verceil sent off to Rome his own nephew, count Alciati, for the purpose of opening a negotiation.

To this overture Bonaparte joined an act yet more bold, that he dared not indulge in Paris; but he was pleased to make it reach that city at a distance, as an earnest of his future intentions. The Italians had prepared a solemn *Te Deum* in the old cathedral of Milan. He resolved to assist at the ceremony; and on the 18th of June, or 29th Prairial, he wrote in these terms to the consuls:—

"To-day, in spite of all that may be said by our Paris atheists, I shall go with great ceremony to the *Te Deum* that they are going to chant in the metropolitan church of Milan[1]."

After having given these attentions to the general affairs of Italy, he made some indispensable arrangements for distributing the army in the conquered country, its provision, and reorganization. Masséna had just joined him. The ill humour of the defender of Genoa was dissipated before the flattering reception given him by the first consul; and he received the command of the army of Italy, that in every way he so well merited. This army was composed of the corps that had defended Genoa, of that which had defended the Var, of the troops that descended the St. Bernard, and of those which, under general Moncey, had arrived from Germany. The whole formed an imposing mass of eighty thousand tried men. The first consul quartered them in the rich plains of the Po, in order that they might repose after their fatigues, and make up for their former privations by the abundance they enjoyed.

With his accustomed foresight, the first consul ordered the forts and citadels which closed the passes between France and Italy, to be destroyed. In consequence, the demolition of the forts of Arona, Bard, and Seravalle, and of the citadels of Ivrée and Ceva, was ordered and executed. He fixed the mode and extent of the contributions to be levied for the sustenance of the army; sent off the consular guard for Paris, calculating the marches it would require to be in Paris at the time of the festival of the 14th of July, which, agreeably to his intentions, was to be celebrated with great pomp. He even took care, at Milan, to regulate the details of the festival:—

[1] Depôt of the Secretary of State's Office.

"It is necessary," he wrote, "to study to render as brilliant as possible the solemnity of the 14th of July [1], and to take care that it does not APE the rejoicings which have recently taken place. Chariot-races might have been very well in Greece, where they fought in chariots; they are out of place and unmeaning in France [2]."

He forbade triumphal arches to be erected for him, saying, he desired "NO OTHER ARCH OF TRIUMPH THAN THE PUBLIC SATISFACTION."

The first consul, in spite of all that called for his presence in Paris, remained twelve days in Milan. His reason was, that he might be certain of the exact execution of the convention of Alexandria. He had fears of the Austrian honour, and fancied that he saw some delay in giving up certain fortresses. He cried out against the weakness of Berthier, and ordered the detention of the second and third columns of the army of Mélas. The first column had already passed. There was some reason to fear for the delivery of Genoa, which the Austrians might easily be tempted to deliver over to the English, before the French should enter. The prince of Hohenzollern, in fact, either spontaneously or urged by the English, refused at the moment to deliver up to Masséna a place they had acquired with so much labour. Mélas, informed of the difficulty, insisted, in the most honourable manner, that his lieutenant should fulfil the convention of Alexandria, and threatened him, if he resisted, to give him up to the consequences of such a dishonourable act. The order of Mélas was obeyed, and Genoa was delivered up to the French on the 24th of June, to the great joy of the Ligurian patriots, who were freed in so short a space of time from the Austrians and the aristocratical dominion that oppressed them. Thus the spirited words of Masséna were verified, "I swear to you that I shall re-enter Genoa before fifteen days are over."

All these things being completed, the first consul departed from Milan on the 24th of June, in company with Duroc, his favourite aid-de-camp, Bessières, who commanded the consular guard, Bourrienne, his secretary, and Savary, one of two officers whom he had attached to his person out of regard to the memory of Desaix. He stopped some hours at Turin, to examine the works at the citadel, and give orders. He traversed Mount Cenis, and entered Lyons under arches of triumph, in the midst of a population astounded at the prodigies which he had accomplished. The Lyonnese, who were equally struck with his policy and his glory, surrounded the Hotel of the Celestins, where he had set down, and absolutely demanded to see him. He was obliged to go out before them, and unanimous acclamations burst forth at his appearance. They earnestly requested him to lay the first stone of the Place Bellecour, of which the reconstruction was about to be commenced; and he was obliged to consent. He passed a day at Lyons in the midst of a vast concourse of all the population of the environs. After addressing to the Lyonnese, in terms which much pleased them, a speech relative to the approach of peace, commerce, and order, he proceeded to Paris. The inhabitants of the provinces thronged to greet him at every place through which he passed. The man then so well treated by fortune enjoyed glory, yet conversing continually with his travelling companions, he made this fine remark, so expressive of his insatiable love of fame: "Yes, I have conquered in less than two years Cairo, Milan, and Paris; yet if I were to die to-morrow, I should not have half a page in a universal history." He arrived in Paris in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of July.

His return was necessary, because, absent from the capital nearly two months, his absence, and more particularly the false statements about Marengo, had caused several intrigues. It was believed, for a short time, that he was either dead or vanquished, and the ambitious set themselves at work. Some thought of Carnot, others of La Fayette, who from the dungeons of Olmutz had re-entered France, through the kindness of the first consul. They would have Carnot or La Fayette for president of the republic. La Fayette had no hand in these intrigues; Carnot no more. But Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte both had an unjust misgiving about Carnot, which they planted in their brother's mind. Thence came that unfortunate resolution, which the first consul executed at a later period, of taking from Carnot the ministry of war. There were some who fancied they could see in Talleyrand and Fouché, who hated each other, a tendency notwithstanding to a reconciliation, no doubt for the purpose of concert, and profiting together by the concatenation of events. Nothing was perceived at this time about M. Sieyès, the man most expected to figure, in case Bonaparte had disappeared from the scene. He was the only personage who exhibited so much reserve. All these things had scarcely time to show themselves, before the bad news was effaced by the good. What really did take place was greatly exaggerated in the relation, and the first consul conceived against some persons a resentment which he had the good sense to conceal, and soon to forget entirely in regard to all who had been pointed out to him, except the illustrious Carnot. The first consul besides, full of delight at his success, would not have the slightest shade thrown over the public joy. He received everybody kindly, and was himself received in return with transports, more especially by those whom there was ground to reproach. The people of Paris, on hearing of his return, ran under the window of the Tuileries, and during the day filled the courts and garden of the palace. The first consul was obliged to show himself several times to the people. In the evening the city of Paris was spontaneously illuminated. They celebrated with delight a miraculous victory, the certain presage of a peace ardently wished. That day affected so deeply him who was the object of this homage, that twenty years afterwards in loneliness, exiled, a prisoner in the midst of the Atlantic Ocean, he counted it, in recalling the scenes of other times, as among the most delightful of his life.

On the following day the various bodies of the state waited upon him, and gave the first example of those felicitations, of that distasteful spectacle, which has been renewed so many times under every reign. There were seen at the Tuileries, the senate, the legislative body, the tribunate, the great

[1] At the storming of the Bastile, in 1789.

[2] Dated Milan, June 22nd.—State Paper Office.

tribunals, the prefecture of the Seine, the authorities civil and military, the directors of the bank of France, finally, the institute and the learned societies. These great bodies attended to compliment the victor of Marengo, and addressed him as they formerly spoke, and as they have spoken since to kings. But it must be said, that the language, although uniformly full of praise, was dictated by a sincere enthusiasm. In fact, the aspect of things had changed in a few months; the security that had succeeded to great troubles, a victory unparalleled had replaced France at the head of the European powers, the certainty of approaching peace putting an end to the anxieties of a general war; in fine, the prosperity already showing itself every where,—how should such great results, so soon realized, fail to transport every spirit! The president of the senate terminated his address as follows, and this may serve as an idea of all the others:—

"We are pleased to acknowledge that the country owes its safety to you; that to you the republic owes its consolidation, and the people a prosperity which in one day you have made succeed to ten years of the most stormy of revolutions."

While these things were passing in Italy and France, Moreau, on the banks of the Danube, continued his fine campaign against Kray. We left him manœuvring before Ulm to oblige the Austrians to quit that strong position. He had placed himself between the Iller and the Lech, supporting his left and his right on these two rivers, his front to the Danube, his rear to the city of Augsburg, ready to receive marshal Kray if he chose to fight, and, in waiting where he was, barring the road to the Alps, the essential condition of the general plan. If the success of Moreau had not been prompt or decisive, it had been sustained and fully sufficient to allow the first consul to accomplish in Italy all he had himself proposed to perform. But the moment was now come when the general of the army of the Rhine, emboldened by time and by the success of the army of reserve, was tempted to try a serious manœuvre to dislodge Kray from the position of Ulm. Now, that without a knowledge of the battle of Marengo, he knew the fortunate success of the passage of the Alps, Moreau had no fear about uncovering the mountains, having full freedom for all his movements. Of all the various manœuvres possible to reduce the position of Ulm, he preferred that which consisted in passing the Danube below that position, and forcing Kray to decamp by menacing the line of his retreat. This manœuvre was really the best. That which consisted in pushing on straight to Vienna by Munich was too bold for the character of Moreau, and perhaps it was premature also in the existing state of affairs. The plan which consisted in passing the Danube below and very near Ulm, to storm the Austrian camp, was hazardous, as every attack by main force must be; but to pass below Ulm, and by threatening Kray's line of retreat to oblige him to regain it, was, at the same time, the wisest and surest manœuvre.

From the 15th to the 18th of June, Moreau set himself in movement to execute his new resolve. The organization of his army, as before observed, had received certain changes in consequence of the departure of generals St. Cyr and St. Suzanne. Lecourbe always formed the right, and Moreau the centre at the head of the body of reserve. The corps of St. Cyr, under the orders of general Grenier, composed the left. The corps of St. Suzanne, reduced to the proportions of one strong division, and confided to the command of the audacious Richepanse, had to perform the duty of a corps of flankers, that at the moment had the charge of observing Ulm, while the army manœuvred below that city.

There had been some fighting before Ulm, more particularly on the 5th of June, when two French divisions made head against forty thousand Austrians. This was part of the object of Kray, in order to detain the French before Ulm, by continuing to keep them employed. On the 18th of June Richepanse was in sight of Ulm; Grenier, with the left, at Guntzburg; the centre, composed of the corps of reserve, at Burgau; and Lecourbe, with the right, extended as far as Dillingen. The enemy had destroyed the bridges from Ulm as far as Donauwerth. But an observation made by Lecourbe decided Moreau to choose the points of Blindheim[1] and Gremheim to cross the Danube, because at these two places the bridges were imperfectly destroyed, and might be easily repaired. Lecourbe was charged with this dangerous operation. In order to facilitate, general Boyer was reinforced with five battalions and the entire reserve of cavalry under the orders of general Hautpoul. The centre, under the general-in-chief, moved from Burgau to Aislingen, to be at hand to support the passage. Grenier, with the left, was ordered to make an attempt on his side, in order to attract the attention of the enemy.

On the 19th of June, in the morning, Lecourbe posted his troops between the villages of Blindheim and Gremheim, the bridges of which were only partially destroyed, and he took care to shelter himself behind some clumps of trees. He had no bridge equipage, and possessed only a quantity of boards. He supplied by his courage the want of every thing else. General Gudin directed, under Lecourbe, this attempt at a passage. Some guns were placed on the bank of the Danube to keep off the enemy; and at the same time, Quenot, the adjutant, threw himself courageously into the water, in order to seize upon two large boats that were lying on the other side. This gallant officer brought them over under a shower of balls, and unhurt, save by a slight wound in the foot. The best swimmers of the division were chosen; they placed their clothes and arms in the two boats, and plunged into the Danube under the enemy's fire. On reaching the opposite bank, and without taking time to put on their clothes, they seized their arms and flew upon some companies of the Austrians protecting that part of the river, dispersed them, and took two pieces of cannon with the ammunition waggons. This being achieved, the soldiers hastened to the bridges, the piles of which were still standing; they worked hard on both banks, placing ladders and planks, to establish a communication. Some artillery soldiers availed themselves of it to cross to the other side of the Danube, in order to employ against the enemy the

[1] Blenheim!—*Translator.*

two guns which had been thus taken from him. The French were soon masters of both banks of the river, and had sufficiently established the bridges to afford a passage to the greater part of the troops. The infantry and cavalry began to pass over. It was expected that numerous Austrian reinforcements would promptly ascend from Donauwerth, and descend from all the upper positions, Gundelfingen, Guntzburg, and Ulm. Lecourbe, who had himself repaired to the spot, placed all the infantry he could spare, with some cavalry troops, in the village of Schwenningen, which is situated on the road to Donauwerth. This was an important point, because by that road it was that the Austrians who ascended the Danube must arrive. It was not long, in consequence, before four thousand infantry, five hundred horse, and six pieces of cannon showed themselves, and attacked the village, which, for the space of two hours, was several times taken and retaken. The superiority of the Austrians in numbers, and their determination to retake so important a post, had nearly given them the victory over the French, and obliged them to abandon the village, when Lecourbe was seasonably reinforced by two squadrons of carabiniers. To these he joined some troops of the 8th hussars, that happened to be at hand, and sent them upon the enemy's infantry, which extended itself on the vast plain towards the bank of the Danube. The charge was executed with so much vigour and promptitude, that the Austrians were routed, leaving to the French their artillery, two thousand prisoners, and three hundred horses. Two battalions of Wurtembergers, who endeavoured to resist by forming themselves into squares, were broken like the rest. After this brilliant action, fought by the brigade of Puthod, Lecourbe had no more to fear on the side of the Lower Danube. But it was not on that side from which he had to fear the greatest dangers. The main body of the Austrians being posted above, or at Dillingen, Gundelfingen, and Ulm, it was necessary to turn himself to that side in order to face the enemy, who was about to descend. Happily the divisions of Montrichard, Gudin, and the reserve of Hautpoul had passed over the re-established bridges of Gremheim and Blindheim, and bordered upon the famous plain of Hochstedt, rendered so sadly celebrated for the French in the time of Louis XIV., on the 13th of August, 1704. The enemy, having hurried from all the nearest points to Dillingen, at some distance from Hochstedt, was drawn up near the Danube, the infantry upon the French left, along the marshes of that river, and behind some clumps of wood, the cavalry on their right in great force. Thus they presented themselves in good order, awaiting the reinforcements which were approaching, and slowly retiring to draw nearer to them. The 37th demi-brigade and a squadron of the 9th hussars followed, step and step, the retrograde movement of the Austrians. Lecourbe, disembarrassed, by the combat of Schwenningen, of the enemy who might have come from the Lower Danube, arrived at a gallop at the head of the 2nd regiment of carabiniers, of the cuirassiers, the 6th and 9th cavalry, and the 9th hussars: this was nearly all the reserve cavalry of general Hautpoul. They were upon a plain, separated from the enemy by a little water-course, called the Egge, on which was the village of Schrezheim. Lecourbe, at the head of the cuirassiers, crossed the village at full gallop, formed as they issued out of it, and rushed upon the Austrian cavalry, who, surprised at the suddenness and rapidity of the charge, fell back in disorder, and left uncovered nine thousand infantry, whom it was designed to protect. The infantry thus abandoned would have thrown themselves into the ditches that burrow the banks of the Danube towards Dillingen; but the cuirassiers, well directed, cut the column, separating one thousand eight hundred men, who were made prisoners.

This was the second fortunate act in the day due in part to the cavalry, but it was not the last. Lecourbe placed himself on the Egge, waiting for the rest of his resources that was coming by the bridge of Dillingen, which had fallen into the hands of the French. Kray's cavalry hurried forward with all expedition, outstripped the infantry, and arranged itself in two grand lines in the plain at the rear of Lauingen. This was an excellent opportunity for the French cavalry to take advantage of the spirit which had inspired them through the successes of the morning, and to measure themselves in the plain, with the numerous and brilliant squadrons of the Austrian army. Lecourbe, having occupied Lauingen with his infantry, united with Hautpoul's all the cavalry of his divisions, and formed it on the plain, offering to the enemy that kind of challenge which was likely to tempt him on account of the numbers and quality of his horse. The first of the Austrian lines charged the French at full speed with the steadiness and order natural to a well-trained cavalry. It drove back the 2d regiment of carabiniers, which had conducted itself so well in the morning, and the squadrons of hussars which had charged along with it. The French cuirassiers then advanced, rallied the hussars and carabiniers, who faced about on seeing they were supported; and the whole united dashed forward upon the Austrian squadrons, which they in turn drove back. On seeing this, the second line of the enemy's cavalry advanced, and having the advantage of the impulse over the French, whom the former charge had separated, obliged them to fall back with precipitation. The 9th was in reserve, and, manœuvring with skill and steadiness, attacked the Austrian flank by surprise, threw it into confusion, and secured to the victorious French squadrons the plains of Hochstedt.

The losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners, could not be great, since it is only the encounters of cavalry with infantry that are serious in this respect. But the plain remained in possession of the French, whose cavalry now claimed a real advantage over that of the Austrians, which it never before exhibited. Each French military arm had a decided superiority over that of the enemy. It was eight o'clock, and in the long days of June, there was still time for the imperialists to dispute the left bank of the Danube, so gloriously conquered in the morning. Eight thousand infantry advanced to the assistance of the corps already beaten, followed by a numerous artillery. Moreau arrived at the head of the reserve. A new and more obstinate contest then commenced. The French infantry in turn attacked the Austrian under a fire of round and grape shot. The soldiers of Kray, who fought for a great stake—the preser-

vation of Ulm, displayed great energy. Moreau found himself several times engaged in person in the midst of the fray; and his infantry, supported by the cavalry, which returned to the charge, remained victorious at eleven o'clock at night. At the same moment the 37th demi-brigade entered into Gundelfingen, from which time all the positions on the plain were in the power of the French. They had crossed the Danube, taken five thousand prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, twelve hundred horses, three hundred carriages, and considerable magazines at Donauwerth. The fighting had lasted for eighteen hours successively. This affair, which changed the unfortunate recollection of Hochstedt into one equally glorious, was, after Marengo, the finest operation of the campaign, and was alike honourable to Lecourbe and Moreau. The last had slowly acquired hardihood: stimulated by the examples which Italy afforded, he had entered upon more enlarged views, and had culled a laurel of that tree from which the first consul had gathered such evergreen wreaths,—a rivalry noble and happy, had it never extended further.

After a manœuvre so hardy and decisive on the part of his adversary, Kray could not much longer remain in Ulm, without being cut off from his communications with Vienna. To march up directly to the French, and offer them battle, would be too hazardous a measure, with forces in whom the courage had been so damped by the late combat. He hurried himself for the purpose of decamping the same night. He sent off in advance his park, consisting of several thousand carriages, and the next morning followed it with the main body of his army on the route to Nordlingen. He marched in frightful weather over roads that the rain had entirely torn up. Nevertheless, the rapidity of his retreat was such, that in twenty-four hours he arrived at Neresheim. In order to support his dispirited troops, he gave out that a suspension of arms had been signed in Italy, and that it would be extended into Germany; peace not failing to succeed. This news diffused joy among his soldiers, and gave them some energy. They arrived at Nordlingen.

Moreau was apprised too late of the departure of the enemy. Richepanse had not perceived the evacuation of Ulm until the last detachments were retiring. He immediately made known the circumstance to his commander-in-chief. But during the interval the Austrians had gained the advance; and the bad weather, which had existed for two days, did not permit him to overtake them, even by a forced march. Still Moreau arrived at Nordlingen on the 23d of June, in the evening, and pressed upon the rear-guard of Kray, who continued to retire. Seeing, that from the bad state of the roads, he could not gain upon the Austrian army so as to overtake it, and that he might not be drawn on into a fruitless pursuit for an unseen distance, Moreau determined to halt, and choose a position adapted to the present state of things. Kray, concealing the good news of the battle of Marengo, which was not then known to the French army, sent to announce the suspension of arms, concluded in Italy, and proposed a like stipulation for Germany. Moreau, suspecting from this that some great events had occurred on the other side of the Alps, did not doubt their being propitious, and expecting every instant a courier, who would put him in possession of the information, he would conclude nothing before he learned the particulars, and, above all, before he had secured better cantonments for his army. He therefore took the resolution of re-passing the Danube, confiding to Richepanse the investment of the two principal places on that river, Ulm and Ingoldstadt, and proceeding with the main body of his army to the other side of the Lech, in order to occupy Augsburg and Munich, and to secure a part of Bavaria for provisions; in fine, to conquer all the bridges of the Isar, and acquire all the roads leading to the Inn.

Moreau accordingly repassed the Danube and the Lech, by Donauwerth and Rhain, moving his different corps by Pottmess and Pfaffenhofen, as far as the banks of the Isar. On that river he occupied the points of Landshut, Moosburg, Freisingen, and detached Decaen upon Munich, which he entered, as if in triumph, on the 28th of June. Whilst he executed this movement, the armies encountered each other for the last time, and fought a battle without an object. This took place at Neuburg, on the right bank of the Danube, while both were marching on the Isar. A French division having separated itself at too great a distance from the rest of the army, had to maintain a long and obstinate contest, in which it was at last successful, after sustaining a severe loss in that of the brave Latour d'Auvergne. This illustrious soldier, honoured by Bonaparte with the name of the first grenadier of France, was killed by the thrust of a lance through his heart. The army shed tears upon his tomb, and did not quit the field of battle until they had raised a monument over his remains.

On the 3d of July, or 14th Messidor, Moreau was in the midst of Bavaria, blocking Ulm and Ingoldstadt, on the Danube, and occupying on the Isar, Landshut, Moosburg, Freisingen, and Munich. It was now time to think of the Tyrol, and to take from the prince de Reuss the strong positions of which he was master along the mountains, at the sources of the Iller, the Lech, and the Isar—positions through which he was always able to annoy the French. He was not very dangerous to encounter, but his presence obliged the French to make considerable detachments, and he became the subject of continual occupation for the right wing. To this end, general Molitor was reinforced, and put in possession of the means for attacking the Grisons and the Tyrol. The positions of Fussen, Reitti, Immenstadt, and Feldkirch, were taken in succession, in a prompt and brilliant manner; and our establishments on the Isar were thus perfectly consolidated.

Kray had repassed the Isar, and placed himself behind the Inn, occupying, in advance of the river, the camp of Ampfing, and the bridge heads of Wasserburg and of Mühldorf. It was the middle of July, or end of Messidor. The French government had left to general Moreau the liberty of acting as he pleased, and to lay by his arms when he thought it convenient. He imagined, with some reason, that it was not right he alone should remain fighting. The rest which the soldiers of the army of Italy enjoyed, was envied by the soldiers of Germany; further, the army of the Rhine, between the Isar and the Inn, had a much more advanced position than the army of Italy,

and had thus one of its flanks uncovered. Although an article in the treaty of Alexandria interdicted both Austrians and French from sending detachments into Germany, it was possible that this stipulation might not be scrupulously kept, and that the army of the Rhine might soon expect an increase of enemies upon its hands. Moreau, who had received several propositions from marshal Kray, determined at last to listen to them; and on the 15th of July, or 26th Messidor, he consented to sign at Parsdorf, a place in advance of Munich, a suspension of arms nearly conformable to that of Italy.

Both armies were to retire, each behind a line of demarcation, which, parting from Balzers in the Grisons, passed along the Tyrol, ran between the Isar and the Inn at an equal distance from both rivers, and fell to Wilshofen on the Danube, ascending that river as far as the mouth of the Alt-Mühl, and following the Alt-Mühl, the Rednitz, and the Mayn, as far as Mayence: the fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt, remaining blockaded; but every fifteen days they might receive a quantity of provisions in proportion to the strength of their garrisons. The two armies had to give twelve days' notice before the commencement of hostilities. The French army had Franconia from which to draw its provisions, as well as Swabia, and a large part of Bavaria. The French troops posted upon the Mincio on one side of the Alps, and on the other upon the Isar, were now about to receive, for their toils and privations, a compensation from the rich plains of Italy and Germany. These brave men had merited it by the greatest exploits that had yet signalized the arms of France. The army of the Rhine, although it had not cast so bright a lustre as the army of Italy, had still distinguished itself by a campaign conducted with as much sagacity as energy. The last great event of the campaign, the passage of the Danube at Hochstedt, might take a place by the side of the finest feats of arms in the military history of France. Public opinion, which in 1799 had not been favourable to Moreau, had, in 1800, become almost partial in his behalf. After the name of Bonaparte—it is true at a great distance, but such a distance as that the distinction was flattering—was heard without cessation the name of Moreau; and as public opinion is fluctuating, this year he had completely occupied the place of the conqueror of Zurich, by whom the preceding year he had been eclipsed.

The news of the brilliant success of the army of the Rhine completed the public satisfaction produced by the extraordinary success of the army of Italy, and changed into certainty the hopes of peace with which every mind was filled. There was general joy. The public funds, the five per cents., which sold at thirteen francs before the 18th Brumaire, mounted to forty. A decree of the consuls announced to the fundholders, that in the first half year of the year IX. the dividends falling due on the 22nd of September, 1800, would be wholly paid in specie. Agreeable tidings, such as had not for a long while been imparted to the unfortunate state creditors. All these benefits were attributed to the armies, to the generals who had led them to victory, but principally to young Bonaparte, who knew well how at the same time to govern and to fight in a superior manner. Therefore the fête of the 14th of July, one of the two republican solemnities preserved by the constitution, was celebrated in the most splendid manner. A very magnificent ceremony was prepared at the Invalides. The musical composer, Mehul, prepared some fine pieces; and the first Italian singers of Italy, that about this period became deprived of its master-pieces and its artists, were brought to Paris to execute them. After hearing the performances under the dome of the Invalides, the first consul, accompanied by a numerous staff, went to the Champ de Mars to review the consular guard. It had arrived that same morning, covered with dust, its clothes in tatters, not having stopped on the march from the day after the battle of Marengo, in order to be punctual at the meeting appointed with the first consul for the 14th of July. The consular guard brought the colours taken in the late campaign, to be placed in the general depository of the French military trophies. The crowd, which lined both sides of the Champ de Mars, rushed forward to obtain a nearer view of the heroes of Marengo. The intoxication of the public joy was carried to such an extent as well nigh to produce accidents. The first consul was a long while pressed up in the crowd. He entered the Tuileries surrounded by the multitude that pressed upon his steps. The entire day was devoted to public rejoicing.

Some days afterwards, upon the 21st of July, or 2nd Thermidor, the arrival of count St. Julien in Paris was announced, an officer in the confidence of the emperor of Germany, charged to carry to Paris the ratification of the convention of Alexandria, and to confer with the first consul upon the conditions of the approaching peace. No doubt was then entertained of the conclusion of the pacification so much desired, which should put an end to the second coalition. France, it may be said, had never before seen such delightful days.

BOOK V.

HELIOPOLIS.

STATE OF EGYPT AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF BONAPARTE.—DEEP GRIEF OF THE ARMY, AND DESIRE TO RETURN TO FRANCE.—KLÉBER INCREASES, IN PLACE OF REPRESSING, THE FEELING.—HIS REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE COLONY.—THE REPORT DESIGNED FOR THE DIRECTORY IS RECEIVED BY THE FIRST CONSUL.—FALSEHOODS IT CONTAINED.—GREAT RESOURCES OF THE COLONY, AND FACILITY OF ITS PRESERVATION TO FRANCE.—KLÉBER DRAWN ON BY THE FEELINGS HE HAD ENCOURAGED, IS BROUGHT TO TREAT WITH THE TURKS AND ENGLISH.—CULPABLE CONVENTION OF EL-ARISCH, STIPULATING FOR THE EVACUATION OF EGYPT.—REFUSAL OF THE ENGLISH TO EXECUTE THE CONVENTION, THEY CALCULATING THAT THE FRENCH MUST LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS.—NOBLE INDIGNATION OF KLÉBER.—RUPTURE OF THE ARMISTICE AND BATTLE OF HELIOPOLIS.—DISPERSION OF THE TURKS.—KLÉBER PURSUES THEM TO THE FRONTIERS OF SYRIA.—TAKES THE CAMP OF THE VIZIER.—REPARTITION OF THE ARMY IN LOWER EGYPT.—RETURN OF KLÉBER TO CAIRO, IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE CITY, BROKEN OUT INTO INSURRECTION DURING HIS ABSENCE.—HAPPY TEMPORIZING OF KLÉBER.—HAVING COLLECTED HIS MEANS, HE ATTACKS AND RETAKES THE CITY.—GENERAL SUBMISSION.—ALLIANCE WITH MURAD BEY.—KLÉBER, WHO THOUGHT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP EGYPT WHEN SUBDUED, RECONQUERS IT IN THIRTY-FIVE DAYS FROM THE TURKISH FORCES AND THE REVOLTED EGYPTIANS.—HIS FAULTS ALL GLORIOUSLY EFFACED.—EMOTION OF THE MUSSULMAN PEOPLE IN LEARNING THAT EGYPT REMAINS IN THE HANDS OF THE INFIDELS.—A FANATIC TRAVELS FROM PALESTINE TO CAIRO, TO ASSASSINATE KLÉBER.—UNFORTUNATE DEATH OF THE LATTER, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COLONY.—PRESENT TRANQUILLITY.—KLÉBER AND DESAIX BOTH KILLED ON THE SAME DAY.—CHARACTERS AND LIVES OF THOSE TWO CELEBRATED WARRIORS.

In August, 1799, Bonaparte, upon receiving intelligence from Europe, decided that he would quit Egypt suddenly, and ordered Admiral Ganteaume to send to sea from the port of Alexandria the Muiron and the Carère frigates, the only ships which remained after the destruction of the flotilla, and to bring them to an anchor in the little road of Marabout. It was there that he intended to embark, about two leagues west from Alexandria. He took with him the generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy, Marmont, and two learned men of whom he was most fond, Monge and Berthollet. On the 22nd of August, or 5th Fructidor, year VII., he went to Marabout, and embarked precipitately, continually in fear that the English squadron would appear. The horses that had served to bring his party to the spot were left upon the shore, and went off full gallop towards Alexandria. The sight of the horses ready saddled, and deprived of their riders, occasioned considerable alarm. It was believed that some accident had happened to the officers of the garrison, and a body of cavalry was detached in pursuit. Soon afterwards a Turkish groom, who had assisted at the embarkation, explained all as it had really occurred; and Menou, who was alone acquainted with the secret from the beginning, announced in Alexandria the departure of Bonaparte, and the appointment which he had made of Kléber as his successor. Kléber had an appointment with Bonaparte at Rosetta for the 23rd of August; but Bonaparte, anxious to embark, had gone without attending to it. Besides, in imposing upon Kléber the heavy burthen of the command, he was spared the trouble of either objection or refusal, by leaving him the absolute order.

This intelligence caused a sorrowful surprise to the army. At first nobody credited it: general Dugua, commanding at Rosetta, made a contradiction of the statement, not believing it himself, and fearing for the bad effect it might produce. All doubt upon the subject soon became impossible, and Kléber was officially proclaimed the successor of general Bonaparte. Officers and soldiers were in a state of consternation. The ascendency exercised by the conqueror of Italy over the soldiery was required for the purpose of drawing them after him into distant and unknown lands; it would soon require that ascendency to retain them in due subordination. The regard for home is a passion which becomes violent when the distance and strangeness of the place, and fears of the impossibility of return, increase the irritation of the feeling. Often, in Egypt, this passion caused murmurings, and sometimes suicides. But the presence of the general-in-chief, his address, and his incessant activity, expelled all gloomy feelings. Always knowing how to occupy himself and to occupy others, he captivated to the highest pitch, and dissipated around him those irksome sensations, or prevented their having birth, to which he himself was utterly foreign. The troops often said, that they should never return to France,—that they should never more recross the Mediterranean,—now more than ever since the fleet of Aboukir was destroyed; but general Bonaparte was there, and with him they would go any where, and find a way home again, or make a new country for themselves. Bonaparte being gone, the face of every thing was changed. Thus the news came upon them like a thunderbolt. The worst epithets were made descriptive of his act of departure. They did not consider that irresistible impulse of patriotism and ambition which, at the news of the disasters of the republic, had induced him to return to France. They saw nothing but the abandonment of the unfortunate army which had so much confidence in his genius as to induce it to follow him. They said to themselves, that he himself must be convinced of the hopelessness of the enterprise, of the impossibility of making it succeed, since he had eloped and given up to others that which he himself con-

sidered to be altogether impracticable. But thus to start off alone, leaving beyond the sea those whom he had thus compromised,—it was a cruelty, even a cowardice, according to certain slanderers; for he always had some, that were even very near his person, throughout the most brilliant epochs of his career.

Kléber was not attached to Bonaparte, and bore his ascendency with a species of impatience. If he restrained this feeling in his presence, he showed it elsewhere by improper remarks. Fanciful, and given to grumble, Kléber had greatly desired to take a part in the expedition to Egypt, in order to get himself out of that state of disfavour in which he was suffered to live under the directory, and now he was regretting his having quitted the banks of the Rhine for those of the Nile. With a feebleness unworthy of his character, he permitted his feelings to display themselves; and this man, so great in danger, gave way to them as much as the lowest of his soldiers could have done. The commandership-in-chief did not balance in him the necessity of living in Egypt, because he was not fond of command. Pushing on the discontent against Bonaparte, he committed the fault, that might be called criminal, if heroic acts had not repaired them, of himself contributing to produce a dissatisfaction in the army which very soon became general. Following his example, every body began to declare that they would not stay any longer in Egypt, and that it was necessary at any cost to return to France. Other sentiments mingled with this passion for returning, calculated to subvert the spirit of the army, and give occasion to the most mischievous resolutions.

An old spirit of rivalry then and for a good while before had divided the officers who once belonged to the armies of Italy and of the Rhine. They were jealous of each other, one party pretending against the other, that it carried on warlike operations in a superior manner; and although this rival feeling was repressed during the presence of Bonaparte, it was in reality the principal cause of the difference of their opinions. All those who came from the army on the Rhine, had little attachment for the Egyptian expedition; while the officers who had composed part of the army of Italy, though feeling melancholy at being so far from France, were in favour of the expedition, because it was the work of their commander-in-chief. After his departure all restraint disappeared. They tumultuously ranged around Kléber, and repeated loudly with him, what began to take hold of every body's mind, that the conquest of Egypt was an insensate expedition, which should be abandoned at the earliest possible moment. Nevertheless, there were some of an opposite way of thinking; several generals, such as Lanusse, Menou, Davout, Desaix, more particularly, manifested different sentiments. Hence there were two parties, one called the colonist, the other the anti-colonist. Unhappily Desaix was absent. He had accomplished the conquest of Upper Egypt, where he had fought several brilliant actions, and governed with great ability. His influence could not, therefore, be opposed at that moment to Kléber's. To complete the misfortune, he was not to remain in Egypt: Bonaparte, wishing to have him near his person, had committed the error of not nominating him commander-in-chief, but left an order for him to return to Europe as soon as possible. Desaix, whose name was universally cherished and respected in the army, and whose talents for government equalled his military ability, would have administered the government well, and would have avoided all those weaknesses to which Kléber delivered himself over, at least for the moment.

Still Kléber was the most popular general among the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with the utmost confidence, and it consoled them in some degree for the loss of the great general who had quitted them. The first impression once passed, their minds, though they had not perfectly recovered their usual equilibrium, were become more calm and sensitive to justice. A different kind of conversation was held: they said, that, after all, Bonaparte was obliged to fly to the aid of France when in danger; and that besides, the army once established in Egypt, the best thing he could do for it was to go to Paris, in order to explain there its situation and necessities, and to demand the succours which he alone would be able to extort from the negligence of the government.

Kléber returned to Cairo, took the command with a species of ostentation, and placed his quarters in the Ezbekyeh, in the fine Arab house which had been inhabited by his predecessor. He displayed a degree of pomp, less to satisfy his own taste, than to present an imposing appearance before the orientals, and determined to make his authority felt by exercising it with vigour. But it was not a long while before the cares of the commandership-in-chief became unbearable to him: the new dangers with which the Turks and English threatened Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his heart with the most gloomy discouragements. After having received a report of the state of the colony, made at his order, he addressed to the directory at home a despatch full of errors, and with it sent a report of the administrator of the finances, Poussielgue, in which things were represented under a false aspect, and more particularly accusatory of Bonaparte himself.

In this despatch and the report, dated the 26th of September, or 4th Vendémiaire, year VIII., general Kléber and the commissary, Poussielgue, said that the army, already diminished one-half, found itself at that moment reduced to about 15,000 men; that it was nearly naked, which in that climate was extremely dangerous, on account of the difference of the temperature between the day and night; that they were in want of cannon, muskets, projectiles, and powder, all which things it was difficult to replace there, because iron for casting, lead, and timber for building, and materials for making powder, were not to be obtained in Egypt: then there was a large deficiency in the finances, as the sum of 4,000,000f. was due to the soldiers for pay, and 7,000,000 or 8,000,000f. to contractors, for various services; that the resources for establishing contributions were already exhausted, the country being ready to revolt if new ones were laid on; that the inundation not being great that year, and the crops likely to be deficient, the means and the will to pay the impost were equally unavailable with the Egyptians; that dangers of every kind threatened the colony; that the two old chiefs of the Mamelukes, Murad-Bey and Ibrahim-Bey, main-

tained their ground, one in Upper, the other Lower Egypt. That the celebrated pacha of Egypt, Djezzar, was about sending to the Turkish army a reinforcement of 30,000 excellent soldiers, the former defenders of St. Jean d'Acre against the French; that the grand vizier himself had left Constantinople, and had already arrived in the neighbourhood of Damascus with a powerful army; that the Russians and the English had united a regular force with the irregular Turkish soldiers; that in this extremity there remained but one resource, which was to treat with the Porte; that Bonaparte, in having given the example and express authority in the instructions left for his successor, an attempt was about to be made to stipulate with the grand vizier, for a sort of mixed government, by which the Porte should occupy the open part of Egypt, and levy the miri, or land-tax, while the French should occupy the towns and forts, and receive the revenue of the customs. Kléber added, that the general-in-chief had seen the crisis approaching, and that it was the real cause of his precipitate departure. Poussielgue finished his report by a gross calumny, saying that Bonaparte, in quitting Egypt, had taken with him 2,000,000 f. It must be added, that Bonaparte had heaped benefits upon the head of Poussielgue.

Such were the dispatches sent to the directory by Kléber and Poussielgue. Bonaparte was treated in them as an individual supposed to be lost, and to whom no regard need be had. He was believed to be exposed to the double danger of capture by the English, and of condemnation by the directory, for having quitted his army. What would have been the embarrassment of those who wrote these communications, if they had known that they were to be opened and read by him who was the object of their calumny, become in the interim the absolute head of the government!

Kléber, too careless to assure himself of the true state of things, did not think of examining whether the statements thus sent were in accordance with his own assertions. Kléber did not imagine he was stating what was untrue; he transmitted, through negligence or ill-humour, the sayings that excited feelings had multiplied around him, so far as to establish for them a species of public notoriety. These despatches were confided to a cousin of the director Barras, and were accompanied by a multitude of letters, in which the officers of the army expressed their despair to a degree equally imprudent and unjust. This cousin of Barras was taken by the English. He threw overboard the despatches, of which he was bearer, in a great hurry; but the packet swam, was seen, recovered, and sent to the British cabinet. The effect of these mischievous communications will be soon seen; the despatches, in the hands of the English, were soon published all over Europe.

At the same time Kléber and Poussielgue had sent their despatches to Paris in duplicate. The last arrived safe, and was handed over to the first consul.

What truth was there in these pictures drawn by diseased fancies? This may soon be judged in a certain manner, by the events themselves; but in the interim it is proper to rectify the false assertions which have been just stated.

The army, according to Kléber, was reduced to fifteen thousand men, yet the returns to the directory made them twenty-eight thousand five hundred. When two years afterwards it was brought back to France there were still twenty-two thousand soldiers in its ranks, and it had fought several great battles and innumerable actions. In 1798 there left France thirty-four thousand men; four thousand remained at Malta, thirty thousand therefore arrived at Alexandria. At a later period three thousand seamen, the remnant of those of the fleet destroyed at Aboukir, reinforced the army, which raised the number to thirty-three thousand. It had lost four or five thousand soldiers from 1798 to 1799; it was then reduced in 1800 to twenty-eight thousand men at least, of whom twenty-two thousand were fighting men.

Egypt is a healthy country, where wounds heal with wonderful rapidity; there were this year very few sick, and there was no plague. Egypt was full of Christians, Greeks, Syrians, and Copts, soliciting to enter into the French service, and it might have furnished excellent recruits to the number of fifteen or twenty thousand. The blacks of Darfour, bought and made free, supplied five hundred good soldiers to one of the demi-brigades. Moreover, Egypt had submitted. The peasants who cultivated the land, habituated to obedience under every master, never dreamed of taking up arms. Except some tumults in the towns, there were none to fear save the undisciplined Turks coming from a distance, or English mercenaries brought by sea with great trouble. Against such enemies the French army was more than sufficient, if it was commanded not with genius, but merely with common judgment.

Kléber said, in his despatches, that the soldiers were nearly naked; but Bonaparte had left cloth for clothing them, and a month after the despatches were sent off the men were actually clothed anew. In any case Egypt abounded in cotton, which it produced for all Africa. It could not be difficult to procure them the stuffs by purchase, as they might have been levied in part of the imposts. As to provisions, Egypt is the granary of the countries that produce no corn. Grain, rice, beef, mutton, fowls, sugar, and coffee, were at a price there ten times less than in Europe. The markets were so low, that the army, although its finances were not over rich, was able to pay for every thing which it consumed; in other words, it conducted itself in Africa much better than Christian armies conduct themselves in Europe, because there, it is well-known, they live on the conquered country, and pay nothing. Kléber said that he wanted arms: there remained in his stores eleven thousand sabres, fifteen thousand muskets, fourteen or fifteen hundred cannon, of which one hundred and eighty were field pieces. Alexandria, that he said had been stripped of its artillery for the siege of St. Jean d'Acre, had more than three hundred pieces of cannon in battery. Then as to ammunition, there remained three millions of musket cartridges, twenty-seven thousand cannon cartridges, filled, and resources for making more, as there were still in the magazines two hundred thousand projectiles and eleven hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder. Subsequent events demonstrated the truth of these allegations, for the army continued

to fight for two years longer, and left to the English considerable stores. What, in fact, could have become in so short a time of the immense *matériel*, so carefully accumulated by Bonaparte on board the fleet which transported the army to Egypt?

Then in respect to the finances, the report of Kléber was equally untrue. The soldiers were paid up to the day. It is true, that nothing had yet been done in fixing the system of finance best adapted for provisioning the army without pressing upon the country; but the resources were in existence, and in maintaining only the imposts already established it was easy for the troops to live in abundance. There was money from the imposts of the year enough to pay all the current expenses, or more than 16,000,000 f. There was consequently no necessity for driving the population to revolt, by the establishment of fresh contributions. The accounts of the finances, made at a late period, prove that Egypt, well managed, could supply 25,000,000 f. per annum of revenue. At this rate she would not pay the half of what was taken, with a thousand vexations, by the numerous tyrants who oppressed the country, under the name of Mamelukes. At the price of things in Egypt, the army might live very well upon 18,000,000 f. or 20,000,000 f. As to the chests, so far was Bonaparte from having diminished them, that he had scarcely touched them, and at his departure had not even drawn the whole of his own pay.

In regard to the dangers with which the colony was threatened, this is the truth: Murad Bey, discouraged, was a fugitive in Upper Egypt, with a few Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who under the government of the Mamelukes, partook the sovereignty with Murad, was in Lower Egypt, towards the frontiers of Syria, with less than four hundred horse in place of some thousands. Djezzar Pacha was shut up in St. Jean d'Acre. So far was he from succouring the army of the vizier with thirty thousand men, that, on the contrary, he saw with displeasure the approach of this new Turkish army, now more than ever that his pachalic was freed from the French. As to the grand vizier, he had not yet passed the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon, and were at the moment thinking of employing them in Tuscany, Naples, or on the coast of France. In regard to a Russian expedition, that was a pure fable. The Russians had not yet thought of taking so long a voyage for the purpose of supporting the policy of England in the east.

The inhabitants were not, as was said, inclined to revolt. By managing the sheiks as Bonaparte had prescribed, the sheiks, who are the priests and lawyers of the Arabs, their good-will might soon be gained. We had commenced already to have a strong party among them. We had with us, besides, the Copts, the Greeks, and the Syrians, who being all Christians, behaved in regard to the French as friends and useful auxiliaries. Thus there was nothing imminent from this quarter to fear. It is not to be doubted that if the French had met with reverses, the Egyptians would do as the Italians themselves had done, with the fickleness of a conquered people. They would join the victors of to-day against the victors of yesterday. Still they felt the difference of the government that pressed upon them, robbed them, and was never without the sabre in its hand, and the French who respected their property, and very rarely struck off their heads.

Kléber had given way to these dangerous exaggerations, the melancholy result of hatred, ennui, and exile. By his side general Menou, observing every thing under the most favourable colours, believed the French in Europe to be invincible, and regarded the expedition as the first appearance of a considerable revolution in the commerce of the world. Men are unable to divest themselves sufficiently of their personal impressions in these kind of appreciations. Kléber and Menou were upright men, both honest; but one wanted to go away, the other to remain in Egypt. The clearest and most authentic statements signified opposite things in their views; misery and ruin for one, abundance and success for the other.

Whatever might be the situation of the country, Kléber and his party rendered themselves seriously culpable in thinking of an evacuation; because they had no right to do so. It is true that Bonaparte, in his instructions, full of sagacity, examining every possible case, had provided for that which might occur if the army should be obliged to evacuate Egypt. "I go," said he, "to France, either as a private or a public man; I will get succours sent to you. But if in the approaching spring," (he wrote in 1799,) "you have received neither succours nor instructions; if the plague should carry off above fifteen hundred men independently of losses by war; if a considerable force, which you will not be capable of resisting, should press you vigorously, negotiate with the vizier; even consent, if it must be so, to the evacuation, under one condition, that of recourse to the French government; and in the meantime continue the occupation. You will thus gain time; and it is not possible but that, in the interval, you will be succoured." These instructions were wise; but the case provided for was far from being realized. In the first place it was necessary to wait for the spring of 1800; it was necessary at that time for no succours, no orders to reach Egypt; it was necessary to have lost by the plague a part of the effective strength; and lastly, to have been pressed by superior forces: but nothing of the kind had occurred nor did occur. An open negotiation without these conditions was an act of real offence.

In September, 1799, Vendémiaire, year VII., Desaix, having completed the conquest and secured the submission of Upper Egypt, had left two moveable columns in pursuit of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace, on condition of his becoming the vassal of France. He had come back to Cairo by order of Kléber, who wished to have his name in the unfortunate negotiations into which he was about to enter. While these proceedings were going forward the army of the vizier, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who convoyed with his vessels the Turkish troops destined to proceed by sea, had arrived at Damietta with eight thousand janissaries. On the 1st of November, or 10th Brumaire, year VIII., the first disembarkation of four thousand janissaries took place, towards the Bogaz of Damietta, that is, at the entrance of the branch of the Nile which passes before that city. General Verdier, who had but

one thousand men at Damietta, went out with that number, and proceeded above the fort of Lesbeh, on a narrow tongue of land, on the shore of which the Turks had disembarked; and before the four thousand janissaries on the way could arrive, he attacked the four thousand that had already landed. In spite of the fire of the English artillery, placed advantageously on an old tower, he beat them, and killed or drowned more than three thousand, making the rest prisoners. The gun-boats, seeing the whole scene, returned to their vessels, and landed no more of the troops. The French had only twenty-two killed, and one hundred wounded.

At the news of this disembarkation Kléber sent Desaix with a column of three thousand men; but these, on arriving at Damietta, found the victory gained, and the French full of boundless confidence. This brilliant feat of arms ought to have encouraged Kléber; unluckily, he was ruled at the time by his own chagrin and that of the army. He had led the minds, that led him in turn, to the fatal resolution of an immediate evacuation. Bonaparte was made the subject of new invectives. "This headstrong young man," said he, "who has exposed the French army to danger, and himself to other perils, in braving the seas and the English cruizers, to return to France,—this rash young man has not escaped the dangers of the passage. The wise generals, educated in the school of the army of the Rhine, ought to give up this wild scheme, and take back to Europe brave soldiers indispensable to the republic, threatened on all quarters.

In this disposition of mind Kléber sent one of his officers to the vizier, who had entered Syria, to make overtures of peace. Already Bonaparte, to embroil the vizier with the English, had had an idea of attempting to negotiate; though on his own part it was no more than a feint. His overtures were received with a haughty defiance. Those of Kléber obtained a better reception, by the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who prepared to play a prominent character in the affairs of Egypt.

This English officer of the navy had greatly contributed to prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d'Acre; he was proud of what he had done, and conceived a *ruse de guerre*, according to the expression of the English agents. It consisted in profiting, by a moment of weakness, to snatch from the French this precious conquest. As all the intercepted letters of the French officers showed clearly enough their ardent desire to return to France, Sir Sidney Smith wished to induce the army to negotiate, by subscribing a capitulation; and before the French government had time to give assent to or refuse the ratification, to embark it and throw it upon the coast of Europe. It was with this view that he disposed the grand vizier to listen to the overtures of Kléber. As to himself, he loaded the French officers with civilities; he allowed the news from Europe to reach them, but took care only to give such intelligence as was anterior to the 18th Brumaire[1]. Kléber, on his side, sent a negotiator to Sir Sidney Smith, the English being masters of the sea, and he wishing to have them as parties to the negotiation, so that the return of the army to France might be rendered practicable. Sir Sidney listened willingly to this message, and showed himself disposed to enter into an arrangement, adding, besides, that in virtue of a treaty dated the 5th of January, 1799, of which he had been the negotiator, there existed a triple alliance between Russia, England, and the Porte; that these powers were bound to make a common cause; and that, in consequence, no arrangement executed with the Porte would be binding, if it was not made in concurrence with the agents of the three courts. Sir Sidney Smith took, in these communications, the title of "minister plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty to the Ottoman Porte, commanding his squadron in the waters of the Levant."

Sir Sidney Smith here gave himself a title which he once had, but which he had ceased to hold after the arrival of lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople; and in reality he had at the moment no other power than such as belongs always to a military commander—that of signing military conventions, suspensions of arms, and similar documents.

Kléber, without closer examination, without knowing whether he was treating with agents accredited sufficiently, engaged in a blind manner in this perilous affair, into which he was drawn by a feeling common to the whole army, and which would have terminated ignominiously if, happily for him, Heaven had not endowed him with an heroic soul, which could not fail to recover him with glory, as soon as he became sensible of the extent of his error. He entered into the negotiations, and offered Sir Sidney Smith as well as the vizier, who had advanced as far as Gaza in Syria, to nominate officers furnished with full powers to treat. Feeling repugnant to the admittance of Turks into his camp, and unwilling, on the other hand, to risk his officers in the midst of the undisciplined army of the grand vizier, he conceived the place best to choose for the conferences would be the Tigre, Sir Sidney Smith's vessel.

Sir Sidney was cruising with only two vessels—which, by the way, sufficiently proved the possibility of communicating between France and Egypt; Sir Sidney had no more than one at that time; the other, the Theseus, being under repair at Cyprus. Rough weather frequently obliging him to stand off the coast, and his communications being neither prompt nor regular with the land, it took some time to receive his assent. At last his reply came; it intimated that he would appear successively off Alexandria and Damietta, to receive on board such officers as Kléber might send.

Kléber appointed Desaix and Poussielgue the

[1] [It would have been singular had Sir Sidney Smith communicated to general Kléber what had not then occurred. The 18th of Brumaire was the 9th of November, 1799. Kléber's correspondence with Sir Sidney began, Kléber himself says, (see his letter to the directory dated 10th Pluviôse, or January 30th,) a *few days before* the disembarkation of the janissaries at Damietta. The janissaries were disembarked and routed on the first of November. Sir Sidney could not then have known what occurred subsequently in Paris, therefore, on the 9th of that month. The negotiations went on in a more serious manner on the 22nd of December; at which date, even, it is probable Sir Sidney himself knew nothing of what must have gone from Paris to London, and would, in those days, have taken five or six weeks to reach Alexandria from London, at the usual estimate.—*Translator.*]

Desaix received by Sir Sidney Smith.—Kléber's unreasonable demands.—Sir Sidney's answer.—The grand vizier at El-Arisch.

commissary, who had so heavily slandered Bonaparte, and whom the Egyptians, in their Arabic phraseology, had denominated "sultan Kléber's vizier." Poussielgue was the advocate of the evacuation, Desaix was opposed to it. The last had made the utmost exertion to resist the torrent, and elevate the spirits of his companions in arms; and he had only charged himself with the negotiation commenced by Kléber, with the hope of protracting it, and gaining time for the arrival of orders and succours from France. Kléber, in order to excuse himself in the sight of Desaix, told him that Bonaparte was the first who had commanded treating with the Turks; that besides he had provided himself and authorized the advance of a treaty of evacuation in case of imminent danger. Desaix, ill-informed, hoped continually that the first vessel which arrived from France would clear up all obscurities, and perhaps change the deplorable state of the staff of the army. He parted with M. Poussielgue, and unable to join Sir Sidney Smith off Alexandria, found him before Damietta, and went on board the Tigre on the 22nd of December, 1799, or 1st of Nivôse, the year VIII., the same moment that Bonaparte was invested with the supreme power in France.

Sir Sidney Smith, who was delighted to have on board such a plenipotentiary as Desaix, treated him in the most flattering manner, and sought by every means of persuasion to bring him into the idea of evacuating Egypt.

Desaix knew perfectly well how to defend himself, and stuck to the conditions which his commander had instructed him to ask. These conditions, unacceptable to the English commander, were very convenient to Desaix, who wished to gain time; they were too, on the part of Kléber, very ill calculated, because they were so extravagant as to render agreement impossible. Kléber sought in the extended nature of the demand itself an excuse for his error. He demanded, for example, to be landed on any point of the continent he might choose, in order to afford the republic the aid of his army wherever it might be deemed of most service, retiring from Egypt with the honours of war, with arms and baggage. He demanded that the Porte should restore to France immediately the Venetian Islands, which by the treaty of Campo Formio had become subject to France; that is Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, and others, at that moment occupied by Turco-Russian garrisons; that these islands, and above all Malta, a much more important one, should be given up to France; that the possession of these should be guaranteed to her by the persons signing the treaty of evacuation; that the French army, on retiring, should have the right to reinforce and revictual the garrisons; lastly, that the treaty which united Turkey, Austria, and England, should be instantly annulled, and the triple alliance of the East dissolved.

These conditions were unreasonable it must be said; not that they were an exaggerated equivalent for what was given up in giving up Egypt, but because they were impossible to execute. Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this,—that officers, treating for a suspension of arms only, could not include objects of such a wide latitude in their negotiations. Zante, Cephalonia, and Corfu, were occupied by Turkish and Russian troops; it was required, therefore, to communicate with St. Petersburg as well as Constantinople. Malta was held under the king of Naples as lord paramount of the order; it could not be disposed of without the consent of that prince, who had always refused to cede it to France. To place French troops on the island at that moment was, in a manner, sufficient of itself to settle the question. There were to be found the cruizers of all the allied powers, that would not retire upon an order of Sir Sidney Smith or of the grand vizier. England, besides, would never consent to any condition which placed Malta in the hands of France. To land the French army on a point of the continent, where it would be able to change the combinations of the war by its unexpected appearance, was a piece of hardihood that a single commodore commanding a naval station would not take upon himself to permit. In fine, to abolish the treaty of the triple alliance, was to demand that Sir Sidney Smith should abrogate, on board his own ship, a treaty ratified by three great powers, which was of great importance for the East. Supposing that all these stipulations should be accepted by all the courts whose consent would be required, it was necessary to send to Naples, London, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople; this, then, could be no longer a military convention of evacuation, such as that signed at Marengo and executable at the instant. If it were referred to London, it must be referred to Paris, which Kléber had no desire should be done. All this, then, was evidently far beyond the limits of a military capitulation.

Sir Sidney Smith had no difficulty in making the French negotiators feel the cogency of these reasons. But he was urgent to settle two objects immediately,—the departure of the wounded and of the learned men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix demanded a safe-conduct, and a suspension of arms; because the army of the grand vizier, although marching slowly, would soon find itself in presence of the French army. It had arrived, in fact, before the port of El Arisch, the first French port on the Syrian frontier, and had already summoned it to surrender. Kléber, made acquainted with this circumstance, had written to Desaix, and prescribed to him, as an indispensable condition of the conference, that the Turkish army should halt on the frontier.

The first point, the departure of the wounded and the scientific men, rested with Sir Sidney Smith. He at once assented to it with great cheerfulness and much courtesy. As to the armistice, Sir Sidney said that he would demand it, but that the obtaining it did not depend upon himself; for the Turkish army was composed of barbarous and fanatical hordes, and it was extremely difficult to make a regular convention with it, and, above all, secure the execution. To remove this difficulty, he determined to proceed himself to the camp of the grand vizier, which was near Gaza. The negotiation had been proceeding for a fortnight on board the Tigre, while floating at the mercy of the winds off the coasts of Syria and Egypt. The parties had said all they had to say, and the negotiation could no longer continue to be useful, unless it were carried on near the grand vizier himself. Sir Sidney Smith therefore proposed to repair to the vizier's camp, and to conclude a sus-

pension of arms, and prepare for the arrival of the French negotintors, if he thought that he could procure for them respect and security. The proposition was accepted. Sir Sidney, profiting by a favourable moment, got off in a boat, which landed him on the coast, not without incurring some dangers, ordering the commanding officer of the Tigre to meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Desaix and Poussielgue were to be landed, if the place of conference should be changed to the camp of the grand vizier.

At the moment when the English commodore arrived at the grand vizier's camp, a horrible event had occurred at El-Arisch. The Turkish army, composed the smaller part of janissaries, and the larger of Asiatic militia, that the Mussulman laws place at the disposition of the Porte, presenting a confused and undisciplined body, was very formidable to those who wore the European dress. It had been levied in the name of the prophet, the Turks being told that this was the last effort to be made for driving the infidels out of Egypt; that the formidable "sultan of fire" (Bonaparte) had gone away from them; that they were enfeebled and discouraged; that it only sufficed for them to show themselves and to conquer; that all Egypt was ready to revolt against their domination. These, and other things, repeated every where, had brought seventy or eighty thousand Mussulman fanatics around the vizier. To the Turks were united the Mamelukes under Ibrahim Bey, that had for some time retired into Syria; and Murad Bey, who, by a long circuit, had descended from the cataracts to the vicinity of Suez, all became auxiliaries to their former adversaries. The English had made for this army a sort of field artillery drawn by mules. The Bedouin Arabs, in the hope of soon pillaging the vanquished, no matter of which side, placed fifteen thousand camels at the disposal of the grand vizier, to aid him in crossing the desert which separates Palestine from Egypt. The Turkish commander-in-chief had in his half barbarous staff some English officers and many of those culpable emigrants who had taught Djezzar Pacha how to defend St. Jean D'Acre. It will now be seen of what those miserable refugees became the cause.

The fort of El-Arisch, before which the Turks were at that moment, was, according to Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt; the other was Alexandria. On the same authority an army coming by sea could not land in any great number except upon the beach near Alexandria. An army coming by land, and having to cross the desert of Syria, was obliged to pass by El-Arisch, in order to obtain water at the wells situated there. Bonaparte had in consequence ordered works of defence to be constructed about Alexandria, and that El-Arisch also should be put into a state of defence. A body of three hundred men, well provided with ammunition and provisions, garrisoned the fort, and an able officer, named Cazals, commanded it. The Turkish advanced guard appearing before El-Arisch, it was summoned to surrender by colonel Douglas, an English officer in the Turkish service. A disguised French emigrant was the bearer of the summons to the commandant, Cazals. A parley took place, and the soldiers were told that the evacuation of Egypt would be immediate; that it was already announced as resolved upon; that it would soon be inevitable; and that it would be cruel to wish they should defend themselves. The culpable sentiments which the officers had too much encouraged in the army, then broke out. The soldiers garrisoning El-Arisch, having the same desire to leave Egypt as the rest of their comrades, declared to the commandant, that they would not fight, and that he must surrender the fort. The gallant Cazals called them together indignantly, addressed them in manly terms, told them that if there were cowards among them they had leave to quit the garrison and go over to the Turks, he giving them full license to do so; but that he would resist to the last with those Frenchmen who continued to be faithful to their duty. This address recalled for a moment the feeling of honour into the hearts of the men. The summons was rejected, and the attack begun. The Turks were not able to carry a position even tolerably defended. The batteries of the fort silenced their artillery. Directed by English and emigrant officers, notwithstanding this, they pushed their trenches to the salient angle of a bastion. The commandant ordered a sortie to be made by some grenadiers, in order to drive the Turks from the first branch of the trench. Captain Ferray, who was ordered on the duty, was only followed by three grenadiers. Seeing himself abandoned, he returned towards the fort. Meanwhile the mutineers had struck the colours, but a sergeant of grenadiers rehoisted them. A contest ensued. During this struggle, the scoundrels who insisted upon surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks, and these ferocious enemies, once hoisted up into the fort, fell sword in hand upon those who had admitted them, and massacred the larger part. The rest, coming to their senses, united with the remainder of the garrison, and, in despair, defending themselves with the utmost courage, were the larger part cut to pieces. Some few in number obtained quarter, thanks to colonel Douglas, owing their lives entirely to the intervention of that officer.

Thus fell the fort of El-Arisch. This was the first effect of the unhappy disposition of the mind of the army; the first fruit that the commanders gathered through their own errors.

It was the 30th of December, or 9th Nivôse: the letter, written by sir Sidney Smith to the grand vizier, to propose a suspension of arms, had not arrived in time to prevent the sad occurrence of El-Arisch. Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous sentiments, and this barbarous massacre of a French garrison was revolting to his feelings, and made him fear, in a more particular manner, the rupture of the negotiations. He sent in haste explanations of the affair to Kléber, as well in his own name as in that of the grand vizier; and he added the formal assurance that all hostilities should cease during the negotiations.

At the sight of these hordes, who resembled more an emigration of savages, than an army going to combat, actually fighting among themselves over their provisions at night for the possession of a well, sir Sidney Smith felt alarmed for the security of the French plenipotentiaries. He insisted that the tents destined for their reception should be situated in the same quarter as that of the grand vizier and reis effendi, who were both

present with the army; that a chosen body of troops should be placed around their tents; he placed his own near them, and, lastly, provided a body of English seamen, to secure from violence both himself and the French officers committed to his honour. Having taken these precautions, he sent to Jaffa in search of Desaix and Poussielgue, in order to bring them to the place of conference.

Kléber, when he heard of the massacre of El-Arisch, was not so indignant as he should have shown himself, being aware that if he were too warm about the affair, all negotiation might be broken off. He was more than ever urgent for a suspension of arms; and by way of prevention, as well as to be nearer the place of conference, he transferred his head-quarters to Salahieh, on the frontier of the desert, within two marches of El-Arisch.

In the meanwhile Desaix and Poussielgue, having the wind contrary, were not able to land at Gaza until the 11th of January, or 21st of Nivôse, nor to arrive at El-Arisch before the 13th. The conferences began upon their arrival; and Desaix nearly broke off the negotiation by his indignation. The Turks, barbarous and ignorant, put their own construction upon the conduct of the French; and from their disposition to treat, imagined they were afraid to fight, in place of desiring so immediately to return to France. They required, therefore, that the French army should surrender and become prisoners of war. Desaix was for terminating at that moment every kind of parley; but sir Sidney interposing, brought back both parties to more honourable terms, if there could be such for a convention of this character. It was no longer possible to put forward the first propositions of Kléber. Of this he had been informed by letters written from on board the Tigre, and he had ceased to speak of the Venetian islands, of Malta, and of the revictualling of those places. Still, to colour his negotiation, he held fast to the retirement of the Porte from the triple alliance. This point might in strictness have been negotiated at El-Arisch, because the reis effendi and the grand vizier were there; but it could hardly be required of the English negotiator, whose intervention was indispensable. The condition was therefore set aside with the others. It was a vain artifice that Kléber and his advisers employed towards themselves, to disguise in their own eyes the disgraceful nature of their conduct.

In a short time the simple and pure evacuation and its conditions became the sole subject. After long discussions it was agreed that hostilities should cease for three months; and that for these three months the grand vizier should employ himself in collecting in the ports of Rosetta, Aboukir, and Alexandria, the vessels required for the conveyance of the French army; that general Kléber should employ himself in evacuating Upper Egypt, Cairo, and the surrounding provinces, and in concentrating his troops for the purpose of embarkation; that the French should embark with arms and baggage, in other words, with the honours of war, taking with them such stores as they might require, and leaving the rest; that from the day of the signature of the treaty, they should cease to impose contributions, and abandon to the Porte those which remained due; but in return, that the French should receive three thousand purses of the value of 3,000,000 f., representing the sum necessary for their subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeïs, to be given up ten days after the ratification of the treaty, and Cairo in forty days afterwards. It was agreed that the ratification of the treaty should be returned by general Kléber alone in eight days, without having recourse to the French government. Lastly, sir Sidney Smith agreed, in his own name and that of the Russian commissioners, to furnish passports to the army, in order that it might sail free of the English cruisers.

The French commissioners here committed a grievous error. The signature of sir Sidney Smith was indispensable, because without his signature the sea would remain closed. They ought to have required this of sir Sidney Smith, as he was the negotiator of the convention. Then the mystery of his powers would have been cleared up. It would then have been seen, that the English commodore, having had formerly the power to treat with the Porte, had none at that moment, lord Elgin having arrived as minister at Constantinople; that he had no special instructions for the present case; and that he could alone have had a strong presumption that his conduct would be approved in London. Little versed in diplomatic usages, the French plenipotentiaries believed that sir Sidney Smith, in offering them passports, had the power to give them, and that such passports would be valid.

The conditions of the convention being thus terminated, nothing remained but to sign them. The noble heart of Desaix revolted at what he was obliged to do. Before he put his name to the paper, he sent for Savary, his aid-de-camp, and directed him to proceed to the head-quarters at Salahieh, where Kléber was, to communicate to him the draft of the convention, and to declare that he would not sign it until he had a formal order for that purpose. Savary went to Salahieh and acquitted himself of his commission to Kléber. That general, who had a confused feeling of his error, in order to cover it, called a council of war, to which all the generals of the army were summoned.

This council assembled on the 1st of January, 1800, or 1st Pluviôse, year VIII. The minutes still exist. It is painful to see brave men, who had spilled their blood and were going again to spill it in their country's service, accumulate miserable falsehoods to hide their criminal weakness. The example may well serve as a lesson to military officers, that it does not alone suffice to be firm in combat, but that the courage that braves balls and bullets is the least of the duties imposed upon their noble profession. Great weight was laid in this council of war upon the intelligence, then well known in Egypt, that the grand French and Spanish fleets had gone out of the Mediterranean into the ocean, from which it was inferred that all hope of aid from France was cut off. Five months had elapsed since the departure of Bonaparte, during which no despatch had been received. The discouragement of the army was also used as an argument which they had themselves contributed to produce. They cited what

had occurred recently at Rosetta and Alexandria, where the garrisons had threatened mutiny, behaving like that of El-Arisch, if they were not immediately sent back to Europe; they pretended further that the active force was reduced to eight thousand men; the force of the Turks was exaggerated beyond possibility; a pretended Russian expedition for the purpose of joining the grand vizier, an expedition existing only in the heated imagination of those who wished to quit Egypt at any cost; the impossibility of resistance was positively established—an assertion which was soon to be proved false, in a manner the most heroic, by the very persons who now advanced it; finally, to keep as near as possible to the instructions of Bonaparte, they alleged a few cases of plague, of very doubtful character, and absolutely unknown in the army.

In spite of all that was said, the partisans of the evacuation were far from conforming to the instructions left by Bonaparte. He had laid down four conditions: namely, if no succours, no orders, should arrive before the spring of 1800; if the plague should have carried off one thousand five hundred men, besides those lost in battle; if the danger was so great as to render all resistance impossible; and these events being realized, then he recommended, lastly, the gaining time by negotiating, and the admission of the evacuation only under the condition of its being ratified by France. It was still only January, 1800; there was no plague, no pressing danger; yet still an immediate evacuation was on the point of taking place, without any recourse to France. One who has shown in war something superior to courage—in other words, character—general Davout, afterwards prince of Eckmuhl, dared to oppose this culpable impulse. He did not fear to oppose Kléber, to whose influence all the rest submitted; and he combated with energy the idea of a capitulation. He was not listened to; and by an unhappy condescension, he consented to sign the resolution of the council of war, and left it to remain an entry in the minutes, that it had been adopted unanimously.

Davout, notwithstanding, took Savary aside, and told him to inform Desaix, that if he were willing to break off the negotiation, he would not want supporters in the army. Savary returned to El-Arisch, and stated what had occurred, and what he had been desired by Davout to say on his part. Desaix, seeing in the minutes of the deliberation the name of Davout, answered warmly to Savary, "In whom do you desire I should confide, when he who disapproves of the convention does not make it conformable to his opinion? He would have me disobey, and yet he dares not support to the end the opinion which he has expressed." Desaix, although deeply hurt upon seeing the torrent, suffered himself to be carried away with it, and subscribed his name, on the 28th of January, to this unfortunate convention, since so well known as the treaty of El-Arisch.

The thing being completed, every body began to feel the importance attached to it. Desaix returned to the camp, expressed himself with deep sorrow, not dissimulating his chagrin, that he had been appointed for such a mission, and forced to fulfil it by the order of the commander-in-chief. Davout, Menou, and some others broke out into bitter expressions, and divisions existed in all parts of the camp of Salahieh.

Nevertheless, preparations were made for the departure of the army, the main body of which was full of delight at the prospect of quitting those distant shores, and of soon returning to France. Sir Sidney Smith had returned on board. The vizier approached and took possession, one after another, of the entrenched posts of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeïs, that Kléber, pressed to carry out the convention, faithfully gave up. Kléber returned to Cairo to make his dispositions for departure, to recall his troops guarding Upper Egypt, concentrate his army, and direct it upon Rosetta and Alexandria, at the times specified for the embarkation.

While these events were taking place in Egypt, the unhappy consequences of a sentiment which the leaders of the army had strengthened in place of combating, other events, consequences of the same error, were taking place in Europe. The letters and despatches sent in duplicate had, as we have seen, arrived at the same time both in London and Paris. The despatch accusatory of Bonaparte, and designed for the directory, had been delivered into the hands of Bonaparte himself, become the head of the government. He was disgusted at such weaknesses and falsehoods; but he was well aware how much the army stood in need of Kléber; he appreciated the great qualities of that officer, and not imagining that his discouragement could proceed to so great a length as to induce him to abandon Egypt, he concealed his own feelings. He then hastened to transmit instructions from France, and to announce that he was preparing to send great succours.

On the other side, the British government having also a duplicate of Kléber's despatches, and a vast number of letters written by French officers to their families, published them all, with the object of exhibiting to Europe the situation of the French in Egypt, and to raise a quarrel between Bonaparte and general Kléber. This was a calculation quite natural on the part of a hostile power. In the mean while the English cabinet had received notice of the overtures made by Kléber to the grand vizier and sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French army was reduced to the last extremity, it hastened to send out a formal order to grant no capitulation to the French unless they surrendered prisoners of war. Mr. Dundas in parliament made use of odious expressions. He said—"An example must be made of this army, that, in a time of profound peace, dared to attack the dominions of one of our allies; the interests of mankind demand that it be destroyed."

This language was barbarous; it displays the violent passions which then raged in the breasts of the two nations. The English cabinet had understood to the letter the exaggerations of Kléber and of the French officers. It considered that the French were in a state to accept any terms it might choose to impose; and without being aware of what had passed, committed the folly of giving to lord Keith, commander-in-chief in the Levant, a positive order not to sign his name to any capitulation unless it expressly constituted the French prisoners of war.

This order, sent from London on the 17th of

December, reached lord Keith in Minorca, about the first week in January, 1800; and on the 8th of the same month that admiral hastened to communicate the instructions to sir Sidney Smith, which he had just received from his government. It took time at that season of the year to sail across the Mediterranean. The despatches of lord Keith did not reach sir Sidney Smith until the 20th of February. Sir Sidney was deeply mortified. He had acted without instructions from the government, counting that his acts could not fail to be approved; he found himself compromised in regard to the French, because he felt he might be accused by them of a breach of faith. Best aware of the true state of things, he well knew that Kléber would never consent to surrender himself a prisoner of war; and he saw the convention of El-Arisch, so cleverly wrung from the weakness of the moment, wholly compromised. He hastened to write to Kléber, expressing his sorrow, and to apprise him candidly of what was going forward, advising him immediately to suspend the delivery of the Egyptian forts to the grand vizier, and to conjure him to wait for fresh orders from England before taking any definitive resolution.

Unfortunately, when these despatches from sir Sidney Smith reached Cairo, the French army had already executed a part of the convention of El-Arisch. It had given up to the Turks all the positions on the right bank of the Nile, Katieh, Salahieh, Belbeïs, and every one of the positions of the Delta, particularly the city of Damietta and the fort of Lesbeh. The troops were already on their march for Alexandria, with their baggage and stores. The division of Upper Egypt had given up Higher Egypt to the Turks, and fallen back upon Cairo, to join the rest of the army near the sea. Desaix, taking advantage of the order he had received to return to France, would not take any part in the arrangements of this disastrous retreat, and had gone away with Davout, who, on his part, would not remain near Kléber. Kléber, forgetting his differences with Davout, was anxious to retain him, and offered him the rank of general of division, which it was in his power to bestow as governor of Egypt. This Davout refused, saying that he did not wish his promotion to bear the date of an event so deplorable. When Desaix and Davout embarked, Latour-Maubourg arrived from France with despatches from the first consul; he met them on the beach, and informed them of the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, and of the elevation of Bonaparte to the head of the state. Thus Kléber found, at the moment when he had given up his fortified places, the refusal of the fulfilment of the treaty of El-Arisch, and the important intelligence to him of the elevation of Bonaparte to the consular government.

There had been sufficient weakness shown for any great character to exhibit; an ignominious offer was about to recal Kléber to himself, and to prove him, as he was, a hero. He must surrender himself a prisoner, or defend himself in a far worse position than that which he had declared untenable in the council of war at Salahieh. He must either submit to dishonour, or engage in a desperate conflict. He did not hesitate; and it will be seen, that, despite his impaired position, he knew well how to do that which he had judged impossible some days before, and thus he gave to himself the finest of contradictions.

Kléber countermanded immediately all the orders he had previously issued to the army. He recalled to Lower Egypt, as far as Cairo, a part of the troops which had already descended the Nile; he sent up his ammunition; he pressed the division from Upper Egypt to rejoin him, and to signify to the grand vizier he must stay his march upon Cairo, unless he chose to commit immediate hostilities. The grand vizier replied that the convention of El-Arisch was signed, and that it must be executed; that in consequence he should advance upon the capital. At the moment, an officer with a letter from lord Keith at Minorca, to Kléber, was received at head-quarters. Among other expressions this letter contained the following passage:—"I have received the most positive orders from his Britannic majesty not to consent to any capitulation with the army which you command, except the troops lay down their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and give up all the vessels in the harbour of Alexandria."

Kléber, indignant, had this letter copied into the order of the day, adding to it the simple words:—

"Soldiers, to such insults there is no other answer than victory—prepare for action!"

This noble language was echoed from every breast. His situation was greatly changed since the 28th of January, the day on which the convention of El-Arisch was signed. Then the French possessed all the fortified positions of Egypt, and governed the Egyptians, who were quiet and submissive; the grand vizier was on the other side of the desert. Now, on the contrary, the more important posts had been given up, and the plain was all that was in the possession of the French. The population was every where awake; the people of Cairo, excited by the presence of the grand vizier, who was within five hours' march, only awaited the first signal to revolt. The gloomy picture drawn by the council of war in the treaty of El-Arisch had been debated: the picture, false then, was now rigorously correct. The French army was about to combat in the plains of the Nile, with the vizier in front having eighty thousand men; and in the rear, Cairo with three hundred thousand ready to rise; and it was without fear.—Glorious reparation of a great error!

The agents of sir Sidney Smith had hastened up to interpose between the French and the Turks, and to propose new terms of accommodation. Letters were written to London, and when the convention of El-Arisch was known there it would certainly be ratified; in this situation it would be right to suspend hostilities and wait. The grand vizier and Kléber consented, but on conditions that could not be admitted. The grand vizier insisted on the delivery of Cairo; Kléber, on the other hand, would have the vizier fall back even to the frontier. In such a state of things, to fight was alone the alternative.

On the 20th of March, 1800, or 29th Ventôse, in the year VIII., before break of day, the French army left Cairo, and formed in the rich plains which border the Nile, having that river on the left, the desert on the right, and in front, but afar off, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis. The night,

almost luminous in that climate, facilitated the manœuvres, without rendering them distinctly visible to the enemy. The army was formed into four squares; two on the left under general Reynier, and two on the right under general Friant. They were each composed of two demi-brigades of infantry ranged in several lines. At the angles and outside were companies of grenadiers with their backs to the squares, serving to reinforce them during the march, or under charges of cavalry, and detaching themselves to go to the attack of positions where the enemy attempted to make a stand. In the centre of the line of battle, that is, between the two squares of the left and the two squares of the right, the cavalry was disposed in a dense mass, having light artillery on the wings. At some distance in the rear and on the left, a fifth square, less than the others, was designed to serve as a reserve. The number of troops which Kléber had been able to collect in the plain of Heliopolis was about ten thousand. They were firm and tranquil.

Day began to break; Kléber, who since he had been commander-in-chief, had displayed a species of magnificence in order to impose upon the Egyptians, was dressed in a rich uniform. Mounted upon a lofty horse, he showed to his soldiers that noble figure which they were so fond of beholding, and the bold beauty of which filled them with confidence. "My friends," said he, riding through their ranks, "you possess in Egypt no more ground than is under your feet. If you recoil a single step you are lost." The greatest enthusiasm every where greeted his appearance and address. As soon as it was day he gave the order to march.

Only a part of the grand army of the Turks was in sight. On the plain of the Nile, which extended before the French, was seen the village of El-Matarieh, which the Turks had entrenched. An advanced guard of five or six thousand janissaries was there, good soldiers, escorted by several thousand horse. A little beyond, another body of the enemy appeared, as if about to glide between the river and the left wing of the French, in order to go and obtain the revolt of Cairo in the rear. In front, but much further off, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis, a wood of palms, and considerable unevenness of the ground, hid the main body of the Turkish army from the view of the French soldiers. The total number of all these forces, including the principal body, the corps placed at El-Matarieh, and the detachment marching to penetrate into Cairo, might be estimated at seventy or eighty thousand men.

Kléber ordered first a squadron of mounted guides to charge the detachment manœuvring on his left for the purpose of entering into Cairo. The guides dashed up at a gallop upon this confused mass. The Turks, who never fear cavalry, received and returned the charge. They completely surrounded the French horse, which was in danger of being cut to pieces, when Kléber sent the 22nd regiment of chasseurs, and the 14th dragoons to their aid, who charging the close mass that surrounded the guides, dispersed them with the sabre, and put them to flight. The Turks then retired out of view.

This being done, Kléber hastened to attack the entrenched village of El-Matarieh, before the larger part of the enemy's army had time to arrive, and committed this duty to general Reynier, with the two squares on the left; he himself, to make a diversion, taking up a position between El-Matarieh and Heliopolis, in order to hinder the Turkish army from succouring the attacked position.

Reynier arrived at El-Matarieh, detached the companies of grenadiers that doubled the angles of the squares and ordered them to storm the village. The companies advanced in two small columns. The brave janissaries would not wait for them, but marched out to the encounter. The grenadiers received them firmly, gave them a discharge of musketry when almost close to the ends of their pieces, and brought down a great number, after which they charged them with fixed bayonets. While the first column was attacking the janissaries in front, the second took them in flank, and completed their rout. Then the two columns reunited, attacked El-Matarieh, amidst a hail shower of balls, rushed on the Turks who resisted, with the bayonet, and after a great slaughter of them remained masters of the position. The Turks, flying to the plain and joining those whom the guides, chasseurs, and dragoons had just before dispersed, they fled in confusion towards Cairo, under the order of Nassif Pacha, the lieutenant of the grand vizier.

The village of El-Matarieh, full of oriental spoils, was a rich booty for the French soldiers. But they could not stay there; the generals and soldiers both knew too well how important it was not to be surprised in the midst of a mass of Turkish troops. The army, resuming by degrees the order observed in the morning, advanced upon the plain, always formed in squares, with the cavalry between. It passed the ruins of Heliopolis, and saw beyond them a cloud of dust ascending in the horizon, and moving rapidly onwards. On the left the village of Seriaqous appeared; on the right, amid a grove of palms, the village of El-Merg, situated on the shores of a little lake, called the Lake of the Pilgrims. A slight elevation of ground ran from one of these villages to the other. All at once the moving cloud of dust stopped; then it was dispersed by the wind, and the Turkish army was seen forming a long floating line from Seriaqous to El-Merg. Placed on more elevated ground, it commanded, in a slight degree, the ground upon which the French troops were formed. Kléber then gave the order to advance. Reynier, with the two squares on the left, marched towards Seriaqous. Friant, with the two columns on the right, directed himself upon El-Merg. The enemy had scattered abroad, in advance of the palm-trees on the shore of the lake, a good number of tirailleurs. But a combat with tirailleurs could scarcely be successful against the French soldiers opposed to them. Friant sent out some companies of light-infantry, which soon made the Turks, thus detached, re-enter into the confused mass of their army. The grand vizier was there in the midst of a troop of horsemen, whose arms glittered brilliantly in the sun. Some shells soon dispersed this group. The enemy moved forward his artillery in the way of reply; but his bullets, ill-directed, passed over the heads of the French soldiers. His guns were soon dismounted by those of the French, and rendered useless. The thousand colours of the Turkish army were then seen waving in the air. A part of his squadron dashed out of El-Merg, upon the squares of

Friant's division. The deep openings in the ground, the common effect of a hot sun upon a soil a good while inundated, fortunately retarded the impetuosity of the horses. General Friant, suffering the Turkish horse to arrive pretty near, ordered a fire of grape shot to be suddenly opened upon them as they advanced nearly to the mouths of the guns, and overturned them by hundreds. They then retired in disorder.

This was but a prelude to a general attack. The Turkish army was visibly preparing for it. The French squares awaited it with firmness, two on the right, and two on the left; the cavalry between facing both to the front and rear, and covered by two lines of artillery. At the signal given by the grand vizier, the mass of the Turkish cavalry moved forward together, rushed upon the French squares, opened out upon their wings, turned them, and soon surrounded the four fronts of the French order of battle. The French infantry, whom the cries, the movement, and the tumult of the Turkish horse did not at all trouble, remained calm, with bayonets at the charge, continuing a well-directed fire. In vain those thousand groups of horse wheeled round it; they fell under the grape-shot and balls, seldom arriving as far as the bayonets, expiring at the feet of the infantry, or turning and flying, never more to appear.

After a protracted and frightful confusion, the heavens, before obscured by the smoke and dust, became clear; the sun came forth, and the victorious French saw before them a mass of men and horses dead and dying, and at a distance, as far as the view could extend, bands of fugitives running away in all directions.

The main body of the Turks retreated towards El-Kanquah, where they had encamped on the preceding night upon the road to Lower Egypt. A few groups only joined the detachments, which in the morning were directed upon Cairo, led by Nassif Pacha, the lieutenant of the grand vizier.

Kléber would not allow the enemy the least rest. His squares, preserving the order of battle, crossed the plain at a rapid pace. Passing Seriaqous and El-Merg, they advanced as far as El-Kanquah, where they arrived at night; the enemy seeing himself pursued, fled again in disorder, leaving the French army the baggage and the provisions, of which it had great need.

Thus, in the plain of Heliopolis, ten thousand soldiers, by the ascendancy of discipline and calm courage, dispersed seventy or eighty thousand enemies. But to obtain a more important result than that already gained in the few thousands killed and wounded, it was necessary to pursue the Turks, to drive them into the desert, and leave them to perish there by hunger, thirst, and the swords of the Arabs. Kléber, therefore, allowed the army a little repose, and then gave orders for the pursuit on the following day.

There were scarcely more than two or three hundred French killed and wounded, for in such a species of contest, soldiers in a square, preserving themselves unbroken, sustain little loss. Kléber, hearing cannon in the direction of Cairo, had no doubt that the corps which had turned his left, had gone to second the revolt of that city. Nassif Pacha, lieutenant of the vizier, and Ibrahim Bey, one of the two Mameluke chiefs, had in fact entered it, with two thousand Mamelukes, eight or ten thousand Turkish horse, and some of the revolted villagers of the vicinity, in all about twenty thousand men. Kléber had left scarcely two thousand men in this large capital, divided between the citadel and the forts. He ordered general Lagrange to go off at midnight with four battalions to their aid. He directed the officers of the troops left in Cairo to occupy strong points, and keep up communications with each other, but not to attempt any decisive attack before his return. He feared some false manœuvre might take place on their part, that would uselessly compromise the lives of soldiers, every day becoming more valuable now they were condemned to remain in Egypt.

During the whole time of the battle, Murad Bey, who had formerly partaken with Ibrahim Bey in the government of Egypt, and was distinguished from his colleague by his brilliant courage, chivalrous generosity, and much intelligence, remained on the wings of the Turkish army, immoveable, at the head of six hundred superb horsemen. The battle over, he rushed into the desert and disappeared. It was in consequence of a promise given to Kléber that he thus behaved. Murad Bey had arrived at the head-quarters of the vizier, and discovered, still prevalent, the old jealousy which had so long divided the Turks and Mamelukes. Murad soon saw that the Turks desired to recover Egypt, not to return it to the Mamelukes, but to possess it themselves. He then thought of making terms with the French, in the view of becoming their ally if they were successful, or of succeeding them if they were vanquished. Still, he acted with great circumspection; he would not declare until hostilities were definitively renewed, and promised Kléber that after the first battle he would ally himself with the French. The battle was fought, and proved glorious for the French, and his regard towards them could not but be much augmented by it. There was reason to hope that, after a few days were elapsed, he would declare his alliance.

At the hour of midnight following the battle, after a few hours of rest to the troops, Kléber beat the *réveillé*, and marched upon Belbeïs, in order to allow the Turks no rest. He arrived there at an early hour in the day. It was the 21st of March, or 30th of Ventôse. The vizier had already in his rapid flight, passed Belbeïs. He had left in the fort and town a body of infantry, and in the plain a thousand horse. On the approach of Kléber's army the horse fled. The Turks were driven out of the town, but they shut themselves in the fort, where, after the exchange of a few cannon-shot, want of water, and the fear of being stormed, induced them to surrender. The fanaticism of some of them was so great that they chose rather to be put to death than give up their arms. In the meantime the cavalry of general Leclerc, scouring the plain, fell in with a long caravan of camels marching towards Cairo, and carrying the baggage of Nassif Pacha and Ibrahim Bey. This capture revealed more fully to Kléber the real object of the Turks, which consisted in raising an insurrection, not only in the capital, but in the large cities of Egypt. Thus aware of the design, and discovering that the Turkish army made no resistance any where, Kléber detached five battalions upon Cairo, under general Friant, to support the four batta-

lions sent off on the preceding evening, from El-Kanquah, under the orders of general Lagrange.

On the following day, the 22nd of March, or 1st of Germinal, Kléber marched upon Salahieh. General Reynier preceded him at the head of the left division; he himself marching after at the head of the guides and the 7th hussars; last of all came general Belliard with his brigade, the remainder of Friant's division. During the march a message was received from the grand vizier, offering to negotiate, but a positive refusal was returned. On arriving at Koraïm, about half-way to Salahieh, a cannonade was heard, and soon afterwards the division of Reynier was seen formed in a square, and in combat with a multitude of horse. Kléber sent an order to Belliard to hasten forward, while with the cavalry he set out in all speed towards Reynier's square. At the sight of Kléber and his horse, the Turks, who were much more partial to a conflict with the French cavalry than with the infantry, attacked the guides and 7th hussars. They charged them so suddenly that the light artillery had not time to place itself in battery. The gunner-drivers were sabred on the guns. Kléber with the guides and the hussars found themselves on the instant in great danger; particularly when the inhabitants of Koraïm, believing that so few French must be destroyed, hastened out with scythes and pitchforks to finish them. But Reynier sent the 14th dragoons to their assistance immediately, who disengaged Kléber in time. Belliard, who had quickened his pace, arrived with his infantry directly afterwards, and cut some hundred men to pieces.

Kléber, desirous to reach Salahieh, hastened his march, delaying until his return the punishment of Koraïm. The heat of the day was insufferable; the wind blew from the desert, and they respired with the burning air a fine penetrating dust. Horses and men were overcome with fatigue. They arrived at Salahieh at the close of day. They were now on the frontier of Egypt itself, at the entrance upon the desert of Syria; and here Kléber expected, the next morning, a last conflict with the grand vizier. But on the following day early, being the 23rd of March, or 2d of Germinal, the inhabitants of Salahieh came to meet him, and from them he learned that the grand vizier was continuing his flight in great disorder. Kléber hastened onwards, and saw himself the proof how much he had exaggerated the danger of a Turkish army.

The grand vizier, taking with him five hundred of his best horse, had plunged with some baggage into the desert. The rest of his army had fled in every direction; one part fled towards the Delta; another asked quarter on its knees at Salahieh; another part, seeking an asylum in the desert, perished under the sabres of the Arabs. These having conveyed the Turkish army to the frontiers of Egypt, remained there, knowing that one party or the other must be vanquished, and from that party booty might be obtained. They had judged correctly; and finding the Turkish army completely demoralized and incapable of defending itself, even against them, they butchered the fugitives for the sake of pillaging them. At the moment of Kléber's arrival, they had come down upon the vizier's deserted camp like so many birds of prey. At the sight of the French they flew off on their swift horses, and left an abundance of plunder for the French soldiers. Here, in the midst of an entrenched camp, covering a square league, were a vast quantity of tents, saddles, harness of all kinds, forty thousand horseshoes, provisions in plenty, rich garments, boxes already broken open by the Arabs, but full of perfumes, of aloes, silk stuffs, and all the objects which contribute to the glittering and barbarous luxuries of oriental armies. At the side of twelve litters of wood, carved and gilded, was found a carriage hung upon springs, in the European mode, and of English manufacture; and pieces of cannon with the motto, "Honi soit qui mal y pense:" a certain evidence of the very active intervention of the English in the war.

The soldiers, who had brought nothing with them, found in the Turkish camp provisions, ammunition, a rich booty, and some things, the singularity of which made them laugh, as they were always disposed to do after a short period of dejection. Strange power of the mind upon men! To-day victorious, they no longer wished to quit Egypt; for they no longer thought themselves condemned to perish in a far-distant banishment.

When Kléber had witnessed himself the utter disappearance of the Turkish army, he determined to return and bring back to obedience the towns of Lower Egypt, and more particularly Cairo. He then made the following dispositions: Generals Rampon and Lanusse were ordered to scour the Delta. Rampon to march upon the important town of Damietta, which was in the power of the Turks, and to retake it. Lanusse was to keep up a communication with Rampon, to sweep the Delta from the city of Damietta as far as Alexandria, and to reduce successively the revolted villages. Belliard was to support these operations generally; was more especially to second Rampon in his attack upon Damietta, and to retake the fort of Lesbeh himself, commanding one of the mouths of the Nile. Kléber left Reynier at Salahieh to prevent the return of the wrecks of the grand vizier's army, gone into the Syrian desert. He was to remain on the frontier in observation, until the Arabs had finished the dispersion of the Turks, and then to return to Cairo. Kléber himself departed the next day, the 24th of March, or 3rd of Germinal, with the 88th demi-brigade, two companies of grenadiers, the 7th hussars, and the 3rd and 14th dragoons.

Kléber arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Serious events had occurred there since his departure. The population of this large city, numbering nearly three hundred thousand, fickle, passionate, prone to change, as every multitude is found to be, had given way to the suggestions of the Turkish emissaries, and attacked the French as soon as they heard the cannon of Heliopolis. Running without the walls of the city during the battle, and seeing Nassif Pacha and Ibrahim Bey with some thousand horse and janissaries, they thought them the conquerors. Careful not to undeceive the people, the Turks asserted, on the contrary, that the French were exterminated, and that the grand vizier had obtained a complete victory. At this news fifty thousand men had risen at Cairo, Boulaq, and Gyzeh. Armed with sabres, lances, and old muskets, they proposed to put to death all the French that remained among

them. But two thousand men, entrenched in the citadel and the forts which commanded the city, supplied with provisions and ammunition, offered a resistance difficult to overcome. Having nearly all fallen back in good time, they had succeeded in shutting themselves up in the fortified places. Some had run great hazards; they were those who, to the number of two hundred only, composed the guard of the house occupied as head-quarters. This fine house, formerly inhabited by Bonaparte, and afterwards by Kléber, and the principal administratives, was situated at one of the extremities of the city. On one side it looked upon the square of Ezbekyeh, the finest in Cairo, and on the other, upon the gardens that were backed by the Nile. The Turks and the populace in revolt wished to take this house, and to kill all the French who occupied it, two hundred in number. This appeared the more easy to do, as general Verdier, who was in the citadel at the other end of the city, could not come to their assistance. But the brave men who were in the house, as much by a well sustained fire as by bold sallies, defended themselves so well, that they kept off the ferocious mob, and thus gave time to general Lagrange to arrive. He had been detached, as has been seen, already in the evening from the field of battle with four battalions. He arrived at noon the next day, entered by the gardens, and thenceforth rendered the head-quarters impregnable.

The Turks, having no means to overcome the resistance of the French, revenged themselves upon such unfortunate Christians as were at hand. They began by killing a part of the inhabitants of the European quarter, and some of the merchants, pillaged their houses, and carried off their wives and daughters. They sought out those of the Arabs who were accused of being on good terms with the French, and of having drunk wine with them. These they murdered, and, as customary, rapine succeeded to slaughter. They impaled an Arab, who had been chief of the janissaries under the French, and who had the charge of the police of Cairo; they treated in the same manner one who had been secretary of the divan instituted by Bonaparte. From thence they proceeded to the quarter of the Copts. These, as it is well-known, are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of Egypt, and have persisted in Christianity, in spite of all the Mussulman governments that have succeeded each other in this country. Their wealth was great, arising from the collection of the imposts delegated to them by the Mamelukes. The object was to punish them for being friends of the French, but more than all to plunder their houses. Happily for the Copts, their quarters formed the left of the Place Ezbekyeh, and adjoined the head quarters. Their chief was besides both rich and brave; he defended himself well, and succeeded in saving them.

In the midst of these horrors, Nassif Pacha and Ibrahim Bey were ashamed at what they did, and suffered to be done by others. They saw lost, with regret, the riches which would have been theirs if they had become masters of Egypt. But they allowed every thing to be done by a populace of which they were no longer masters, and wished besides by those massacres to continue to nourish a hatred of the French.

During these transactions general Friant arrived, detached from Belbeïs; finally, came Kléber himself. Both entered the head-quarters from the gardens of the house. Although victor over the army of the vizier, Kléber had a serious difficulty to surmount here, in conquering an immense city, peopled by three hundred thousand inhabitants, part of them in a state of revolt, and occupied by twenty thousand Turks. Constructed in the oriental style, that is to say with narrow streets, divided into masses of buildings that were real fortresses, receiving light from within, showing nothing externally but high solid walls, having terraces in place of roofs, whence the insurgents could pour down a plunging and murderous fire—to all this it must be added, that except the citadel and Place Ezbekyeh, the Turks were masters of all. The latter was in a manner blockaded, the streets that ran into it being closed up by the Turks with crenelled walls.

The French had only two modes of attack; either to open from the citadel a destructive fire of shells and shot until the place was reduced, or to attack by the Place Ezbekyeh, and overturning all the barriers raised at the ends of the streets, to take the houses one and one by assault. The first mode would cause the destruction of a great city, the capital of the country, of which too the French had need for the supply of necessaries; the second mode exposed them to the risk of losing more soldiers than in ten such battles as that on the plain of Heliopolis.

Here Kléber exhibited as much prudence as he had shown energy in the field. He resolved to gain time, and to suffer the insurrection to exhaust itself. He had sent nearly all his *matériel* into Lower Egypt, believing that he was on the eve of embarkation. He ordered Reynier, as soon as the army of the vizier had crossed the desert, and Damietta and Lesbeh were taken, to ascend the Nile with his entire division, and the stores that were wanted at Cairo. In the interim he caused all the outlets, by which Cairo could communicate with the country, to be blocked up. Though the insurgents should procure provisions by pillaging the Egyptian houses, commonly well supplied with them; though they forged bullets and cast cannon, it was impossible they should not soon suffer from want. They could not be long so unacquainted with the real state of things in other parts of Egypt, as not to discover that the French were every where victorious, and the army of the vizier dispersed; finally, they were likely to have differences among themselves before long, because their interests were opposite. The Turks of Nassif Pacha, the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, and the Arabs of Cairo, could not long be in accordance together. For all these reasons Kléber determined to temporize and to negotiate.

While he thus gained time he completed his treaty of alliance with Murad Bey, through the agency of the wife of that Mameluke prince, who was universally respected, endowed with beauty, and a superior intellect. He granted to Murad the province of Saïd, under the sovereignty of France, on condition of paying a tribute, equal in amount to a good part of the taxes of that province. Murad Bey engaged, on the other hand, to fight for the French; and the French engaged, in case of

evacuating Egypt, if they ever should do so, to facilitate as much as possible his occupation of the country. Murad Bey, as will be seen hereafter, was faithful to the treaty which he had subscribed, and began by driving out of Upper Egypt a Turkish corps, which had occupied it.

Through Murad Bey and the sheiks, who were friends of France, Kléber opened a negotiation with the Turks who had entered Cairo. Nassif Pacha and Ibrahim Bey began to fear being shut up in the city, and treated in the Turkish mode. They knew besides that the army of the vizier was completely dispersed. They lent themselves with good will to the proposal of a conference, and consented to a capitulation, in virtue of which they were to be permitted to retire safe and sound. But at the moment when the capitulation was to be concluded, the insurgents in Cairo, seeing themselves left to the vengeance of the French, were seized with terror and rage, broke off the parley, threatened to murder those who should abandon them, and gave money to the Turks to engage them to fight. An attack by main force, therefore, become necessary to reduce the city to subjection.

Lower Egypt having returned to its duty, Reynier had ascended to Cairo with his corps and a convoy of stores. He took a part in the investment of the works of Cairo to the north and east, or from Fort Camin to the citadel. General Friant encamped on the west in the gardens and house of the commander-in-chief, between the city and the Nile; Le Clerc's cavalry was placed between the divisions of Reynier and Friant, scouring the plains; general Verdier occupied the south.

On the 3rd and 4th of April general Friant began the first attack, directed immediately to disengage the Place Ezbekyeh, which was the principal inlet for the French. The beginning was made at the Copt quarter, which formed the left of the square. The troops penetrated with the greatest courage into the streets which crossed that quarter in every direction, while several detachments blew up the houses around the Place Ezbekyeh, in order to make openings to the interior of the city. During this operation the citadel threw some shells to intimidate the population. These attacks succeeded, and made the French masters of the issues of all the streets which terminated in the Place Ezbekyeh. On the following days an eminence near Fort Sulkouski, which the Turks had entrenched, commanding the Copt quarter, was taken. Every disposition was now made for a general simultaneous attack. Before the order was given, Kléber, for the last time, summoned the insurgents to surrender, but they refused to listen to the offer. Still attaching great importance to the preservation of the city, which besides was innocent of the crimes committed by fanatics, Kléber determined to appeal to their sight by means of a terrible example. He ordered Boulaq, a detached suburb on the bank of the Nile, to be attacked.

On the 15th of April, or 25th of Germinal, the division of Friant encircled Boulaq, and rained upon that miserable suburb a shower of shells and shot. Favoured by the fire the soldiers pushed on to the assault, but found, on the part of the inhabitants and of the Turks, a very obstinate resistance. Every street, and every house, became the scene of an obstinate contest. Kléber suspended the horrible carnage for a moment in order to offer pardon to the insurgents; but his offer was repelled. The attack was renewed. The fire flew from house to house, and Boulaq in a blaze imparted a double horror to the flames and the assault. The heads of the population then threw themselves at Kléber's feet; he stopped the effusion of blood, and saved the rest of that unfortunate suburb. It was the quarter where the warehouses of the merchants were situated, and an immense quantity of goods was found there; the goods were preserved for the use of the army.

This horrible spectacle had been seen by all the population of Cairo. Profiting by the effect which it ought to produce, Kléber then attacked the capital itself. A house near the head-quarters, still held by the Turks, had been undermined, and the Turks and insurgents were blown into the air together. This was the signal for the attack. The troops of Friant and Belliard assaulted the city by all the inlets from the Place Ezbekyeh, while general Reynier entered at the north and east, and general Verdier from the lofty citadel showered down shells. The combat was obstinate. The troops of Reynier entered by the gate of Bab-el-Charyeh, at the extremity of the grand canal, and driving before them Ibrahim Bey and Nassif Pacha, who defended it, crowded them both up between the 9th demi-brigade, which had penetrated from the opposite point, and had driven back all they encountered in their victorious march. The French corps met after making a fearful carnage. Night parted the combatants. Several thousand Turks, Mamelukes, and insurgents had fallen; and four hundred houses were in flames.

This was the last attempt made at resistance. The inhabitants, who had so long retained the Turks, now conjured them to leave the city and give them the opportunity of negotiating with the French. Kléber, to whom these scenes of slaughter were repugnant, and who wished to spare his soldiers, desired nothing more. The agents of Murad Bey served as mediators. The treaty was soon concluded. Nassif Pacha and Ibrahim Bey were to retire into Syria, under escort of a detachment of the French army. They obtained no other terms than that their lives should be spared. They quitted Cairo on the 25th of April, or 5th of Floréal, leaving to the mercy of the French the miserable people whom they had stirred up to revolt.

Thus terminated this sanguinary conflict, which had commenced by the battle of Heliopolis, on the 20th of March, and finished on the 25th of April, by the departure of the last lieutenants of the vizier, after thirty-five days of fighting, between ten thousand French on one side and the whole power of the Ottoman empire on the other, seconded by the revolt of the Egyptian towns. Great faults caused this revolt and provoked this horrible effusion of blood. If the French had not put on the appearance of departure, the Egyptians would never have dared to revolt. The contest would have been limited to a combat, brilliant indeed, but little beyond, between the French squares and the Turkish cavalry. But a commencement of the evacuation raising a popular commotion in some cities, it was necessary to retake them by an assault, much more destructive than a battle. The

faults of Kléber must be forgotten in doing honour to his fine and energetic conduct. He had imagined that he could not defend Egypt, when peaceful and subdued, against the Turks, and he had made the conquest in thirty-five days, against the Turks and the Egyptian insurgents, with as much energy as humanity and prudence.

In the Delta all the cities were in complete submission. Murad Bey had driven the Turkish detachment of Dervish Pacha from Upper Egypt. Every where the vanquished trembled before the victor, and expected a terrible punishment. The inhabitants of Cairo particularly, who had committed frightful cruelties on the Arabs attached to the French service, and on the Christians of all nations—they were filled with terror. Kléber was humane and wise; he took care not to repay cruelty with cruelty. He knew that conquest must be odious to every people, and could only become tolerable in the view of those upon whom it falls, at the price of good government, while it cannot become legitimate in the eyes of great nations but by contributing to the accomplishment of grand objects. He hastened therefore to use his successes with moderation. The Egyptians were convinced he would treat them with severity. They thought that the loss of their goods and their heads could alone expiate the crime of their revolt. Kléber assembled them together, exhibited a severe countenance towards them, then pardoning them, satisfied himself by imposing a contribution upon the insurgent cities.

Cairo paid 10,000,000 f., not an onerous burthen for so large a city, the inhabitants regarding themselves lucky to get off so well. Eight millions, besides, were imposed upon the other insurgent cities of Lower Egypt.

This sum immediately paid all the arrears that were due, as well as for the provisions of which the army had need, the care of the wounded, and the completion of the fortifications begun. It was a precious resource until the system of taxation could be ameliorated and put into execution. Another resource, altogether unexpected, offered at the moment. Sixty-six Turkish ships had entered the ports of Egypt to transport the French army. The recent hostilities gave the French the right of detaining them. They were laden with merchandize, which was sold to the profit of the military chest. From these different sources an abundance of every thing required was obtained, without any requisition in kind. The army found itself in the midst of plenty; and the Egyptians, who had not hoped to get clear so easily, submitted with perfect resignation. The army was proud of its successes, confident in its strength; and knowing that Bonaparte was at the head of the government at home, did not doubt that he would soon come to their succour. Kléber had conquered, the noblest of excuses for his momentary fault, in the fields of Heliopolis.

He assembled the commissaries of the army and the persons best acquainted with the country, and set them to organize the finances of the colony. He gave to the Copts, to whom it had formerly been confided, the collection of the direct contributions. He imposed new duties on the customs, and on articles of consumption. The total of the revenue was to be carried to 25,000,000 f. It sufficed for all the wants of the army, if the amount did not exceed eighteen or twenty million francs. He admitted into the ranks of his army, Copts, Syrians, and even blacks, bought in Darfour, whom some of his subaltern officers, beginning to speak the language of the country, commenced to teach the military exercise. These recruits, placed in the more reduced regiments, fought there as well as the French, at whose sides they had the honour to serve. Kléber ordered the forts round Cairo to be finished, and set workmen upon those at Lesbeh, Damietta, Burlos, and Rosetta, situated on the coast. He pushed forward the works at Alexandria with rapidity, and impressed fresh activity on the learned researches of the Institution of Egypt. Every thing, from the cataracts to the mouths of the Nile, assumed the aspect of a solid and durable establishment. For months afterwards, the caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Darfour, began to re-appear at Cairo, where their hospitable reception insured their return.

If Kléber had lived, Egypt would have been preserved to France, at least until the day of her great misfortunes. But a deplorable event took away that general in the midst of his exploits and most judicious government.

It is not without danger that the great principles of human nature can be deeply shaken. The entire of Islamism had been affected by the presence of the French in Egypt. The sons of Mahomet had experienced somewhat of that enthusiasm, which in old time aroused them against the crusaders. On every side was heard, as in the twelfth century, the cries of a holy war; and there were Mussulman devotees who vowed to accomplish the "sacred combat," which consisted in killing an unbeliever. In Egypt, where the French were seen more closely, where their humanity was duly valued and comprehended, where they were able to compare them to the soldiers of the Porte, or more particularly to the Mamelukes; in Egypt, finally, where they witnessed their respect for the prophet, (a respect ordered to be shown by Bonaparte,) the aversion towards them was less; and when at a later time they quitted the country, fanaticism had already sensibly cooled. There were perceived in some places, during the last insurrection, real signs of attachment for the French soldiers, to such a degree that the English agents were surprised at it. But, throughout the rest of the east, there was only one thing that appeared striking to all the natives, the invasion, by infidels, of an immense Mussulman country.

A young man, a native of Aleppo, named Sulieman, who was the prey to great fanaticism, who had made journeys from Mecca to Medina, who had studied at the mosque, El-Azhar, the wealthiest and most renowned in all Cairo, where the Koran and Turkish law were taught, and who wished to join the body of doctors of the faith, happened to be wandering in Palestine when the remnant of the grand vizier's army passed through that country. He was an eye-witness to the sufferings and despair of those of his own religion, and this sight strongly affected his diseased imagination and moved his sensibility. The aga of the janissaries, who saw him by chance, inflamed his fanaticism yet more by his own suggestions. This young man offered to assassinate "the French sultan," general Kléber. They furnished him with a

dromedary, and a sum of money to pay his journey. He reached Gaza, crossed the desert, came to Cairo, and shut himself up for several weeks in the great mosque, into which students and poor travellers are admitted at the cost of that religious foundation. The rich mosques are, in the east, what the convents formerly were in Europe; there are found prayer, hospitality, and religious instruction. The young fanatic disclosed his intention to four of the principal sheiks of the mosque, who were at the head of the department of instruction. They were alarmed at his determination, and the consequences which might ensue; they told him that he would not succeed, that he would occasion great mischiefs to Egypt; but still they did not make the French authorities acquainted with the circumstance.

When this wretch was fully confirmed in his resolution, he armed himself with a poignard, followed Kléber for several days, and not being able to get near him, conceived the design of penetrating into the garden of the head-quarters, there to conceal himself behind an old cistern. On the 14th of June he suddenly presented himself before Kléber, who was walking with the architect, Protain, showing him what repairs were necessary to be done to the house, in order to obliterate the marks left by the bullets and shells. He approached close, as if to solicit alms, and, while Kléber was in the act of listening to him, he rushed upon his victim and plunged the poignard several times into his heart. Kléber sank under the blows. The architect, Protain, fell upon the assassin with a stick which he had in his hand, and struck him violently on the head, but was, in his turn, struck down by a stab of the poignard. At the cries of Kléber and his companion, the soldiers ran to the spot and raised up their expiring commander; then searching, found the assassin, who was concealed behind a pile of rubbish.

In a few minutes after this tragic scene Kléber was no more. The army shed bitter tears over him. The Arabs, who admired his clemency to them after their revolt, united their regrets with those of the French soldiery. A military commission was instantly formed to try the assassin, who avowed all. He was condemned to be impaled, according to the law of the country. The four sheiks, who were in his confidence, lost their heads. These sanguinary sacrifices were believed necessary to insure the security of the chiefs of the army. Vain precautions! In Kléber the army had lost a general, and the colony a founder, whom none of the officers in the army of Egypt could replace. With Kléber, Egypt was lost for France. Menou, who succeeded him in the order of seniority, was an ardent partisan of the expedition; but, in spite of his zeal, he was altogether below such a task. One man alone could equal Kléber, or surpass him, in the government of Egypt; he had three months before embarked in the port of Alexandria to reach Italy, and he fell at Marengo, the same day, and nearly at the same instant that Kléber fell at Cairo—it was Desaix! Both died on the 14th of June, 1800, in the accomplishment of the vast designs of Bonaparte. Singular, indeed, was the fate of these two men, continually side by side in life, undivided in death, and yet so very different in their qualities both of mind and body.

Kléber was the finest man in the army. His stature lofty and commanding; his countenance noble, and expressive of the pride of his spirit; his courage at once cool and intrepid; his prompt and sure intelligence making him on the battle-field the most formidable of commanders. His mind was original and brilliant, but uncultivated. He read Quintus Curtius and Plutarch continually and exclusively, and searched for the food of great souls in the history of the heroes of antiquity. He was capricious, indocile, and a grumbler. It was said of him that he would neither command nor obey, and this was said truly. He even obeyed the orders of Bonaparte murmuringly. He sometimes commanded, but in the name of another, under that of general Jourdan, for example, assuming the command by a species of inspiration in the middle of the battle, and exercising it like a great soldier; then, after the victory, resuming his character of lieutenant, which he preferred to every other. He was licentious in his manner and language, but of strict integrity; disinterested, as men were in his days, before the conquest of the world had corrupted their characters.

Desaix was in every respect the reverse of Kléber. Simple, bashful, even a little awkward, he had not the aspect of a soldier, his face being hid by his ample head of hair. Heroic in battle, kind to the soldiers, modest among his companions, generous to the vanquished, he was adored by the army, and the people whom he had subdued by the French arms. His mind was solid, and had been well cultivated; while his intelligence in war, his disinterestedness, and his attention to his duties, made him the accomplished model of all the military virtues. Kléber, unsubmissive, indocile, could not endure a superior authority. Desaix was as obedient as if he had never known how to command. Under a coarse exterior, he concealed an animated soul, very susceptible of enthusiastic feelings. Although brought up in the severe school of the army of the Rhine, he felt a strong admiration for the campaigns of Italy, and had a wish to see himself the fields where the battles of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli had been fought. While he was visiting those fields, the scenes of immortal glory, he fell in by accident with the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, who soon felt a strong attachment for him. What an honourable homage was the friendship of such a man! Bonaparte was deeply affected by it. He esteemed Kléber for great military talents; but he placed no one either for talent or character on a level with Desaix. He loved him besides; in that, having around him companions in arms who had not yet pardoned his ascendancy, though they affected towards him an obsequious submission, he the more valued Desaix's pure and disinterested devotion, founded upon deep admiration. At the same time keeping secret his preference, and pretending ignorance of Kléber's faults, he treated both him and Desaix alike, and wished, as will be seen soon, to join in the same honours two men, whom fortune had mingled in one common destiny.

For the rest, every thing remained tranquil in Egypt after Kléber's death. General Menou, on taking the chief command, despatched the Osiris from Alexandria with all speed, to carry to France intelligence of the flourishing state of the colony, and of the deplorable end of its second founder.

BOOK VI.

THE ARMISTICE.

VAST PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUCCOUR OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.—ARRIVAL OF M. ST. JULIEN IN PARIS.—IMPATIENCE OF THE FRENCH CABINET TO TREAT WITH HIM.—DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENT POWERS OF M. ST. JULIEN, TALLEYRAND INDUCES HIM TO SIGN PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PEACE.—M. JULIEN SIGNS THEM, AND SETS OFF WITH DUROC FOR VIENNA.—STATE OF PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA.—ADROIT EXPEDIENT OF THE FIRST CONSUL IN REGARD TO THE EMPEROR PAUL.—HE SENDS SIX THOUSAND RUSSIAN PRISONERS BACK WITHOUT RANSOM, AND OFFERS HIM THE ISLAND OF MALTA.—ENTHUSIASM OF THE EMPEROR PAUL FOR BONAPARTE, AND MISSION GIVEN TO M. SPRENGPORTEN FOR PARIS.—NEW LEAGUE OF THE NEUTRAL POWERS.—THE FOUR GREAT QUESTIONS OF MARITIME LAW.—RECONCILIATION WITH THE HOLY SEE.—THE COURT OF SPAIN, AND ITS INTIMACY WITH THE FIRST CONSUL.—INTERIOR STATE OF THAT COURT.—GENERAL BERTHIER SENT TO MADRID.—THAT ENVOY NEGOTIATES A TREATY WITH CHARLES IV., BY WHICH TUSCANY WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE HOUSE OF PARMA, AND LOUISIANA TO FRANCE.—ERECTION OF THE KINGDOM OF ETRURIA.—FRANCE REINSTATES HERSELF IN THE FAVOUR OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS.—ARRIVAL OF M. ST. JULIEN AT VIENNA.—ASTONISHMENT OF THE COURT OF VIENNA AT THE NEWS OF THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES BEING SIGNED WITHOUT POWERS.—EMBARRASSMENT OF THE CABINET OF VIENNA, WHICH HAD ENGAGED NOT TO TREAT WITHOUT ENGLAND.—DISAVOWAL OF M. ST. JULIEN.—ATTEMPT AT A NEGOTIATION COMMON TO BOTH ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA.—THE FIRST CONSUL, TO ADMIT ENGLAND INTO THE NEGOTIATION, REQUIRES A NAVAL ARMISTICE, WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO SUCCOUR EGYPT.—ENGLAND REFUSES, NOT TO TREAT, BUT TO ACCORD THE PROPOSED ARMISTICE.—THE FIRST CONSUL THEN REQUIRES A DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATION WITH AUSTRIA, OR A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.—MANNER IN WHICH HE PROFITED BY THE SUSPENSION OF ARMS, TO PLACE THE FRENCH ARMIES ON A FORMIDABLE FOOTING.—APPREHENSION OF AUSTRIA, AND THE REMISSION OF THE FORTRESSES OF PHILIPSBURG, ULM, AND INGOLDSTADT, TO PROCURE A PROLONGATION OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMISTICE.—CONVENTION OF HOHENLINDEN, GRANTING A NEW SUSPENSION OF ARMS FOR FORTY-FIVE DAYS.—DESIGNATION OF M. COBENTZEL, AS ENVOY TO THE CONGRESS OF LUNEVILLE.—FÊTE OF THE 1ST VENDÉMIAIRE.—TRANSLATION OF THE BODY OF TURENNE TO THE INVALIDS.—THE FIRST CONSUL GIVES UP THE TIME LEFT TO HIM BY THE INTERRUPTION OF HOSTILITIES, TO OCCUPY HIMSELF WITH THE INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.—SUCCESS OF HIS FINANCIAL MEASURES.—PROSPERITY OF THE BANK OF FRANCE.—PAYMENT OF THE STOCKHOLDERS IN SPECIE.—REPAIR OF THE ROADS.—RETURN OF THE PRIESTS.—DIFFICULTIES RESPECTING THE SUNDAY AND DECADE IN THEIR CELEBRATION.—NEW MEASURES RESPECTING THE EMIGRANTS.—SITUATION OF PARTIES.—THEIR DISPOSITION TOWARDS THE FIRST CONSUL.—THE REVOLUTIONISTS AND ROYALISTS.—CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THEM.—DIFFERING INFLUENCES ABOUT THE FIRST CONSUL.—PARTS PLAYED NEAR HIM BY TALLEYRAND, FOUCHÉ, AND CAMBACÉRÈS.—THE BONAPARTE FAMILY.—LETTERS OF LOUIS XVIII. TO THE FIRST CONSUL, AND THE REPLY MADE.—PLOT OF CERACCHI AND ARENA.—AGITATION OF THE PUBLIC ON HEARING OF THE PLOT.—THE IMPRUDENT FRIENDS OF THE FIRST CONSUL WISH TO PROFIT BY IT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELEVATING HIM TOO SOON TO THE SUPREME POWER.—PAMPHLET WRITTEN WITH THIS VIEW BY M. FONTANES.—NECESSITY FOR DISAVOWING THAT PAMPHLET.—LUCIEN BONAPARTE DEPRIVED OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, AND SENT AS ENVOY TO SPAIN.

While the Osiris was conveying to Europe the news of what had occurred on the banks of the Nile, there left England orders altogether contrary to those which had been sent before. The observations of sir Sidney Smith had been favourably received in London. The government had been fearful of disavowing the acts of an English officer who had represented himself as invested with powers from his government; it had, more than all, discovered the falsity of the intercepted despatches, and better appreciated the difficulty of taking Egypt out of the hands of the French army. It therefore ratified the convention of El-Arisch, and desired lord Keith to see it executed. But there was no longer time, as has been already seen; the convention was at that moment torn in pieces, sword in hand; and the French re-established in the possession of Egypt, would not now abandon the country. The English ministry were destined to reap the fruit of their levity in bitter regret, and to sustain violent attacks in parliament for their conduct.

The first consul, upon his part, received with joy the tidings of the consolidation of his conquest. Unhappily the news of the death and exploits of Kléber arrived nearly at the same moment. His regrets were deep and sincere. He rarely dissimulated, and only when forced to do so by some duty or great interest, but it was always done with effort, because his vivacity of temper rendered dissimulation difficult. In the narrow circle of his family and counsellors, he never disguised any thing; he exhibited his affection and aversion with extreme violence. It was among his intimate friends he betrayed the grief caused by the death of Kléber. He did not regret in him a friend, as he did in Desaix; he regretted a great general, an able commander, more capable than any other man to secure the establishment of the French in Egypt—an establishment which he regarded as his finest work, of which the definitive success alone could change from a brilliant essay into a great and solid undertaking.

Time, like a river, carries along with it all that

man flings into its rapid waters—time has swallowed up the odious falsehoods invented by party malice. Still there is one of them which it is instructive to mention here, although long since completely forgotten. The royalist agents reported, and the English newspapers circulated, that Desaix and Kléber, having given umbrage to the first consul, they had been both assassinated by his orders, one at Marengo, the other at Cairo. There were not wanting miserable fools who believed this, while to-day people are almost ashamed to recall such base imputations. Those who fabricate such infamous falsehoods, should sometimes place themselves before posterity; they would then blush, if they could, at the denial that time had prepared for them.

The first consul had already given pressing orders to the fleets of Brest and Rochfort, to prepare to sail into the Mediterranean. Although the finances were in an improved state, still obliged to make great efforts on land, the first consul was not able to do at sea all that he had judged necessary. At the same time he omitted nothing to place the great Brest fleet in a state to put to sea. He urged the court of Spain for the necessary orders to admirals Gravina and Mazzaredo, commanding the Spanish division to concur in the movements of the French. By the united squadrons of the two nations, blockaded in Brest for a year past, a force of forty sail of the line would be formed. The first consul wished that, profiting by the putting to sea of this large naval force, the French vessels disposable at L'Orient, Rochefort, and Toulon, and the Spanish vessels disposable at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, should join the combined fleet, so as to augment its strength. These different movements were to be conducted in such a mode as to deceive the English, and throw them into great perplexity, during which admiral Ganteaume, taking with him the best sailers, was to slip off and carry to Egypt six thousand chosen men, numerous workmen, and an immense *matériel*.

Spain consented very willingly to this combination, which for her had at least the advantage of recalling into the Mediterranean, and consequently into her own ports, the squadron of Gravina, uselessly blockaded in Brest harbour. She saw no other objection than that arising from the bad condition of the two fleets, and their wretched equipment. The first consul did his best to remove this objection, and the vessels of both nations were quickly provided with the stores that were most necessary. In the mean time he was anxious that the army of Egypt should receive intelligence from him every five or six days. He gave orders that from all the ports in the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy included, brigs and small vessels, mere merchantmen, should sail with balls, shells, lead, powder, muskets, sabres, timber for carriages, medicines, bark, grain, wine, all in fact that could be wanted in Egypt. He ordered further, that each of these small vessels should carry workmen—masons, smiths, gunners, or picked horsemen. He had vessels chartered for this purpose at Carthagena, Barcelona, Port-Vendres, Marseilles, Toulon, Antibes, Savona, Genoa, Bastia, St. Florent, and other parts. He bargained with the merchants of Algiers to send cargoes of wine to Egypt, of which the army was destitute. By his order a troop of comedians was provided with all that was required for a theatre, the whole to sail for Alexandria. The best Paris journals were ordered to be sent to the principal officers of the army, that they might know all that was going on in Europe. Nothing was neglected, in one word, of all that would be expected to sustain the spirit of the excited soldiers, and to keep them in constant communication with the parent country [1].

Several of these vessels were of course likely to be captured; but the larger number had the chance of arriving safe, and did actually arrive, because the extended coast of the Delta could not be strictly guarded. The same success did not attend the attempts made to revictual Malta, which the English kept in a state of rigorous blockade. They made it a most important object to take this second Gibraltar, knowing that here the blockade was certain of proving effective; because Malta is a rock that can only be supplied by sea, while Egypt is a large country that supplies its neighbours and itself. They persevered, therefore, with great strictness in the investment of the island, and in inflicting upon it the horrors of famine. The gallant general Vaubois having at his disposal four thousand men, had no fear from being attacked; but he saw, hour by hour, the diminution of the provisions required for the sustenance of his troops, and, unfortunately, did not receive from the ports of Corsica sufficient supplies to replace the daily consumption.

The first consul directed his attention to select a commander capable of replacing Kléber in Egypt. The loss of this officer was painful, more particularly in consideration of those who might be called to succeed him. If Desaix had remained in Egypt the mischief would have been easily repaired; but Desaix had come back, and was no more. Those who remained in Egypt were not equal to such a command. Reynier was a good officer, brought up in the school of the army of the Rhine, skilful and experienced, but cold, irresolute, and having no ascendancy over the men. Menou was well-informed, brave, enthusiastic in favour of the expedition, but not capable of managing an army; and rendered ridiculous from having married a Turkish woman and professed the Mahometan faith. He called himself Abdallah Menou, which became a subject of jesting to the soldiers, and much diminished the respect with which a commander-in-chief should be ever invested. General Lanusse was brave and intelligent, full of a warmth which he knew how to communicate to others. He appeared to the first consul to merit the preference, although he was deficient in prudence. But general Menou had taken the command from seniority. It was difficult to secure the arrival of an order in Egypt; the English might intercept it; and by not publishing it word for word, raise a suspicion of its real meaning in such a way as to render the command uncertain, to raise divisions among the generals, and to distract the colony. He left things, therefore, in the same state, and confirmed Menou, not believing him, indeed, as incapable as he really proved himself to be.

[1] These particulars are all extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the first consul with the departments of war and of the marine.

It is necessary now to return to Europe, in order to see what is passing in the theatre of the great events of the world. The letter which the first consul had addressed from Marengo itself to the emperor of Germany, was brought to him with the news of the loss of that battle. The court of Vienna was now aware of the fault it committed in repelling the offers of the first consul at the beginning of the winter; in obstinately crediting that France was so reduced as not to be able to continue the war; in refusing to believe in the existence of the army of reserve; and in pushing Mélas so blindly into the gorges of the Apennines. The influence of M. Thugut was considerably diminished, because it was to him alone that were to be imputed all these errors in conduct and foresight. Still to these faults, already so great, he added another, not less so, in forming a closer alliance with England than ever, under the impression of the disaster of Marengo. Until now the cabinet of Vienna had declined the English subsidies[1]; but it thought right to obtain as soon as possible the means of repairing the losses of the campaign, whether to enable it to treat more advantageously with France, or to place itself in a better condition to renew the struggle with her, if her demands were too exorbitant. Austria therefore accepted 2,500,000*l.* sterling, or 62,000,000 f.[2] In return for this subsidy, Austria agreed not to make peace with France before the month of February following, unless the peace was common both to Austria and England. The treaty was signed on the 20th of June, 1800, the same day that the disastrous news arrived from Italy. Austria was thus bound up to the fortunes of England for seven months to come; but she hoped to pass the summer in negotiating, and to see winter arrive before hostilities recommenced. In other respects the cabinet of Austria was inclined to peace; and only wished to negotiate in common with England, and above all, not to be obliged to make too many sacrifices in Italy. On this condition she desired nothing better than to conclude it.

The emperor employed to be bearer of his letter to the first consul the same officer who had brought him the letter from Italy, written at Marengo, M. St. Julien, in whom he reposed great confidence. The reply was this time directed and addressed personally to general Bonaparte. It contained the ratification of the double armistice, signed in Germany and Italy, and an invitation to explain confidentially, and with perfect frankness, the basis of a future negotiation. M. St. Julien had a special order to sound the first consul about the conditions on which France would be willing to sign a peace; and, on the other side, to explain enough of the intentions of the emperor to induce the French cabinet to discover its own. The letter of which M. Julien was the bearer, full of flattering and pacific protestations, contained a passage in which the object of his mission was clearly specified.

"I am writing to my generals," said his imperial majesty, "to confirm the two armistices and regulate their details. In regard to other matters, I have sent to you the major-general of my armies, count St. Julien; he is in possession of my instructions, and commanded to call to your attention, how essential it is not to enter into public negotiations, likely to deliver so many nations to hopes, perhaps illusory, until after having known, at least in a general way, if the bases which you would propose for peace are such as will enable us to flatter ourselves with an arrival at so desirable an object. —Vienna, July 5, 1800."

The emperor let fall, towards the conclusion of his letter, the engagements which connected him with England, and which made him desire a peace common to both the belligerent powers.

M. St. Julien arrived in Paris on the 21st of July, or 2nd Thermidor, in the year VIII., and was received with the greatest cordiality and attention. He was the first envoy, for a long while, sent from the emperor, who had made his appearance in France. People welcomed him as the representative of a great sovereign, and as the messenger of peace. We have already spoken of the lively desire the first consul felt to put an end to the war. No one contested with him the glory of battles; he now wished for glory of another kind; less brilliant, but more novel, and, at that moment, more advantageous to his authority—that of pacifying France and Europe. In his ardent mind desires were passions. He sought peace then as he afterwards sought war. Talleyrand desired it as much as the first consul, for he was already fond of assuming the part of moderator about Bonaparte. It was an excellent part to play, particularly at a later period; but now to press the first consul to peace was to add one impatience to another, and to compromise the result by hastening the event too much.

The day after his arrival, July 22nd, or 3rd of Thermidor, M. St. Julien was invited to a conference with the minister for foreign affairs. They conversed on the reciprocal desire felt to terminate the war, and on the best mode to succeed in that object. M. St. Julien listened to all that was said to him upon the conditions under which peace might be concluded, and, on his side, hinted at all that the emperor his master desired. Talleyrand too hastily imagined that M. St. Julien had secret and sufficient instructions to treat, and proposed, in consequence, that they should not confine them-

[1] [If the difference between a loan never to be repaid and sum of money given directly, can be defined, M. Thiers is undoubtedly correct. Austria got £1,600,000 from England in 1795; in 1797, £1,600,000, under the name of *loans:* not one shilling of which advances she ever returned. The first money given under the name of "*subsidy*" was sent, as M. Thiers observes, in 1800. The present thus made to renew defeats similar to that of Marengo, was £1,066,666. Thus England paid towards the continued reverses of Austria alone, up to 1800, or in five years, no less than £7,266,660.] —*Translator.*

[2] [This sum is erroneous. The whole of the *subsidies* presented by England to different European states in 1800, according to our own returns, were—

Germany, or Austria.....	£1,066,666
German princes	500,000
Bavaria.....	501,017
Russia	545,494
	£2,613,177

M. Thiers seems to imagine that all was presented to Austria, or about £2,500,000.]—*Translator.*

selves to a mere convention, but reduce to writing preliminary articles for a peace. M. St. Julien, who was not authorized to commit himself in so serious an affair, because the engagements between Austria and England were absolutely in opposition to it;—M. St. Julien objected, that he had no power to conclude a treaty. Talleyrand replied, that the letter of the emperor completely authorized him; and that if he would agree to some preliminary articles, and sign them, with the reservation of their ulterior ratification, the French cabinet, upon the simple letter of the emperor, would consider him sufficiently accredited. M. St. Julien, who was a soldier, and had no experience in diplomacy, was simple enough to make Talleyrand acquainted with his ignorance of forms and his embarrassment, and to ask him what he would do in his place. "I should sign," said Talleyrand. "Very well, then; let it be so," replied M. St. Julien; "I will sign the preliminary articles, which shall not be esteemed valid until they have received the ratification of my sovereign." "Most undoubtedly not," replied Talleyrand; "no engagements are valid between nations but such as have been ratified."

This strange manner of communicating their powers to each other, is to be found specified at full length in the protocol of the negotiation still in existence. The minutes are dated the 23d, 24th, 27th, and 28th of July, or 4th, 5th, 8th, and 9th of Thermidor in the year VIII. All the important subjects for arrangement between the two countries were discussed, and the treaty of Campo Formio adopted as the basis of the negotiation, with a few modifications. Thus the emperor abandoned to the republic the boundary of the Rhine, from the point where that river leaves the Swiss territories, to that where it enters upon the Batavian limits. Under that article M. St. Julien required and obtained a change in the language. He wished the expression, "The emperor concedes the line of the Rhine," to be changed into "The emperór does not oppose the conservation of the limits of the Rhine by the French republic." This mode of expression had for its object to answer the reproaches which might be made by the Germanic body, that had accused the emperor of delivering up to France the territory of the confederation. It was agreed that France should not retain on the right bank of the Rhine any of the fortified posts, such as Kehl, Ehrenbreitstein, or Cassel, that the works should be razed; but that, on the other hand, the Germans should not throw up any works of earth, or masonry, within three leagues of the river.

Thus far for the boundary limits between France and Germany. It remained to settle those that belonged to Austria and Italy. The fifth secret article of the treaty of Campo Formio, had stipulated that Austria should receive in Germany, an indemnity for certain lordships which she had conceded on the left bank of the Rhine, independently of the Low Countries, which she had long before given up to France.' The bishoprick of Salzburg was to comprise this indemnity. The emperor would have been better pleased to have had the indemnity in Italy, because the acquisitions which he obtained in Germany, particularly the ecclesiastical principalities, were hardly new acquisitions, the court of Vienna having already in those principalities an influence and privileges which were nearly equivalent to a direct sovereignty. On the contrary, the acquisitions that it obtained in Italy had the advantage of giving the emperor countries over which he had not before the slightest influence or power; above all, extending its frontier and its influence in a country, the object of the continued ambition of the emperor's family. From the same motives France preferred that Austria should indemnify herself in Germany rather than Italy. Nevertheless, this last point was given up. The treaty of Campo Formio threw Austria upon the Adige, and gave to the Cisalpine republic, the Mincio and the celebrated fortress of Mantua. The desire of Austria, at this time, was to obtain the Mincio, Mantua, and the Legations, which was an exorbitant demand. The first consul was willing to go as far as the Mincio and Mantua, but he would not yield the Legations at any rate. He would do no more than consent that they should be given to the grand duke of Tuscany, on condition that in return Tuscany should be bestowed upon the grand duke of Parma, and the duchy of Parma on the Cisalpine. The grand duke of Parma would be a considerable gainer by this exchange, which would be a satisfaction accorded to Spain, in what respect will be shown hereafter.

M. St. Julien replied, that on this last point his sovereign was not prepared to give a definitive resolution. That the translations of sovereign powers from one country to another were little conformable to his political views; and that it was, in fact, a point to be regulated at a later period. In order to evade the difficulty, the negotiators were content to say, in the preliminary articles, that Austria should receive in Italy the territorial indemnities previously granted to her in Germany.

The Austrian officer, thus metamorphosed into a plenipotentiary, testified, in his sovereign's name, great interest for the independence of Switzerland, but little for that of Piedmont, and insinuated that France could pay herself there, for what she gave up in Lombardy to the house of Austria.

Thus they stayed their proceedings at very general points; the limits of the Rhine for France, with the demolition of the fortresses of Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein; particular indemnities for Austria taken in Italy in place of Germany, which signified that Austria would not be reduced within the limits of the Adige. But it must be said, that not only was it vain to treat with a powerless plenipotentiary, but that there was something yet more vain in considering articles preliminary to peace, articles in which the sole questionable part, for which the emperor had gone to war, namely, the frontier of Austria in Italy, as resolving that point even in the most general manner. As to the boundary of the Rhine, nobody had for a long time before thought seriously of contesting that frontier.

To the foregoing articles were added some accessary arrangements; it was, for example, agreed that a congress should be immediately held; that during this congress, hostilities should be suspended, the levies *en masse* making in Tuscany be disbanded, and the disembarkation threatened in Italy by the English be delayed.

M. St. Julien, whom the desire to play an important character had carried beyond all reason-

able bounds, had felt, from time to time, scruples upon the bold and singular step which he had permitted himself to take. In order to make him easy upon the matter, Talleyrand agreed to give him a promise, upon his word of honour, that the preliminary articles should remain a secret, and that they should not be considered as possessing any value whatever until they were ratified by the emperor. On the 28th of July, 1800, or 9th Thermidor, year VIII., these famous preliminaries were signed at the hotel of Talleyrand, being the office for foreign affairs, to the great delight of Talleyrand, who seeing M. St. Julien so well prepared to answer every question, seriously believed that officer had secret instructions for the purpose. Such was not, however, the case; and if M. St. Julien was so well-informed, it was only because they desired at Vienna to put him in a position to provoke and to receive the confidential communications of the first consul, relative to the articles of the future treaty. The French minister had not been able to penetrate into this circumstance, and by the desire to fulfil an act bearing a resemblance to a treaty, he had committed a serious fault.

The first consul, not occupying himself with the forms observed by the two negotiators, and trusting entirely in that regard to Talleyrand, never thought for his own part of doing more than of making Austria explain her own objects, to ascertain if she wished for peace, and to force it from her by a new campaign if she appeared to have no desire to make it. But for this purpose it would have been better to call upon her for an explanation within a given period of time, than to enter into an illusory and puerile negotiation, in which the consequence might be a compromise of the dignity of the two nations, and thus a final reconciliation be rendered more difficult.

M. St. Julien did not think it right to wait in Paris for the reply of the emperor, as he had been requested to do, but wished to carry the preliminaries to Vienna himself, without doubt for the purpose of explaining to his master the motives of his singular conduct. He left Paris on the 30th of July, or 11th of Themidor, accompanied by Duroc, whom the first consul sent into Austria, as he had been before sent into Prussia, to observe the court narrowly, and give it an advantageous idea of the moderation and policy of the new government. Duroc, as we have elsewhere observed, by his good sense and excellent bearing, was well fitted for similar missions. The first consul had, besides, given him written instructions, in which he had provided for every thing with the most minute attention. In the first instance, upon any circumstance occurring which might lead to an inference of the intentions of Austria in respect to the preliminaries, he was to send off a courier to Paris immediately. Until the ratification he was recommended to keep a perfect silence, and to appear ignorant in every respect of the intentions of the first consul. If the ratification was conceded, he was authorized to say, in a positive manner, that the peace might be signed in twenty-four hours, if it was sincerely desired. He was to make it known, in some way, that if Austria contented herself with the Mincio, the Fossa-Maestra, and the Po, which was the line marked out by the convention of Alexandria; that if, further, she admitted the translation of the duke of Parma to Tuscany, and of the duke of Tuscany to the Legations, there was no obstacle to an immediate conclusion. Those instructions contained further rules respecting the language to be used for all the subjects which might arise in conversation. Duroc was forbidden to lend himself to any jokes against Prussia and Russia, which were then little loved at Vienna, because they were not parties in the coalition. He was recommended to maintain a great reserve in regard to the emperor Paul, whose character was a subject of raillery at every court; he was to speak well of the king of Prussia; to visit the grand duke of Tuscany, to let none of those passions be visible which the revolution had excited, neither on one side nor the other. Royalists and Jacobins in France were to be spoken of as if they were as ancient as the Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy. He was desired to show no dislike towards the emigrants, except, indeed, to such as had borne arms against the republic. He was ordered to say, upon every occasion, that France was, of all the countries of Europe, the most attached to its government, because it was that of all the European governments which had afforded its government an opportunity of doing the most good. Lastly, he was to represent the first consul as having no prejudices, neither of the old times nor of the present, and as being indifferent to the attacks of the English press, because he did not understand English.

Duroc set off with M. St. Julien, and although the secret of the preliminaries had been kept, still the numerous conferences of the envoy of the emperor with Talleyrand had been remarked by every body, and people said loudly that he was the bearer of the conditions of a peace.

The prodigious success of the French in Italy and in Germany naturally exercised a considerable influence, not only in Austria, but in all the courts of Europe, friendly or inimical to France.

At the news of the battle of Marengo, Prussia, still ruled by the neutral system, was kindly inclined to France according to the turn of events; Prussia had expressed a warm admiration of the first consul, and never said again, from that moment, a single word which could put in doubt the assignment to France of the entire line of the Rhine. The only thing she now considered was, that justice might be done in the partition of the indemnities due to all those who had lost territory on the left bank of that river, and that discretion might be preserved in settling the limits of the great states. She added, that it was right to be firm towards Austria, and to repress her insatiable ambition. Such was the language held every day to the French ambassador at Berlin.

M. Haugwitz, and particularly the king, Frederick William, whose kindness was sincere, informed general Beurnonville daily of the rapid progress the first consul made in the regard of Paul I. As has been seen already, this prince, fickle and enthusiastic, passed during a few months from a chivalric passion against the French revolution, to an admiration beyond all limit for the man who was now its representative. He had begun to bear a downright hatred towards Austria and England. Although through this change a great result had been obtained in the inactive position of

the Russians on the Vistula, the first consul aspired to something better still. He wished to enter directly into relations with the emperor Paul, who was suspicious that Prussia prolonged the existing equivocal state of things, that she might be the only intermediate party in our relations with the most weighty of the northern powers.

He hit upon the means which obtained complete success. There remained in France six or seven thousand Russians taken prisoners the preceding year, not having been exchanged because Russia had no prisoners to offer for that purpose. The first consul had proposed to England and to Austria, that having in his hands a great number of Russian soldiers and seamen, they should be exchanged, Russians against French. Both nations certainly owed to Russia such a courtesy, because the Russians had been made captives in serving the designs of the English and Austrians. Still the proposition was refused. Immediately on this, the first consul conceived the happy idea of returning to Paul, without any conditions, all the prisoners in his possession. This was a generous and dexterous action, little onerous for France, that had nothing to do with the prisoners, since Frenchmen were not to be procured in exchange. The first consul accompanied the act with proceedings the most likely to act upon the susceptible heart of Paul I. He had the Russians armed and clothed in the uniforms of their sovereign; he even gave up to the officers their colours and their arms. He next wrote a letter to count Panin, the Russian minister for foreign affairs at St. Petersburg, informing him, that as Austria and England had refused to give their liberty to the soldiers of the czar, who had become prisoners of war in serving the cause of these powers, the first consul would not indefinitely detain these brave men, but send them back to the emperor unconditionally; this being, upon his part, a testimony of consideration for the Russian army, an army of which the French had acquired the knowledge and esteem upon the field of battle.

This letter was sent by the way of Hamburg, and transmitted by M. de Bourgoing, the French minister in Denmark, to M. Muraview, the minister of Russia in that city. But such was the fear of Paul I. among his own agents, that M. Muraview refused to receive the letter, not daring to break the anterior order of his own cabinet, which interdicted all communication with the representatives of France. M. Muraview contented himself with reporting to the court of St. Petersburg what had occurred, and made known to it the existence and contents of the letter of which he had refused to take charge. Upon this the first consul added another and still more efficacious advance towards the Russian monarch. Seeing plainly that Malta could not hold out much longer, and that the island, rigorously blockaded, would soon be obliged to surrender to the English for want of provisions, he conceived the idea of making it a present to the emperor Paul. It was well known that this prince was an enthusiastic admirer of the old orders of chivalry, and of that of Malta more particularly, having got himself to be elected under the title of grand master of St. John of Jerusalem; that he had determined to establish that religious and chivalric institution, and that he held in St. Petersburg frequent chapters of the order, for the object of conferring the decoration upon the princes and great personages of Europe. It was impossible to captivate his heart more completely than by offering him this island, which was the seat of the order of which he wished to be the head. The thing was admirably conceived under every point of view. Either the English, who were on the eve of its capture, would consent to its restitution, and thus it would be out of their hands; or they would refuse, and Paul I. was capable for such an object to declare war against them. M. Sergijeff, a Russian officer, who was detained in France as a prisoner of war, was this time charged to proceed to St. Petersburg, carrying the two letters relative to the prisoners and to Malta.

When these different communications arrived in St. Petersburg, they produced their inevitable effect. Paul was greatly touched, and from this time gave himself up without reserve to his admiration for the first consul. He selected immediately an old Finland officer, once a Swedish subject, and a very respectable man, exceedingly well disposed towards France, and much in favour at the Russian court. He was nominated governor of Malta, and ordered to put himself at the head of the six thousand Russian prisoners who were in France, and to go with that force well organised, and take possession of Malta, to be delivered up to him by the hands of the French. Paul ordered him to go by Paris, and to thank the first consul publicly. To this demonstration Paul added a step of much greater efficiency. He enjoined M. Krudener, his minister at Berlin, who had some months before been charged to renew the connexion between Russia and Prussia, to enter into a direct communication with general Beurnonville, the French ambassador, and furnished him with necessary powers to negotiate a treaty with France.

M. Haugwitz, who perhaps found that the reconciliation proceeded too rapidly, since Prussia would lose her character of a mediator the first moment that the cabinets of Russia and France were in direct communication, arranged so as to be himself the ostensible agent of this reconciliation. Thus far M. Krudener and M. de Beurnonville had met at Berlin with the ministers of the different courts without speaking. M. Haugwitz invited both to dinner one day: after dinner he brought them together, and then left them by themselves in his own garden, that they might have the means of the more perfect explanation. M. Krudener expressed his regret to general Beurnonville that he had never been able before to enjoy the society of the French legation; made an excuse for the refusal given at Hamburg to the receipt of the first consul's letter, because of the existence of the anterior order; and last of all entered into a long explanation of the new disposition of his sovereign. He announced to general Beurnonville, that M. Sprengporten had been sent an envoy to Paris; and stated to him the lively satisfaction that Paul I. had felt in learning the restitution of the prisoners, and the offer to restore Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. He passed at last from these subjects to the more important one of all; in other words, to the conditions of a peace. Russia and France had no

Interview between the Russian and French ministers at Berlin.—Reconciliation between France and Russia.—Reflections upon Bonaparte's genius and success.

quarrel between themselves. They were not at war for any interest connected with commerce or territory; but on account of a dissimilarity in their forms of government. They had nothing more to do, therefore, in regard to what immediately concerned themselves, but to write one article, declaring that peace was re-established between the two powers. This fact alone indicated how unreasonable the war had been. But the war had brought alliances in its train, and Paul, who piqued himself upon fidelity to his engagements, demanded only a single condition, which was, that his allies should be taken care of. They were four in number, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont, and Naples; for these four he asked the integrity of their territories. Nothing was more facile than to introduce an explanatory clause to this effect, that the conditions should be regarded as fulfilled, if those princes obtained an indemnity for the provinces which the French republic might take from them. This point was thus understood and admitted by M. Krudener. The secularisation of the ecclesiastical estates in Germany, and their proportional partition amongst the lay princes, who had lost a part or all of their territories in consequence of the abandonment of the left bank of the Rhine to France, was in effect a matter long assented to by every body. It had been admitted in the congress of Rastadt under the directory. The arrangement was not less easy as regarded the Italian princes, the allies of Paul I. Piedmont lost Nice and Savoy; she might be indemnified in Italy, if the ambition of Austria in that country was kept under due restraint, and not permitted to extend itself too far. On this subject Paul I., greatly irritated against the cabinet of Vienna, said, like Prussia, that Austria must be kept down; and was not inclined to grant her that which it was possible to refuse. In regard to the kingdom of Naples, France had nothing to take from it, but France had offensive conduct to punish and outrages to avenge. Still the first consul was willing to pardon her upon one condition, which was of a nature to please Paul I., as ill-disposed towards the English as towards the Austrians; it was that the cabinet of Naples should expiate its faults by a formal rupture with Great Britain. On all these topics there was a pretty near agreement, and every day there must have been a closer approximation, from the active movement of affairs, and from the impatient character of Paul I., who from a state of discontent with his former allies, was about to pass, without transition, into a state of open hostility.

The reconciliation of France with Russia was thus nearly accomplished, and even made public, because the departure of M. Sprengporten from Paris had been officially announced. Paul I., the furious enemy of France, thus became its friend, against the powers of the old coalition. The glory and the profound dexterity of the first consul had produced this singular change. A circumstance at once fortuitous and important was about to make it more complete; this was the quarrel of the neutral powers, increased by the violence of England upon the high seas. It seemed as if every thing at that time united to favour the designs of the first consul; and we are induced to admire at the same moment his good fortune as well as his genius.

On regarding the affairs of this lower world, one is almost tempted to say, that Fortune loves youth, it so wonderfully seconds the early years of great men. But let us not, like the ancient poets, make her blind and capricious. If she favours so often the youth of great men, as she did of Hannibal, Cæsar, and Napoleon, it is because they have not yet abused her favours.

Bonaparte was then happy, because he was worthy to be so; because he had reason on his side against all the world: at home against party, abroad against the powers of Europe. At home he would have nothing but justice and order; abroad, peace, but a peace advantageous and glorious, such as he has a right to desire who was not the aggressor, and who had himself known how to be victorious. Thus the world would reconcile itself with France represented by a great man, at once just and powerful; and if this great man had met with fortunate circumstances, there was not one of which he had not himself been the cause, and by which he had not profited with skill. It was but a little before, that one of his lieutenants, anticipating his commands, hastened at the sound of cannon to give him victory at Marengo; but what had he not done to prepare the way for that victory? Now a prince, stfruck with insanity, seated upon one of the first thrones in the world, became an easy prey to his diplomatic talents; with what clever condescension had he not flattered his folly? England, by her conduct on the ocean, was soon about to recall to France all the maritime powers; it will soon be seen with what art he set about managing them, and casting upon England the charge of all the violence. Fortune, the capricious mistress of great men, is not so capricious then as some would fain represent her. All is not caprice when she favours them, or caprice when she abandons them. In these pretended infidelities the errors are, in general, not upon her side. Let us speak a more correct language, more worthy of an important subject: Fortune, the pagan name given to the power which regulates all sublunary things, is but Providence befriending genius when it walks in the path of rectitude, or, in other words, in the way designated by infinite wisdom.

The fortunate circumstance which was about to rally definitively the powers of the north around the policy of the first consul, and to procure him auxiliaries upon the element where he had the greatest necessity for finding them, in other words, upon the sea, happened thus. The English had committed fresh outrages upon neutrals. They would not suffer the Russians, the Danes, the Swedes, and the Americans, to enter freely all the ports of the world, and to lend their flags to the trade of France and Spain. They had already violated the independence of the neutral flag, more particularly in regard to America; and it was because the Americans had not sufficiently defended it, that the directory showed its anger by subjecting them to treatment almost as rigorous as that they received from the English. Bonaparte had repaired this error by annulling the harshest of the regulations enforced by the directory; by the institution of the tribunal of prizes charged with administering better justice to captured vessels; by rendering homage in the person of Washington to the whole of America; and,

finally, by calling to Paris negotiators, in order to establish with her relations of amity and commerce. It was at this very moment that England, as if irritated by the bad success of her policy, seemed to become more oppressive towards neutrals. Already the most offensive acts had been committed by her upon the high seas; but the last exceeded all bounds, not only of justice, but of the commonest prudence.

This is not the place for entering upon all the details of that serious dispute; it will suffice to mention its main points. The neutrals asserted that the war, which the great nations chose to wage with each other, ought not in any manner to cramp their trade, that they had even a right to carry on the commerce of which the belligerent parties had voluntarily deprived themselves. They claimed, in consequence, the right of entering freely all the ports of the world, and of navigating between the ports of the belligerents; of going, for example, from France and Spain to England, and from England to Spain and France, and, what was less reasonable, of going from the colonies to the mother-country, as from Mexico to Spain, for the purpose of carrying the precious metals, which, but for their interference, could not reach Europe. They maintained that the flag covered the merchandise, or, in other words, that the flag of a nation, not concerned in the war, covered against every species of search the merchandize conveyed in such vessels; that on board of them French merchandise could not be seized by the English, nor English merchandise by the French; as a Frenchman, for instance, would have been inviolable on the quays of Copenhagen, or of St. Petersburg, for the British power: in short, that the vessel of a neutral nation was as sacred as the quays of its capital.

The neutrals only consented to one exception. They acknowledged that they ought not to carry goods used for purposes of war; because it was contrary to the idea of neutrality itself, that they should furnish one belligerent power with arms against another. But they understood that this interdiction should be limited solely to objects fabricated for warlike purposes, such as muskets, cannon, powder, projectiles, and articles of equipment of every kind; as to provisions, they would not admit the interdiction of any, except such as were prepared for the usage of armies, as biscuit for example.

If they admitted an exception as to the nature of transportable merchandise, they admitted of another, in respect to the place to be entered, on the condition that it should be strictly defined. The second exception was, as to the ports really and truly blockaded, and guarded by a naval force capable of laying siege to, or reducing them by famine, under a state of blockade. In such a case it was admitted that, to run into a blockaded port, was threatening one of the two nations in the use of its right, by preventing it from taking the places of its enemy by famine or attack; that it was consequently affording aid to one of the two against the other. But they demanded that the blockade should be preceded by formal declarations, that the blockade be real, and executed by such a force that there would be imminent danger in violating it. They would not admit that by a simple declaration of blockade, either party should be able to interdict at pleasure, by means of a pure fiction, the entry of such and such a port, or to exclude from the entire extent of certain coasts.

Lastly, it was necessary to discover whether a vessel really belonged to the nation whose flag she hoisted, whether or not she carried merchandise qualified as contraband of war. The neutrals consented to be searched, but it was required that the search should be made with a certain regard to civility, to be agreed upon and faithfully kept. In particular, it was considered essential that merchant-ships should not be searched if convoyed by a man-of-war. The military, or royal flag, must, according to them, have the privilege of being credited on its word, when it affirmed, upon the honour of its nation, that the vessels under convoy, were of the nation in the first place; and, in the second, that they carried no interdicted goods. If it were different, they said, a brig only while cruizing, might stop a convoy, and with that convoy a fleet-of-war, perhaps an admiral. Who could know! Even a privateer might stop M. De Suffren, or Lord Nelson!

Thus, the doctrine sustained by the neutrals, might be resolved into four main points.

The flag covered the merchandise; that is to say, it interdicted the search for an enemy's merchandise on board a neutral vessel, a stranger to the belligerents.

No merchandise to be interdicted, but such as is contraband of war. The contraband confined wholly to the objects fabricated for the use of armies. Corn, for example, and naval stores not included.

Access could not be interdicted to any port, unless such a port be really blockaded.

Lastly, no vessel under convoy could be visited.

Such were the principles supported by France, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and America, in other words, by the immense majority of nations; principles founded upon a respect for the rights of others, but absolutely contested by England.

She maintained, in effect, that, under those regulations, the commerce of her enemies would be carried on without any obstacle by means of neutrals (which, by the by, was not correct, for that commerce could not be continued by means of neutrals, without giving up to them the greater part of the profits, and causing the nation obliged to have recourse to them, an immense loss). She insisted on seizing French or Spanish property wherever it might be. She maintained that certain merchandises, such as corn, and naval stores, were real succours to a country at war; she desired that a declaration of blockade should be sufficient without the presence of a naval force to interdict the entrance to certain ports or coasts; lastly, that neutrals, under the pretext of convoy, should not escape the examination of the belligerent powers.

If it be desirable to know what was the foundation of the important interest concealed under this sophism of the public writers of England, here it may be found. England wished to hinder the carriage to the Spaniards of the rich metals of Mexico, the great source of Spanish opulence; to the French, the sugar and coffee, without which they are unable to live; to the one and the other, the timber, iron, and hemp of the north, necessary for their ships. She would have wished to be able to starve them in case of deficient harvests, as she

did, for example, in 1793; she wished for the power of closing the ports of entire countries without the obligation of a real blockade; lastly, she desired, by means of searches, vexations, and obstacles of all kinds, to ruin the trade of every nation; so that war, which, for commercial countries, is a state of distress, should become for her merchants, what it truly was, a time of monopoly and of extraordinary prosperity. In regard to the Americans, she had an intention still more iniquitous; it was to take from them their seamen, under the pretext that they were English; a confusion easy to make, owing to the uniformity of the language.

In 1780, during the American war, Catherine the Great had formed a league of neutrals, to resist these pretences. The first consul, profiting by the new-born friendship of Paul, the irritating wrongs of neutrals, and the outrageous violence of the English, set every effort at work to form a similar league in 1800.

At this moment the dispute presented itself only under one form, in the right of search. The Danes and Swedes, to escape the vexations of the English cruizers, had devised the plan of sailing in numerous convoys, escorted by frigates carrying the royal flag. It must be added, that they never dishonoured this flag, and took good care not to escort false Danes or Swedes, to cover the contraband of war, as it is denominated; they studied only how to escape vexations which were become unbearable. But the English, seeing in this only a manner of eluding the difficulty, and continuing the trade of neutrals, determined to continue the right of search, without regard to the convoying vessel.

The preceding year two Swedish frigates, the Troya and the Hulla-Fersen, accompanying some Swedish vessels, were stopped by the English squadrons, and obliged to submit to the search of the convoy under their charge. The king of Sweden sent the two captains of the frigates to trial by a court-martial, for not defending them. The example had for a moment stopped the English, who feared they might be exposed to a rupture with the northern powers. They had, in consequence, been somewhat less rigorous with Swedish ships. But two recent examples had renewed the difficulty, and forced Sweden and Denmark to the utmost pitch of exasperation.

In the winter of 1799-1800, the Danish frigate the Haufersen, captain Vandockum, who convoyed a fleet of merchantmen in the Mediterranean, was stopped by order of lord Keith; he attempted to resist, was fired upon, and carried into Gibraltar. A very violent dispute followed upon the subject between the English and Danish cabinets. It was still in progress when, in the month of July, a Danish frigate, the Freya, escorting a convoy of its own nation, was met in the channel by an English squadron. The latter insisted on the right of search; the commander of the Freya, captain Krabe, nobly resisted the summons of the English admiral, and refused to permit the search of his convoy. Force was employed with unnecessary violence; captain Krabe defended himself until he was crippled, and he was obliged to surrender to the superiority of the enemy, as he had but a single ship to oppose to six men-of-war. The Freya was taken into the Downs.

This event was soon followed by another of a different nature, but more odious and more serious. Two Spanish frigates[1] were at anchor at the entrance of the road of Barcelona. The English formed a scheme for capturing them. Here there was no question about the right of neutrals, but the committal of a complete piece of knavery, for the purpose of entering with impunity into an enemy's port without being recognized. They perceived in the roads a Swedish galliot, the Hoffnung, and resolved to make use of it for the act of brigandage which they had meditated. They manned their boats, boarded the galliot, clapped a pistol to the breast of the Swedish captain, and obliged him to sail quietly towards the Spanish frigates, which, having no mistrust of the Swedish flag, suffered her to come alongside. The English immediately rushed on board, surprised the two frigates, which had few hands on board, took, and left the harbour of Barcelona with their prey so dishonestly acquired.

This circumstance produced an extraordinary sensation in Europe, and rendered every maritime nation indignant, whose rights the English were no longer satisfied with violating, but whose flag they outraged, by making them unconsciously serve the purpose of a most infamous piracy. Spain was already at war with Great Britain, she could do no more; but she had recourse to Sweden, whose flag had been usurped, to denounce the odious fact, as well for Sweden as for Spain[2]. It needed

[1] [In this statement there is not one syllable of fact. True it is, that the English and French alike, in those days, stated the most extraordinary things of each other, without regard even to probability; and history will pass many of them to posterity as facts. The Conception and La Pas, nearly four hundred tons each, and carrying twenty-two guns, were in the port of Barcelona, laden with provisions and stores ready for sea, on the sixth of September, 1800. The port was blockaded by the Minotaur and Niger, English ships of war, the boats of which, five or six in number, attacked the Spanish vessels and carried them. The captain of the Conception fought well; three of his men were killed and twenty-three wounded. The English had two killed and six wounded. The cowardly commander of the La Pas got into his boat on the other side of his vessel from that attacked, and pulled away. To cover his cowardice, he gave out that he was boarded in the way stated by M. Thiers, to shelter himself from the anger of his government. The fort of Mont Jouc fired on the English boats. Captain Louis, of the Minotaur, says, "The firing began from all quarters at nine; about ten o'clock I had the pleasing satisfaction to see the two ships dropping out of the road, under a heavy fire from the vessels, four batteries, ten gun-boats, two schooners, with two forty-two pounders, the fort of Mount Jouc at the same time throwing shells." The Hoffnung, a Swedish galliot, was in the harbour at the time. Under the circumstances, such a use of that vessel would have been, in a naval sense, not possible.]—*Translator.*

[2] [The Spanish minister, De Huerta, complained of this affair to the Swedish chancellor, Ehrenheim, who remarked pithily in his reply, that the Spaniards must be negligent, in permitting violence to be done to neutrals in their own ports. De Huerta actually accused the Swede of coolness in the affair. In the mean time, it does not appear that any complaint was ever made of such an outrage by the master of the Hoffnung. The point to be gained was to excite Sweden against England, upon a circumstance that never did occur, on the strength of the story of a cowardly Spaniard. The king of Sweden's reply to one remonstrance on the subject—a remonstrance most probably urged by France—ran, that

no more to envenom the quarrel between England and the neutral powers, especially at this moment above all, when the moderation of the first consul towards them was of such a nature as to exhibit in a strange light the violence of England. Sweden demanded satisfaction; Denmark had already made the same demand. Behind the two courts was Russia, which from 1780 regarded itself as bound up with the powers of the Baltic in all the questions which involved their maritime freedom.

M. Bernstorff, on the side of Denmark, kept up a lively controversy with the cabinet of London, by means of notes, which France published, and which reflect equal honour on the minister who wrote them and the government that signed them, and which was soon called to support its signature by arms. "A mere gun-boat," the English remarked, "carrying the flag of a neutral, is to have the right of conveying the commerce of the world, and of keeping out of our view the trade of our enemies, which may be carried on as easily during war by this means as during peace." "An entire squadron then," answered M. Bernstorff, "would be obliged to obey the summons of the most wretched cruizer, to stop upon her demand, and suffer the convoy she is escorting to be examined before his eyes. The word of an admiral, making a declaration upon the honour of his country, is not to weigh against the doubt of the captain of a privateer, who is to possess the right of verification by search." One of these hypotheses is much more admissible than the other.

In order to support these opinions by fear, the English cabinet, which had just sent lord Whitworth to Copenhagen, ordered him to be followed by a squadron of sixteen sail of the line, which at that moment was cruising at the entrance of the Sound. The presence of this squadron produced a strong feeling among the Baltic powers, and not only alarmed Denmark, against which it more immediately pointed, but Sweden, Russia, and even Prussia herself, whose trade was interested in the navigation of the Baltic. The four signatures to the old neutrality of 1780 began a negotiation, with the avowed end of forming a new league against the maritime tyranny of England. The cabinet of London, which was still in apprehension of such an event, insisted strongly at Copenhagen upon arranging the dispute; but so far from offering satisfaction, it had the singular audacity to demand it. It wished, by alarming, to detach Denmark from the league before it was consummated. Unfortunately Denmark had been surprised, the Sound was not defended, Copenhagen was not secure against bombardment. In this state of things it was necessary to yield for the moment, in order to gain the advantage of the winter season, during which the ice defends the Baltic, and thus give all the neutral powers time to make preparations for resistance. On the 27th of August, or 11th Fructidor, in the year VIII., Denmark was obliged to sign a convention, in which the question of the law of nations was adjourned, and the last difference above, which had arisen respecting the Freya, was adjusted. The Freya was repaired in an English dockyard, and restored; and for the moment Denmark gave up convoying her merchant ships.

This convention decided nothing. The storms, in place of being dissipated, soon gathered again, because the four northern powers felt greatly irritated. The king of Sweden, whose honour was not yet satisfied, prepared for a voyage to St. Petersburg, in order to renew the ancient neutrality. Paul I., who was not fond of middle measures, began by a most energetic action. Learning the dispute with Denmark, and that an English fleet was off the Sound, he ordered the sequestration of all the property belonging to the English, as a security for the injury which might accrue to Russian commerce. This measure was to be continued until the intentions of the English government were completely cleared up.

Thus in the courts of the north every thing occurred to favour the objects of the first consul; and events turned out according to his wishes. Things did not go on less prosperously in the south of Europe, that is in Spain. There was seen one of the first monarchies in Europe sinking into dissolution, to the great injury of the balance of Europe, and the great sorrow of a generous people, indignant at the character which they had been made to play in the world. The first consul, whose indefatigable intellect embraced every object at once, had already directed to the side of Spain his political efforts, and sought to obtain as much advantage as possible for the common cause from that degenerate court.

We should not here retrace the sad picture which follows, if, in the first place, it were not true, and if it were not necessary afterwards to comprehend the great events of the age.

The king, the queen of Spain, and the prince of peace had occupied for many years the attention of Europe, and offered a spectacle dangerous for royalty, already so much compromised in popular esteem. One would have said that the illustrious house of Bourbon was destined, at the end of the century, to lose its power in France, Naples, and Spain, because in these three kingdoms three kings of extreme feebleness handed over their sceptres to the contempt and ridicule of the world, by leaving them in the hands of three queens, either giddy, violent, or dissolute.

The Bourbons of France, whether from their own fault or by misfortune, had been swallowed up by the French revolution; by foolishly provoking it, those of Naples had been driven, for the first time, from their capital; those of Spain, before they let their sceptre fall into the hands of the crowned soldier which the revolution had produced, had seen no better step to take than to pay their court to him. They had already become the allies of France during the convention, they could now much more willingly be in connexion with her, when the revolution, in place of a sanguinary anarchy, offered to them a great man disposed to protect them if they followed his advice. Happy would it have been for these princes had they followed the counsels of this great man, at that time so excellent. Happy for himself, had he done no more than give it to them!

The king of Spain, Charles IV., was an honest man; not hard and blunt like Louis XVI., but

"he could not take upon himself any share of responsibility for the improper use which the belligerent powers might make of the Swedish vessels they may seize upon."—NOTE OF EHRENHEIM.]—*Translator.*

more agreeable in his person, less informed, and exceeding him in weakness. He rose very early, not to attend to his royal duties, but to hear several masses, and then descend into his workshops, where, mingled with turners, smiths, and armourers, he stript off his clothes like them, and in their company laboured at all kinds of work. Loving hunting a good deal, he liked better to manufacture arms. From his workshops he went to his stables, to assist in taking care of his horses, and gave himself up to the most incredible familiarities with his grooms. After having thus employed the first half of the day, he partook of a solitary meal, to which neither the queen nor his children were admitted, and gave up the remainder of the day to hunting. Several hundred horses and domestics were set in motion for his daily pleasure, his dominant passion. After having rode like a young man, he re-entered the palace, gave a quarter of an hour to his children, a half hour to the signature of the papers submitted to him by his minister, sat down to play with some of the grandees of his court, and sometimes took a siesta with them until the time arrived for his last meal, which was immediately followed by his retiring to bed, always at the same fixed hour. Such was his life, without one single change during the whole year, except in Passion-week, which he devoted entirely to religious duties. In other respects he was an honest man, faithful to his word, mild, humane, religious, of exemplary chastity, though not cohabiting with his wife, ever since his physician had, by her order, requested him to abstain from it; he had no other concern in the scandals of his court or the errors of his government than in allowing them to be committed, without seeing or believing them during his long reign.

At his side the queen, sister of the duke of Parma, a pupil of Condillac, who composed for her and her brother excellent works for their education, led a totally different life. She would have done little honour to the celebrated philosophical instructor of her youth, if philosophers were commonly able to answer for their disciples. She was about fifty years of age, and possessed some remains of beauty, which she took pains to perpetuate with infinite care. Attending mass, as the king did, every day, she passed in corresponding with a great number of persons, and more particularly with the prince of peace, that time which Charles IV. gave to his workshops and stables. In this correspondence she made the prince of the peace acquainted with all the affairs of the court and the state, and she received from him, in return, all the scandal and puerilities of Madrid. She finished her morning by giving an hour to her children, and another to the cares of government; not an act, not an appointment, not a pardon, went to receive the royal signature, before the contents were seen by her. The minister who allowed himself to commit such an infraction of the conditions of her favour, would have immediately been displaced. She took her dinner alone, like the king, in the middle of the day; the rest of the afternoon was devoted to receptions, in which she acquitted herself with great grace, and to the prince of peace, on whom she bestowed daily several hours of her time.

At the period now spoken of, it is well known the prince of the peace was no longer minister. M. Urquijo, who will shortly be introduced, had succeeded him; but the prince was not less the first authority in the kingdom. This singular personage, incapable, ignorant, full of levity, but of a handsome appearance, as it is necessary to be in order to succeed in a corrupt court, was the arrogant ruler of queen Louisa, and had reigned for twenty years supreme over her empty and frivolous mind. Weary of his exalted favour, he shared it at last voluntarily with obscure favourites, and resigned himself to a thousand disorders and debaucheries, which he repeated to his crowned slave, whom he found pleasure in rendering miserable by his tales; he even ill-treated her, it was said, in the grossest way. Still he retained an absolute influence over the princess, who was wholly unable to resist him, and could not live happily unless she saw him every day. She committed the government to him for a long time, under the official title of prime minister, and afterwards, when he had the title no longer, he remained so in fact, for nothing was done in Spain without his consent. He disposed of all the state resources, and he had in his own possession enormous sums in specie, while the treasury, reduced to the greatest want, sustained itself upon paper-money depreciated one-half in value. The nation was well nigh accustomed to this spectacle, and exhibited its indignation only when some new and extraordinary scandal made the cheeks of those brave Spaniards blush, whose heroic resistance soon afterwards proved that they were worthy of a better government. At the time when Europe resounded with the great events which were passing on the Po and the Danube, the court of Spain was the scene of an unparalleled scandal, which had nearly destroyed the patience of the natives. The prince of peace, from one disorder to another, completed all by marrying a relation of the royal family. A child was the offspring of this marriage. The king and queen themselves determining to become sponsors for the new-born infant at the baptismal font, proceeded to the completion of the ceremony, with all the usages customary at the baptism of a royal child. The grandees of the court were obliged to fulfil the same duties that would have been exacted of them if the child had been the issue of royalty itself. Upon that babe in swaddling-clothes, the great orders of the crown, and the most magnificent presents, were conferred. The grand inquisitor officiated at the religious ceremony. It is true, that this time public indignation arose to the highest point, and that every Spaniard thought himself personally outraged by this odious affair. Things had come to such a head, that the Spanish ministers opened their minds upon the matter to the foreign ambassadors, and particularly to the ambassadors of France, who were generally their resort in most of their embarrassments, and who heard from their own tongues the frightful details which are here related.

In the midst of these disgraceful actions, the king alone, who was kept under a continual observation by his wife, was ignorant of all, nor had he the least suspicion of what was passing. Neither the voices of his subjects, nor the revolt of some of the Spanish grandees, who were indignant at the services required of them, nor even the inexplicable assiduity of the prince of the peace, could make

him see. The poor and good-tempered king was sometimes heard to make this singular observation, which embarrassed all those who were condemned to hear it, "My brother of Naples is a fool, who suffers his wife to govern him!" It must be observed, that the prince of Asturias, afterwards Ferdinand VII., brought up at a distance from the court, with incredible strictness, detested the favourite, of whose criminal influence he was well aware, and that this just hatred of the favourite finished by being converted into an involuntary hatred for his father and mother.

What a sight at the close of the eighteenth century, and the beginning of the nineteenth, when the throne of France had just fallen with a crash, and when upon its ruins a young soldier, simple, austere, indefatigable, full of genius, had just elevated himself. How long could the Spanish monarchy resist the dangerous example of the contrast?

The house of Spain, amidst these disorders, was struck sometimes with confused presentiments, and was often under the apprehension of a revolution. The old attachment of the Spaniards for royalty and religion, without doubt, in some degree reassured it, but it feared to see a revolution come by the way of the Pyrenees, and endeavoured to avert the danger by an entire deference towards the French republic. The incredible violence of the English cabinet, and the angry outbreakings of Paul I. in its regard at the moment of the second coalition, had thrown it completely into the arms of France. She found this conduct advantageous, even honourable, since Bonaparte had ennobled, by his presence at the head of power, all the relations of the cabinets with the government of the republic.

The good king, Charles IV. had imbibed, though at a distance, a sort of friendship for the first consul. This sentiment every day augmented, and it is sorrowful to reflect how this friendship was destined to end, without any perfidy on the side of France, by an inconceivable chain of circumstances. "What a great man is that general Bonaparte," said Charles IV. continually. The queen also said the same, but with more coolness; because the prince of the peace censured sometimes what was done by the court of Spain, of which he was no longer the minister, and appeared to blame the partiality it testified towards the French government. Still, the first consul informed by M. Alquier, the French ambassador, a man of comprehensive mind and great sagacity, that he must absolutely secure at Madrid the good will of the prince of the peace, sent to the favourite some magnificent arms, made in the Versailles manufactory. This attention, on the part of the most famous personage in Europe, touched the vanity of the prince of the peace. A few attentions from the French ambassador completely gained him over, and from that time the court of Spain seemed to give itself up entirely to France without reserve.

From the minister Urquijo alone was the slightest resistance ever experienced. He was a man of odd character, naturally the enemy of the prince of the peace, of whom he was the successor, and he had little love for Bonaparte. M. Urquijo, of plebeian extraction, endowed with a certain degree of energy, had attracted the enmity of the clergy and court, through some insignificant reforms that he had attempted in the government of the kingdom; and was inclined, in a manner somewhat extraordinary for a Spaniard of the time, towards revolutionary ideas. He was in connexion with many French demagogues, and partook, in a certain degree, of their dislike to the first consul. He possessed the merit of wishing to reform the more glaring abuses, of desiring to reduce the revenues of the clergy and the jurisdiction of the agents of the court of Rome. Towards these measures he was endeavouring to obtain the consent of the Holy See, and even in this attempt he had exposed himself to serious dangers. Having against him in fact the prince of the peace, he was utterly undone, if the influence of Rome should join that of the prince to destroy his influence in the palace. Affected by some attentions which were paid him by M. Alquier, and witness, besides, of the inclinations of the king and queen, M. Urquijo became in his turn the admirer of Bonaparte, whom it was not only natural, but every way the fashion, at that time, to admire.

The king's partiality soon became unbounded; it was impossible to be more manifested. Having seen the arms which had been sent to the prince of the peace, he conceived and expressed a desire to possess some of the same kind. Some magnificent specimens were immediately manufactured and sent to him, and he received them with great delight. The queen wished to have some dresses, and Madame Bonaparte, whose taste was renowned, sent to her all that Paris could produce of the most elegant and tasteful character. Charles IV., generous as a true Castilian, would not remain behind in the career of civility, and he acquitted himself in a manner truly royal. Knowing that horses would be an agreeable present for the first consul, he took the most beautiful animals he possessed from the studs of Aranjuez, Medina-Cœli, and Altamira, to find first six, then twelve, and then sixteen, the finest in the peninsula. No one could tell where he would have stopped, if his ardour had not been moderated. He employed himself two months in the selection; and no one was better able to acquit himself of such a task, because he was a perfect judge of horses. He composed a numerous train of persons to conduct them to France, taking for the mission the best of his grooms, and clothing them in magnificent liveries; and on all this fine cavalcade he laid but one positive order, which was, that while travelling through France they should attend mass every Sunday. The promise was given him that what he desired should be attended to; and his delight at making his handsome present to the first consul was then unalloyed. Though fond of France, this kind prince really believed that it was not possible for a man to live in that country many days without forsaking the religion of his fathers.

The noise made by these demonstrations well suited the objects of the first consul. While it gratified him, he thought it was useful to show to Europe and to France itself, the successors of Charles V., the descendants of Louis XIV., taking honour to themselves from their personal relations with him. But he sought much more solid advantages in his diplomatic relations, and aimed at one important object.

The king and queen of Spain were fond of one of their children, the infanta Maria Louisa, the

wife of the hereditary prince of Parma. The queen, sister, as we have said, to the reigning duke of Parma, had united her daughter to her nephew, and concentrated upon their heads her best affections; because she was extremely attached to the house from whence she descended. She contemplated for that house some aggrandizement in Italy; and as Italy depended upon the conqueror of Marengo, it was from him she hoped to obtain the accomplishment of all her wishes. The first consul, aware of the secret desire of the queen, took care not to neglect this means of carrying out his views, and sent to Madrid his faithful Berthier, in order to profit by the existing circumstance. If he had sent one of his aids-de-camp to Berlin and Vienna, he wished to do more for the court of Spain, and resolved to send thither the man who had the larger share in his glory, because Berthier was then Parmenio to the new Alexander.

At the same moment that the first consul was negotiating with M. St. Julien the preliminaries of peace, while he was winning over the inflammable heart of Paul I., and fomenting in the north the quarrel of the neutral powers, it was at that moment he despatched general Berthier in haste to Madrid. He set off towards the end of August, or commencement of Fructidor, without any official title, but with the assurance that his presence would alone produce a very great effect, and with secret powers to negotiate upon very important subjects.

His journey had several objects. The first was to visit the principal ports in the Peninsula, and to examine into their state, and their resources, and to urge forward, with the money in his hand, expeditions to Malta and Egypt. Berthier performed this part of his mission with great rapidity, and then hastened to Madrid to fulfil the more important part of his duty. The first consul was willing to grant an accession of territory to the house of Parma; he was willing to join to this increase of greatness the title of king, which would have met fully the desires of the queen: but he demanded to be paid for these concessions in two ways, namely, by the return of Louisiana to France, and by Spain assuming a threatening attitude towards Portugal, for the purpose of getting that country to treat with the French republic and break with England.

The motives of the first consul for exacting such conditions were these: since Kléber's death he had felt uneasy about the preservation of Egypt, for he shared, in common with his contemporaries, the desire of possessing distant colonies. The rivalry of France and England, which countries, for a century past, had fought solely about the East and West Indies, had raised to the highest pitch the desire to possess colonial territories. If Egypt were taken from France, the first consul still wished to do something for her colonial interests. He looked over the map of the world, and saw a magnificent province, placed between Mexico and the United States, formerly possessed by France, but ceded in a time of abasement by Louis XV. to Charles III., always threatened by the English and Americans as long as it remained in the impotent hands of the Spaniards, to whom it was of little value, though possessing half of the American continent. Of great value to the French, who had no possession in that part of America, and capable of being rendered productive, when their active labour could be concentrated there, he wished to possess the territory, which was that of Louisiana. If Egypt, being lost, could no more be a substitute for St. Domingo, the first consul hoped to find what he desired in Louisiana.

He, therefore, demanded it formally of Spain, as the price of the Italian acquisition; he also asked in addition that part of the Spanish fleet which was blockaded in Brest. In regard to Portugal, he wished to profit by the geographical position of Spain as it affected her, and also to turn to advantage the relationship of the two houses reigning in the peninsula, in order to detach that country from English alliance. The prince of Brazil, who governed Portugal, was, in fact, the son-in-law of the king and queen of Spain. They therefore possessed at Madrid, besides the influence exercised by the vicinity, that of the family, and it was a fit time to employ those double means for expelling the English from that part of the continent. The English once excluded from Portugal, when the courts of Prussia, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden were about to be closed against them, when Naples, forced into submission to the will of France, received orders to exclude them from her ports, would thus, in a little time, be altogether shut out of the entire continent.

Such were the proposals which Berthier had orders to carry to Madrid. He was perfectly well received there by the king, the queen, the prince of the peace, and by all the Spanish grandees, who were curious to see the man whose name always figured by the side of that of Bonaparte in the details of the wars of the time. The conditions of the bargain thus tendered by France appeared hard, and yet no serious resistance could be offered to them. The minister Urquijo alone, having fears what effect the cession might produce upon the Spanish people, showed somewhat more opposition than the court. Reasons, deemed incontestably sound, were brought forward to make him quiet. He was informed that it would take a large territory on the uninhabited borders of the Mississippi, to balance, as an equivalent, a small possession in Italy. That the Spaniards stood in need, in the gulf of Mexico, of such allies as the French, against the English and Americans; that if Louisiana was of value to France, deprived of her colonial possessions, it was of very small value to Spain, that was already so rich in the new world, that an accession of influence in Italy would be of more consequence to her than a territory so far off, placed in a region where she had already more than she was able to defend; finally, that it was an old French possession, torn away through the feebleness of Louis XV., and that Charles III. himself, with a true spirit of integrity, as was well known to the world, had at one time refused it, so convinced was he that it was not his due. These reasons were excellent, and Spain certainly, in this instance, was asked to give no more than she received. But that which decided M. Urquijo more than all the better arguments in behalf of the measure, was the fear of offending France, and of opposing a combination to which his court clung fast with a kind of passion.

A treaty was eventually agreed upon, in which the first consul promised to procure for the duke of Parma an augmentation of his dominions in Italy to the extent of one million two hundred thousand souls, or thereabouts, to assure to him the title of king, and the acknowledgment of the new title by all the sovereigns of Europe at the period of a general peace. In return, Spain, as soon as a part of these conditions was fulfilled, was to cede back to France Louisiana, with the same extent of territory as that province possessed when it was ceded by Louis XV. to Charles III., and to give besides six sail of the line full-rigged, armed, and ready to receive their crews. This treaty, signed by Berthier, filled the queen with delight, and elevated the infatuation of the court of Spain for the first consul to the highest degree.

The last condition, which had, for its object, to force Portugal to break her alliance with England, was easy to be performed; for it was as much in accordance with the interests of Spain as it was with those of France. Spain, in fact, was as much interested as France, that England should be excluded from the continent, and her power reduced. In this the first consul did nothing more than awaken her from her unpardonable apathy, and force her to make use of an influence which it was her duty long ago to have employed. He went still further in the matter; he proposed to Charles IV., that if the court of Lisbon did not immediately obey the injunction given to it, a Spanish army should pass the frontier of Portugal, and keep one or two of the Portuguese provinces as pledges, in order to oblige England afterwards to restore the Spanish colonies which she had captured, and to save the dominions of her ally. If Charles IV. did not feel himself strong enough to undertake such an enterprise, he offered to second the object with a French division. The good king did not desire so much as was thus offered. The prince of Brazil was his own son-in-law; he had no wish to take his provinces from him, though they were to be pledges for the restitution of Spanish provinces. But he addressed to him most urgent exhortations, and even menaced him with war, if his advice was not regarded. The court of Lisbon promised to send an envoy immediately to confer at Madrid with the French ambassador.

Berthier returned to Paris from Spain, loaded with the favours of the court, and gave the first consul the assurance, that he had at the court of Madrid persons wholly devoted to him. The fine horses given him by Charles IV. arrived about the same time, and were presented to the first consul in the Place Carrousel, at one of those grand reviews where he was always pleased to exhibit to the Parisians and to strangers the soldiers that had conquered Europe. An immense crowd of persons came to see those beautiful animals; the grooms were so splendidly attired, that they recalled the times of old monarchical pomp, and proved the consideration in which the new chief of the French republic was held by the oldest courts of Europe.

At this moment three negotiators from the United States of America to France arrived in Paris, Mr. Oliver Ellsworth, Mr. Richardson Davie, and Mr. Van Murray. That republic, governed by interest much more than by gratitude, ruled above all by the policy of the federal party, had approximated nearer to Great Britain during the late war, and had been wanting, not only to France, but to itself, in deserting the principles of the maritime neutrality. In spite of the alliance of 1778, to which the states owed their existence, a treaty which obliged them not to concede to others the commercial advantages which were not also conceded to the French, they had granted to Great Britain peculiar and exclusive privileges. Abandoning the principle that "the flag covers the merchandise," they had admitted that an enemy's property might be searched for in a neutral vessel, and seized, if its origin were ascertained. This conduct was as dishonourable as it was impolitic. The directory, naturally exasperated, had recourse to a system of reprisals, by declaring that France would treat neutrals as they were suffered to be treated by England. From one harshness to another, a state of things existed between France and America very little different from that of open war, without active hostilities.

It was this state of things to which the first consul wished to put an end. It has been seen what honours were given to the memory of Washington, with the double object of producing an effect at home and abroad. Bonaparte now appointed three individuals to negotiate with the Americans—Joseph, his brother, and the two counsellors of state, Fleurieu and Rœderer; they were to urge on the conclusion of the negotiation, for the purpose of soon giving a new adversary to England, and placing a new power on the list of those that had bound themselves to observe strictly the true principles of maritime neutrality. The first obstacle to a reconcilement was the article by which America had promised France the participation in commercial advantages accorded by the states to every nation. This obligation to give nothing to others which others would not give to us, caused the Americans very great embarrassment. Their negotiators did not exhibit the least disposition to give way upon this point; but they showed themselves ready to acknowledge and defend the rights of neutrals, and to re-establish, in their stipulations with France, the principles which they had abandoned in treating with England. The first consul, who was much more anxious to hold fast the principle of an armed neutrality than the commercial advantages of the treaty of 1778, become illusory in practice, enjoined his brother to pass that over, and to conclude an arrangement with the American envoys, if it were possible to obtain from them a perfect recognition of the principles of the rights of nations, which it was of the utmost importance to enforce. This difficulty removed, the rest might soon be arranged, and at the moment a treaty of reconcilement was preparing with America.

Another reconciliation, much more important, that between France and the Holy See, began now to produce its effect. The new pope, elected in the vague hope of an accommodation with France, had seen this hope realized, to which he owed his elevation. Bonaparte, as we have said, returning from Marengo, had sent some overtures to Pius VII. by cardinal Martiniana, bishop of Vercelli, assuring him that he had no intention of re-establishing the Roman Parthenopean republics, the works

of the directory. He had certainly enough in Italy to constitute, direct, and defend against the policy and interests of all Europe the Cisalpine republic. Bonaparte had, in turn, demanded that the new pontiff should use his spiritual influence in France to aid in the establishment of concord and peace. The pope received with pleasure count Alciati, the nephew of cardinal Martiniana, charged to carry the overtures of the first consul; he sent him back instantly to Vercelli to declare, in his name, that, disposed to second the intentions of the first consul relative to an object so important and so dear to the church, he wished, in the first place, to become acquainted in a more precise manner with the views of the French cabinet. The cardinal wrote in consequence from Vercelli to Paris, to make known the disposition and wish of the new pope. The first consul, in reply, asked for a negotiator with whom he would be able to explain himself directly, and the pope designated immediately monsignor Spina, bishop of Corinth, nuncio of the Holy See at Florence. This negotiator, after having repaired first to Vercelli, resolved to set out for Paris at the pressing instance of the first consul, who, by bringing this negotiation under his own superintendence, thought to make more sure of success. Upon the side of the first consul, it was a delicate matter to bring to Paris a representative of the Holy See, above all in the existing state of the public mind, which was hardly yet prepared for such a spectacle. It was agreed that monsignor Spina should not have any official title, and that he should style himself bishop of Corinth, ordered to treat with the French government upon the affairs of the Roman cabinet.

While these negotiations, so ably and actively conducted with all the powers, were in progress, M. St. Julien, who had signed the preliminaries of peace, and was the bearer of them, proceeded with Duroc to Vienna. Sensible of the imprudence of his conduct, he had not dissimulated with Talleyrand, that he was not sure whether he should be able to take Duroc as far as Vienna. The illusion of Talleyrand had not permitted him to believe in the existence of such a difficulty; and it was agreed that M. St. Julien and Duroc should pass the head-quarters of general Kray, then established near the Inn, at Alt-Œttingen, in order to obtain from that general a passport that should permit Duroc to pass into Austria. They arrived at the head-quarters of Kray on the 4th of August, 1800, or 16th Thermidor, year VIII.; but Duroc was detained, not being suffered to pass the limits fixed by the armistice. This was a first, and by no means a favourable sign of the reception destined for the preliminaries. M. St. Julien then proceeded to Vienna alone, saying to Duroc that he would demand passports for him there, and send them to the head-quarters, if he obtained them. M. St. Julien then went to the emperor, and delivered to him the articles which he had signed at Paris, under conditions of secresy. The emperor was much surprised and dissatisfied at the singular latitude which M. St. Julien had given to his instructions. It was not precisely the conditions contained in the preliminary articles which displeased him, but the fear of compromising himself with England, that had aided him with money, and was exceedingly suspicious. He was willing to make known a part of his own intentions, in order to become acquainted with those of the first consul; but he would on no account have a signature affixed to any document whatever, because it implied an open negotiation concluded without consulting the British cabinet. Then, in spite of the danger of provoking a storm on the side of France, the imperial cabinet took the step of disavowing M. St. Julien. That officer was very ill treated in public, and sent into a species of exile, in one of the remote provinces of the empire. The preliminaries were considered as void, having been signed, though provisionally, by an agent without powers or character. Duroc received no passports; and having waited until the 13th of August, or 25th Thermidor, he was obliged to return to Paris.

All these things, independently of causing a delay in the conclusion of a peace, were very disagreeable to the first consul; and Austria had reason to dread the effect of such a communication upon his irritable character. It was very probable that he would quit Paris immediately, put himself at the head of the armies of the republic, and march upon Vienna. The court of Austria resolved, therefore, in disavowing the preliminaries, not to make that a cause of rupture. Lord Minto, the representative of England at the court of the emperor, consented that Austria should negotiate, but only on condition that England should be included in the negotiation. It was arranged with him to propose diplomatic conferences, in which England and Austria should take an equal part. In consequence, M. Thugut wrote to Talleyrand, under date of the 11th of August, or 23rd Thermidor, that, while disavowing the imprudent conduct of M. Julien, the emperor had not a feeling less warm for peace; that he proposed the immediate opening of a congress in France itself, at Schelestadt or Luneville, whichever was deemed preferable; that Great Britain was ready to send a plenipotentiary; and that if the first consul agreed, a general peace might soon be given to the world. This offer was accompanied with expressions the best calculated to soothe the impetuous character of the man who at that time was ruler of France.

When the first consul received the intelligence of what had occurred, he was exceedingly angry. He was first offended at the disavowal of an officer who had treated with him, and next mortified that peace was still distant. He perceived, more particularly, in the presence of England in the midst of the negotiation, the cause of interminable delays, because a maritime peace was much more difficult to conclude than one that was only continental. On the moment, and under the influence of a first impression, he was about raising an outcry, and recommencing hostilities at once, denouncing the bad faith of Austria. Talleyrand, knowing well that he had done wrong in negotiating with a plenipotentiary who had no powers, endeavoured to calm the first consul. The whole matter was submitted to the council of state. That great body, which is now nothing more than an administrative tribunal, was then a real council of government. The minister addressed to it a detailed report.

"The first consul," said the report, "has judged it proper to convoke an extraordinary meeting of the council of state, and, confiding in its discretion,

as in its wisdom, has charged me to make known to it the more minute details of the negotiation which has been carried on with the court of Vienna." After having laid open the negotiations, as might have been done before a council of ministers, Talleyrand acknowledged that the Austrian plenipotentiary had no powers, and that in negotiating with him, the chance of a disavowal ought to have been seen; that, in consequence, it was impossible to make a laboured controversy[1] about the matter; and that, therefore, a violent outcry should be avoided. But recalling the example of the negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, which had gone before the signature of the treaty of Munster a good while, during which the parties continued to fight and to negotiate, he proposed that the opening of the congress should be assented to, and, at the same time, that hostilities should be recommenced.

This was, in fact, the wisest course that could be taken. It was necessary to treat, since the opponent powers, in addressing themselves to France, had made the offer; but it was equally right to profit by the state of the French armies, which were ready to take the field anew, and by that of the Austrian armies, which had not yet recovered from their defeats, in order that Austria might be forced to negotiate seriously, and separate herself from England.

It was possible to take one step besides, which might have its advantages, and that the first consul seized upon with his customary sagacity. England proposed a common negotiation. By admitting that power into the congress, there was the danger of introducing a contracting party that was in very little hurry to conclude; and more than that, the danger of complicating the continental peace, with all the difficulties of one that was maritime. The time consumed in these negotiations, insincere or difficult as they might be rendered, would also permit the fine season for fighting to pass away, and would give to the Austrian armies the rest of which they had so great a need. These were great inconveniences; but it was possible to find a compensation to balance them. England, on demand, might be admitted to the negotiation, but on one condition, namely, that she should conclude a naval armistice. If England consented to such a thing, the benefit of a naval armistice would far surpass the inconveniences of the continental one; because the French fleets, at liberty, would be able to provision Malta, and to take soldiers and *matériel* to the army in Egypt. For a like advantage the first consul would most willingly have exposed himself to the chances of an extra campaign upon the continent. A maritime armistice was undoubtedly something new, altogether unusual in the law of nations: yet, it was but just that the Anglo-Austrian alliance should in some mode indemnify France for the sacrifice she would make in suspending the march of her armies upon Vienna.

There was resident in London, on the French side, an able, clever, and shrewd negotiator, M. Otto, who was kept there for the purpose of treating on matters relating to prisoners-of-war. He had been selected by the French cabinet on purpose to make use of him on the first occasion that overtures of peace might occur on the side of France, or overtures be made by England. He was especially charged to address himself to the British cabinet, and at once make the proposal of a naval armistice. In this mode of proceeding the first consul saw the advantage of moving with more rapidity, and of treating directly respecting such affairs, which he always preferred to employing intermediate agents. On the 24th of August, or 6th Fructidor, in the year VIII., instructions, in agreement with this new plan of negotiation, were transmitted to M. Otto. Upon the same day the communications from Vienna were answered in a very severe tone. In the French communications, the refusal to admit the preliminaries was attributed to the treaty for a subsidy, signed on the 26th of June preceding. The French government deplored the state of dependence in which the emperor was placed in regard to England. A congress at Luneville was assented to; but it was added that, while the negotiations proceeded, the war must be continued: because, in proposing a joint negotiation, Austria had not taken care to provide, as a natural consequence, a suspension of arms by land and sea. This was said for the object of engaging the Austrian diplomatists to interfere themselves in London, in order to obtain a naval armistice.

Communications were established in London, between M. Otto and Captain George, the head of the transport-board. They lasted during the whole of the month of September. M. Otto proposed, on the side of France, that hostilities should be suspended by sea and land; that all vessels, both of trade and war, belonging to the belligerent nations, should navigate freely; that the ports belonging to France, or occupied by her armies, such as Malta and Alexandria, should be assimilated to the fortresses of Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingoldstadt, in Germany, which, though blockaded by the French armies, were nevertheless, to be victualled and supplied. M. Otto freely admitted that France would derive great benefit from such an arrangement; but he stated that her advantages ought to be great to compensate for the concessions which she must make, in letting the summer pass away without completing the destruction of the Austrian armies.

The sacrifice thus demanded of England was one which nothing was capable of snatching from her hands. It was, in fact, giving permission to revictual Malta and Egypt, and perhaps give over those two possessions to France for ever; it was to permit the combined French and Spanish fleets to leave Brest and sail up the Mediterranean, taking possession of a place which would render it anew master of the sea for a longer or shorter time. England could not assent to such a proposal, though the danger threatening Austria touched her very nearly; she had a great interest in preventing Austria from being crushed; because if Austria fell, Bonaparte, having all his resources at liberty, might be able to make some formidable attempt upon the British isles. In consequence, she believed it was needful to make some sacrifices for an interest of this nature; and while crying out against the novelty of a naval armistice, she presented a counter-project, dated the 7th of September, 1800, or 20th of Fructidor, year VIII. To commence, she agreed to Luneville as the place

[1] Polémique d'apparat.

for the meeting of the congress, and appointed Mr. Thomas Grenville, the brother of the minister for foreign affairs, to treat of a general pacification. England then proposed the following system in respect to the naval armistice. All hostilities shall be suspended by land and sea; the suspension of arms shall be not only common to the three belligerent parties, Austria, England, and France, but also to their allies. This arrangement had for its object to deliver Portugal from the threatening attitude of Spain. The maritime places which are blockaded, such as Malta and Alexandria, shall be assimilated to those in Germany, and be provisioned every fifteen days, in proportion to the consumption of the provisions, which has taken place in the same interval of time already elapsed. The ships of the line in Brest and the other ports were not to be at liberty to change their stations during the armistice.

This counter-project on the part of England was rather an evidence of good will towards Austria, than an effective concession on the important point of the negotiation. Malta might no doubt gain something by being provisioned for a short time; but Egypt had no need of provisions. Soldiers, muskets, and cannon were wanted there; not corn, with which she could supply the whole world.

Still France, yielding in some things, might find in the naval armistice advantages sufficiently great to admit of its execution with certain modifications.

On the 21st of September, being the 4th complementary day of the year VIII., the first consul made a last proposition. He consented that the vessels of the line should not change their stations, which condemned the combined squadrons of France and Spain to remain blocked up in Brest harbour; he demanded that Malta should be revictualled every fifteen days, at the rate of ten thousand rations a-day; he consented that Egypt should remain blockaded, but required that six frigates should pass free to Egypt from Toulon, to go and return from Alexandria without being visited.

His intention was here very clear; and he was right not to disguise an interest which all the world must discover at first sight. He intended to arm three frigates *en flûte*, to load them with men and munitions of war, and to send them to Egypt. He hoped they might have been able to carry six thousand men, a great quantity of muskets, swords, bombs, shells, and similar articles. He therefore sacrificed every thing to obtain his essential object, the victualling of Malta and the recruiting of the army in Egypt.

But the difficulty, whatever efforts might have been made on either side to remove it, continued the same. The object was to preserve Malta and Egypt to France; to her interest in these England would not give way. There was no means of coming to an understanding upon the matter, and the negotiation was abandoned, on the refusal in London to allow the last plan for a naval armistice.

Before entirely breaking off the negotiation, the first consul, in the way of courtesy, made a last proposition to England. He offered to renounce the naval armistice, and to treat with her in a separate negotiation from that about to commence with Austria.

It was now September, 1800; several months had been passed in vain negotiations, since the victories of Marengo and of Hochstedt, and the first consul would lose no more time without action.

Austria, when threatened, replied that she could not force England to sign a naval armistice; that she offered for herself to negotiate immediately; that she had appointed M. Lehrbach to go to Luneville, and that he was about to proceed there immediately; that Mr. Thomas Grenville was only waiting for his passports; that they could thus negotiate without any waste of time; but that it was not necessary to renew hostilities during negotiations, and shed more torrents of human blood. The first consul, who knew well the secret intention of dragging on the affair until winter should arrive, determined at last upon the renewal of hostilities, and gave orders in consequence. He had perfectly well employed the two months that were gone, and had put a finishing hand to the organization of the armies. His new dispositions thus made were as follow:—

Moreau, as already has been said, had been obliged to send general St. Suzanne on the Rhine, with some detachments, for the purpose of uniting the garrisons of Mayence and Strasburg, and making head against the peasant levies made by the baron Albini in the centre of Germany. This was a weakening of Moreau's force, and still an insufficient means of covering his rear. The first consul, in order to prevent any damage in that quarter, hastened to complete the Batavian army, placed under the orders of Augereau. He formed it of eight thousand Dutch and twelve thousand French, both one and the other taken from the troops that guarded Holland and the departments of the north. The battalions most worn out or fatigued by the preceding campaigns, restored by rest and completed with recruits, were now excellent corps. Augereau marched to Frankfort, and there by his presence restrained the Mayence levies of the baron Albini and the Austrian detachments left in the neighbourhood. This precaution taken, the corps of St. Suzanne, re-organized and very nearly eighteen thousand strong, had again marched to the Danube, and formed once more the left wing of Moreau's army. His return raised the active army of Moreau to very nearly one hundred thousand men.

When the army of reserve had thrown itself into Italy, it had left in the rear a part of the corps designed to complete it; but for its complete formation there had not been time to wait. In place of an effective force of sixty thousand men, as was originally designed, it had only amounted to forty and a few thousand men. The first consul formed these into a second army of reserve, about fifteen thousand strong, and placed it in the Grisons, in face of the Tyrol, which thus allowed Moreau to draw closer to him his right wing, commanded, as is well-known, by Lecourbe, and to unite at hand the entire mass of his forces, if it was required to force the barrier of the Inn.

On its own side the army of Italy, established on the banks of the Mincio by the convention of Alexandria, delivered from all care about the Tyrol and Switzerland by Macdonald, had been enabled to bring its wings nearer to its centre, and to concentrate in such a manner as to be fit for immediate action. Composed of troops that had

passed the St. Bernard, and those which had been drawn from the German army by the St. Gothard, lastly, of the troops of Liguria, which had defended Genoa and the Var, recruited, rested, and refreshed, it presented a total mass of about one hundred and twenty thousand men, of which number eighty thousand were united on the Mincio. Masséna was at first the general-in-chief, and the only one capable of commanding it well. Unhappily dissensions arose between the commissariat of the army and the Italian governments. The army, although transported into the midst of fertile Italy, and in possession of the rich magazines left by the Austrians, had still not enjoyed all the good things to which it had a right. It was alleged that the officers of the commissariat had sold a part of these magazines. The governments of Piedmont and of the Cisalpine complained that they were crushed under war contributions, and refused to pay them. In the midst of this confused state of affairs, very heavy charges were made against the French administrators, and they reached even to Masséna himself. The clamour soon became so loud, that the first consul found himself obliged to recal Masséna, and replace him by general Brune. Brune, with much courage and mind, was in reality but an indifferent general, and in politics still less able. He was one of the most zealous chiefs of the demagogue party, which did not prevent his being strongly attached to the first consul, who was much pleased at knowing it to be the case. Not having been able to give him an active command during the spring, the first consul gave him one during the autumn. The victory in Holland strongly recommended him in public opinion; but the recal of Masséna was a misfortune for the army and for the first consul himself. Masséna got soured, and was on the point of becoming, despite himself, a subject of hope for a crowd of intriguers, who at that particular moment happened to be busy. The first consul was not ignorant of this, but he would not permit irregularities any where, and he was not to be blamed.

To the four armies above-mentioned, the first consul joined a fifth, consisting of troops assembled around Amiens. He detached from demi-brigades remaining in the interior, the skeletons of various companies of grenadiers; he had them filled up with fine men, and formed a superb corps of nine or ten thousand choice soldiers, who were designed to do duty on the coasts, if the English should effect a disembarkation on any part, or they were to pass into Italy, to fill the place occupied by Augereau in Germany—that of covering the wings and rear of the principal army. Murat was nominated to the chief command.

All this was done, as far as the recruiting was concerned, by means of the levy ordered by the legislative body, and, in regard to the expenses, by means of the financial resources recently created. Nothing was now wanting to the three different corps; they were well-fed, well-armed, and their horses and *matériel* were complete.

It may be supposed that the first consul was impatient to make use of these means to force a peace from Austria before the winter came on. He ordered Moreau and Brune in consequence to repair to their respective head-quarters, and to prepare to recommence hostilities. He enjoined upon Moreau to give the Austrian general proper notice, under the time stipulated in the armistice, and not to permit him to prolong the suspension of arms but on one sole condition, that the emperor should give up to the French army the three places actually blockaded, Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt. On this condition five or six weeks' respite longer might be given. These places were worthy of the sacrifice. By occupying them, an excellent base for operations on the Danube would be obtained. The French would be strengthened by the corps thus employed in the blockade; they would thus have time to push a wing of the army of Italy upon Tuscany and the kingdom of Naples, countries in which the levies *en masse* were continued at the instigation of Austria with English money. Such were the orders sent to the head-quarters of Moreau.

On his side the emperor of Germany, profiting by the time gained, employed with the greatest activity the subsidy furnished him by England. He urged forward the new levies ordered in Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Styria, and Carinthia. The English minister, Wickham, established offices of a peculiar sort in various German towns, in order to purchase the services of soldiers to go and fight for the coalition. By means of a new subsidy, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg corps were considerably augmented. Independently of the sums given to Austria, the recruiting agents had taken into the direct pay of the English government two regiments composed of boatmen raised from the rivers of Germany, and designed to facilitate the passage over them. Ten thousand peasants were hired to execute, under the direction of engineers, formidable entrenchments along the line of the Inn, from the Tyrol to the union of that stream with the Danube. Every thing was in movement from Vienna to Munich. The staff of the Austrian army had been entirely changed. Kray, despite his experience and his activity on the field of battle, had partaken in the disgrace of Mélas. The archduke Ferdinand himself, who served under his orders, had been removed. The archduke John, a young prince, brave and well-educated, but wholly without experience in war, his head full of theories, his imagination smitten with the manœuvres of Bonaparte, and wishing at any cost to imitate them, was called to the chief command of the imperial forces. This was one of those novelties which people willingly attempt in desperate circumstances. The emperor himself repaired to the army, to re-animate it by his presence, and by passing it in review.

He spent several days with the troops, accompanied by M. Lehrbach, the negotiator appointed to attend the congress at Luneville, and by the young archduke John. After having seen and examined every thing in company with his counsellors, he discovered that nothing was ready; that the army was not yet sufficiently established, either in point of confidence or *matériel*, to commence immediate hostilities. M. Lehrbach was then charged to proceed to the head-quarters of Moreau, to learn whether he was able to obtain again a prolongation of the armistice, for a few days, from the French government. Moreau informed M. Lehrbach what the conditions were upon which the first consul would agree to a new suspension of arms. The emperor consented regretfully to these conditions;

and on the 20th of September, or third complementary day of the year VIII., a new prolongation of the armistice was concluded between M. Lehrbach and general Lahorie, in the village of Hohenlinden, destined soon to become so celebrated. The fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt, were to be delivered up to the French army, to be disposed of as it might see fit. In return, the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days from the 21st of September, comprising fifteen days' notice of the resumption of hostilities, if afterwards they were to recommence.

The emperor returned to Vienna very ill-satisfied with the visit he had made to his army, since that event had been attended with no other results than to give up to the French army the three strongest places in his dominions. He was deeply mortified. His people partook in his feelings, and accused M. Thugut of being entirely in the interest of England. Queen Caroline of Naples had just arrived with lord Nelson and lady Hamilton, to support the war party in Vienna. But the public clamour was great. M. Thugut was charged with serious errors, such as his refusal, at the beginning of the winter, to listen to the pacific propositions of the first consul; the bad direction of the military operations; his obstinacy in not admitting the army of reserve, even when it was passing the St. Bernard; the concentration of the principal forces of the empire in Liguria, to please the English, who flattered themselves that they should get possession of Toulon; and lastly, the engagement entered into with the English government not to treat without it—an engagement signed on the 20th of June, when he ought, on the other hand, to have preserved his freedom of action. These reproaches were in a great degree well-founded. But well-founded or not, they were sanctioned by events; for nothing had succeeded under the auspices of M. Thugut, and people only judge according to results. M. Thugut was then obliged to bend to circumstances, and to retire, but still retaining a great influence over the Austrian cabinet. M. Lehrbach was appointed to succeed him in the foreign office; and to succeed M. Lehrbach at the congress of Luneville, a well-known negotiator, M. Louis Cobentzel, was appointed, who was well-known personally to Bonaparte, and was particularly agreeable to him, having negotiated together the treaty of Campo Formio. It was hoped that M. Cobentzel would be a person better adapted than any other for establishing a good understanding with the French government; and that, placed at Luneville, at some distance from Paris, he would sometimes visit that city, in order to have more communication with the first consul.

The delivery to the French army of the three fortresses of Ulm, Ingoldstadt, and Philipsburg, happened very seasonably for the celebration of the fête of the 1st Vendémiaire. It revived the hopes of peace, because it displayed very clearly the extreme situation of Austria. The annual fête was founded to celebrate the foundation of the republic, and was one of the only two which the constitution had established. The first consul determined that it should not be less splendidly celebrated than that of the 14th of July, which had been so happily increased in attraction by the presentation of the colours taken in the preceding campaign, to the Invalides; he determined that it should be distinguished by a character as patriotic, but more serious than any of those which were given in the course of the revolution, and, more than all, that it should be freed from that ridicule attached to the imitation, in modern times, of the customs of the ancients.

It must be confessed that religion leaves a great vacancy in being excluded from the festivals of nations. Public games, theatrical representations, fires that make the night brilliant with illuminations, may occupy the popular attention for some time, upon any public occasion of the kind, but cannot fill up the whole day. In past times, nations have ever been disposed to celebrate their victories at the foot of the altar, and have made their public ceremonies an act of thankfulness to the divinity. But France had then no altar but that which had been elevated to the goddess of reason during the reign of terror; those, which the theophilanthropists innocently strewed with flowers, during the licentious reign of the directory, were now covered with ineffaceable ridicule, because, in regard to altars, those only are respectable which are ancient. The old Catholic altar of France had not then been restored, and nothing remained in consequence but certain ceremonies in some degree academic, under the dome of the Invalides; elegant orations, such as those made by M. Fontanes, or patriotic music composed by Méhul or Lesueur. The first consul was sensible of this, and endeavoured, therefore, to supply the deficiency in religious feature, by giving the fête something that should possess a deeply moral character.

The homage paid to Washington, and the presentation of the colours taken at Marengo, had already supplied subjects for the two festivals yet celebrated under his consulship: he contrived for the present to find, in a great act of reparation, the subject for the fête of the 1st of Vendémiaire, year IX., or 23d of September, 1800.

At the time when the tombs of St. Denis were rifled, the body of Turenne had been found in perfect preservation. In the midst of the excesses of the people, an involuntary respect had saved these remains from the common desecration. At first deposited in the Jardin des Plantes, they were subsequently committed to the care of M. Alexander Lenoir, a man whose pious zeal, worthy of being honoured in history, preserved a multitude of old monuments, which he collected in the museum of the Petits Augustins. There lay the remains of Turenne, exposed rather to the curious feelings of visitors, than to their respect. The first consul thought of depositing the remains of this great man under the dome of the Invalides, and the guard of our older soldiers. In honouring an illustrious general and servant of the old monarchy, he was bringing into union the glories of Louis XIV. and those of the republic; it was an act re-establishing the respect for the past without doing outrage to the present time; it was, in a word, the entire political object of the first consul, under a noble and touching aspect. The translation was to take place on the last complementary day of the year VIII. or the 22d of September, and on the following day, or 1st of Vendémiaire in the year IX., or 23d of September, the first stone was to be laid

of the monument to Kléber and Desaix. Thus, at the moment when the earth, in obedience to the laws which impart motion to it, was completing one great century, and giving birth to another, not less renowned in its turn if it proved in future worthy of its commencement,—at such a moment the first consul determined to pay a double homage to one hero of the past time, and to two of the present. In order to make the ceremonies the more striking, he imitated, to a certain extent, the same proceedings which had been practised at the federation of 1790, and he requested all the departments to send representatives, who, by their presence, might give a character to the scene not only Parisian, but national. The departments answered readily to the call, and selected distinguished citizens, that curiosity, the desire to see for themselves tranquillity succeed to trouble, prosperity to the miseries of anarchy, the wish, above all, to see and converse with a great man, attracted to Paris in considerable numbers.

Upon the 5th complementary day of the year VIII., or 22d of September, the public authorities went to the museum of the Petits Augustins, to fetch the car upon which lay the body of Turenne. On this car, drawn by four white horses, was placed the sword of the hero of the monarchy, preserved in the family of Bouillon, and lent to the government for that striking ceremony. Four old generals, mutilated in the service of the republic, held the tassels of the car, which was preceded by a piebald horse, such as that which Turenne rode, harnessed after the fashion of his time, and led by a negro, all an accurate representation of some of the scenes of a day belonging to the times of the hero to whom the homage was paid. Around the car marched the invalids, followed by some of those fine troops which had returned from the banks of the Po and the Danube. This singular and noble procession traversed Paris to the Invalides in the midst of an immense assemblage. There the first consul waited its arrival, surrounded by the envoys from the departments, both those of the old France and those of the new France; these last representing Belgium, Luxemburg, the Rhenish provinces, Savoy, and the county of Nice. The precious relic which was carried by the procession, was placed under the dome. Carnot, the minister-at-war, delivered a simple and appropriate address, and then, while solemn music resounded through the vaulted building, the body of Turenne was deposited in the monument which it now occupies, and where it was soon to be rejoined by his companion in glory, the illustrious and virtuous Vauban; where, too, he was destined to be one day joined by the author of the great achievements we are recounting, and where he will most assuredly rest, surrounded by this august company, throughout the ages which heaven may have reserved for France.

If in days like our own, when faith is become cold, any thing can fill its place, and perhaps equal the purposes of religion, it is such a spectacle as this.

On the evening of the same day a gratuitous representation of the "Tartuffe" and of the "Cid" was given to the people, with the view of offering them an amusement less coarse than had been customary upon such occasions. The first consul attended the performance. His presence, his intention, instinctively guessed by a sensitive and intelligent people, all concurred to maintain upon the occasion, in a tumultuous assemblage, a thing not usual at gratuitous exhibitions—the most complete decorum. The order was interrupted only by cries a thousand times repeated—"Long live the republic!—Long live general Bonaparte!"

On the following day, the first consul, as before, accompanied by the public authorities and envoys from the departments, repaired to the Place des Victoires. There a monument was about to be erected in the Egyptian style, intended to receive the mortal remains of Kléber and Desaix, whom the first consul wished to repose side by side. He then went on horseback to the Invalides, where the minister of the interior, his brother Lucien, delivered a speech on the state of the republic, which made a powerful impression. Some passages were very strongly applauded; this, among others, relative to the present age and to that of Louis XIV. "It may be said that at the present moment these two great ages have met to salute one another over that august tomb!" The orator, in delivering these words, mounted upon the tomb of Turenne. Unanimous plaudits responded, showing that every heart, without derogating from the present, was willing to receive from the past whatever deserved revival. And that the scene might be complete—that the common illusions of human nature might do their part, the orator further exclaimed—"Happy the generation which sees finished, in a republic, the revolution which it commenced under a monarchy!"

During this ceremony the first consul received a despatch by telegraph, announcing the armistice of Hohenlinden and the cession of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt. He sent a note to his brother Lucien, which was read to all those present, and welcomed with greater applauses than the speech of the minister of the interior. Despite all respect for places, the cries of "Long live Bonaparte!—Long live the republic!" shook the arches of that noble edifice. The immediate publication of this intelligence produced deeper satisfaction than all the amusements destined to please the multitude. The people were not afraid of war; they had full confidence in the talents of the first consul, and in the courage of their armies, if it was necessary that war should be continued; but after so many battles, so many troubles, they wished to enjoy in peace the glory acquired, and the prosperity which was beginning to appear.

This prosperity was making a rapid progress. I the sole presence of Bonaparte sufficed, on the 18th of Brumaire, to calm, soothe, re-assure, and give back hope, the matter must be changed now when the success of the armies, the earnest advances made by Europe towards France, the prospect of an approaching and brilliant peace,—in fine, the tranquillity every where established,—had realized the hopes conceived in the first moment of confidence.

These hopes were become realities. It might be said, that in the ten months past, from November, 1799, to September, 1800, the aspect of France had changed. The public funds, the vulgar but certain expression of the state of the public mind, had risen from twelve francs on the real price at

which the five per cents. were sold the day before the 18th Brumaire, to forty francs—they promised to reach fifty.

The stockholders had received half a year's dividend in specie, a thing which had not happened since the commencement of the revolution. This financial phenomenon had produced a great effect, and appeared not to be the least of the victories of the first consul. How had he been able to effect such a success! It was an enigma which the mass of the people explained by that singular power which he was said already to possess, of doing whatever he pleased.

But it was not the smallest miracle; there is no other cause for real successes than good sense seconded by a powerful determination, and such was the sole cause of the happy results obtained under the administration of the first consul. He had, at first, sought to remedy the real evil existing, which arose from the slowness with which the imposts were collected; he had, with this view, established a special agency for perfecting the lists of assessment, left too complaisantly before to the communes. This special agency, stimulated by the prefects, another creation of the consular government, had corrected the assessments in arrear for the years VII. and VIII., and had terminated those for the year IX., that which had just begun, or from September, 1800, to September, 1801. Thus, for the first time since the revolution, the lists of the current year were placed in a train for collection from the first day of the year. The receivers-general, having the taxes punctually paid to them, were enabled to be punctual in their monthly acquittal of the obligations which they had accepted, and had paid them in constantly at the end of every month. It has been said before, that in order to guaranty the credit of these obligations or bills, the treasury had required of the receivers-general security in specie, which security, being deposited in the sinking fund, served to pay any of the obligations that might be protested. Out of the sum of 20,000,000 f., being the total amount of the securities, 1,000,000 f. sufficed to pay the dishonoured bills. From this circumstance they acquired a credit equal to that of the best commercial paper. At first they could not be discounted under three-fourths per cent. per month, or nine per cent. per annum; now they were discounted at eight, and many were willing to discount them at seven per cent. This was very moderate interest in comparison with that which the government had before been obliged to pay. Thus, as the direct contributions in a total budget of 500,000,000 f. represented about 300,000,000 f., the treasury had, at the first day of the year, 300,000,000 f. of value in its hands, very nearly realized; for in place of receiving nearly nothing, as formerly, and receiving the little paid very slowly, it had, on the 4th of Vendémiaire, the best part of the public revenues at its disposal. Such had been the result of the completion of the assessment lists in good time, and of the system of monthly bills, drawn under the title of obligations upon the chests of the receivers-general, by preventing the last from having any pretext for delaying their receipts, the government was able to impose upon them the condition of paying in upon a fixed day.

The year VIII., which had just terminated, from September, 1799, to September, 1800, had not been provided for with such facility as the year IX. promised to be. It had been necessary to withdraw all the paper emitted before, such as the bills of arrear, of requisition, the delegations, and others. The different paper had been withdrawn, either by the acquittal of the anterior contributions, or by means of certain arrangements agreed upon with the holders. The revenue of the year VIII. had, in consequence, been so much diminished, there was a deficiency too in that year's receipts. But the victories of the French armies having taken them into the enemies' country, the treasury was relieved from the burden of their support; and with some of the national domains, which had begun to fetch good prices in the market, the deficiency of that year might be made good. The expenditure of the year IX. would not offer any similar difficulty. No more bills of arrear were issued, because the stockholders were paid in specie; no more bills of requisition, because the army was either fed by the treasury itself, or by the treasury of the foreigner; no more delegations were issued, because, as before observed, the first consul adopted an invariable rule in regard to those who had claims upon the state: he paid them specie or nothing; and in specie he paid them already more than the preceding governments had done. Every week he held a council of finance, when he required a statement of the resources to be laid before the council, and also one of the money wanted by each minister; he chose the most urgent demands, and divided them with exactness; he distributed the assets certain to be paid, but no more than those. In this mode, with a firm conduct, there was no more need for issuing paper money; and having no fictitious paper abroad, there was none to be redeemed. The receipts of the year IX. were certain to be in specie.

The stock or fund-holders were paid by the bank of France. The bank had only been in existence for six months, and was already capable of issuing notes to a large amount, taken by the public as readily as specie itself. The necessities of trade, and the conduct of the government in regard to the new establishment, had caused this rapid success. This was the mode in which the matter was managed. Of the securities in specie, one million in twenty millions sufficed to sustain the credit of the obligations. The remainder was without employment; and however pressing was the temptation to employ those 19,000,000 f. to meet urgent necessities, the government did not hesitate to impose upon itself the severest hardships, that it might lay out 5,000,000 f. in purchasing shares in the bank, the amount of which it immediately paid. It did not stay there, but deposited with it in current account the surplus of the disposable funds. The account current was composed of sums paid in, on condition that they might be drawn out accordingly as they were wanted, day by day. Having such resources suddenly placed at its command, the bank lost not a moment in discounting, and in issuing notes which, always paid in money, if desired, had acquired in a few months the value of cash. To-day such a thing would not appear extraordinary, because in the smallest towns the same operation is seen performing in the easiest way, and many banks prosper from the

time of their starting. But in that day, after so many bankruptcies, after the dislike which the assignats had created for paper, it was a species of commercial wonder, worked out by a government which had, above all other things, the gift of inspiring confidence.

The treasury then thought of confiding to the bank divers services, advantageous to itself as well as to the state, especially that of paying the stockholders. This it effected by means perfectly simple. The bills of the receivers-general were as good as bills of exchange. The treasury offered the bank these bills, to the amount of 20,000,000 f., for discount,—an operation highly advantageous to the bank, because discount was at six and seven per cent.; and the operation was perfectly secure, since the bills had become of undeniable value. The bank undertook, in consequence, to pay the half-yearly dividends to the stockholders, who received money or notes, as they might prefer.

Thus in some months the government, in knowing how to impose privations upon itself, had already procured a powerful instrument, which for an aid of 10,000,000 f. or 12,000,000 f., that it had received at a moment's notice, could make a return of service to the extent of hundreds of millions.

Financial ease was therefore every where renewed. The only sensible suffering remaining was that of the landed proprietary. In the worst time of the national troubles, the proprietors of estates and houses had the advantage of not paying any taxes, owing to the delay in the making up the assessment lists; or of paying next to nothing, owing to the assignats. To-day it was otherwise. The landed proprietors were now forced to pay up their arrears and their current taxes, all in cash. For the small proprietors the charge was heavy. At first an allowance had been made in the budget of 5,000,000 f. for assets not available, in order to exempt such payers as were too severely pressed; but it was found necessary to devote a much larger sum to this purpose. It was a sort of profit and loss account opened with the payers, by which the past was given up in order to secure the exact acquittal of the present. The landed proprietary alone cannot pay all the public burdens of a state. Some must be met by duties imposed upon articles of consumption. The revolution, by abolishing the taxes imposed upon liquors, upon salt and different articles of the kind, had closed up one of the two necessary sources of public revenue. Time had not yet opened it again. This was one of the glories destined, at a later period, for the return of order and of society in France to effect. Bonaparte had at first many prejudices to overcome. By establishing an excise or "octroi" at the gates of the towns, to provide for the necessities of the public hospitals, he had made a first useful essay, which accustomed people to the restitution of a tax sooner or later indispensable.

Though the landed property was for the moment heavily taxed, still a general feeling of prosperity was diffused among all classes of persons. On all sides the people felt themselves regenerated, and found they had courage to labour and speculate.

But there were other efforts to be made in that upturned state of society, to bring every thing right, if not to so perfect a state as time might do, to such a state as was supportable for all. It has been seen what was done for the finances; there was another branch of the public service fully as much disorganized as the finances had been, namely, that of the roads. These had become nearly impassable. As everybody knows, not years of negligence, but a few months only, are sufficient to change into bogs the artificial roads that man makes upon the surface of the earth for the transport of heavy loads. It was nearly ten years since the roads in France had been left almost without repair. Under the old government, the roads were repaired by "corvées," or tenant labour; and subsequently to the revolution, by means of a sum of money, which appeared in the general budget, but had not been more punctually paid than the sums destined for other services. The directory, seeing how matters stood, had contemplated a particular resource for the purpose, which should not be alienated, and could never be diminished; and, to arrive at this object, had established a toll, and created barriers for its collection. This toll had been farmed out to the contractors for the road themselves, who being negligently surveyed, cheated both in the collection of the toll and in the application of the product. Besides, the sum was insufficient that was thus obtained. It returned 13,000,000 f. or 14,000,000 f. per annum at most, and 30,000,000 f. was necessary. In the years VI., VII., and VIII., no more than 32,000,000 f. had been expended upon the roads, and at least 100,000,000f. would have been required to repair the ravages which time had made, and to preserve them in repair annually.

The first consul, postponing the adoption of a perfect system, had recourse to the most simple means—the general funds of the state; applying them to the purpose of the roads, a service so important in every respect. He suffered the toll to continue in the old mode of being levied and in its application, taking care that its outlay was carefully superintended; and he added 12,000,000f. in the year IX., a considerable sum for that time. This sum was intended to repair the main roads going from the centre to the extremities of the republic, from Paris to Lille, to Strasburg, to Marseilles, to Bordeaux, and to Brest. He proposed afterwards to proceed to other roads with the funds thus devoted, and to augment the sums in proportion to the improved state of the treasury, employing them concurrently with the toll, until the roads were restored to such a state as they ought to be in every civilized land.

The canals of St. Quentin and of Oureq, undertaken towards the close of the regal government, exhibited every where to the sight mere ditches half-filled, hills partly cut through, and utter ruins; in a word, they seemed any thing but works of art. Bonaparte sent engineers to survey them immediately, and went himself and ordered the definitive plans, that by labors of public utility the first movements of the approaching peace might be signalized.

The bad state of the roads was not the only thing which rendered them impassable; there were robbers infesting them, in a great many of the provinces. The Chouans and the Vendéans, remaining without employ from the end of the civil

war, having contracted habits of life which were irreconcileable with a state of peace, ravaged the great roads in Britany, Normandy, and the environs of Paris. Refractory persons who wished to escape the conscription, and some of the soldiers of the Ligurian army that misery had driven to desertion, were committing robberies upon the highways of the south and centre of France. Georges Cadoudal, who had come back from England with plenty of money, concealed in the Morbihan, secretly directed these new Chouan depredations. It was necessary to have a number of moveable columns, with military commissions following them, to suppress these disorders. The first consul had already formed some of these columns, but he was in want of men. The directory had kept too many troops at home; he had kept too few; but he said, with sound reason, that when he had beaten the enemies without, he would soon put an end to those within. "Patience," he replied to those who spoke to him fearfully of this species of disorder; "give me a month or two; I shall then have conquered peace, and I will do prompt and complete justice upon these highway robbers." Peace was, then, the indispensable condition of good in all things. Still he did not the less employ the interim in applying remedies to the more urgent disorders.

It has been before observed, that he had consented to substitute for an oath formerly exacted from the priesthood, a simple promise of obedience to the laws, which could in no way wound their consciences. They had immediately availed themselves of this concession in considerable numbers; and the clerical duties were at once seen to be disputed by the constitutional priests who had taken the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, the unsworn priests who had only given a verbal promise of obedience to the laws, and, lastly, those who had neither given a promise to obey the laws, nor taken any oath at all. The priests belonging to the first two classes were alike agreed in the endeavour to obtain churches, which were conceded to them with greater or less facility, according to the very variable humour of the local authorities. Those who had refused to make any kind of oath or promise, performed the duties clandestinely in the interior of private houses, and passed, in the eyes of many of the faithful, for the only true ministers of religion. Lastly, to add to the confusion, came the Theophilanthropists, who replaced the Catholics in the churches, and on certain days deposited flowers on the altars, where the priests who preceded them had just said mass. These ridiculous sectarians held festivals in honour of all the virtues,—of temperance, courage, charity, and similar qualities. Upon All Saints' day, they celebrated, for example, a festival in honour of ancestors. In the view of the strict Catholics this was a profanation of a religious edifice, and good sense as well as respect for dominant creeds demanded that it should be discontinued.

In order to put an end to the prevailing chaos, it was necessary to have an agreement with the holy see—an agreement by means of which, those who had taken the oath, and those who had only given the promise, and those who had refused to do either the one or the other, should be reconciled. But Monsignor Spina, the envoy from the holy see, had just arrived in Paris, and kept out of sight, feeling surprised to find himself there. The business upon which he had come was as delicate for him as for the government. The first consul, discerning, as he did, with rare tact, the characters of men, and the employment for which they are best adapted, opposed to the wary Italian the individual most fitted to cope with him, the Abbé Bernier, who, having for a long while directed the affairs of La Vendée, had, ultimately, reconciled it with the government. The first consul, having brought the abbé to Paris, attached him to himself by the most honourable of all relations, a desire to contribute to the public good, and to be a partaker of the honour of the task. To re-establish a good understanding between France and the Roman church was, with the abbé Bernier, but a continuance and completion of the pacification of La Vendée. The interview with Monsignor Spina had scarcely begun, and the government was unable to promise itself any immediate result.

It was important to arrive as speedily as possible at a settlement of these religious affairs. Peace with the holy see was not less desirable for calming the minds of the people, than peace with the great European powers. In the mean while there remained a number of irregularities, singular or mischievous, to provide against, which the first consul did by the best means he was able to use, by consular decrees. Already by his ordinance of the 7th Nivôse, year VIII., or 28th of December, 1799, he had prevented the local authorities, frequently favourable to the priesthood, from thwarting them in the performance of their religious duties. Disposing, as already observed, of the churches of which they had the care, they would often refuse permission to the priests to use them on the Sunday in place of the décadi, asserting that the last was the only holiday recognized by the laws of the republic. The ordinance before referred to had provided against this difficulty, and obliged the local authorities to deliver the places of religious worship to the priests on the days indicated by each religious denomination. But this ordinance had not resolved all the difficulties relative to the Sundays and décadis. Upon this point the manners and laws were opposed to each other; a matter necessary to explain, in order to give an idea of the state of French society at that time.

In the passionate taste for symmetry and uniformity attached to the revolution, it had not confined itself to the introduction of uniformity in the measures of length, superficies, and weight, and to reducing them to natural and immutable unities, such as a fraction of the meridian, or the specific gravity of distilled water; it had introduced the same kind of regularity into the measurement of time. It had divided the year into twelve equal months, of thirty days each, and had completed it by five complementary days. It had divided the month into three décades, or weeks, of ten days each, thus reducing the days of rest to three in each month, and substituting for the four Sundays of the Gregorian calendar, the three décadis of the republican. Beyond contradiction, and under the mathematical view of the question, this last calendar was much better than the old one; but then it hurt religious feelings; it was not that of

the generality of nations nor that of history, and it could not overcome inveterate habit. The metrical system, after forty years of effort and legislative enactment, notwithstanding its incontestable commercial advantages, has scarcely been yet definitively established; how then could it be expected that the republican calendar could be maintained after the usage of twenty centuries, against the custom of the whole world, and against the power of religion itself? It is necessary when we reform, to content ourselves with reformation so far as to destroy real suffering—to establish justice when it is required; but to reform for the mere pleasure of the sight and fancy, for the purpose of putting a straight line where none exists, is exacting too much of human nature. The habits of a child may be formed at pleasure, but not so those of a grown man. It is the same with nations; the habits of a people, after an existence of fifteen centuries, cannot be changed.

In consequence Sunday was again kept everywhere. In some towns the shops were closed on Sundays, in others on décadis; often in the same town and street the contrast was exhibited, and presented a picture of a mischievous conflict between manners and ideas. Sunday would have everywhere been observed, but for the intervention of some of the authorities. The first consul, by a new decree of the 7th Thermidor, year VIII., or July 26, 1800, declared that every one should be free to keep holiday when he pleased, and to adopt for a day of rest that most agreeable to his taste and religious notions; and that the authorities, constrained to adhere to the legal calendar, should alone be obliged to choose the décadi for the suspension of their business. This was at once to insure the triumph of the Sunday.

The first consul was acting with judgment, in aiding this return to old and general habits, especially if he inclined to the restoration of the Catholic religion, as indeed he did, and which he had good reason for desiring.

His attention was engaged anew by the emigrants. We have already made mention of their anxiety to return during the first days of the consulate: this eagerness continued to increase, as they saw the repose enjoyed by France, and the security in which the inhabitants of her soil were living. But however great the wish to put an end to the proscription against these people, it was necessary, in putting an end to one disorder—for such was the proscription—to guard against giving birth to another; for a precipitate reaction is a disorder, and one of the gravest character. The emigrants, on their return, met with either their former proscribers who had contributed to their persecution, or persons who had obtained possession of their property for assignats; and to the one or the other they were either restless enemies, or at least troublesome people to meet; nor were they by any means discreet enough to avoid abusing the clemency shown towards them by the government.

They availed themselves eagerly of the laws passed a few months before, by which the proscription-list was closed. Those who had been omitted on this list, hastened to profit by the clause referring to their case; and as they could no longer be put upon that list but by the authority of the ordinary tribunals (of which, in their opinion, the danger was but slight); they felt tranquillized on this score, and had almost all returned. Those who had been on the list, and whom the law sent before the administrative authorities to claim their erasure, profited by the spirit of the times to get themselves erased. They first of all made application for *surveillance*, that is to say, as we have already explained, the privilege of returning temporarily under the surveillance of the high police; and then they went on to deliver in, either through friends or complaisant persons, false certificates, showing that they had not quitted France during the reign of terror, but had only been concealed to avoid the scaffold; thus they obtained their erasure with an incredible facility. The lists, as made up by the local authorities, with all the cold recklessness of persecution, comprehended one hundred and forty-five thousand individuals, and formed nine volumes. At this time there was as much recklessness shown in erasing as there had been in inscribing, and the emigrants were restored by thousands to their civil rights. That part of them whose effects had not already been sold, addressed themselves to the members of the government to have the sequestration removed; they importuned, as is usual, the very men whom they had vilified yesterday, and were ready to vilify again to-morrow; and not unfrequently Madame Bonaparte herself, who had been, to some extent, formerly allied to the French nobility, in consequence of the rank which she held in society.

That the emigrants, whose effects had not been sold, should recover them at the expense of certain proceedings, followed by ingratitude, was no great evil; but others, whose effects had been alienated, betook themselves to the provinces, addressed themselves to the new proprietors, and successively, by the force of threats and importunities, or by religious suggestions at the bed of the dying, caused them to give back, at a low price, their family estates, by proceedings hardly more creditable than the means by which they had been themselves despoiled of them.

The uproar was at this moment so general as to attract the attention of the first consul. His desire was to repair the cruelties of the revolution, but, beyond all, it was his wish not to alter any of the interests it had created, and to which time had given the sanction of law. Consequently he thought it his duty to adopt a measure, which was only a part of what he afterwards did, but which gave some slight order to the chaos of claims, precipitate returns, and attempts, fraught with danger. After a profound consultation in the council of state, a decree to the following effect was issued 20th of October, 1800, 28th Vendémiaire, year IX.

In the first place, all persons erased anterior to the decree, no matter by what authority, or what carelessness had been shown in conducting the proceedings in their regard, were validly struck out of the list of emigrants. Certain collective inscriptions, under the designation of the children or heirs of emigrants, were to be considered as not having taken place. Wives under the command of their husbands when they left France, minors sixteen years of age, the priests who left the country in obedience to the law for their banishment, persons comprised under the description of

labourers, day-labourers, workmen, artisans, and domestics, persons whose absence dated anterior to the revolution, and the knights of Malta, who were at Malta during the troubles, all these were definitively erased. The government also struck off the list the names of the victims who had perished on the scaffold—a reparation due to their families and to humanity. After these had been erased from the list, there were kept on it, without exception, all who had borne arms against France, those who held offices in the household, civil or military, of the exiled princes, those who had received rank or titles from foreign governments without authorization from the government of France, and others. Nine commissioners were to be named by the minister of justice, and nine by the police, to which eighteen commissioners the first consul was to add nine counsellors of state; and these twenty-seven personages were collectively charged to draw up a new list of the emigrants upon the basis indicated. The emigrants who were definitively erased were under an obligation to make a promise of fidelity to the constitution, if they wished to remain in the country, or obtain a removal of the sequestration on their effects, if not sold. They were adjudged to remain under the surveillance of the high police until the conclusion of a general peace, and for one year afterwards,—a precaution taken in favour of those who had purchased property from the nation. As regarded those emigrants who were definitively kept on the list, nothing could be determined at present on their account; what concerned them was left to a later period.

Under the actual circumstances, this decree was all that could be done in reason. It struck from the proscription list the great mass of those inscribed, and reduced it to the small number of the declared enemies of the revolution, whose fate even it postponed to a future time. So that when the republic should be definitively victorious over Europe, universally recognized, and solidly established; when the firm intention of the first consul to protect the holders of national property should have sufficiently reassured them, it would probably be possible to complete this act of clemency, and recal at last all the proscribed, even those who had been criminal towards France. For the present it went no further than deciding some embarrassing questions, and putting an end to a multiplicity of intrigues.

It will be seen that the government had difficulties of all kinds to contend against, in restoring order where society had been overthrown, in being clement and just towards one party without being alarming and unjust to the other. But if it had its troubles, France rewarded them by a support which we may call unanimous. In the first period that succeeded the 18th Brumaire, the state threw itself into the arms of Bonaparte; because it sought for strength wherever that might be, and because, after the acts of the young general in Italy, it had hopes that strength would be given in aid of good sense and of justice. One doubt alone still remained, and to some extent weakened the confidence with which this self-abandonment was made:—"Would he maintain himself longer than the governments which had preceded him? Would he know how to govern as well as he did to fight? Would he make the troubles, the persecutions, to cease? Would he be of this or that party?" The past eleven or twelve months had, however, cleared up these doubts. His power consolidated itself every hour, and especially when, since Marengo, France and Europe bent under his ascendency. Upon his political genius there was but one opinion amongst those who approached him; he was the great statesman no less than the great soldier. As to the tendency of his government, it was as evident as his genius. He was of that moderate party, which was disinclined to persecution of any kind; which, though disposed to retrace many of the steps of the revolution, desired not to go back on all points, but, on the contrary, was resolute in maintaining its principal results. The removal of these doubts brought over all men to him with eagerness and joyful gratitude.

There are in all parties two portions: the one numerous and sensible, which he who carries into accomplishment the wishes of his country, can always bring over to himself; the other small in numbers, inflexible and factious, who by such accomplishment of a country's wishes are chagrined rather than contented, inasmuch as they are thereby shorn of all their pretexts. Except this latter portion, all parties were satisfied, and gave themselves frankly to the first consul, or, at least, resigned themselves to his government, if their cause was irreconcileable with his, as, for instance, that of the royalists. The patriots of 1789, (and, ten years before, these would have comprised all France,) carried away at first by an enthusiasm towards the revolution, then quickly driven back by the sight of the bloody scaffold, were now disposed to think that they had been deceived in almost all things, believing that in the consular government they had at last found all of their wishes that could be accomplished—the abolition of the feudal royalties, civil equality, the power of the country to exercise some influence in its own affairs, not much of liberty, but much of order, the brilliant triumph of France over Europe. All these, however different from what they had at first hoped for, but sufficient for their desires—all these seemed assured to them. La Fayette, who, in many respects, bore a resemblance to men of this class, except that he was less disabused of former notions—La Fayette, released from the dungeons of Olmutz by the act of the first consul, gave full proof, by his truly disinterested assiduities towards him, of the esteem in which he held his government, and the adhesion of those who thought with him. As to the more ardent revolutionists, who, without being connected with the revolution by a participation in its culpable excesses, yet adhered to it from conviction and feeling, these were delighted with the first consul, as being the opposite of the Bourbons, and assuring their definitive exclusion. The holders of national property, thrown a little in the shade at times by his indulgence towards the emigrants, doubted not his resolution to maintain the inviolability of their new properties, and held by him as an invincible sword, which guarantied them from their only real danger—the triumph of the Bourbons and the emigrants through the arms of Europe.

As to the timid and well-disposed portion of the royalist party, who desired, before all, to have no longer a dread of the scaffold, of exile, or confis-

cation, who, for the first time within ten years, began to have it no longer before their eyes; it was almost happy; for this party no longer to fear, was indeed in itself happiness. It fondly, if I may so express myself, expected from him, all that he had not yet given. To see the people at their workshops, the tradesmen at their counters, the nobility in the government, the priests at their altars, the Bourbons at the Tuileries, and Bonaparte at their side, in the very highest fortune imaginable for a subject to attain, would have been, for these royalists, the perfection of their wishes. Of these things there were three or four which they could already clearly discern in the acts and projects of the first consul; as to the last, that of the return of the Bourbons to the Tuileries, they were disposed, in their kind credulity, to expect it from him, as one of the marvels of his unparalleled genius; and, if some who had more clearsightedness found an obstacle in the difficulty of believing that any man would give a crown to others, while he could keep it for himself; they took up their position thus: "Let him make himself king," said they, "but let him save us, since nothing but a monarchy can save us;" in default of a legitimate prince, a great man would have been acceptable to them; but at any rate a king they must have.

Thus, by assuring to the patriots of 1789, civil equality; to the holders of national property, to the more especial patriots, the exclusion of the Bourbons; to the more moderate royalists the security and the re-establishment of religion; to all, order, justice, and the greatness of the nation, he had gained over the mass of the honest and disinterested of all parties.

There remained, what always remains, the implacable portion of these parties, which time can never induce to change, but by carrying it to the grave; it is generally composed of those who are most convinced they are right, or those who are most wrong, and they are generally the last upon the breach.

The men, who, in the course of the revolution had stained themselves with blood, or *signalised*, being noted for some excess impossible to be forgotten; others, who, without any thing to reproach themselves with, had been hurried along as demagogues by the violence of their character, or the nature of their minds; the furious portion of the mountain, the few survivors of the commune, all these were irritated in proportion to the success of the new government. They called the first consul a tyrant, whose desire it was to effect a complete counter-revolution in France, to abolish liberty, and to bring back the emigrants, the priests, and, possibly it might be, the Bourbons, to make himself one of their lowest servants. Others, less blinded by anger, said that he was trying to make himself a tyrant for his own sake, and that it was in his own interest that he wished to strangle liberty. Here was a Cæsar who called for the dagger of a Brutus. They spoke of daggers; but they did no more than speak of them, for the energy of these men, greatly exhausted by ten years' excesses, began to lean towards violence in language. We shall see, in fact, that it was not amongst their ranks, that assassins were to be found. The police was on their track unceasingly, penetrating into their secret councils, and watching them with continual attention. There were some who only wanted bread; with which the first consul, acting under the advice of his minister, Fouché, supplied them of his own accord; or, if they were good for any thing, did what was better, gave them employment. After this they were no more, to use the language of the rest, than wretches sold to the tyrant. Those too, who had grown a little more quiet from sheer fatigue, Santerre for instance, and many others, came under the same title, as men who had sold themselves. According to the custom of parties, these incorrigible demagogues searched amongst the real or supposed malcontents of the time, for the imaginary few who could realize their views. It is not easy to say by what indications Moreau had appeared to them to be jealous of the first consul; it may be because he had acquired sufficient glory to be the second personage in the state. They elevated him, at once, to the clouds. But when Moreau happened to arrive in Paris, and the first consul, after giving him a most flattering reception, had presented him with a pair of pistols, enriched with pearls, and the titles of his battles, he was then to them no more than a valet. The demagogue Brune, at first dear to their hearts, attracted the attention of the first consul, obtained his confidence, and received the command of the army in Italy: he also was immediately a valet. But on the other hand, Masséna, unceremoniously deprived of his command of this army, was discontented, and could scarcely contain himself. On the instant he was declared the future saviour of the republic, and was to place himself at the head of the true patriots. Thus it was that Carnot, whom they called a royalist on the 18th Fructidor, whose proscription they had demanded and obtained, but who, now deprived at the time of the portfolio of war, became again in their eyes a great citizen. So also was it with Lannes, who, it is true, was attached to the first consul, but who was a decided republican, and at times used rather violent language about the return of the priests and the emigrants: thus also was it with Sieyès himself; Sieyès, at one time odious to the republicans, for being the chief accomplice in the 18th Brumaire; next, an object of their raillery on account of the trifling return with which the first consul had repaid his services; and lastly, just then most agreeable in their eyes, because, dissatisfied at being a cipher, he showed the same face of coldness and disapprobation at acts of the present government, as he had done to all others. Lastly, a touch which will finish the picture of the silly credulity of this expiring faction; the minister, Fouché, who was one of the two principal counsellors of the first consul, and who had nothing to wish for—the minister, Fouché, because he well knew the patriots, feared them little, and occasionally assisted them, from a knowledge that their tongues needed silencing more than their hands disarming—the minister Fouché was to join with Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, and Sieyès, to throw down the tyrant, and rescue liberty from his menaces.

The royalist faction, like the revolutionary, had its implacable sectarians; equally credulous as reasoners, but as plotters more to be dreaded. These were the great lords of Versailles, who had returned, or were about to return; intriguers,

charged with the pitiable affairs of the Bourbons, coming and going between France and foreign countries to weave puerile plots, or to gain money; and, lastly, men of action, soldiers devoted to Georges, and ready for every crime.

These first, being great noblemen, accustomed to fashionable conversation, confined themselves to talking against the first consul, his family, and his government. They lived in Paris, somewhat after the fashion of foreigners in France, scarcely deigning to notice what was passing, and occasionally soliciting their erasure from the list of proscription, or that the sequestrations be taken off their unsold property. For this purpose they visited madame Bonaparte; those at least who had been in her circle when she was the wife of M. de Beauharnais. They visited her in the morning, never in the evening, and were received in the entresol of the Tuileries, where were her private apartments. Urgent suitors while in her presence, they excused themselves strongly when they left for having made their appearance there, putting it off upon their desire to be of service to some unfortunate friend. Madame Bonaparte was weak enough to permit these equivocal relations; and her husband, though it exposed him to frequent importunities, put up with them nevertheless out of complaisance to his wife, as well as from a desire of knowing every thing, and being in communication with all parties. There were few of these askers of favours, who, whether by themselves or by their connexions, were not under obligations to the government; but their freedom of speech was none the less diminished. All that was done for them, was, in their opinion, only their due; they had been despoiled of their property; and if it were restored to them, it was an act of repentance, for which no gratitude was necessary. They jested at every thing and every body, even the embarrassment of madame Bonaparte; who, if she was proud of her connexion with the first man of the age, seemed almost ashamed of belonging to the head of the government, and was indeed at once too kind and too weak to crush them by that haughtiness which she ought legitimately to have felt. They railed, as we have said, at all the world, except, however, the first consul, whom they regarded as a great soldier, but a mediocre politician, with no settled plan; one day favouring the Jacobins, on another the royalists; with no disposition but for war, as war was his profession; and even in that, in more than one respect, inferior to Moreau. Without doubt his successes had been brilliant; these gentlemen could not deny them; up to this time all had gone prosperously with him: but how long would this last! Europe, it is true, was now no longer able to withstand him; but conqueror abroad, would he be so at home over all the difficulties which lay around him! The finances wore a better appearance to be sure; but paper, which had been the ephemeral resource of all the governments of the revolution, was again the resource of the present; and nothing was to be seen but bonds of the receivers-general, bills of the bank of France, and the like. Would not this new paper end as paper had always ended. They got on tolerably at present, for the armies supported themselves on the enemies' country; but at a peace, when they came back within their own country, how would they then be able to keep them! Landed property was weighed down by taxation; and, in short, those liable to the taxes, neither could, nor would, pay the imposts. They spoke, it is true, of the satisfaction of certain classes, the priests and emigrants, who are well treated by the existing government; but this government recals the emigrants without restoring their property. Here then are enemies whom it transports from without to within, and makes them only the more dangerous. It recalls the priests without restoring them to their altars. Thus to concede by halves, is to oblige a man one day in a manner which must make him ungrateful the next. Bonaparte, as these royalists styled him, for they disdained to give him his legal title, Bonaparte only knew how to do things in an incomplete manner. He permitted the observation of the Sunday, but had not dared to abolish the décadi, or observance of the tenth day; France, however, when left to herself, returned altogether to the Sunday. This was not the only thing of the past to which she would return, if she had once but the example and the liberty of so doing. Bonaparte, by re-establishing one thing and another, was, in fact, himself commencing a counter revolution, which would lead him further than he intended to go. Through his resuscitation of so much, might he not go the length of setting up the monarchy again, and even of setting it up for himself, by making himself king or emperor! He would thereby only the more certainly bring about a counter revolution, by undertaking to do it on his own account. Soon would this restored throne demand the princes who alone were worthy to occupy it; and, in re-establishing the institution, he would have established it for the Bourbons [1].

Hatred is not unfrequently a correct prophet, for it usually supposes faults, and, unhappily, faults are always the most probable supposition; only in the ardour of its impatience it antedates the time of their commission. These trifling talkers knew not to what extent they were saying what was true; but they did not also know that before their predictions would be accomplished, it was ordained that the world should be for fifteen years in commotion; it was ordained that this man, of whom they held such language, should do the noblest deeds, and commit gigantic faults; and that before the end of all this should come, they would have time to declare themselves false prophets, to prove renegades to their cause, to abandon their only legitimate princes, in their opinion, to enter into the service of this ephemeral master, to serve him and to adore him! They knew not that if France must one day come again to the foot of the Bourbon, she would come there as if thrown by a tempest at the foot of some tree of ages, and be prostrate there but for a moment.

[1] I have painted, not *drawn*, this picture of the emigrants of that period from imagination. The language I make them use is literally extracted from the voluminous correspondence addressed to Louis XVIII., and brought over to France by that prince. Left at the Tuileries during the hundred days, and afterwards deposited in the archives of the foreign office, they comprise a singular evidence of the illusions and passions of the period. Some of them are exceedingly clever, and all of them very curious.

In a lower sphere, there were men who conspired otherwise than in words, the intriguers in the service of the Bourbons; and in one still lower, yet more dangerous, the agents of Georges, whose hands were full with money sent from England. Since his return from London, Georges kept in the Morbihan, concealing himself from all eyes, playing the part of a man who resigns himself to what has happened, and returns to cultivate his fields: but in reality implacable; for he had sworn in his heart, he had sworn to the Bourbons, to destroy the first consul or fall in the attempt. To try the chances of battle with the grenadiers of the consular guard was impossible; but among the men of the *Chouannerie* there were hands always ready for the last resource of a vanquished faction; for assassination itself. Amongst them could be found a hand ready for every thing, for crimes the blackest or attempts the most rash. These, Georges, not yet knowing what time or place he ought to choose, kept to their object, communicating with them by trusty friends, while he let them find their subsistence on the high roads, or upon a portion of the money he was profusely supplied with by the British cabinet.

The first consul, satisfied with the homage of France, and the unanimous adhesion of the sincere and disinterested of all parties, felt little inquietude at the scandal of some royalists, or the plots of others. Closely applying himself to his occupation, he thought little of the vain discourse of idlers, though far from being insensible to it; but he was actually too much absorbed by his task to give much attention to such language. Nor did he pay more regard to the plots directed against his person; he considered it as one of the chances which he braved every day on the field of battle with the indifference of fatalism. Nevertheless, he deceived himself in the nature of his danger. He had attained the 18th Brumaire by snatching power from the party of the revolution, and regarding it at the time as his principal enemy, he imputed to this party all that happened, and seemed to feel displeasure at that alone. The royalists, in his eye, were no more than a party under persecution, which it was his wish to preserve from oppression. Amongst them he well knew were some bad men; but from his intercourse with the moderate party, it had grown habitual with him to look for no violence but from the revolutionists. One of his counsellors, however, endeavoured to correct this error in his mind; this was Fouché, the minister of police.

In this government, reduced nearly to one man, all the ministers were eclipsed except two, Fouché and Talleyrand. They alone have preserved the privilege of being sometimes visible in the halo surrounding Bonaparte, in which all figures disappear but his own. General Berthier had just succeeded Carnot in the war department, as being more pliable, and more resigned to the modest part of comprehending and carrying out the ideas of his chief, which he did with a clearness and precision truly wonderful. It was no small merit to fill worthily the part of the chief of the staff to the greatest soldier of the age, and possibly of all ages. But Berthier, by the side of the first consul, could not have any importance as a director of military operations. The navy at this epoch, drew very little attention. The finance merely required a firm and persevering, though unnoticed, application of certain principles of order laid down once for all. The police, on the contrary, was of great importance, from the vast arbitrary power with which the government was armed; and with the police, the department of foreign affairs, from the re-establishment of relations with all the world. For the police there was necessary to the first consul a man who had a perfect knowledge of all parties, and of the individuals who composed them; this was the reason of the influence acquired by the minister Fouché. In regard to foreign affairs, however the first consul might be the most competent person to offer to Europe, he wanted an intermediate agent for all occasions, with more mildness and patience than he himself possessed; and this was the cause of the influence acquired by Talleyrand. Fouché, then, and Talleyrand shared between them the only portion of political credit which the ministers of that time enjoyed.

The police of this epoch was not, what it has happily since become, a simple surveillance without power, charged only with the prevention of crime, and the capture of the culprit. It was the depository of an immense arbitrary power in the hands of one man alone. The minister of police had power to banish these as revolutionaries, those as returned emigrants; to assign to one or the other their place of residence, or even throw them into a temporary prison, without fear of the disclosures of the press or of the tribune, then powerless and decried; it was in his power to take off or keep on the sequestration upon the effects of the proscribed of all periods; to restore or take away his church from the priest; to suppress or reprimand a journal which displeased him, and, lastly, to mark out every individual to the mistrust or to the favour of the government, which had at this moment an extraordinary number of places to distribute, and the wealth of Europe to bestow profusely on its creatures. The minister, on whom the laws conferred such powers, however he might be placed under the superior and vigilant authority of the first consul, had yet a formidable power over every relation of life.

Fouché, the man charged with the exercise of this power, an old oratorian and an old conventionalist, was a person of intelligence and craftiness; filled with no love of good or inclination to ill, he had a thorough knowledge of mankind, especially the bad portion, and despised them without distinction. He employed the revenues of the police in supporting the fosterers of sedition, as much as in watching them; always ready to give bread or a place to such individuals as were tired of political agitations: he thus procured friends for the government, and, above all, procured them for himself; making them far superior to credulous or treacherous spies, dependents who never failed to furnish him with intelligence of what it was his interest to be informed. Thus he had in every party, but especially among the royalists, his dependents whom he knew how to manage and control to his purpose. Always forewarned in time, and never exaggerating a danger either to himself or to his master, he could distinguish between an imprudent man and one really to be feared, knowing how

to restrain the one and proceed against the other; in a word, conducting the police better than it had ever been before, since this consists in disarming as much as in repressing hatred: a minister of a high order, if his extreme indulgence had had any other principle than an indifference most extreme to good or evil; if his incessant activity had been actuated by any other motive than an anxiety for meddling in all things which rendered him an inconvenient person, and exposed him to be suspected by the first consul, giving him moreover the appearance of an intriguing subaltern; for the rest, his countenance, intelligent, vulgar, and equivocal, well represented the qualities and defects of his soul.

Jealous of his confidence, the first consul did not grant it freely, at least to those for whom he had not a perfect esteem; he made use of Fouché, but distrusted him while he did so. Thus he sought how to supply his place or to control him, by giving money to his secretary, Bourrienne, or to Murat, the commandant of Paris, or to his aid-de-camp, Savary, thus making up several opposition polices. But Fouché always found a way to convict these secondary police departments of clumsiness and puerility; while he showed that he alone was well-informed: so that all the time he was running counter to the first consul, he inclined him nevertheless the more to himself, by his manner of treating men, into which neither love nor hatred found admission, but simply an application directed to wrest individuals, one by one, from a life agitated by faction.

Fouché, with a half fidelity to the revolutionary party, willingly undertook the management of his old friends, and ventured, on this point, to contradict the first consul. Well acquainted with their moral position, appreciating moreover the scoundrels of royalism, he incessantly repeated that if there was any peril, it was to be looked for from the side of the royalists, not of the revolutionists; and that there would soon be an opportunity of seeing this. He had also the merit, though he had it not long, of insisting that it would be better not quite so much to desert the revolution and its principles. Hearing, at that time, the flatterers of the epoch say, that the reaction must be carried on more quickly, that no account must be made of the prejudices of the revolution, and that it was time to go back to something that resembled a monarchy, but without the Bourbons, he had daring enough to blame, if not the object, at least the imprudence by which it was endeavoured to be attained. While all the time admitting the justice of his advice, given as it was without frankness, and without dignity, the first consul was struck, but not satisfied. He could not but acknowledge, while he did not relish, the services of this personage.

Talleyrand played a part altogether the contrary; he bore neither affection nor resemblance to Fouché. Both of them alike having been formerly priests, and come out the one from the high clergy, the other from the low, they had nothing in common, but that they had both taken advantage of the revolution, the one to strip off the robes of a prelate, the other the humble gown of an oratorian professor. It is a strange spectacle, it must be avowed, a spectacle which admirably paints a society in which order has been completely reversed, to see this government, composed of a soldier and two priests, who had abjured their profession, though thus composed, have none the less of glory, grandeur, and influence in the world.

Talleyrand, a man of the highest extraction, destined to the profession of arms from his birth, condemned to the priesthood by an accident which deprived him of the use of one foot, having no taste for the profession imposed upon him, becoming successively prelate, courtier, revolutionary emigrant, then, at last, minister of foreign affairs to the directory; Talleyrand had preserved something of all these conditions, and one might find in him the bishop, the nobleman, and the revolutionist, without any fixed opinion, but merely a natural moderation, which felt a repugnance to all exaggeration; accommodating himself in an instant to the ideas of those whom it may be his inclination or interest to please; expressing himself in an unique language, peculiar to the society of which Voltaire was the founder; fertile in repartee, lively, yet so cutting as to render him equally as formidable as he was attractive; by turns caressing or disdainful, open or impenetrable, careless or dignified, lame without any loss of grace; a personage, lastly, the most singular, and such as a revolution only could produce, he was the most seducing of negotiators, but at the same time incapable of directing the affairs of a state as its head; since to guide a state requires purpose, principle, and close attention, not one of which he possessed. His purpose confined itself to pleasing, his principles consisted in the opinions of the moment, application he had none. He was, in a word, an accomplished ambassador, but not a directing minister; it being understood, however, that this expression is to be taken only in its highest acceptation. Besides this, he held no other office under the consular government. The first consul, who allowed to no person the right of giving him advice in war or diplomacy, never employed him but in carrying on negotiations with foreign ministers according to his own directions; and this Talleyrand did with a skill which will never be surpassed. Once for all too he had a moral merit, that of being a lover of peace under a master who was fond of war, and of allowing this inclination to be perceived. Gifted with an exquisite taste, of a sure tact, and even a useful indolence, he was able to render true service, if only in opposing to the abundance of the speech, pen, and action of the first consul, his own sobriety, his perfect moderation, his inclination to do nothing. But he had little influence on his imperious master, on whom he made no impression either by his genius or by conviction. Thus he had no more power than Fouché, even less, though always equally employed, and more agreeable.

For the rest, Talleyrand expressed opinions quite contrary to those of Fouché; a lover of the ancient regime, minus the persons and ridiculous prejudices of other times, he counselled the reconstitution of the monarchy, or an equivalent for it, by making the glory of the first consul serve in the place of a blood-royal; adding, that if it were wished to make a speedy and lasting peace with Europe, it was necessary to lose no time in assimilating ourselves to her institutions: so that while Fouché, in the name of the revolution, advised not

to go too fast; Talleyrand, in the name of Europe, counselled that we should not go so slow.

The first consul prized the good common sense of Fouché, but liked the graces of Talleyrand, without absolutely believing either the one or the other on every subject; and as for his confidence, he had given it—given it entirely, but not to either of these two persons—to his favourite colleague Cambacérès. This personage, though not very brilliant in talent, had a rare good sense, and an unbounded devotion to the first consul. Having trembled for ten years of his life under proscribers of every kind, he loved with a species of tenderness the powerful master who gave him at last the faculty of breathing at ease. He cherished his power, his genius, and his person, from which he had never received, and hoped to receive nothing but benefits. Knowing the weakness even of the greatest men, he gave his advice to the first consul as those ought to advise who wish to be attended to, with perfect good faith, and infinite management, never for the sake of showing off his own wisdom, but always to be useful to a government, which he loved as himself, expressing his approbation of it in public, in every respect, nor permitting himself to disapprove it but in secret, in an absolute *tête-à-tête* with the first consul; silent, where there was no longer a remedy, and when all criticising could only be the vain pleasure of finding fault; always speaking out, and with a courage the more meritorious in one who was the most timid of men, when there was time to prevent a fault, or to influence the general conduct of affairs. Yet, as it must be, a character which restrains itself unceasingly, is certain to escape on some one side, the consul Cambacérès allowed himself to exhibit with his inferiors a puerile vanity; he had with him constantly some subaltern courtiers, who paid him their gross homage; promenaded the Palais Royal almost every day, in a costume ridiculously magnificent, and sought in the gratification of a *gourmandise*, now proverbial, pleasures which suited the man at once vulgar and wise. But of what consequence, on the whole, are a few eccentricities when they are accompanied with a superior reason.

The first consul willingly pardoned these eccentricities in his colleague, and held him in great consideration. He valued at its worth that superior good sense, which never wished to shine but only to be useful, which made all things clear in a true and temperate light. He appreciated, moreover, the sincerity of his attachment; smiled at his foibles, yet always with regard; and paid him the greatest of homages—that of saying all to no one but him, nor ever giving himself any concern but about his judgment. Thus he was susceptible of no influence but his alone; an influence hardly suspected, and, for that reason, very great.

The consul Cambacérès was, moreover, just adapted to temper his quickness in regard to persons and his precipitation in action. Amidst the conflict of two opposite tendencies, the one pushing forward to a precipitate reaction, the other, on the contrary, combating this reaction, Cambacérès, inflexible when acting for the maintenance of order, was, in every thing else, always in favour of not going too fast. He did not oppose the end to which things were visibly tending. "Let them decree some day, to the first consul, all the power they please:" he would repeat, "so be it; but not too soon." His wish was, moreover, that reality should be always preferred to appearance; true power, to that which was nothing but ostentation. A first consul, with full power to do all he wished in effecting good, seemed to him worth much more than a crowned prince limited in action. To act and not to be seen, moreover never to act too quickly, constituted the whole of his wisdom. This is not genius, certainly, but it is prudence; and in laying the foundation of a great state there must be both.

Cambacérès was also useful to the first consul in another way than that of giving him counsel; this was in governing the senate. That body, as we have already mentioned, had an immense importance, inasmuch as the gift of offices was vested in it. In the beginning this was, in some measure, left to Sieyès, as an equivalent for the executive power, which was entirely handed over to Bonaparte. Sieyès, at first content to abdicate, and living on his estate at Crosne, began to feel a slight vexation at his insignificance; for there never was an abdication without regret. If he had possessed purpose and consistency, he might have been able to wrest the senate from the influence of the first consul, and then no other resource would have been left him but a *coup d'état*. But Cambacérès, without noise and without ostentation, insinuated himself by degrees into this body, and occupied there the territory which the negligence of Sieyès abandoned to him. People knew that it was through him that the first consul, the source of every favour, was to be got at; and it was to him, in fact, that men addressed themselves. Of this he took advantage with infinite, yet always concealed, skill, to restrain or gain over the opposition. But with such discretion was this done, that no person thought of complaining. At a time when repose was become the true wisdom, when the same repose was necessary to give some day new birth to a taste for liberty, we dare not blame—we dare not call by the name of corrupter, the man who, on one side, tempered the master imposed on us by events, and, on the other, arrested the imprudences of an opposition which had neither aim, nor fitness of season, nor political intelligence.

In regard to the consul Lebrun, Bonaparte treated him with regard, and even with affection; yet as a personage who mixed little in affairs, the administration excepted. He gave him the charge of watching over the detail of the finances, and of keeping himself well acquainted with what the royalists were doing or thinking; and by these the third consul was frequently surrounded. He had thus an ear or eye amongst them; attaching to it no other importance than a simple interest or curiosity, to know what was doing or hatching in that quarter.

To have an idea of the first consul's circle, we must say a word of his family. He had four brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome. We shall, in their proper time, make acquaintance with the two last. Joseph and Lucien alone were then of any importance. Joseph, the eldest of the family, had married the daughter of a wealthy and honourable merchant of Marseilles. He was of gentle disposition, of tolerable talents, agreeable in

person, and caused his brother much less annoyance than any of the others. It was for him the first consul reserved the honour of negotiating peace for the republic with the states of the old and new world. He had charged him with the conduct of the treaty which he was preparing with America, and had just named him plenipotentiary to Lunéville, endeavouring thus to give him a part to play which would be pleasing to France. Lucien, at that time minister of the interior, was a man with much cleverness, but of an unequal, restless, and ungovernable mind, and though he had talent, not having sufficient to make up for his deficiency as regards good sense. Both of these encouraged the inclination of the first consul to raise himself to the supreme power; as can be easily conceived. The genius of the first consul and his glory were things personal to himself; the only quality which could be transmissible to his family would be the princely quality, if he should some day assume it, by preferring himself to the chief magistracy of the republic. His brothers were of the party who said, with little reserve, that the present form of government was only one of transition, designed to quiet the prejudices of the revolution, but that it was necessary to make a choice; that if it were wished to lay the foundation of any thing really stable, it was impossible to do so without giving to power more of concentration, unity, and solidity. The conclusion of all this could easily be drawn. The first consul, as all the world knew, had no children, and this was a great embarrassment to those who already had their dreams of the transformation of the republic into a monarchy. It was, in fact, difficult to pretend that there was a wish to assure the regular and natural transmission of power, in the family of a man who had no heirs. Thus, though at a future time this want of heirs might possibly be a personal advantage to the brothers of the first consul, it was at the moment an argument against their plans, and they frequently reproached Madame Bonaparte with a misfortune, of which they said she was the cause. Having quarrelled with her from jealousy of her influence, they used little reserve respecting her before her husband, and persecuted her with their observations, repeating incessantly and even loudly, that the first consul ought to have a wife who would bring him children; that this was a matter not of private but of public interest, and that a resolution to this effect became indispensable, if he had any desire to assure the future to France. These fatal words, full of so sinister a conclusion for her, they caused to be repeated from every lip, and the wife of the first consul, in appearance so fortunate, was thus at that moment far from being happy.

Josephine Bonaparte, married at first to the count of Beauharnais, then to the young general, who had saved the convention on the 13th Vendémiaire, and now sharing with him a place which began to assume some resemblance to a throne, was a creole by birth, and had all the graces, all the deficiencies, usual in women of such an origin. Kind, prodigal, and frivolous, not beautiful, but the perfection of elegance, gifted with infinite power of charming, she had the skill of pleasing much more than women who were her superiors in wit and beauty. The levity of her conduct, depicted to her husband in the most odious colours on his return from Egypt, filled him with anger. He was inclined to separate from a spouse, whom, whether right or wrong, he considered culpable. She wept a long time at his feet; her two children, Hortense and Eugène de Beauharnais, who were both of them very dear to Bonaparte, wept also; he was conquered, and yielded to a conjugal tenderness which, during many years, was with him victorious over political considerations. He forgot the faults, real or supposed, of Josephine, and loved her still; but never as at the early period of their union. Her extravagancies without limit, her annoying imprudencies, every day brought under his notice, frequently excited in her husband emotions of impatience, which he could not control; but he pardoned all with the kindness prompted by successful power, and knew not how to be long angry with a wife, who had shared the first moments of his nascent greatness, and who seemed, from the day she took her seat by his side, to have brought fortune along with her.

Madame Bonaparte was a true woman of the old régime, a devotee, superstitious, and even a royalist, detesting those she called the Jacobins, who fully returned her hate; nor seeking any society but the men of the past, who returning in crowds, as we have said, came to pay their visits to her in the mornings. They had known her as the wife of an honourable man, of sufficiently high rank, and of military dignity, the unfortunate Beauharnais, who died on the revolutionary scaffold; they found her the wife of a *parvenu*, but of a *parvenu* more powerful than any prince in Europe; they had no hesitation in going to her to ask favours, while all the while they affected to look upon her with disdain. She took pains in making them share in her power, and rendering them services. She ever studied to foster an opinion amongst them, which they willingly adopted, that Bonaparte was, secretly, only waiting an occasion to recall the Bourbons, and restore to them the inheritance which was their right. And, singular as it is, this illusion, which she took a pleasure in exciting amongst them, she was almost inclined herself to share in; for she would have preferred to see her husband a subject of the Bourbons,—but a subject, the protector of his king, and surrounded by the homage of the ancient French aristocracy,—much rather than as a superior monarch crowned by the hand of the nation. She was a woman of weak heart; yet whatever her levity, she loved the man who covered her with glory, and loved him the more now that she was less loved by him. Never imagining that he could plant his audacious foot on the steps of the throne without falling, alike by the daggers of the republicans and the royalists, she saw confounded in one common ruin, her children, her husband, and herself. But, supposing that he should arrive safe and sound upon that usurped throne, another fear tore her heart; she could not sit there with him. If ever they made Bonaparte king or emperor, it would evidently be under the pretext of giving to France a fixed government, by rendering it hereditary; and, unhappily, the physicians allowed her no hope of having children. On this subject she called to mind the singular prediction of a woman, a kind of Pythoness then in vogue,

who had said to her: "You will occupy the first position in the world; but for a short time only." She had already heard the brothers of the first consul give utterance to the fatal word—divorce. This unfortunate lady, whom, if they judged of her condition by the continued brilliancy with which she was surrounded, the queens of Europe might have regarded with envy, lived in the most terrible anxiety. Every advance of fortune added to the appearance of her happiness and to the regrets of her life; and if she continued to escape from her heart-piercing anxieties, it was from a levity of character, which preserved her from prolonged thought. The attachment of Bonaparte, his abruptness of passion when he gave way to it, made up on the instant by emotions of the most perfect kindness, served also to reassure her. Hurried on, moreover, like all persons of that time, by a whirlwind which took away their senses, she counted on chance, the god of revolutions; and, after the most painful agitations, returned to her enjoyments. She strove to divert her husband's mind from his notions of exceeding greatness, ventured to speak to him of the Bourbons, at the risk of storms; and, in spite of her tastes, which should have led her to prefer Talleyrand to Fouché, she took the latter into her favour, because, as she said, all Jacobin though he was, he yet ventured to speak the truth to the first consul; since, in her eyes, to make the consul hear the truth was to advise the preservation of the republic, with an augmentation of the consular power at the same time. Talleyrand and Fouché, thinking they should strengthen their position by penetrating into the family of the first consul, introduced themselves by flattering each side as it liked to be flattered. Talleyrand sought to please the brothers, by saying that it was necessary to devise for the first consul some position different from that which he held by the constitution. Fouché endeavoured to make himself agreeable to Madame Bonaparte, by saying that to push on too fast would be to commit the gravest imprudence, and would, in fact, risk the loss of all. This manner of insinuating themselves into his family circle was singularly displeasing to the first consul. He gave frequent evidence of this feeling; and when he had any communication to make to his relatives, entrusted it to his colleague Cambacérès, who, with his accustomed prudence, heard all and said nothing but what he was directed, and thus acquitted himself of this class of commissions with as much skill as exactness.

A circumstance, sufficiently strange, occurred at this moment to give to all these internal agitations an immediate and positive object. The prince, who was afterwards Louis XVIII., then an exile, attempted a singular step, and one which showed little reflection. Many of the royalists, to explain and excuse their return towards the new government, feigned to believe, or actually did believe, that Bonaparte was desirous of recalling the Bourbons. These men, who had either not read, or did not know how to read, the history of the English revolution, and to discover there the terrible lessons with which it was full, came all at once to a discovery of an analogy in it which was propitious to their hopes: this was the bringing back of the Stuarts by general Monk. They suppressed all consideration of Cromwell, whose part nevertheless was quite great enough not to be overlooked. They ended by getting up a factitious opinion, which had reached as far as Louis XVIII. This prince, gifted with tact and some sense, had the great weakness to write to Bonaparte himself, and forwarded to him several letters, which he considered well-timed, but which were by no means so, and proved but one thing—the ordinary illusions of the emigrants. Here is the first of these letters:

"20th February, 1800.

"Whatever appearance their conduct may assume, men like you, sir, inspire no inquietude. You have accepted a post of eminence, and I am rejoiced that you have done so. You, better than any person, know how much strength and power are wanting to make the happiness of a great nation. Save France from her own frenzy, and you will fulfil the first wish of my heart; restore her king to her, and future generations will bless your memory. You will always be too necessary to the state to admit of my acquitting, even by the most important posts, the debt of my ancestors and my own. "Louis."

On receiving this letter the first consul was much surprised, and remained undecided, not knowing whether he ought to reply to it. It had been transmitted to him by the consul Lebrun, who received it himself from the abbé Montesquiou. Absorbed in the multiplicity of affairs at the commencement of his government, the first consul allowed the time for answering it to pass by. The prince, with the impatience of an emigrant, wrote a second letter, still more strongly impressed with the credulity of his party, and still more to be regretted for the sake of his own dignity. It was as follows:—

"For a long time, general, you must have known, that you have acquired my esteem. If you doubt whether I am susceptible of gratitude, mark out your own place, fix those of your friends. As for my principles, I am a Frenchman; clement by disposition, I shall be still more so from reason.

"No, the victor of Lodi, of Castiglione, of Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and of Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. Nevertheless, you are losing valuable time; we can assure the repose of France; I say we, because I have need of Bonaparte for this purpose, and he cannot effect it without me.

"General, Europe observes you, glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people. "Louis."

This time the first consul thought he could not dispense with replying. In reality, he had never any doubt as to the course to be pursued in regard to the deposed princes. Independently of all ambition, he looked upon the recall of the Bourbons as an impracticable and fatal step. Whatever might be otherwise his desire to be master of France, it was from conviction that he repulsed them. His wife had been informed of the secret, as also his secretary; and though he did not do them the honour of admitting them to his deliberations on such a matter, he informed them

of his motives. His wife had thrown herself at his feet, supplicating him to leave the Bourbons at least some hope; he repulsed her with some temper, and addressing himself to his secretary, "You do not know these people," said he; "if I were to restore their throne to them, they would believe they had recovered it by the grace of God. They would be quickly surrounded, and drawn on by the emigrants; they would upset every thing, in their wish to restore even what cannot be restored. What would become of the numerous interests created since 1789? What would become of them, and of the holders of national property, and of the chiefs of the army, and of all the men who have engaged their lives and fortunes in the revolution? Next to men, what would become of things? What would become of the principles for which we have fought? All would perish, but would not perish without a conflict: there would be a fearful struggle; thousands of men would fall. Never, never, will I adopt so fatal a resolve." He was right. All personal interest apart, he acted properly. His own dictatorship, which retarded the establishment of political liberty in France, a liberty, be it said, at that time surrounded with great difficulties; his own dictatorship achieved the triumph of the French revolution, which Waterloo itself, because it happened fifteen years later, could not destroy.

His answer was of course conformable with his opinion, and left no more hope than he meant to give. It is only from the text itself of the letter that we can form an opinion of the grandeur of expression with which he replied to the imprudent advances of the exiled prince.

"Paris, the 20th Fructidor, year VIII.
"7th September, 1800.

"I have received your letter, sir; I thank you for the polite expressions you make use of in regard to myself.

"You must not wish for your return to France; you would have to march there over five hundred thousand corpses.

"Sacrifice your own interest to the repose and happiness of France; history will give you credit for it.

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family; and I will contribute with pleasure to the ease and tranquillity of your retreat.

"BONAPARTE."

Some part of this was made known, and thus the personal designs of the first consul became only the more evident.

It is often the attempt of parties against a rising power that hastens its progress, and encourages it to dare all it meditates. An attempt, more ridiculous than criminal, of the republicans against the first consul, hastened a demonstration, altogether as ridiculous on the part of those who wished to precipitate his elevation; neither the one nor the other attained the object.

The patriot declaimers, more noisy and much less formidable than the agents of royalism, met frequently at the house of an old *employé* of the committee of public safety, then out of office. He was called Demerville; he spoke much, carried from one place to another pamphlets against the government, and was scarcely capable of doing more than this. To his house resorted the Corsican Arena, one of those members of the five hundred who had escaped through the window on the 18th Brumaire; Topino-Lebrun, a painter of some talent, a pupil of David, who shared in the revolutionary enthusiasm of the artists of that time; and also many of the Italian refugees, who were exasperated against Bonaparte because he protected the pope, and had not established a Roman republic. The principal and most noisy of these last was a sculptor named Ceracchi. These hot-headed fellows usually assembled at Demerville's, and held the most foolish discourse. It was necessary, they said, to bring matters to an end; they had most of the world with them—Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, Sieyès, and Fouché himself. They had but to strike the tyrant, and all the true republicans would at once declare themselves; all would reunite to raise up once more the expiring republic. But it was requisite to find a Brutus to strike this new Cæsar—and no one offered himself. A soldier without employ, named Harrel, who was living in idleness and misery, with these declaimers, indigent and discontented as themselves, appeared to them the man of action of whom they stood in need. They made proposals to him at which he was terrified. In his agitation he disclosed the matter to a commissary of war with whom he had some connection, and who advised him to impart what he knew to the government. Harrel next went and found Bourrienne, the secretary to the consul, and Lannes, the commandant of the consular guard. The first consul, forewarned by them, caused money to be given by the police to Harrel, as well as an order for him to undertake every thing that his accomplices might propose. These wretched conspirators believed themselves to have met in this individual with the right man to execute their purpose; but they found that one was not sufficient. Harrel proposed to them to introduce others; they consented, and he introduced some of Fouché's agents. After they had fallen into this snare, their next care was to procure poignards, wherewith to arm Harrel and his companions. This time they undertook the care themselves, and brought poignards purchased by Topino-Lebrun. At last they made choice of a place to assassinate the first consul, and that was the opera, then styled the theatre of arts. They fixed the time, it was to be the 10th October, or 18th Vendémiaire, year IX., the day when the first consul was to be present at the first representation of a new opera. The police, forewarned, had taken precautions. The first consul went to the theatre of the opera, followed by Lannes, who, watching over him with the greatest solicitude, had doubled the guard, and placed about the box the bravest of his grenadiers. The pretended assassins came in fact to the rendezvous, but not all, and not armed. Topino-Lebrun was not there, no more was Demerville. Arena and Ceracchi alone presented themselves. Ceracchi approached nearer than the others to the box of the first consul, but he was without a poignard. There were no bold men of all those present on the spot, nor armed, except the conspirators placed by the police on the scene of crime. They arrested Ceracchi, Arena, and all the others in succession, but the

most part at their own dwellings, or in houses where they had gone to seek refuge.

This affair created a great sensation, which it did not deserve. Assuredly the police—which ignorant men, strangers to any knowledge of public affairs, accuse in general of itself fabricating the plots which it discovers—the police had not invented this, though it might be said to have taken too great a share in it. The conspirators without doubt meditated the death of the first consul, but they were incapable of striking the blow with their own hands; by encouraging them, and by furnishing them with what it was their greatest difficulty to find, hands to execute their purpose, they had been drawn into crime further than they would have been engaged in it had they been left to themselves. If all this were to have ended in a severe but temporary punishment, such as is inflicted on madmen, it would have been well; but to lead them to their death by such a road is more than is right, even when we are acting for the preservation of a valuable life. Men did not look at matters so nicely at that time. They instituted proceedings directly which rendered the scaffold inevitable to these unhappy offenders.

This attempt caused general alarm. Until now there had only been seen during the revolution what were called the *journées*, in other words, attacks by armed men; but against assaults such as these there was security in the military power of the government. No one had thought about assassination, and the possibility of the first consul being suddenly struck down and killed, notwithstanding he might be surrounded by his grenadiers. The attempt of Ceracchi, the ridiculous character of which was not known, was a piece of intelligence that frightened the public. The dread to see society plunged again into a chaos dwelt upon every mind, and gave birth to a species of passion. The crowd ran to the Tuileries. The tribunate was the only public body of the state which happened at that moment to be sitting, from its habit of holding its meetings every fortnight during the interval of the sessions; and that body went there collectively. All the public authorities followed the example. A vast number of addresses were presented to the first consul. Their sense may be collected from the contents of that drawn up by the municipal body of Paris:—

"General, we come in the name of the citizens of Paris to express to you the deep indignation which they feel at hearing of the new attempt meditated against your person. Too many interests are attached to your existence for the plots which have threatened it not to become a subject of public sorrow, as all that protects it is a subject of acknowledgment and national gratitude.

"Providence, which in Vendémiaire, year VIII., brought you back from Egypt, that at Marengo preserved you from all the perils of the field; that lastly, on the 18th Vendémiaire, in the year IX., saved you from the rage of the assassins, permit us to say so, is the providence of France much more than yours. The same providence will not allow that a year so important, so full of glorious events, and destined to occupy so grand a place in human memory, should terminate all at once by a detestable crime. O that the enemies of France would cease to desire evil to you and to us, that they would but submit themselves to that destiny which, more powerful than all their plots, will assure your preservation and that of the republic! We do not speak to you of the guilty: they belong to the law."

These addresses, all cast in the same mould, continually repeated to the first consul that he had no right to be merciful, that his life belonged to the republic, and ought to be placed under the same safeguard as the public good, of which it was the pledge. It is proper to state that these manifestations were sincere. Every one thought himself in danger from the first consul being in that situation. All who were not of the factious wished for his preservation. The royalists believing, that if anything happened to him they would be turned back to the scaffold or to exile; the revolutionists believing they should have a counter-revolution, rendered triumphant by means of foreign armies.

The first consul took particular care, it is worthy of remark, to diminish the idea of the danger to which he had been exposed. He would not have it believed that his life depended upon the first comer, and he regarded that belief as equally necessary for his safety and his dignity. Speaking to the authorities commissioned to compliment him, he told them that the danger about which they were so much alarmed really had nothing in it very serious; he explained to them how, surrounded by officers of the consular guard and a picket of grenadiers, he was completely secured against all that seven or eight miserable wretches could have intended to effect. He believed much more than his words would seem to imply, in the peril which had threatened his life; but he judged it useful to impress upon all minds, that surrounded by the grenadiers of Marengo he was inaccessible in the midst of them to the attempts of an assassin.

Plots as serious as that which made all this stir, and directed by other hands, were preparing in darkness. A vague feeling prevailed of such being the case, and people said that these attempts would be renewed more than once. This gave the partizans of the first consul a reason for repeating that something was wanting more stable than an ephemeral power, resting in the hands of one man, that might disappear beneath the blow of an assassin's poignard. The brother of the first consul, Rœderer, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Talleyrand, Fontanes, and many others held these notions, some from a conviction of their truth, others to please their master; all, as it commonly happens, mingled with sentiments sincere or interested. At this moment a pamphlet appeared anonymously, a singular and very remarkable production. It had for its author, according to report, Lucien Bonaparte; but from its rare beauty of style, and its knowledge of classic history, it should only have been ascribed to its real author, M. Fontanes. This pamphlet, as the cause of a great sensation in the public mind, deserves to be noticed here. It marked one of the steps that advanced Bonaparte in his career to the supreme power. The title was, "A Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, Monk, and Bonaparte." The author first compared Bonaparte with Cromwell, but was unable to trace any resemblance between the principal personage in the English revolution and the first consul. Cromwell was a fanatic, the chief of a sanguinary faction, the assassin of his

king, a victor only in a civil war, conquering a few cities and provinces of England, a mere barbarian, who ravaged the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. He was a very able scoundrel, not a hero. The parallel of Cromwell in the French revolution would be Robespierre, if Robespierre had been possessed of the courage, and if France had only La Vendée to conquer, and he had been the conqueror. General Bonaparte, on the contrary, a stranger to the evils of the revolution, had covered with astonishing glory the crimes in which he had no concern. He had abolished the barbarous festival instituted in honour of the regicide; he had put an end to the horrors of revolutionary fanaticism; he had honoured learning and science, reestablished the schools, and opened the temple of the arts. He had not made a civil war; he had conquered, not cities but kingdoms. As to Monk, what had he in common with that wavering man, the deserter from all parties, not caring whither he went, having wrecked the vessel of the republic on the monarchy, as he would have wrecked that upon the republic,—what had that vulgar and miserable personage in common with general Bonaparte, and his stedfast mind acquiring whatever it desired? The title of duke of Albemarle had satisfied the wretched vanity of Monk. "But can it be credited, that the baton of a marshal or the sword of a constable sufficed for a man before whom the universe is confounded? Was it not felt that he was one of those destined to fill a first place? Besides, if Bonaparte were ever able to imitate Monk, would not France be seen again plunged into the horrors of a new revolution? storm in place of calm being every where renewed.

After having repelled these comparisons, the author could find no one analogous to Bonaparte in history but Cæsar. He recognized in that character the same military glory, the same political greatness; and he also discovered one dissimilarity. Cæsar at the head of the demagogues of Rome had trampled upon the good men and destroyed the republic; Bonaparte, on the contrary, had elevated the party of good men, and crushed only the base.

All this was true; the work undertaken by Bonaparte was much more upright than that of Cæsar.

After these comparisons the writer concluded, "Happy the republic, *if Bonaparte were immortal.*" "But where," he adds,—"where are his heirs." Where are the institutions that can adequately maintain his good deeds and perpetuate his genius? The fate of thirty millions of men only hangs upon the life of one! Frenchmen, what would become of you, if at this moment a melancholy cry announced to you that this man was dead?"

Here the author examined the different chances which would present themselves on the death of general Bonaparte. "Shall we fall under the yoke of an assembly? But the remembrance of the convention was there to drive the minds of every body from such a supposition. Shall we throw ourselves into the arms of a military government? But where was the equal of Bonaparte? The republic, there was no doubt, possessed great generals, but which of them was so superior to all the rest, as to be above rivalry, and able to hinder the armies from combating each other for the interest of this particular leader? In default of a government of assemblies, in default of a government of pretorians, should recourse be had to a *legitimate* dynasty, that was upon the frontier holding out its arms to France? But that would be a counter revolution, the return of Charles II. and of James II. to England; blood had flowed at their appearance: they were sufficing examples to open the eyes of nations, and if there was need of more recent examples, the return of the queen of Naples and her imbecile husband to that unhappy kingdom was a lesson written in characters of blood! *Frenchmen, you sleep on the edge of an abyss!*" Such were the last words of this singular piece of writing.

All which it contained, except the flattering language, was true; but the truths were premature, to judge by the impression which they produced. Lucien, minister of the interior, employed every means in his power to scatter this pamphlet all over France. He filled Paris and the provinces with it, having taken good care to conceal its origin. It produced a great effect. At the bottom it disclosed that which every body thought; but it demanded from France an avowal which a very legitimate pride did not yet permit her to make. She had abolished eight years previously a monarchy of fourteen centuries, and she must so soon afterwards come forth and acknowledge at the feet of a general thirty years old, that she had played the fool, and pray him to revive, in his own person, that very monarchy! She was willing to give him a power equal to that of monarchs, but it was necessary, at least, to preserve appearances, were it only for the sake of the national dignity. Besides, the young warrior had gained great victories, and already given the beginning of services to the country; but he had scarcely commenced the reconciliation of parties, the reorganization of France, the arrangement of the laws; above all, he had not yet given peace to the world. There remained to him these and many titles to conquer, which he was very certain in addition to place soon over his glorious head.

The impression was general and painful. On all sides, the prefects stated the pamphlet produced a mischievous effect; that it gave some reason to the factious demagogues to say, that the Cæsars produced the Brutuses, that the pamphlet was imprudent and to be regretted. In Paris the impression it produced was similar. In the council of state, the disapprobation was not concealed. The first consul, whether he had known anything of the pamphlet, whether he had been compromised unknowingly by impatient and awkward friends, still believed the disavowal necessary, above all, in the sight of the revolutionary party. He sent for Fouché, and publicly demanded of him why he suffered the circulation of such writings. The minister replied, "I know the author." "If you know him," replied the first consul, "he must be sent to Vincennes." "I am not able to send him to Vincennes," replied Fouché, "because he is your own brother." At this Bonaparte complained bitterly of his brother, who had already more than once compromised him. His sourness towards Lucien increased. One day, Lucien not being exactly in time at the council of ministers, a thing that often occurred, and many complaints being made against his official conduct, the first consul testified great discontent towards him, and appeared determined to revoke

his appointment immediately. But the consul Cambacérès urged him not to take from Lucien the portfolio of the home department without giving him an equivalent.

The first consul consented; Cambacérès devised an embassy to Spain, and was instructed to offer it to Lucien, who accepted it without difficulty. Lucien went off, and there was soon no more thought of the imprudent pamphlet.

Thus a first attempt at assassination directed against the first consul had called forth in his favour a first attempt to elevate him; but the one was as foolish as the other was badly managed. It was necessary for Bonaparte to attain by new services an augmentation of authority, which no one could yet precisely define, but all could confusedly foresee in the future, and to which he or his friends made no secret of his aspiring; at any rate, his fortune was about to furnish him, in services rendered, and in dangers avoided, great titles to similar demands, such as France could no longer resist.

BOOK VII.

HOHENLINDEN.

PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE BARBARY REGENCIES.—MEETING OF THE CONGRESS OF LUNÉVILLE.—M. COBENTZEL REFUSES A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION, AND WISHES AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENCE OF AN ENGLISH PLENIPOTENTIARY, TO COVER THE REAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND FRANCE.—THE FIRST CONSUL, TO HASTEN THE CONCLUSION, ORDERS THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.—PLAN OF THE WINTER CAMPAIGN.—MOREAU COMMANDED TO PASS THE INN, AND MARCH UPON VIENNA.—MACDONALD, WITH THE SECOND ARMY OF RESERVE, ORDERED TO PASS THE GRISONS INTO THE TYROL.—BRUNE, WITH EIGHTY THOUSAND MEN, IS DESTINED TO FORCE THE MINCIO AND ADIGE.—PLAN OF THE YOUNG ARCHDUKE JOHN, NOW BECOME GENERALISSIMO OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.—HIS PLAN TO TURN MOREAU FAILS FROM DEFECTS IN THE EXECUTION.—HE HALTS IN HIS WAY, AND WISHES TO ATTACK MOREAU IN THE FRONT OF HOHENLINDEN.—FINE MANŒUVRE OF MOREAU, EXECUTED IN AN ADMIRABLE MANNER BY RICHEPANSE.—MEMORABLE BATTLE OF HOHENLINDEN.—GREAT CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE.—PASSAGES OF THE INN, SALZA, TRAUN, AND ENS.—ARMISTICE OF STEYER.—AUSTRIA PROMISES TO SIGN AN IMMEDIATE PEACE.—OPERATIONS IN THE ALPS AND IN ITALY.—PASSAGE OF THE SPLUGEN BY MACDONALD IN THE MIDST OF THE HORRORS OF WINTER.—ARRIVAL OF MACDONALD IN THE ITALIAN TYROL.—DISPOSITIONS OF BRUNE FOR PASSING THE MINCIO AT TWO PLACES.—ERROR OF HIS DISPOSITIONS.—GENERAL DUPONT MAKES THE FIRST PASSAGE AT POZZOLO, AND DRAWS UPON HIMSELF THE WHOLE AUSTRIAN ARMY.—THE MINCIO IS FORCED AFTER A USELESS WASTE OF BLOOD.—PASSAGES OF THE MINCIO AND ADIGE.—LUCKY ESCAPE OF GENERAL LAUDON, BY MEANS OF A FALSEHOOD.—THE AUSTRIANS BEING ROUTED, DEMAND AN ARMISTICE IN ITALY.—SIGNATURE OF THE ARMISTICE AT TREVISO.—RENEWAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT LUNÉVILLE.—THE PRINCIPLE OF A SEPARATE PEACE ADMITTED BY M. COBENTZEL.—THE FIRST CONSUL INSISTS UPON AUSTRIA PAYING THE EXPENSES OF THE SECOND CAMPAIGN, AND IMPOSES CONDITIONS HARDER THAN THOSE OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF M. JULIEN.—HE GIVES FOR AN ULTIMATUM THE LIMITS OF THE RHINE IN GERMANY, AND OF THE ADIGE IN ITALY.—BOLD RESISTANCE OF M. COBENTZEL.—THIS RESISTANCE, ALTHOUGH HONOURABLE TO HIM, MAKES AUSTRIA LOSE VALUABLE TIME.—WHILE THE NEGOTIATION PROCEEDS AT LUNEVILLE, THE EMPEROR PAUL, TO WHOM THE FIRST CONSUL HAD CEDED THE ISLAND OF MALTA, RECLAIMS IT OF THE ENGLISH, WHO REFUSE IT.—ANGER OF PAUL I.—HE INVITES THE KING OF SWEDEN TO PETERSBURG, AND RENEWS THE LEAGUE OF 1780.—DECLARATION OF THE NEUTRAL POWERS.—RUPTURE OF ALL THE NORTHERN POWERS WITH ENGLAND.—THE FIRST CONSUL PROFITS BY IT TO FORCE HARDER TERMS UPON AUSTRIA.—HE INSISTS, BESIDES THE LIMITS OF THE ADIGE, UPON THE EXPULSION OF ALL THE PRINCES OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA FROM ITALY.—THE GRAND DUKE OF TUSCANY, AS WELL AS THE DUKE OF MODENA, TO BE REMOVED INTO GERMANY.—M. COBENTZEL AT LAST GIVES WAY, AND SIGNS WITH JOSEPH BONAPARTE, ON THE NINTH OF FEBRUARY, 1801, THE CELEBRATED TREATY OF LUNÉVILLE.—FRANCE, FOR THE SECOND TIME, OBTAINS THE RHINE FOR A BOUNDARY THROUGHOUT ITS WHOLE LENGTH, AND REMAINS MISTRESS OF NEARLY ALL ITALY.—AUSTRIA IS FORCED BACK BEHIND THE ADIGE.—THE CISALPINE REPUBLIC IS TO INCLUDE THE MILANESE, MANTUA, THE DUCHY OF MODENA, AND THE LEGATIONS.—TUSCANY IS DESTINED FOR THE HOUSE OF PARMA, WITH THE TITLE OF KINGDOM OF ETRURIA.—THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SECULARISATIONS IMPOSED FOR GERMANY.—IMPORTANT RESULTS GAINED BY THE FIRST CONSUL IN THE COURSE OF FIFTEEN MONTHS.

Joseph Bonaparte had signed, at Morfontaine, the treaty which established peace between France and America, with the American negotiators, Ellsworth, Davie, and Van Murray. It was the first treaty concluded by the consular government. It was natural that the reconciliation of France with the different powers of the globe, should commence with that republic, to which, in a certain sense, she had given birth. The first consul had permitted the adjournment of the difficulties relative to the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778; but, in return, he had required the adjournment of the American claims, relative to captured vessels. He judged, with reason, that he ought to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of the rights of neutrals. This gave to France another ally, and

to England an enemy more on the ocean; it was a new fermentation in the maritime dispute, which was rising in the north, and daily becoming more serious. In consequence of this, the principal articles of the neutral rights, such at least as they are laid down by France and all the maritime states, were integrally in the new treaty.

These articles were the same as we have already stated.

1. The flag covers the merchandise; in consequence, the neutral can carry the goods of any enemy without being searched.

2. There is no exception from this rule, unless for the contraband of war; and that contraband does not extend to alimentary substances, or to naval stores, timber, pitch, and hemp, but solely to manufactured arms and munitions of war, such as powder, saltpetre, petards, matches, balls, bullets, bombs, grenades, carcasses, pikes, halberts, swords, sword-belts, accoutrements, pistols, scabbards, cavalry-saddles, harness, cannon mortars with their carriages, and generally arms, munitions of war, and implements for the use of troops.

3. Neutral bottoms can sail from any port to any port; there is no exception to their freedom of navigation, except in regard to ports blockaded *boná fide*, and those ports alone are *boná fide* blockaded, which are guarded by such a force that there would be serious danger in attempting to break the blockade.

4. The neutral is bound to submit to be visited for the purpose of discovering her real character; but the visitor vessel must remain out of cannon-shot distance, and send a boat and three men; and if the neutral is convoyed by a ship-of-war, the visit shall not take place, the presence of the military flag being a sufficient guarantee against every species of fraud.

The treaty contained other stipulations in detail; but the four principal articles which truly constitute the law of neutrals, were an important victory, since the Americans, in adopting them, were obliged to insist upon their application in their commerce with the English, or to go to war with them.

The signature of the treaty was celebrated with rejoicing at Morfontaine, a fine estate that Joseph Bonaparte, who was richer than his brothers through his marriage, had acquired some time before. The first consul attended, accompanied by a numerous and brilliant party. Elegant decorations, placed in the house and gardens, exhibited every where the union of France and America. Toasts were given in honour of the occasion. The first consul proposed this: "To the manes of the French and Americans, who died on the field of battle for the independence of the new world."

Lebrun proposed: "To the union of America with the powers of the north to enforce the liberty of the seas."

Finally, Cambacérès proposed the third: "To the successor of Washington."

The French government waited with impatience for the arrival of M. Cobentzel at Lunéville, to discover if his court was disposed to conclude a peace. The first consul, if he were not satisfied with the march of the negotiations, was determined to resume hostilities, although the season was ever so far advanced. Since he had passed the St. Bernard, he made no account of obstacles, and imagined that men could fight just as well upon snow and ice, as when the ground was covered with verdure or harvests. Austria, on the other hand, wished to gain time, because she had engaged with England not to make a separate peace before the coming month of February, 1801, or Pluviôse, in the year IX. Fearing greatly the resumption of hostilities, she applied for a third prolongation of the armistice. The first consul had refused it peremptorily, from the motive that M. Cobentzel had not yet arrived at Lunéville. He was resolved not to yield the point until the Austrian plenipotentiary should reach the place fixed upon for the negotiation. At last, M. Cobentzel arrived at Lunéville on the 24th of October, 1800. He was received on the frontier and along the whole way by the sound of cannon, and with great testimonies of consideration. General Clarke had been nominated to the governorship of Lunéville, in order to do the honours of the city to the members of the congress, and that he might acquit himself of the duty in a convenient manner, funds were placed at his disposal as well as some prime regiments. Joseph Bonaparte, on his own side, had repaired there, accompanied by M. Laforêt as his secretary. M. Cobentzel had scarcely arrived before the first consul, wishing to be convinced of the disposition of the Austrian negotiator, addressed to him an invitation to come to Paris[1]. M. Cobentzel dared not refuse, and proceeded with great deference to that city. He arrived there on the 29th of October. A new extension of the armistice was then granted him for twenty days. The first consul conversed with him respecting the peace and the conditions upon which it might be concluded. M. Cobentzel's answers were not very satisfactory on the matter of a separate negotiation, and in regard to the conditions, he put forward pretensions that could not be tolerated. Austria had, in regard to Italy, objects that it was not possible to satisfy; she was in the expectation that if the indemnities promised her in Italy, by the treaty of Campo Formio, were to be given in Germany, she should receive very large grants of territory, either in Swabia, Bavaria, or the Palatinate. The first consul gave way to some exhibitions of temper. This he had before done with M. Cobentzel, at the treaty of Campo Formio; but advancing age, and more power than formerly, made him restrain himself less. M. Cobentzel complained in the bitterest manner, saying that he had never been so treated, neither by Catherine, Frederick, nor by the emperor Paul himself. He demanded leave in consequence to return to Lunéville; and the first consul suffered him to go, thinking it would be better to negotiate with him foot by foot, through the medium of his brother Joseph. The last, mild, calm, and sufficiently intelligent, was a better person than his brother for an operation requiring so much forbearance.

M. Cobentzel and Joseph Bonaparte having met together at Lunéville, exchanged their full powers on the 9th of November, or 18th of Brumaire. Joseph had orders to address to him the three following questions. Had he authority to treat? Was

[1] Napoleon said at St. Helena, that M. Cobentzel wished to come to Paris to gain time. This was an error of memory. The diplomatic correspondence proves the contrary.

he authorized to treat separately from England? Was he to treat for the emperor in the name of Austria alone, or in the name of the whole Germanic empire?

The powers being exchanged and recognized to be valid, for which object they were scrutinized very minutely, on account of the misadventure of M. St. Julien, they discussed the extent of their mutual powers. M. Cobentzel did not hesitate to declare that he was unable to treat without the presence of an English plenipotentiary. As to the question if he would treat for the house of Austria alone, or for the whole empire, he said that he must refer to Vienna for new instructions.

These replies were sent to Paris. Immediately afterwards the first consul announced to M. Cobentzel, that hostilities should be renewed as soon as the armistice was concluded, or in the last days of November; that the congress need not break up; that while hostilities were going forward, they might negotiate; but that the French armies would not halt until the Austrian plenipotentiary had consented to treat without England.

While these proceedings were in hand, the first consul had taken, in respect to Tuscany, a precaution become indispensable. The Austrian general Somma-Riva had remained there with a few hundred men, conformably to the convention of Alexandria, but he continued to raise levies *en masse*, with the money of England. At the very moment a disembarkation at Leghorn was announced of those same English troops, that for a long while had been on their way from Mahon to Ferrol, and from Ferrol to Cadiz. The Neapolitans on their side were marching upon Rome, and the Austrians spreading themselves over the Legations beyond the limits marked by the armistice, were endeavouring to aid the Tuscan insurrection. The first consul, seeing that the object of the Austrians was to gain time, and that they were preparing to place the French between two fires, ordered Dupont to march upon Tuscany, and Murat, who commanded the camp at Amiens, to go immediately to Italy. He had several times informed the Austrians of what he intended to do if they did not suspend the movements of the troops begun in Tuscany; and seeing that they did not regard his notice, he gave orders accordingly. General Dupont, with the brigades of Pino, Malher, and Carra St. Cyr, crossed the Apennines rapidly, and occupied Florence, while general Clement marched from Lucca to Leghorn. No resistance was experienced there. Still the insurgents resisted in the city of Arezzo, which had already shown itself hostile to the French during the retreat of Macdonald in 1799. They were obliged to take it by assault, and to punish it, though much less severely than it merited from its conduct towards the French soldiers. Tuscany was from that time wholly submissive. The Neapolitans were stopped in their march, and the English driven from the soil of Italy, at the moment when they were about to enter Leghorn. Two days afterwards they landed twelve thousand men.

All the armies were every where in motion, from the banks of the Mayn to the shores of the Adriatic, from Frankfort to Bologna. Notice of the commencement of hostilities had been given. Austria, in apprehension, made a final attempt through the mediation of M. Cobentzel, an attempt which showed her good-will to terminate matters, and as well her unfortunate embarrassment with England. M. Cobentzel, addressing himself to Joseph Bonaparte, and putting on a tone of confidence, demanded from him several times whether he might calculate upon the discretion of the French government. Assured that he might by Joseph, he showed him a letter from the emperor, in which that personage testified the same inquietude that he, M. Cobentzel, felt himself, relative to the danger of an indiscretion; but relying upon his knowledge of men and things, he authorized him to make the following proposal. Austria at last consents to separate herself from England, and to treat separately upon two conditions, on which she must in the most absolute manner insist: first, inviolable secrecy to be preserved, until the 1st of February, 1801, the time that her engagements terminated with England, with a formal promise, if the negotiation did not succeed, to return all the documents both on one side and the other. Secondly, the admission of an English plenipotentiary at Lunéville, to cover by his presence the real negotiation. Upon these two conditions Austria consented to treat immediately, and desired a fresh prolongation of the armistice.

The proximity of Paris allowed an immediate reply. The first consul would not admit, at any price, an English negotiator at Lunéville. He would consent again to suspend hostilities on condition of a treaty of peace signed secretly, if that would be convenient to Austria; but it must be signed in forty-eight hours. The conditions of such a peace were already nearly settled by the discussion on the preliminaries. They were these: The Rhine for the frontier of the French republic towards Germany; the Mincio for the Austrian frontier in Italy, in place of the Adige, which it had in 1797, but with that the cession of Mantua to the Cisalpine; the Milanese, Valteline, Parma, and Modena to the Cisalpine; Tuscany to the duke of Parma; the Legations to Tuscany; finally, as general conditions, the independence of Piedmont, of Switzerland, and of Genoa. Such were the ground of the St. Julien preliminaries, with the difference of the abandonment of Mantua to the Cisalpine, to punish Austria for her refusal of the ratification. But the first consul demanded that the treaty should be signed in forty-eight hours, otherwise he proclaimed war to the last extremity. In case of acceptance, he bound himself to secresy until the 1st of February, and to a new suspension of hostilities.

Austria was not inclined to proceed too quickly, nor to agree to so many sacrifices in Italy. She deceived herself regarding the conditions she might be able to obtain, and rejected the proposals of France. Hostilities were the immediate result. M. Cobentzel and Joseph Bonaparte remained at Lunéville, waiting to make new communications, according to the events which might happen on the Danube, the Inn, the Higher Alps, or the Adige.

The resumption of hostilities had been announced for the 28th of November, or 7th Frimaire, year IX. All was ready for this winter campaign, one of the most celebrated and decisive in the annals of France.

The first consul had displayed five armies upon

the vast theatre of war. His intention was to direct them from Paris, without putting himself at their head. He had still not renounced the idea of proceeding to Germany or Italy, and taking the command of one of them upon any unforeseen reverse occurring, or should any other cause render his presence necessary. His equipages were at Dijon, ready to take him to any point where it might be necessary to transport himself.

The five armies were those of Augereau on the Main, of Moreau on the Inn, of Macdonald in the Grisons, of Brune on the Mincio, and of Murat marching towards Italy with the grenadiers of Amiens. Augereau had under his command eight thousand Hollanders and twelve thousand French, in all twenty thousand men. Moreau one hundred and thirty thousand, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand belonged to the active army. The army of the last had been raised to this considerable strength by recruiting, by the return of sick and wounded, and by the union of the corps of St. Suzanne. The surrender of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt, had besides permitted Moreau to concentrate all his forces between the Isar and the Inn. Macdonald had at his disposal fifteen thousand men in the Grisons. Brune in Italy was at the head of one hundred and twenty-five thousand soldiers, eighty thousand of whom were on the Mincio, twelve thousand in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria, eight thousand in Tuscany, and twenty-five thousand in the hospitals. Murat's corps was composed of ten thousand grenadiers. If to this number be added forty thousand men in Egypt and the colonies, and sixty thousand in the interior and on the coasts, it will appear that during the administration of the first consul, the republic had nearly four hundred thousand men under arms. The three hundred thousand placed in the theatre of war, of which two hundred and fifty thousand were effective, and capable of immediate action, were provided with every thing, owing to the united resources of the treasury and contributions in the conquered countries. The cavalry was well mounted, more especially that in Germany. The artillery was numerous, and perfectly well served. Moreau had two hundred pieces of cannon, and Brune one hundred and eighty. The French were, therefore, better prepared than in the spring, and the armies had, in themselves, a confidence beyond bounds.

Enlightened but severe judges have asked why the first consul, in place of dividing into five corps the whole of his active force, had not, following his own principles, formed two grand masses, one of one hundred and seventy thousand men, under Moreau, marching on Vienna, through Bavaria; the other of one hundred and thirty thousand men, under Brune, passing the Mincio, the Adige, the Alps, and threatening Vienna and Friuli. This was, in fact, the plan which he adopted in 1805; but an examination of facts will show how well and profoundly he was acquainted with men and things, and how he was able to vary, according to circumstances, the great principles of war.

The two principal armies, those of Moreau and Brune, were placed on the two sides of the Alps, and nearly at the same height, the first along the Inn, the second along the Mincio. Moreau had to force the line of the Inn; Brune that of the Mincio. Those two armies were, at least, equal in numerical, and greatly superior in moral force, to those that were opposed to them. Between the two arose the chain of the Alps, forming in this part what is called the Tyrol. The Austrians had the corps of general Iller in the German Tyrol, and that of general Davidovich in the Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, with the fifteen thousand men placed under his command, styled "the second army of reserve," was to occupy the attention of these two corps entirely, by keeping them uncertain where he would make an attack; since, placed in the Grisons, he was at liberty to throw himself directly into the German Tyrol, or by the Splügen into the Italian. The title which his army bore, and the doubts circulated regarding its strength, gave out the belief of some extraordinary blow being about to be struck, and it was ready to profit by the prestige which the army of St. Bernard had produced. Too little credit had been given to the existence of the first army of reserve, and people were ready to give too much to the second. Moreau and Brune, having no more anxiety on the side of the Alps, were thus able, without being in apprehension about their flanks, to push forward with all their forces.

The little army of Augereau was destined to watch over the levies *en masse* in Franconia and Suabia, supported by the Austrian corps of Simbschen. It thus covered the left and rear of Moreau. Finally, Murat, with ten thousand grenadiers and a powerful artillery, performed for Brune what Augereau did for Moreau. He covered the right and rear of Brune against the insurgents of central Italy, the Neapolitans, English, and others.

These prudent precautions are such as it is proper to take when confined within the conditions of ordinary warfare. But the first consul was necessarily confined within them, when he had to carry out his designs two such generals as Moreau and Brune. Moreau, the best of the two, and one of the best in Europe, still was not the man to do what the first consul did himself in 1805, after he became emperor, when he collected a considerable force on the Danube, and leaving a smaller force in Italy, marched thundering on upon Vienna, not disturbing himself about his flanks or his rear, and placing his security in the crushing vigour of his blows. But Moreau and Brune were not men to comport themselves in this manner. It was necessary that in directing them he should keep within the limits of methodical warfare; it was necessary to guard their flanks and rear, to secure them against what might occur around them; for neither the one nor the other were equal to the control of accidents by the grandeur and vigour of their resolutions. It was for this that Macdonald was placed in the Tyrol, Augereau in Franconia, and Murat in central Italy.

These dispositions did not admit of being changed, unless the internal affairs of France had permitted the first consul to make war in person; but all the world agreed that at such a moment he ought not to quit the centre of his government. His absence during the short campaign of Marengo had produced inconveniences great enough

to prevent his exposing himself to them again without an absolute necessity.

The dispositions of the Austrian army were, in every way, inferior to those of the French. Their armies, nearly equal in numbers to the French, were in no way equal to them in other respects. They were not yet recovered from their recent defeats. The archduke John commanded in Germany; marshal Bellegarde in Italy. The corps of Simbschen, destined to form the nucleus of the army of the levies of Suabia and of Franconia, was supported on general Klenau. The last commanded an intermediate corps, placed on both sides the Danube, connecting itself, on the right, with the corps of Simbschen, and on the left, with the principal army of the archduke. Generals Simbschen and Klenau had between them twenty-four thousand men, exclusively of the partizan troops raised in Germany. General Klenau was destined to follow the movements of general St. Suzanne; to approach the archduke if St. Suzanne approached Moreau, or to join Simbschen's corps if St. Suzanne should join the little army of Augereau.

The archduke John had eighty thousand men under his command, of which force sixty thousand Austrians were in advance of the Inn and twenty thousand Wurtembergers, or Bavarians, behind the entrenchments on that river. General Iller commanded twenty thousand men in the Tyrol, independently of ten thousand Tyroleans. Marshal Bellegarde, in Italy, was at the head of eighty thousand men, well stationed behind the Mincio. Lastly, ten thousand Austrians, detached towards Ancona and Romagna, were ready to second the Neapolitans or English, in case the last should make an attempt on central or southern Italy. Here, then, was a force of two hundred and twenty-four thousand men, that, with the Mayençais, the Tyroleans, the Neapolitans, the Tuscans, and the English, amounted to about three hundred thousand men. The first consul, in disarming the Tuscans, closing Leghorn against the English, and restraining the Neapolitans, had taken a useful precaution, very well adapted to hinder the augmentation of the enemy's means of offence.

Under a kind of common resolution, the two belligerents seemed disposed to settle their quarrel in Germany, between the Inn and the Isar. The operations commenced on the 28th of November, or 7th Frimaire, in very severe weather, which produced a cold rain in Suabia, and an intense frost in the Alps. While Augereau, advancing by Frankfort, Aschaffemberg, Wurtzburg, and Nuremberg, fought a brilliant action at Burg-Eberach, separated the Mayence levies of the corps of Simbschen, and neutralized the last for the remainder of the campaign; while Macdonald, after having for a long time occupied the Austrians towards the sources of the Inn, was getting ready, despite the severity of the season, to cross the great Alpine chain, in order to throw himself upon the Italian Tyrol, for the purpose of facilitating the attack of Brune upon the line of the Mincio; Moreau, with the principal part of his forces, advanced between the Isar and the Inn, over a field of battle which he had long studied, seeking a decisive engagement with the grand army of the Austrians.

It is necessary clearly to understand the nature of the country over which the French and Austrians went to the encounter, in one of the most important battles during our long wars. We have elsewhere described the basin of the Danube, composed of that great river and a number of tributaries, which descend rapidly from the Alps, and in succession go to increase the body of its stream. These tributaries, we have before said, are the lines which an Austrian army should defend to cover Vienna, and which must be forced by a French army that seeks to march upon that capital. Moreau, as will be remembered, in the summer campaign, after having penetrated from the valley of the Rhine into that of the Danube, and having passed the Iller, Lech, and Isar, had halted between the Isar and the Inn. He was master of the course of the Isar, of which he occupied all the principal points. Munich first, then Freising, Moosburg, Landshut, and other places. He had advanced beyond that river, and was in face of the Inn, occupied in force by the Austrians.

The Isar and the Inn both flow from the Alps, running together into the Danube, and are separated by a distance, almost continually the same, of ten or twelve leagues. At first they direct themselves nearly north, the Isar as far as Munich, the Inn to Wasserburg; then both rivers fall off to the east, until they flow into the Danube, the Isar at Deggendorf, the Inn at Passau. The French were masters of the Isar; it was necessary they should force the Inn. This river, broad, deep, defended at its outbreak from the mountains by the fort of Kufstein, and in the lower part of its course by the fortress of Braunau, covered between these two points with a great number of entrenchments—this river was a difficult obstacle to pass over. To force the Isar in the upper part of its course, between Kufstein, Rosenheim, and Wasserburg, local difficulties presented themselves nearly insurmountable; and besides these, the army of the Tyrol would be upon the right flank. If Moreau attempted to force the Isar in the lower part of its course, between Braunau and Passau, near where it falls into the Danube, he would be exposed, during a long march upon the left, in a difficult country, woody, marshy, and his flank bare to the Austrian army, which by Mühldorf and Braunau, had the means of throwing itself upon his right wing. These inconveniences were thought to be of a very serious nature. If the Austrians, taking care to guard themselves, and to watch with vigilance all the passages of the Inn, kept upon the defensive, Moreau would encounter obstacles well nigh insurmountable. Such was not their scheme: the Austrian staff resolved upon assuming the offensive. The young archduke John, his head full of new theories invented by the Germans, and eager to emulate some of the great movements of Bonaparte, conceived a very extensive plan, not on the whole a bad conception, according to good judges; but it was unluckily vain, because it was not founded upon a correct view of existing circumstances. As well as can be ascertained, this plan was as follows.

Moreau occupied the ground which separated the Isar from the Inn. Between Munich and Wasserburg the land forms an elevated level, covered with a thick forest, subsiding as it approaches the Danube. As it thus subsides it is broken into numerous ravines, some parts still

continuing to be covered with wood, other parts marshy, and everywhere presenting great difficulties of access. Moreau was in possession of this level, of the forest, and the roads that passed over it. From Munich, where his head-quarters were situated, two roads lead to the Inn, one going directly by Ebersberg on Wasserburg, the other leading obliquely to the left, passing by Hohenlinden, Haag, Ampfing, and Mühldorf. Both one and the other cross the sombre forest of pines which covers that elevated region. It was in this formidable retreat, formed by a mountainous and wooded country, to be approached only by two roads of which Moreau held possession, that the archduke must seek him in order to give battle. The other roads consisted only of straight, narrow ways, principally used for the conveyance of wood, and wholly impracticable for the heavy trains that accompany an army.

The young archduke projected a grand manœuvre. He had no idea of attacking the front of Moreau's position, but of turning it by the bridge of Mühldorf, New-Œtting, and Braunau. Leaving twenty thousand men, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, and the emigrants of Condé to guard the Inn, he proposed to himself to assume the defensive with sixty thousand Austrians, and to march upon the left of Moreau, through that woody, marshy district which extends between the Inn and Isar near to the points where they unite with the Danube. If the archduke rapidly passed over this difficult country by Eggenfelden, Neumarkt, Vilsbiburg, and arrived in time at Landshut upon the Isar, he would be able to ascend the Isar in the French rear, as far as Freising, pass over the Isar there, and take up his ground upon a chain of heights which commencing at Dachau overlook the plains of Munich. Placed there he would dangerously threaten the line of Moreau's retreat, and oblige him to evacuate the country between the Inn and the Isar, and to traverse Munich in great haste, in order to take up a retrograde position upon the Lech. But to ensure him the success of this manœuvre he must have accurately calculated the means of execution; and after having engaged in the operation, great firmness was requisite to encounter the chances of danger, for it was necessary to cross a country almost impracticable, in a dreadful season, the whole time upon the skirts of the enemy, who was not prompt and daring it is true, but intelligent, firm, and not easily disconcerted. The armies of the two nations were in movement on the 26th or 27th of November, or the 5th and 6th of Frimaire, to commence hostilities on the 28th or 7th of Frimaire. The Austrian general Klenau, stationed upon the Danube to support Simbschen against the little army of Augereau, had attracted the attention of general St. Suzanne, commanding the 4th corps of Moreau. Drawn both one and the other far from the principal theatre of events, they were upon the Danube, general St. Suzanne towards Ingoldstadt, and general Klenau towards Ratisbon.

Moreau had moved his left wing, twenty-six thousand strong, and placed it under the orders of general Grenier on the great road from Munich to Mühldorf by Hohenlinden, Haag, and Ampfing; thus it occupied the slopes of that species of lofty level which extends between the two rivers. His centre, which Moreau commanded in person, and which amounted to about thirty-four thousand men[1], occupied the direct road from Munich to Wasserburg by Ebersberg. The right wing under Lecourbe consisting of about twenty-six thousand men, was placed along the upper Inn, in the vicinity of Rosenheim, observing the Tyrol with one division. Moreau had only at hand therefore his left and centre, or about sixty thousand men. He had set his army in movement to make a strong reconnoissance from Rosenheim as far as Mühldorf, to force the enemy to discover his intentions. Moreau knew not, like Bonaparte, how to divine the plans of his adversary, still less to dictate them, as the last did, by taking the initiative boldly himself. Moreau was forced to grope in order to find out that which he could not guess or command; but he advanced prudently, and if he was surprised, quickly repaired with great coolness the mischief thus occasioned.

The 29th and 30th of November, or 8th and 9th Frimaire, the year IX., was employed by the French army in reconnoitring the line of the Inn; and by the Austrian army in passing that line, and traversing the low country between the Inn, the Danube, and the Isar. Moreau forced the Austrian advanced posts to fall back, moved his right under Lecourbe to Rosenheim, his centre under himself to Wasserburg, and his left under Grenier to the heights of Ampfing. From the heights a command is obtained of the banks of the Inn, though at a great distance. The left of the French army was somewhat compromised, because in following the channel of the Inn as far as Mühldorf it was no less than fifteen leagues from Munich, while the rest of the army was more than ten. Moreau in consequence took care that it should be supported by a division of the centre, under the command of general Grandjean. But it was a fault to advance in this way in three corps, so far one from another, in place of marching in a strong body upon the Inn, presenting himself at a single opening, and making false demonstrations at several other places. This error was very near being productive of serious consequences.

The Austrian army had passed by Braunau, Neu-Œtting, Mühldorf, and traversed the low country, of which mention has been already made. A part of the troops of the archduke, recently arrived, had scarcely had time to rest. They were marching with labour in that woody district, crossed by small rivers, such as the Vils, the Rott, and the Isen, which descended from the table land occupied by the French army. The narrow paths which they were forced to take were broken up; the heavy waggons had much difficulty in moving. The young archduke and his advisers, who were not prepared for any of these circumstances, were frightened at the undertaking now it was commenced. The French left wing, advanced nearly to Mühldorf and Ampfing, made them fear being cut off from the Inn. They designed to turn Moreau, and were now in fear of being turned

[1] The centre consisted of thirty thousand men; but the Polish division of Kniacewitz, which had rejoined general Decaen, and the reserve of the artillery, must have increased the number to about thirty-four or thirty-five thousand men.

themselves. They ought to have foreseen such a danger, and formed on the Danube, between Ratisbon and Passau, a new base of operation in case of their being separated from the Inn. But they had done nothing. In every bold operation it is proper to provide for the difficulties of the execution. Then, the execution once commenced, to persevere with firmness in the intention once begun; since it is rare that we do not ourselves risk the very dangers which we have prepared for our adversary. The Austrian staff was afraid, from the first setting out, of that which it had planned itself, and suddenly changed its design. Instead of persisting in gaining the Isar to ascend into the French rear, it stopped short, determined to fall upon the French left and to give battle at once. This was to face the difficulty in full force, and without the least diminution; for it was necessary, in ascending by the beds of the rivers, to climb to the elevated ground which the French occupied, and to penetrate into the forest, where they had been for a long time well established. The Austrians might be able at commencing to obtain an advantage over the left wing of the French, which was somewhat endangered; but that success gained, the French would be found concentrated in a real labyrinth, of which they well knew and commanded all the outlets.

On the 1st of December, or 10th of Frimaire, in the year IX., the archduke John moved the larger part of his army upon the left of the French at once by three roads; the valley of the Isen, the highway from Mühldorf to Ampfing, and by the bridge of Krayburg on the Inn. The valley of the Isen, opening on the flanks of the woody table-land already described, allowed the lengthened position, too much lengthened as it was, to be turned. A corps of fifteen thousand men ascended the elevation. Another corps marched right on upon the highway of Mühldorf, which, after mounting the heights of Ampfing, conducts through the forest to Hohenlinden and Munich. Lastly, a detachment crossing the Inn at Kraiburg, and passing through Aschau took in flank the left wing of the French, which had unfortunately adventured as far as Ampfing. Forty thousand men were in a moment about to fall upon twenty thousand. Thus the contest was severe and difficult for the twenty thousand men thus situated, who were commanded by general Grenier. Ney, who defended the heights of Ampfing, displayed on that day the incomparable energy and courage for which he was so distinguished in war. He exhibited the most wonderful efforts of valour, and managed to effect his retreat with no very serious loss. Being menaced by the troops of the enemy that had passed the Inn at Krayburg, and that had penetrated into the defile of Aschau, he was happily disengaged from his hazardous situation by the division of general Grandjean, that Moreau, as we have said, had detached from his centre to support his left. The division of Legrand, which was in the valley of the Isen, ascended that valley in retrograding upon Dorfen. Moreau, seeing the superiority of the Austrians, had the good feeling to restrain himself, and effected his retreat in good order.

It is clear from these movements that Moreau had been unable to penetrate the design of the enemy, and that by advancing upon all the openings of the Inn at once, in place of making an attack upon a single point, he had compromised his left. The extraordinary courage of the troops, the activity of his lieutenants, who in execution were accomplished generals, had repaired every oversight.

This was only an insignificant commencement. Moreau had abandoned the borders of his position, and withdrew to the centre of the extensive forest of Hohenlinden. The Austrians would find it necessary to force him from this formidable retreat. His coolness and energy were here about to be confronted with the archduke's inexperience, infatuated by a first success.

We have already said that two roads traversed the forest, one on the right, which led directly to the Inn by Ebersberg and Wasserburg; the other on the left, which passed by Hohenlinden, Mattenboett, Haag, Ampfing, and joined the Inn at Mühldorf, a longer distance than the former. It was upon this last road that the Austrians were proceeding in a body. Some were following the defile which it forms through the forest, others, ascending with labour by the beds of the rivulets which gave access to the flank of the French position. Moreau at once judged of the situation of things, judged correctly, and became at once possessed with an idea productive of great results. This was to suffer the Austrians that were already in conflict with his left, to engage themselves in the forest, and when they were pretty far advanced into it, to move his centre from the Ebersberg to the Hohenlinden road, surprise them in that dangerous position, and beat them there. He made all his dispositions with that view.

The road on the left, or that of Hohenlinden, adopted by the Austrians, after having quitted the banks of the Inn, and mounted the heights of Ampfing, passed as far as Mattenboett, over hills alternately wooded or open, then from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden through a dense wood, forming a long defile, bordered by tall pines. At Hohenlinden itself the forest suddenly disappeared. A small plain then appeared, without wood, covered with scattered hamlets, and in the middle of the plain were situated the post-house and village. There the Austrian army must pass, and not only the principal column marching in the defile of the forest, but the detachments ascending the river Isen, in order to open out by different issues upon the left of the French position.

Moreau formed, in this little plain of Hohenlinden, his left wing under Grenier and the division of Grandjean already detached from the centre; in fact, all his reserve of artillery and cavalry.

To the right of the road and village of Hohenlinden, Moreau placed Grandjean's division, commanded that day by general Grouchy; to the left the division of Ney; more still to the left on the border of the wood, at the head of the road by which the Austrian columns would ascend from the valley of the Isen, he stationed the divisions of Legrand and Bastoul, both one and the other drawn up in front of the villages of Preisendorf and Harthofen. The reserves of cavalry and artillery were in the rear of these four divisions of infantry, formed in the middle of the plain. The centre, reduced to the two divisions of Richepanse and Decaen, were some leagues distant on the right

hand road in the vicinity of Ebersberg. Moreau sent orders to those two divisions, rather vaguely expressed, but of the most positive character, to throw themselves from the right hand road upon that on the left, to get upon the last in the environs of Mattenboett, and there to take the Austrian army entangled in the forest by surprise. This order was not given with precision, clearness, nor minuteness, as all orders should be that are well conceived and well given, as those of Bonaparte uniformly were. It neither indicated the road to be followed, nor did it provide for any possible contingencies, but left all to be done by the intelligence of generals Decaen and Richepanse. They might be entrusted, it is true, to supply themselves with all that the commander-in-chief had omitted. Moreau directed Lecourbe who commanded his right towards the Tyrol, and St. Suzanne who formed his left toward the Danube, to approach by forced marches towards the spot where the decisive event of the campaign was about to happen. But one was at least fifteen leagues off, and the other twenty-five, and both were in consequence beyond reach. Bonaparte never acted thus upon the eve of his great battles; he never left, at similar times, half his forces at such distances. But to bring up at one time on the point where the destiny of the war is to be decided, every detachment composing a numerous army, demands that superior foresight which the greatest commanders alone possess, and destitute of which it is very possible to be an excellent general. Moreau was on the point of fighting seventy thousand Austrians with less than sixty thousand French; yet this number was more than sufficient with the soldiers which then composed the French army.

The archduke John, ignorant of all these things, was intoxicated with his advantage gained on the 1st of December, or 10th Frimaire. He was young, and had seen the redoubtable army of the Rhine, that for many years the Austrian generals had not possessed the skill to stop, fall back before himself. He remained idle on the 2nd of December, which gave Moreau time to make the dispositions of his army which have been just described. He prepared every thing for marching through the vast forest of Hohenlinden on the 3rd of December, or 12th Frimaire. The archduke, a novice in his profession, did not imagine that the French army could make any resistance to him in the route he was about to take. He thought only that he might fall in with it in advance of Munich.

He divided his army into four corps. The principal, that of the centre, composed of the reserve, the Hungarian grenadiers, Bavarians, the greater part of the cavalry, the baggage, and a hundred pieces of cannon, was to take the high road from Mühldorf to Hohenlinden, clear the defile through which it passes in crossing the forest, and then open upon the little plain of Hohenlinden. General Riesch, who had crossed the Inn at Krayburg, on the 1st of December, with about twelve thousand men, was to flank this centre, and to come upon the open ground at Hohenlinden, on the left of the Austrians and right of the French. At the other extremity of the field of battle, the corps of Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer, that were in the valley of the Isen, were to continue their ascent, and to issue forth at some distance from each other, the first by Isen upon Kronaker and Preisendorf, the second by Lendorf upon Harthofen, both in the unwooded plain of Hohenlinden. They were ordered not to lose time, but to leave even their artillery behind, the corps of the centre taking with it a large quantity by the principal road; they were to take no more necessaries than were sufficient to make soup for the soldiers.

Thus then the four corps composing the Austrian army marched at a great distance from one another, in a thick forest: while only one of the four passed over a high paved road, the other three went along roads employed solely for the carriage of timber. All were, however, to meet together in the cleared ground which extended between Hohenlinden and Harthofen, subject to the hazard of not arriving together, and of meeting during the march many unforeseen obstacles. The Bavarians having rejoined the Austrians, the army of the archduke numbered at the time seventy thousand men.

On the morning of the 3rd of December, the French were formed in order of battle between Hohenlinden and Harthofen. Moreau was on horseback before break of day at the head of his staff, and at some little distance Richepanse and Decaen had begun the movement which they had been commanded to execute between the roads of Ebersberg and Hohenlinden.

The four Austrian corps advanced simultaneously. They marched as fast as they were able, well aware of the value of time, at a season when there is so little daylight either to march or to fight. A thick snow-shower fell and darkened the air, so as to render it difficult to distinguish objects distant but a short way off. The archduke John, at the head of the centre, had got into the defile of the forest between Mattenboett and Hohenlinden, and had nearly cleared it, long before general Riesch on his left, and generals Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer on his right, were able to arrive at the field of battle, embarrassed as they were amidst the horrible roads they had taken. The young archduke at last appeared on the skirt of the wood in front of Grandjean's and Ney's divisions, drawn up in order of battle in advance of the village of Hohenlinden. The 108th demi-brigade of Grandjean's division was in line, having upon its wings the 46th and 57th in close coloumns; the 4th hussars and 6th of the line supported them in the rear. On both sides a brisk fire of artillery commenced the action. The Austrians attacked the 108th, which made a determined resistance. Eight battalions of Hungarian grenadiers were then ordered to file through the wood to turn the French by the right. Upon observing this movement, generals Grouchy and Grandjean went with the 46th to the assistance of the 108th, which, disordered, had begun to give ground. The 46th penetrated into the wood, and a desperate combat ensued there, almost man to man, among the pine trees, with the Hungarian grenadiers. A battalion of the 57th, pushing into the wood still deeper, turned the Hungarians, and obliged them to seek for safety in the recesses of the forest. Thus the division of Grandjean remained victorious, and hindered the Austrian column from opening out upon the plains of Hohenlinden.

After a few moments' cessation, the archduke John directed a new attack to be made upon Hohenlinden and the division of Grandjean. This

second attack was repulsed as the first had been. At this moment there was discovered, on the side of Kronaker, the Austrian troops of Baillet-Latour, who showed themselves upon the left, ready to issue out upon the plains of Hohenlinden. The snow for a few minutes having ceased to fall, permitted them to be distinctly seen, though they were not yet in a condition to act, and then the divisions of Bastoul and Legrand were prepared to give them a warm reception. On a sudden a sort of unsteadiness, a wavering, an agitation, was seen along the centre of the Austrian army, which had not yet been disengaged from the forest defile. Something unaccountable seemed to be taking place in their rear. Moreau, with a sagacity which did honour to his military glance, remarked it, and said to Ney, "This is the moment to charge; Richepanse and Decaen must be on the rear of the Austrians." He immediately commanded the divisions of Ney and Grandjean, which were on the right and left of Hohenlinden, to form themselves in columns of attack, to charge the Austrians drawn up on the skirts of the forest, and to drive them back upon the long defile in which until then they had been enclosed. Ney charged them in front, Grouchy with Grandjean's division took them in flank, and then both drove them furiously into the defile, where they were crowded together pell-mell with their cavalry and artillery.

At this very moment, near the other end of the defile, at Mattenboett, that event was happening for which Moreau had prepared, and which he had just now foreseen. Richepanse and Decaen, in obedience to the orders which they had received, had started across from the road of Ebersberg into that of Hohenlinden. Richepanse, who was nearest to Mattenboett, had proceeded without waiting for Decaen, and had plunged deeply and audaciously into that country of wood and ravine which separates the two roads, marching while the battle was fighting at Hohenlinden, and making incredible efforts to drag with him over that inundated ground six light guns. He had already passed through the village of St. Christopher with one brigade, when the corps of general Riesch, that was designed to flank the Austrian centre, arrived there. Drouet, with the second brigade, was left engaged with the enemy; Richepanse making sure that Decaen would soon come up to his assistance and disengage him, he himself marched upon Mattenboett as fast as possible, for there his military instinct told him he would find the decisive point. There only remained with him two demi-brigades of infantry, the 8th and 48th, a single regiment of cavalry, the 1st chasseurs, and six guns, in all about six thousand men. He pushed forwards, dragging his artillery by hand, continually in quagmires. Having arrived at Mattenboett, at the other end of the forest defile, of which they had just attacked the head, he encountered a troop of cuirassiers on foot, their bridles on their arms; he attacked them and took them prisoners. Then forming on the little space of open ground that surrounds Mattenboett, he ranged the 8th on right, the 48th on the left, and sent the 1st chasseurs upon eight squadrons of cavalry, which on seeing the French prepared to charge. The chasseurs charged home, but were driven back, and rallied behind the 8th demi-brigade. This last crossing bayonets stopped the advance of the Austrian cavalry. At this moment the position of Richepanse was very critical. Having left his second brigade in the rear, to keep head against the corps of general Riesch, himself surrounded on all sides, he thought it best not to let the Austrians perceive his weakness. He confided to general Walther the 8th demi-brigade and the 1st chasseurs, in order to restrain the rearguard of the enemy, which seemed disposed to attack. He himself, with the 48th alone, moved to the left, and boldly determined to attack the Austrians in the forest defile. Perilous as this resolution seemed, it was not less wise than courageous, because the column of the archduke must have before it the whole of the French army, and by flinging himself desperately upon the rear, it was more than probable he would produce great disorder and obtain important results. Richepanse, therefore, formed the 48th into two columns, and marching sword in hand in the midst of his grenadiers, penetrated into the forest, receiving, without yielding an inch, a severe discharge of grape-shot; there he met two Hungarian battalions that disputed his passage. Richepanse would have animated his men both by voice and gesture; but they had no need of either. "These men are our prisoners," they shouted; "let us charge!" They immediately charged, and completely routed the Hungarians. They next came upon heaps of baggage, artillery, and infantry, all accumulated in confusion in that narrow pass. Richepanse by his appearance struck them with indescribable terror, and they were thus flung into disorder, at the same moment that confused cries were heard at the other extremity of the defile. On arriving there the shouts became more distinct, and discovered the presence of the French. They came from Ney, who, leaving Hohenlinden, had penetrated by the head of the defile, driving before him the Austrian column that Richepanse was now forcing back upon him from the rear.

Ney and Richepanse then met, recognized each other, and embraced full of joy at the glorious result they had obtained. Their soldiers rushed upon those Austrians on every side, who had sought shelter in the woods, and were now asking for quarter. Thousands of prisoners were taken, the whole of the Austrian artillery and baggage. Richepanse abandoned to Ney the care of gathering up the trophies of their victory, returning to Mattenboett, where he had left general Walther, and the rest of his brigade, with one regiment of cavalry. He found the gallant general struck by a ball, and carrying off in the arms of his men, his countenance beaming with joy, and repaid in his sufferings by the satisfaction of having contributed to the decisive manœuvre. Richepanse disengaged his troops and returned to St. Christopher's, where he had left Drouet and his brigade alone in combat with the corps of Riesch. All his hopes had been fulfilled on this fortunate day. General Decaen had arrived in time, had disengaged the corps of Drouet, and made a number of prisoners.

By this time it was noon-day. The centre of the army of the archduke had been enveloped and utterly routed. The left, under general Riesch, having arrived too late to stop Richepanse, attacked and driven towards the Inn by Decaen, was in full retreat, after suffering considerable loss.

From such results in regard to the centre and left of the Austrians, the termination of the battle could not be doubtful.

During these events the divisions of Bastoul and Legrand, placed on the left of the open plain of Hohenlinden, found upon their hands, the infantry of generals Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer. These divisions had enough to do, being inferior in number to the enemy by one-half, and were pushed hardly in consequence. They had too the disadvantage of the ground, since the head of the wooded ravines, by which the Austrians issued upon the little plain of Hohenlinden, being somewhat higher than the plain itself, permitted a plunging fire to be directed upon it. Still, generals Bastoul and Legrand, under the command of general Grenier, were seconded by the courage of their brave soldiers. Fortunately, also, Hautpoul's cavalry was present to support them, as well as Ney's second brigade, he having taken but one with him into the defile.

These two French divisions, at first borne down by numbers, lost ground. Abandoning the edge of the wood, they fell back into the plain, but with a steady front they displayed to the enemy the most heroic firmness. Two demi-brigades of Legrand's division, the 51st and 42d, falling back to Harthofen, had to engage Kienmayer's infantry, as well as a division of cavalry attached to that corps. Sometimes keeping up a steady fire on the infantry, sometimes repulsing the cavalry with the bayonet, they opposed an invincible resistance to every assault. At this time general Grenier, gaining intelligence of the success obtained over the Austrian centre, formed Legrand's division into columns, supporting the movement by some charges of Hautpoul's cavalry, and thus repulsed the corps of Kienmayer, as far as the skirt of the wood. On his own side general Bonnet, with the division of Bastoul, charged the Austrians, and overthrew them into a valley, from whence they were attempting to issue. The grenadiers of Jola's brigade, part of Ney's second, rushed up to Baillet-Latour and repulsed him. The impulse of victory, communicated to these bold troops, redoubled their strength and courage. They alternately drove back the two corps of Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer, the one towards the Isen, the other towards Lendorf, in that low and difficult country, out of which they had vainly attempted to come, in order to possess themselves of the plain of Hohenlinden.

Moreau at this moment returned from the depth of the forest, with a detachment of Grandjean's division, in order to succour the left, which was so briskly attacked. But there, as on all the other points, he found the soldiers victorious, transported with joy, and felicitating their general upon his signal victory. The triumph was, indeed, very great. The Austrian army had still more difficulty to encounter in getting out of the woods than it had to penetrate into them. Every where straggling corps were observed, that not knowing whither to fly, fell into the hands of the victors and laid down their arms. It was five o'clock, and night covered with its shadows the field of battle. From seven thousand to eight thousand Austrians were killed, and twelve thousand made prisoners, three hundred waggons, and eighty-seven pieces of cannon, were the results of a battle not usual in warfare. The Austrian army lost that day nearly twenty thousand men, almost all its artillery, its baggage, and, what was worse than all, nearly the entire of its spirit.

This battle was the finest ever gained by Moreau, and most assuredly one of the greatest fought during the present century, in which so many extraordinary battles have taken place. It has been wrongfully said, that there was another conqueror of Marengo besides Bonaparte, that it was general Kellermann. With much greater force might it be said, that there was another conqueror at Hohenlinden than Moreau, and that it was general Richepanse; because this last, upon a vague order, executed a very fine manœuvre. But, although less unjust, this assertion would still be unjust. To every man should be left the property of his own labours, not supporting the miserable efforts of envy, which at all times would fain seek any other conqueror than the real conqueror himself.

Moreau, in advancing along the Inn, from Kufstein to Mühldorf, without having selected a precise point of attack, without having concentrated on that point all his strength, to make only simple demonstrations, Moreau had thus exposed his left on the 1st of December. But this could only be productive of a momentary advantage to an enemy; and in withdrawing himself into the labyrinthian recesses of Hohenlinden, attracting the Austrians there after him, bringing down his centre upon his left at the opportune moment from Ebersberg upon Mattenboett, he executed one of the happiest manœuvres known in the history of war. It has been asserted that Richepanse marched without orders [1], this is an error; the orders were given, as has been stated here, but they were too general, or not sufficiently detailed. No obstacle that might have happened had been provided against. Moreau merely directed Richepanse and Decaen to go off from the Ebersberg road upon St. Christopher's, without designating his route, without warning him of the corps of Riesch being present there in all probability, nor designating any of the possible or probable accidents he might meet with in the midst of a forest full of enemies. Without an officer as vigorous as Richepanse, he might have reaped a defeat in place of a victory. But fortune always has a part in military successes. All that can be said is, that it was good in this instance, and much better too than usual.

Moreau has been censured, because while he was fighting with six divisions out of twelve, he had left St. Suzanne with three upon the Danube, and three under Lecourbe on the Upper Inn; by which he exposed his left, under Grenier, to the chance of fighting under the difference of one to two. This censure is assuredly more grave and better merited; but let not so great a triumph be tarnished; and let it be added, in order to be just, that, as in the finest works of man, there are defects, so in the finest victories there are faults—faults which fortune repairs, and which must be admitted as the ordinary accompaniment of great military actions.

[1] Napoleon erroneously asserted this at St. Helena. The written orders still exist, and have been printed in the memorial of the war.

After this important victory, it was right to follow up vigorously the pursuit of the Austrian army, to march upon Vienna, to throw down the defences of the Tyrol by pushing forward, and in this manner to determine a retrograde movement along the whole line of the Austrians from Bavaria to Italy. Thus the retreat of the troops of the Inn would have made those of the troops of the Tyrol a necessary consequence, and the retreat of these last would have made inevitable the abandonment of the Mincio. But to obtain all these results, it was necessary to force the Inn, and then the Salza, which falls into the Inn, forming a second line to be passed after the former. At the moment all this might have been achieved from the strong impulse given to the army by the victory of Hohenlinden.

Moreau, when he had allowed rest to his troops, moved his left and a part of his centre on the road to Mühldorf, thus threatening at the same time the bridges of Krayburg, Mühldorf, and Braunau, in order to make the enemy believe that he intended to cross the Inn in the lower part of its course. In the mean time Lecourbe, who some months before had so gloriously passed across the Danube on the day of the battle of Hochstedt, was ordered to pass the Inn in the vicinity of Rosenheim. The general had discovered a place near Neubeurn, where the right bank occupied by the French, commanded the left occupied by the enemy, and where it was practicable to place his artillery with advantage, in order to protect the passage. This point was chosen in consequence. Several days were most unfortunately lost in collecting the *matériel* necessary, and it was not until the 9th of December, six days after the great battle of Hohenlinden, that Lecourbe was ready to act.

Moreau had suddenly taken up a position upon the Upper Inn. The three divisions of the centre had been directed from Wasserburg upon Aibling, a short distance from Rosenheim, ready to succour Lecourbe. The left had replaced them in their positions, and general Collaud, with two divisions of the corps of St. Suzanne, had been moved in advance of the Isar to Erding.

On the morning of the 9th of December, or 18th Frimaire, Lecourbe began his operations for the passage of the river at Neubeurn. Montrichard's division was to be the first to pass the Inn. General Lemaire placed on the heights commanding the right bank a battery of twenty-eight pieces of cannon, and drove off the troops that presented themselves there. Upon this part of the river Austria had only the corps of Condé, which was too feeble to offer any serious resistance. After having driven off, by the continued fire of the artillery, all the enemy's detachments, the pontonniers placed themselves in their boats, followed by some light battalions designed to protect their operations. In two hours and a half the bridge was finished, and the division of Montrichard began the passage. It advanced upon the Austrians, who retreated, descending the right bank of the river until they were opposite Rosenheim. They then took up a strong position at Stephenskirchen. During this movement, the divisions of the French centre, placed before Rosenheim itself, exerted themselves in preventing the Austrians from completely destroying the bridge at that town. Being unsuccessful, they ascended the Inn, and crossed over at Neubeurn, in order to support Lecourbe. The corps of Condé having been reinforced, supported itself on one side upon the ruined bridge of Rosenheim, upon the other on the little lake of Chiem-see. Lecourbe sent a detachment to turn the lake, and thus obliged the enemy to retreat after no very sanguinary resistance.

Thus the Inn was crossed, and that formidable obstacle, which it was declared would stop the French army, was overcome. Lecourbe thus gained another laurel in the winter campaign. The march was not retarded. The next day a bridge was thrown over at Rosenheim for the passage of the rest of the centre. Grenier, with the left, crossed the Inn over the bridges of Wasserburg and Mühldorf, which the Austrians had left undestroyed.

It was necessary to hasten forward and drive the Austrians as far as the banks of the Salza, which flows behind the Inn, and falls into that river a little below Braunau. The Salza is a second arm of the Inn in itself. If it is crossed near the mountains, it must, in a certain respect, be twice crossed, while on passing it in the neighbourhood of Braunau after its union with the Salza, there is only one passage to be performed. But in the last case the volume of the water is doubled, and the difficulty of crossing by main force is proportionally augmented. This reason, and the wish to surprise the enemy, who did not expect to see the French attempt to cross above Rosenheim, decided Moreau in the choice.

Lecourbe, supported by the divisions of the centre, advanced with great rapidity, in spite of the difficulties presented by a mountainous country, covered with woods, rivers, and lakes, a country at all times difficult, but much more so in the middle of December. The Austrian army, although stricken by so many reverses, so far maintained itself in the field. The feeling of honour, awakened by the danger of the capital, occasioned it still to make noble efforts to stop the progress of the French. The Austrian cavalry covered the retreat, charging with vigour the French corps that advanced with too much temerity. The Austrians crossed the Alz, which conveys the water of the Chiem-see to the Inn; they also passed Traunstein, and at last arrived near the Salza not far from Salzburg itself.

There they remained before Salzburg, a strong position to occupy, and there the archduke John thought he should be able to concentrate his troops, hoping to obtain for them some kind of success that would restore their courage, and at least render the daring pursuit of the French less rapid. The archduke then concentrated himself before Salzburg on the 13th of December, or 22nd Frimaire, 1800.

The city of Salzburg is seated upon the Salza. In advance of this river there runs another smaller stream, called the Saal, which descends from the neighbouring mountains, and joins the Salza below Salzburg. The ground beneath these two rivers is level, marshy, and covered with clumps of wood, being everywhere difficult of access. It was there the archduke John had taken up his position, his right on the Salza, his left to the mountains, his front covered by the Saal, his artillery swept the

whole level. His cavalry stationed on the uncovered and solid portion of the ground, was ready to charge any French corps that took the offensive. His infantry was well supported on the city of Salzburg itself.

On the 14th, in the morning, Lecourbe, drawn onwards by his ardour, forded the Saal, received several charges of cavalry on the bank bordering the river, and sustained them with bravery. Presently a dense fog clearing up, he discovered in advance of Salzburg a formidable line of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. This was the whole Austrian army. In presence of such a danger he conducted himself with much steadiness, but did not escape without loss.

Most fortunately the division of Decaen had crossed the Salza at this moment near Laufen in a manner almost miraculous. On the preceding day the advanced guard of the division, finding the bridge of Laufen destroyed, had coasted the banks of the Salza, everywhere covered with the Austrian tirailleurs, and continued to hunt out a passage. A boat was seen upon the opposite side of the river. At the sight, three chasseurs of the 14th threw themselves into the water, and swam to the other side, in spite of the intense cold, and a current more rapid than that of the Inn. After fighting hand to hand with several Austrian tirailleurs, they succeeded in getting the boat, and bringing it over. By this means the French, to the extent of some hundreds, crossed successively to the opposite bank, occupied a village close to the bridge of Laufen, which had been destroyed, and there barricaded themselves in such a manner as that a small number were able to defend it. The rest rushed upon some Austrian artillery, got possession of it, seized all the boats on the right bank of the Salza, and thus supplied with the means of coming over the whole of the division on the left side of the river. The following morning, the 14th, the whole of Decaen's division had passed over, and ascended nearly to Salzburg at the very moment when Lecourbe was engaged with the entire Austrian army. It was impossible for it to arrive at a better moment. The archduke, informed of the passage of the French, and of their march upon Salzburg, decamped in a hurry, and Lecourbe was thus disengaged from a very hazardous situation, to which his own ardour and daring courage had exposed him.

Thus the defences of the Inn and Salza had fallen before the French. From that moment there was no obstacle to cover the Austrian army, or enable it to resist the French. There remained, it is true, twenty-five thousand men in the Tyrol, who had it in their power to threaten the French rear; but it is not when an enemy is victorious, and demoralization pervades the ranks of an army, that bold attempts are likely to be made. Moreau, having left the corps of St. Suzanne in the rear, to invest Braunau, and to occupy the country between the Inn and Isar, emboldened by the success of every step he had taken, marched upon the Traun and Ens, which were not capable of arresting his march. Richepanse commanded the advanced guard, sustained by Grouchy and Decaen. The retreat of the Austrians was conducted in great disorder. At every instant the French took men, carriages, and cannon. Richepanse gained several brilliant actions at Frankenmarkt, Vœklabruck, and Schwanstadt. Continually engaged with the Austrian cavalry, he made prisoners of twelve hundred horse at a time. On the 20th of December, or 29th of Frimaire, he had passed the Traun, and was marching upon Steyer in order to pass the Ens.

The young archduke, whom so many disasters had completely put out of heart, was now succeeded by the archduke Charles, who had at last been recalled from disgrace, to perform the task, now become impossible, of saving the Austrian army. When he arrived he saw with deep pain the spectacle presented to his sight by the soldiers of the empire, who, after they had nobly resisted the French, demanded that they should not be sacrificed to an unhappy system of policy universally reprobated. The archduke sent M. Mecrfeld to Moreau to propose an armistice. Moreau willingly granted it for forty-eight hours, on condition that, during the delay, that officer should return from Vienna with full powers from the emperor; but he stipulated, at the same time, that during the interval, the French army should have the right to advance as far as the Ens.

On the 21st he passed the Ens at Steyer, and his advanced posts were upon the Ips and Erlaf. He was, in fact, at the gates of Vienna, and might feel the temptation to enter the city, and thus bestow upon himself the glory which no French general ever before had, of penetrating to the capital of the empire. But the moderate mind of Moreau had no desire to push fortune to the extreme. The archduke Charles gave his word, that if hostilities were suspended, the Austrians would immediately treat for peace, on the conditions that France had always demanded, more especially upon the basis of a separate negotiation. Moreau, feeling a well-founded esteem for the archduke Charles, showed a disposition to give him full credit.

Several of Moreau's lieutenants endeavoured to excite him to march upon Vienna. "It will be better," he answered, "to secure peace. Of Macdonald and Brune I have no intelligence. I know not if one has succeeded in penetrating the Tyrol, or if the other has been able to pass the Mincio. Augereau is a great way off from me, in a hazardous situation. I should, perhaps, drive the Austrians to despair, if I insisted on humiliating them yet more. It is better for us to halt, and content ourselves with peace, because that is all for which we are fighting."

These were wise sentiments, well worthy of praise. On the 25th of December, or 4th Nivôse, year IX., Moreau consented to sign, at Steyer, a new suspension of arms, upon the following conditions:—

There is to be a cessation of hostilities in Germany between the Austrian and the French armies, commanded by Moreau and Augereau. The generals Brune and Macdonald are to be invited to sign a similar armistice for the armies of the Grisons and of Italy. The entire valley of the Danube, comprising also the Tyrol, with the fortresses of Braunau and Wurtzburg, and the forts of Scharnitz, of Kufstein, and others, and the magazines of the Austrians, to be placed at the disposal of the French. No detachment of troops to be sent into Italy, if it should appear that no

suspension of arms has been consented to by the general commanding in that country. This stipulation to be common to both armies.

Moreau was content with these stipulations, as he had full reason to be, calculating upon peace, and preferring it to more signal, but more hazardous triumphs. A brightness of glory surrounded his name, because his winter campaign had surpassed that of the spring. After crossing the Rhine in the spring campaign, having driven the Austrians to the Danube, while Bonaparte was crossing the Alps, and after dislodging them from their camp at Ulm, by the battle of Hochstedt, thus pushing them back to the Inn, he had taken breath during the fine season. He had commenced his march in winter, during the most severe cold; he had overthrown the enemy at Hohenlinden, flung them back from the Inn upon the Salza, from the Salza upon the Traun and Ens, pushing them in confusion to the very gates of Vienna. Lastly, he had granted them, in stopping his victorious march a few leagues from the capital, time to sign a treaty of peace. There had been "gropings," delays, and faults, that severe judges have keenly censured since, as if to revenge upon the memory of Moreau the injustice committed upon the memory of Napoleon; but Moreau had a continued chain of successes justified by his own prudence and firmness. All true glory should be respected; we ought not to darken the glory of one to avenge the other. Moreau proved himself capable of commanding one hundred thousand men with prudence and courage; no one, except Napoleon, has manœuvred such a force in the present age so well; and if the place of the victor of Hohenlinden be at an immense distance from that of the victor of Rivoli, Marengo, and Austerlitz, his place is still great, and would have continued great, if criminal conduct, the unfortunate production of jealousy, had not later in life sullied a character until then pure and exalted.

The armistice in Germany took place very opportunely for rescuing the Gallo-Batavian army, commanded by Augereau, from its hazardous situation. The Austrian general, Klenau, who always remained far enough away from the archduke John, suddenly formed a junction with Simbschen, and by thus uniting their forces, placed Augereau in imminent danger. But the last defended Radnitz with great skill and courage, and supported his ground until the conclusion of hostilities. The retreat of the Austrians into Bavaria relieved him from his peril, and the armistice saved him from the dangers of a situation in which he was destitute of support, seeing Moreau was at the gates of Vienna.

During these events in Germany, hostilities were continued in the Alps and in Italy. The first consul, seeing in the opening of the campaign, that Moreau could spare the army of the Grisons, had ordered Macdonald to pass over the Splügen, and throw himself from the great chain of the Alps into the Valteline, from the Valteline into the Italian Tyrol, and then moving upon the Trent, to turn the line of the Mincio; by this manœuvre putting an end to the resistance of the Austrians in the plains of Italy. No objection arising from the height of the Splügen or the rigour of the season could change the determination of the first consul. He had constantly answered, that wherever two men could place their feet, an army possessed the means of passing, and that the Alps were easier to cross in frost than when the snow was melting, the season in which he had himself crossed the St. Bernard. This was the language of a mind altogether absolute, determined at any cost to attain its end. The event proved, that in the mountains the winter presents dangers at least equal to those of spring; besides which, it condemns those who brave it to the most horrible sufferings.

General Macdonald prepared to obey the order of the first consul, with all the energy natural to his character. After having left Morlot's division in the Grisons, to guard the openings which form the communication between the Grisons and the Engadine, or superior valley of the Inn, he moved towards the Splügen. For some time before, the division of Baraguay d'Hilliers had been in the high or upper Valteline, threatening the Engadine from the side of Italy, while Morlot menaced it from the side of the Grisons. With the main body of his army, about twelve thousand men, Macdonald commenced his march, and clambered up the first declivities of the Splügen. The pass of this lofty mountain, narrow and winding, during many leagues of the ascent, offered the severest perils, more particularly at that season, when frequent storms encumbered the roads with enormous drifts of snow and ice. The artillery and ammunition were placed on sledges, and the soldiers were loaded with biscuits and cartridges. The first column, composed of artillery and cavalry, commencing the passage in fine weather, on a sudden was overtaken by a frightful storm. An avalanche carried away half a squadron of dragoons at once, and filled the soldiers with terror at the sight. Still they did not lose their courage, and, after a delay of three days, another attempt was made to cross this redoubtable mountain. The snow had encumbered all. Oxen were driven before the troops to tread down the snow, into which they sank up to their bellies; labourers beat it down hard; the infantry in passing over rendered it harder: and lastly, the sappers widened the passes where they were too narrow, by cutting away the ice with hatchets. These exertions were all needful to make the road practicable for cavalry and artillery. Thus the first days of December were employed in effecting the passage of the three first columns. The soldiers endured the most terrible sufferings with great fortitude, living upon biscuit with a small quantity of brandy. The 4th and last column had nearly reached the summit of the pass, when another storm came on and again closed up the passage, dispersed the 104th demi-brigade entirely, and buried a hundred men. General Macdonald was there, and rallied the soldiers, cheered them amid their pains and sufferings, made the road be cleared a second time, that was thus closed with blocks of frozen snow, and with all the rest of his forces entered the Valteline.

This enterprise, so justly wonderful, carried the greater part of the army of the Grisons across the great mountain-chain, to the very entrances of the Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, as he had been commanded, sought, as soon as he had passed the Splügen, to act in concert with Brune, in order to move upon the sources of the

Mincio and Adige, thus overturning the whole defensive line of the Austrians, which extended from the Alps to the Adriatic.

Brune would not deprive himself of an entire division to aid Macdonald, but he consented to detach the Italian division of Lecchi, which was to ascend the valley of the Chiesa, as far as Rocca d'Anfo.

Macdonald now determined to ascend the Valteline and attack mount Tonal, which commanded the entrance into the Tyrol, and the valley of the Adige; but there, though the height was inferior to the Splügen, the ice was as deeply collected; and further, general Wukassowich had covered with intrenchments the principal approaches. On the 22nd and 23rd of December, general Vandamme led an attack upon them at the head of a body of grenadiers, and several times renewed it unsuccessfully with the most heroic courage. These brave men made incredible but useless exertions to gain their object. Several times they marched over the ice entirely unprotected, and under a murderous fire. They reached the palisadoes of the entrenchment, endeavouring in vain to force them. The ground was frozen, and it was impossible to pull them up. There was no use in persisting further; and it was in consequence resolved to move into the valley of the Oglio, and descend that river to Pisogno, in order to proceed into the valley of Chiesa. The object was to cross the mountains in a less elevated region, and by passes not so effectually defended. Macdonald, having descended to Pisogno, crossed the passes which separated him from the valley of the Chiesa, formed his junction with Lecchi's brigade towards Rocca d'Anfo, and then found himself beyond the obstacles which separated him from the Italian Tyrol and the Adige. Thus he was enabled to reach Trent before general Wukassowich had made his retreat from the heights of mount Tonal, and to take up a position between the Austrians who defended in the middle of the Alps the sources of the different rivers, and the Austrians who defended the inferior parts of the streams in the plains of Italy.

Brune, before he forced the passage of the Mincio, had waited until Macdonald had made sufficient progress for the attack to be nearly simultaneous in the mountains and in the plains. Out of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men spread over Italy, he had, as we have already observed, one hundred thousand effective men, tried soldiers, recruited after their sufferings and privations; an artillery perfectly organized by general Marmont, and an excellent cavalry.

Twenty thousand men, or nearly that number, protected Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, and Tuscany. A feeble brigade, commanded by general Petitot, watched the Austrian troops that sallied out of Ferrara, and menaced Bologna. The national guard of this last city was ready, in addition, to defend it against the Austrians. The Neapolitans were crossing the new Roman state, in order to march upon Tuscany; but Murat, with ten thousand men from the camp of Amiens, had marched to encounter them.

Brune, after having provided for the protection of the different places in Italy, had about seventy thousand men to direct upon the Mincio. Bonaparte, perfectly acquainted with the theatre of operations, had recommended him to concentrate his troops with care; and as much as possible in Upper Italy, to pay no attention to what the Austrians might attempt in the direction of the Po, in the Legations, or even in Tuscany; but to remain steady, as he himself had formerly done, near the openings of the Alps. He repeated to Brune incessantly, that when the Austrians were beaten between the Mincio and Adige, in other words, on the line by which they enter Italy, all those who had passed the Po, to penetrate into central Italy, would only be the more exposed to danger.

The Austrians really put on the face of attacking Bologna, by sallying from Ferrara for that purpose; but general Petitot knew how to restrain them, and the national guards of Bologna exhibited upon their own side the firmest attitude.

Brune, conforming at once to the instructions which he had received, advanced to the Mincio from the 20th to the 24th of December, or 29th Frimaire to 3rd Nivôse, took the positions which the Austrians had occupied in advance of that river, and made his dispositions for passing it on the morning of the 25th. General Delmas commanded his advanced guard; general Moncey the left; general Dupont the right; and general Michaud the reserve. Beyond the cavalry and artillery distributed in his divisions, he had a considerable reserve of both.

In recounting the first campaigns of Bonaparte [1], we have already described the theatre of so many memorable events. It will be necessary still to retrace in a few words the configuration of the places. The great mass of the waters of the Tyrol are conveyed by the Adige into the Adriatic: thus it is that the line of the Adige is one of great strength. But before the line of the Adige is obtained, a less important one is encountered, that of the Mincio. The waters of several of the lateral valleys of the Tyrol, which first accumulate in the lake of Garda, deliver themselves from thence into the Mincio, remain some time around Mantua, where they form an inundation, and last of all fall into the Po. In consequence there was a double line to cross, first that of the Mincio, and next that of the Adige, this last being much more considerable, and much the strongest of the two. It was necessary to cross both these rivers; and if this was done so promptly as to act in immediate concert with Macdonald, who was moving by Rocca d'Anfo and Trent upon the Upper Adige, it would be possible to separate the Austrian army which defended the Tyrol, from that defending the Mincio, and to take the former.

The line of the Mincio, in length not more than seven or eight leagues, was supported on one flank by the lake of Garda, and by Mantua, bristling with artillery, upon the other; and was defended by seventy thousand Austrians, under the command of count Bellegarde, nor was it easily to be forced. The Austrians had at Borghetto and Valleggio a bridge well entrenched, and this enabled Bellegarde to act upon both banks. The river was not fordable at that season, and the mass of its waters was yet more augmented by closing all the canals it fed.

Brune, after having united his columns, con-

[1] History of the French Revolution.

ceived the singular idea of crossing the Mincio in two places, both at the same moment, at Mozzembano and Pozzolo. Between these two points the river formed a bend, the convex point of which turned towards the French army. The right bank, which Brune occupied, commanded the left, occupied by the Austrians, so that at Mozzembano, as well as at Pozzolo, a converging fire could be opened from higher batteries upon the Austrian bank, and the operation of the passage be covered. Still, at both points the Austrians were found to be firmly posted behind the Mincio, covered with solid entrenchments, that were supported either on Mantua or Pechiera. The advantages and inconveniences were therefore nearly the same, either at Pozzolo or Mozzembano; but what should have decided Brune to prefer one of these two points, no matter which, while he made a false demonstration on the other, was, that between these two points there was an entrenched bridge, then occupied by the enemy. The Austrians therefore could pass over by this means, and throw themselves upon one of the two operations, in order to prevent it from being effected: it was proper, therefore, that only one should have been attempted, and that with the entire of his army.

Still Brune persisted in his double plan, apparently for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy; and on the 25th of December he arranged every thing to effect this double passage. But obstacles intervened in respect to carriage, obstacles very great at that season of the year, and prevented every thing being ready at Mozzembano, the point where Brune was himself, together with the larger part of his army, and the operation was deferred until the next day. It would then appear that the order to attempt the second passage should have been countermanded; but Brune, having always considered the attempt on the side of Pozzolo as merely a diversion, thought that the diversion would more surely produce its effect if it preceded the principal operation twenty-four hours.

Dupont, who commanded at Pozzolo, was an officer full of ardour; he advanced on the morning of the 25th to the bank of the Mincio, crowned with artillery the heights of Molino-della-Volta, which overlooked the opposite bank, threw over a bridge in a short time, under favour of a dense fog, and succeeded in conveying over Wattrin's division to the right bank. During this time Brune remained immoveable with the left and the reserve at Mozzembano. General Suchet, placed between the two with the centre, masked the Austrian bridge of Borghetto. Thus general Dupont was on the left bank with a single corps before the whole Austrian army. The result it is easy to discover. Count Bellegarde, without losing a moment, directed the whole mass of his forces upon Pozzolo. Dupont sent to apprise Suchet his neighbour, and also the commander-in-chief, of his success, and of the danger to which he was exposed. Suchet, a brave and faithful fellow-soldier, hastened to the assistance of Dupont; but on quitting Borghetto, sent to urge Brune to provide for the guard of the entrenched bridge, which he left open by his movement upon Pozzolo. Brune, in place of hurrying with all his forces to the point where a fortunate incident had opened for his army the passage of the Mincio, never moved from his position, being engrossed by his operations at Mozzembano, which were to take place on the following day. He approved of the movement of Suchet, but recommended him, at the same time, not to endanger himself on the opposite side of the river, sending Boudet's division alone to mask the bridge of Borghetto.

General Dupont, impatient to profit by his success, was absolutely engaged. He had passed the Mincio, taken Pozzolo, which is situated on the left bank, and successively carried over the divisions of Wattrin and Monier. One of his wings was supported on Pozzolo, the other on the Mincio, under the protection of the elevated batteries upon the right bank.

The Austrians marched upon the position with all their reinforcements. They were preceded by a number of pieces of cannon. Happily, the French artillery placed upon Molino-della-Volta, in sweeping from one bank to the other, protected the French by the superiority of their fire. The Austrians flung themselves with great fury upon the divisions of Wattrin and Monier. The sixth light, the twenty-eighth, and the fortieth of the line, were nearly overwhelmed, but still they resisted with wonderful courage the repeated attacks of the Austrian cavalry and infantry. Monier's division, surprised in Pozzolo by a column of grenadiers, was driven out. At this moment the corps of Dupont, detached from its principal point of support, was on the eve of being driven into the Mincio. General Suchet, arriving on the right bank with the division of Gazan, and perceiving, from the height of Molino-della-Volta, the serious danger of Dupont, engaged with ten thousand men against thirty thousand, hastened to reinforce him. Restrained by the orders of Brune, he dared not send him the whole of Gazan's division, and he threw Clauzel's brigade over to the other side of the river. This brigade was insufficient, and Dupont must have succumbed, despite this aid, but the rest of Gazan's division, crowning the opposite bank, from which the Austrians could be reached with grape-shot, and even by musketry, poured upon them a murderous fire, and thus stopped them. Dupont's division, being supported, resumed the offensive, and made the Austrians fall back. Suchet, seeing the danger that every moment increased, determined to send over the whole of Gazan's division to the opposite bank. The important point, Pozzolo, was fiercely disputed; six times it was taken and retaken. At nine o'clock at night the contest still continued by moonlight, under a severe frost. The French finally remained masters of the left bank, but they had lost the flower of four divisions. The Austrians left six thousand killed and wounded on the field of battle, and the French nearly the same number. But for the arrival of general Suchet, the left wing would have been utterly destroyed; as it was, he dared not engage fully, his hands being tied up by the orders of the commander-in-chief. If count Bellegarde had directed his whole force upon that point, or if he had passed over the bridge of Borghetto, while Brune remained immoveable at Mozzembano, he would have inflicted a fearful blow upon the centre and left of the French army.

Fortunately, he did nothing of the kind. The Mincio was thus crossed at one point. Brune persisted in his plan of passing the next day, the 26th

of December, towards Mozzembano, thus newly exposing himself to the chances of an operation by main force. He covered the heights of Mozzembano with forty guns, and, favoured by the fogs of that season, succeeded in placing a bridge. The Austrians fatigued with the fight of the preceding day, and doubting the intention of the second passage, made less resistance than the day before, and permitted the positions of Sallionzo and of Vallegio to be taken from them.

The whole army passed in this way beyond the Mincio, and was thus enabled to march with its united divisions upon the Adige. The entrenched bridge of Borghetto must have fallen naturally from the offensive movement of the French columns. A first fault was committed, and several hundreds of brave men's lives sacrificed to complete the conquest of a point that was not tenable: twelve hundred Austrians were made prisoners there.

The French were victorious, but at the cost of valuable blood, which generals Bonaparte or Moreau would not have failed to spare the army. Lecourbe passed the German rivers in a very different manner. Brune, having forced the Mincio, advanced towards the Adige, which he ought to have crossed immediately. He was not ready to effect the passage before the 31st of December, or 10th Nivôse. On the 1st of January, general Delmas, with the advanced guard, successfully crossed that river above Verona at Bussolengo. General Moncey, with the left, was to ascend to Trent, while the rest of the army again descended to invest Verona.

Count Bellegarde at this moment found himself in the greatest danger. A part of the troops of the Tyrol, under general Laudon, were retiring before Macdonald and falling back upon Trent. General Moncey, with his corps, was also marching there in ascending the Adige. General Laudon must have succumbed, being hemmed in between Macdonald and Moncey's corps, unless he had time to save himself in the valley of the Brenta, which, flowing beyond the Adige, terminates in many windings near Bassano. Brune, if he passed the Adige quickly, and pushed Bellegarde beyond Verona, to Bassano itself, might anticipate at this last point the corps of the Tyrol, and take it entirely by closing the opening of the Brenta.

An act of general Laudon, not very honourable, and the dilatoriness of general Brune, excused in some degree, perhaps, by the season, disengaged the corps of the Tyrol from its peril.

Macdonald had in effect arrived near Trent, while the corps of general Moncey was proceeding thither at its side. General Laudon placed between these two corps, had recourse to a falsehood. He announced to general Moncey that an armistice had been signed in Germany, and that this armistice was common to both armies. This was false, because the treaty signed at Steyer by Moreau only applied to the armies operating on the Danube. General Moncey, in an excess of honourable feeling, believed what Laudon stated, and opened a passage for him to the valley of the Brenta. He was thus enabled to rejoin count Bellegarde in the vicinity of Bassano.

But the disasters of Austria in Germany become known. The Austrian army beaten in Italy, pressed by a mass of ninety thousand men after the junction of Macdonald with Brune, was no longer able to hold out. An armistice was proposed to Brune, who hastened to accept it, and it was signed on the 16th of January at Treviso. Brune, eager to settle affairs, was contented to demand the line of the Adige, with the fortresses of Ferrara, Pechiera, and Portolegnago. He did not dream of demanding Mantua; still his instructions were not to halt until he had entered Isonzo, and made himself master of Mantua. This was the only place that was worth the trouble, because all the others must fall naturally and as a thing of course. It was of great importance to occupy it, that there might be a claim for demanding its cession to the Cisalpine republic at the congress of Lunéville.

While these events were happening in Upper Italy, the Neapolitans entered Tuscany. The count Damas, who commanded a body of sixteen thousand men, eight thousand of whom were Neapolitans, had advanced as far as Sienna. General Miollis, obliged to protect all the posts in Tuscany, had only three thousand five hundred disposable men, the larger part Italians. Notwithstanding this, he marched upon the Neapolitans. The gallant soldiers of the division of Pino threw themselves upon the advanced guard of count Damas, overthrew it, forced their way into Sienna, and put to the sword a number of the insurgents. Count Damas was obliged to retreat. Murat was advancing with his grenadiers to force from him a signature to a third armistice.

The campaign was thus every where terminated, and peace insured. On every belligerent point the French had been successful. The army of Moreau, flanked by that of Augereau, had penetrated nearly to the gates of Vienna; that of Brune, seconded by Macdonald, had passed the Mincio and the Adige, and marched to Treviso. Though it had not entirely driven the Austrians beyond the Alps, it had taken from them a sufficiency of territory to furnish the French negotiator at Lunéville with powerful arguments against Austrian pretensions in Italy. Murat was about to compel the court of Naples to submission.

Upon receiving intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, the first consul, who was said to be jealous of Moreau, was filled with hearty delight[1]. This victory lost nothing of its value in his eyes because it was gained by a rival. He deemed himself so superior to all his companions in arms, in military glory and in political influence, that he felt no jealousy towards any of them; wholly devoted to the object of pacifying and reorganizing France, he learned with lively satisfaction every event which contributed to facilitate his labour, although such events might aggrandize men who were afterwards set up as rivals to him.

That which most displeased him in this campaign was the useless effusion of French blood at Pozzolo, and above all, the serious fault committed in not demanding Mantua. He refused to ratify the convention of Treviso, and declared that he would give orders for the renewal of hostilities, if the fortress of Mantua were not immediately delivered over to the French army.

[1] Bourrienne says that "he leaped for joy;" and this biographer is not to be suspected; for, though he owed every thing to Napoleon, he seems not to have remembered that he did so in his memoirs.

At this moment, Joseph Bonaparte and M. Cobentzel were at Lunéville, awaiting events on the Danube and Adige. These negotiators were placed in a singular situation, treating while the fight was going on, and being in some sort witnesses of the duel between two great nations, expecting every moment the news, though not of the death, yet of the exhaustion of one or the other. M. Cobentzel exhibited upon the occasion a vigour of character which might serve as an example for those men who are called upon to serve their country in such important circumstances. He never suffered himself to be disconcerted, neither by the defeat of the Austrians at Hohenlinden, nor by the passage of the Inn, the Salza, or the Traun. To all these disastrous events he replied, with imperturbable self-possession, that all these things were no doubt very vexatious, but that the archduke Charles had recovered from his chagrin, and that he had arrived at the head of the extraordinary levies of Bohemia and Hungary; that he had brought to the assistance of the capital twenty-five thousand Bohemians and seventy-five thousand Hungarians; that, in advancing further, the French would encounter a resistance which they could little expect to find. He supported at the same time all the Austrian demands, particularly that of not treating without an English plenipotentiary, who would at least cover by his presence the real negotiations which it might be possible to establish between the two nations. Sometimes he threatened to return to Frankfort, and thus put an end to all the hopes of peace of which the first consul had need, for composing the minds of the people. At this threat, the first consul, who was never guilty of tergiversation, when any one attempted to intimidate him, answered M. Cobentzel, that if he quitted Lunéville, all chance of accommodation would be for ever lost, that the war should be pushed to the utmost, even to the entire downfall of the Austrian monarchy.

In the midst of this diplomatic contest, M. Cobentzel received intelligence of the armistice concluded at Steyer, the orders of the emperor to treat at any price, and above all, to extend to Italy the armistice already agreed upon in Germany, because nothing would be gained, if, having stopped one of two armies marching upon Vienna, the other should be permitted to take the same direction, by Friouli and Carinthia. In consequence, M. Cobentzel declared, on the 31st of December, that he was ready to treat without the consent of England, that he would agree to sign preliminaries of peace, or a definitive treaty, whichever was desired by France; but before he committed himself decidedly, in separating from England, he wished that an armistice, common to Germany and Italy, should be concluded, and some explanations regarding the terms of the peace should be made, at least in a general manner. For his own part, he would propose as conditions, that the Oglio should be the limit of Austria in Italy, with the Legations, and at the same time, that the dukes of Modena and Tuscany should be reinstated in their former dominions.

These conditions were unreasonable, the first consul would not have admitted them before the triumphs of the winter campaign had been achieved, and much less afterwards.

The preliminaries of M. St. Julien have not been forgotten here. The treaty of Campo-Formio was adopted for the basis, with this difference, that certain indemnities promised to Austria for small territories, were to be taken in Italy in place of Germany. We have already indicated the substance of them; the treaty of Campo-Formio, assigned to the Cisalpine republic and to Austria the boundary of the Adige; in promising indemnity to Austria in Italy, she was given to hope for the Mincio, for example, in place of the Adige, as a boundary, but the Mincio at most, and the territory of the Legations not at all, of which the first consul intended to make a different disposition.

The ideas of the first consul were thus determined. He insisted that Austria should pay the expenses of the winter campaign; that her Italian limits should be the Adige, and nothing more, and that she should receive no indemnity, neither in Germany nor in Italy, for the small territories ceded on the left bank of the Rhine. The Legations he intended to reserve, and make them subservient to divers combinations. Until now they had belonged to the Cisalpine republic. His design was rather to leave them to that republic, or to devote them to the aggrandizement of the house of Parma, as promised by treaty with the court of Spain. In this last case he would have given Parma to the Cisalpine, Tuscany to the house of Parma, which would have been a great aggrandizement, and the Legations to the grand duke of Tuscany. As to the duke of Modena, Austria had promised, by the treaty of Campo-Formio, to indemnify him for his lost duchy by means of the Brisgau. It was for her to keep her engagements towards that prince.

The first consul wished for another thing that was well understood, but very difficult to make Austria consent to. He did not wish, as he was bound to do, after the treaty of Campo-Formio, to hold a congress with the princes of the empire, to obtain from each individually the formal abandonment of the left bank of the Rhine to France. He recollected the congress of Rastadt, which terminated in the assassination of the French plenipotentiaries. He recollected the trouble he had been at to treat with each prince individually, and to come to an agreement with all those who had lost territories, upon a system of indemnity which should be satisfactory to them. The first consul demanded, in consequence, that the emperor should sign, as chief of the house of Austria, for what concerned the house, and as emperor for what concerned the empire. In a word, he wanted to have at a single stroke the acknowledgment of the French conquests, whether on the part of Austria or on the part of the Germanic confederation.

Bonaparte therefore ordered his brother Joseph to signify to M. Cobentzel, as definitively settled, the following conditions:—The left bank of the Rhine to France. The limits of the Adige to Austria and the Cisalpine, without abandoning the Legations. The Legations to the duke of Tuscany. Tuscany to the duke of Parma. Parma to the Cisalpine. Brisgau to the duke of Modena. Finally, the peace to be signed by the emperor, as much for himself as for the empire. As for the armistice in Italy, he was willing to grant it on condition that Mantua be immediately given up to the French army.

As the first consul well knew the mode of treating common to the Austrians, and in particular that of M. Cobentzel, he wished to cut short many difficulties, and much opposition, and menaces of simulated despair; he therefore thought of a new mode of signifying his ultimatum. The legislative body had just assembled; it was proposed to it on the 2d of January, or 12th Nivôse, to declare that the four armies commanded by Moreau, Brune, Macdonald, and Augereau, had merited the thanks of their country. A message added to this proposition announced that M. Cobentzel at last consented to treat without the concurrence of Great Britain, and the definitive conditions of the peace were, the Rhine for France, the Adige for the Cisalpine republic. The message added, that in case these conditions should not be accepted, the peace should be signed at Prague, at Vienna, and at Venice.

This communication was received with great joy in Paris, but it caused a deep emotion at Lunéville. M. Cobentzel raised a great outcry against the hardness of these conditions, above all against their form. He complained bitterly, that France seemed to be making the treaty herself, without negotiating with any one. Still he kept firm, and declared that Austria could not give way upon all these points; she would rather fall with arms in her hands than concede such conditions. M. Cobentzel consented to retire from the Oglio to the Chiesa, which runs between the Oglio and the Mincio, on the condition of having Peschiera, Mantua, and Ferrara, without the obligation to demolish the fortifications. He consented to indemnify the duke of Modena with Brisgau, but insisted on the restitution of the territory of the duke of Tuscany. He spoke of formal guarantees to be given for the independence of Piedmont, Switzerland, the Holy See, Naples, and other states. As to peace with the empire, he declared that the emperor was about to demand powers of the Germanic Diet, but that this monarch would never take upon himself to treat for it without being authorized. M. Cobentzel insisted upon an armistice in Italy, stating that as far as regarded Mantua, if Austria were to surrender that place into the hands of the French army, she would put Italy at once into the hands of the French, and deprive herself of all the means of resistance if hostilities should be recommenced. M. Cobentzel joined blandishments to firmness, endeavouring to touch Joseph in speaking to him of the favourable dispositions of the emperor towards France, and more particularly towards the first consul; even insinuating that Austria might probably ally herself with the French republic, and that such an alliance would be very useful against the concealed but real ill-will of the northern courts.

Joseph, who was of a very mild disposition, could not but be affected to a certain extent by the complaints, the threats, and the blandishments of M. Cobentzel. The first consul awakened his brother's energy by numerous dispatches. "You are forbidden," he wrote to Joseph, "to admit of any discussion on the principle laid down as the ultimatum: the Rhine and the Adige. Hold to these two conditions as irrevocable. Hostilities shall not cease in Italy, but with the surrender of Mantua. If they commence again, the middle of the Adige shall be carried back to the crest of the Julian Alps, and Austria shall be excluded from Italy. Should Austria speak of her friendship and alliance, reply that those who have just shown themselves so attached to the English alliance cannot care about ours. Assume, while you are negotiating, the attitude of general Moreau, and make M. Cobentzel take that of the archduke John."

At last, after a resistance of some days, intelligence more alarming continuing to arrive every hour from the banks of the Mincio, where it must not be forgotten hostilities were much more prolonged than in Germany, M. Cobentzel consented that the Adige should be adopted for the boundary of the Austrian possessions in Italy. This assent took place on the 15th of January, 1801, or 25th of Nivôse. M. Cobentzel ceased to allude to the duke of Modena, but renewed the formal demand for the re-establishment of the duke of Tuscany in his estates. He agreed yet further to a declaration, that the peace of the empire should be signed at Lunéville, after the emperor had obtained power to do so from the Germanic diet. In the same protocol this plenipotentiary asked for an armistice in Italy, but without the condition that Mantua should be immediately given up to the French troops. He feared that in abandoning this point of support, France would exact still harder conditions; and however alarming the resumption of hostilities appeared to be, he would not consent to part with this pledge so soon.

This pertinacity in the defence of his country, when in so difficult a position, was honourable, but it terminated at last by becoming imprudent, and brought with it consequences M. Cobentzel had never foreseen.

That which at this time was passing in the north, contributed as much as the victories of the French armies to augment the pretensions of the first consul. He had pressed forward as much as lay in his power a peace with Austria, in the first instance to have peace, and in the second to secure himself against those caprices of character so common with the emperor Paul. For some months past that sovereign had exhibited a bitter feeling of resentment against Austria and England; but a manœuvre of the Austrian or English cabinet might recal him to the arms of the coalition, and then France would again have all Europe upon her hands. It was this apprehension which made the first consul brave the inconveniences of a winter campaign, in order to crush Austria while she was deprived of the assistance of the other forces of the continent. The recent change of events in the north had removed all apprehensions upon that score, and he became immediately much more patient and more exacting. Paul had broken formally with his old friends and allies, and had flung himself altogether into the arms of France, with that warmth which attached to all his actions. Already very much disposed to act thus, the effect produced in his mind by the victory of Marengo, the restitution of the Russian prisoners, the offer of the island of Malta, and, lastly, the adroit and delicate flattery of the first consul, had been definitively disclosed by a late event. It will be remembered that the first consul, despairing of the preservation of Malta, strictly blockaded by the

English, had struck upon the happy idea of offering the island to Paul I.; that the czar had received the offer with delight, and had commanded M. Sprengporten to go to Paris, and thank the head of the French government. There he was to receive the Russian prisoners, and to conduct them to Malta to hold it as the garrison. But in the interval, general Vaubois, reduced to the last extremity, had surrendered the island to the English. This event, which under other circumstances would have been a subject of deep regret to the first consul, chagrined him very little. "I have lost Malta," he observed, "but I have placed the apple of discord in the hands of my enemies." In fact, Paul hastened to demand of England the seat of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, but the English kept the island, and gave him a flat refusal. He could restrain himself no longer, but immediately laid an embargo upon nearly three hundred English vessels, then in the ports of Russia, and even ordered any of them, endeavouring to save themselves by flight, to be sunk. This circumstance, joined to the dispute respecting neutral vessels, before explained, could not fail to produce war. The czar placed himself in front of the battle, and calling Sweden, Denmark, and even Prussia to his assistance, proposed to them the renewal of the armed neutrality of 1780. He sent an invitation to the king of Sweden to visit Petersburg, to confer with him upon so important a subject. King Gustavus accepted the invitation, and was magnificently received. Paul, full of the mania which at that time possessed him, held in Petersburg a grand chapter of the order of Malta, admitting as knight the king of Sweden, and those persons who had accompanied him, lavishing beyond all sober limits the honours of the order. But he affected something more serious still, he renewed immediately the league of 1780. On the 26th of December, 1800, there was signed by the ministers of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, a declaration, by which the three maritime powers engaged to maintain even by force of arms the principles of neutral law. They enumerated all the principles in their declaration, without the omission of one of those which we have mentioned, and which France had prevailed upon the United States to acknowledge also. They engaged themselves to unite their forces, and to use them against any power, whatever it might be, that should attempt to assail the rights which they asserted belonged to them. Denmark, although very zealous for the rights of neutrals, was not quite willing to proceed with such rapidity; but the ice defended her for three months, and she hoped that before the return of the fine season England would yield, or that the preparations made by the neutral parties in the Baltic would be sufficient to prevent the English fleet from approaching before the Sound, as it had done in the month of August previously. Prussia, that would rather negotiate than proceed with such promptitude, was drawn into the treaty, as well as Sweden and Denmark. Two days afterwards she adhered to the declaration of St. Petersburg.

These were events of serious importance, and insured to France the alliance of all the northern powers of Europe against England; but this was not all the diplomatic success of the first consul. The emperor Paul had proposed to the court of Prussia to have a common understanding with France on what was passing at Lunéville, and that all three should agree to the bases of a general peace. Now the privileges which these two powers[1] communicated to the French government were precisely those that France was desirous of carrying at Lunéville.

Prussia and Russia granted the left bank of the Rhine to France without the necessity of a disputation; they only required an indemnity for such princes as lost, by that means, a portion of their territories; but only for hereditary princes, by means of the secularization of the ecclesiastical estates. This was just the principle that Austria opposed and France admitted. Russia and Prussia required the independence of Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, and Naples, which at that moment were in no way opposing themselves to the interests of the first consul. The emperor Paul interfered with the interests of Naples and Piedmont on the ground of a treaty of alliance, concluded with these states in 1798, when it had been seen needful to involve them in the war of the coalition; but he did not mean to protect Naples, save on the conditions that she should break with England. In respect to Piedmont, he only claimed for her a slight indemnity for the cession of Savoy to France. He deemed it right, and so did Prussia with him, that France should restrain the ambition of Austria in Italy, and confine her within the limits of the Adige.

Paul was so ardent at last, that he made a proposal to the first consul that both should ally themselves more strictly against England, and not make peace with her until after the restoration of Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. This was more than the first consul would consent to do, who was by no means fond of making such positive engagements. Paul, desirous of reconciling the show of things with their real state, in place of clandestine communications with M. Krudener and general Beurnonville at Berlin, opened a public negotiation in Paris itself. He nominated as a plenipotentiary M. Kalitscheff to treat ostensibly with the French cabinet, and that personage had orders to go to France immediately. He was bearer of a letter to the first consul, and what was more, written by the emperor Paul with his own hand. M. Sprengporten was already in Paris, and M. Kalitscheff was about to be there. It was not possible to wish for a more signal proof of the reconcilintion of Russia with France.

All was thus changed in Europe in the north as well as the south. The maritime powers in open war with England endeavoured to league with France against that country by engagements altogether absolute. In the south, Spain was already bound to France by the closest ties; and she threatened Portugal in order to force her to break with Great Britain. Finally, Austria, beaten in Germany and Italy, abandoned by the other powers of Europe to the mercy of France, had no other defence than the obstinacy of her negotiators at Lunéville.

These events, which the ability of the first consul had wrought out, made a great noise one after the other in rapid succession, during the first days of

[1] Letter of the king of Prussia, of the 14th of January, communicated by M. de Lucchesini.

January. Russia and Prussia manifested their wishes for the peace of the continent, and Paul with his own hand announced to the first consul the mission of M. Kalitscheff at the very time when M. Cobentzel, giving way as to the limit of the Adige, obstinately held out in regard to the rest, and refused the delivery of Mantua as the price of the Italian armistice.

The first consul wished immediately to suspend the progress of the negotiations at Lunéville. He had instructions given to Joseph [1], and wrote to him, prescribing a new line of conduct to the French legation. In such a crisis as had thus occurred in Europe he now thought it not to be convenient to press too forward. It was possible that something might be ceded which might be opposed to the views of the northern courts, or something might be contrary to their wishes in the stipulations. Thinking besides that M. Kalitscheff would arrive in a few days, he wished to see him before making a definitive engagement. Orders were then sent to Joseph to temporize at least for ten days before signing, and to exact conditions still harder than those which had preceded.

Austria consented to limit herself to the Adige. The first consul intended to understand by that, the absence of the duke of Tuscany from Italy, and his reception of an indemnity like the duke of Modena in Germany. His ultimate object was, not to leave an Austrian prince in Italy. To leave the duke of Tuscany in Tuscany was in his sight to give Leghorn to the English. To place him in the Legations was giving Austria a hold beyond the Po. In consequence he adopted the plan of giving Tuscany to the house of Parma, as he had stipulated at Madrid; to confide Leghorn in consequence to the Spanish navy, and of thenceforward including the whole valley of the Po in the Cisalpine republic: for after this plan it would consist of the Milanese, Mantua, Piacenza, Parma, Modena, and the Legations. Piedmont, situated at the opening of the valley, would in future be only a prisoner to France. Austria, gone back to the Adige, was thrown to one extremity of Italy; Rome and Naples confined to the other; France, placed in the centre, through Tuscany and the Cisalpine, would sway and direct the whole of that superb country.

Joseph Bonaparte had, therefore, for his new instructions to exact that the duke of Tuscany, as well as the duke of Modena, should be transferred to Germany; that the principles of the secularization of the ecclesiastical states should be carried out in order to indemnify the hereditary German princes, as well as the Italian princes, dispossessed by France; that peace with the empire should be signed at the same time as peace with Austria, without waiting for powers from the diet; that nothing should be stipulated respecting Naples, Rome, or Piedmont, because France, desirous to preserve these states, wished first to arrange with them the conditions of their preservation; finally, that Mantua be given up to the French armies under the threat, without, of the immediate renewal of hostilities.

Nothing is more common when a negotiation has not terminated, and when a treaty has not been signed, nothing is more usual than to modify the proposed conditions. The French cabinet was consequently justified in altering the first conditions; but it must be acknowledged that here the alterations were abrupt and very considerable.

M. Cobentzel, by lingering on, demanding too much, and being obstinately blind to his position, had lost the favourable minute. According to his custom, he complained bitterly, and threatened France with Austria in desperation. He was still pressed to obtain an armistice for Italy, and determined to concede Mantua; though he feared that after delivering up this bulwark, he should find himself at the mercy of France, and see himself exposed to new demands. In this disposition of mind, he showed himself mistrustful and peevish. He would not yield Mantua until the last moment. At length, on the 26th of January, or 6th Pluviôse, he signed the order for the surrender of that place to the French army, in order to obtain an armistice in Italy, and a prolongation of that in Germany. The negotiators sent off couriers from Lunéville itself, to prevent an effusion of blood; of which there was imminent danger.

The discussions that followed this event at Lunéville were exceedingly warm. M. Cobentzel said, that Joseph had promised the re-establishment of the grand duke—promised it too the same day that he had consented to the boundary of the Adige. Joseph Bonaparte replied, that such was the fact, but that the re-establishment of this prince was to be in Germany; that every state profited of its existing situation to treat more advantageously; that France, in thus acting, applied the very principles expressed by M. Thugut in his letter of the last winter; that moreover the grand duke, respecting whom they were in discussion, would be isolated completely from Austria in Tuscany, and thus be unsupported. That in the Legations, on the contrary, he would be too well placed, as he would thus be a connexion between Austria, Rome, and Naples, or, in other words, between the enemies of France, to which she would never consent. He must, therefore, resign all hope of being placed either in Tuscany or in the Legations.

After some warm controversies, M. Cobentzel appeared at length to consent that the indemnities for the grand duke should be taken in Germany; but he refused to admit the absolute principle of the secularization of the ecclesiastical states. The ecclesiastical states remained devoted to Austria, more especially the three electoral archbishopries of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence, while the hereditary princes were often opposed to her influence in the Germanic Diet. Austria consented to the secularization, on the understanding that the small ecclesiastical states should serve not only to indemnify the hereditary princes of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Orange, but the great ecclesiastical princes, such as the archbishops of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence; since by them her influence would have been partly supported in Germany. Joseph Bonaparte had directions to refuse this proposition determinately. He was not to admit the principle of secularization but for the advantage of the hereditary princes alone. Finally, M. Cobentzel would not sign the peace for the empire without power from the Diet. His refusal arose, according to his own account, from his repugnance to violate forms: in reality it was from his dislike to make

[1] Letter dated 1st Pluviôse, or 21st January, in the State Paper Office.

too evident the game commonly played in regard to the members of the Germanic body, by compromising them with France, whenever it was the interest of Austria to do so; and afterwards, when the war became unfortunate, to abandon them. In 1797 she delivered over Mayence to the French, a proceeding severely censured by all Germany; and now to sign on the part of the empire according to M. Cobentzel was a perfect novelty, grievous indeed, added to all the anterior acts with which the German princes had to reproach their sovereign. Joseph Bonaparte replied to these arguments, that it was easy to discover the real motives of Austria; she was afraid of committing herself with the Germanic body, but that it was not for France to enter into such considerations; that, as to the point of form, there was an example in the peace of Baden in 1714, signed by the emperor, without power from the Diet. There was nothing more demanded of him now, than to sanction that which the deputation from the empire had already assented to at Rastadt,—that was, the abandonment of the left bank of the Rhine to France; that his refusal would be a poor service rendered to Germany, for the French armies would continue in the territory they occupied until a peace was concluded with the empire, whereas, if the peace was common to all the German princes, the evacuation of their territories would follow immediately upon the ratifications.

These discussions continued for several days. M. Cobentzel was now anxious to terminate the affair. On its own side the French legation, lately desirous of delaying the negotiations for a few days, finding that M. Kalitscheff would not arrive in Paris as soon as was expected, saw that nothing was to be gained by further delay, and wished the matter to be brought to a conclusion. An order was received by both plenipotentiaries to arrive at an agreement; and, in order to force M. Cobentzel to determine quickly, Joseph Bonaparte had orders to make a concession of the character of those which serve, at the last moment, to make a worn-out negotiation conclude with honour. The middle of the Rhine was the limit assigned as the boundary to France and to Germany. In consequence, Dusseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, Kehl, and Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, though attached to the left by many ties, remained to the Germanic confederation. But Cassel, a suburb of Mayence, on the right bank, was a contested subject, because it was difficult to detach it from Mayence itself. Joseph was authorized to cede it, on condition that it be dismantled. In consequence, Mayence was no longer a fortified bridge, affording a passage to the right bank of the Rhine at all times.

On the 9th of February, 1801, or 20th of Pluviôse, year IX., the last conference took place. According to custom, they were never more near a rupture than on the day when they met for a definitive agreement. M. Cobentzel warmly insisted upon the maintenance of the grand duke of Tuscany in Italy; on the indemnity designed for the German princes—an indemnity which he desired to render common to the ecclesiastical princes of the higher order; on the inconvenience, lastly, of signing without having powers from the Diet. An article relating to the Belgic debt gave birth to great difficulties. Upon all these heads he declared that he dared not sign without a reference to Vienna. Joseph then informed him that his own government authorized him to close the negotiations, unless they brought them to a conclusion before they broke up; he added, that in another campaign, Austria would be repelled beyond the Julian Alps. Finally, he ceded Cassel and all the fortified positions upon the right bank of the Rhine, on the condition that France should demolish the works before she evacuated them, and that they should not be repaired.

Upon this concession M. Cobentzel gave way, and the treaty was signed on the 9th of February, 1801, at half-past five o'clock in the evening, to the great joy of Joseph, and the great grief of M. Cobentzel, who still had nothing with which to reproach himself, because if he had hazarded the interests of his court, it was through having defended them too well.

Such was the celebrated treaty of Lunéville, which terminated the war of the second coalition, and a second time conceded the left bank of the Rhine to France, with a dominant position in Italy. The following were the more essential conditions.

The middle of the Rhine, from its issue out of the Helvetic to its entry into the Batavian territory, formed the limits of France and of Germany. Dusseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel, Kehl, Philipsburg, Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, remained to Germany, after being dismantled. The hereditary princes who lost territory on the left bank were to be indemnified. No allusion was made to the ecclesiastical princes, nor to their mode of indemnity; but it was well understood, on each side, that ecclesiastical territories would furnish them also with indemnities. The emperor, at Lunéville as at Campo-Formio, ceded the Belgic provinces to France, and also the small territories belonging to him on the left bank, such as the county of Falkenstein and the Friedthal, which was cooped up between Zurzach and Basle. He abandoned also the Milanese and the Cisalpine. For these he received no other indemnity than the Venetian states as far as the Adige, which had been before insured to him by the treaty of Campo-Formio. He lost the bishopric of Salzburg, which had been promised him by a secret article in the treaty of Campo-Formio. His house was, besides, deprived of Tuscany, ceded to the house of Parma. An indemnity in Germany was promised to the duke of Tuscany. The duke of Modena preserved still the promise made to him of Brisgau.

Thus the Italian territory was placed on a basis much more advantageous for France than at the conclusion of the treaty of Campo-Formio. Austria continued her limits of the Adige, but Tuscany was taken from her house, and given to one dependent upon France. The English were excluded from Leghorn; all the valley of the Po, from Sesia and the Tanaro as far as the Adriatic, belonged to the Cisalpine republic, a dependent child of the French; Piedmont, confined to the sources of the Po, depended upon France. Thus master of Tuscany and of the Cisalpine, France occupied the entire of central Italy, and the Austrian connexion was prevented between Piedmont, the Holy See, and Naples.

Austria lost by the first coalition Belgium and Lombardy, besides Modena from her house. She lost in the second, the bishopric of Salzburg from herself, and Tuscany from her house. This placed her in a position little inferior in Germany, but very greatly so in Italy; yet it was not, assuredly, too much for all the bloodshed and efforts made by France.

The principle of the secularizations was not explicitly, though it was implicitly determined, since being for the indemnification of the hereditary princes, it made no allusion to ecclesiastical ones. The indemnity could only be demanded of the ecclesiastical princes themselves.

The peace was declared to be common to the republics of Batavia, Helvetia, Liguria, and the Cisalpine. Their independence was guarantied; nothing was said in regard to Naples, Piedmont, or the Holy See. Those states depended upon the goodwill of France, which was bound, in regard to Piedmont and Naples, by the interest that the emperor Paul felt towards those courts; and in regard to the holy see by the religious objects of the first consul.

Still the first consul, as we have seen, had not yet deemed it right to explain himself to any one relative to Piedmont. Not pleased with the king of Sardinia, who delivered up his ports to the English, he wished to preserve his freedom of action towards a country placed so near to France, and of such great importance to her.

The emperor signed the treaty of peace for himself, as the sovereign of the Austrian states, and for the Germanic body, as emperor of Germany. France secretly promised to employ her influence with Prussia, to gain her sanction to the emperor's mode of procedure in respect to his thus signing for the Germanic body. The ratifications were to be exchanged within thirty days by Austria and France. The French armies were not to evacuate Germany until after the ratifications were exchanged at Lunéville, but they were to evacuate it entirely within a month after that exchange.

In this treaty, as in that of Campo-Formio, the freedom of all persons confined for political offences was expressly stipulated. It was agreed that the Italians, incarcerated in the dungeons of Austria, and particularly Moscati and Caprara, should be released. The first consul insisted upon this act of common humanity from the opening of the congress.

Bonaparte attained the supreme power on the 9th of November, 1799, or 18th Brumaire, year VIII., it was now the 9th of February, 1801, or 20th Pluviôse, year IX., and not fifteen months had passed since. In this time, France, reorganized in part at home, was completely victorious abroad, and allied with the south and north of Europe against England. Spain was ready to march against Portugal; the queen of Naples had thrown herself at the feet of France, and the court of Rome negotiated at Paris the arrangement of religious affairs.

General Bellavène, appointed to carry the treaty, left Lunéville on the 9th of February, in the evening, and arrived as an extraordinary courier in Paris. The treaty which he brought was immediately inserted, word for word, in the *Moniteur*. Paris was illuminated immediately; joy was upon every countenance; and countless thanks were given to the first consul for this happy result of his statesmanship and his victories.

BOOK VIII.

THE INFERNAL MACHINE

PLOTS DIRECTED AGAINST THE LIFE OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—THREE AGENTS OF GEORGES, NAMED CARBON, ST. RÉJANT, AND LIMOELAN, FORM A PLAN TO DESTROY THE FIRST CONSUL BY THE EXPLOSION OF A BARREL OF POWDER.—CHOICE MADE OF THE STREET ST. NICAISE, AND OF THE 3RD NIVÔSE, FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME.—THE FIRST CONSUL SAVED BY THE DEXTERITY OF HIS COACHMAN.—GENERAL SENSATION PRODUCED.—THE CRIME ATTRIBUTED TO THE REVOLUTIONISTS, AND TO THE INDULGENCE SHOWN TO THEM BY FOUCHÉ, THE MINISTER.—DISLIKE OF THE NEW COURTIERS TO THAT MINISTER.—HIS SILENCE AND COOLNESS.—HE DISCOVERS A PART OF THE FACT, AND MAKES IT KNOWN; BUT STILL MEASURES ARE TAKEN AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONISTS.—IRRITATION OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—AN ARBITRARY MEASURE CONTEMPLATED.—DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE.—AFTER LONG DELIBERATION, A RESOLUTION IS PASSED FOR BANISHING A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS WITHOUT A TRIAL.—SOME RESISTANCE MADE, BUT VERY SLIGHT, TO THIS DESPOTIC ACT.—EXAMINATION WHETHER IT SHALL BE EFFECTED BY A LAW, OR BE THE SPONTANEOUS ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT.—ONLY REFERRED TO THE SENATE FOR THE SAKE OF BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION.—THE LAST COURSE IS ADOPTED.—A DECREE OF TRANSPORTATION AGAINST ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY ALLEGED TERRORISTS.—FOUCHÉ, WHO KNEW THEM TO BE INNOCENT OF THE ATTEMPT ON THE 3RD NIVÔSE, CONSENTS NOTWITHSTANDING TO THEIR PROSCRIPTION.—DISCOVERY OF THE REAL AUTHORS OF THE INFERNAL MACHINE.—PUNISHMENT OF CARBON AND ST. RÉJANT.—UNJUST CONDEMNATION OF TOPINO-LEBRUN, ARENA, AND OTHERS.—SESSION OF THE YEAR IX.—NEW MANIFESTATIONS OF OPPOSITION IN THE TRIBUNATE.—INSTITUTION OF SPECIAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ROBBERIES ON THE HIGH ROADS.—FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE RESOURCES FOR THE YEARS V., VI., VII., AND VIII.—BUDGET OF THE YEAR IX.—DEFINITIVE ARRANGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT.—REJECTION BY THE TRIBUNATE, AND ADOPTION BY THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, OF THIS PLAN OF FINANCE.—SENTIMENTS OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—CONTINUATION OF HIS ADMINISTRATIVE LABOURS.—ROADS.—CANAL OF ST. QUINTIN.—BRIDGES OVER THE SEINE.—WORKS ON THE SIMPLON.—THE MONKS OF ST. BERNARD ESTABLISHED ON THE SIMPLON AND ON MOUNT CENIS.

WHILE the situation of France externally became day by day more brilliant, and Austria as well as Germany was signing a treaty of peace; while the northern powers were leaguing with France to resist the maritime domination of England, Naples and Portugal closing their ports against her; while, in short, every thing succeeded according to the wishes of a victorious and moderate government, the internal situation of France presented a spectacle, sometimes fearful, of the last struggles of expiring parties. It has been already seen, that in spite of the prompt reorganization of the government, robbers infested the highways, and factions in despair attempted to assassinate the first consul. These were the inevitable consequences of past discords. The men that civil war had trained to crime, and could not return to peaceable occupations, endeavoured to find employment on the highroads. The beaten factions, that despaired of vanquishing the grenadiers of the consular guards, attempted, by means the most atrocious, to destroy the invincible author of their defeat.

Highway robbery increased on the approach of winter. It was not possible to travel the roads without being exposed to pillage and assassination. The departments of Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Britany, and Poitou, were, as formerly, the scenes of these depredations. Theevil, too, had extended itself. Several departments of the south and centre, such as those of the Tarn, Lozère, Aveyron, Haute-Garonne, Hérault, Gard, Ardèche, Drôme, Vaucluse, Bouches du Rhône, High and Low Alps, and Var, had in their turn been infested. In these departments the bands of robbers were recruited from the assassins of the south, who, under the pretence of hunting out the Jacobins, killed for the purpose of robbery the purchasers of the national domains. They were augmented too by young men who would not submit to the conscription, and by soldiers whom misery had driven away from the army of Liguria during the cruel winters of 1799 and 1800. These miserable men having once engaged in criminal courses, had imbibed a taste for them; and nothing but the force of arms, and the rigor of the law, could turn them aside from their bad habits. They stopped the public conveyances; they took from their homes the purchasers of the national domains, and frequently wealthy landed proprietors as well, carrying them into the woods, as for example the senator Clément de Ris, who was detained for twenty days; and they made their victims submit to horrible tortures, sometimes burning their feet until they advanced considerable sums of money for their ransom. They more especially plundered the public chests, and frequently seized the public money in the houses of the collectors, under the pretext of making war upon the government. Vagabonds who, in the midst of troubled times, had quitted those provinces, to deliver themselves up to a wandering life, acted as their spies, and appeared in the towns under the character of mendicants. These scoundrels, obtaining every kind of information while they were begging, gave

it to the robbers their accomplices, as well as what carriages they were to stop, or what houses to rob.

Small bodies of soldiers were required to suppress these banditti. But when any of them were captured, justice could not be done; because the witnesses were afraid to give evidence against them, and even the juries were fearful of convicting them. Extraordinary measures are always to be regretted in such cases, less from the severities which they are sure to bring in their train, than by the shock they give to the constitution of the country, and particularly when the constitution is new. But here measures of this kind were become indispensable, because the ordinary course of justice, after having been tried, was found to be altogether powerless. The project of a law had been prepared for the institution of special tribunals, destined to repress highway robbery. This plan or project, presented to the legislative body, at that moment sitting, became an object of a strong attack upon the part of the opposition. The first consul, exempted from all those scruples of legality which have only existence in quiet times, and which even when they are narrow and petty, are a happy sign at least of respect for the law—the first consul did not hesitate to have recourse to martial law until the projected enactment under discussion could be adopted. As it was necessary to employ bodies of troops to repress these bands of robbers, the gendarmerie not being in sufficient strength to cope with them, he thought such a situation of things approximated so closely to a state of real war, that it authorized the laws peculiar to that position. He formed a number of small bodies of soldiers, which traversed in all directions the departments infested, and these were followed by military commissions. All the robbers taken with arms in their hands, were tried and shot within forty-eight hours.

The terror inspired by these villains was so general and so powerful, that nobody dared to raise a doubt of the regularity, or of the justice of the executions. In the mean while some miscreants of another character meditated by different means, and still more atrocious, the ruin of the consular government. While Demerville, Ceracchi, and Aréna were under a judicial instruction, their adherents of the revolutionary party continued to plan a thousand schemes, one more insane than another. They planned the assassination of the first consul in his box at the opera, and hardly dared, as has been seen, to seize their poignards. Now they were planning something different. At one time they proposed to raise a disturbance at the rising of one of the theatres, and to destroy the first consul in the midst of the confusion; at another they were to seize him on his way to Malmaison, and to carry him off and murder him. All this they talked about openly, like club-orators, and so loudly, that the police were hourly informed of all their designs; though while they thus declaimed, not one of them was bold enough to put his hand to the work. Fouché, though he had little fear from them, yet watched them most attentively. Still among their numerous schemes, there was one which was more formidable than the rest, and which had much attracted the attention of the police. A man named Chevalier, a workman employed in the manufactory of arms established in Paris during the time of the convention, had been discovered at work upon a most terrible machine. It consisted of a cask full of powder and missiles, to which a musket barrel with a trigger was appended. This was clearly intended to destroy the first consul by blowing him up. The inventor was arrested, and put into prison. This new invention made a noise, and contributed to concentrate the public attention upon those denominated Jacobins and Terrorists. Their character in 1793 made them more feared by far than they deserved. The first consul, as has been remarked before, partook in the common error indulged in their regard; and having always had to deal with the revolutionary party, often with honest men of the party discontented with a reaction too rapid, often with miscreants projecting crimes which they had not courage to commit, he threw the blame of every thing upon the revolutionists, was incensed against them alone, and only talked of punishing that party. Fouché persisted in vain in attempting to fix his attention upon the royalists. It would have required very strong proofs to change the first consul's opinion, as well as that of the public, on this subject. Unfortunately, facts of a most atrocious nature were in progress to set the matter at rest.

Georges, returned to the Morbihan from London, with plenty of money, (thanks to the English!) secretly directed the robbers of the public vehicles. He had sent to Paris some of his cut-throat instruments, with a commission to assassinate the first consul. Among these were two persons named Limoëlan and St. Réjant, both well practised in the horrors of civil warfare; the last had been a naval officer, having a considerable knowledge of the artillery service. To these two were added a third, named Carbon, a subordinate to them, and a very worthy instrument of such great criminals. One arrived after the other in Paris towards the end of November, 1800, or the first days of Frimaire. They set about the consideration of the best mode of destroying the first consul; and they made in the environs of Paris more than one experiment with air-guns. Fouché, aware of their presence and of their objects, had them watched very closely, but, owing to the bad management of the two spies employed upon that service, they lost sight of the conspirators. Whilst the police were making efforts to re-find them, these villains had involved themselves in complete obscurity. They made no declamations like the Jacobins; they communicated their secret to no one; but prepared for a horrible deed, which has had its equal but once in the present times. The machine of Chevalier had given them the idea of destroying the first consul by means of a barrel of powder charged with missiles. They determined to put this barrel into a cart, and to place it in one of the narrow streets leading to the Carrousel, which the first consul often passed through in his carriage. They bought a horse, a cart, and hired a cart-house, passing themselves for country traders. St. Réjant, who was, as observed above, an officer of the marine and artillery, made the necessary experiments, went a number of times to the Carrousel to see the carriage of the first consul come out from the Tuileries, to calculate the time it would take to reach the neighbour-

ing streets, and to arrange every thing in such a manner that the barrel should explode at the proper moment. These three persons chose for the fulfilment of their plot, a day when the first consul was to go to the Opera, to hear Haydn's oratorio, "The Creation," which was then to be executed for the first time. It was the 3rd of Nivôse, or 24th of December, 1800. They selected for the scene of their crime the street St. Nicaise, which ran from the Carrousel towards the Rue de Richelieu, that the first consul was often in the habit of passing through. In this street, successive turnings rendered necessary a slackening of his pace by the most adroit coachman. The day having arrived, Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan conducted the cart into the Rue St. Nicaise, and then they directly separated. While St. Réjant was to set fire to the barrel of powder, the other two were to place themselves in sight of the Tuileries, in order to give notice when they saw the carriage of the first consul appear. St. Réjant had the barbarity to give the horse of this horrible machine to a girl of fifteen years of age to hold. He himself kept in readiness to set fire to the powder.

At this precise moment, the first consul, worn down with his labours, was in some doubt about going to the opera in consequence. He was finally prevailed upon to attend, by the earnest persuasions of those who happened to be present at the time, and he left the Tuileries at about a quarter past eight o'clock. General Lannes, Berthier, and Lauriston accompanied him; and a detachment of mounted grenadiers followed, in place of preceding the carriage. It arrived in the narrow part of the street St. Nicaise, without the guard announcing its approach to St. Réjant, or even his accomplices, the last never coming to apprise him of it, either through fear, or perhaps from the non-recognition of the carriage. St. Réjant himself did not perceive the carriage until it had passed the machine a trifling distance. He was violently jostled by one of the horse grenadiers; but not disconcerted, he set fire to the machine and instantly fled. The coachman of the first consul, who was exceedingly adroit at his business, and who commonly drove at a great rate, had by that time passed one of the turnings of the street, where the explosion took place. The shock was terrible; the carriage was nearly overturned, all the windows were broken, and the fronts of the neighbouring houses were defaced with the missiles. One of the horse grenadiers was slightly wounded; and a number of persons, killed or wounded, were instantly prostrated in the surrounding streets. The first consul and those who were with him thought first that they had been fired upon with grape-shot; they stopped for a moment, and, learning the truth, continued on their way to the opera, whither the first consul insisted upon proceeding. He exhibited a calm, impassive countenance, in the midst of a most extraordinary sensation pervading every part of the house. It was reported there that a whole quarter of Paris had been blown up by banditti in order to destroy him.

He remained only a few moments at the opera, and then returned to the Tuileries, where, in consequence of the news of the attack, an immense crowd of persons had assembled. His anger, which until then had been restrained, now burst forth. "These are the Jacobins, the Terrorists," he cried out; "it is those miscreants in a permanent revolt, formed in square against every government; they are the assassins of the 2nd and 3rd of September, the authors of the 23rd of May, the conspirators of Prairial; they are those miscreants who, to assassinate me, do not regard immolating thousands of lives. I will do signal justice upon them."

There was little need to arouse public opinion against the revolutionists after so high an authority. Their exaggerated reputation, and their attempts for two or three months before, were of a nature to cause all sorts of crimes to be charged upon them. In the saloon, where a number of persons were assembled, anxious to exhibit their attachment as much as possible, there could but be a united cry against the Terrorists as they were called. The numerous enemies of Fouché hastened to profit by the event, and pour out against him the bitterest invectives. His police, they said, saw nothing, and did nothing; he exhibited a criminal indulgence towards the revolutionary party. This comes from his feeling towards his old accomplices. The life of the first consul will no more be secure in his hands. In a moment the hatred against the minister rose to its full elevation; the same evening his disgrace was proclaimed. As to Fouché himself, he retired into one corner of the saloon of the Tuileries with some individuals who did not experience the general excitement, where he heard, with great composure, all that was preferred against him. His incredulous air yet more excited the anger of his enemies. He would not tell that with which he was well acquainted, for fear of marring the success of the researches on foot. But recollecting the agents of Georges, for some time under the observation of the police, and of whom the traces had been lost, he did not himself hesitate to impute the crime to them. Some members of the council of state, addressing observations to the first consul, implying doubts as to the real authors of the attempt in the street of St. Nicaise, he warmly replied: "I am not to be cheated in this; they are neither Chouans, nor emigrants, nor old nobles, nor old priests. I know the authors; I shall soon reach them, to inflict upon them the most exemplary punishment." In uttering these words, his tone was most vehement, and his gesture threatening. His flatterers approved of all he said, exciting his anger still more, in place of restraining it, after the horrible event which had so shocked the feelings of all the world.

The next day the same scenes were renewed. According to the custom lately established, the senate, the legislative body, the tribunate, the council of state, the tribunals, the administrative authorities, and the military staffs waited upon the first consul to testify their sorrow and indignation at what had occurred; sentiments sincere and very largely partaken—for never, in fact, had a similar thing been seen. The revolution had habituated the minds of the people to the cruelties of the victorious party, but never yet with the plots of those that had been vanquished. Every mind was struck with surprise and dismay. They dreaded the repetition of these base attempts; and each inquired of the other what would happen, if

the only man who could alone restrain these wretches should be taken off. All the public bodies, admitted at the Tuileries, expressed their ardent attachment to the hero-pacificator, who had promised to give, and had, in effect, given, peace to the world. The language of these addresses was of the common stamp, but the sentiment they expressed was as sincere as it was deep, The first consul replied to the municipal council of Paris :—

"I have been much touched with the proofs of affection which the people of Paris have given to me on this occasion. I deserve them, because the only object of my thoughts and of my actions is to increase the prosperity and glory of France. As far as this troop of banditti directed its attacks upon myself, I could leave to the laws the task of their punishment; but when they have, by an unparalleled crime in history, endangered part of the population of the capital, the punishment shall be as prompt as terrible. Assure, in my name, the people of Paris, that this handful of miscreants, the crimes of whom almost dishonour liberty, will be soon deprived of the power to effect mischief."

Every one applauded these revengeful words, because there was nobody who had not himself made use of the same expressions. Reflecting minds foresaw with apprehension that the angry lion might possibly overleap the barrier of the law. The multitude called out for punishment. In Paris the agitation was very great. The royalists cast the crime upon the revolutionists; the revolutionists upon the royalists. The one and the other were equally in earnest, since the crime remained a profound secret except to its originators. Every one discoursed upon the subject; and, according to the bias of his feelings, condemning this or that party beyond any other, discovered reasons equally plausible to accuse royalists or revolutionists. The enemies of the revolution, old and new, declared that the Terrorists were alone capable of forming so atrocious a plot, and, in conclusive proof of their opinions, quoted the machine of Chevalier, the armourer, recently detected. Wise heads, on the contrary, who stedfastly clung to the revolution, asked why the robbers on the high road, the *chauffeurs*, who committed so many crimes, and every day exhibited a refinement in cruelty, without example, who, in particular, had carried off the senator Clément de Ris; why these men might not be the authors of the horrible explosion in the street St. Nicaise, as well as those pretended Terrorists. It must be observed, that calm minds were unable, at that moment, to obtain a hearing, so deeply was the public mind agitated, and so prejudiced was it against the revolutionary party. But, will it be credited? in the midst of this conflict of varied imputations, there were some persons inconsiderate or obstinate enough to speak very differently. Certain factious loyalists longed for the destruction of the first consul, cost what it might; and in supporting the general notion, which attributed the crime to the Terrorists, they admired the atrocious energy and the profound secresy which must have been put in practice to perform such a deed. The revolutionists, on the contrary, appeared as if they were covetous of the merit for their party; and there were among them certain boasters in crime, who would have been almost proud of the imputation of such an execrable act. It is in times of civil troubles alone, that such unreflecting and wicked language is heard among men, who, themselves, would be wholly incapable of performing the actions they thus affect to approve.

The minister of police, Fouché, alone had a suspicion of the real criminals; all besides, who talked or conjectured as to its authors, were entirely wrong.

While he was occupied in their detection, every one inquired what was to be done for the future prevention of similar attempts. People were then so habituated to violent measures, that they thought it was but natural to arrest the men once known under the appellation of Terrorists, and to treat them as they treated their victims in 1793. The two sections of the council of state, to whom the matter more immediately belonged, the sections of legislation and of the interior, assembled two days after the event, on the 26th of December, or 5th of Nivôse, to examine, among the different plans that presented themselves, which it was most advisable to adopt. As the proposed law for the purpose of instituting special tribunals was under discussion, it was proposed to add to it two clauses. The first, for the institution of a military commission, to try all crimes committed against the members of the government; the second, to invest the first consul with the power to remove from Paris the individuals whose presence in the capital might be deemed dangerous, and to punish them with transportation, if they should attempt to evade their first exile.

After the preliminary examination of the subject in two sections of the legislative and interior, the entire council of state met under the presidency of the first consul. M. Portalis made a report of what had taken place in the morning in the two sections, and submitted the propositions to the assembled council. The first consul in his impatience thought the proposals insufficient for the end. He was for arresting the Jacobins in a body, shooting those who should be found guilty of the crime, and transporting the rest. He wished to accomplish this end by an extraordinary measure in order to make sure of the result. "The proceedings of a special tribunal," he said, "were slow, and would not reach the true criminals. It is not now the question to frame a system of judicial metaphysics; metaphysical minds have destroyed every thing in France for these ten years past. It is necessary to judge in our situation of statesmen, and to apply a remedy like determined men. What is the evil that torments us? There are ten thousand scoundrels in France, spread over the entire country, who have persecuted every honest man, and who are drenched in blood. All are not in the same degree culpable; very far from it. Many are susceptible of repentance, and are not irreclaimable criminals; but while they see the head quarters established in Paris, and their chiefs forming plots with impunity, they keep hope alive, and hold themselves in good breath; strike boldly at the leaders, and the soldiers will disperse. They will return to those labours from which they were driven by a violent revolution; they will soon forget that stormy period of their lives, and become peaceable citizens. Honest men, kept in continual fear, will lose all apprehension, and attach themselves to the government which

has known how to protect them. There is no middle way; we must either pardon all like Augustus; or vengeance, prompt and terrible, proportionate to the crime, must overtake them. As many of the guilty must be sacrificed as there have been victims; fifteen or twenty of these villains must be shot, and two hundred of them transported. By this means the republic will be disembarrassed of perturbation that disturbs it; we shall purge it of the sanguinary lees." At every sentence the first consul became more and more animated and irritated by the disapprobation which he saw expressed upon some countenances. "I am," he cried, "I am so convinced of the necessity and justice of some strong measure to purify France, and at the same time to calm her, that I am ready to make myself the sole tribunal, to have the culprits brought before me, to investigate their crimes, to judge them, and order sentence to be executed. All France would applaud me, because it is not my own private vengeance that I seek. My good fortune which has preserved me so many times on the field of battle will secure me still. I do not think of myself; I think of the social order which it is my duty to re-establish, and of the national honour, from which I am commissioned to wash out this abominable stain."

This scene struck with surprise and fear a part of the council of state. Some of the members, partaking in the sincere but intemperate warmth of the first consul, applauded his arguments. A large majority regretfully heard in his words the same language which had been held by the revolutionists themselves, when they prescribed thousands of victims. They had said in the same way, that the aristocrats placed the republic in danger; that it was necessary to be rid of them by the most prompt and certain means; and that the public safety was worth some sacrifices. The difference was most assuredly great; because in place of sanguinary miscreants, who in the blindness of their fury had taken each other for aristocrats and destroyed one another, a man of genius was here seen, proceeding with energy towards a noble end, in restoring to its place a disorganized society. Unhappily, he wished to proceed, not by the slow observation of rules, but by direct and extraordinary methods, such as those employed who had been the cause of the evil. His good sense, his generous heart, and the horror of shedding blood then prevalent, were sufficient guarantees against sanguinary executions; but with this exception he was disposed to have recourse to every kind of severity towards the men at that time known as Jacobins and Terrorists.

Objections were raised in the council of state, though timidly, because of the indignation every where excited at the crime in the Rue St. Nicaise, which checked the courage of those who would have opposed a stronger resistance to acts so arbitrary. Still there was one individual who did not fear to make head against the first consul, and who made it boldly and with perfect freedom,—this was admiral Truguet, who seeing that the intention was to strike at the revolutionists in a body, expressed doubts in regard to the real authors of the crime. "Government," said the admiral, "is desirous of getting rid of the base men who trouble the republic; be it so; but there are villains of more than one class. The returned emigrants threaten the holders of national property; the Chouans infest the high-roads; the reinstated priests in the south inflame the passions of the people; the public mind is corrupted by pamphlets." Admiral Truguet made an allusion here to the famous pamphlet of M. Fontanes, of which mention has been already made.

At these words the first consul, stung to the heart, and advancing directly to the speaker, asked —"To what pamphlets do you allude?" "Pamphlets publicly circulated," the admiral replied. "Designate them," replied the first consul. "You know them as well as I do," retorted the bold man who dared defy in this way the anger the first consul exhibited.

Such a scene as this had never before been seen in the council of state. The circumstance was a specimen of the impetuous character of the man who then held the destinies of France in his hand. Upon this reply he displayed all the eloquence of his anger. "Do people take us for children?"—he exclaimed,—"do they think to draw us away by declamations against the emigrants, the Chouans, and the priests? Because there are still some partial disturbances in La Vendée, do they demand, as formerly, that we shall declare the country in danger? Has France ever been in a nobler position,—the finances ever in a better way,—the armies more victorious,—peace ever so near at hand? If the Chouans commit crimes, I will have them shot. Must I recommence proscription because of the titles of nobles, priests, and royalists? Must I send into exile ten thousand old men who only desire to live in peace and obey the established laws? Have you not known Georges himself put to death in Britany four ecclesiastics, because he saw they were likely to be reconciled to the government? Must I proscribe again merely for rank and title? Must I strike some because they are priests, others because they are ancient nobles? Do you not know, gentlemen of the council, that except two or three, you all pass for royalists? You, citizen Defermon, are you not considered a partisan of the Bourbons? Must I send citizen Devaisne to Madagascar, and then constitute myself a council *à la Babœuf*? No, citizen Truguet, I am not to be blinded; there are none who threaten our peace but the Septembrians. They would not spare yourself; in vain would you tell them how well you defended them to-day in the council of state,—they would immolate you as they would me—as they would all your colleagues."

There was only one word to be said in reply to this vehement apostrophe, that it was not just to proscribe any individual on account of his quality; neither the one party for being royalist, nor the other for being revolutionist. The first consul had no sooner finished his last words than he arose suddenly and concluded the sitting.

The consul Cambacérès, always calm, had wonderful skill in obtaining that object by gentle means which his fiery colleague would, if possible, obtain by the power of his own will. On the following day he assembled the sections at his own house, endeavoured to excuse, in a few words, the warmth of the first consul, asserted what was the fact, that he had no antipathy to contradiction, when it was unaccompanied by spleen or personality, and then endeavoured to incline their minds

to take some extraordinary step. This was unworthy of the usual moderation of Cambacérès; but although he was accustomed to give prudent advice to the first consul, he yielded when he saw him resolute, and particularly when the point at issue was to repress the Terrorists. M. Portalis, who had the merit of never desiring the proscription of any man, though he had been himself proscribed, assented to the idea of the two sections, which added two articles to the law for special tribunals. Despite of these, Cambacérès insisted, and gained a majority in favour of an extraordinary measure, upon the agreement that it should have a fresh discussion before the two sections united. In this species of secret meeting warm words took place. Rœderer clamoured loud against the Jacobins, imputed their crimes to the indulgence of Fouché, and even proceeded to move the council of state to join in a declaration for the dismissal of that minister.

Cambacérès repressed all these over-zealous displays, and convoked the sections at the residence of Bonaparte, in whose presence a sort of privy council was held, composed of the consuls, the two sections of the interior and of legislation, the ministers for foreign affairs, the interior, and justice. The prejudice shown against Fouché was so great, that he was not even summoned to these conferences.

The proposition for an extraordinary resolution was then presented anew, and discussed a good while. There were many sittings of the privy council before the members could be got to agree. At last it was decided that some general measure should be carried into effect against the party denominated Terrorists, but the form of the measure became a weighty question. The main point to be settled was whether the measure should be carried into effect by the spontaneous act of the government or by means of a law. The first consul, generally so bold, wished it should be by law. He did not like to compromise the great bodies of the state upon such an occasion, and openly declared, that "the consuls were irresponsible, but the ministers were not so; and that any of them who signed such a resolution might, on some future day, have to answer for it. Not a single individual should be compromised; the legislative body must share in the responsibility of the proposed act. The consuls themselves," he said, "knew not what might occur. As for myself, while I live I am not afraid that any one will call me to a reckoning for my actions. But I may be killed, and then I shall not be able to answer for the security of my two colleagues. It would be your turn to govern," he added, laughing, to the second consul Cambacérès, "and *you are not very firm in the stirrups*. It will be better to have a law for the present as well as for the future."

There was passing at this moment a very singular scene. Those who were repugnant to the measure desired to see it adopted not as a law but as the spontaneous act of the government. They wished to throw upon the government the entire responsibility of the measure, not perceiving that as so doing they were suffering it to acquire the pernicious habit of acting alone upon its own arbitrary authority. It was said in support of this opinion, that the law could not pass, that sentiments were divided upon the real authors of the crime, that the legislative body recoiled before a list of proscription, and that the government would expose itself to the danger of incurring a very serious defeat. Rœderer and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely declared themselves of this opinion. The first consul said to the last, "Since the tribunate rejected one or two laws, you are seized with a panic. There are some Jacobins in the legislative body, it is true, at most ten or a dozen. They alarm the others, who know that but for me, on the 18th Brumaire they would have been murdered. These last will not be wanting upon this occasion, the law will pass."

They persisted, and Talleyrand agreed in opinion with those who, fearing the chances were against the passing of a law, for which he gave a reason to the first consul the most likely to produce an effect, namely, that out of France the act would appear the more imposing. "Foreigners will see," said he, "a government that knows and dares to defend itself against the anarchists." The first consul gave way to this argument, but devised in consequence a middle course, and this was followed; namely, to refer it to the senate, that the senate might examine whether the act was or was not an attack upon the constitution. It will, doubtless, be remembered that according to the constitution of the year VIII., the senate did not pass the laws, but had the power of annulling them, if it deemed them contrary to the constitution. With respect to the measures of the government it did not possess the same power. The idea of the first consul was approved in consequence, and M. Fouché was commanded to draw up a list of the principal terrorists, with the design of transporting them to the deserts of the New World. The two sections of the council of state were charged to make a declaration of the reasons for the proceeding. The first consul was to sign the decree, and the senate to declare whether it was contrary to the constitution or not.

This measure against the terrorists, in itself illegal and arbitrary, had not even the justice upon its side which arbitrary measures sometimes have, when they fall upon those who are really guilty; because the terrorists were not the authors of the crime. About this time the truth began to be suspected. The minister Fouché, and the prefect of police, Dubois, had continued to make researches incessantly into the affair, nor had their exertions been unavailing. The violence of the explosion had destroyed, almost to annihilation, nearly all the instruments used. The young girl to whom St. Réjant had given the horse to hold, had been torn in pieces; nothing of the unfortunate creature was left but her legs and feet. The iron of the cart-wheels was thrown to a great distance. Fragments of the articles employed in committing the crime could alone be found, the only things likely to lead to a discovery; and these were scattered at a great distance off in every direction. There were still some remains of the cart and horse. These remains were all collected together, and a description of them was written and made public through the newspapers, and all the horse-dealers in Paris were asked to inspect them. By a fortunate chance, the original owner of the horse identified the animal at once, and named a dealer in seeds to whom it

had been sold. This dealer, on being summoned, declared with the most perfect frankness every thing he knew about the matter. He had sold the horse to two men, who passed for foreign traders. He had had several interviews with them, and was able to describe them with great exactness. A man who kept carriages to let, and who had let the cart-house for some days in which the cart had been kept, made a very precise declaration. He described the same individuals, and gave the same indications as to their persons, as the dealer in seeds had done. The cooper who had sold the barrel, and had put iron hoops upon it, gave descriptions concurring exactly with those of the other two. The descriptions exactly tallied in respect to features, stature, dress, and general appearance, with the parties suspected. When all this evidence had been taken, recourse was had to decisive proof. Above two hundred revolutionists, apprehended upon suspicion, were made to appear before them. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of January, or 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th of Nivôse, were consumed in confronting these prisoners with the witnesses, and concluded in the conviction that none of the revolutionists arrested were authors of the crime, because not one was recognized. There was no doubt could be entertained of the honesty and veracity of the witnesses who had furnished the evidence, almost all of whom had come forward spontaneously to state what they knew, showing the greatest zeal in seconding the efforts of the police. It was thus proved, almost to a certainty, that the revolutionists were innocent; but the absolute fact could not be made clear until the discovery of the real criminals. An important circumstance directed attention to the agents of Georges, who had been sent to Paris nearly a month before, and who had always been considered by Fouché to be the guilty parties. Though all trace had been lost, yet down as recently as the 3rd of Nivôse they had been seen, sometimes in one place, sometimes in another, though the police had been unable to seize them. After the 3rd of Nivôse they had entirely disappeared, so wholly, that it might be thought they had been buried under the earth. This disappearance, so complete and sudden, from the very day of the crime, was a striking fact. To this it must be added, that one of the descriptions given by every witness corresponded with the person of Carbon. M. Fouché, after all these indications, believing more than ever that the real authors of the plot were the Chouans, lost no time in despatching an emissary to observe Georges, and obtain information respecting St. Réjant, Carbon, and Limoëlan. While this was doing, he obtained enough evidence to shake the previous opinions of many persons, and even those of the first consul himself; but who still would not yield his first opinion unless the matter was clearly and certainly ascertained.

Such was the state of the proceedings on the 4th of January, or 14th of Nivôse, the day on which the decree that condemned so many of the terrorists was definitively settled [1].

[1] I have compared the dates of the documents in this case with the dates of the measures passed against the revolutionary party; the result is, that between the 11th and 14th Nivôse, or 1st and 4th of January, only one thing was known, namely, that the examinations of the persons of the

There was at last, on the part of the government, an accordance upon all the points discussed. It had never at any time seriously thought of a summary tribunal, which should try the terrorists, and sentence them to be shot; it had always stopped its measures at the idea of transporting a certain number of them. After numerous debates upon the subject, it was agreed upon that they should be transported by the act of the consuls, first submitted for the sanction of the senate. All having been settled with the principal members of the council and senate, the rest could be only a mere formality.

M. Fouché, without knowing all the truth, and yet knowing a part, assailed upon all sides, had the weakness to lend himself to a measure, directed, it is true, against men who had been stained with blood, but were not the authors of the crime, the perpetrators of which were then awaiting detection and punishment. Of all who had a share in this act of proscription, he was, therefore, the most inexcusable; but he was attacked upon every side. He was accused of forbearance towards the revolutionists, and he had not the courage to resist. He drew up himself the report of the council of state upon which the decree of the consuls was grounded.

In this report, presented to the council of state upon the 1st of January, 1801, or 11th Nivôse, numbers of men were denounced who for ten years had participated in every kind of crime, who had spilled the blood of the prisoners in the Abbaye, invaded and done violence to the convention, threatened the directory, and who, reduced now to despair, had armed themselves with the poignard to strike at the republic in the person of the first consul. "All these persons," it was said, "have not taken the dagger in their hands; but all are universally known to be capable of sharpening and of using it." It was added, that the tutelary forms of justice were not made for them; it was therefore proposed to seize and transport them beyond the territory of the republic.

The examination of the report raised the question as to whether the Jacobins ought not to be denounced as the authors of the 3rd Nivôse. The first consul opposed the proposal earnestly. "We may believe so," said he, "but we do not know it." He began, it is probable, to be shaken in his convictions. "They are transported for the 2nd of September, for the 31st of May, the days of Prairial, the conspiracy of Babœuf, for all which they have done, and for all which they might still do."

Terrorists had not led to the recognition of any one of them; there was, consequently, every just reason to believe that the revolutionary party was entirely unacquainted with the crime in the Rue St. Nicaise. It was not possible to have perfect certainty upon this point until much later, or until the 28th Nivôse, or 18th of January, the day of the arrest of Carbon, and his complete identification by the parties that sold him the horse, the cart, and the barrel. The act decreed against the revolutionists is dated the 14th of Nivôse, or January 4th. It is not true, therefore, as some have ventured to assert, that the proscription took place with a perfect knowledge of the real authors of the crime; and that the government struck at the revolutionists, well knowing that they were innocent of the offence charged upon them. The act was not the less arbitrary for all that; still it is proper to give the real fact, without extenuation or exaggeration.

A list of one hundred and thirty individuals, condemned to transportation, followed the report. The government did not confine itself to transporting the persons named, but, what was more cruel, if possible, added to the names of many of them the description of "Septembriseur," with no other proof for so stamping them than mere common report.

The council of state showed a visible repugnance on hearing the hundred and thirty names, because it might be said to be employed in drawing up a list of proscription. Thibaudeau the counsellor said that such a list could not be prepared by the council. "I am not so foolish," rejoined the first consul, with some temper, "to make you pronounce the doom of these individuals; I only submit to you the principle of the measure." The principle was approved, but not without some opposing voices.

The next question was, whether the measure should be an act of the high police on the part of the government, or be passed in the customary form of a law. This had been arranged previously; the resolutions already secretly decreed were confirmed; and it was decided that the measure should be a spontaneous act of the government, only referred to the senate to pronounce upon the question of its being constitutional.

On the 4th of January, or 14th Nivôse, the first consul having had the definitive list prepared, issued a decree by which he transported beyond the territories of the republic the individuals inscribed upon it, and without any hesitation placed his signature to the decree.

On the 5th of January, or 15th Nivôse, the senate met and advanced further than the council of state had done, by declaring that the decree of the first consul was a measure necessary to the preservation of the constitution.

The unfortunate persons thus named were collected together on the day following, and sent on their way to Nantes, there to be placed on board ship, to embark for distant countries. There were of the number several deputies of the convention, some members of the old commune, all those that remained of the assassins of September, and the well-known Rossignol, formerly a general of the revolutionary army. These men, it is true, merited no pity as regarded themselves, or at least but few of them; yet were all the forms of justice violated in their persons, and what proved the danger of violating such sacred forms was, that many of the designations made by the police were contested with great appearance of truth. It required, at such a moment, no small degree of moral courage to appear in the behalf of these proscribed persons; yet there were some who, on the recommendation of courageous men, were erased from the list of the proscribed, and saved at Nantes from the fatal embarkation.

That upon an influential recommendation an individual should be able to obtain, or not to obtain, the favour of a government—be it so; but that a recommendation should suffice to exclude or not from a proscription list, according as a man has a friend bold or influential enough to command it, causes every sentiment of justice to revolt, and proves that when forms are once violated there only remains for society the horrors of arbitrary power. Yet this period may be radient with glory; it was remarkable for the love of order and a hatred of bloodshed. But the country was rising out of a revolutionary chaos; it had no regard for rules, and found them inconvenient and insupportable. If this arbitrary proceeding was spoken of, a single word was sufficient to justify it. It was said that these miscreants were drenched in blood, and would be so again if they had their own way; that they were treated much better than they had treated their victims; and if, in effect, this act, under the aspect of a violation of forms, equalled those which had been witnessed at anterior epochs, it presented two points of difference; it fell for the most part upon villains, and their blood was not spilled:—a very miserable excuse, it must be allowed, to offer in mitigation, but it may still be urged to show that the year 1800 had no common feature with 1793.

While these miserable men were on their way to Nantes, it was with great difficulty they were preserved from the fury of the populace, in all the towns through which they travelled, so much was the public sentiment against them. Under the influence of this sentiment, there was something still more deplorable occurred, in the condemnation of Ceracchi, Aréna, Demerville, and Topino-Lebrun. It will be remembered that in the month of October preceding, or Vendémiaire, these discontented fellows entered into a plot for the purpose of assassinating the first consul at the opera. But neither of them had the boldness, perhaps never the real determination, to carry the plot into execution. The police agents sent in spies among them, gave them poignards, and pushed them on to a degree in crime greater than they contemplated themselves, or had the courage to commit. In any case they did not make their appearance at the place where they were to execute their design, save Ceracchi, who was arrested alone at the opera, and was not even armed with a single poignard of those given to them. They were no more than empty talkers, who certainly wished for the destruction of the first consul, but would never have dared to attempt the deed themselves. They were tried on the 9th of January, or 19th of Nivôse, at the very moment when the events were occurring which have just been narrated. Their counsel, aware of the terrible influence exercised upon the minds of the jury, by the event of the 3rd of Nivôse, made vain efforts to combat it. The influence upon their minds was irresistible; for of all jurisdictions a jury is that most governed by public opinion, having all the advantages and disadvantages of the disposition. Four of these unhappy men were condemned to death, Ceracchi, Aréna, Demerville, and Topino-Lebrun. The last merited some sympathy, and was a striking instance of the cruel mutations of fortune during the revolution. Young Topino-Lebrun had been a pupil of the celebrated David, and was a young artist of some talent. Participating in the wild notions of artists at that time, he had been one of the jury of the revolutionary tribunal, and had shown himself much more merciful than his brother officials. He produced upon his trial the advocate Chauveau-Lagarde, the respectable defender of the victims before that tribunal, to give evidence of his humanity. What an extraordinary change of fortune! The former juryman of the revolutionary tribunal, accused in his own turn

and calling to his assistance the old defender of the victims of that sanguinary judgment seat! But the aid thus generously given could not save him. All four were condemned on the 9th of January, or 19th of Nivôse, and after a useless appeal to the court of cassation, were executed on the 31st of that month.

In the meanwhile, the horrible mystery of the infernal machine was clearing up by little and little. Fouché had sent, to be near Georges, certain agents, who were to make inquiries about Carbon, what had become of him and where he lived. He learned, through this medium, that Carbon had sisters, who were residents in Paris, and he found out their abode. This was searched by the police, and a barrel of powder discovered. From the youngest sister the police obtained a knowledge of the new lodgings where he had concealed himself. It was with very respectable persons, the ladies De Cicé, sisters of M. de Cicé, once archbishop of Bordeaux, and minister of justice. The ladies took him for a returned emigrant, whose passport was not rectified, and they procured him a place of refuge with some old religious sisters, living in company in a retired part of Paris. These unfortunate sisters, who every day thanked Heaven that the first consul had escaped death, because they considered themselves all lost if he was no more, had given an asylum, unconscious what they did, to one of his intended assassins. The police went to their house on the 18th of January, or 28th of Nivôse, and apprehended Carbon, together with all those who had thus received him. The same day he was confronted with the witnesses already mentioned, and recognized at once. At first he denied every thing; but at last confessed he was a participator, but an innocent participator only, in the crime, because, from his own statement, he was not aware of the object for which the cart and barrel were intended. He denounced Limoëlan and St. Réjant. Limoëlan had found time to escape into a foreign country; but St. Réjant, thrown down by the explosion, and for some minutes half dead, had only just time and strength left to change his lodgings. An agent of Georges, employed to attend upon him, who had been left at liberty for the purpose, as it was hoped, of finding St. Réjant, by tracking him, was the means of discovering his residence. The police found him still ill in consequence of his wounds. He was soon confronted, recognized, and convicted by such a crowd of witnesses, as left no room for doubt. A letter to Georges was found under his bed, in which he detailed, in an ambiguous manner, the principal circumstances of the crime, and made a sort of justification of himself to his employer because he had not succeeded. Carbon and St. Réjant were sent before the criminal tribunal, which sentenced these execrable ruffians to lose their heads.

When all the particular facts of the case were published, the obstinate accusers of the revolutionary party, and the complacent defenders of the royalists, were surprised and confounded. The enemies of Fouché, too, found themselves embarrassed. The correctness of his judgment was recognized, and he was again well established in the favour of the first consul. But he had furnished his enemies with a weapon of which they took advantage with some justice. "Why," said they, "if he was so certain of the fact, did he suffer the revolutionists to be proscribed?" He well deserved upon this point a bitter reproach. The first consul, who did not regard a violation of forms, caring for nothing but the results obtained, showed no regret about the matter. He thought that what had been done was well done, in every point of view; that he was disembarrassed of those whom he called the "staff of the Jacobins," and that the 3rd of Nivôse only proved one thing, which was, the necessity for watching the royalists as well as the Terrorists. "Fouché," said he, "judged better than most other persons; he is right; it is necessary to have an eye open upon the returned emigrants, upon the Chouans, and over all who are of that party."

This event much diminished the interest felt in behalf of the royalists, who had been complacently styled the victims of terror: it also greatly lessened the antipathy felt against the revolutionists, while M. Fouché, though he did not increase in public esteem, gained in credit.

The painful sentiments of which the infernal machine had been the cause, were soon removed by the joy inspired at the treaty of Lunéville. Every day under the most prosperous government is not fortunate. That of the consulate had this unequalled advantage, that if sad impressions at one moment occupied the minds of the people, they were dissipated the next instant by some great, new, and unforeseen result. Some short and mournful scenes there were in which the first consul appeared as the saviour of France; these every faction was desirous of obliterating; after these scenes, victories, treaties, acts of reparation, came healing deep wounds and reviving public prosperity—such was the spectacle which he thus unceasingly presented—Bonaparte constantly emerged from them, greater, dearer to France, more evidently destined for the supreme power.

The second session of the legislative body had commenced. It was at this moment engaged in the discussion and adoption of many laws, of which the principal, that of the special tribunals, was of no real importance after what had just before been done. But the opposition in the tribunate opposed these laws against the government, which was a sufficient inducement to their being carried out. The first of these related to the archives of the republic. It had become necessary, since the abolition of the ancient provinces had consigned to disorder a great number of old titles and of documents, either very useful or very curious, to decide where they should deposit such a mass of records, laws, treaties, and similar instruments. This was a measure of order only, having no political character. The tribunate voted against the law; and after having, according to custom, sent its three orators to the legislative body, it obtained a rejection of the measure by a large majority. The legislative body, though strongly attached to the government, as assemblies so attached generally are, was jealous of sometimes exhibiting its independence in measures of detail, and it was assuredly able to do this without danger, under the proposal of a law, the object of which was merely to decide upon the deposit, in this or that place, of certain papers and ancient records.

The two assemblies were occupied at the same moment with the consideration of a more important law, but equally a stranger with the preceding to politics. It related to the justices of the peace, of which the number was acknowledged to be too great. Six thousand having been appointed at their first institution, they had not answered the purpose for which they were created. Men capable of fulfilling the functions of the office could not be found in many cantons; they had failed, too, in another point. It had been judged proper to assign to them the judicial police, but they had performed the duty very indifferently, and the paternal and benevolent character of their jurisdiction had been in some degree injured by it. The proposed measure of the government included two modifications to be introduced relative to these officials. In the first instance, their reduction from six thousand to two thousand six hundred was contemplated; and next, the duty of the judicial police was to be performed by other magistrates. The proposed measure was very rational, and made with the best intentions; but it encountered a strong opposition in the tribunate. Several members spoke against it, more particularly Benjamin Constant; notwithstanding this, it was adopted in the tribunate, by fifty-nine to thirty-two, and in the legislative body by two hundred and eighteen to forty-one.

Another law, more likely to become a subject of discussion, and of a character wholly political, was presented at this time: the law for the institution of special tribunals. This law had lost its chief utility, since the first consul had instituted military commissions, to follow the moveable columns which were in the pursuit of the robbers upon the highways; and since, above all, he had not hesitated to proscribe, in the most arbitrary manner, the revolutionists who were deemed dangerous to the state. The military commissions had already produced very salutary effects. The judges, in military uniforms, who composed them, had no fear of the accused; they encouraged the witnesses who gave evidence, and not unfrequently these witnesses were the soldiers themselves, who had arrested the robbers, having surprised them with arms in their hands. Prompt and vigorous justice following the employment of a very active force, had singularly contributed to re-establish the security of the high roads. The escorts placed on the imperials of the diligences, often obliged to engage in murderous conflicts, had intimidated the robbers. Attacks were less frequent; and security began again to be felt, thanks to the vigour of the government and the tribunals, and to the conclusion of the winter. The proposed law was, therefore, introduced when the mischief was already much diminished; but it had the useful object of regulating the military dispensation of justice upon the high roads, and it applied to highway robbers a permanent and legal punishment. The projected organization was this:—

The special tribunals were to be composed of three ordinary judges, all members of the criminal tribunal, of three military officers, and of two assessors, the last chosen by the government, and duly qualified to act as judges. The military members could not, therefore, have the majority. The government was to have full power to establish these tribunals in the departments where it might believe them to be necessary. They were empowered to take cognizance of all offences committed upon the high roads and in the country by armed bands; of all assaults against the purchasers of national property; and, finally, of murder directed with premeditation against the heads of the government. This last provision comprehended the infernal machine, the plot of Ceracchi and Aréna, with the like offences. The court of cassation was authorized to decide in cases of doubtful competency, all other business before the court being suspended for that purpose. These special tribunals were to be abolished as a matter of right, two years after a general peace.

Every thing might be objected to these tribunals which could be objected to exceptional justice. But there was this to be urged in their favour, that society never so deeply convulsed, at no time demanded more prompt and extraordinary means to restore it to tranquillity. Under the plea of fidelity to the constitution, use was made of that article belonging to it, which permitted the legislative body to suspend it in those departments where it might be judged necessary. The case of extraordinary jurisdictions was evidently comprised in this article, because the suspension of the constitution of necessity led to the establishment of martial law. Besides the discussion was superfluous in a country, and at a moment when one hundred and thirty persons had been proscribed without a trial, and military commissions had been established in several departments without the least censure of public opinion. It must still be allowed that, compared with these acts, the proposed law was a return to legal government. But it was warmly and acrimoniously attacked by the usual opposition members, by Daunou, Constant, Ginguené, and others. In the tribunate it only passed by a majority of forty-nine to forty-one voices. In the legislative body the majority was much more considerable, the law obtaining one hundred and ninety-two in its favour, to eighty-eight against it. But a minority of eighty-eight surpassed the ordinary number of the minority in that assembly entirely devoted to the government. The great number of negative suffrages then obtained was attributed to a speech made by M. Francis of Nantes, in which he addressed the legislative body in language considered too intemperate. "M. Francis of Nantes has done well," said the first consul, in reply to one of his colleagues Cambacérès or Lebrun, who expressed disapprobation of his speech. "It is better to have fewer votes, and to show that feeling insults, we are determined not to tolerate them."

The first consul held stronger language to a deputation of the senate which presented him with a resolution of their body. He expressed himself in the boldest way, and in several instances said, without disguise, that if he was much incommoded, and prevented from restoring peace and order to France, he would trust to the opinion which the country held of him, and govern by consular ordinances. Every moment his ascendancy increased with his success, and his boldness with his ascendancy, and he gave himself no more trouble to dissemble the entire of his intentions.

He encountered a stronger opposition upon the

question of the finances, which constituted the last business of the session. This was the most praiseworthy of all the labours of the government, and most particularly due to the personal intervention of the first consul.

We have several times explained the means taken to secure the regular collection and payment of the revenues of the state. These means had perfectly succeeded for the year VIII., or 1799-1800; the sum of 518,000,000 f.[1] had been received, which equalled the total sum of the taxes for one year; for at that time the revenue and expenditure in the budget did not exceed 500,000,000f. Of these 518,000,000f., 172,000,000f. belonged to the years V., VI., and VII., and 346,000,000 f. to the year VIII. All liabilities for these four years were not acquitted. It was necessary that there should be a complete liquidation, in order that the year IX., or 1800-1801, which was the current year, might proceed with complete regularity. The income of the year IX. was certain to meet its own expenses, because the taxes would produce from 500,000,000 f. to 520,000,000 f., and this was adequate to the expenses in a time of peace. A practical system of accounts having been established, from that date the receipts of the year IX. would be applied exclusively to the expenses of the year; the receipts of the year X. to the expenses of the year X. and so on; thus the future was secure. In regard to the past, or for the years V., VI., VII., and VIII., there remained a deficit to be covered. To this object the daily receipts from the arrears of taxes for those years were respectively applied. These arrears, which were principally due from the landed proprietors, reduced them to a situation of considerable depression. At the meeting of the councils-general of the departments, held then for the first time, eighty-seven councils-general out of one hundred and six, remonstrated against the excessive burdens of the direct contributions. The government was obliged in consequence, as has been before stated, to remit a part of the taxes in arrear, for the purpose of securing the punctual payment of the entire tax in future. A law was proposed for the purpose of authorizing the local administrations to relieve those persons who were taxed too heavily, and the measure passed without opposition. In consequence there was a deficiency of resources noted, as attaching to the years V., VI., VII., and VIII. The amount was estimated for the three years, V., VI., and VII., at 90,000,000 f., and for the year VIII. alone at 30,000,000 f. The year VIII., 1799-1800, was distinguished from the years V., VI., VII., because the year VIII. was under the consulship.

It became necessary, therefore, to discover how these deficiencies were to be met. There remained about 400,000,000 f. of national property disposable; and it was here that the first consul exercised the most fortunate influence upon the financial system, and made the best employment possible of the public resources.

Not being able to dispose of the national property at pleasure, the value had always been received by anticipation, through the means of a paper emitted under different names, receivable in payment for that species of property. After the fall of the assignats, the later name devised for this kind of paper was that of "rescription." In the course of the year VIII. some of the "rescriptions" had been negotiated to a less disadvantage than in the time gone by, but with too little advantage still for it to be prudent to have recourse to them as a resource. This paper had been circulated at a loss; for from the first day of its issue it fell into discredit, and soon passed into the hands of speculators, who, by this means, purchased the national domains at a very trifling price. Thus it was that a valuable resource had been foolishly wasted to the great injury of the state, and the great benefit of stock-jobbers. The 400,000,000 f. in value remaining, if they could be successfully preserved from the disorder by which so many other millions had been lost down to this time, would not fail to acquire, with peace and time, a value three or four times greater. The first consul was resolved not to expend them in the mode in which several thousand millions had been already flung away.

But resources were immediately required, and the first consul endeavoured to find them in the issue of stock, which already, since his accession to power, had obtained considerable value. The funds had risen from the rate of ten and twelve, to that of twenty-five and thirty, after the battle of Marengo. Since the peace of Lunéville they had risen above fifty, and at a general peace it was expected they would reach as high as sixty. At this rate the government might begin to deal in them, as there was less loss in selling stock than in selling the national property. The first consul, unwilling to raise a regular loan, proposed to pay with stock certain state creditors, and to devote to the sinking fund an equivalent sum in landed property, which that fund might afterwards sell, but slowly, at its full value, so as to compensate in this mode for the increase about to be made to the public debt by the stock. This was the principle of the financial law now proposed for the year.

The unpaid debts which remained to be liquidated for the last three years of the directory, or the years V., VI., and VII., passed for bad debts. These were the remnant of disgraceful contracts made under the directory, and amounted to 600,000,000 f. On beginning a new system it was proper to have a due regard to these debts, whatever might be their nature or origin. The sum due was 90,000,000 f.; nearly the whole being in the hands of speculators, they were at a discount of seventy-five per cent. in the market. It was proposed to acquit these by means of stock bearing an interest of three per cent. The total of these debts being 90,000,000 f., a sum of 2,700,000 f. would be required to pay the dividend. This sum, at the existing prices of the public funds, represented a real amount of 27,000,000 f. or 30,000,000 f., and could not represent less than 40,000,000 f. in the eight or ten months that must elapse before the liquidation could be completed. The debts which it was to acquit being at a discount of seventy-five per cent. in the market, and the capital of 90,000,000 f. being thus reduced in reality to one of 22,000,000 f. or 23,000,000 f., more would be paid for them than their value, if the government were to pay divi-

[1] About £21,000,000 sterling.

dends for them at the rate of 27,000,000 f., because such an interest immediately sold would produce 27,000,000 f. or 30,000,000 f., and was very soon likely to produce more.

The debts of the year VIII., still in arrear, were of a totally different character. They were the obligations for services executed during the first year of the consular government, when order had been perfectly established in the administration. These services, executed at a time when the public distress was still great, had been paid for at a dear rate without doubt; but it was against the honour of the consular government to treat its engagements so recently contracted, which had not like those of the directory taken the character of discredited debts, and been so negotiated—to treat such engagements in the same manner as those which belonged to the years V., VI., and VII. The government did not hesitate, therefore, to pay in full, and at its nominal worth, the excess of the expenditure of the year VIII. Its actual amount was estimated at 60,000,000 f., but the payment of the arrears of taxes in the year VIII. reduced the sum to 30,000,000 f. It was determined to pay a part of this debt, amounting to 20,000,000 f., by constituting stock at five per cent., which would amount to a million interest. It will presently be explained how the remaining part of the debt was provided for.

The year IX., or 1800-1801, promised to meet its own expenses, upon the very probable hypothesis of the approaching termination of the war, because the continental peace concluded at Luneville must soon bring about a maritime one. The budget was not then voted a year in advance, but was voted the same year during the time that the expenses were incurring. The budget of the year IX., for example, was brought forward and discussed in Ventôse of the year IX., that is to say, the budget of 1801 in the month of March, 1801. The expenses and receipts of this year were estimated at the moment at 415,000,000 f., exclusively of the expenses of collection and divers local services, which may be taken at about 100,000,000 f. more, and raised it to 515,000,000 f. in place of 415,000,000 f. But the estimate of receipt and expenditure was inferior to the real amount, because then, as now, the real expenses were always beyond the estimates. It will by and by be clearly shown that the sum of 415,000,000 f. was increased to 500,000,000 f. Happily the product of the taxes exceeded the estimate as well as the expenditure. The double excess thus produced there is no doubt had been foreseen; but fearing that in future the receipts would not equal the excess of the expenditure, the government determined to assure itself of a supplementary resource. Ten millions still remained to be met, as we have before said, in order to complete the payments of the year VIII.; it was supposed that 20,000,000 f. would be wanted for the payments of the year IX., 30,000,000 f. would thus have to be raised in two years. It was decided for this sum alone to have recourse to an alienation of the national property. Fifteen millions of this property sold in each year would not surpass the amount of alienation which it was possible to effect with advantage, and without disorder in the course of the year. By placing this business in the hands of the managers of the sinking fund, who had already very ably acquitted themselves of the duty, the government was certain to obtain an advantageous price for the portions of the domains of the state thus sold. In this way the past debt would be liquidated, and the present account be balanced. There only remained one operation to execute in order to terminate the re-organization of the state finances; this was the regulation of the public debt definitively.

The moment was in effect come for determining its amount, for arranging the resources of the sinking fund with the recognized amount of the debt, and for making a convenient use with this object of the 400,000,000 f. of national property which still remained at the disposal of the state.

The public debt was, as it had been left, in a state of bankruptcy, being so declared by the directory for which the convention and constituent assembly had prepared the way. A third of the debt had been placed in the great book, and it was this third, which, in the language of that time, had been called the "consolidated third." Interest at five per cent. had been allowed upon this third, saved from the bankruptcy. The amount inscribed in the great book was 37,000,000 f. interest, not capital, and there remained a considerable sum still to be inscribed; two-thirds of the sum had been erased from the great book, or had been "mobilised," another expression used at that time, and declared to be receivable in payment for the national domains, thus they were no more in fact than real assignats. A posterior law had completed their depreciation by reducing them to one only purpose, that of paying exclusively for the buildings, but neither for the woods nor the land, that made a part of the national property.

It was absolutely necessary to put a term to such a state of things as this, and for that purpose to carry into the "great book" the remainder of the consolidated third, which the anterior government had delayed inscribing, that it might escape paying the interest. Justice, and the good order of the finances, required that such a state of things should terminate. It was proposed to carry into the "great book," a million and a half of the consolidated thirds, but only to bear interest from the beginning of the year XII. This portion of the debt, though the enjoyment of the interest was delayed for two years, acquired instantly, from the mere circumstance of its inscription, a value nearly equal to that already entered; and a much higher value was thus conferred on all which remained of the provisional third, by this appearance of punctuality. A considerable sum remained to be entered, either in "consolidated thirds," properly so called, or in the debts of emigrants, of which the state had taken the responsibility when it confiscated their property, or in the debts of Belgium, which had been the condition of the conquest. Finally, there were the "two-thirds mobilised," extremely depreciated, and which it was but equitable to give the holders the means of realising. The conversion of the "consolidated thirds" was offered by funding them at the rate of five for a hundred capital. It was likely that the holders would eagerly accept this offer. For this purpose it was proposed to create a million stock, and if the project succeeded, it was imagined that the "mobilised two-thirds" would be speedily absorbed. A

final period was fixed for the payment of debts due for national property, after which, the "two-thirds" bonds were to be no longer received in payment. The time thus allowed having expired, the property not paid for lapsed to the state.

It was estimated that on adding the 20,000,000f. of stock to the sum of 37,000,000 f. of consolidated thirds, already entered in the great book, it would be sufficient to meet the amount of the consolidated third remaining to be entered, the mobilised two-thirds, of which the conversion was contemplated, and, lastly, the debts of the emigrants and of Belgium. The total of the permanent public debt would then consist of a charge of 57,000,000 f. In addition to this permanent charge there were 20,000,000 f. in life-annuities, 19,000,000 f. in civil and religious pensions, the last paid to the clergy who had lost their property, and, finally, 30,000,000f. of military pensions, in all 69,000,000 f. of terminable annuities, of which about 3,000,000 f. would annually terminate. It was possible to hope in a few years, by means of the extinction of the terminable debt, that the savings would cover the sensible augmentations to which the perpetual debt was liable, in consequence of new entries in the great book. It followed that the whole charge, making provision for the old claims, could not exceed the amount of 100,000,000 f. for the service of the public debt, of which one-half would be a perpetual charge, and one-half be terminable. The position of the finances, therefore, stood thus: a public debt of 100,000,000 f.; a budget of 500,000,000 f.; equal in receipt and expenditure, or altogether of 600,000,000 f., including the expenses of collection. This was a situation certainly much better than that of England, which had an absorbing debt of 500,000,000 f. annually, upon a revenue of between 1000,000,000 f. and 1100,000,000 f. In addition to this there remained still to France the resource of the indirect contributions; that is to say, of the tax upon liquors, tobacco, salt, and similar articles not then re-established, and which furnished, at a future time, a very large revenue.

The first consul was desirous of proportioning the resources of the sinking fund to the income of the debt. He decided upon the creation of stock involving a charge of 2,700,000 f. to cover the deficiency of the years V., VI., and VII., of 1,000,000 f. for that of the year VIII., and of several millions more for the inscription of the consolidated thirds, for the conversion of the two-thirds mobilised, and similar exigencies. He devoted to the sinking fund a capital of 90,000,000 f. in national property, which might be sold as convenience required, and employed in the purchase of stock. The first consul also had a transfer made to it of 5,400,000 f. of stock belonging to the funds of public instruction, which was replaced in a mode that will be shortly seen.

The national domains were thus preserved from being wasted; because by the sinking fund they were alienated slowly, at the times most beneficial, or were kept back if it was found convenient; thus being protected from the renewal of those dilapidations which had been before so much lamented. In order to secure the rest with greater certainty, the first consul determined to apply a considerable part to other services, respecting which he felt great solicitude, such as public instruction and the invalids. Public instruction appeared to him the most important service of the state, and that for which an enlightened government, such as his own, was bound to make a provision in all haste, having a new state of society to form. As to the invalids, in other words, the wounded soldiers, they composed in some sort his own family; they were the supporters of his power, and the instruments of his glory; he owed them all his cares, and he was indebted to them some portion at least of the thousand millions formerly promised by the republic to the defenders of their country

The first consul disliked to see these important objects liable to the variations and deficiencies of the budget. In consequence, he devoted 120,000,000 f. of national property to public instruction, and 40,000,000 f. to the support of the invalids. Here he had ample means to endow richly the noble institutions which it was his intention some day to devote to the instruction of the youth of France, and also to endow several hospitals for invalid soldiers, similar to that which had its origin in the time of Louis XIV. Whether these allotments were or were not maintained afterwards, there were, for the moment, 160,000,000 f. preserved from irregular sale, and made a relief to the annual budget.

Thus, of 400,000,000 f. remaining of the national property, 10,000,000 f. were devoted to the expenditure of the year VIII., and 20,000,000 f. to that of the year IX. The sinking fund had 90,000,000 f.; public instruction, 120,000,000 f., and the invalids, 40,000,000 f. This was a sum total of 280,000,000 f. out of 400,000,000 f., for which a very useful employment was found, without having recourse to the system of alienation. Of this sum of 280,000,000 f., 10,000,000 f. only were for the year VIII., and 20,000,000 f. for the year IX., which was to be disposed of in two years, and, therefore, was attended with little inconvenience; the 90,000,000 f. designed for the sinking fund, would only be sold if the fund required money, and then very slowly, perhaps not at all. The 120,000,000 f. devoted to public instruction, and the 40,000,000 f. for the invalids, were never to be sold. Out of the 400,000,000 f., therefore, but 120,000,000 f. would remain unappropriated and disposable, while, in reality, only about 30,000,000 f. out of 400,000,000 f. were to be parted with by the state. The remainder was for divers services, or as a disposable reserve, with the certainty of soon acquiring a value double or triple, at least, in advantage to the state.

To recapitulate: the government took the advantage of the return of credit to substitute the resource of the creation of stock for that of the alienation of the national property. By disposing of a very small portion of this property, and by a creation of stock, it paid off the debts arising upon the years V., VI., VII., and VIII. It completed means for the acquittal of the public debt, and assured the payment of the interest in a certain and regular manner. Having thus regulated the past, saved the rest of the state domains, and fixed the amount of the debt, there were 100,000,000 f. of interest annually to be paid, with an ample sinking fund; and, lastly, a budget of balance, in receipt and expenditure, of 500,000,000 f. without, and 600,000,000 f. with the expenses of collection.

Such a distribution of the public property, conceived with as much equity as good sense, ought

to have met general approbation. Notwithstanding this, a strong opposition was raised in the tribunate. The 415,000,000 f. demanded for the current year, or year IX., were accorded without opposition; but its enemies complained that the budget was not voted in advance; a very unjust reproach, for nothing had been arranged at that time for such a proceeding. It was not yet practised in England, and among financiers was still a matter of disputation. The same opposition members reproached the government that the regulation of the arrears was an act of bankruptcy towards the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., and consolidated their debts at 3 per cent. in place of 5, as was the case with those of the year VIII. They censured the regulation of the debt for depriving the holders of the consolidated third of the interest of their stock for two years, because that interest was only to commence with the year XII. These two reproaches were very ill founded; because, as has been seen, the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., in obtaining stock carrying an interest of 3 per cent., received more than the value of their debts; and as to the portion of the consolidated thirds, of which the inscription was ordered, a great benefit was done to the holders by the mere circumstance of the inscription. If, in effect, the inscription had been deferred for a year or two more, as had been done by the former government, not only would the holders have been deprived of the interest, but of the benefit of the definitive consolidation. It was a great advantage to them so soon to resume the mere work of consolidation. The tribunate got warm upon these petty objections, paid no regard to the answers which were addressed to it, and rejected the plan of finance by a majority of fifty-six to thirty, in the sitting of the 19th of March, or 28th of Ventôse. Some cries of "Long live the Republic!" were heard, raised in the tribunes, which had not been heard for a long time, and recalled the unhappy times of the convention. On the motion of MM. Riouffe and Chauvelin, the president ordered the tribune to be cleared.

On the 21st of March, or 30th of Ventôse, two days after, being the last day of the session of the year IX., the legislative body heard the discussion of the bill. Three of the tribunate attacked and three of the counsellors of state defended it. Benjamin Constant was one of the three tribunes. He urged, in an eloquent and brilliant manner, the objections to the government scheme. The legislative body, notwithstanding, voted for its adoption by a majority of two hundred and twenty-seven against fifty-eight. The first consul ought to have been satisfied with this result. But he did not know, any more than those who surrounded him, that we ought to do good without being surprised or annoyed by the injustice with which it is too frequently repaid. What man had ever so much glory to repay him for such unjust and indiscreet attacks? Besides, in spite of these attacks, the measures of the government were really sound and excellent. The majority in the legislative body was, at least, five-sixths, and in the tribunate, where nothing was decided, it was only two-thirds. There was nothing to be alarmed at or to astonish in such feeble minorities. But although he was the object of universal admiration, the man that governed France knew not how to bear the puny censures dealt out upon his administration. The time for a real representative government was not then come; the opposition had not more of principles and manners than the government itself. That which achieves the portraiture of the opponents of the measure in the tribunate is, that the odious act against the revolutionists was not the subject of a single observation. They availed themselves of the circumstance of that act not being referred to the legislative, to remain silent about it. Upon matters far less important, and even irreproachable, they declaimed aloud, and suffered to pass, without observation, an unpardonable infraction of all the rules of justice. Thus it fares, at nearly all times, with men and parties.

The sterile agitation, produced by a few opponents in complete error about the general movement, the public mind, and the necessities of the times, occasioned but little sensation. The public was entirely occupied with the spectacle of the immense labours which had procured for France victory and a continental peace, and which were soon to procure for her a maritime one.

In the midst of his military and political occupations, the first consul, as has been several times observed, did not cease to give his attention to the roads, the canals, the bridges, and to whatever concerned manufactures and commerce.

The miserable state of the roads has been already described, as well as the means employed to make up the deficiency of the tolls. He had ordered an ample inquiry to be made into the subject, but as too often happens, the difficulty lay more in the deficiency of funds than in the selection of a good system. He went directly to the object; and in the budget of the year IX. appropriated fresh sums from the treasury out of its general funds to continue the extraordinary repairs already commenced. Canals were also much talked about. Men's minds, wearied with political agitation, willingly directed themselves towards all that concerned commerce and manufactures. The canal now known under the name of the canal of St. Quentin, joining the navigation of the Seine and the Oise with that of the Somme and the Escaut, in other words connecting Belgium with France, had been abandoned. It had not been found possible to agree upon the mode of executing the excavation, by means of which a passage was to be afforded from the valley of the Oise into that of the Escaut. The engineers were divided in opinion. The first consul repaired to the spot in person, heard the difficulty explained, decided it, and decided it rightly. The excavation was determined upon, and continued in the best direction, that which has succeeded. The population of St. Quentin received him with great joy, and scarcely had he returned to Paris when the inhabitants of the Seine Inférieure addressed him by a deputation, to solicit him to grant them in turn forty-eight hours of his time. He promised them an early visit to Normandy. He then decided upon the erection of three new bridges in Paris; that at the termination of the Jardin des Plantes; that denominated Austerlitz, which joins the island of the City to the island of St. Louis; and lastly, that which connects the Louvre with the palace of the Institute. At the same time he turned his attention to the road of the Simplon, the first of his youthful projects, always the nearest to his heart, and wor-

thy, in future ages, of taking its place among the recollections of Rivoli and of Marengo. It will be remembered that the first consul, as soon as he had founded the Cisalpine republic, wished to connect it with France by a road, which from Lyons or Dijon, passing Geneva, should traverse the Valais, and going by Lago Maggiore to Milan, enable an army of fifty thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon to proceed at any time into the midst of Upper Italy. For want of such a road he had been obliged to cross Mount St. Bernard. Now the Cisalpine republic had been reconstituted at the congress of Lunéville, it was more than ever needful to establish a great military communication between Lombardy and France. The first consul immediately gave the necessary instructions for the work. General Tureau, whom we have already seen descending the Little St. Bernard with his legions of conscripts, while Bonaparte descended the greater mountain with his more seasoned forces, the same general Tureau received orders to make Domo d'Ossola his head-quarters, at the foot of the Simplon itself. The general was to protect the workmen, and his soldiers were to assist in the labour of the undertaking.

To this magnificent work the first consul desired to add another in commemoration of the passage of the Alps. The fathers of the Great St. Bernard had rendered real services to the French army. Being supplied with money, they had for ten days supported the vigour of the soldiers by means of wine and food. The first consul, retaining a grateful sense of these services, resolved to establish two similar hospitals, one upon Mount Cenis, the other at the Simplon, both to be subsidiary to the convent of the Great St. Bernard. They were each to consist of fifteen brothers, and to receive from the Cisalpine republic an endowment in land. The republic was unable to refuse any thing to its founder. But as that founder loved promptness of execution before all things, he had the works for the first named establishment executed at the expense of France, in order that no delay might occur in forwarding these memorable establishments. Thus magnificent roads and noble benevolent foundations were destined to attest to future generations the passage of the modern Hannibal across the Alps.

With these great and beneficent objects those of another character occupied his attention, having for their object a creation of a different, but equally useful character—the compilation of the civil code. The first consul had charged Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet, and Bijot de Préamenen, eminent lawyers, with the task of digesting the code, and their labour was completed; the result was then communicated to the court of cassation, and to twenty-nine tribunals of appeal, afterwards denominated royal courts. The opinions of all the chief magistrates were thus collected. The whole was now to be submitted to the council of state, and carefully discussed under the presidency of the first consul. After this it was proposed to lay it before the legislative body in the approaching sessions, or that of the year x.

Always ready to support great undertakings, and equally as ready to recompense their authors munificently, the first consul had just employed his influence to raise M. Tronchet to the senate. He rewarded in him a great lawyer, one of the authors of the civil code, and—what was not an indifferent matter in his eyes, under a political signification—the courageous defender of Louis XVI.

Every thing, therefore, was organized at one time, with that harmony which a great mind is able to introduce into his labours, and with a rapidity which a determined will is alone able to effect, under a punctual obedience to its authority. The genius which effected these things was, beyond doubt, great; but it must be remarked, that the situation was not less extraordinary than the genius. Bonaparte had France and Europe to move, and victory for his lever. He had to digest all the codes of the French nation; but, in the mean while, every one was disposed to submit to his laws. He had roads, canals, and bridges to construct; but nobody contested with him the resources for these objects. He had even nations ready to furnish him with their treasures; the Italians, for example, who contributed to the opening of the Simplon, and the endowment of the hospitals on the summit of the Alps. Providence does nothing by halves; for a great genius it finds a mighty operation, and for a mighty operation a great genius.

BOOK IX.

THE NEUTRAL POWERS.

CONTINUANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DIFFERENT COURTS OF EUROPE.—TREATY WITH THE COURT OF NAPLES.—EXCLUSION OF THE ENGLISH FROM THE PORTS OF THE TWO SICILIES, AND AGREEMENT CONTRACTED WITH THE NEAPOLITAN GOVERNMENT TO RECEIVE A DIVISION OF FRENCH TROOPS AT OTRANTO.—SPAIN PROMISES TO FORCE THE PORTUGUESE TO EXCLUDE THE ENGLISH FROM THE COASTS OF PORTUGAL.—VAST NAVAL PLANS OF THE FIRST CONSUL, FOR UNITING THE NAVAL FORCES OF SPAIN, HOLLAND, AND FRANCE.—MEANS DEVISED FOR SUCCOURING EGYPT.—ADMIRAL GANTEAUME, AT THE HEAD OF ONE DIVISION, LEAVES BREST DURING A STORM, AND SAILS TOWARDS THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR, UPON HIS WAY TO THE MOUTH OF THE NILE.—GENERAL COALITION OF ALL THE MARITIME COUNTRIES AGAINST ENGLAND.—PREPARATIONS OF THE NEUTRALS IN THE BALTIC.—WARLIKE ARDOUR OF PAUL I.—DISTRESS OF ENGLAND.—SHE IS VISITED BY A FEARFUL FAMINE.—HER FINANCIAL STATE BEFORE AND SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR.—HER EXPENDITURE AND RESOURCES ALIKE DOUBLED.—UNPOPULARITY OF PITT.—HIS DISAGREEMENT WITH GEORGE III.

AND HIS RETIREMENT.—THE MINISTER ADDINGTON.—ENGLAND, DESPITE HER DIFFICULTIES, FACES THE STORM, AND SENDS ADMIRALS PARKER AND NELSON INTO THE BALTIC, TO BREAK UP THE NEUTRAL COALITION.—PLAN OF NELSON AND PARKER.—THEY DETERMINE TO FORCE THE PASSAGE OF THE SOUND.—THE SWEDISH SIDE BEING BADLY DEFENDED, THE ENGLISH FLEET PASSES THE SOUND WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY.—IT APPEARS BEFORE COPENHAGEN.—THE OPINION OF NELSON IS, BEFORE ENTERING THE BALTIC, TO GIVE BATTLE TO THE DANES.—DESCRIPTION OF THE POSITION OF COPENHAGEN, AND OF THE MEANS ADOPTED FOR THE DEFENCE OF THIS IMPORTANT MARITIME FORTRESS.—NELSON EXECUTES A BOLD MANŒUVRE, AND SUCCEEDS IN ANCHORING IN THE KING'S CHANNEL, IN FACE OF THE DANISH SHIPS.—SANGUINARY ENGAGEMENT.—VALOUR OF THE DANES, AND DANGER OF NELSON.—HE SENDS A FLAG OF TRUCE TO THE CROWN PRINCE OF DENMARK, AND THEREBY OBTAINS THE ADVANTAGES OF A VICTORY.—SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES FOR FOURTEEN WEEKS.—THE DEATH OF PAUL I. IS MADE KNOWN.—EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN RUSSIA.—EXASPERATION OF THE RUSSIAN NOBLES AGAINST THE EMPEROR PAUL, AND DISPOSITION TO RID THEMSELVES OF THAT PRINCE BY ANY MEANS, EVEN BY A CRIME.—COUNT PAHLEN.—HIS CHARACTER AND PLANS.—HIS CONDUCT WITH THE GRAND DUKE ALEXANDER.—THE SCHEME OF ASSASSINATION CONCEALED UNDER THAT OF A FORCED ABDICATION.—FRIGHTFUL SCENE IN THE MICHEL PALACE DURING THE NIGHT OF THE 23RD OF MARCH.—TRAGICAL DEATH OF PAUL I.—ALEXANDER'S ACCESSION.—THE COALITION OF THE NEUTRAL POWERS DISSOLVED BY THE DEATH OF THE EMPEROR PAUL.—REAL ARMISTICE IN THE BALTIC.—THE FIRST CONSUL ENDEAVOURS, BY OFFERING HANOVER TO PRUSSIA, TO RETAIN HER IN THE LEAGUE.—ENGLAND, SATISFIED AT HAVING BROKEN THE LEAGUE BY THE BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, AND BEING RID OF PAUL I., SEEKS TO PROFIT BY THE OCCASION TO TREAT WITH FRANCE, AND REPAIR THE ERRORS OF PITT.—THE ADDINGTON MINISTRY OFFERS PEACE TO THE FIRST CONSUL THROUGH THE INTERMEDIATE MEANS OF M. OTTO.—THE PROPOSITION IS ACCEPTED, AND A NEGOTIATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND IS OPENED IN LONDON.—PEACE BECOMES GENERAL, BOTH ON LAND AND SEA.—PROGRESS OF FRANCE AFTER THE 18TH OF BRUMAIRE.

PEACE with the emperor and empire having been signed at Lunéville, in February, 1801, the first consul was impatient to reap the benefit of the consequences. These were to conclude a peace with those continental states which had not yet become reconciled with the republic; to force them to shut their ports against England; and to turn against that country the united forces of the neutral powers, in order to combine some great operation against its territory and commerce, and by this union of means to force a maritime peace, indispensable to that of the continent. Every thing announced that the great and happy consequences could not be delayed for a long time.

The Germanic diet had ratified the signature of the emperor to the treaty of Lunéville. There was no apprehension that it would be otherwise; because Austria held the power of influencing the ecclesiastical states, the only states really opposed to the treaty. In regard to the secular princes, as they were to be indemnified for their losses from the estates it was proposed to secularize, they had an interest in seeing the stipulations promptly accepted between Austria and France. Besides, they were placed under the influence of Prussia, which power France had disposed to give her approval of what was done by the emperor at Lunéville. Besides this, all the world at that time wished for peace, and was ready to contribute to that end even by making some sacrifices. Prussia alone, in ratifying the signature of the emperor without powers given to him from the diet, was rather desirous of according to the ratification the character of her tolerance, than of her approbation; thus reserving for the future the rights of the empire. But this proposition on the part of Prussia, as it implied a censure upon the emperor, while she ratified the treaty, did not obtain the support of the majority. The treaty was ratified, in its pure and simple form, by a *conclusum*, on the 9th of March, 1801, the 18th of Ventôse, in the year IX. The ratifications were exchanged in Paris on the 16th of March, or 25th Ventôse. Nothing more remained to be regulated but the plan of indemnification, which was to be the subject of ulterior negotiations.

Peace was thus concluded with the greater part of Europe. It had not yet been signed with Russia; but France was leagued with her and the northern courts, as will be seen, in one great maritime coalition. There were at Paris two Russian ministers at once, M. Sprengporten, relative to the Russian prisoners, and M. Kalitscheff, for the regulation of general business. The last had arrived in the beginning of March, or middle of Ventôse.

The courts of Naples and Portugal it still remained to coerce, in order to shut out England entirely from the continent.

Murat was marching towards southern Italy with a choice body of men, drawn from the camp at Amiens. Reinforced by several detachments taken from the army of general Brune, he had reached Foligno, in order to oblige the court of Naples to yield to the will of France. Had it not been for the interest testified in behalf of Naples by the emperor of Russia, the first consul would most likely have given to the house of Parma the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in order to keep that fine country out of an enemy's family. But the wishes of the emperor Paul did not admit of such a proceeding. The first consul, too, was very desirous of conciliating public opinion throughout Europe; and, upon this ground, it was expedient to avoid, as much as possible, the overthrow of the older kingdoms. He was willing to grant a peace to the court of Naples, if it would consent to break its alliance with England; but to induce it to do this, was a task exceedingly difficult of accomplishment. Murat advanced as far as the frontiers of the kingdom, taking great care to avoid the papal dominions, and lavishing upon the pope the highest marks of his respect. The court of Naples no longer hesitated, and signed an armistice, which contained a stipulation, in consonance with the views of the first consul, securing the exclusion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies. The armistice was short, being only for the space of thirty days; these being expired, a definitive treaty of peace was to be signed. The marquis of Gallo, one of the negotiators of the treaty of Campo Formio, who had the advantage of being

acquainted with the first consul, and of having over him as much influence as M. Cobentzel, repaired to Paris. He relied on these personal recommendations, on the protection of the Russian legation, and on the recommendation of Austria, for obtaining the conditions desired by the court of Naples, which were included in a simple neutrality. This was a ridiculous pretension; because a court which had given the signal for the second coalition, which had waged war obstinately against France, and, in fact, treated her with great indignity, could hardly expect, now it lay at the mercy of France, to get off upon the pure and simple condition of separating itself from England. The least that France could insist upon would be to compel Naples, by good will or by force, to act as hostilely against England as she had before acted in hostility to France.

M. Gallo, having shown some marks of self-sufficiency in Paris, and having exhibited his dependence—more than, indeed, was decent—upon the Russian embassy, an end was quickly put to his negotiation. Talleyrand informed him that a French plenipotentiary had departed for Florence; that the negotiation was consequently adjourned to that city; and that, besides, he would not be able to treat with a negotiator who was not empowered to consent to the sole condition considered essential; namely, the expulsion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies—a condition which the emperor Paul had demanded as well as the first consul himself. In consequence, M. Gallo found himself obliged to leave Paris immediately. M. Alquier had, in fact, been despatched to Florence; he had been recalled from Madrid at the time when Lucien Bonaparte was sent there. M. Alquier was furnished with full powers and instructions to negotiate with Naples.

On reaching Florence as expeditiously as possible, M. Alquier found there the Chevalier Micheroux, the minister who had signed the armistice with Murat; he had received full powers from his court. The negotiations carried on in that city under the bayonets of the French army, met with none of the difficulties they had encountered in Paris. The treaty of peace was signed on the 18th of March, 1801, or 27th of Ventôse, year IX. The stipulations of the treaty were moderate, upon comparing the situation of the court of Naples with that of the French republic. To this branch of the house of Bourbon was left the integrity of its states. The only territory demanded was a small portion of the island of Elba, Porto Longone, and the surrounding district; the rest of the island belonging to Tuscany, and having been divided between the two countries. The intention of the first consul was to attach the entire island to France. An historian of these treaties has loudly attacked this as a violent act, whereas it was no more than the simple right of the victor; with the exception of this very trifling sacrifice, Naples lost nothing. She was obliged to shut her ports against the English, and to make over to France three frigates, ready armed, in the port of Ancona. These the first consul designed for Egypt. The most important stipulation of the treaty was secret. It obliged the Neapolitan government to receive a division of twelve or fifteen thousand men in the gulf of Tarento, and to find them provisions during their stay. The object of the first consul was to send them without reserve to the succour of Egypt. At that place they would be half way on their road to Alexandria. The last article stipulated for the objects of art which had been chosen at Rome for France. These having been packed in cases when the Neapolitan army had penetrated into the estates of the pope in 1799, had been seized by the court of Naples, and appropriated by that government. An indemnity of 500,000 f. was granted to the French who had been pillaged or harassed by the undisciplined bands belonging to Naples.

Such was the treaty of Florence; which must be considered an act of clemency, when the anterior conduct of the court of Naples is reflected upon, but which was perfectly well adapted to the objects of the first consul, almost wholly occupied with the object of closing the ports of the continent against England, and with securing the most advantageous points from whence he could communicate with Egypt.

Nothing was yet arranged with the pope, whose plenipotentiary was at Paris still negotiating the most important question of all, that relating to religion. He was dissatisfied with the king of Sardinia, who had given up that island to the English, and as well with the inhabitants of Piedmont, who had shown feelings not very amicable towards France. He was, therefore, anxious to free himself from any engagement respecting that important part of Italy.

Turning to Spain and Portugal; every thing in these countries proceeded successfully. The court of Spain, delighted with the stipulations of the treaty of Lunéville, which secured Tuscany to the young prince of Parma, with the title of king, showed itself, day by day, more at the devotion of the first consul and his views. The fall of M. Urquijo, an event wholly unexpected, far from being injurious to the relations of France, only served to render them more intimate. This was not at first believed, because in Spain M. Urquijo was thought to be a sort of revolutionist, from whom towards France more favour was to be expected than from any other minister. But the result showed this idea to be erroneous. M. Urquijo had only been prime minister a very short time; desiring to correct certain abuses, he had prevailed upon the king, Charles IV., to address a letter to the pope, written in the royal hand all through, which contained a series of propositions for the reform of the Spanish clergy. The pope, alarmed to find a spirit of reformation introducing itself into Spain of all countries, addressed himself to the old duke of Parma, the queen's brother, complaining of M. Urquijo, and representing him as a bad catholic. This was of itself sufficient to ruin M. Urquijo in the king's opinion. The prince of the peace, the open enemy of M. Urquijo, took advantage of the occasion to strike the final blow during a journey taken by the court. By these united influences M. Urquijo was disgraced, and treated with a brutality beyond example. He was carried away from his own house, and banished from Madrid as a state criminal. M. Cevallos, the relative and creature of the prince of the peace, was nominated his successor, and the prince became again from that moment the real minister of the court of Spain. As he had sometimes shown

an opposition to a close alliance with France, probably that he might be able to make it a charge against the Spanish minister, it was feared that this ministerial revolution might be prejudicial to the objects of the first consul. But Lucien Bonaparte, who had recently arrived in Madrid, discovering at once how matters stood, paid no attention to M. Cevallos, who he saw was a powerless subordinate, and placed himself in immediate communication with the prince of the peace himself, whom he made to comprehend that he was regarded in Paris as the real prime minister of Charles IV.; that to him alone would be attributed all the difficulties which the policy of France might meet with in Spain, and that it depended upon himself whether France regarded Spain as a friend or an enemy, according to his conduct. The prince of the peace, who had drawn upon himself numerous animosities, and, above all, that of the heir presumptive, who was deeply irritated at the state of oppression in which he was condemned to live—the prince of the peace thinking himself utterly lost if the king and queen should die, looked upon the friendship of Bonaparte as most valuable to him, and promptly accepted the alliance of France in place of its hostility.

From this period business was transacted directly between the prince of the peace and Lucien Bonaparte. M. Urquijo, finding himself too weak to bring the question of Portugal to a settlement, had continually deferred any positive explanation upon the subject. He had made France a thousand promises, followed by no result. The prince of the peace avowed in his interviews with Lucien, that thus far they had felt no inclination to act; that M. Urquijo had amused France with fine words, but declared himself that he was ready, as far as he was concerned, to concoct measures with the first consul for the purpose of acting effectively against Portugal, provided it were possible to agree upon some particular points. He demanded, first, the assistance of a French division of twenty-five thousand men, because Spain was not able to raise a larger force than twenty thousand; to such a wretched state was this fine monarchy reduced. The presence of a French force would alarm the king and queen, therefore, in order to quiet their fears, he proposed that the force thus supplied should be placed under the command of a Spanish general; that this general should be the prince of the peace himself; lastly, that the provinces of Portugal of which the conquest might be made, should remain in trust in the hands of the king of Spain, until a general peace; in the interim the ports of Portugal were to be closed against England.

These propositions were eagerly accepted by the first consul, and were sent back for the acceptance of king Charles IV. This prince, governed by the queen, as she was herself governed by the prince of the peace, consented to make war upon his son-in-law, on condition that he should not be deprived of any part of his territories; that he should only be obliged to break with the English, and to enter into an alliance with Spain and France. These objects did not altogether correspond with those of the prince of the peace, who wished, so it was said in Madrid, to procure for himself a principality in Portugal. However that might have been he was obliged to submit, and received in due course the rank of generalissimo.

A summons was now sent to the court of Lisbon, and a demand made that it should, within fifteen days, enter into an explanation, and make its selection between England and Spain, the last being supported by France. In the meanwhile, on both sides of the Pyrenees, preparations were made for war. The prince of the peace became generalissimo of the Spanish and French troops, and took away even the king's guards in order to complete his army. He then amused the court with reviews and warlike exhibitions, giving himself up to illusions of military glory. The first consul, on his side, hastened to march upon Spain a part of the troops which were returning to France. He formed a division of twenty-five thousand men, well armed and equipped. General Lecler, had the command of the advanced guard, and general Gouvion St. Cyr, whom with reason he regarded as one of the most able generals of the time, was to command the entire force, and make up for the perfect incapacity of the prince generalissimo.

It was settled that these troops, put in movement in the month of March, should be ready to enter Spain in April following.

The whole of Europe concurred in aiding the objects of the French government. Under the influence of the first consul, the southern states had shut their ports against England, and the northern states were in active league against her. In this situation it was necessary that England should have forces every where. In the Mediterranean to blockade Egypt; in the Straits of Gibraltar to arrest the movements of the French fleets in both seas to help her threatened ally; before Brest and Rochefort to blockade the grand French and Spanish fleets, which were ready to set sail; in the north to keep the Baltic in restraint, and overcome the neutral powers; and in India as well, to maintain her authority and conquests in that quarter of the globe.

The first consul was desirous of seizing the moment when the British forces, obliged to be every where, should necessarily be much scattered, in order to attempt a great expedition. The principal, and that which he had most at heart, was the succour of Egypt. He had a great duty to fulfil towards that army, which he had himself led beyond the sea, and then left alone that he might himself come back to the aid of France. He considered the colony he had thus formed upon the banks of the Nile the most glorious of all his works. It was important that he should prove to the world, that in transporting thirty-six thousand men to the east, he had not yielded to the impulses of a young and ardent imagination, but had attempted a grave enterprise, susceptible of being conducted to a successful end. His efforts have already been seen for concluding a naval armistice, which should permit six frigates to enter the port of Alexandria. This armistice, as it will be remembered, had not been concluded. Not having had financial resources sufficient for completing armaments by sea and land, the first consul had been unable to carry into effect the great operation which he had projected for the succour of Egypt. At present, from absence of the pressure of a continental war, he was able to direct his resources exclusively towards naval war-

fare. Having nearly the whole extent of the coasts of continental Europe at his disposal, he contemplated, for the preservation of Egypt, projects as bold and extensive as those which he had executed in making its conquest. The winter season too was near, which would render impossible the continuation of the English cruisers upon the coasts.

Meanwhile vessels of every kind, both of war and commerce, from the smallest barks up to those of trade and war, sailed from different ports of Holland, France, Spain, Italy, and even from the Barbary coast, carrying to Egypt, with intelligence from France, luxuries, European goods, arms, and warlike stores. Some of these vessels were taken, but the greater part entered Alexandria. Not a week passed without news being received at Cairo from the government at home,—proofs of the interest which the colony inspired there.

The first consul projected a species of line-of-battle ship, adapted to the inland navigation of Egypt. He had the model of a seventy-four executed, combining great strength with the advantage of being able to navigate the shallow channels of Alexandria with her guns on board [1]. Orders were given to build a certain number of ships upon that model.

While he was taking such great care to sustain the spirit of the Egyptian army, transmitting men to it frequently as well as partial relief, he had at the same moment in the course of preparation a great expedition in order to convey there at once a powerful reinforcement of troops and munitions of war. The armies had returned home to the French soil. They were about to press heavily, by their cost, upon the national finances; but in return they offered to the government a great means of disturbing, if not of striking a blow at England. Thirty thousand men remained in the Cisalpine republic, ten thousand in Piedmont, six thousand in Switzerland; fifteen thousand were on their march to the gulf of Tarentum; twenty-five thousand were marching upon Portugal; twenty-five thousand were quartered in Holland. There were thus one hundred and eleven thousand men that were to be supported by foreign powers. The remainder were to be maintained by the French treasury, but they were at the disposal of the first consul. A camp was formed in Holland, another in French Flanders, and a third at Brest; a fourth was already established in the Gironde, either for Portugal, or to furnish such troops as were to embark at Rochefort. The corps returning from Italy were to be collected near Marseilles and Toulon. The division of fifteen thousand men designed for the gulf of Tarentum was to occupy Otranto, in virtue of the secret article in the treaty with Naples, to cover the neighbouring harbours with numerous batteries, and to lay down moorings, where a fleet might come and take on board a division of ten or twelve thousand men, to transport them into Egypt. Admiral Villeneuve went thither in order to superintend the preparations necessary for such an embarcation.

The naval forces of Holland, France, and Spain, with some remains of the Italian navy, stationed near these different assemblages of troops, gave England reason to fear several expeditions directed upon different points of attack at the same time, on Ireland, Portugal, Egypt, and the East Indies.

The first consul concerted measures with Spain and Holland relative to the employment of the three naval armaments. By uniting the wrecks of the old Dutch navy, five sail of the line and a few frigates might be rendered fit for service. Thirty sail of the line were at Brest, fifteen French, and the same number of Spanish, detained two years in that harbour. With Spain the arrangements made by the first consul were as follow:—five Dutch, combined with five French and Spanish vessels lying at Brest, were to sail for the Brazils, in order to protect that fine kingdom, and prevent the English from indemnifying themselves for the occupation of Portugal by the Spanish and French forces. By this arrangement twenty French and Spanish vessels would remain in Brest, and be ready at any moment to throw an army upon Ireland. A French division, under admiral Ganteaume, was organized in the same port of Brest, to sail, it was said, for St. Domingo, for the purpose of re-establishing in that island the French and Spanish authority. Another French division was equipped at Rochefort, and a Spanish division of five vessels was at Ferrol, with the object of carrying troops to the Antilles, and of recovering Trinidad, or, for example, Martinique. Spain, by the treaty which secured Tuscany to her in exchange for Louisiana, had promised to give France six vessels, armed and equipped, and to deliver them in Cadiz; she also engaged to employ the resources of that ancient arsenal in order to reorganize a portion of the naval force which she formerly had in that port.

The first consul, in making these arrangements, did not explain to the Spanish cabinet his real design, because he was in dread of its indiscretion. He wished to send a part of the combined forces to Brazil and the Antilles, in order to effect the objects which he stated, and to attract after them the English fleets. For the Brest fleet he contemplated one expedition alone, under Ganteaume, announced as for St. Domingo, but in reality destined for Egypt. He ordered the selection of seven vessels of the squadron, the finest sailors, as well as two frigates and a brig. These vessels were to transport five thousand men, munitions of every kind, timber, stores, iron, medicines, and the European commodities which were most desirable in Egypt. The first consul ordered the lading of the vessels, which was nearly completed, to be stopped, and recommenced in a different mode which he had himself determined upon. He wished that every vessel should contain a complete assortment of the articles required for the colony, and not one entire lading of the same article, in order that if one of the vessels should be captured, the expedition should not be entirely deficient in the article contained in the captured ship. This arrangement, contrary to the custom of the naval service, rendered the steerage of the vessels more complicated and difficult; but the absolute will of the first consul vanquished all such obstacles; Lauriston, his aid-de-camp, remained at Brest, and joined to the letters of which he was the bearer, the influence of his presence and earnest exhortations to complete the duty required.

[1] Letter of the 1st of Nivôse, year IX., in the Secretary of State's Office.

The Rochefort expedition, announced to be for the Antilles, also had Egypt for its destination. They laboured at its equipment with all possible expedition. Savary, the aid-de-camp, pushed forward its departure, and urged the arrival of the troops detached from the army of Portugal. The division of twenty-five thousand men, which was going to pass across the Pyrenees, was assembled in the Gironde, and thus furnished an excellent disguise for the real object of the expedition from Rochefort. There were a few battalions borrowed from this force without exciting the least suspicion that they were got ready to embark on board the squadron. This squadron was trusted to the command of the most remarkable of the seamen, perhaps, that France at that time possessed. He joined to a superior intellect, rarely equalled among men in civil or military life, a perfect knowledge of seamanship, and was distinguished in a particular manner by his successful cruise in the Mediterranean, in 1799, which was frequently alluded to in his praise. When, at the last moment, Bonaparte intended to disclose his secret object to the cabinet of Madrid, admiral Bruix was to sail into Ferrol, and strengthening himself by uniting his vessels to the squadron in that port, proceed from thence to Cadiz, where he was to be joined by the division furnished by Spain. Proceeding from thence to Otranto, he was to embark the troops collected there, and set sail for Egypt.

The division at Cadiz, furnished by Spain, was composed of six capital vessels, which were got ready for sea with great expedition. Admiral Dumanoir had set out by post for Cadiz, in order to urge forward this equipment. Bodies of seamen proceeded by land towards that port; and at the same time small vessels filled with seamen were sent coastwise that they might be turned over to the ships of war.

Such numerous expeditions could not fail to attract the attention of the English to all the points at once, dividing and distracting her operations; during which, some one of them availing itself of such a state of things, had nearly a certain chance of arriving safely in Egypt. Desirous of profiting by the bad season, which rendered the cruising of the enemy off Brest, both difficult and liable to interruption, the first consul intended that the sailing of admiral Ganteaume should take place before the commencement of the spring. His orders were explicit; but he was unable to communicate to his naval commanders the boldness which animated those on land. Admiral Ganteaume appeared to the first consul to be bold and successful, because it was that officer who had almost miraculously brought him from Alexandria to Fréjus. But this was an illusion. This experienced naval officer, knowing well the navigation of the Mediterranean, and possessing undaunted bravery, was of a wavering character, and incapable of supporting the burden of a heavy responsibility. The expedition was ready; several families of workmen were on board, under the idea of their being about to sail for St. Domingo; still there was a hesitation about sailing. Savary, having the orders of the first consul, silenced all difficulties, and obliged Ganteaume to set sail. The enemies' cruisers discovered them, and made signals to the blockading squadron that the French fleet was leaving the port. Ganteaume was obliged to return and moor in the outer road. He then feigned to enter the inner road, in order to induce the belief in the English that he had no other object in view than to exercise and manœuvre his squadron.

At last, on the 23rd of January, or 3d of Pluviôse, when a frightful storm had dispersed the enemies' cruisers, admiral Ganteaume set sail, and in spite of the greatest danger, fortunately succeeded in getting out of the port of Brest, and sailing towards the straits of Gibraltar. The succours of Ganteaume were the more desirable in Egypt, since the famous English expedition, consisting of fifteen thousand or eighteen thousand men, said one day to be destined for Ferrol, another for Cadiz, or it might be for the south of France, was at that moment upon its way to Egypt. It was in the road of Macri, opposite the island of Rhodes, awaiting the season for landing, and the completion of the Turkish preparations.

Orders were issued to all the newspapers of the capital to say nothing of any naval movements which might be remarked in the ports of France, unless the intelligence was taken from the *Moniteur*[1].

Before detailing the operations of the French squadrons in the south, it will be right to revert to the north, and observe what passed between England and the neutral powers.

The greatest dangers at this moment were accumulating over England. War had broken out between her government and the Baltic powers. The declaration of the neutrals, similar to that entered into in 1780, being simply a declaration of their rights, England might have dissembled with them for a time, taking this declaration, which was addressed in a general way to all the belligerent parties, as addressed in particular to herself, and might have avoided for a moment the chance of a collision, by taking care to respect the vessels of the Danes, Swedes, Prussians, and Russians. She had, in fact, much more interest in keeping herself in peace with the north, than in annoying the trade of the smaller maritime powers with France. Besides, at this moment, she was in great want of foreign corn, which, for her own interest, rendered the liberty of the neutrals useful to her for a time. In strictness, she was not fully justified in taking measures of reprisal against any but Russia; because among all the members of the league of neutrality, it was only the emperor Paul who had added the measure of an embargo to the declaration. Moreover, here the question of Malta was much more the motive of the embargo, than any of the points at issue concerning maritime rights.

But England, in her pride, had responded to an

[1] Here is a curious letter relating to this subject:—

"The first consul to the minister of general police.—Have the goodness, citizen minister, to address a short circular to the editors of the fourteen journals, forbidding the insertion of any article calculated to afford the enemy the slightest knowledge of the different movements taking place in our squadrons, unless derived from the official journals.

"Paris, 1st Ventôse, year IX."

From the State Paper Office.

exposition of principles by an act of violence, and placed an embargo upon all Swedish, Danish, and Russian vessels. The commerce of Prussia alone she had exempted from these rigorous proceedings, because she wished still to have an understanding with that country; she hoped to detach it from the northern coalition; and, above all, because she knew that Hanover lay at the mercy of that country.

England found herself at one time involved in a war with France and Spain, her old enemies, and with the courts of Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, her old allies. She had been abandoned by Austria since the treaty of Lunéville, and by the court of Naples since the treaty of Florence. Portugal, her last hold upon the continent, was also about to be lost to her. Her situation was become similar to that of France in 1793. She was obliged to fight alone against all Europe, exposed to less danger it is true than France, and also with the less merit in defending herself, because her insular position preserved her from the perils of invasion. To render the similarity of their situations more remarkable and singular, England was the prey to a frightful famine. Her people wanted food of the first necessity. This state of affairs was entirely owing to the obstinacy of Pitt and to the genius of Bonaparte. Pitt refused to treat for peace before the battle of Marengo; and Bonaparte, disarming a part of Europe by his victories, turned the other part against England by his policy; both were incontestably the authors of this wonderful change of fortune.

The situation of England was at that moment very alarming; but it must be acknowledged that she did not become dispirited. The corn harvest of the preceding year, 1799, had been one-third less than a common average, and all the last year's corn had been consumed. The harvest of 1800 had fallen short a fourth part, and a scarcity was the consequence. This deficiency was aggravated doubly by the general war, and by the war in the north with the maritime powers, more especially because her supplies of grain were commonly obtained from the Baltic. If, therefore, the bad crop was the first cause of the famine, it was equally true that the war was a great cause of its aggravation. If the war had only raised the price of corn by interrupting the commerce of the Baltic, it must have already exercised a very disastrous influence upon the public distress. All the taxes this year presented very alarming deficiencies. The income tax and the excise caused an apprehension of a deficit in the revenue of 75,000,000 f. to 100,000,000 f.[1] The expenditure for that year was enormous. In order to meet the necessity, a loan was necessary, amounting to 625,000,000 f. or 650,000,000 f.[2] The total of the expenses of the three kingdoms for that year, Ireland being then united to England, amounted, including the interest of the debt created by Mr. Pitt, to the enormous sum of 1,723,000,000 f.[3], a sum enormous at any time, but more so in 1800; for at that period the budgets had not yet received the increase of amount to which a subsequent period of forty years has raised them in all the European states. France, as before seen, had then to support no more than an expenditure of 600,000,000 f. The amount of the English debt was, as usual, disputed; but taking the amount stated by the government[4], it was 12,109,000,000 f.[5] This demanded for the annual interest and sinking fund an expense of 504,000,000 f.[6], not reckoning the debt of Ireland, and the loans guaranteed on account of the emperor of Germany. Pitt was accused of having increased the public debt, in order to carry on the war of the revolution, more than 7,500,000,000 f.[7] According to the government statement, the amount was 7,454,000,000 f.[8]

But it must be admitted that England presented a singular phenomenon in the improvement of her resources of all kinds, and that her riches increased in proportion to the public burdens. Besides the conquest of India, achieved by the destruction of Tippoo Saib; besides the conquest of a part of the French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies, to which must be added the acquisition of the island of Malta, England had engrossed the commerce of the entire world. According to the official returns, her importations, which had been in 1781, towards the close of the American war, only 318,000,000 f.[9], and in 1792, at the commencement of the war of the revolution only 491,000,000 f.[10], had risen in 1799 to 748,000,000 f.[11] The exportations of the manufactured productions of England, which in 1781 had been 190,000,000 f.[12], were, in 1792, 622,000,000 f.[13], and in 1799 had reached 849,000,000 f.[14] Thus, from the date of the termination of the American war all had tripled; and since the commencement of the war of the revolution had doubled.

In 1788 the commercial navy of England employed 13,827 ships, and 107,925 seamen; in 1801 it employed 18,877 ships, and 143,661 seamen. The excise and customs had risen from 183,000,000 f.[15] to 389,000,000 f.[16] The sinking fund, which, in 1784, was 25,000,000 f.[17], was 137,000,000 f.[18] in 1800.

All the forces of the British empire had received a double or triple increase within twenty years; and if the pressure was great at the moment, it was still a pressure upon wealth. It was very true that England was loaded with a debt of more than 12,000,000,000 f., and an annual charge upon that debt of 500,000,000 f.; that she had to support, in that year, an expenditure of 1,700,000,000f., and to make a loan of 600,000,000 f. to meet her outlay. All this was, beyond doubt, enormous in amount, especially if the value of money at this time be taken into consideration; but England contained within herself means to meet these charges. Although she was not a continental

[1] £3,000,000 or £4,000,000.
[2] £25,000,000 or £26,000,000.
[3] £69,000,000.

[4] These amounts are taken from the budget presented to parliament by Mr. Addington, successor to Pitt, in June, 1801.
[5] In sterling money, £484,365,474.
[6] Or £20,144,000.
[7] Or £300,000,000.
[8] Or £298,000,000.
[9] £12,734,000.
[10] £19,659,000.
[11] £29,945,000.
[12] £7,633,000.
[13] £24,905,000.
[14] £33,991,000.
[15] £7,320,000.
[16] £15,587,000.
[17] £1,000,000.
[18] £5,500,000.

power, she had one hundred and ninety-three thousand regular troops, and one hundred and nine thousand militia or fencibles, in all three hundred and two thousand men[1]. She possessed eight hundred and fourteen[2] ships of war of all sizes, building, repairing, in ordinary, or at sea. In this number were one hundred vessels of the line and two hundred frigates, spread over every latitude; and twenty vessels with forty frigates in reserve, ready to come out of port. Her effective force could not then be taken at less than one hundred and twenty ships of the line and two hundred and fifty frigates, manned by one hundred and twenty thousand seamen. To this colossal strength in *matériel*, England added a crowd of naval officers of the greatest merit, at the head of whom was the great admiral Nelson. He was an eccentric, violent man, not well adapted for a command where diplomacy and war were intermingled. He had but too recently given a proof of that at Naples, by suffering his renown to be sullied by female intrigues, during the sanguinary executions commanded by the Neapolitan government. But in the midst of danger he was a hero; he displayed, too, as much genius as courage. The English were justly proud of his glory.

England and France have filled the present age with their formidable rivalry. The period at which we have just arrived is one of the most remarkable in the renowned contest which they sustained against one another. They had continued the war for eight years. France with financial resources much less, but perhaps more solid, because they were founded upon territorial revenue, with a population nearly double, and with the enthusiasm a good cause inspires, had resisted all Europe, extended her territory as far as the Rhine and the Alps, obtained dominion in Italy, and a decisive influence over the continent. England, with the wealth arising from the commerce of the world, and with a powerful navy, had acquired the same preponderance upon the ocean which France had obtained on the land. England, by subsidizing the European powers, had incited them to fight even to their own destruction. But while she thus exposed them to be crushed in her service, she seized the colonies of every nation, oppressed neutral powers, and avenged herself for the successes of France upon the land by her overbearing tyranny upon the ocean. Still although victorious upon this element, she had not been able to prevent France from forming a magnificent maritime establishment in Egypt, threatening even her East India dominions.

A strange reaction of opinion, as we have elsewhere observed, had resulted from this alteration of circumstances. France admirably governed, appeared in the sight of the world humane, tranquil, wise, and, what is not common, amid her victories actuated by moderation. Whilst the various cabinets of Europe were becoming reconciled to her, they at the same time perceived how much they had played the dupe to the political objects of England. Austria had fought for England as much as she had for herself. For this same England the Germanic empire had been dismembered. The powers of the north, with Russia at their head, acknowledged at last, that under the pretext of pursuing a moral end, in fighting against the French revolution, they had only served as the instruments to procure for England the commerce of the universe. Thus all the world turned at the moment against the mistress of the seas. Paul I. had given the signal with the natural impetuosity of his character; Sweden followed his example without hesitation; Denmark and Prussia had equally done so, though with less resolution. Austria vanquished, and recovered from her delusion, nursed her chagrin in silence, and, at least for the time, promised herself a long resistance to the temptation of British subsidies.

England reaped the consequences of the policy which she had pursued. She had doubled her colonies, her commerce, her revenue, and her navy, but she had at the same time doubled her debt and its expenses, her enemies, and her entire expenditure. She presented, in the midst of immense wealth, the frightful spectacle of a people dying with hunger. France, Spain, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden were leagued against her. France, Spain, and Holland could reckon upon eighty ships of the line, and were able to arm more. Sweden had twenty-eight, Russia thirty-five, and Denmark twenty-three. Here then was a total of one hundred and sixty-six ships of the line, a force superior to that of England. On the other hand, she had a great advantage in contending against a coalition; and what was more in her favour, her armaments surpassed in quality those of all the coalition. There were only the Danish and French vessels which were able to cope with her's; and there was still the greater difficulty in fighting in large fleets, that the English navy excelled those of all the world in manœuvring. Still the danger was threatening, because if the contest lasted long, Bonaparte was well capable of undertaking a formidable expedition; and if he succeeded in passing the Straits of Dover with an invading army, England was lost.

The long good fortune of Pitt began, like the fortune of M. Thugut, to be on the decline, before that of the young general Bonaparte. Pitt's was the most brilliant destiny of his time, after that of the great Frederick; he was only forty-three years of age, and had held the government seventeen years, possessing a power almost absolute in a free country. But his good fortune was growing old; and that of Bonaparte, on the contrary, was still young, merely in its infancy. The fortunes of men succeed each other in the history of the world, like the races of the same universe; they have their youth, their decrepitude, and their dissolution. The more prodigious fortune of Bonaparte was one day to decline also; but in the meanwhile, he was destined to see the fall, under his own ascendency, of that of England's greatest minister.

[1] Besides the Indian army.—*Translator.*

[2] In all, 819: viz., 197 of the line, 29 fifties, 251 frigates, 332 sloops and other vessels, in October, 1801. Of these there were at sea, 111 ships of the line, 16 fifties, 185 frigates, 230 sloops and smaller vessels. Of this naval force there were in the Channel, 42 of the line and 35 frigates; North Sea stations, 14 of the line, 3 fifties, and 31 frigates; the Mediterranean, 31 of the line, 4 fifties, and 56 frigates; on the coasts of Spain and Portugal, 11 of the line and 6 frigates; while 9 sail of the line, 7 fifties, and 8 frigates, were in India.—*Translator.*

England seemed at this time to be threatened with a species of social convulsion. The people, under the suffering of great scarcity, were rising in different places, and pillaging the fine habitations of the British aristocracy, and, in the towns, attacking the shops of the butchers and dealers in food. There were in London in 1801, as in Paris in 1792, ignorant friends of the people, who encouraged attacks against supposed engrossers, and insisted upon some measure analogous, in fact, though not in name, to a maximum for the price of bread. Neither the government nor the parliament appeared disposed to grant this foolish demand. Pitt was reproached with being the cause of the sufferings of the time; they asserted that it was he who had loaded the people with taxes, doubled the debt, and raised to an exorbitant price all the articles of the first necessity in existence; that it was he who was so obstinate in pursuing a senseless war; and he who, in refusing to treat with France, had concluded by turning the other maritime nations against England, thus depriving the people of the indispensable resource of the Baltic corn. The opposition, seeing, for the first time during seventeen years, the power of Pitt shaken, redoubled its ardour. Fox, who had for a long while neglected to attend in parliament, reappeared there. Sheridan, Tierney, Grey, and Lord Holland, renewed their attacks; and, that which does not always happen on the side of a warm opposition, they had the reason of the argument against their opponents. Pitt, despite his accustomed self-assurance, had little to urge in reply, when he was asked why he had not treated with France, when the first consul proposed peace after the battle of Marengo? why recently, and before the battle of Hohenlinden, he had not consented, if not to a naval armistice,—which would have given the French a chance of maintaining themselves in Egypt,—at least to the separate negotiation which had been offered? why had he, with so much want of shrewdness, suffered the opportunity to escape of the evacuation of Egypt, by refusing to ratify the treaty of El Arisch? why had he not negotiated with the northern powers, in order to gain time? why had he not imitated Lord North, who, in 1780, avoided replying to the manifesto of the northern powers, by a declaration of war? why had he thus drawn all Europe upon him, on account of some very doubtful question in the law of nations, about which every nation had a different opinion, and in which, at the moment, England had little interest? why not, in order to prevent France from obtaining some building timber, iron, and hemp, which were not capable of making a navy,—why had England been exposed to be cut off from the importation of foreign corn? why was an English army paraded from Mahon to Ferrol, and from Ferrol to Cadiz, without any useful result? The opposition compared the conduct of the affairs of England with those of France and their management, asking Pitt, with cutting irony, what he had to say of young Bonaparte, of the rash young man, who, according to the ministerial language, would only like his predecessors have an ephemeral existence; so ephemeral, that he did not merit they should condescend to treat with him.

Pitt had great trouble in maintaining himself against Fox, Sheridan, Tierney, Grey, and Lord Holland, who put to him these forcible questions in the face of all England. He became alarmed at the number of his enemies, and was disconcerted at the cries of a half-famished people demanding, without obtaining, bread.

To their questions Pitt replied with great feebleness. He continued to repeat his favourite argument, that if he had not made war upon France the English constitution would have perished. He cited as examples Venice, Naples, Piedmont, Switzerland, Holland, and the ecclesiastical states of Germany; as if it were possible to make any one believe that what had occurred in a few Italian or German states of the third order, could happen to England, with her liberal constitution. He replied, too, and with more reason on his side, that if France had aggrandized herself on the land, England had done the same by sea; that the navy was covered with glory; that if the debt and taxes were doubled, the wealth of the country was doubled also, and that under every point of view England was more powerful now than before the war began. All this could not be denied. Pitt added that the first consul, appearing to be established in a stable manner, he felt every disposition to treat with him. That as to what regarded the right of neutrals, he should remain inflexible. "If," said he, "England agrees to the proposed doctrines of the neutral powers, a single armed sloop may convoy the commerce of the whole world. England will be shut out from proceeding in any way against the commerce of her enemies; she will be unable to do any thing to prevent Spain from receiving the treasures of the new world, or to prevent France from receiving the naval stores of the north." "We must," he said, "wrap ourselves in our own flag, and find our grave in the ocean sooner than admit the currency of such principles in the maritime law of nations."

Two sessions of parliament succeeded each other without an adjournment. In November, 1800, the last parliament denominated the parliament of England and Scotland, assembled for the last time. In January, 1801, the united parliament of the three kingdoms held its first assemblage. During these two sessions, the discussions were continued without cessation, and with the most vehement warmth. Pitt was evidently weakened, not only in the number of the majorities in parliament, but in general influence and moral power out of doors. Every body perceived that in obstinately continuing the war against France, he had gone beyond the mark, and had missed on the eve of Marengo and on that of Hohenlinden the opportunity of treating advantageously. To miss the opportunity is for the statesman, as it is for the soldier, an irreparable mischief. The moment for peace once passed over, fortune turned round upon Pitt. He felt himself, and the public felt, that he was vanquished by the genius of the young general Bonaparte.

The justice must be done to Pitt, and also to England, of acknowledging that during this fearful want of food, the measures adopted were those of great moderation. The maximum price was repelled. The government was content to give considerable bounties upon the importation of corn, to prohibit the use of grain in distilleries, and not to give any more parochial relief in money, lest it should tend to raise the price of bread, relief being

afforded, in place of money, with food, such as salt meat, vegetables, and similar sustenances. A royal proclamation, addressed to all persons in easy circumstances, who had it in their power to vary their diet, recommended them to adopt a system of great economy in the consumption of bread in their families. Lastly, numerous vessels were sent to obtain rice in the East Indies, and corn in America and in the Mediterranean. Some even endeavoured to procure it from France, by means of a contraband trade, along the coasts of La Vendée and Britany.

Still in the midst of this distress so courageously supported, Pitt neglected no means for the prosecution of the war, and made every arrangement for a bold demonstration in the Baltic as soon as the season would permit. He wished to strike the first blow at Denmark, then at Sweden, and to go even to the bottom of the gulf of Finland, for the purpose of threatening Russia. It is not known, even in his own country, whether he really wished or not at this time to continue at the head of affairs in England. There were two questions raised by him in the cabinet, one of which, most inopportune at that moment, led to his retirement from office. After great exertions the year preceding, it has been seen that he carried into effect what was called the "union with Ireland," or in other words the union of the parliaments of England, Scotland, and Ireland, into on eimperial legislative body. This measure seemed like a species of political victory, more particularly in the face of the reiterated attempts of the French republic to raise an insurrection in Ireland. But England had only succeeded in depriving Ireland of her independence, by giving the Irish catholics the formal promise of their "emancipation" from the restrictions under which they laboured. They had in effect said to the catholics that they would never obtain their freedom, owing to the prejudices of an Irish parliament, and the assertion was most undoubtedly correct. It appeared, too, that the promises given were equivalent to a positive engagement, which must be regarded as a political error, if it be true that Pitt was obliged, by the nature of his own personal pledge, either to grant emancipation or to retire, because it was a pledge it was not possible to fulfil. However this might have been, in the month of February, 1801, on the first meeting of the united parliament, Pitt asked the consent of George III. to the measure of catholic emancipation. This prince, at the same time a protestant, was a complete devotee, and asserting that his coronation oath would be affected by such a measure, he obstinately refused his assent. Pitt made a second request, which was a very reasonable one, namely, that the occupation of Hanover by Prussia should not be considered an act of hostility to this country, that England might keep up relations with that court, in order, at least, to possess one friendly power upon the continent. This sacrifice was too great for a prince of the house of Hanover to make. The quarrel between the king and minister became warmer, and on the 8th of February, 1801, Pitt gave in his resignation for himself and his colleagues, Dundas, Windham, Grenville, and others. This resignation, after a ministry of seventeen years, caused much surprise in such extraordinary circumstances. People were unable to ascribe it to natural events, and attached a secret motive to Pitt, which at last became the public opinion, since zealously propagated by historians; this motive was, that Pitt seeing the necessity for a momentary peace, consented to retire for a few months, in order to let it be negotiated by others rather than himself, intending to return to the management of public affairs when the necessity of the moment should be passed. Such are the reasons that the multitude ascribe to public men under similar circumstances, which ill-informed writers repeat, as they pick them up from rumour. Pitt neither foresaw the peace of Amiens, nor its short duration; nor did he believe that peace was at all incompatible with his position at the head of affairs. He had consented to the well-known negotiation at Lille in 1797, and had recently named Mr. Thomas Grenville to proceed to the congress of Lunéville. But Pitt had gone considerable lengths with the catholics; he had been guilty of a fault which public men often commit, that of sacrificing the interest of to-day to that of to-morrow. Having promised too much, he felt embarrassed at not being able to fulfil his promises, and in a very anxious position in which the addition of a few more enemies would suffice to overwhelm him. It is true that he subsequently denied his having contracted any positive engagement in regard to the emancipation of the catholics; the denial was wanting to justify him from so imprudent a charge. Whatever may be thought upon this matter, there was never a period when the perils of any country permitted and even demanded to the same extent the adjournment of the execution of existing engagements, because in 1801, England had famine at home, and abroad was at war with all Europe. Still Pitt withdrew from office; and his retirement can only be considered as having arisen from the weakness of a superior mind. It is clear, that surrounded by fearful embarrassments, Pitt was not sorry to escape from such a situation under the honourable pretext of inviolable fidelity to his engagements. The resignation was accepted, to the great sorrow of the king, and the discontent of the ministerial party, as well as to the apprehension of all England, which saw with deep anxiety men, inexperienced men, take the helm of affairs. Pitt was replaced by Mr. Addington, who was his creature[1], and had for many years held the post of speaker of the house of commons. Lord Hawkesbury, afterwards lord Liverpool, replaced Grenville at the foreign office. They were prudent, moderate men, but of little capacity for office; both had been friends of Pitt, and for some time followed his system. This it was more than any thing else which made it reported, and believed, that the retirement of Pitt was only simulated.

[1] I obtained these details from several of the cotemporaries of Pitt, who were on intimate terms with him, mingled in the ministerial negotiations of the period, and fill, even in the present day, eminent situations in England.—*Note of the Author.*

The author should rather have said, "the creature of George III.," with whom he was a favourite, partaking the bigoted notions of that monarch in regard to religion, and holding the same arbitrary ideas in politics; while his feebleness of mind made him a jest with the friends of Pitt, as well as with those who had been the opponents of that minister. —*Translator.*

The feeble intellects of George III. were unable to bear up against the political agitations of the crisis. He was seized with a fresh attack of insanity, and for a month was unable to fulfil the royal functions. Pitt had given in his resignation. Addington and Hawkesbury were the designated ministers, but had not yet entered upon their duties. Pitt, although he had ceased to be minister, was at this time the real king of England, during a crisis of nearly a month, and was so by the consent of the whole nation. Explanations upon the subject were asked in the house of commons. These were of a very delicate nature. When thus demanded in the house they were answered in the noblest manner by Sheridan and Pitt. All motions common in England respecting the state of the country, were postponed; and it is probable that it occurred to some mistrustful persons, that Pitt voluntarily prolonged the species of royalty which he enjoyed. "He trusted, it would be believed," to use his own language at that time, "that in the event of ministers being no longer able to receive the commands of his majesty from his own mouth, they would propose measures to which it was unnecessary to allude more distinctly, but which they would not delay for a single day. They found themselves placed by their duty in an extraordinary situation, which they did not wish, upon any ground, should endure a moment beyond the strict necessity." Sheridan, in reply, testified his entire confidence, that neither Pitt, nor any other minister, would seek to profit by the state of the king's health to prolong for one moment the possession of a power equal to that of the sovereign himself.

The most delicate reserve was kept upon the subject. The word "madness" characterizing the real condition of the king, was not once pronounced; but all waited with anxiety, yet with perfect composure, the termination of this extraordinary crisis. In the interim Pitt voted subsidies which were not opposed; the English fleets were prepared in the different ports, and admirals Parker and Nelson set sail from Yarmouth for the Baltic with forty-seven vessels.

About the middle of March the king's health was re-established, and Pitt handed over the reins of government to Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury. The new ministers, according to custom, entered into explanations upon their taking office. They did not fail to declare to the house that they felt sentiments of the greatest esteem for their predecessors, and that they considered the line of policy they had adopted as highly salutary, and the salvation of England. They affirmed in consequence, that they should follow the same principles, and tread exactly in the same steps. "Wherefore, then, have you taken office?" inquired Sheridan, Grey, and Fox. "If you mean to follow the same course of policy, the ministers who have gone out are much more capable of directing the affairs of the country than you are!"

Impartial persons, members of parliament, blamed Pitt for abandoning the government of the country at so difficult a moment, and for resigning without valid reasons. The opposition itself was in the wrong so far as to reproach him with making his retreat at the expense of the king's character, by declaring that the king refused to allow "emancipation," a measure at the time extremely popular. This reproach was unreasonable, and at variance with true constitutional principles. Pitt, in retiring, was naturally obliged to state the reason, and if the king refused him "emancipation," he had a perfect right to declare that such was the fact. He made it known in language extremely well-suited to the circumstances, but it remained very evident that the refusal was rather a pretext than a real motive, and that Pitt withdrew from a state of affairs with which he had not the courage to contend. His star was growing pale before one that was then ascending, destined to cast a brighter lustre than his own. Although he afterwards reappeared at the head of affairs, to die at the post, his political existence may be said to have terminated from that day. Pitt, after governing for seventeen years, left his country loaded with debt and wealth both alike increased and alike burthened. He was an accomplished orator, regarded as the organ of government, and a very able and influential head of a party; but, as a statesman, he possessed very unenlightened views, had committed great errors, and was continually overborne by the worst prejudices of his countrymen. No native of England entertained so deep a hatred to France. But this consideration must not make us unjust towards him, knowing as we do how to honour patriotism in others, even when it was employed in a contest with our own.

Neither Lord Hawkesbury nor Mr. Addington were to be compared for talent to Pitt; the impulse being given, the vessel of the state moved onwards for a time under the momentum imparted to it by the head of the fallen ministry. The subsidies were demanded and obtained; the English fleets were launched towards the Baltic, to settle the great question about neutral rights; and an army, embarked in the fleet of lord Keith, was upon its voyage to the East to dispute the possession of Egypt with the French.

Admiral Parker, an old and experienced naval officer, who understood how to act under difficult circumstances, was the commander-in-chief of the English fleet, and sent to the Baltic. Nelson was at his side, in case it should become necessary to fight; he was, in fact, only qualified for battles, endowed as he was with a happy instinct for war, and perfectly master of every thing connected with his profession. Nelson proposed that, without waiting for the divisions of the fleet, they should pass the Sound, and bearing directly up for Copenhagen, detach Denmark from the coalition by a vigorous blow; then repair to the Baltic, in the midst of the coalesced fleets, prevent their junction, and thus give them all the law. This plan was happily arranged, because in the month of March, the ice still covered those northern seas, and was of itself sufficient to prevent their junction; which, indeed, Nelson had some reason for dreading, as, in that case, the British squadron would be exposed to great danger.

This squadron, consisting of seventeen sail of the line and thirty frigates, or smaller vessels, appeared, on the 30th of March, in the Cattegat. The Cattegat is the first gulf, formed by the land of Denmark approaching the opposite coast of Sweden.

The neutral powers were making their preparations with great activity. The emperor Paul, full of ardour, stimulated Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, and threatened with his enmity those who did not exhibit as much zeal as himself. Denmark and Prussia would have preferred commencing with a negotiation; but the menaces of Paul, the earnest, but not menacing, remonstrances of the first consul, accompanied with the formal promise of French assistance, brought into the same system those two courts. Denmark, besides, seeing the English reply to a declaration of principles was by a declaration of war, thought that it was her place to receive and prepare for resistance with all her energies. Prussia, pressed between Russia and France, had been deprived of her character of mediatrix, since Paul I. and the first consul had commenced to be upon friendly terms with each other. In place of leading, as before, she was now reduced to the situation of being a follower, and could only rely in future upon their good-will alone, for that part of the German indemnity advantageous to her interests. Prussia was, therefore, anxious to please by her firmness in the cause. She declared against England, and to overtures from that power, avowed her adherence to the side of the neutrals. She interdicted to the English all the coast of the north sea from Holland to Denmark; she closed the mouths of the Elbe, the Ems, and the Weser, and placed batteries, with troops, at those principal outlets. Finally, she occupied Hanover with a body of troops; which was the most serious and most decisive of her measures. The first consul recompensed her by marked proofs of his satisfaction, and by the strongest and most positive promise of an advantageous partition in her behalf of the German indemnities.

Denmark, on her side, occupied Hamburg and Lubeck. The little port of Cuxhaven, which belonged to Hamburg, and which was the only place where the English could land, had already been occupied by Prussia. Thus, then, the English had nothing left to them but their vessels and the ocean. They had not a single port where they could cast anchor. They had now the alternative of recovering by force their access to the continent.

In order to reach the Baltic through the Cattegat, it is necessary to pass through the noted strait called the Sound. This strait is formed by the approach of the coast of Denmark to that of Sweden. Between Elsinore and Helsingburg, it is about two thousand three hundred fathoms broad. The batteries placed on the two opposite shores are enabled to cross their fire, but not sufficiently near to cause much damage to a fleet. Notwithstanding this, the channel is deeper on the Swedish side, and very large ships are obliged to approach nearer that shore in consequence; so that by strengthening it with batteries, the passage might have been rendered difficult for the English. But the Swedish side was not fortified, and had no batteries, nor indeed had it ever possessed them. In fact, it has no port which merchant ships would be likely to visit. There is none in the Sound, except that of Elsinore, which belongs to Denmark, and upon that account batteries were erected there only, and scarcely any upon the Swedish coast. On the Danish side was constructed the fort of Kronenburg, regularly fortified. From this came the custom of paying the Danes dues for the passage, and not the Swedes. In this state of things it was necessary to construct fortified works on the Swedish side, of which they were in want. The king, Gustavus Adolphus, who, after Paul I., was the most earnest of the coalition, had conversed with the czar upon this subject, when he was at St. Petersburgh; but they were aware of the impossibility of executing any work there at such a season, when the soil, during the winter frost, was as impenetrable as iron. Gustavus Adolphus had also an interview with the prince of Denmark, then regent of the kingdom; the same who died in 1841, after a long and honourable reign. They conversed upon the subject; and the prince-regent, for some particular reason which influenced Denmark, appeared to attach very little importance to the fortification of the Swedish shore[1]. The Sound, then, was feebly defended on the Swedish side. They were obliged to be contented with an old battery of only eight guns, long ago established upon the most salient point of the shore. Besides, though this disregard of the defence has been much blamed since, it is very certain that the Sound, if well fortified upon both sides, could not have presented any very serious obstacle to the English; because the width of the passage being about three miles, ships in mid-channel would be a mile and a half from the batteries, and would, consequently, sustain no other damage than a little injury inflicted upon their sails or rigging.

There are, besides the Sound, other entrances into the Baltic; these are formed by the two arms of the sea which separate the Isle of Zealand from that of Funen, and the Isle of Funen from the coast of Jutland, passages known under the names of the Great and Little Belts. The English were but little inclined to attempt these straits where they were likely to meet with more than one Danish battery, but above all from fear of the shallows, which render the navigation very dangerous for ships of the line. The passage of the Sound was, therefore, that which they would most probably choose.

The Danes concentrated all their means of defence not immediately in the Sound, but lower down in the channel into which the Sound opens, in reality before the city of Copenhagen itself. The two shores of Denmark and Sweden, after approximating towards the Sound, retire from each other again, and form a channel twenty leagues long and from three to twelve wide, over which reefs and sandbanks are thickly strewn, and in which navigation must be effected by following the

[1] Erroneous assertions have been circulated upon this subject. I have had recourse to the most authentic evidence possible; the archives of France, Denmark, and Sweden contain proofs of what is here stated. Those stating otherwise, Napoleon among them, have only repeated the rumours and assertions of the time. The second passage of the Sound, which took place in 1807, at a time when Sweden and Denmark were at war, and Sweden saw with pleasure the triumphs of the English, has contributed to attach to Sweden the charge of perfidy. But at the time of the first passage, that is to say, in 1801, Sweden acted with perfect good faith; she wished heartily for the common success, and would have ensured it had she been capable of so doing.—*Note of the Author.*

narrow channels, and by incessantly sounding. The city of Copenhagen is situated on one of the most important of these channels about twenty leagues from the Sound, towards the south. There it was that the Danes had made their greatest preparations, and there they awaited the approach of their enemy. The post which they thus held did not precisely close up the passage into the Baltic, as will presently be explained, but it obliged the English to make an attack upon a position exceedingly well defended, and prepared beforehand for their reception. The prince royal had promptly made numerous strong measures of defence. In front of Copenhagen he had placed a number of vessels of war cut down and armed with cannon, making of them very formidable floating batteries; he had also armed ten sail of the line, which were only waiting for seamen from Norway to complete their complement of men. It is well known that the Danes are the best seamen in the north of Europe.

To these Danish preparations were joined those of Sweden and Russia. The Swedes had disposed of their troops along the coasts from Gottenburg to the Sound, and had fortified Karlscrona in the Baltic, as well as all the accessible points of that sea. The king, Gustavus Adolphus, was pushing forward the equipment of the Swedish fleet, and urging admiral Cronstedt to its completion. This fleet consisted of seven sail of the line and two frigates, which would be ready to set sail as soon as the sea was clear of the winter ice. The Russians had twelve sail of the line ready at Revel, which, like those of Sweden, were only embarrassed by the ice. The coalesced powers had not completed all, without doubt, which would have been possible if they had possessed at their head a government as active as that of France at the same period; but by uniting in time seven Swedish and twelve Russian vessels to the ten Danish ships before Copenhagen, they would have possessed a fleet of thirty sail of the line and of ten or twelve frigates, established in a very formidable position, which the English could not have approached without danger, while still less could they have sailed by and disregarded it. To have sailed by without attacking it, in order to carry on any operations in the Baltic, would have been to leave in their rear a most imposing force, capable of blocking up the outlet to the sea, and preventing their passage out in case of a reverse. But to unite in time these naval squadrons demanded a celerity of movement of which these three neutral governments were not capable. They made all the haste they could there is little doubt; but calculating too much upon the prolongation of the bad season, they had not begun their preparations early enough, and the energetic promptitude of the English was far too much in advance of them.

On the 21st of March an English frigate touched at Elsinore, and put on shore Mr. Vansittart, who was charged to make a last communication to the Danish government. Mr. Vansittart delivered to Mr. Drummond, the English chargé d'affaires, the ultimatum of the British cabinet. The terms of the ultimatum were the withdrawal of Denmark from the maritime confederation of the neutral powers, that Denmark should open her ports to the English, and adhere to the provisional engagement entered into in the preceding month of August, by which they had engaged no longer to convoy their trading-vessels. The prince royal of Denmark rejected the idea of such a defection, with indignation, and answered that neither Denmark nor her allies had made a declaration of war, having confined themselves to the publication of their principles of maritime law; that the English were the aggressors, because they had replied to the mere assertion of a thesis, in the law of nations, by an embargo; that Denmark would not commence hostilities, but would energetically meet force by force. The brave population of Copenhagen supported by its loyalty and adhesion the prince who represented it with so much dignity. The entire population took up arms, and, on the appeal of the prince royal, formed militia and volunteer corps. Eight hundred students took up the musket; all who could handle a pick-axe aided the engineers in executing the works of defence, and intrenchments were every where cast up. Messrs. Drummond and Vansittart left Copenhagen abruptly, threatening this unhappy city with all the thunders of England.

On the 24th, Messrs. Drummond and Vansittart went on board the fleet, and the English immediately made their preparations for commencing hostilities.

Nelson, and the commander-in-chief, Parker, held a council of war on board ship. The plan of operations was discussed. One was for passing through the Sound, another was for sailing through the Great Belt: Nelson declared that it was of no consequence by which mode the passage was made; that it was necessary as soon as possible to enter the Baltic, and appear before Copenhagen, in order to prevent the junction of the coalesced fleets. Once in the Baltic, the English fleet should be directed, a part upon Copenhagen to strike a blow at the Danes, and a part upon Sweden and Russia, to destroy the northern squadrons. They had twenty sail of the line, and twenty-five or thirty frigates and vessels of all descriptions. He himself would undertake, with twelve sail of the line, to destroy the Swedish and Russian fleets, the rest of the English force should attack and bombard Copenhagen. As to which passage they should make, he would prefer braving a few cannon-shots in forcing the Sound, to encountering the dangerous shoals of the Great and Little Belt.

Parker, far less enterprising, made an attempt by the Great Belt, on the 26th of March. Several small vessels of his fleet having taken the ground, the commander-in-chief recalled the squadron, and determined to force a passage. Early in the morning of the 30th of March, he entered this renowned strait. It blew at the moment a fresh breeze from the north-west, very much in favour for passing through the Sound, which runs from north-west to south-east, as far as Elsinore, after which, it continues nearly due north and south. The fleet, under the favourable breeze, boldly advanced, keeping at an equal distance from both shores. Nelson led the advanced squadron, Parker the centre, and admiral Graves the rear. The line-of-battle ships formed a single column in the middle of the channel. Upon each side a flotilla of gun and bomb-vessels passed nearer to the shores both of Denmark and Sweden, in order to return the enemies' fire closer to their batteries.

When the fleet came in sight of Elsinore, the fortress of Kronenburg instantly opened, and a hundred pieces of heavy cannon, vomited forth at once a storm of shells and red-hot balls. The English admiral, seeing that the battery upon the Swedish shore scarcely fired at all, because that old battery of eight guns was almost useless, steered nearer to that side, and the English in passing on jeered at the Danes, whose projectiles did not reach their ships by four or five hundred yards. The bomb-vessels which had approached the Danish shore, gave and received a great number of shells, but very little bloodshed ensued, as only four men were hurt on the side of the Danes, two of whom were killed, and two wounded. In Elsinore only one house suffered injury from the English fire, and that, remarkably enough, was the house of the English consul.

The whole fleet anchored about noon in the middle of the gulf, near the island of Huen.

This gulf, as before observed, descended from north to south for the distance of about twenty leagues; irregular in width, from three to twelve leagues, as the shores recede or advance, and possessing but few navigable channels. About twenty leagues towards the south stands the city of Copenhagen, situated on the west of the gulf upon the side of Denmark, at a very small elevation above the sea, forming a plane slightly inclined from whence a cannon-ball would just skim over the surface of the sea. The gulf, very wide and broad at this place, is divided by the low island of Saltholm into two navigable channels; one of which, called the passage of Malmo, stretching along the coast of Sweden, is scarcely accessible for large vessels; the other, which is called Drogden, stretches almost parallel with the coast of Denmark, and is commonly preferred for the purpose of navigation. This last passage is itself divided by a sand-bank, called the Middel Grund, into two passages; one named the King's Channel, borders the city of Copenhagen; the other the Dutch Channel, is situated on the opposite side of the Middel Grund. It was in the King's Channel that the Danish force was placed, leaving the other, or that of the Dutch, open to the English, the Danes thinking more of the defence of Copenhagen than of preventing the entrance of the English into the Baltic. But it was very obvious that Parker and Nelson would not have ventured into the Baltic until they had destroyed the defences of Copenhagen, together with any naval force of the neutrals which might be there united.

The means of defence which were possessed by the Danes consisted in batteries on shore, situated to the right and left of the entrance of the port, and of a line of floating batteries, or vessels cut down and moored in the middle of the King's Channel, for the whole length of Copenhagen, in such a manner as to protect the city from the fire of the enemy. Commencing on the north of the position, there was placed a work called the Three Crowns, constructed in masonry, nearly closed up at the gorge, commanding the entrance into the port, and connecting its fire with that of the citadel of Copenhagen. It was mounted with seventy pieces of cannon of the largest calibre. Four ships of the line, of which two were at anchor, and two under sail, and also a frigate under sail, closed the entrance of the channel which led into the port. From the fort of the Three Crowns, in going southwards, twenty hulks of large vessels were strongly moored, carrying heavy guns, and filling up the middle of the King's Channel, being also connected with land batteries on the island of Amack. Thus the Danish line of defence was supported on the left by the Three Crown batteries, and on the right by the isle of Amack, occupying lengthways and completely blockading up the middle of the King's Channel. The fort of the Three Crowns could not be forced, defended as it was by seventy cannon and five vessels, three of which were under sail. The line of defence, on the contrary, composed of immovable hulks, was too long and not sufficiently close, besides being incapable of manœuvring[1], and in the object of obstructing the middle of the passage they were placed too far in advance of the point of support on the right, or in other words, of the fixed batteries upon the isle of Amack. This island is only a continuation of the land upon which Copenhagen stands, the line of defence might therefore be attacked on the right. If it had been composed of a division of vessels under sail, capable of moving, or if it had been more closely united and more strongly supported on the shore, the English would not have come safe and sound out of the attack. But the Danes thought a good deal of their ships of war, which they were not rich enough to replace if they should be destroyed; and besides, they had not yet received their complement of men from Norway; they were consequently shut up in the interior of the port, thinking that unserviceable vessels were sufficient to answer the purpose of floating batteries against the English fleet.

Their bravest seamen, commanded by intrepid officers, served the artillery in those old floating batteries, thus moored in line.

The English arrived at Copenhagen long before the junction, at that city, of all the vessels of the neutral powers could take place. They might have passed to the east of the middle ground, and disregarding the floating batteries moored in the Royal Channel, have gone through the Dutch Channel into the Baltic. They might have done all this out of reach of the guns of Copenhagen; but they must have left behind them a very imposing force, capable of cutting off their retreat in case of any untoward event occurring which might oblige them to return by the passage of the Sound, weakened and in want of resources. It was much better to profit at once by the isolation of the Danes, to strike a decisive blow at them, detach them from the confederation; and after having, by this means, seized upon the keys of the Baltic, proceed, as quickly as possible, to attack the Swedes and Russians. This plan was at the same time bold and wise, and obtained the concurrence of both Nelson and Parker, a thing that rarely happens between two such commanders.

The 31st of March and 1st of April were employed in reconnoitring the Danish line, sounding the channels, and arranging the plan of attack. Nelson, Parker, the older captains of the fleet,

[1] This "manœuvring" in a narrow and intricate channel, shows that the author does not understand naval affairs, or he would not have made a disadvantage of what in such a place was impossible.—*Translator.*

and the commandant of the artillery, reconnoitred in person the position of the enemy, in the midst of ice, and sometimes of the Danish balls. Nelson maintained, that with ten sail of the line he would attack and break the right line of the Danes. His plan was to proceed along the entire length of the Middle Ground, passing through the Dutch Channel, then doubling back immediately, to enter the King's Channel, and place ship against ship, a hundred fathoms from the Danish line. He wished at the same time, that some vessels of the fleet, under captain Riou, should attack the Three Crowns battery, and having silenced the guns, disembark a thousand men and carry it by storm. The commander-in-chief, admiral Parker, with the remainder of the fleet, was not to engage in this bold attack; he was to remain in the rear, cannonade the citadel, and cover any disabled vessel that might retire out of action.

This manœuvre, as bold as that of Aboukir, could only succeed by great ability in the execution, and great good fortune as well. Admiral Parker consented, upon condition that the enterprise should not be carried too far if the difficulties were found not likely to be surmounted. He gave Nelson twelve ships in place of the ten he demanded. On the 1st of April, in the evening, Nelson sailed through the Dutch Channel, and came to anchor some way below Copenhagen, off a point of the isle of Amack, called Drago. In order to get into the King's Channel, and to sail through it, a different wind was required from that which the day before had enabled him to pass through the Dutch Channel. On the following day, in the morning, the wind blew just opposite to the point whence it blew on the preceding night. He sailed into the King's Channel, steering between the Danish line and the Middle Ground. All the channels had been sounded; but in spite of this precaution three [1] vessels got fast upon the Middle Ground, and Nelson took up his post with only nine. He did not suffer himself to be disheartened, but anchored very close to the Danish line, at a distance that must have rendered the effect of the cannonade most horrific. The want of the three vessels aground was much felt, more particularly for the attack on the batteries of the Three Crowns, which now could only be answered by frigates.

At ten in the morning the whole of the British squadron was in line. It received and returned a dreadful fire. A division of bomb-vessels, which drew little water, was placed upon the shoal of the Middle Ground, and threw shells into Copenhagen, passing over both squadrons. The Danes had eight hundred pieces of artillery in play on their batteries, which inflicted considerable damage upon the English. The officers commanding the floating batteries and hulks displayed uncommon bravery, and found in those under their command the most devoted courage. The commander of the Provesten in particular, which was the southernmost of the Danish line, behaved with heroic courage. Nelson, seeing the importance of depriving their line of the support of the batteries on the isle of Amack, directed the fire of four vessels upon the Provesten alone. M. Lassen, the commander, defended his ship until he had lost five hundred out of six hundred of his gunners; he then threw himself into the sea with the remainder, and swam on shore, leaving his vessel in flames. He had thus the glory of not striking his flag. Nelson then directed all his efforts against the other floating batteries and rafts, and succeeded in silencing several. In the meanwhile, at the other end of the line, the English suffered considerably, and captain Riou was very roughly handled. Three English vessels were still on shore on the middle ground, and he had none but frigates to oppose to the batteries of the Three Crowns. He had received a terrible fire, without the hope of silencing it, or storming the work. Parker, observing the resistance made by the Danes, and fearing the English vessels, much injured in their rigging, would be exposed to getting aground, gave orders for the battle to cease. Nelson, perceiving the signal at the mast-head of Parker, gave way to a noble expression of indignation. He had lost one eye, and to that applying his spy-glass, he coolly said, "I cannot see Parker's signal for ceasing action;" and ordered his own signal for close action to be kept flying. This was a noble act of imprudence upon his part; and as often happens to audacious imprudence, it was followed by complete success.

The Danish hulks, which could not be moved to find shelter under the land batteries, were exposed to a most destructive fire. The Danebrog blew up with a terrible explosion; several others were disabled and driven from their moorings, with an enormous loss of men. But the English, on the other side, did not suffer less, and found themselves in great danger. Nelson, endeavouring to take possession of the Danish ships which had struck their colours, was exposed, on approaching the batteries [2] upon the isle of Amack, to several deadly discharges from their guns. At this moment two or three of his vessels were so completely cut up as to be incapable of manœuvring; and on the side of the Three Crowns, captain Riou, who had been obliged to retire, from these formidable batteries, was cut in two by a chain-shot. Nelson, nearly beaten, was not disconcerted, and struck upon the idea of sending a flag of truce to the prince-royal of Denmark, who, from one of the batteries, was a spectator of the terrible scene.

[1] Two only were aground; one was anchored, from not being able to weather the shoal.—*Translator.*

[2] Being moored, the Danish line was stronger, and could fire on the English ships coming to an anchor, that had to anchor and furl their sails under a heavy fire. Though the Danes fought nobly, it was the rapidity of the English fire that gave Nelson the victory. The Danish force south of the Crown batteries was all destroyed, burned, or taken. It consisted of six sail of the line, eleven floating batteries, mounting each twenty-six 24-pounders, or eighteen 18-pounders, each flanked by the batteries which inflicted the principal loss. Nelson sunk, burned, took, or drove on shore, the whole line; and Copenhagen, at the close of the day, was open to bombardment, and the vessels placed for that purpose. One seventy-four, one sixty-four, four two-decked hulks, two frigates, a floating battery, four pontons or praams of twenty-four guns each, were taken, a frigate and a brig sunk, the Danish commodore was blown up, one or two were driven on shore under the batteries; all this was achieved without the loss of a single vessel. Few but our author could deem such a pretended or dubious victory.—*Translator.*

In his letter, Nelson stated, that if the prince did not stop the fire which prevented his taking possession of his prizes, which by right belonged to him, having struck their colours, he should be obliged to blow them up with all on board; that the English were the brethren of the Danes; that both had fought enough to show their valour, and that any further effusion of blood ought to be avoided [1].

The prince, stricken by the appalling spectacle, and fearing for the city of Copenhagen, deprived of the support of the floating batteries, ordered the firing to cease. This was a fault, because in a few moments the fleet of Nelson, nearly disabled, would have been obliged to retire half destroyed. A sort of negotiation was commenced, and Nelson took advantage of it to quit his place of anchorage. As he retired three of his vessels got aground. If at this moment the fire of the Danes had but continued, these three vessels must have been lost [2].

On the following day Nelson and Parker, after great labour, got the three vessels afloat that had been aground, and entered into a negotiation with the Danes with the object of stipulating for a suspension of hostilities. They stood as much in need of this as the Danes, because they had twelve hundred men killed and wounded, and in six vessels a horrible slaughter [3]. The loss of the Danes was not much greater; but they had relied too much upon their line of floating batteries, and now that these batteries were destroyed, the lower part of the city, that which was open to the sea, was exposed to a bombardment. Above all, they were apprehensive for their vessels in the basin, in which were their ships of war, but half equipped; immovable, and locked up in the basin, they might have every one been burned. This was a most alarming subject of solicitude. They regarded their fleet, in fact, as they did their maritime existence itself; because if it were lost they had not the means of fitting out another. Under the irritation of suffering and danger at the moment, they complained of their allies, without making any allowance for the difficulties they had to encounter, and which had obstructed their arrival under the walls of Copenhagen. The contrary winds, the ice, and want of time, had retained the Swedes and Russians without any fault of their own. It is true, that if they had arrived with twenty vessels and joined the Danish fleet in the straits where the engagement took place, Nelson would have failed in his daring enterprise, and the cause of maritime neutrality would have triumphed that day. But time was necessary for them to prepare, and the promptitude of the English changed the destiny of the war.

Parker, who had been alarmed at the temerity of Nelson, in the battle of the 2nd of April, was now able to form a tolerably correct opinion of the actual position of the Danes, and understood all the results which could be drawn from the battle that had taken place. He required that the Danes should withdraw from the neutral confederacy, that they should open their ports to the English, and should receive an English force, under the pretence of protecting them against the resentment of the neutral powers. Nelson had the courage to land on the 3rd of April, and to carry these propositions to the crown-prince. He went in a boat to Copenhagen, and heard himself the murmurs of this brave population, indignant at his appearance; but he found the crown-prince was inflexible. The prince, more alarmed the evening before than the actual danger of Copenhagen justified, would not consent to the shameful defection which was proposed to him. He replied, that he would sooner bury himself under the ruins of his capital than he would consent to betray the common cause. Nelson returned on board his ship without having obtained any concession. During this interval, the Danes seeing themselves exposed to the dangers of a second battle, set themselves at work to add new defences to those already existing. They made the battery of the Three Crowns much stronger, and covered with cannon the isle of Amack and the lower part of the town. They brought their ships, the great objects of their care, into basins, as far as possible from the sea, covering them with earth and dung, in order to preserve them as much as possible from fire: and became in a certain degree more confident when they saw the hesitation of the English, who did not seem in

[1] Nelson did not want to approach the isle of Amack for such a purpose. When he wrote the note to the crown-prince the Danish line was irrecoverably ruined, but the fire was still hot. The Danebrog had just before struck her colours; and the boats going to take possession of her, Nelson's ship having ceased to fire for that purpose, the Danebrog fired upon the boats, most likely from ignorance of the usage of war; and they were obliged to return. The Elephant then opened again upon the Danebrog with grape-shot from her 36-pounders, killing and wounding many in that vessel, but making a far more horrible slaughter in two praams, feebly resisting, full of men, ahead and astern of her. The sight was most abhorrent to Nelson; and he had no choice but to burn the Dane with all on board, including numbers of wounded. With the same humane feelings as those with which he rushed on deck at the battle of the Nile, to save the crew of l'Orient, but with a different feeling as to the quarrel, and a desire, ever uppermost, to detach the Danes from the confederacy by the impression produced,—for Nelson was a man of genius as well as courage,—he wrote the letter to the crown-prince. Some have said there was a third motive; but as the Danes had nothing to do with that motive, it is immaterial to mention it here. The battle was over in the afternoon, about a couple of hours before dark. Early the next morning Nelson went on shore, and was received with acclamations by the people, not with "murmurs;" they knew his object was peace, and they did not harmonize with the designs of Paul I. and the first consul.—*Translator.*

[2] This was not true. The Desirée frigate, the Defiance, and Elephant, got on shore only at the close of the action. They had anchored so close to the Middle Ground, under the mistaken idea that there was shoal water between the Danish line and them, that the Elephant had only four feet water under her keel when the battle began. These ships had no enemy opposed to them, the Danish line being destroyed, and bomb-vessels moored in a position ready for the bombardment. The Monarch and Isis were the only ships that required serious repair, and they were sent home for that purpose, with one of the Danish prizes containing the wounded. Not half the fleet had been engaged. The line of defence gone between Amack and the Crown batteries, Parker's division might have moved up and cannonaded the city the next day, if the bomb-vessels were not of themselves sufficient to destroy it.—*Translator.*

[3] The English had 20 officers and 234 men killed, and 48 officers and 641 men wounded; in all 943. Three ships sustained nearly half the loss, the rest had to be divided between sixteen vessels of all classes. The English accounts gave the Danish loss at 2000 men; the Danish accounts at 1800.—*Translator.*

a hurry to recommence the terrible struggle. One part of the population capable of assisting, lent their aid in the defensive works; the other part was employed in preparing means to prevent the conflagration.

Finally, after five days of delay, Nelson returned to Copenhagen notwithstanding the threatening aspect of the Danish people. The discussion was lively, and Nelson took upon himself to concede more than Parker authorized. He concluded an armistice which was no more virtually than a *status quo*. The Danes did not retire from the confederation[1], but all hostilities were to be suspended between them and the English for fourteen weeks, after which time they were to return to the same position as on the day of the signature for the suspension of arms. The armistice comprehended only the Danish isles and Jutland, but not Holstein, so that hostilities might continue in the Elbe, and that river be still interdicted to the English. The English were to keep at cannon-shot distance from all the Danish ports and armed vessels, except in the King's Channel, which they had the liberty to pass and repass for the purpose of entering the Baltic. They were not to establish themselves on any part of the Danish territory, and were only to touch at the ports for the purpose of getting such things as were necessary for the health and refreshment of the crews.

Such were all the terms which Nelson could obtain, and it must be acknowledged they were all his victory gave him a right to demand. But as he was upon the point of quitting Copenhagen, a very unfortunate event was currently reported, of which the crown-prince, who had been induced by it to enter into negotiations, succeeded in keeping from him the knowledge. It was rumoured at the same moment that Paul I. had died suddenly. Nelson set sail without knowing this, or it would no doubt have made him advance in his demand. The armistice was immediately ratified by admiral Parker. The prince-royal of Denmark hinted to the Swedes, that it would be of no use to expose themselves to the attack of the English, whom they would find themselves incapable of resisting. Nor was the advice unnecessary, for Gustavus Adolphus had got his fleet ready for sea. In the desire to get his fleet forward, he had dismissed one rear-admiral from his service, and sent an admiral before a court-martial, to punish him for his delay in getting forward, though very unjustly.

All these efforts were vain. Paul I. had died at St. Petersburg on the night between the 23rd and 24th of March. This event terminated much more certainly than the incomplete victory of Nelson, the maritime confederation of the northern powers. Paul I. had been the author of the confederation, and had applied towards its success all the impetuosity of temper which he threw into every action of his life, and he would most certainly have displayed similar earnestness in repairing the disaster, nearly of equal disadvantage to each, of the battle of Copenhagen. He would have sent his land forces to Denmark, and the whole of the neutral fleet to the Sound, and probably have made the English repent of their cruel enterprise against the Danish capital. But this prince had pushed to the utmost the patience of his subjects, and had just become the victim of a tragical revolution in his own palace.

Paul I. was a spirited and not a bad man; but he carried his opinions to extremes, and like all others who are of the like character, was capable of good or evil actions, according to the disordered impulses of a violent and feeble mind. If such an organization is unfortunate in private individuals, it is much more so in princes, and still worse in absolute sovereigns. With such it very frequently approaches to madness, at times putting on a sanguinary complexion of mind. Thus every person in St. Petersburg was in dread for his own destiny. Even the best treated favourites of Paul were by no means sure that the favour they enjoyed would terminate out of Siberia.

This prince, sensitive and chivalrous, had felt a lively sympathy for the victims of the French revolution, in consequence a vengeful hatred to that event. Thus while the able Catherine had contrived, during her whole reign, to excite all Europe against France without marching against her a single soldier, Paul, on arriving at the throne, had sent Suwarrow, with one hundred thousand Russians, into Italy. In the warmth of his zeal, he interdicted even French books, manners, and customs. This could not fail to offend the Russian nobility, who, like the whole of the European aristocracy, were fond of reviling France, with the reservation of enjoying her wit, her manners, and her advanced civilization. The Russian nobles found the antirevolutionary zeal unbearable when pushed to such an excess.

Paul had been seen to alter these opinions, and to run into the opposite extreme, contracting a hatred for his allies, taking his enemies to his bosom, and filling his apartments with portraits of Bonaparte, drinking to his health in public, and acting so much upon contraries as to declare war against England. This last step made him not only distasteful to the Russian nobility, but odious; because it touched not merely their tastes but their interests. The vast extent of his empire, occupying nearly the whole of the northern part of Europe,

[1] Nelson landed on the 3rd of April. Sir Hyde Parker was at some distance, with whom conference was to be held. Notwithstanding delays and exchanges of powers, the suspension of arms was executed for fourteen weeks on the 9th. The stipulations were as stated by the author, *except* that he has disengenuously omitted to notice the most important of all: "*The treaty of armed neutrality shall, as far as relates to the co-operation of Denmark, be suspended while the armistice is in force.*" Nelson had gained all he required—to proceed against Sweden and Russia with no fear of an enemy in his rear. In ten or twelve days after the battle, the English fleet had arrived—so far from being seriously injured—within two days' sail of St. Petersburg. Count Pahlen's letter to Admiral Parker, written on the 30th of April, was answered by Admiral Parker on board the London, at sea, on the 22nd. Count Pahlen's letter put an end to the confederacy. It announced that, on Alexander's accession, one of the first events had been, the acceptance of "the offer which the British court had made to his illustrious predecessor," to terminate the dispute "by an amicable convention." This letter, and acceptance by Alexander of what Paul had refused, suspended Parker's proceedings. The British court had no part in that act, beyond orders previously given to its admirals, in case Russia consented to the convention, that hostilities should be suspended. Parker sailed back to Kioge Bay, in Denmark, immediately resigned, and Nelson took the chief command.—*Translator.*

fertile in grain, timber, hemp, and minerals, stands in need of the aid of foreign merchants to take their productions, and give money or manufactured goods in exchange. The English furnish to Russia for the raw produce of her soil, the articles which are the product of their own labour, and thus the Russian farmers are able to pay their landlords the rents of their land. The English possess in consequence most of the trade with St. Petersburg; and that is, in a great degree, the bond which so connects the policy of Russia to that of England, retarding a rivalry which sooner or later must arise between those two great copartners of Asia.

The Russian aristocracy was exasperated at the new system of policy adopted by the emperor. If it had blamed in this prince his excess of hatred towards France, it yet more censured his excess of attachment, more particularly when it went the length of resolutions fraught with ruin to the great landed proprietors. To these annoyances against their tastes and interests, Paul joined cruelties that were not natural to his heart, which was rather good than evil. He had sent a multitude of unfortunate people into Siberia; he afterwards recalled them in consequence of being moved by their sufferings, but he never gave them back their property. These unhappy beings filled St. Petersburg with their miseries and their complaints. Annoyed by this he sent them anew into banishment. Daily becoming more awake to the sense of hatred borne towards him by his subjects, he grew more distrustful, and threatened every life around him. He formed the most sinister designs, now against his ministers, then against his wife and children, and at length with his madness assumed all the conduct of a tyrant. He rendered the Michel palace in which he resided a complete fortress, surrounding it with bastions and ditches. It might be thought he was in dread of an unforeseen or sudden attack. Every night he barricaded the door which separated his apartments from those of the empress, and thus, without being aware of it, prepared himself for his tragical fate.

This state of affairs could not continue long, and terminated—as, in this empire which approaches fast, it is true, towards civilization, but where barbarism was the starting point, as it had terminated before more than once. The notion of getting quit of the unfortunate Paul by the customary mode, in other words, by a revolution in the palace—there where the palace is the nation—was uppermost in every mind. Let a proper value be set upon national institutions. At another extremity of Europe, upon one of the first thrones in the world, there was also a prince, George III., in a state of madness, a headstrong prince, good, and religious. This prince, occasionally deprived of his reason for whole months, had just experienced a return of the same disorder, at one of the most serious periods in the history of England. Notwithstanding which things proceeded in the most simple and regular manner. The constitution placed at the king's side ministers who conducted the government on his behalf, and this eclipse of the royal reason did not in any mode affect the public business of the country. Pitt governed in behalf of George III. as he had done before for seventeen years: the idea of an atrocious crime in such a case entered into no man's imagination. In St. Petersburg, on the contrary, the sight of a prince on the throne in a state of insanity gave origin to the basest designs.

There was at that time in the court of Russia one of those formidable men who never resile upon any extremity, who, under a regular government, would perhaps become great and distinguished citizens, but under a despotic government become criminals, if crime is in particular situations, though not actually countenanced by the government, incidental to its administration on certain occasions. Crime must be condemned in every country; but the institutions that produce it must be still more a matter of reprobation.

Count Pahlen had served with distinction in the Russian army. He was of a very imposing person, and concealed under the rough and sometimes familiar manner of a soldier a shrewd and penetrating intellect. He was endowed with singular boldness and imperturbable presence of mind. Governor of St. Petersburg, entrusted with the police of the whole empire, initiated, for which thanks were due to his master's confidence, into all the great affairs of the state, he was in reality more than by the title of his office the principal person in the Russian government. His ideas upon the policy of his country were of a decided character. He deemed the crusade against the French revolution as very unreasonable, and the new zeal against England as intemperate. A prudent reserve, an able neutrality, in the midst of the formidable rivalry between England and France, appeared to him the most profitable political situation for Russia. Neither English nor French, but Russian in his political views, he was also Russian in his manners—Russian as it was understood in the time of Peter the Great. Convinced that all would be lost in Russia if the reign of Paul were not abridged; having even felt himself some forebodings for his own personal safety, from certain signs of dissatisfaction he had remarked in the emperor, he resolutely determined upon his course of action, and communicated it to count Panin, the vice-chancellor and minister for foreign affairs. They both agreed that it had become absolutely needful to put an end to a situation as alarming for the empire as it was for individual security. Count Pahlen accordingly took upon himself to execute the terrible design upon which they had mutually agreed[1]. The heir to the throne was the

[1] The following details are the most authentic that can be obtained regarding the death of Paul I. The source from which they are derived is as follows. The court of Prussia was much affected at the death of Paul I., and the more indignant at the effrontery with which certain accomplices in the crime were heard to boast about it in Berlin. The court obtained by different ways, and above all through a person well informed on the matter, some very curious particulars, which were collected into a memoir, and communicated to the first consul. These are the particulars of which M. Bignon, then secretary of the French embassy at the court of Prussia, was able to obtain the knowledge, and which he has detailed in his work. Still the more secret circumstances attending the event remained wholly unknown, when a singular incident placed France in possession of the only account worthy of credit, which perhaps at this moment exists, of the death of Paul I. A French emigrant, who had passed his life in the service of Russia, and who acquired a degree of military renown, had become the friend of count Pahlen and general Benningsen. Being with them at the

grand duke Alexander, whose reign belongs to our time, a young prince who gave a promise of superior qualities, and who then appeared, which he did not afterwards prove, easy to be led. He it was whom count Pahlen wished to place upon the throne by a catastrophe sudden and free from alarm. It was indispensable to have an understanding with the grand duke and heir to the crown, in the first place, in order to have his consent, and then not to be after the event treated as a common assassin, who is sacrificed while the advantage of his crime is secured. It was difficult to break such a matter to the prince, full of kindly feeling, and utterly incapable of lending himself to an attempt against the life of his father. Count Pahlen, without laying open his mind, and without avowing the design he intended, discussed the affairs of the government with the grand duke, and at each fresh extravagance of Paul that was dangerous to the empire, communicated it to him, but remained silent without commenting upon what he had said. Alexander, upon receiving these communications, cast down his eyes with grief, but said nothing. These dumb but expressive scenes were many times renewed. At last clearer explanations became necessary. Count Pahlen finished by making the young prince comprehend that such a state of things could not be much longer protracted without causing ruin to the empire; and taking good care not to speak of a crime of which Alexander would not have tolerated the proposition, he intimated to him that it would be necessary to depose Paul and ensure him a quiet retreat, but in any case to take out of his hands the chariot of the state, which he was driving towards a precipice.

Alexander shed a good many tears, protested against any idea of disputing the government of the empire with his father, and then gave way by degrees, before fresh proofs of the danger into which Paul was throwing the affairs of the state, and even the imperial family itself. In fact, Paul, dissatisfied with the sluggishness of Prussia in the quarrel of the neutral powers, spoke of marching eighty thousand men upon Berlin. Besides this, in the delirium of his arrogance, he wished the first consul to take him for arbitrator in every thing; and that even this powerful personage should neither make peace with Germany, nor the courts of Piedmont, Naples, Rome, or the Porte, except upon bases laid down by Russia; in such a way it was soon reasonable to think he would not long have kept terms with France, whose side he had embraced with so much ardour. To these arguments count Pahlen added an expression of inquietude on his own part for the security of the imperial family itself, of which he said Paul began to be suspicious.

Alexander at length consented, but exacted a solemn oath from count Pahlen that he should not attempt any thing that might affect the life of his father. Count Pahlen swore to every thing desired by the inexperienced son, who thought a sceptre could be snatched from the hand of an emperor without first taking his life.

The actors were yet to be found for the tragedy; in his conception of the design, count Pahlen deemed it beneath him to be a personal partaker in the execution. He had the actors in view, but reserved the secret according to the confidence each seemed to merit, making them sooner or later acquainted with the part which he had reserved for them to perform. The Soubow brothers, who had been raised from nothing by Catherine's favour, were chosen for carrying out this catastrophe. Count Pahlen only opened his design to them at a late period. Plato Soubow, the favourite of Catherine, restless and supple, was well worthy to make a figure in a palatial revolution. His brother Nicolas, solely distinguished by his great bodily strength, was well fitted for a subaltern part. Valerian Soubow, a brave and good soldier, a friend of the archduke Alexander, deserved from his merits to have been omitted from so unworthy a project. They had a sister closely allied with all the English faction, the friend of lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, who poured into their ears her own zeal for the policy of England. Count Pahlen secured many other confederates, and brought them under different pretences to St. Petersburg, without disclosing to them his secret. There was one individual whom he had summoned to St. Petersburg, whose concurrence he did not doubt any more than of his redoubtable energy,—that individual was the celebrated general Benningsen, an Hanoverian belonging to the Russian service, the first officer in the Russian army at that time, and who had the honour at a later period, in 1807, to stop the victorious march of Napoleon. His hands, worthy of bearing a sword, should never have been armed with a poignard.

Benningsen had sought a refuge in the country from the anger of Paul, whom he had displeased. Count Pahlen drew him from his retreat, made him acquainted with the plot, but only spoke, if general Benningsen is to be credited, of the deposition of the emperor. Benningsen gave his word, and kept it with frightful determination.

It was resolved to choose for the time of executing the plot, some day when the regiment of Semenourki, which was entirely devoted to the grand duke Alexander, should be on guard at the Michel palace. They were obliged to wait. But time pressed, for Paul's illness made a rapid progress, every day becoming more alarming for the interests of the empire, and placing the safety of his attendants in greater peril. One day he seized the imperturbable Pahlen by the arm, and singularly addressed him in these words:—"You were in St. Petersburg in 1762?"

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country-house of count Pahlen, he one day obtained from their own lips the circumstantial account of all that passed in St. Petersburg in the tragical night of the 23rd and 24th of March. As the emigrant was very careful to commit to writing all which he saw or heard, he immediately wrote down the narrative of the two principal actors in that event, and inserted them in the memoirs which he left behind him. These manuscript memoirs are now French property. They rectify many vague or incorrect assertions; and, in other respects, do not commit, more than they were previously committed, the names already connected with this dark incident; they only give more precise and correct details in place of those falsified or exaggerated which were already known. After comparing this account, emanating from testimony so valid, with the details furnished by the court of Prussia, we have put together the historical recital which follows, and which seems to us the only one worthy of belief, perhaps the only perfect one in existence, or that posterity will ever be able to obtain, of a catastrophe so tragical.—*Note of the Author.*

This was the year when the emperor, the father of Paul, was assassinated, that Catherine might mount the throne.

"Yes," replied Pahlen, with great coolness, "I was there."

"What part did you take in the event which then happened?"

"That of a subaltern officer in a cavalry regiment,—I was a witness, not an actor, in that catastrophe."

"Very well," replied Paul, casting a look of accusation and of suspicion at his minister, "they want to recommence to-day the revolution of 1762."

"I know it," replied count Pahlen, without emotion; "I know the plot and am in it."

"What you!" exclaimed Paul, "you in the plot!"

"Yes, in order to become well acquainted with it, and to be better able to watch over your security."

The calmness of this redoubtable conspirator disconcerted all the suspicions of Paul, who ceased to be jealous of Pahlen, but continued to be still agitated and restless.

A curious circumstance very nearly of public interest, if such a phrase may be employed in connexion with so great a crime, hastened, among other causes, the contemplated event. Paul ordered, on the 23rd of March, a despatch to be written and sent off to M. Krudener, his minister at Berlin, in which he commanded him to declare to the Prussian court, that if it did not immediately decide to act against England, he would march eighty thousand men upon the Prussian frontier. Count Pahlen wishing, without discovering his reason, that M. Krudener should not attach any importance to the despatch, added with his own hand the following postscript:—

"His imperial majesty is indisposed to-day; this may have serious consequences[1]."

The 23rd of March was chosen by the chiefs of the conspiracy for the execution of the fatal plot. Count Pahlen, under the pretext of a dinner party, had united at his house, the Soubows, Benningsen, and a number of generals and officers on whom he well knew he could rely. The bottle was profusely circulated with wine of every kind. Pahlen and Benningsen drank nothing. When dinner was over the design for which they were then assembled was unfolded to the conspirators, and to nearly all of them for the first time. They were not informed that the intention was to assassinate the emperor; from such a crime they would have recoiled with horror. They were told that they must all proceed to the palace in order to compel Paul to abdicate the imperial dignity. That thus they should deliver the empire from very imminent peril, and save a vast number of innocent persons whose lives were threatened by the sanguinary insanity of the emperor. Finally, in order more completely to secure their assent, it was affirmed to them that the grand duke Alexander, convinced himself of the necessity of preserving the empire, was well aware of the design, and approved of it. Soon after this the party, flushed with wine, no longer hesitated, and all, three or four excepted, went to the palace, believing that they were going merely to depose a mad emperor, not to shed the blood of their unfortunate master.

The night appearing to be sufficiently advanced, the conspirators, to the number of sixty or thereabouts, separated, dividing themselves into two parties. Count Pahlen took the direction of one, general Benningsen of the other. Both those officers were in full uniform, wearing sashes and orders, and proceeding sword in hand. The palace Michel was built and guarded like a fortress, but the bridges were lowered and the gates opened to the two heads of the conspiracy. The party of Benningsen went first straight forwards to the apartment of the emperor. Count Pahlen remained behind, with a reserve of conspirators. He who had organized the plot, disdained to aid in the execution, and was there solely to make provision for any unexpected events. Benningsen penetrated to the apartment of the sleeping monarch. Two heydukes were the emperor's body guard, and like faithful servants attempted to defend their sovereign. One of them was struck down with a blow from a sabre; the other fled, crying out for assistance, a very useless cry in a palace guarded almost wholly by accomplices in the crime. A valet, who slept near the emperor, ran to the spot, and he was made to open his master's door. The unhappy Paul would fain have found a refuge in the apartments of the empress, but amid his dark suspicions, he had been accustomed, with great care, to barricade the door that led to them every night. He had therefore no way of escape, and flinging himself out at the bottom of the bed, concealed himself behind the folds of a screen. Plato Soubow, running to the imperial bed, found it empty, and cried out in alarm, "The emperor has saved himself;—we are lost."

At that instant Benningsen saw the emperor, went to him sword in hand, and presented him with the act of abdication. "You have ceased to reign," cried he; "the grand duke Alexander is emperor. I summon you in his name to resign the empire, and sign this act of abdication; on this condition alone will I answer for your life." Plato Soubow repeated the same summons. The emperor, struck with dismay, and in utter confusion, asked of what he had been guilty to merit such treatment. "You have not ceased to persecute us for years," replied the half-drunken assassins. They then pressed close upon the unfortunate Paul, who urged and implored for mercy in vain. At this moment a noise was heard,—the footsteps only of some of the conspirators who had remained behind. The assassins, believing it was assistance coming to the emperor, fled immediately. Benningsen alone, but with fearful determination, remained in the monarch's presence, and advancing with his sword pointed at Paul's breast, prevented him from moving. The conspirators, recognizing each other, re-entered the theatre of their crime. They surrounded anew the unfortunate monarch, in order to force him to sign his abdication. The emperor for a moment tried to defend himself. In the scuffle, the lamp, which cast a light upon the horrible scene, was overturned. Benningsen went to seek for another, and on entering found Paul expiring under the blows of two of the con-

[1] This despatch was shown to general Beurnonville, the French ambassador, who communicated the contents to his own government immediately.

spirators; one had fractured his skull with the pummel of his sword, the other was in the act of strangling him with his sash.

While this terrible scene was going forward within, count Pahlen, with the second band of conspirators, had remained outside. When he was informed that all was over, he had the body of the emperor placed upon his bed, and set a guard of thirty men at the door of the apartment, with orders to forbid any one, even of the imperial family, from entering. He then set out to find the grand duke, to announce to him the frightful occurrence of the night.

The grand duke Alexander, agitated most violently, as might be expected, demanded of the count, when he arrived, what had become of his father. The silence of count Pahlen soon taught him how fatal were the expectations he had cherished, when he persuaded himself that nothing but an act of abdication was contemplated. The sorrow of the young prince was very great; the act became, it was said, the secret torment of his life, because nature had given him a kind and generous heart. He flung himself upon a seat, burst into tears, and would listen to nothing, loading count Pahlen with bitter reproaches, while the count bore them all with imperturbable composedness.

Plato Soubow went to find the grand duke Constantine, who had no knowledge of what had occurred, though he has been unjustly accused of having been implicated in the horrible deed. He came tremblingly to the spot, thinking that all his family were to be sacrificed. He found his brother overwhelmed with despair, and then became aware of what had happened. Count Pahlen sent a lady of the palace, who was on very intimate terms with the empress, to inform her of the event of her tragical widowhood. The empress ran in haste to her husband's apartment, and attempted to reach his bed of death, but was prevented by the guards. Having recovered for a moment from her first grief, she felt within her heart, mingling with the emotions of sorrow, strong impulses of ambition. She recalled Catherine to her recollection, and at once felt a desire to mount the throne. She sent several messengers to Alexander, who was about to be proclaimed, to say to him that the throne was hers, and that she, not he, ought to be proclaimed sovereign. Here was a new embarrassment, and a new trouble for the wounded heart of her son, who, about to mount the steps of the throne, had to pass, in order to ascend it, between the body of a murdered father and a mother in tears, demanding, alternately, either her husband or a crown. The night departed upon these appalling scenes; morning dawned; it was necessary that no time should be allowed for reflection; the death of Paul it was most important should be made known, and that the accession of his successor should, at the same time, be promulgated. Count Pahlen went to the young prince, and said, "You have wept enough as a child; now come and reign." He snatched young Alexander from the place of his sorrow, and followed by Benningsen, went to present him to the troops.

The first regiment they encountered was that of Preobrajensky. Being devoted to Paul I., it gave them a very cool reception; but the others, that were much attached to the grand duke, and were, besides, under the influence of Pahlen, who possessed a great ascendancy in the army, did not hesitate a moment to shout "Long live Alexander!" Their example was followed by others of the troops; the young emperor was speedily proclaimed, and put in possession of the throne. He returned and took up his residence with his spouse, the empress Elizabeth, in the winter palace.

All St. Petersburg heard with dismay of this sanguinary catastrophe. The impression which it made, proved that the manners of the people had begun to change in that country, and that since 1762, Russia had been influenced by the example of civilized Europe. It may be observed, to her honour, that if she had then advanced since 1762, she has now advanced equally far from what she was in 1800. On this occasion, the Russians exhibited feelings which did them honour. They feared Paul I. and his madness much more than they hated him, because he was not of a sanguinary disposition. The horrible circumstances of his death were immediately known, and inspired every bosom with pity. The body of Paul was exposed in state, according to custom, but with infinite care to conceal his wounds. Military gloves concealed the mutilations of his hands, and a large hat covered his head. His face was deformed by injuries; but it was promulgated that he had died of apoplexy.

This barbarous act made an extraordinary sensation throughout Europe. The intelligence flew like lightning to Vienna, Berlin, London, and Paris, producing consternation and horror every where. Some years before, it was Paris that had shocked Europe by spilling royal blood: but now Paris gave an example of order, humanity, and peace; they were the old monarchies which, in their turn, had become the scandal of the civilized world. Only a year before, Neapolitan royalty had bathed itself in the blood of its subjects; and now a revolution in a palace ensanguined the imperial throne of Russia.

Thus, in this age of agitation, every country successively gave sad examples, and furnished lamentable subjects for the censures of their enemies. If nations desire to revile each other, they have certainly enough in their several histories to yield deplorable materials for such a purpose: let us take care not to employ similar recollections for such ends. If we recount these horrible narratives, it is because truth is the first quality of history,—it is because truth is the most useful and the most powerful of teachers; the most effective for the prevention of similar scenes; and without meaning what is offensive to any nation, let us say once more, that the institutions are more in the wrong than the people; and, that if, in St. Petersburg, an emperor was assassinated, in order to bring about a change of policy, in London, on the contrary, without any sanguinary result, the policy of peace succeeded that of war by the simple substitution of Addington for Pitt.

The more minute particulars of this catastrophe were soon made public by the indiscreet conduct of the assassins themselves. At Berlin, more particularly, the court of which was so closely allied to that of St. Petersburg, the details of the crime were circulated with great rapidity. The

sister of the Soubows had taken refuge there, and, it was said, had shown symptoms of disquietude and anxiety, such as a person would exhibit that had been in expectation of some great event. She had a son, who was the very officer commanded to announce to Prussia the accession of Alexander. This young man, with the indiscretion natural to youth, disclosed some of the particulars connected with the assassination, and caused at Potsdam a rumour which much offended the young and virtuous king of Prussia. The court made the young man sensible of the impropriety of his conduct; and from thence originated a disgraceful calumny. The sister of the Soubows was on intimate terms of friendship with the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth, who some time afterwards figured at Paris, where he played a remarkable part. The death of the emperor Paul, of great advantage to the English, coming so opportunely to perfect the incomplete victory of Copenhagen, was attributed by the vulgar throughout Europe to the influence of British policy. The intimacy of the English ambassador with a family so deeply implicated in the murder of Paul, gave ground for strong presumption in confirmation of the calumny, and presented new arguments to those who were unable to perceive that such events may arise from general and very natural causes.

None of these conjectures were well-founded. Lord Whitworth was an honourable man, incapable of being concerned in such an attempt. His cabinet had committed many unjustifiable actions for some years, and was soon afterwards guilty of others which it would be more difficult to justify, but it was as much taken by surprise at the death of the czar, as the rest of Europe. Yet the first consul himself, in spite of the perfect impartiality of his judgment, could not keep entertaining suspicions, and he caused many more by the manner of announcing in the *Moniteur* the death of Paul. "It is for history," said the official journal, "to clear up the mystery of his tragical end, and to say what cabinet in the world was most deeply interested in bringing about this catastrophe."

The death of Paul delivered England from an unrelenting enemy, and deprived the first consul of a powerful ally, but one at the same time that was embarrassing, and in his later days nearly as dangerous as he was useful. It is clear that the defunct emperor, believing that the first consul would refuse him nothing as the price of his alliance, had exacted conditions in regard to Italy, Germany, and Egypt, which France could not possibly have agreed to, and that must have proved great obstacles in the establishment of a general peace. The first consul made choice of Duroc, his favourite aid-de-camp, to go to Russia, the same who had already been sent to Berlin and Vienna. Duroc carried a letter, written in the first consul's own hand to congratulate the new emperor upon his accession to the throne, and to try all that the powers of flattery and persuasion could do in order to fill his mind, if possible, with just ideas in regard to the relations between Russia and France.

Duroc set off immediately, with orders to go through Berlin. He was to visit a second time the court of Prussia, and to collect the most correct information upon the late occurrences in the north, that he might arrive in St. Petersburg better prepared to manage the men and things with which he was about to come in contact.

England was much pleased, as might be expected, to learn at the same time the victory of Copenhagen, and the death of the formidable adversary who had formed the neutral league against her. They exalted the heroism of the British hero Nelson, with a natural and legitimate enthusiasm; nations act well in the first excess of their joy to celebrate and even exaggerate their victories. Still, when the first enthusiasm was over, and when the popular imagination became more calm, the pretended victory of Copenhagen was better appreciated. The Sound, people said, was not difficult to force; the attack upon Copenhagen, in a narrow channel where the English vessels could not move without great hazard, was a bold act, worthy of the conqueror at Aboukir. But the English fleet had been seriously disabled. If it had not been that the crown-prince too eagerly listened to lord Nelson's truce, probably he would have been beaten. The victory had then been very near a defeat, and, moreover, the result obtained was not very important, because only a simple armistice had been obtained of the Danes, after which the contest must be renewed. If the emperor Paul had not died, this novel campaign, which the English must have carried on, in the midst of an enclosed sea, where they could not put into any port, for all the ports were shut against them, presented great and fearful chances. But the blow, struck so opportunely at the very gates of the Baltic against the Danes, was decisive; Paul was no longer alive to take up the gauntlet and continue the fight. This is another proof added to a thousand others in history, that there are many favourable chances on the side of boldness, especially when its blows are directed by commanding ability.

The English immediately sought to avail themselves of this fortunate change of government to relax the rigour of their maxims in maritime law, so as to arrive at some honourable adjustment with Russia, and after her with all the other powers. They well knew the kind and amiable character of the young prince who had mounted the Russian throne, because at that time it was reported to be almost bordering upon feebleness: moreover, they flattered themselves that they should regain a considerable degree of influence at St. Petersburg. They sent Lord St. Helen's to that capital with the necessary powers to negotiate an arrangement. M. Woronzoff, the ambassador of Russia at the court of George III., entirely devoted to British interests, had incurred even the sequestration of his property, on account of his not quitting London, which was his usual place of residence. Count Woronzoff was invited to take upon himself again his former official duties. The vessels belonging to the neutral powers in the English ports which had been laid under an embargo were released. Nelson, by orders of his government, continued inactive in the Baltic, and was instructed to declare to the northern courts that he should abstain from every act of hostility, while they refrained from sending their fleets to sea, in which case he should attack them. If, on the contrary, their fleets remained in port, and did not attempt the junction long threatened with the Danes, he was interdicted from any

hostile act upon the coasts of Denmark, Sweden, and Russia; and that he should permit to all merchant-vessels a free passage, the relations between the countries being placed upon the same footing as before the rupture.

The blow thus struck at Copenhagen had unhappily produced its effect. The smaller neutrals, such as Denmark and Sweden, although irritated against England on their own account, had been only forced into the league by the threatening influence of Paul I. Prussia, that regarded her maritime interests as only secondary to those of the nation at large, and that was greatly inclined to peace, had not entered into the quarrel at all but for the double influence of Paul I. and the first consul; she therefore felt a great pleasure in being extricated from her embarrassing position. She was, as the rest all were, very well-disposed to the re-establishment of her commercial interests.

In a very short time the flags of commercial vessels were seen again in the Baltic, English, Swedish, Danish, and Russian; and the navigation there once more resumed its former activity. Nelson permitted them all to pass freely, and received in return, along the northern coasts, the refreshments of which he stood in need. This state of the armistice was, therefore, universally assented to. The Russian cabinet, governed by count Pahlen, without giving way before English influence, showed itself well inclined to terminate the maritime quarrel by such an arrangement as should, up to a certain point, secure neutral rights. It was announced that lord St. Helens would be received; M. Woronzoff had already been authorized to return to London, and M. Bernstorff was sent to England by Denmark.

The first consul, who had by his skill formed this redoubtable coalition against England, founded as it was upon the interest of all the maritime powers, saw its dissolution with regret, through the feebleness of the confederates. He endeavoured to make them ashamed of the haste with which they withdrew; but each excused its conduct by that of its neighbour. Denmark, justly proud of her bloody engagement at Copenhagen, said that she had fulfilled her duty, and that they ought to fulfil theirs. Sweden declared that she was ready to fight, but added, that as the Danish, Prussian, and above all the Russian flags, were sailing freely over the ocean, she could not discover a reason why her subjects should not partake the benefit of navigation as well as the rest. Prussia excused her inaction from the change that had occurred at St. Petersburg, and repeated to France new protestations of firmness and constancy. She declared that her perseverance might be best judged, when the necessary time came to conclude an arrangement, and articles should be definitively agreed upon for regulating maritime rights. Russia affected to support neutral rights, but pretended to have in view only one main object, that of putting an end to hostilities commenced without sufficient grounds.

The first consul, who wished to retard as long as possible any accommodation between Prussia and England, devised a clever expedient to prolong their differences. He had offered Malta to Paul, he now offered Hanover to Prussia. It has been seen that Prussia had occupied that province, so dear to the heart of George III., as a reprisal for the violence committed by England upon the rights of neutrals. Prussia had reconciled herself with difficulty to this aggressive action; but the secret longing which she always felt to possess that province, the most desirable for her that could be, coming so well in for enlarging and rounding off her dominions—this feeling decided her, in spite of her desire for repose and peace. Prussia had a claim to an indemnity in Germany, because it was one of those secular principalities which were to be indemnified for their losses on the left bank of the Rhine, by the secularization of the ecclesiastical states. These pretensions were very considerable; and in the hope that the first consul would favour these views, she was anxious to secure his good will by occupying Hanover. Bonaparte at once said, that if she were inclined to keep Hanover, and consider it as her indemnity, though it was ten times more than was her due, he would consent to it, without any jealousy on the part of France, on account of so large a portion of territory being granted to a power bordering upon that country. This proposition was most welcome, and yet it troubled the heart of the young monarch of Prussia. The offer was seductive; but the great difficulty in the way was the light in which it would be viewed by England. Still, without accepting the proposal in a definitive manner, the cabinet of Berlin replied, that the king, Frederick-William, was touched with the kindness of the first consul; that without positively accepting the proposal, it was better to delay the consideration of the question of territory until general negotiations for peace took place throughout Europe; and he added, that grounding his conduct upon the present state of things, which was that of a tacit armistice rather than one formally stipulated, he should continue to keep possession of Hanover.

The first consul did not wish for more than this, being perfectly satisfied with having created between the courts of London and Berlin a very complicated difficulty, and placed in the hands of a power devoted to him a precious pledge, of which he should be able to make a great advantage in negotiating with England.

The period of such negotiations at last drew near. England had seized with some degree of eagerness the opportunity of softening the harshness of her maritime principles, in order to dispel the danger which threatened her in the north. She was now anxious to conclude the existing state of things, and have peace, not only with the neutrals, but with a power which had been much more formidable than they—with France, that for the last ten years had shaken all Europe, and had begun to threaten the English soil with serious dangers. At one moment, thanks to the obstinacy of Pitt and the talents of Bonaparte, she had found herself alone engaged in a contest with all the world: escaped from this position by a successful act of boldness, by a stroke of good fortune, she was unwilling to fall again into the same hazards through a repetition of similar errors. England, too, could now negotiate with honour; and it was wise, after so many lost opportunities, not to suffer that which at present offered itself anew to escape. Wherefore—reasoned the more sensible people in England—wherefore prolong the war? We have taken all the colonies that are worth the trouble; France

has vanquished all the allies to which we were bound; she has aggrandised herself at their expense, and has become the most formidable power in the universe. Every day in addition to the contest renders her stronger, more particularly so by the successive conquests of all the coasts and harbours of Europe. She has subjugated Holland and Naples, and she is now marching upon Portugal. We must not add to her power by obstinately continuing the war. If it was for the support of the most salutary principles that we had been fighting for years,—if it was for social order threatened by the French revolution,—these are no longer the question, since France gives at this moment the best examples of prudence and order. Do we think to re-establish the Bourbons? but that was Pitt's great fault, the mistake of his policy; and if we have lost his powerful influence and the assistance of his great talents, we must at least obtain the sole advantage of his retirement from office; in other words, we must renounce that inflexible and malicious hatred, which between him and Bonaparte originated insults and personalities of the grossest nature.

All the more sensible minds in England were, therefore, directed to peace. Two great sources of influence were exerted on the same side—the king and the people. The king of England, the obstinate and religious, who refused "emancipation" to Pitt from his fidelity to the protestant cause, did not the less rejoice to see catholicism re-established in France, a re-establishment which was already announced to be near. He saw the triumph of religious principles, and that was sufficient. He had a great aversion to the French revolution; and although Bonaparte had been the means of giving severe and terrible checks to the policy of England, he was much pleased with his conduct in acting against that revolution, and in reinstating true social principles in his own country. France, which in so great a degree possessed the faculty of communicating to every people her own sentiments and feelings, having become tranquil, had returned to sound ideas; George III. regarded the blessings of social order as being by this means preserved to mankind. If for Pitt the war had been one of national ambition, for George III. it had been a war of principles. So far George III. might be considered a friend to Bonaparte of a very different character from Paul I. Recovered from the access of disorder that for some months had obscured his reason, he was perfectly well disposed to peace, and urged his ministers to its conclusion. The English people, loving novelty, regarded a peace with France as the very first of novelties to them, for they had been slaying each other for ten years over the whole world. Attributing alone the scarcity of bread to the sanguinary contest which was desolating sea and land, they loudly demanded peace with France. At last the new minister, Mr. Addington, very unequal as a rival to the glory of Pitt, to whom in talents he was infinitely inferior, as he was in character and political importance—Mr. Addington had only one clear and intelligible duty, that of making peace. He, accordingly, was anxious to conclude it. Pitt, still powerful in Parliament, advised him, on his own part, to follow so expedient and judicious a step. The events in the north, far from exalting British pride, furnished her, on the contrary, with a more facile and honourable opportunity for negotiation. The new minister had determined upon this step the day on which he accepted office, and he was only the more confirmed in this opinion, when he learned what had passed at Copenhagen and St. Petersburg Proceeding still further, he determined to make a direct tender to the first consul, which might serve as a return to that made by the first consul to England upon his acceptance of power.

Lord Hawkesbury, who was in the cabinet of Mr. Addington, as secretary of state for foreign affairs, sent for M. Otto. This gentleman fulfilled in London, as we have already shown, certain diplomatic functions relative to prisoners of war, and had been entrusted six months before with the negotiations which took place regarding the naval armistice. He was thus very naturally become the intermediate agent of the new communications between the two governments then about to commence. Lord Hawkesbury stated to M. Otto that the king had charged him with an agreeable commission, which without doubt would be heard of with as much pleasure in France as in England, a commission for the proposal of a peace. He declared that the king was ready to send a plenipotentiary to Paris itself, or to any other city that the first consul might choose. Lord Hawkesbury added, that the conditions he intended to offer were such as were honourable to both nations, and to show the perfect frankness of the reconciliation, he affirmed that reckoning from the selfsame day, every design directed against the present government of France should be discountenanced in the British cabinet, and he expected the same return from that of the French republic.

This was disavowing the anterior political system of Pitt, who had always pretended to endeavour to effect the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, and had never ceased to uphold the attempts of the emigrants and Vendéans with English money. The proposed negotiations could not have been commenced in a more dignified manner. Lord Hawkesbury required an immediate answer.

The first consul, who, at this moment, did not aspire at more than completely fulfilling his pledge to France, of restoring to her order and peace, was much pleased with this solution of the question, that he had, it may be said, commanded by his successes and political ability. He received the overtures of England with as much earnestness as they had been offered. A negotiation of formal diplomacy appeared to him, under such circumstances, to be tedious and ineffective. The recollection of that of Lord Malmesbury, in 1797, which had proved only a vain demonstration on the part of Pitt, had left a distasteful impression upon his mind. He thought, that if there was real sincerity in London, as there appeared to be, it would suffice to confer directly, and without noise, at the foreign-office, there to treat of the conditions of a peace with frankness and good faith. He regarded it as easy of arrangement, if a reconciliation were truly intended; "because," said he, "England has taken the Indies, and we have taken Egypt. If we agree to keep, each of us, these valuable conquests, the rest is of small importance. Of what importance, in effect, are a few islands in the West Indies or elsewhere,

which England retains from us or our allies, compared to the vast possessions we have conquered! Perhaps she refuses to restore them, when Hanover is in our hands, when Portugal must soon be so; and we offer to evacuate those kingdoms for a few American islands. Peace is, therefore, easy to conclude." So he wrote to M. Otto: "If the English desire it, I authorize you to treat; but directly, and only with lord Hawkesbury."

Powers were sent to M. Otto, with a recommendation to make nothing public, to write as little as possible, to negotiate verbally, and to exchange written notes only upon the most important points. It was impossible to keep perfectly secret such a negotiation; but the first consul desired him to request, and upon his own part to observe, the utmost possible discretion relative to the questions which must arise and be discussed on both sides.

Lord Hawkesbury consented to this mode of proceeding, in the name of the king of England; and it was agreed that the conferences should begin at once in London, between him and M. Otto. They, therefore, really commenced in the early part of April, 1801, or middle of Germinal, year IX.

From the 18th of Brumaire, year VIII., or 9th of November, 1799, to the month of Germinal, year IX., or April, 1801, eighteen months had elapsed, and France had now peace with the continent, was engaged in a frank and sincere negotiation with England, going, finally, to obtain, for the first time for ten years, a general peace on land and sea. The condition of this general peace, admitted by all the contracting parties, was the preservation of her brilliant conquests.

BOOK X.

EVACUATION OF EGYPT.

THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON EXCITE THE GENERAL ATTENTION.—REMARKS UPON THE INFLUENCE THAT THE DEATH OF PAUL I. WOULD EXERCISE UPON THIS NEGOTIATION.—STATE OF THE COURT OF RUSSIA.—CHARACTER OF ALEXANDER.—HIS YOUNG FRIENDS FORM WITH HIM A SECRET GOVERNMENT, WHICH DIRECTS THE WHOLE BUSINESS OF THE EMPIRE.—ALEXANDER CONSENTS TO DIMINISH, IN A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, THE PRETENSIONS BORNE TO PARIS BY M. KALITCHEFF IN THE NAME OF PAUL I.—HE RECEIVES DUROC WITH MUCH FAVOUR.—REITERATES HIS PROTESTATIONS OF A DESIRE TO BE UPON GOOD TERMS WITH FRANCE.—COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATION SET ON FOOT IN LONDON.—PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS BOTH ON ONE SIDE AND THE OTHER.—CONQUESTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES BY LAND AND SEA.—ENGLAND CONSENTS TO RESTORE A PART OF HER MARITIME CONQUESTS, BUT MAKES EVERY OTHER QUESTION SUBORDINATE TO THE EVACUATION OF EGYPT BY FRANCE.—THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TACITLY AGREE TO TEMPORIZE, IN ORDER TO AWAIT THE PROGRESS OF MILITARY EVENTS.—THE FIRST CONSUL, APPRIZED THAT THE NEGOTIATION DEPENDS UPON THESE EVENTS, URGES ON SPAIN TO MARCH RAPIDLY UPON PORTUGAL, AND MAKES FRESH EFFORTS TO SUCCOUR EGYPT.—EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVAL FORCES.—DIFFERENT EXPEDITIONS PROJECTED.—COURSE FOLLOWED BY GANTEAUME ON SAILING FROM BREST.—THE ADMIRAL PASSES THE STRAITS.—READY TO GO ON TO ALEXANDRIA, HE IS ALARMED AT IMAGINARY DANGERS, AND ENTERS TOULON.—STATE OF EGYPT AFTER THE DEATH OF KLÉBER.—SUBMISSION OF THE COUNTRY, AND PROSPEROUS SITUATION OF THE COLONY IN RESPECT TO ITS RESOURCES.—INCAPACITY AND GENERAL ANARCHY AMONG THE COMMANDERS.—DEPLORABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GENERALS.—BADLY-DEVISED MEASURES OF MENOU, WHO WISHES TO EFFECT EVERY OBJECT AT THE SAME TIME.—IN SPITE OF REPEATED WARNINGS RESPECTING THE ENGLISH EXPEDITION, HE TAKES NO PRECAUTIONARY STEPS.—DISEMBARKATION OF THE ENGLISH IN THE ROAD OF ABOUKIR, ON THE 8TH OF MARCH.—GENERAL FRIANT, WITH FORCES REDUCED TO FIFTEEN HUNDRED MEN, MAKES INEFFECTUAL ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THEIR LANDING.—A REINFORCEMENT OF TWO BATTALIONS TO THE DIVISION WOULD HAVE SAVED EGYPT.—TARDY CONCENTRATION OF THE FORCES ORDERED BY MENOU.—ARRIVAL OF THE DIVISION OF LANUSSE, AND SECOND BATTLE WITH INEFFICIENT STRENGTH, ON THE 13TH OF MARCH.—MENOU ARRIVES AT LENGTH WITH THE MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY.—SAD CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIVISIONS AMONG THE GENERALS.—PLAN OF A DECISIVE BATTLE.—THE INDECISIVE BATTLE OF CANOPUS FOUGHT ON THE 21ST OF MARCH.—THE ENGLISH REMAIN MASTERS OF THE PLAIN OF ALEXANDRIA.—LONG DELAY, DURING WHICH MENOU MIGHT HAVE RETRIEVED THE FRENCH FORTUNES, BY MANŒUVRING AGAINST THE DETACHED CORPS OF THE ENEMY.—MENOU DOES NOTHING.—THE ENGLISH MAKE AN ATTACK UPON ROSETTA, AND SUCCEED IN TAKING POSSESSION OF ONE OF THE MOUTHS OF THE NILE.—THEY ADVANCE INTO THE INTERIOR.—THE LAST CHANCE OF SAVING EGYPT AT RAMANIEH IS LOST BY THE INCAPACITY OF GENERAL MENOU.—THE ENGLISH SEIZE UPON RAMANIEH, AND CUT OFF THE DIVISION OF CAIRO FROM THAT OF ALEXANDRIA.—THE FRENCH ARMY, THUS DIVIDED, HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO CAPITULATE.—SURRENDER OF CAIRO BY GENERAL BELLIARD.—MENOU IS SHUT UP IN ALEXANDRIA, AND DREAMS OF A DEFENCE SIMILAR TO THAT OF GENOA.—EGYPT IS FINALLY LOST TO FRANCE.

THE object of the first consul in assuming the direction of the affairs of state was now nearly attained. Tranquillity prevailed throughout the French dominions; there was satisfaction upon every mind, for a treaty of peace was signed at Lunéville with Austria, Germany, and the Italian powers, and peace was re-established, in fact, with Russia, and negotiating in London with England. Once formally signed with these last two powers, and the tranquillity would be universal. In the

space of twenty-two months, young Bonaparte would have accomplished his noble task, and have made his country the grandest and happiest on the globe. It was necessary, therefore, in order to complete this mighty task, to conclude the peace with England; because, while that power was in arms, the sea was closed to France; and, what was of more serious consequence, the continental war might be renewed, under the corrupting influence of English subsidies. The universal exhaustion, it is true, left but a small chance for England to arm the continent anew against France; while she had even recently seen the greater part coalesced with France against her maritime power: and had not the death of Paul so opportunely occurred, she might have paid dearly for her violence towards the confederated neutrals. But his sudden decease was a new and serious event, which could not fail to alter the existing situation of affairs. What influence, then, would the catastrophe at St. Petersburg exercise upon European politics? This was the question which the first consul was impatient to discover. He had sent Duroc to St. Petersburg, in order to obtain this information as early and as correctly as possible.

A little before the decease of Paul, the relations of Russia with France had presented very considerable difficulties, owing to the excessive arrogance of Paul, and an arrogance in his representative, M. Kalitcheff, not less than that of his master. The defunct czar, as already stated, wished to dictate to France the conditions of a peace with Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont, and the Two Sicilies, states of which he was made the protector, either spontaneously of his own accord, or by obligation, arising out of treaties which had been managed under the second coalition. At the same time, he was for regulating the relations of France with the Porte, and pretended that the first consul was bound to evacuate Egypt, because that province belonged to the sultan, and that there were no just grounds for depriving him of his territory.

This ally, full of ardent hatred as he was against England, was still a very dangerous friend; because a misunderstanding with him might easily arise. That, too, which only appeared to be a fruit of madness in the emperor Paul, was a singular indication of the progress of Russian ambition during three-quarters of a century. There were scarcely eighty years elapsed, since Peter the Great attracted the attention of Europe for the first time, limiting the extent of his influence to the north of the continent, in contesting against Charles XII. the honour of the election for a king of Poland. Forty years afterwards, Russia, already pushing her ambitious designs into Germany, fought against Frederick, with France and Austria, in order to prevent the formation of the Prussian power. Some years later, in 1772, she partitioned Poland. In 1778 she took another step, and on an equality with France, regulated the affairs of Germany; she interposed her mediation between Prussia and Austria, that were ready to make war about the Bavarian succession; and had the distinguished honour to guarantee, at Teschen, the Germanic constitution. Lastly, before the end of the century arrived, in 1799, she sent one hundred thousand Russians into Italy, not to contest a question of territory, but a moral question—for the preservation, she said, of social order, threatened by the French revolution.

Never, in so short a time, is there exhibited in history so great a degree of aggrandizement accruing to any single state. Paul, who would fain be the arbitrator of every thing, as the price of his alliance with the first consul, was only, therefore, the unconscious tool of a policy which was the result of profound design in the Russian cabinet. His ambassador at Paris requested, in cold and unvarying haughtiness, that which his master demanded with his accustomed excitement, when he desired to have his will. He even affected, clumsily enough, to institute himself the protector of the smaller states, which, after having offended her, were now at the mercy of France. The court of Naples had sought to place itself under Russian protection: but this had not met with success, because M. Gallo had been sent from Paris, and his court obliged to submit, at Florence, to the terms of the first consul. M. St. Marsan, who was invested with the same powers from the house of Savoy to the French republic, having attempted the same thing as M. Gallo, had been sent away in a similar manner.

M. Kalitcheff hastened to support the claims of the courts of Naples and Turin, to whom his master had guaranteed their territories; and he understood, in signing a treaty with France, that he was not to confine himself to the condition of the re-establishment of a friendly understanding between the two empires, which, indeed, had no dispute by land or sea to settle, but to regulate the affairs of Germany and Italy, in nearly all their details, and even those of the East, if he persisted in demanding the restoration of Egypt to the Porte.

In spite of the desire of France to be on an amicable footing with the emperor Paul, his ambassador was answered with firmness. A public treaty had been agreed upon by France, which simply re-established amity and peace between the two countries; but a secret convention was added, in which it was undertaken to concert with Russia the regulation of the Germanic indemnities, and to favour, in particular, the courts of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, which were either in Russian relationship or alliance; and to reserve an indemnity to the house of Savoy, if not reinstated in its dominions; but without stipulating when, where, or to what extent, because the first consul had already harboured the design of keeping back Piedmont for France. This was all that could be yielded. As to Naples, the treaty of Florence was declared to be irrevocable; and in respect to Egypt, the resolution was adopted not to listen to a word upon that subject.

M. Kalitcheff having insisted in a tone and manner altogether unaccountable upon these points, the matter was terminated by making no more replies to his questions, and by leaving him at Paris, tolerably embarrassed in his official character, and in the engagements he had entered into with the smaller states. Matters were in this situation when the intelligence arrived of the tragical end of Paul I. M. Kalitcheff, without waiting for the commands of his new sovereign, was anxious to get out of the false position in which he had placed himself, and, therefore, ad-

dressed a peremptory note to M. Talleyrand, on the 26th of April, to which he requested an immediate reply upon all the points of the negotiation, complaining that the things accorded in Berlin between general Beurnonville and M. Krudener were disputed at Paris. He seemed to insinuate, that if the weaker states were not better treated by France, the glory of the first consul would suffer, and that his government would come to be confounded with the revolutionary governments that had preceded it.

M. Talleyrand answered immediately that his communication was very much out of place; that it was very deficient in the respect due from independent powers to one another; that he could not place it under the eyes of the first consul without offending his dignity; that M. Kalitcheff might, therefore, consider it as not having been forwarded; and that the reply it solicited, in the name of his cabinet, would not be made, until the request should be renewed in other terms, and in another despatch.

This severe lesson had its due effect upon M. Kalitcheff. He appeared to feel alarmed at the consequences of his own act. Already the petty states that had sought a shelter behind him, felt apprehensive of his protection, and began to regret that they had confided their interests to his hands. M. Kalitcheff, reduced to the necessity of reproducing his demands in a better form, or remaining without a reply, wrote a second despatch, in which he reiterated his request for an explanation, but confined himself to an enumeration of each head, without any remark, or without complaints or compliments. The despatch was cold; but not objectionable. He was then duly informed by M. Talleyrand, that in this new form his questions should be submitted to the first consul, and should receive their due reply. It was added by M. Talleyrand, that the last despatch only should be preserved in the archives of the foreign-office, and that the first should be destroyed.

A few days afterwards, M. Talleyrand answered M. Kalitcheff in polite, but very decided terms. He went over all the points settled by the French cabinet, and added the very natural reflection, that if France had consented, in regard to many of the most important affairs of Europe, to concert them amicably with Russia, and had appeared disposed to do that which she had desired, it was in consideration of the intimate alliance contracted with Paul I. against the policy of England; but that since the accession of the czar Alexander, it was needful to understand whether the new emperor would enter into the same views, and afford the same certainty that France would find in him an ally equally as constant as the deceased emperor.

After that day M. Kalitcheff remained perfectly inactive, awaiting instructions from his new master.

The prince, who had just ascended the throne of the czars, was a singular character,—singular, as the greater part of the princes have been who, for a century past, have governed in Russia. Alexander was twenty-five years of age, tall of stature, having a mild and noble countenance, though his features were not perfectly regular; he possessed an acute mind, a generous heart, and complete grace of manner. Still there might be perceived about him traces of paternal infirmity. His mind, lively, changeable, and susceptible, was continually impressed with the most contrary ideas. But this remarkable prince was not always led away by such momentary impulses; he joined with his extensive and quickly-changing comprehension, a depth of mind that escaped the closest observation. He was well-meaning, and a dissembler at the same time, capable of acting with deep subtilty; already some of these excellencies and defects had begun to exhibit themselves in the tragical events which had preceded his arrival at the throne. Let care be taken, however, not to calumniate this illustrious prince; he had been under a complete delusion in regard to the design of count Pahlen; he had believed, with the credulity natural to his age, that the abdication of his father was the only object in view, and would be the sole result of the conspiracy, the secret of which had been entrusted to him. He had believed, that in aiding it, he should save the empire, his mother, his brothers, and himself from unknown violence. Become well acquainted with that event, he detested the error of which he had been guilty, as well as those who had led him into it.

This young emperor, in short, of noble aspect, gracious manners, witty, enthusiastic, changeable, artificial, difficult to penetrate, was endowed with the charm of great personal attraction, and was destined to exercise over his contemporaries the most seductive influence. He was even destined to exercise this seductive influence upon the extraordinary man, so difficult to deceive, who then governed France, and with whom he was one day to have such great and terrible animosities.

The education of this young prince was a strange one. He had been a pupil of colonel La Harpe, who had inspired him with the feelings and notions of Swiss republicanism. Alexander had given way to the influence of his teacher with his customary flexibility, and the effect was visible when he ascended the throne. While he was yet an imperial prince, subjected to the severe rule, first of Catherine, and then of Paul I., he formed an intimate acquaintance with some young persons of his own age, such as Paul Strogonoff, Nowosiltzoff, and above all, prince Adam Czartorisky. This last descended from one of the most ancient families in Poland, and much attached to his native land, was at St. Petersburg as a species of hostage: he served in the regiment of guards, and lived at court with the young grand dukes. Alexander, drawn towards him by a species of analogy in sentiments and ideas, communicated to him all the dreams and hopes of his youth. Both in secret deplored the misfortunes of Poland, a thing very natural in a descendant of the Czartoriskys, but rather surprising in the grandson of Catherine. Alexander solemnly vowed to his friend that when he ascended the throne, he would restore her laws and liberty to unhappy Poland.

Paul, who had observed this intimacy, felt offended at it, and exiled prince Czartorisky, by naming him his minister to the king of Sardinia, a king without a realm. Scarcely was Alexander seated upon the throne, when he sent off a courier to his friend, then resident at Rome, and recalled him to St. Petersburg. He also united near his person, Nowosiltzoff and Paul Strogonoff. These

formed a sort of occult government, composed of young men without experience, animated by the most generous feelings, and full of illusions, little proper, it must be said, to direct a great government, in a difficult conjuncture of the times. They were impatient to free themselves from the old Russians, who had, until then, held the reins of government, and with whom they had no kind of sympathy. One personage alone, older and more serious than themselves, the prince Kotschoubey, mingled in this young society, and tempered by a riper reason their youthful vivacity. This prince had travelled all over Europe, acquired a vast deal of knowledge, and engaged his sovereign's attention upon every opportunity with the ameliorations which he believed it would be very useful to effect in the interior government of the empire. All alike censured the course of policy which led at first to the making war upon France on account of her revolution, and afterwards in carrying it on against England in behalf of a thesis about the law of nations. They were against a war of principles upon France, or a naval war upon England. The great empire of the north, according to them, was best employed in holding the balance between the two powers, that threatened to swallow up the world in their quarrel, and by this means to become the arbitrator of Europe, and the support of the feeble states against the strong. More generally, however, they directed their attention much less to exterior politics than to the interior regeneration of the empire. They did not do less than meditate giving her new institutions, modelled in part upon those they had seen in civilized countries; they had, in a word, the generosity, inexperience, and vanity of youth.

The ostensible ministers of Alexander, were the old Russians, prejudiced against France, and warm in behalf of England, besides which they were much disliked by the sovereign. Count Pahlen alone, thanks to his firm judgment, did not share the prejudices of his colleagues, and wished that Russia should be free from every influence, remaining neuter between France and England. In this view his ideas agreed with those of the new emperor and his friends. But count Pahlen committed the mistake of treating Alexander as a youthful prince, whom he had set upon the throne, directed, and would fain still direct. The sensitive vanity of his young master was thus frequently wounded. Count Pahlen behaved too with great harshness towards the dowager empress, who showed much ostentatious sorrow, and a deadly hatred to her husband's murderers. In a religious establishment of her own foundation, she placed an image of the Virgin Mary, with Paul at her feet, imploring the vengeance of Heaven upon his assassins. Count Pahlen ordered the image to be removed, in spite of the cries of the empress, and the displeasure of her son. An ascendancy, exercised in such a manner as this, could not be of very prolonged duration.

At the commencement of the reign of Alexander, count Panin continued to preside as foreign minister; count Pahlen still remained the most influential, holding a share in all the branches of the government. Alexander, after taking the advice of his friends, went and transacted business afterwards with his ostensible ministry. Under these different influences, sometimes in opposition to each other, they determined to treat with England, and to commence by taking off the embargo on British commerce, an embargo, according to Alexander, which was a most unjust measure. It was then decided that such a maritime treaty should be formed through lord St. Helens with England, as should, if not protect the rights of neutrals, at least secure the interests of Russian navigation. Alexander, ranking among his father's irrational notions the pretension to the grand-mastership of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, announced that he would merely be the protector of that order, until the different languages of which it was composed should be able to reassemble and to choose a new grand-master. This resolution easily got rid of all the difficulties, whether with England, who set a great value upon Malta on the one hand, or France upon the other, that was not inclined to carry on a war for ever, in order to restore the island to the knights, or with Rome and Spain, who had never consented to acknowledge for the grand-master of St. John of Jerusalem a schismatic prince.

In order to put an end to another contested subject, it was resolved that the evacuation of Egypt should no longer be insisted upon with France, since in reality Russia was as little interested in seeing that country in the hands of the French as of the English. As to Naples and Piedmont, Russia was bound to these states, so it was said, by solemn treaties, and Alexander, on commencing his reign, was desirous of exhibiting to the world a grand idea of his good faith. It was agreed that he should no longer stipulate in behalf of Naples for the abrogation of the treaty of Florence, but for the guarantee of her present dominions, and at a peace for the evacuation of the Gulf of Tarentum by the French. As to Piedmont, Russia was resolved to demand for the house of Savoy either Piedmont itself, or a proportionate indemnity in case of default. Alexander also had the intention of regulating, in concert with France, the indemnity promised to the German princes, that had been deprived of territory on the left bank of the Rhine. Nothing here presented any difficulty, the first consul having given his consent to those points already. M. Kalitcheff was recalled, and M. Markoff was chosen to be his successor; a man of considerable talent, but in respect to a knowledge of official forms, in no way superior to his predecessor.

Duroc, sent to congratulate the new emperor upon his accession, on his arrival at St. Petersburg, found that all these questions had been determined; he obtained from the ministers as well as the monarch himself a very favourable reception. His intelligence and elegance of manner succeeded in Russia as they had done in Prussia, and he secured for himself both the esteem and confidence of the Russians. After his formal audiences were over he obtained several private interviews, during which Alexander made a sort of display in the revelation of his sentiments to the representative of the first consul. On one particular occasion in a public garden at St. Petersburg, the prince perceived Duroc, went up to him, addressed him with a graceful familiarity, bade his attendants remain at a distance, and conducting him to a retired spot, appeared to open his mind

with perfect freedom: "I am," said he, "a friend of France in my heart, and for a long while have admired your new chief: I appreciate what he has performed for the peace of Europe and for the maintenance of social order. He need not apprehend from me a new war between the two countries. But let him second my sentiments, and cease to furnish pretexts to those who are jealous of his power. You see I have made concessions. I say no more about Egypt; I had rather it belonged to France than to England; and if, unhappily, the English should take it, I will join with you to snatch it out of their hands. I have given up Malta, in order to remove one of the difficulties which was in the way of a European peace. I am in alliance with the kings of Naples and Piedmont: I know that their conduct to France has not been correct; but how could they act differently, surrounded and governed as they have been by England? I shall see, with great mortification, the first consul seize upon Piedmont, as some recent acts of his administration tend to make me believe is his intention. Naples complains of being deprived of a portion of her territory. This is all unworthy of the first consul, and dims his glory. He is not charged, like the governments which have preceded him, with threatening social order, but he is accused of wishing to invade every state. This is injurious to him, and exposes me, myself, to the clamours of the minor states, by whom I am besieged. Let him cease to suffer these difficulties to exist between us, and we shall live in future under a perfectly good understanding." Alexander, unbosoming himself still more, added: "Say nothing of all this to my ministers; be discreet; employ none but trustworthy couriers. Tell general Bonaparte to send me men upon whom I can rely. The most direct relations will be found the best for establishing a good understanding between the two governments." Alexander added a few words more relating to England. He affirmed that he would not yield up to her the dominion of the seas, the common property of all nations; that if he had removed the embargo on English vessels, it was from a sense of justice. Preceding treaties had stipulated, that in case of a rupture, a year should be allowed to the English merchants for the purpose of settling their affairs; it was, therefore, a gross injustice to seize upon their property. "I will not be guilty of such an act," Alexander exclaimed strongly; "my sole motive was to do justice. I do not intend to deliver myself up to England. It depends entirely upon the first consul whether I shall continue to be his ally,—his friend."

During this conversation the young emperor appeared to have a confiding spirit, devoid of pretence, desirous evidently to make little of his ministers, and to show that he had his own views, and a personal system of policy.

Duroc left St. Petersburg loaded with the favours and proofs of regard he had received from the emperor.

It was clear from these communications that Russia would no longer be any great help against England, but still that there would in future be a much less difficulty in arranging the general affairs of Europe. The first consul, now being certain of coming to a good understanding with the Russian court, did not hasten to terminate the negotiation, because time seemed every day to smooth the difficulties that had subsisted between the two nations. England, in fact, exhibited at the moment but little interest in the houses of Naples and Piedmont; and if, as there was ground to believe, she no longer made their concerns one of the conditions of the peace, it would be much more easy for France to act as she saw fit in regard to these two houses, when England herself had given them over to the first consul.

The negotiation with England now became the main question, and, indeed, almost the only one left to arrange. In order to conduct it correctly, it was not only necessary to negotiate in London with ability, but also to push forward with alacrity the war in Portugal, and as well as to dispute Egypt with the British forces; because the issue of events in those two countries could not fail to exercise a great influence upon the future treaty. The first consul also, wishing to throw more weight into the scale, made additional preparations with much ostentation at Boulogne and at Calais, in order that it might be thought that the extreme measure of an invasion of England, long meditated by the directory, was neither beyond his calculations nor his means. Numerous bodies of troops were put in march towards that part of France, and on the coasts of Normandy, Flanders, and Picardy, a great number of gun-boats were assembled, strongly built and well-armed, capable of carrying troops, and of crossing the channel at Calais.

In consequence of their arrangements previously made, lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto were employed about the middle of April, 1801, or Germinal, year IX., in diplomatic conferences. According to customary usage, the first demands were excessive. England proposed a simple arrangement as a basis, namely, the *uti possidetis*; that is to say, that each should retain whatever acquisitions the chances of war had thrown into their hands. England, in fact, profiting by the long contest of Europe against France, was herself enriched while her allies were exhausted, and had captured the colonies of every other nation. She had seized the entire continent of India, as well as the most important commercial positions in the four quarters of the globe. From the Dutch she had taken Ceylon, that large and rich island, placed at the extreme of the Indian peninsula, and forming to it so desirable a pendant. She had acquired the other Dutch possessions in the Indian seas, except, it is true, the large colony of Java. She had taken from them between the two oceans the Cape of Good Hope, one of the best situated maritime stations on the globe. Her continued efforts had not succeeded in wresting the Mauritius from France, which she had never ceased to hold. In South America she had deprived the unfortunate Dutch, the most ill-treated power of all during the war, of the territory of Guiana, extending between the Amazons and Orinoko, containing Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo; magnificent countries, the agricultural and commercial development of which were not then and have not yet been developed, but which are one day destined to attain wonderful prosperity; and which presented besides the advantage of being the

first step gained towards the great Spanish colonies on the American continent. England coveted these colonies. She had entertained the design of aiding them in the attainment of their independence, in order to avenge herself for what had happened in North America; and she flattered herself besides, reasonably enough, that, being independent, they would soon become the prey of her commerce. It was for this reason that she set a great value upon the conquest of one of the West India islands from the Spaniards, one of the Antilles, the fine island of Trinidad, situated close to South America, a sort of footing, as well disposed for contraband trade as for aggression upon the Spanish possessions. She had made another grand and valuable acquisition in the Antilles, in the French island of Martinique. The manner in which she captured this island had not been very legitimate, because the colonists, dreading an insurrection of the slaves, had placed themselves, for a temporary purpose, in her hands; and of a voluntary deposit, she had made them a property. England held fast Martinique on account of the fine harbour belonging to that island. She had taken besides in the Antilles St. Lucien and Tobago, islands of far less consequence than the others, and towards the fishing station, St. Pierre, and Miquelon. Lastly, in Europe she had taken the best of the Balearic islands from Spain; and from the French, who had captured it from the knights of St. John of Jerusalem, Malta, the queen of the Mediterranean.

After these conquests, it may be well said that there was little left for her to dispute about with the maritime nations, the continental possessions of the Spaniards in the two Americas excepted. It is true that the English threatened, if the French persisted in marching into Portugal, she would recompense herself by the seizure of Brazil.

To balance these vast maritime acquisitions, France had taken the finest portions of the European continent, much more important than all those distant maritime territories. But she had restored all with the exception of that portion comprised between the great lines of the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees. She had conquered besides a colony, which to her alone was a compensation for all the colonial greatness which England had obtained—that was Egypt. No other possession was of equal value to that. If it was thought necessary to shake the new empire of England in India, Egypt was the most certain road to arrive at it. If it were only contemplated which was the wiser plan, to bring to the ports of France a part of the commerce of the East, Egypt was still the natural road of that commerce. For peace as for war, then, it was the most precious colony in the world. If at that moment the head of the French government had considered alone the interests of France, and not that of his allies, he might have accepted the terms proposed by England; since Martinique itself, the sole direct loss worthy of attention that France suffered during the war, was of little or no moment compared to Egypt, the real empire placed between the east and west, commanding, and, at the same time, shortening the communications between the seas. But the first consul considered himself bound in honour to restore to the allies of France a great part of their possessions. It did not depend upon him to spare Holland for all the sacrifices to which she was condemned by the defection of her navy, which had, as is well known, followed the stadtholder to England; but it was the duty of the first consul to restore the Cape and Guiana. He wished that Spain, which had acquired nothing during the war, should lose nothing; and that Trinidad and the Balearic islands should be restored to her; lastly, it was determined, at no price, to cede Malta; because that would weaken the conquest of Egypt, and render its possession precarious in the hands of France.

The intention of the first consul was to leave Indostan to the English undisturbed, including the small factories of Chandernagore and Pondicherry, which were of no moment to France; even to give up Ceylon, the property of the Dutch: but to demand the restoration of the Cape, Guiana, Trinidad, Martinique, the Balearic islands, and Malta; and to retain Egypt as an equivalent for the conquest of India by the English. It will be seen how he conducted himself to attain this end, during a negotiation which continued for five entire months.

To the idea of adopting the *uti possidetis* as the basis of the future peace, the French negotiator was ordered to reply by the most explicit arguments: "Would you lay down the principle," he said to lord Hawkesbury, "that each nation should keep its conquests; in that case France should keep, in Germany, Baden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and three-fourths of Austria; she should keep in Italy, the whole country, the ports of Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, and Venice. She should keep Switzerland, which she intends to evacuate as soon as she has established a proper order of things there; she should keep Holland, occupied by her armies, where she might build and fit out the most powerful navy. She should take Hanover, and bestow it as a compensation to certain powers upon the continent, and by this means attach them to her for ever. She could, finally, push on the campaign against Portugal, and indemnify Spain out of that country, securing new ports for herself. How important would these naval stations be, extending from the Texel to Lisbon and Cadiz, from Cadiz to Genoa, from thence to Otronto, and from Otronto to Venice. If abstract principles were to be laid down as the basis of the negotiations, peace would be impossible. France had restored the greater part of her conquests to their respective governments: to Austria she had given back a part of Italy; to the court of the Two Sicilies the kingdom of Naples; to the pope the Roman states entire; she had given Tuscany, which it was easy for her to have kept, to the house of Spain; she had re-established Genoa in her independence; she had confined herself to making Lombardy a friendly republic; and was preparing to evacuate Switzerland, Holland, and even Hanover. It was necessary, therefore, that England should give up a part of her conquests. Those which France demanded did not affect herself directly, but her allies. France held it her duty to get them back, in order to give them to their real owners. Besides, if India and Ceylon were conceded to England, the possessions demanded to be restored could be of little consequence. If England would make no concession, she should say as much, and declare that the negotiation was only a deception.

The world should know through whose fault it was that peace became impossible. France would then make a last effort, a difficult and perilous effort, but which would, perhaps, be fatal for England; because the first consul did not despair of being able to cross the straits of Calais at the head of a hundred thousand men."

Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington negotiated with the desire to make an advantageous peace for themselves, which was perfectly natural; and they wished it to be speedy. They were aware of the force of the arguments used by the French cabinet, and felt the stern resolve contained in its words. They set themselves at once to lower their pretensions, and to open the way to a reconciliation. They first answered the arguments of the first consul, respecting the conquests given back by France, that if she had abandoned a part of her conquests, it was because she was unable to retain them; while no navy in the world was able to take from the English those colonies which she had acquired. That if France did restore a portion of the territory occupied by her armies, she kept Nice, Savoy, the banks of the Rhine, and, above all, the mouths of the Schelde and Antwerp, which were a considerable aggrandizement, not only by land, but sea; that it was necessary to re-establish the equilibrium of Europe, if not wholly on the continent, at least upon the ocean; that if France desired to preserve Egypt, India was no longer a sufficient compensation for England; and that the British cabinet would then retain a great part of its new acquisitions. Still, added lord Hawkesbury, we have only made the first proposition; we are ready to give way upon any point which may be shown to be too rigorous. We will restore some of our conquests; only state to us those of which the restitution appears to you, at least, most desirable.

The first consul replied in an animated manner to these arguments of the English ministry. It was not correct to say, according to him, that England could keep all her maritime conquests, while, on the other hand, France was unable to retain hers on the continent of Europe. The continental war being closed, either by the complete exhaustion of the allies of England, or by the distaste which others had formed for her alliance, France, aided by the resources of Holland, Spain, and Italy, might have done whatsoever she desired upon the continent; and she was in a state to do much more upon the ocean than the British ministers would believe. France, without doubt, could not have kept the centre of Germany and three parts of Austria without a convulsive overturn of all Europe; but she could have made a much less moderate peace than that of Lunéville; she would have been able, Austria being so exhausted after Hohenlinden, to have kept all Italy and Switzerland, without the slightest opposition from any quarter. In respect to a continental equilibrium, that had been destroyed upon the day when Prussia, Russia, and Austria partitioned the large and fine kingdom of Poland among themselves, without the slightest equivalent for any other power. The banks of the Rhine and the slopes of the Alps were scarcely an equivalent to France for what these, her rivals, had acquired upon the continent. Over sea, Egypt was scarcely a compensation to her for the conquest of the Indies. It might be doubted, if, even with that colony, France could keep her ancient maritime proportions in regard to England.

These arguments had reason on their side, and fortunately the arm of strength, for both one and the other are necessary in a negotiation. The basis of the treaty was soon agreed upon. It was settled that England in having undisturbed possession of India, should restore a part of the conquests she had made from France, Spain, and Holland. The detail of the particular territories she was to keep or restore will be next considered.

Without granting the formal possession of Egypt to France, a point which the English negotiator reserved as doubtful, he proposed two hypotheses, one in which France preserved Egypt, and another in which she renounced it, whether she lost it by force of arms or voluntarily gave it up. On the first hypothesis, that of the retention of Egypt by France, England, retaining India and Ceylon, as well as Chandernagore and Pondicherry, would require in addition, the Cape of Good Hope, a part of the Guianas, that is to say, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, Trinidad, and Martinique in the Antilles; finally, and above all, Malta, in the Mediterranean. She would give up the smaller Dutch possessions of India, Surinam, the insignificant islands of St. Lucia, Tobago, St. Pierre, Miquelon, and finally, Minorca. Under the second hypothesis, in which the French were not to remain masters of Egypt, England demanded India and Ceylon, but consented to give up the small colonies of Pondicherry and Chandernagore, the Cape of Good Hope, Martinique or Trinidad, whichever France might prefer, she keeping the other. Lastly, she demanded Malta, but not peremptorily.

These restitutions, in the opinion of the first consul, were not sufficient. The negotiation notwithstanding approximated at last towards an accommodation, and after a month of discussion, arrived at the following propositions, which were at bottom the real views of both governments.

England insisted in any case upon India and Ceylon. If the French evacuated Egypt, she was to leave them the small factories of Pondicherry and Chandernagore. She restored the Cape to the Dutch upon the condition of its being declared a free port. She restored to Holland also Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, on the American continent; and the colony of Surinam: she restored one of the two great islands in the Antilles, Martinique or Trinidad; and rendered back St. Lucia, Tobago, St. Pierre, and Miquelon, and lastly, Malta and Minorca. Thus, as the result of the war she gained, if France did not keep Egypt, the continent of India, Ceylon, and one of the two principal Antilles, Trinidad or Martinique. If the French kept Egypt, she obtained besides Chandernagore and Pondicherry, the Cape, Martinique, Trinidad, and finally, Malta. That is to say, England, in the second case, deemed it a necessary precaution to deprive France of her footing at Chandernagore and Pondicherry, places in the peninsula of India, and as an indemnity, Trinidad, which threatened Spanish America, Martinique, which has the best port in the Antilles, and finally, Malta, the best port in the Mediterranean.

In regard to the Cape, Martinique, or Trinidad,

and Malta, demanded over and above in case the French possessed Egypt, they were far from being as valuable as that important possession; and although it would have been most expedient to consent at once had this condition been unavoidable, the first consul had still the hope to keep Egypt, and pay less dearly for its possession. He hoped that if the English army sent towards the Nile should fail, and that if the Spaniards pushed with rapidity the war against Portugal, he should be able to obtain the Cape for the Dutch, Trinidad for the Spaniards, and Malta for the order of St. John of Jerusalem, thus obliging England to remain content with India, Ceylon, a part of the Guianas, and one or two of the lesser Antilles.

Every thing therefore depended upon the events of the war; and the English, hoping it would terminate to their advantage, were not reluctant to avert the issue which could not remain long unsettled, because it rested only upon the knowledge whether the Spaniards would venture to march upon Portugal, and whether the English troops on board lord Keith's fleet in the Mediterranean could make good their landing in Egypt. In order to be acquainted with these two results, a month or two was all the time necessary. Thus, on both one side and the other great care was taken not to break off the negotiation, which both were sincerely anxious should terminate in peace. Each took the step of gaining time; to this end the numerous and complicated nature of the subjects which they had to discuss, furnished a very natural means, without having recourse to much of the finesse of diplomacy.

"All depends," wrote Otto, "upon two things—will the English army be beaten in Egypt? Will Spain march freely against Portugal? Hasten; obtain these two results, or one of them, and you will make the finest peace in the world." "But I must inform you," he added, "that if the English ministers have a dread of the soldiers in our army of Egypt, they have very little of the resolution of the court of Spain."

The first consul made continual efforts to arouse to action the old court of Spain, and to obtain its concurrence in his two great designs, which on one part consisted in seizing upon Portugal, on the other, in directing towards Egypt the naval forces of the two countries. Unluckily the resources of the Spanish monarchy were nearly exhausted. A good-hearted king, but blinded and absorbed by the most vulgar cares, little worthy of a monarch, a queen given up to the most shameless debaucheries, a vain, frivolous, incapable favourite, wasted in reckless excesses the last resources of the monarchy of Charles V. Lucien Bonaparte, despatched as ambassador to Madrid, for the purpose of indemnifying him for the loss of the ministry of the interior, Lucien, eager to rival the diplomatic success of his brother Joseph, laboured in Spain to serve the cause of the first consul with credit and brilliancy. It is true that he obtained some influence, thanks to his name, and to the successful boldness with which he neglected the ostensible ministers, and put himself in communication with the real head of the government, the prince of the peace. Placing before the prince the resentment or favour of the first consul as a choice, he had excited in him a more than common zeal for the interests of the alliance, and had made him adopt to the full extent the plan for the invasion of Portugal. Lucien had said to the court of Spain: "You wish for peace, and you wish it to be of advantage to yourselves, or at least not injurious; you desire that it shall terminate without the loss of any of your colonies; aid us then in securing pledges, of which we will make use to obtain from England the larger part of her maritime conquests." These reasons were good; but they were not the most convincing to the prince of the peace. Lucien had devised others much more efficacious. "You are every thing here," he said to the favourite; "my brother knows that well; he will lay at your door alone the failure of the plans of the alliance. Would you have the Bonapartes friends or enemies?" These arguments, first employed to push the war with Portugal, were every day used to hasten the preparations. Still, whatever arguments were used to urge forward the prince of the peace, he did not betray the interests of his country. He was, on the contrary, in no way better enabled to serve them than by the war against Portugal, because that was the sole mode of obtaining from England the restitution of the Spanish colonies.

The preparations were therefore accelerated as much as possible, and the last resources of the monarchy were applied to its completion. Who could believe that this great and noble nation, the glory of which has filled the world, and of which the patriotism was soon to appear with great lustre, unhappily for France,—who could believe that it was with great difficulty she was able to assemble twenty-five thousand men?—she, with her magnificent harbours and ports and her numerous vessels, the relics of the fine reign of Charles III.—who could believe she was even embarrassed to pay a few workmen in the arsenals to set afloat a man of war or two? and more, that it was out of her power to victual her fleet? Who could credit that her fifteen ships, blockaded in Brest for two years, were the whole of her navy, at least, of her navy fit for service? The want of the precious metals, in consequence of the interruption of her trade with Mexico, had reduced her to a paper currency, and that paper currency was at the lowest point of depreciation. An application was now made to the clergy, who did not possess at the moment the funds for which there was an immediate necessity; but possessing a credit which was accorded to the crown, and applying it to the object, the preparations that had been begun were completed.

Twenty-five thousand men, not very badly equipped, were at length sent on the march towards Badajoz, but they were not sufficient. The prince of the peace had declared that without a division of French troops he would not dare to enter Portugal. The first consul had united such a division in haste at Bordeaux. They had soon traversed the Pyrenees, and were in rapid march upon Ciudad Rodrigo. The prince of the peace wished to enter Portugal with the Spaniards by Alentejo, while the French divisions penetrated by the provinces of Tras-os-Montes and Beïra. General St. Cyr, who commanded the French, had gone to Madrid to arrange the operations with the prince of the peace; and although that officer was not well fitted to humour the temper of others,

having none himself, he succeeded in concerting with the prince a proper plan of operation.

Portugal, seeing itself thus pressed, had sent M. Aranjo to Madrid, to which place he had been refused liberty to proceed. He then went to France, and met there with the same refusal. Portugal was ready to submit to any conditions rather than shut her ports against the English merchant ships. These offers were repelled. It was determined that Portugal should exclude all English vessels, both of war and trade; that three of her provinces should be occupied as a security until a general peace; and that she should pay the expenses of the expedition.

The troops of the two nations set out on their march, and the prince of the peace quitted Madrid, his head filled with wild visions of glory. The court, and even Lucien Bonaparte, were to accompany him. The first consul had ordered the most exact discipline to be preserved among the French troops; he had ordered that they should attend mass on Sundays, that the bishops should be visited upon passing through the chief towns of the dioceses, and, in a word, that the French should conform to all the Spanish customs. He was anxious that the sight of the French in place of estranging them from the Spaniards, should cause them to approximate more closely in feeling.

Every thing in this quarter, therefore, prospered according to the wishes of the first consul in aid of the negotiation then going forward in London. But there yet remained much to be done relative to the employment of the naval forces. It has been already shown in what manner the three navies of Holland, France, and Spain had been directed to one common purpose. Five French, Dutch, and Spanish vessels, fifteen in all, filled with troops, were intended to threaten Brazil or retake Trinidad. The rest of the united naval force was designed for Egypt. Ganteaume sailed from Brest with seven vessels, conveying considerable succours, and was on the voyage to Alexandria. The other vessels remained still at Brest, in order to keep alive the continual threat of an expedition to Ireland, while a second expedition sailed from Rochefort uniting with five Spanish men-of-war at Ferrol, and six other men-of-war from Cadiz, that were to follow Ganteaume to Egypt.

This last design had been concealed from Spain for fear of her indiscretion. It was only requested of her to suffer the ships in Ferrol to proceed to Cadiz. The court of Spain remonstrated in warm terms against the passage, on account of danger from the English ships of war which were numerous about the straits and in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar. The vessels in Ferrol were besides scarcely in a fit state to put to sea, so much had their equipment been retarded. Lucien, without speaking of the Egyptian design, hinted at the necessity for a commanding force in the Mediterranean, of the possibility of attempting something that might be of use to both nations; an expedition, perhaps, to retake Minorca. At last, he obtained the requisite orders, and the Spanish fleet at Ferrol was to be joined by the French ships from Rochefort, which were to conduct them to Cadiz. This was not all. Spain, as it will be remembered, agreed to present six vessels to France as a gift. The time when this condition was to be carried into effect had been disputed; but as Tuscany was about to be delivered up to Spain when Louisiana was placed in the hands of France, it was but proper that the ships of war should be given immediately. The Spanish minister, finally, decided to choose six then lying in the arsenal at Cadiz, and to give them up immediately; but they would not give them armed and victualled. It was impossible to send to France for guns and biscuit. These were very trivial things to contest in the face of the common enemy, that it was necessary by all means to combat, if his pretensions were to be lowered. The difficulties were at last overcome in the mode the first consul wished.

It has been stated that the French admiral, Dumanoir, had gone first to Cadiz in order to watch over the equipment of the Spanish vessels now become French property, and to take the command of them. This admiral had visited the ports of Spain and found them all in disorder, the whole exhibiting a scene of reckless opulence and disorganized destitution. Though still in possession of the remnants of magnificent establishments, of stores, and of materials for building vessels, and of numerous fine but dismantled ships, there was not at Cadiz, for want of pay, a single sailor, or a workman to get the ships ready for sea. Every thing was given up to waste and pillage[1]. The French minister sent admiral Dumanoir letters of credit upon some of the richer houses in Cadiz, and by means of ready money that officer contrived to overcome the principal obstacles. After choosing from the vessels those which had suffered least from time and Spanish neglect, he armed them by taking guns and stores from those which remained; and he procured French sailors, some of whom were emigrants in consequence of the revolution, and others escaped from English prisons; he received a certain number from France, sent in small vessels, and got leave to enter some Spaniards, and, by offers of high wages, some Danes and Swedes. The flag and other officers, required to organize the whole, came by post across the peninsula. Detachments of French infantry were marched from Catalonia to complete the complements. This division, those of Ferrol and Rochefort, formed about eighteen sail, and were designed to proceed to Egypt, after touching at Otranto to embark ten thousand men at that place. The objects, already mentioned, were now putting into execution.

To force Spain to the feeble efforts which were obtained with so much trouble, the first consul had fulfilled all he had promised with remarkable fidelity, and had even gone beyond. The house of Parma had received, in place of its duchy, the fine country of Tuscany, which had for so long a time been the ardent wish of the court of Madrid. It was necessary to obtain for that the consent of Austria, and it had been procured. The duchy of Tuscany had further been erected into the kingdom of Etruria. The old reigning duke of Parma, a religious devotee, an enemy to all the novelties of the day, was the brother, as before stated, of the queen of Spain. His son, a young man very ill educated

[1] The reports of the admiral, which exist in the archives, not of the navy, but of the office for foreign affairs, offer a most curious picture of what may befal a large kingdom confided to improper hands.

and brought up, had married an infanta, and lived at the Escurial. For this young couple the kingdom of Etruria was designed. Still the first consul having promised this kingdom only in exchange for the duchy of Parma, was not bound to deliver up the one until the other was vacant. This could not happen until the death or abdication of the old reigning duke; but he would neither die nor abdicate. Notwithstanding the interest which the first consul had in getting quit of such a guest in Italy, he consented to tolerate him in Parma, and to place the infants upon the throne of Etruria. He only required that they should come to Paris to receive the crown from his hands, as of old time vassal monarchs came to ancient Rome to receive the crown from the hands of the people-king. It was a singular and grand spectacle which he thus wished to give to republican France. The young princes quitted Madrid on their way to Paris at the same moment that their parents were travelling towards Badajoz, in order to afford the favourite the pleasure of beholding him at the head of an army.

Such were the complaisant means by which the first consul hoped to secure the zeal of the court of Spain, and to make it concur in his designs.

At this moment all eyes were directed towards Egypt. It was to this point the efforts, the regards, the fears, and the hopes of the two great belligerent nations, France and England, were now directed. It seemed as if, before laying down their arms, these two nations wished for the last time to terminate as gloriously and advantageously as possible for each, that terrible war which for ten years had been ensanguining the whole earth.

Ganteaume was left endeavouring to sail from Brest, on the 23rd of January, 1801, or the 3rd of Pluviôse, during a furious storm. The wind had been for a good while contrary or too light for his purpose. At last, during a gale from the north-west which blew on the coast, he had set sail in obedience to the aid-de-camp of the first consul, Savary, who was at Brest with orders for him to overcome every resistance. This perhaps was imprudent; but how was it possible to put to sea in presence of the enemy's fleet, which continually blockaded Brest roads, and never withdrew except when the weather rendered keeping the station impossible. It was necessary, therefore, not to sail out at all, or to sail in bad weather when the English had withdrawn. The squadron consisted of seven ships of the line, two frigates, and a brig, all good sailers, carrying four thousand men, an immense mass of stores, and numerous workmen, who with their families imagined they were bound for St. Domingo. They extinguished all the fires on board the squadron that they might not be perceived, and set sail with the greatest apprehensions. A north-west wind was the most dangerous of all for working out of Brest. The wind blew at the moment with extreme force, but fortunately did not reach its utmost violence until they had cleared the passages and were fairly on the ocean. They then encountered terrific squalls and a fearfully heavy sea. The squadron sailed in order of battle, the Indivisible, being the admiral's, led the van, and was followed by the Formidable, which bore the flag of rear-admiral Linois. The rest of the squadron were in line; each vessel cleared for action in case the enemy should heave in sight. They were scarcely at sea before the wind increasing carried away the three topsails of the Formidable, and the main-top-mast of the Constitution. The Dix-Août and the Jean-Bart, which were near aft, took up their stations larboard and starboard of the Constitution, and kept her in sight until the morning, in order, if needful, to render her assistance. The Vautour brig took in water so fast, that she was on the point of foundering had she not received timely assistance. During the storm and darkness of the night the squadron had dispersed; the next morning, at break of day, the Indivisible lay to, admiral Ganteaume remaining on the look-out for the purpose of rallying his squadron; but fearing the return of the English fleet, which up to this time had not shown itself, and relying upon the rendezvous appointed for all the vessels, he set sail for the place agreed upon. The place of meeting had been fixed for fifty leagues west off Cape St. Vincent, one of the most salient capes on the western coast of Spain. The other ships of the squadron, after having buffetted the gale, repaired their damages at sea by means of the stores on board, and they all subsequently rejoined each other, except the admiral's ship, which after lying to for them had sailed to the place of rendezvous. The only incident on the passage was an encounter of the French frigate the Bravoure with the English frigate the Concord, which was watching the course of the division. Captain Dordelin, who commanded the Bravoure, bore up to the Concord and offered her battle. He ran alongside of her and poured several broadsides into her, which caused a frightful execution upon her decks. Captain Dordelin was preparing to board her, when the English frigate manœuvring on her side to escape the danger, got clear by making all sail [1].

The French frigate rejoined the squadron, and all the vessels became again united under the admiral's flag at the meridian indicated. In this manner they steered for Gibraltar, after escaping by a miracle the enemy and the dangers of the sea. The squadron was highly animated, and those on board began to guess where they were bound, each desiring to have a share in the glorious mission of saving Egypt.

It became important to use all speed, as the fleet of admiral Keith, assembled in the Bay of Macri upon the coast of Asia Minor, was only awaiting the last preparations of the Turks, who are always slow to set sail, and then to carry an English army to the mouths of the Nile. It was necessary to hasten before them, and circumstances seemed to aid the attempt in the most fortunate manner. The English admiral, St. Vincent, who commanded the fleet, blockading Brest, hearing too late of the sailing of Ganteaume, sent admiral Calder in pursuit with a force equal to the French squadron, seven sail of the line and two frigates. The English, who did not imagine the French would dare to penetrate into the Mediterranean in the midst of so many of their vessels, deceived

[1] The English pretend that it was the French frigate which withdrew from the action. I received the information from two superior officers who still survive, and were in the squadron; they leave me no reason to doubt of the truth of the recital which I have here given.—*Note of the Author.*

besides by the reports in circulation, believed that the French had sailed towards St. Domingo. Admiral Calder went to the Canaries, intending to sail from thence to the West Indies. During this Ganteaume had arrived at the straits, and was steering along the coast of Africa to keep out of sight of the English cruisers about Gibraltar. The wind was not sufficiently favourable, but the moment was highly promising for the success of his object. Admiral Warren, who was continually on the watch, cruising between Gibraltar and Port Mahon, had only four ships, all the remainder of the British force being engaged in transporting troops destined for the landing in Egypt, under admiral Keith. Unfortunately Ganteaume was not cognizant of all this, and the serious responsibilities which weighed upon him, caused him an anxiety which all the cannon-balls of the enemy would never have kindled in his intrepid bosom. Annoyed by two enemy's vessels, the Sprightly cutter and Success frigate, which approached him too near; he gave them chase, and captured both. He passed the straits, and entered the Mediterranean. He had now nothing more to do than to spread all sail towards the east. Admiral Warren, in fact, was snug in the harbour of Port Mahon, and admiral Keith, embarrassed with two hundred transports, had not yet quitted the coast of Asia Minor. The shores of Egypt were, therefore, perfectly open, and the succour, for which the French were waiting impatiently, and which had been so long promised, might have been landed. But Ganteaume, always disquieted about the fate of his squadron, and still more about that of the numerous soldiers whom he had on board, was apprehensive at the sight of the smallest vessel that come in his way. He constantly imagined there was an enemy's fleet between himself and Egypt, which in reality was not the fact. Above all, he was apprehensive of the state of his vessels, and feared that if it should be necessary to carry all sail before a superior force, he should not be able to do it with his masts damaged by the storm, and only hastily repaired at sea. Dissatisfied with the Bravoure frigate, which did not sail as he wished, he desired to get rid of her, and sent her into Toulon. But in place of sending her alone to port, and proceeding himself from the westward to the east along the African coast, he committed the error of standing to the northward, and getting nearly in sight of Toulon. His intention being to escort the Bravoure a part of the way to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy's cruisers; certainly a very poor reason, because it was a hundred times better to expose the frigate to hazard than the entire object of the expedition. In consequence of this fault he was discoverd by admiral Warren, who immediately left Port Mahon. Ganteaume, to deceive him, at once gave chase. The gallant captain Bergeret, commanding the Dix-Août, sailing faster than the rest of the squadron, reconnoitred the English within a very short distance, and saw that there were only four line of battle ships and two frigates. Highly pleased at this discovery, he thought, that being so superior to the English, Ganteaume would have borne down upon them, and given battle, but on a sudden he saw the signal made to give up the pursuit, and to rejoin the squadron. That brave officer, much mortified, immediately communicated to Ganteaume that he was deceived by his watch, and that there were only four vessels of the line. It was in vain; Ganteaume thought he saw seven or eight, and determined to make sail northwards. Nevertheless it was certain, as the reports of admiral Warren afterwards proved, that there were only four of the enemy's vessels in sight[1]. Ganteaume then approached the gulf of Lyons, in order to protect the Bravoure, and again getting in sight of the English squadron, he ran into Toulon in consternation. There he was alarmed by the fear of having incurred the displeasure of the first consul, indignant at discovering that the object of the expedition had been thus compromised at the moment when it promised complete success. This fatal resolution was the cause of the loss of Egypt, which at that moment might have been saved[2].

While Ganteaume was beating up between the coast of Africa and Port Mahon, two frigates, the Justice and Egyptienne, sailed eastward from Toulon with four hundred soldiers and munitions of war, and reached the port of Alexandria without seeing an English vessel. Two other frigates, the Régénérée and the Africaine, left Rochefort, crossed the sea, and passed through the straits into the Mediterranean without any accident. Unhappily they were separated. The Régénérée arrived before Alexandria on the 2nd of March, 1801, or Ventôse, year IX. The Africaine fell in with an English frigate in the night, and stopping to engage, was taken. She had three hundred troops on board, who, anxious to take a part in the battle, occasioned a frightful disorder that, after an heroic defence, became the cause of her defeat[3]. Thus, as was seen, out of four frigates which left Toulon and Rochefort, three arrived without accident, and found the coast of Egypt free from the enemy, and so easily accessible, that they entered the port of Alexandria without firing a shot: thus difficult is it for vessels to meet on the immensity of the ocean, and so greatly does courage stand in aid of a brave officer who ventures to risk his flag in the achievement of a great duty.

Ganteaume entered Toulon on the 19th of February, or 30th Pluviôse, worn down with fatigue and anxiety, experiencing, as he wrote to the first consul, every kind of torment at the same moment[4].

[1] See the report of admiral Warren of the 23rd of April, 1801, inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 27th Messidor, year IX., double number, 296 and 297.

[2] If possible at all, not possible unless Ganteaume had arrived there before the end of February. Ganteaume arrived at Toulon only on the 19th of February. The English were off the Egyptian coast on the 28th, and in sight of Alexandria on the 1st of March, though the weather permitted no landing until the 8th. They were at anchor in Aboukir Bay on the 2nd. Ganteaume had to run to Alexandria from Toulon in nine days to be there before the English: he could scarcely have got through the distance unless with a very fair wind.—*Translator.*

[3] It was a slaughter, not a battle, a brave and useless defence, arising from the crowded state of the Africaine, with 715 on board. She had 200 killed and 143 wounded. The English frigate, the Phœbe, one killed and twelve wounded. The French fired at the rigging, the English at the hull. Nothing so fearful in frigates occurred during the war.—*Translator.*

[4] See his letter written on the 19th of February, or 30th of Pluviôse, the day of his entry into Toulon, preserved in the archives of the navy.

This might well be after thus committing interests of great importance. The first consul, naturally irritable, could little restrain his feelings, when his plans were thus thwarted through those employed to carry them into effect. But he knew man; he knew human nature; he knew that it was not wise at the moment when action was every thing, to exhibit marks of his dissatisfaction too strongly, because it was more necessary to animate than to dishearten: he knew that Ganteaume stood in need of encouragement to be sustained, and not reduced to despair by those ebullitions of rage which at that time were feared by all as the greatest possible misfortune. Far, therefore, from reproaching the admiral, he sent his aid-de-camp, Lacuée, to comfort and reanimate him, to place funds in his hands, troops, and provisions, and to urge him to proceed to sea without a moment's delay. The rebuke he received was limited to a mild censure for having quitted the coast of Africa for the Balearic Islands, and for having drawn admiral Warren in pursuit of him.

Ganteaume was a brave man, a good sailor and officer; but the situation of his mind at that moment shows how much more responsibility will weaken the spirit, than even the dangers of cannon. This is honourable to such men; and proves how much more they fear to commit the interests trusted to their hands, than to hazard their own lives. Ganteaume, thus encouraged by the first consul, went to work, but lost time in repairing his vessels, or waiting for a favourable wind. More than one propitious opportunity happened. Admiral Warren had sailed towards Naples and Sicily. Admiral Keith was, it is true, approaching Aboukir with the English army; but it was not impossible to deceive his vigilance, and to disembark the French troops, either beyond Damietta, or more on this side, twenty or twenty-five leagues from Alexandria, which would have enabled them to reach Egypt by a march or two across the desert.

While the exertions of the first consul were thus directed to hasten the second departure of Ganteaume, fresh letters were sent from Paris, pressing the organization of the squadrons at Rochefort, Ferrol, and Cadiz, in order to convey succour to Egypt by several different channels at once. At last, Ganteaume, encouraged by the exhortations of the first consul, together with numerous marks of his kindness, set sail again on the 19th of March, or 28th of Ventôse; but at the moment of going out, the Constitution got aground, and two days were required to get her afloat. On the 22nd of March, or 1st of Germinal, this squadron, consisting of seven sail of the line and several frigates, again hoisted sail for the coast of Sardinia, without being perceived by the English.

It was very desirable that these attempts should be crowned with success, at least in part, because the French army in Egypt, left to its own resources, was threatened by the united forces of the East and West. Still, although reduced in strength, it could have conquered the multitude of its enemies, (as it had done on the plains of Aboukir and Heliopolis,) if it had been well commanded. Unhappily, Bonaparte was no longer at its head; Desaix and Kléber were no more.

The state of Egypt must now be described from the time when the blow of the poignard laid low the noble figure of Kléber, of which, the appearance alone, on the shores of the Rhine as well as of the Nile, sufficed to inspire the hearts of our soldiers with courage, to make them forget past perils, the misery, and the suffering of their exile. The prosperous state of the colony must be explained, as well as the sudden disaster which overtook it. This is demanded; because it is highly useful to offer to the eyes of a people the spectacle of its reverses as well as its successes, that it may become a wholesome lesson. Certainly, in the midst of the unequalled prosperity of the consulate, the fruit of a most admirable and sagacious course of conduct, a single disaster cannot obscure the brilliancy of the picture which has been delineated; but it is necessary to give our warriors and generals, yet more than to our soldiers, the painful lesson contained in the latter period of the French occupation of Egypt. May it occasion them to reflect upon their too common tendency to disunion, more particularly, when there is no powerful hand to ensure subordination, and to direct against the common enemy their mental energy, and the impetuosity of their natural temperament.

When Kléber expired, Egypt appeared in entire submission to the French arms. Having seen the army of the grand vizier dispersed in the twinkling of an eye, and the revolt of three hundred thousand of the inhabitants of Cairo suppressed in a few days, by a handful of soldiers, the Egyptians regarding the French as invincible, considered their establishment upon the banks of the Nile as the decree of irresistible destiny. Moreover, they began to get more familiar and more accustomed to their European guests, and to feel that the new yoke was much lighter than the old one had been. They paid fewer taxes than under the Mamelukes, and did not receive the blows of the bastinado at the time of the collection of the *miri*, as they did when under the dominion of their co-religionists, whom the French had dispossessed. Murad Bey, that Mameluke prince of so chivalrous and brilliant a character, and who had, at last, become attached to the French, held Upper Egypt of them in fief. He showed himself a faithful vassal, paid his tribute punctually, and administered, with great care, the police government of the Upper Nile. He was an ally that might be depended upon. One single brigade of two thousand five hundred men, placed in the neighbourhood of Beni-Souef, and for whom it was always easy to fall back upon Cairo, was sufficient to keep Upper Egypt in subjection; a great advantage, considering the very limited number of effective troops.

The army having, on its own side, shared in the mistake of its general at the time of the convention of El-Arisch, and having repaired the error as well as he had done in the plains of Heliopolis, had preserved a sense of this fault, and was not disposed to fall into it again. Well aware that they had to give an account to the republic of so noble a possession, the soldiers no more dreamed about its evacuation. Besides, Bonaparte, being at this time the supreme chief of the republic, that fact explained easily the motive of his departure, and they no more regarded him as one who had deserted them. They thought themselves continually

in presence of their former general, and had no more any disquietude about their future fortunes. Thanks to the foresight of the first consul, which had made him charter sailing-vessels in every port, there did not pass a single week without some vessels, small or large, entering the port of Alexandria, bringing stores, the products of Europe, newspapers, correspondence from families, and government despatches. In consequence of this continual intercourse, their country was for ever present in the imagination of the troops. Without doubt regret was soon awakened in their minds, whenever any peculiar circumstance arose to touch their feelings. At the death of Kléber, for example, when Menou took the command, every eye was directed at once towards France. A general of brigade, in presenting his officers to Menou, asked him whether he intended, at last, to take them back to their country. Menou gave him a reproof, and proclaimed, in the order of the day, his formal resolution to conform to the intentions of his government, which were to retain the colony for ever; and every rank at once submitted. But more than all, general Bonaparte held the reins of power; this was, for the old soldiers of Italy, the best ground both of hope and confidence.

The pay was regularly issued, while every thing was at a low price. In place of settling with the troops in rations they were paid in cash. They were merely provided with corn. Thus they had the benefit of a low market, and lived in the midst of an abundance of every thing, often eating poultry in place of butcher's meat. Cloth was deficient, but the warmth of the climate was great, and they supplied that want for the principal part of their dress with calico, of which in Egypt there was always a great plenty. For the rest of their clothing they took all the cloth brought into the east in the course of traffic without regarding the colour: hence there was variety enough in their uniforms. In some regiments, for example, the men were seen dressed in blue, red, or green; but they were all clothed, and presented a fine soldierly appearance. The learned colonel Conte rendered great services to the army by the fecundity of his inventive powers. He had brought with him to Egypt a company of aerostiers, the remnant of the aerostiers of Fleurus. It was a union of all trades organized under military discipline. By their aid he established at Cairo machinery for weaving, fulling, and carding cloth; and as wool was not deficient, it was hoped he would soon be able to supersede there the supply of cloth from Europe. It was the same with gunpowder. The manufactories of that article at Cairo, by M. Champy, had already supplied as much as was demanded for all the necessities of the war. The internal trade was visibly increasing. The caravans, well guarded, began to arrive from the heart of Africa. The Arabs of the Red Sea visited the ports of Suez and Cosseir, where they exchanged coffee, perfumes, and dates for the corn and rice of Egypt. The Greeks, availing themselves of the Turkish flag, and better sailers than the English cruisers, brought to Damietta, Rosetta, and Alexandria, oil, wine, and other similar productions. In a word, nothing was wanting for the present; while great resources were preparing for the future. The officers, seeing that the definitive occupation of Egypt was determined upon, took the best steps possible to establish themselves in the most comfortable manner they were able as permanent residents. Those who lived at Alexandria or at Cairo, and they were by far the larger number, found very commodious quarters. Syrian, Greek, and Egyptian women, some purchased of the dealers in slaves, others out of their own inclination, came and partook of their accommodations. Melancholy was banished. Two engineers erected a theatre at Cairo, and the officers themselves got up French pieces, playing the characters themselves. The soldiers did not live worse than their officers, and, thanks to the facility of the French character that enables it to familiarize itself with every nation, they were soon seen smoking and drinking coffee with the Turks and Arabs.

The financial resources of Egypt, carefully administered, were adequate to all the necessities of the army. Egypt had paid under the sway of the Mamelukes, as the taxes were more or less rigorously levied, from 36,000,000 to 40,000,000 f.[1] She now paid no more than from 20,000,000 f. to 25,000,000 f.[2], and the collection was therefore less oppressive. This 20,000,000 f. to 25,000,000 f. sufficed for the expenses of the colony, because all the expenses united seldom exceeded 1,700,000 f.[3] per month, or 20,400,000 f.[4] per annum. The collection improved as time drew on, and became more regular, and at the same time the burdens became more easy to the people. The resources of the army were thus gradually augmented, and it was not erroneous in consequence to calculate upon a surplus of 3,000,000 f. or 4,000,000 f.[5] per annum, which would have formed a small fund applicable to extraordinary circumstances, or to construct works of defence or utility. The army still amounted to twenty-five or twenty-six thousand individuals, including those attached, whose duties were not strictly military, the women and children of the troops, and persons in the army employ. Of this number, twenty-three thousand might be counted as soldiers, of whom six thousand, less efficient, were still in a state to defend the fortresses, and seventeen or eighteen thousand were capable of the most active service. The cavalry was superb; it equalled the Mamelukes in bravery, and far surpassed them in discipline. The flying artillery was rapid in its motions, and well served. The dromedary regiment had been brought to the highest degree of perfection. It scoured the desert with extraordinary speed, and completely sickened the Arabs' desire of pillage. The loss of men was very small in the common average of mortality; there were only six hundred sick out of twenty-six thousand individuals. Still, in the supposition of a war long protracted, there would, perhaps, have been a want of men; but the Greeks were eager to serve, the Copts were the same. The negroes themselves, purchased at a low price and remarkable for their faithfulness, formed excellent recruits. The army in time might have received

[1] From £1,440,000 sterling to £1,600,000.
[2] From £800,000 sterling to £1,000,000.
[3] About £68,000.
[4] Or £816,000.
[5] Or from £120,000 to £160,000.

into its ranks ten or twelve thousand brave soldiers. Confident even to excess in its bravery and military experience, it did not doubt itself capable of driving the Turks or the English into the sea, sent against them out of Asia or Europe. It is certain that, well commanded, these eighteen thousand men, properly concentrated, and bearing down upon a mass of troops just landed, might have remained, whatever opposition was made, the masters of the Egyptian shore. But it was requisite they should have been well commanded; it was as requisite for this same army as it would be for any other.

Suppose Kléber, or who would have been better still, Desaix, the sagacious, the brave Desaix, left in Egypt, from whence, unfortunately, he was withdrawn by the kind regard of the first consul: suppose Kléber, escaped from the poignard of the Mussulman, administering the government of the country for several years! Who can doubt but he would have converted it into a flourishing colony,—that he would have founded there a magnificent empire! A healthful climate, without a single fever, a country of inexhaustible fertility, a submissive peasantry attached to the soil, voluntary recruits,—what a vast superiority of elements over the establishment we are at this day founding in Africa!

But in place of Desaix, in place of Kléber, it was Menou who had become the general-in-chief of the army by right of seniority. This was an irreparable misfortune for the colony, and it was a fault on the part of the first consul not to have replaced him. Not certain of his orders arriving in Egypt at the proper destination, the first consul was afraid that if the order containing the nomination of the new general fell into the hands of the English, it would only serve to disorganize the existing command. They would have stated that Menou was deprived of his command, but would not have transmitted the order which appointed his successor. The command would have been kept more or less long in a state of uncertainty. Still this motive does not excuse the first consul, if he were cognizant of the incapacity of Menou in a military point of view. One reason decided in favour of that general was his known zeal for the preservation and colonization of Egypt. Menou, in fact, resisted in the strongest manner the scheme of evacuation, combated the influence of the officers of the army of the Rhine, and, in fact, made himself the head and chief of the colonist party. He had pushed his enthusiasm so far as to become a convert to Islamism, and had married a Turkish woman. He called himself Abdallah Menou; and these eccentricities made the soldiers, naturally given to raillery, very merry at his expense; but they did no mischief to the colony in the sight of the Egyptians. Menou was possessed of intelligence, much acquired knowledge, great application to business, a taste for colonial establishments, and all the qualities required for administrative duties, but none of the qualities of a general. Destitute of experience, quick perception, and determination, he was, besides, very unfortunate in his personal appearance. He was short-sighted, corpulent, and looked miserably on horseback. He was a commander, on the whole, very ill selected for soldiers as alert and well-seasoned as the French were. More than all, he wanted strength of character, and under his feeble authority the heads of the army, being divided among themselves, soon became the prey of the most fatal discord.

Under Bonaparte, there was but one will and one mind in Egypt. Under Kléber, there were two, the colonists and anti-colonists, or those who wished to remain in Egypt, and those who wished to depart. But, after the affront which the English attempted to inflict upon the French soldiers, an affront gloriously avenged at Heliopolis, after the necessity for remaining became known, every thing became orderly. Under the imposing authority of Kléber there was order and union. But the time between the victory of Heliopolis and the death of Kléber was too short—far too short. From the moment Menou took the command order and union ceased to exist.

General Reynier, a good staff-officer, having served with credit in that capacity in the army of the Rhine, but cold, with no personal appearance, or ascendancy over the soldiers, was still generally esteemed. He was considered as one of the officers best qualified to appear at the head of the army. He was the oldest officer next to Menou. The same day on which Kléber died, a lively altercation ensued between Menou and Reynier, not as to which should take the command, but which should decline the burden. Neither of them would accept it, and for that day the situation of affairs was most alarming. They were both under the belief that the blow of the poignard which had struck down general Kléber, was but the signal for an extensive insurrection, organized throughout Egypt by the influence of the English and Turks. The heavy duty of the command at such a critical moment, might have been reasonably dreaded. Menou gave way at last to the entreaties of general Reynier, and the other generals, and consented to become chief of the colony. But the French were soon set right upon the actual state of things, by the perfect tranquillity that continued after Kléber's death, and the command, just refused, became afterwards a subject of regret. Reynier now wished for that which he had begun by declining. Under his cold, modest, and even timid bearing, he concealed excessive vanity. The authority of Menou was insupportable to him. Until then quiet and submissive, he became thenceforth a grumbler and a fault-finder. He discovered a fault in every thing. Menou accepted the command at the request of his companions in arms, and assumed the title of commander-in-chief *ad interim*. Reynier criticized the title Menou had adopted. At the funeral of Kléber, Menou had assigned the four corners of the coffin to the generals of division, and placed himself behind, at the head of the staff; Reynier charged him with playing off the viceroy. Menou had requested the illustrious Fourier to pronounce a eulogy over the grave of Kléber; Reynier pretended that it was a slight to the memory of Kléber, to suffer it to be done by another. A delay in a subscription opened to raise a monument to the memory of Kléber, difficulties in the succession or administration to the general's property—very trivial indeed, as the property was of the noble warriors of that period; these and other puerilities were interpreted by Reynier, and by those who followed his example, in the most factious manner.

These miserable incidents would not be cited, unworthy of history as they are, if their very littleness were not instructive by showing to what paltry meannesses motiveless discontent will sometimes descend. Reynier now became an insubordinate, culpable, and foolish lieutenant. He was joined by general Damas, the friend of Kléber, and chief of the general staff, who bore in his heart all the jealousies of the army of the Rhine against the army of Italy. The spirit of opposition had its abode in the staff itself. Menou would not suffer it so near him, and resolved to take from Damas the post which he had occupied under Kléber.

The opponents of Menou being thus disconcerted, endeavoured to parry the blow by sending the brave and clever general Friant to negotiate on their behalf with their commander-in-chief. Friant, absorbed in his military duties, a stranger to all their divisions, interfered only for the purpose of healing them. Menou, firmer than was customary, would not yield, and appointed general Lagrange in place of general Damas. By this step he found himself less encumbered than before by his opponents; but they were not the less irritated; on the contrary, the dissensions among the chiefs of the army only became more disgraceful and more alarming. Men of reflection saw with pain, the shock which must result to the chief authority; lamentable enough any where, but far more lamentable at a far distance from the supreme power, in a position surrounded with continual danger.

Menou, a bad general, but a laborious administrator of a government, worked day and night at what he denominated the "organization of the colony." He effected many good measures, and some that were bad; but, above all, he attempted to effect too much. First, he employed himself in settling the arrears of pay, and employed for this purpose the contribution of 10,000,000 f. which Kléber had exacted from the Egyptian cities as the penalty for their late revolt. This was one mode of keeping up peace and subordination in the army; for at the time of the convention of El-Arisch, some marks of insubordination had manifested themselves, arising in part from the pay being in arrear; Menou, in consequence, regarded the regular pay of what was due to the soldier as a security for good discipline, and he had reason upon his side. But he took the bold step of paying the soldier always, before any other expense, forgetting what urgent circumstances war might originate. He employed himself in improving the soldiers' bread, and he rendered it of excellent quality. He put the hospitals in perfect order; and very carefully applied himself to introduce clearness and order into the public accounts. Menou was a man of the most strict integrity, given a little to lecturing. He so often expressed in the order of the day his intention to establish strict honesty in the army, that he hurt the feelings of the generals. They asked, with some bitterness, if nothing but pillage had existed before Menou, and if integrity dated from his command of the army. It was very true, that but few malversations had been committed during the occupation of Egypt. The army had taken, after the dissolution of the treaty of El-Arisch, a very considerable prize in the port of Alexandria; it consisted of numerous vessels that had come, under the Turkish flag, to transport the French army to its own shores; and they were nearly all filled with merchandise. A commission was appointed to sell them for the profit of the colonial treasury. Menou appeared discontented with the operations of the commission, and with general Lanusse who commanded at Alexandria. He recalled Lanusse, in a manner that seemed to cast a reflection upon his character, and appointed general Friant in his place. General Lanusse was deeply wounded at this, and, upon his return to Cairo, increased the number of the disaffected. Menou did not rest here; he tried to change the system of contributions, and in this committed a great mistake. It was not to be doubted that, in time, a reform might have been operated in the Egyptian finances. By means of a fair repartition of the land revenues, with a few taxes levied judiciously upon articles of consumption, it would have been easy to relieve the Egyptian people, and increase the receipts of the treasury. But at the moment when the French were exposed to attacks from without, it was not politic to increase the difficulties within, and to make the people suffer from changes of which they would not at first be convinced of the benefit. The collection of the former taxes justly and in due course, was enough to establish a comparison between the Mamelukes and the French—a comparison greatly to the advantage of the last, and to increase considerably the funds applicable to the army. Menou conceived the idea of a general valuation of property, a new system of land-tax, and, above all, the exclusion of the Copts, who, in Egypt, are the farmers of the revenue, and act nearly the same part there which the Jews do in the north of Europe. These designs, very proper for future consideration and use, were at that moment very ill-advised. Menou, most fortunately, had not time to put his plans into execution; but he carried into effect the creation of new taxes. The sheiks, El-Beled, or municipal magistrates of Egypt, at certain times were invested with the municipal power, and obtained as presents either pelisses or shawls from the investing authorities. They returned, for these presents, gifts of horses, camels, or cattle. The Mamelukes renewed this ceremony as frequently as possible, for the sake of the profit which they obtained. Some of them had commuted the gift into one of money; Menou thought of making the measure general all over Egypt. He levied upon the sheiks, El-Beled, a tax of about 2,500,000 f.[1] They were generally rich enough to pay this sum, and to some it was a lightening of the existing burthen. But the sheiks had great interest in the two thousand five hundred villages that were under their authority; and the French ran the chance of turning the opinion of the people against them, if they levied an absolute, uniform, uncompensated tax, involving in it the suppression of a usage of which the effect was morally useful.

Menou possessed the idea of assimilating Egypt to France, which he styled "civilizing" it, by establishing an *octroi* or species of excise upon the town consumption of various articles. Egypt had already a duty upon articles of consumption, collected in the okels, a sort of warehouses, in the east, where merchandise is deposited in the course

[1] Or £100,000 sterling.

of its transport from one place to another. This mode of collection was simple and facile. Menou wished to change it into a tax collected at the town gates, which were very numerous in Egypt. Independently of the derangement this occasioned to the inhabitants of the country, the effect was to raise the price of provisions upon the French garrisons, to throw by this means a considerable part of the charge upon the army, and to excite new murmurings. Lastly, Menou resolved to levy contributions upon the rich merchants, who escaped the payment of the public taxes, such as the Copts, Greeks, Jews, Damascenes, Franks, and others. He imposed upon them a capitation tax of 2,500,000 f. per annum. The burden was not too weighty, at least for the Copts, who had been enriched by the farming of the revenue, but the Copts had been very ill-treated during the revolt of Cairo. Besides the French had need of them; because it was to them alone that recourse must be had for a loan, or for any sum of money wanted upon an emergency. It was not prudent, therefore, to alienate them from the French any more than the Greek or European merchants, who, approximating to the French in manners, usages, and mental qualities, should have been intermediate agents between them and the Egyptians. Lastly, Menou created a duty on successions or upon bequeathed property, which was to extend to the army; and this became a fresh cause of discontent for the grumblers.

This mania for assimilating a colony to the mother country, in the belief that arousing the prejudices of a people is the act of their civilization, Menou had in common with all those who colonize with narrow views, more eager to travel quickly than well. To achieve this object, Menou established a private council. This body was not composed of five or six military chiefs, but of about fifty civil and military officers taken from different grades of society. It was a real parliament, that ridicule prevented from assembling. He, lastly, established an Arabic newspaper for the purpose of making officially known to the army and the Egyptians, the acts of the French authorities.

The soldiers paid little attention to these alterations; they lived well, laughed at Menou, and applauded his good-nature and solicitude for their benefit. The Egyptians were submissive, and found after all that the yoke of the French was much more easy than that of the Mamelukes. But amidst all this there were some who were irritable, and these were the malcontents in the army. By doing absolutely nothing, Menou would alone have had a chance of escaping their envenomed criticisms, and then he would have been censured for his inaction. But Menou was too much occupied with his schemes of organization not to supply ample matter for their critical censures. Of these schemes they took advantage, and went so far as to project the deposition of the commander-in-chief; an insensate act which would have destroyed the colony, and turned the army of Egypt into an army of prætorians. The officers in the different regiments were actually sounded for this purpose. Fortunately, they were found to be so prudent and so little inclined to revolt, that the idea of the deposition of Menou was given up. Reynier and Damas had gained Lanusse; all together they had drawn in Belliard and Verdier. General Friant excepted, all the generals of division became united in their unhappy opposition. Two of the old members of the convention, whom Bonaparte had taken with him to Egypt for the sake of giving them employment, Isnard and Tallien, returned to their old habits, and became most violent agitators. The plan of deposing the commander-in-chief being recognized as impracticable, these general officers determined to present themselves to Menou in a body, and to make their observations upon certain of his measures which there could be no doubt merited censure. They went to him without giving him the least notice of their intention, and he was naturally much surprised at their sudden appearance. They laid before him the grievances of which they thought they had reason to complain, and he heard them; but not without great displeasure, and at the same time not without showing considerable dignity. He gave them a promise to consider several of their observations, but he had not the strength of mind to reprimand them at the moment for the great impropriety of their conduct. This proceeding caused a great mischief to the army, and was severely censured. The result was that Isnard and Tallien had the blame placed upon their shoulders, and were embarked for Europe in consequence.

Just at this critical conjuncture the order of the first consul arrived, confirming Menou in his post, and invested him in a very decided manner with the office of commander-in-chief in Egypt. This expression of the will of the supreme head of the government at home came at a very opportune moment, and had the effect of recalling a part of the malcontents to their duty. Unfortunately new disputes arose, and things very soon got again into their previous state. It was in such miserable squabbles, that these discontented persons, soured by exile, and encouraged by the feebleness of the commander-in-chief, employed their time, from the battle of Heliopolis up to the present day, the space of an entire year; a precious period of time, which should have been passed in perfect unity, and in making preparations by that unity to conquer the formidable enemy that was about to land in Egypt.

The waters of the Nile were retiring to their bed, and the inundated land was beginning to dry up. The time for landing had arrived. The month of February, 1801, or Ventôse, year IX., was close at hand. The English and the Turks were preparing to make a new attack upon the colony. The grand vizier, whom Kléber had beaten at Heliopolis, was at Gaza between Palestine and Egypt, not having dared to appear at Constantinople from the day of his defeat; and having with him no more than ten or twelve thousand men of his whole army, devoured by plague, living upon plunder, and having every day to fight the mountaineers of Palestine, who had risen against such visiters. That enemy could be no cause of apprehension for a good while to come. The capitan pacha, the foe of the vizier and a favourite of the sultan, was cruising with a squadron between Syria and Egypt. He was desirous of renewing the convention of El-Arisch, placing little reliance upon conquering Egypt by force of arms, and having a distrust of England, that he much suspected of a desire to seize upon this fine country from the French for themselves. Lastly, eighteen thousand men were assembled at Macri in Asia Minor, partly English,

others Hessians, Swiss, Maltese, and Neapolitans, commanded by officers exclusively English, and in a fine state of discipline, were about to be embarked on board lord Keith's squadron, to be landed in Egypt under an excellent general, sir Ralph Abercromby.

To these eighteen thousand European soldiers, six thousand Albanians were to be added, whom the capitan pacha was at that moment conveying in his squadron, and six thousand sepoys were crossing from India by the Red Sea. About twenty thousand bad soldiers of the east were to join the ten thousand Turks under the grand vizier in Palestine. Thus there were above sixty thousand men whom the army of Egypt was likely to have upon their hands. Still there were enough, and even more than were wanted, if they had been commanded by a skilful and judicious leader.

First, there was no danger of a surprise, because the intelligence was received from all parts. It came from the Archipelago by Greek vessels, as well as from Upper Egypt through Murad Bey, and from Europe itself by the despatches of the first consul. All these accounts gave notice of an approaching expedition, composed both of Europeans and Orientals. Menou, with a deaf ear to the warning, took no steps at the most critical moment, neglecting every thing necessary in the existing state of his position.

Sound policy naturally counselled the keeping up a good understanding with Murad Bey by treating him with cautious regard, because he commanded Upper Egypt, and also preferred the French to the English or the Turks. Menou neglected all this, and replied to the information which he received from Murad Bey, in a manner calculated to alienate him from the French if it had been possible to do so. Good policy demanded that Menou should avail himself of the distrust of the Turks towards the English, and without repeating again the disgraceful convention of El-Arisch, delay their operations by a pretended negotiation, which, by occupying their attention, might relax their efforts. Menou neither thought of this mode of proceeding, nor of any other.

In regard to the administrative and military resources required under such circumstances, he was wholly unable to imagine any that were to the purpose. He ought to have collected at Rosetta, Damietta, Ramanieh, and Cairo, in short, at every place where the army was likely to assemble, a large magazine of warlike supplies, always easy to obtain in a country as abundant as Egypt. Menou refused to do this, not being willing to divert the money from the payment of the soldiers which he had promised them they should punctually receive on the day it was due,—a thing which the difficulty of collecting the new taxes barely enabled him to do at the moment. It was necessary to remount the cavalry and artillery, as they were the most efficacious means of opposing an army just disembarked, and most commonly destitute of these two arms. He refused to do this on the same financial grounds as before. So far did he carry his want of foresight, that he selected the same moment to cut the artillery horses, which were entire, and by their spirit very troublesome to govern.

Lastly, Menou was opposed to the concentration of the troops, which the health of the soldiers at that season rendered very desirable, even if no danger had threatened Egypt from without. Some cases of plague had already appeared. To encamp the men and take them out of the towns was urgently required, besides keeping them more disposable in case of a sudden demand for their services. The army, scattered in garrison, uselessly congregated in Cairo, or employed in the collection of the miri, was in a condition to act no where with effect. Still by the good disposal of twenty-three thousand men, of whom seventeen or eighteen thousand were capable of active service, Menou had the means in his power to defend Egypt at every point. He might be attacked by the side of Alexandria, because it was situated near the roads of Aboukir, and always, therefore, preferred as a landing-place; by the side of Damietta, another place fit for a landing, though less favourable than that of Aboukir; or, thirdly, by the way of the Syrian frontier, where the grand vizier was stationed with the remains of his army. Of these three, there was only one point seriously threatened, namely, Alexandria and Aboukir roads,—a circumstance easy to be foreseen, because every one was of that opinion, and it was openly expressed in the army. The shore of Damietta was, on the other hand, of difficult access, and so little united, by a few narrow points to the Delta, that an invading army, if it disembarked, could be easily blocked up and forced to re-embark. It was not at all probable that the English would approach by the way of Damietta. On the side of Syria there was but little serious danger to be apprehended from the vizier. He was too weak, and too full of the recollection of Heliopolis, to take the lead in an attack. He would only venture to advance upon the successful landing of the English. Under any circumstances it would not be imprudent to suffer him to advance, as the nearer to the French he did so the more certain he would be to commit himself. The main subject for the consideration of the commander-in-chief, in fact that which should have wholly occupied his attention, ought to have been the English army, the landing of which was expected to take place very shortly. In the existing posture of affairs, a strong division of four or five thousand men should have been left around Alexandria, independently of the sailors and the depôts necessary to guard the fortified places. Two thousand would have been sufficient for Damietta. The dromedary regiment would have sufficed to keep guard upon the Syrian frontier. A garrison of three thousand men at Cairo, which would have been joined by two thousand from Upper Egypt, and reinforced several thousands from the depôts, would have been ample to keep in subjection the population of Cairo, even if the vizier had appeared under the walls. These various duties absorbed eleven or twelve thousand men out of seventeen or eighteen thousand effectives. There would then remain six thousand chosen troops in reserve, of which a large camp ought to have been formed exactly between Alexandria and Damietta. There did, in fact, exist such a point, uniting every object required, and that was at Ramanieh, a healthy site on the border of the Nile, not far from the sea, easy to be provisioned, at the distance of a day's march from Alexandria,

and three or four from the frontiers of Syria. If Menou had established at Ramanieh his reserve of six thousand men, he would be able at the first alarm to be in Alexandria in twenty-four hours, and in Damietta in forty-eight; and, if it had been necessary, in three or four days on the frontiers of Syria. Such a force would have rendered vain all the attempts of the enemy.

Menou did not think of any of these modes of action; and not only was he thoughtless of them, but rejected the advice of those who urged others upon his attention. Good advice came upon him from every side, and more especially from the generals who were in opposition to him. To do them justice, these last, and with them Reynier, more accustomed than the others to great military dispositions, informed him of his peril, and pointed out to him the measures best to be adopted; but they had all lost their influence over the commander-in-chief by their late intemperate opposition to his measures; and now, when they had reason upon their side, they were not more regarded than when they had been in the wrong.

The brave Friant, a stranger to these disastrous bickerings, zealously set about putting Alexandria in a state of defence. He had already organized the sailors, and the troops in the depôts, with the object of intrusting to them the defence of the forts; but this being completed, he had scarcely more than two thousand effective men, whom he could collect at the place of disembarkation, wherever it might be. It was necessary to employ a part of these to garrison the different points upon the coast, such as the fort of Aboukir, the Maison Carée, and Rosetta. After placing garrisons in these posts, he had about twelve hundred men left. Fortunately, a frigate, from Rochefort, the Régénérée, brought three hundred men from Rochefort, with a considerable supply of military stores. Owing to this unexpected circumstance, the disposable force of general Friant was raised to fifteen hundred men. It may be imagined what assistance, at such a moment, the squadron of admiral Ganteaume would have been, if, trusting a little more to fortune, that admiral had landed here just at this moment the four thousand chosen men which were embarked on board his fleet.

General Friant, although his force was so deficient, applied for only two battalions more, and a regiment of cavalry. In fact, this force would have sufficed; but it was a step of too much temerity, in such a conjuncture, to trust to a reinforcement of only one thousand men. It is too true, that the self-confidence of the army contributed greatly to its defeat. The French troops in Egypt had been in the habit of fighting one against four, sometimes one against eight; and they had formed no correct idea of the means by which the English would effect a landing. They believed that they would only land a hundred or two of men at a time, without artillery or cavalry; and they imagined, too, that the English could not withstand a charge of the bayonet. This was a fatal illusion. Still, this reinforcement, requested by Friant, weak as it might be, would have saved the colony: subsequent events prove this [1].

[1] This is a singular illusion of our author, even under his very incorrect statement of the proceedings of the English army.—*Translator.*

On the 28th of February, 1801, or 9th of Ventôse, year IX., there was perceived, not far from Alexandria, an English pinnace [2], which appeared to be reconnoitring. Some boats were sent in pursuit of her, and she was captured with the officers who were on board. The papers found upon them left no longer any doubt of the intention of the English. Almost immediately afterwards the English fleet of seventy sail of vessels appeared in sight of Alexandria; but owing to the badness of the weather, it was obliged to stand out to sea again. Fortune still left another chance for the preservation of Egypt from the English, since it was not likely their landing would be attempted for several days to come. The intelligence transmitted by Friant to Cairo reached that place on the 4th of March, or 13th of Ventôse, in the afternoon. If Menou had, without losing time, taken a decisive and prompt resolution, all might still have been repaired. If he had ordered the entire army to fall back towards Alexandria, the cavalry would have arrived there in four days, the infantry in five; that is to say, between the 8th and 9th of March, or 17th and 18th of Ventôse, from ten to twelve thousand men might have been assembled on the sands of Aboukir. It was possible that by this time the English would have been disembarked; but it was impossible for them to have got their artillery, ammunition, and stores on shore, or to have strengthened their position; and our troops would have arrived in time to have driven them into the sea. Reynier, who was at Cairo, wrote to Menou, on that day, a letter of the most convincing character. He advised him to disregard the vizier, who would not take the lead in offensive operations, and also Damietta, which was not the point threatened, and to push the great mass of his force upon Alexandria. Nothing was better than this advice. In any case, there could be no harm done by marching upon Ramanieh, since, on his arrival there, if the danger were in Damietta or Syria, he could, with perfect ease, direct himself upon either of these two points. Not a day would be lost in such a case, and he would be so much closer to Alexandria, where the real danger was threatening; but it was absolutely necessary to decide that moment, and to set out on the march that night. Menou was deaf to this reasoning, and became peremptory in his orders; while, at the same time, he was unsettled how he should act. Not being able to distinguish, to his own satisfaction, the point that was threatened, he sent a reinforcement to general Rampon, at Damietta. He sent general Reynier, with his division, towards Belbeïs, to oppose the vizier upon the Syrian border. He sent the division of Lanusse towards Ramanieh; yet he did not send all that division, but kept at Cairo the 88th demi-brigade. At the moment he merely sent off the 17th chasseurs. General Lanusse was ordered to proceed to Ramanieh, and, according to the information he might there obtain, he was, if needful,

[2] This took place in Aboukir Bay, not off Alexandria. The officers were majors M'Karras and Fletcher of the royal engineers, who, some time before the expedition, sailed from Marmora, having gone down in the Penelope frigate to survey the coast. They were surprised in a very small boat. Major M'Karras was killed by the French.—*Translator.*

to march from that place upon Alexandria. Menou remained in Cairo, with a large proportion of his forces, awaiting later intelligence, in a position at such a distance from the coast. It was impossible for incapacity to proceed further.

During this time, events rapidly succeeded each other. The English fleet was composed of seven sail of the line, a great number of frigates, brigs, and large vessels belonging to the East India company, in all seventy sail. They had on board a great many flat-bottomed boats. As has already been observed, lord Keith commanded the naval forces; sir Ralph Abercromby those of the land. The place which they chose for their disembarkation was that which had always been selected before,—the road of Aboukir. It was there that the French squadron was moored in 1798: there that it was discovered and destroyed by Nelson; it was there that the Turkish squadron landed the brave janissaries, thrown into the sea by Bonaparte, on the glorious day of Aboukir. The English fleet having been obliged to keep off for some days,—a delay, fatal for them, and fortunate for the French, if Menou had known how to profit by it,—came to an anchor in the Aboukir roads on the 6th of March[1], or 15th Ventôse, about five leagues from Alexandria.

Lower Egypt resembles Holland and Venice, in being a country of marshes and pools. Like all countries of the same nature, it presents a character, which it is necessary to examine closely, if one desires to comprehend the military operations of which it may become the scene. At the place where all the great rivers enter the sea, they form banks of sand in their estuaries; these the sea drives back, and thus driven by two opposite forces, they extend themselves parallel with the shore. They form those bars so much dreaded by navigators, always so difficult to pass upon entering or leaving rivers. They rise, scarcely perceived, in succession, to the level of the water, and in time get above it, presenting a long bank of sand, beaten, from without, by the arms of the sea, while, within side, they are perpetually washed by the rivers whose currents they impede in their progress. The Nile, in flowing into the Mediterranean, has formed, before its numerous mouths, a vast semicircle of these sand-banks. This semicircle, which has an arch of seventy leagues at least, from Alexandria to Pelusium, is scarcely interrupted near Rosetta, Bourloz, Damietta, and Pelusium, by some channels, passing through which, the waters of the Nile flow into the sea. On one side bathed by the Mediterranean, it is washed on the other by the lakes Mareotis, Madieh, Edko, Bourloz, and Menzaleh. Every disembarkation in Egypt must be necessarily effected upon one of these sand-banks. Led by example and by necessity, the English chose that which forms the bank or plain of Alexandria. This bank, about fifteen leagues long, runs between the Mediterranean, on one side, and the lakes Mareotis and Madieh on the other, and has, at one of its extremities, the city of Alexandria, and at the other, forms a re-entering semicircle, which terminates at Rosetta. It is this re-entering semicircle which makes the road of Aboukir. One of the sides of this roadstead was defended by the fort of Aboukir, built by the French, and commanded, by its fire, the surrounding sands. A number of small sand-hills skirted the entire shore, and were lost in the distance on the other side of the road, in a level sandy plain. Bonaparte had ordered a fort to be constructed on these hills. Had his orders been carried into effect, to disembark here would not have been practicable.

It was in the midst of this roadstead that the English squadron came to an anchor in two lines. They waited at anchor until the swell becoming less, permitted them to land. At length, on the 8th, in the morning, or 17th Ventôse, the weather being calm, lord Keith distributed five thousand men[2] in three hundred and fifty boats. These boats, disposed in two lines, and led by captain Cochrane, advanced towards the shore, having on each of their wings a division of gun-boats. These boats exchanged with the shore a vigorous cannonade.

General Friant had gone to the spot and formed at some distance from the shore, in order to shelter his men from the English artillery. He had thrown between the fort of Aboukir and the ground which he had taken up, a detachment of the 25th demi-brigade, with several pieces of cannon. On his left he had stationed the 75th, two battalions strong, concealed by the sandhills; in the centre, two squadrons of cavalry, one the 18th, and the other the 20th dragoons; lastly, upon his right he placed the 61st demi-brigade, also two battalions strong, which was ordered to defend the lower part of the beach. His whole force was fifteen hundred men. An advanced party occupied the landing-place, and the French artillery, placed at the salient points of the shore, swept the plain with their fire.

The English pulled towards the land, the soldiers lying down in the bottoms of the boats, and the sailors standing up[3] working their oars with vigour, and taking with perfect coolness the fire of the artillery. When the sailors fell they were instantly replaced by others. The mass moved on as if by one impulse, and approached the land. At length the boats touched the beach. The English soldiers arose from the bottoms of the boats and sprang on shore. They formed, and rushed up the sandy slope which bordered the sea. General Friant, discovering this from his outposts falling back, came up a little late. He, notwithstanding,

[1] It came to anchor there on the 2nd, not the 6th. The sea was too high to land until the 8th.—*Translator.*

[2] They were six thousand, not five thousand, in each division; and two divisions of that number were landed the same day, and in the same manner. Their artillery was taken in the launches with each division, under the care of six naval captains, who conducted the covering gun-boats on the flanks.—*Translator.*

[3] The want of information of our author upon naval affairs is visible again here. The soldiers did not lie down in the bottoms of the boats, nor did the seamen stand to row. The outermost transports were from five to six miles off; and to reach the rendezvous, a mile from the shore, some had been in the boats from three in the morning. The soldiers, in such a case, must have been packed like bales upon each other. Seamen *standing* to row for five hours is a thing out of the question. The soldiers sat with their muskets between their knees, placed perpendicularly; the seamen sat as usual.—*Translator.*

directed the 75th to the left, against the sand-hills, and the 61st to the right, towards the lower part of the shore. This last regiment rushed upon the English with bayonets at the charge, as they were on that side without support. They pushed them with vigour, drove them into their boats, and even got into the boats with them. The grenadiers of the same demi-brigade seized upon twelve of the boats, and used them to pour a murderous fire upon the enemy. The 75th, which received their orders too late, had given the English time to seize upon the position on the left, and advanced to dislodge them. Exposed by this movement to the fire of the gun-boats, it received a terrific discharge of grape-shot, which killed thirty-two men, and wounded twenty. It at the same moment received the terrible fire of the English infantry. This brave demi-brigade surprised for an instant, and not fighting upon firm ground, advanced to the attack in some confusion. General Friant, wishing to support it, ordered a charge of cavalry upon the English centre, which was now forming in the plain, having overcome the first obstacles that presented themselves. The commander of the 18th dragoons was several times sent for by the general to receive his orders, after having made him wait. General Friant, in the midst of a hailstorm of balls, pointed out to him the precise point of attack. Unfortunately the irresolution of the officer caused him, in place of advancing directly against the enemy, to lose time in making a circuit; the charge was badly made, and the lives of many men and horses sacrificed without making any impression on the English, and without disengaging the 75th, that was struggling to retake the sand-hills on the left. There was a squadron of the 20th remaining, commanded by a brave officer, named Boussart; he charged at the head of his dragoons, and overturned all that were opposed to him. At this instant the 61st, which towards the right had been masters of the shore, though unable of themselves to overpower the mass opposed to them, now invigorated, followed the 20th dragoons close, and pushed the left of the English upon its centre, soon forcing them to re-embark. The 75th on its own side, under a dreadful fire, fought with renewed courage. If at that moment general Friant had had the two battalions of infantry, and the regiment of cavalry which he so many times requested, the battle had been won, and the English had been driven into the sea. But a troop of twelve hundred chosen men, composed of Swiss and Irish, turned the sand-hills, and attacked the 75th in flank. This regiment was obliged to give way anew, leaving the 61st on the right, determined to conquer, but endangered by its own excess of courage.

General Friant, seeing that the 75th was obliged to retreat, and that the 61st would be surrounded, ordered its retreat, which was effected in good order. The grenadiers of the 61st, animated by the carnage and by the success, reluctantly obeyed the order of their general, and in retiring kept back the English by several vigorous charges.

This unfortunate combat of the 8th of March, or 17th of Ventôse, decided the loss of Egypt. The gallant general Friant had taken up his position, perhaps, a little too far from the shore; he had also, perhaps, counted too much upon the superiority of his men, and supposed that the English could only disembark a few at a time. But this confidence was very excusable, and, after all, it was justified; because if he had had but one or two battalions more, the English would have been repulsed, and Egypt saved. But what can be said in behalf of the commander-in-chief, who, for two months aware of the danger through many channels, neglected to concentrate his troops at Ramanieh, which would have enabled him to unite ten thousand men before Aboukir on that decisive day? who, informed again on the 4th of March, in the most positive terms, which reached Cairo on that day, did not send any troops? They would then have arrived on the morning of the 8th, and would, in consequence, have been in time to repel the English. What can be said of admiral Ganteaume, who could have landed four thousand men in Alexandria the same day that the Régénérée frigate brought three hundred, who fought at Aboukir? What can be said of this timidity, negligence, error of every kind, unless that there are some times when every thing accumulates to contribute to the loss of battles and the ruin of empires?

The battle was sanguinary. The English computed their loss at eleven hundred killed and wounded out of five thousand that had landed [1]. We had four hundred killed and wounded out of fifteen hundred. The troops had then fought well. General Friant retired under the walls of Alexandria, and sent off the state of affairs to Menou and the generals stationed near him, pressing them to come to his assistance.

Still, all might have been repaired, if the time that remained had been profitably employed in bringing up the disposable force, and had advantage been taken of the difficulties in which the English found themselves placed, having taken up their position upon the sandy plain.

In the first place, they had to disembark their army, then to land their guns, ammunition, and baggage, which would be a labour of some time. It was then necessary for them to advance along the sand-bank in order to approach Alexandria, with the sea on the right, and the lakes Madieh and Mareotis on the left; supported, it is true, by

[1] The English did not compute their loss in the amount the author states; but it was as follows: seamen, 22 killed; 7 officers, 65 men wounded, 3 missing; total navy, 97. The return of the army loss was 4 officers, 4 serjeants, 94 privates, killed; 26 officers, 34 serjeants, 455 privates, wounded; 1 officer and 53 privates missing. Of these last, 14 were of the Corsican rangers made prisoners; these were probably the "Swiss" alluded to above, because there was no other foreign regiment in the British service in the landing of the first division. The total, therefore, was 124 killed, and 625 wounded. The action was warmly contested at the moment. The French cavalry charged the British left as it came out of the boats, and before it could form, causing a confusion impossible to avoid, and instantly remedied. The combat was never for a moment doubtful. The 23rd and 40th, that ascended the sand-hills in the centre, carried all before them, and were never once checked. The French force was rated by good judges, who were able to observe the proceedings, at from 2500 to 3000. General Abercromby estimated them at 2500. Eight French pieces of cannon out of fifteen were taken, a waggon with ammunition, and a number of horses. —*Translator.*

their gun-boats, but without cavalry, and having no other artillery than they were able to drag by hand. These operations, it was clear, would be tedious, and soon become very difficult when they had arrived before Alexandria, reduced to the necessity either of taking that city, or marching over narrow dykes, by which alone they could communicate with the interior of Egypt, and get out of the confined promontory upon which they had landed. If the French wished to check their advance, they ought to have avoided partial and unequal battles, which only inspired their enemies with confidence, made the troops lose their customary reliance upon themselves, and reduced their numbers, already too few. Without fighting at all the French were certain, by choosing good positions, to obstruct the English march completely. One useful thing alone, therefore, remained to be undertaken, and that was to wait until Menou, whose blindness to his own danger had now been overcome by facts too strong to be resisted, had concentrated his forces under the walls of Alexandria.

But general Lanusse had been sent to Ramanieh with his division. Having then learned what had passed on the side of Aboukir, he at once marched upon Alexandria. He brought with him three thousand men; Friant had lost four hundred out of fifteen hundred who were in the battle of the 8th of March; but having called in his small outposts, extending from Alexandria to Rosetta, he had still seventeen or eighteen hundred men. The forts of Alexandria were garrisoned by the seamen and soldiers of the depôts. With the division of Lanusse coming up, a force of about five thousand men could be mustered. The English had landed sixteen thousand exclusive of two thousand seamen. It would have been wiser not to have engaged yet in a second battle; but the two generals were hurried into action by extraordinary circumstances.

The long bank of sand upon which the English had landed, separated by the lakes Madieh and Mareotis from the interior of Egypt, is only joined to it by a long dyke passing between the two lakes, and terminating at Ramanieh. This dyke carries, at the same time, the canal which supplies the city of Alexandria with fresh water from the Nile, and the high road leading from Alexandria to Ramanieh. At this moment there was great danger of its being occupied by the English, as they had very nearly reached the place where it joins the sand-bank upon which Alexandria is situated. The English were busy on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of March, or 18th, 19th, and 20th of Ventôse, in disembarking and organizing their troops. On the 12th their army began to advance, marching slowly and heavily through the sands, the artillery being drawn by the sailors of the squadron, and supported right and left by gun-boats. On the night of the 12th they were very near the point where the dyke and canal form a junction with the site upon which Alexandria stands.

Generals Friant and Lanusse thought there was great danger in permitting the English to occupy that point, and thus place in their possession the road to Ramanieh, by which Menou must arrive. Still, if that road were lost, there remained another long one, it is true, and very difficult for artillery to pass, that was the bed itself of lake Mareotis. This lake, more or less in a state of inundation, according to the rise of the Nile, and the season of the year, left uncovered a large space of marshy ground, through which an army might be certain to track out a sinuous march. There was, in consequence, no sufficient reason for fighting with every chance against success.

Generals Friant and Lanusse, nevertheless, exaggerated the danger to which their communications were exposed, and determined to fight. They had the means of diminishing very considerably the error they thus committed, by remaining upon the sand-hills, which rise across the whole width of the bank upon which the battle was fought, these very hills abutting upon the head of the dyke itself, and commanding it. By remaining in this position, and making a wise use of their artillery, with which they were much better provided than the English, they had the advantage of acting upon the defensive, of compensating for their inferiority of number; and would have succeeded, it is probable, in protecting the point, for the preservation of which they were about to give a second battle, deeply to be regretted.

It was then agreed upon to give battle between generals Friant and Lanusse. The last was an officer of good natural abilities, of great bravery, and even audacity. Unhappily he was too little disposed to attend to the dictates of prudence. He had mingled too in the dissensions prevalent in the army, and was full of delight at the prospect of gaining a victory before the arrival of Menou.

On the 13th of March, or 22nd of Ventôse, in the morning, the English appeared. They were divided into three corps; that on the left followed the shore of lake Madieh, thus threatening the head of the dyke, supported by gun-boats; that of the centre advanced in the form of a square, having battalions in close columns upon its flanks in order to resist the French cavalry, which the English much feared; the third corps marched on the side of the sea, supported also by gun-boats.

The corps destined to take the head of the dyke was in advance of the two others. Lanusse, seeing the left wing of the English venture alone along the side of the lake, could not resist the desire of throwing himself upon it. He descended the heights below which he was to attack it; but at the same moment the formidable square forming the English centre, before concealed from view by some of the sand-hills which it had cleared, appeared suddenly upon that side. Lanusse was thus obliged to turn from his original object; he marched directly towards the square, which at some distance was preceded by an advanced line of infantry. He ordered up the 22nd chasseurs, which charged the line of infantry at full gallop, cut it into two parts, and forced two battalions to lay down their arms. The 4th light dragoons, advancing to sustain the 22nd, completed this first success. While this was going forward, the square which had arrived within musket shot, commenced that fire of well-sustained musketry, by which the French army suffered so much upon the landing at Aboukir. The 18th light next came up, but was received with the same murderous volleys, which threw its ranks into confusion. At this moment the right body of the English was seen advancing from the sea-shore upon its way to sustain the centre. Lanusse, who

had only the 69th to support the 13th, then ordered a retreat, fearing to engage in so unequal a contest. Friant on his side, astonished to see Lanusse descend to the plains, followed in order to support him, and pushed forwards to the head of the dyke, against the English left. He was exposed a long while to a very animated fire, which he returned with equal spirit, when he perceived the retreat of his colleague. He then retreated in his turn, to prevent being left to contend alone against the entire English army. Both after this short engagement regained the position which they had committed the error of quitting.

This was on the whole but a mere reconnoissance, although a very useless one, because the army ought to have been spared, and the result was a new loss of five or six hundred men; a loss very much to be regretted, because the French had not, like the English, the means of obtaining reinforcements, and were reduced to the necessity of giving battle with a force not exceeding five thousand or six thousand men. If the losses of the English could have compensated for those of the French, they were sufficiently great to satisfy them. They lost thirteen or fourteen hundred men [1].

It was now resolved to await the arrival of Menou, who had at last determined upon directing the army on Alexandria. He had ordered general Rampon to quit Damietta, and march upon Ramanieh, and he brought with him the main body of the troops. Yet there still remained in the province of Damietta, and in the vicinity of Belbeis and of Salahieh, in Cairo itself, and in Upper Egypt, troops which were not as useful in the places where they were left as they would have been before Alexandria. If Menou had ordered the evacuation of Upper Egypt, and had confided it to Murad Bey, and if he had left the city of Cairo, but little inclined to insurrection, to the soldiers in the depôts, he would have had two thousand men more with which to face the enemy. Such an additional force was not surely to be despised, because the all-important object was to beat the English. The Egyptians were very far from the idea of revolting, and did not require that any precautions should be taken against them. They were only to be feared in case of the French being decidedly vanquished.

Menou, having reached Ramanieh, discovered the whole extent of the danger threatening him. General Friant had sent forward two regiments of cavalry. The general thought, with good reason, that being for some days shut up within the walls of Alexandria, he had no great need of those regiments, and that, on the contrary, they would be highly useful to Menou to clear the country upon his march.

Menou was obliged to make long circuits in the bed of lake Mareotis, in order to gain the plain of Alexandria. He succeeded with some trouble, above all with his artillery. The troops arrived on the 19th and 20th of March, or 28th and 29th Ventôse. He arrived himself on the 19th, and was then able to appreciate with his own eyes the great fault that had been committed in allowing the English to effect a landing.

The English had received several reinforcements and a good deal of *materiel*. They had taken up their position upon the same sandy heights which had been occupied by generals Lanusse and Friant on the 13th of March. They had thrown up some redoubts, and mounted them with heavy guns. To drive them from their position would have been a difficult task.

The English were besides very superior in numbers. They had seventeen thousand or eighteen thousand men against fewer than ten thousand. Friant and Lanusse, after the affair of the 22nd of Ventôse, had barely four thousand five hundred effective men. Menou did not bring with him more than five thousand. The French had therefore but ten thousand men to oppose eighteen thousand in an intrenched position. All the chances which might have been on the French side in the first, and even in the second affair, were now against them. After having attempted in vain to drive the English into the sea with fifteen hundred men, and afterwards with five thousand, it would have been extraordinary not to have attempted it with ten thousand, or in other words, with all the force we could collect at the same point.

It is not to be disguised that there was another part to play, which should have been followed after the first landing, before the useless battle which generals Lanusse and Friant fought. This was to leave the English upon the tongue of land which they occupied, and to throw up works rapidly around Alexandria, which would have made it extremely difficult to take that place; to have confided the defence to the seamen and the soldiers of the depôt, reinforced with two thousand good men taken from the active army. To evacuate all the posts except Cairo, where three thousand men might have been left in garrison, having the citadel for a stronghold. Then to have kept the field with nine thousand or ten thousand men, in the view of falling upon the Turks if they should make their appearance by way of Syria, or upon the English if they should advance into the interior along the narrow dykes traversing Lower Egypt. The French had the advantage over their enemies, in that they were able to avail themselves of every arm, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, with the exclusive benefit of commanding all the provisions in the country. The English might thus have been blockaded, and probably forced to re-embark. But for such a mode of proceeding a much more able general was required than Menou, much better versed than he was in the art of animating his troops. In short, there was necessary a commander different from him, who, having all the chances of the campaign in his favour upon its commencement, had comported himself in such a manner, that he had turned them all to his own disadvantage.

Still to fight the English, now they were in the country, was but a natural resolution, consequent upon all that had been done since the campaign opened. But having determined to make a decisive exertion, it was proper to attempt it as quickly as

[1] The exact loss of the English was 6 officers, 150 men, and 21 horses, killed; 66 officers, 1015 men, and 5 horses, wounded; 1 man alone was missing: total, 1231. The French continually underrate their losses. The English army continued their advance, and the French retired under the protection of the fortified heights of Alexandria, while general Hutchinson, with the reserve, occupied a position with his right to the sea, and his left on the canal of Alexandria, about a league from the city.—*Translator.*

possible, in order not to give the Turks, on their way from Syria, the opportunity to press the French forces too closely.

In order to fight a battle it was necessary to agree upon some plan of operations. Menou was not competent to invent such a plan, and his situation with his generals scarcely admitted of his meeting them in consultation upon the subject. Notwithstanding this, Lagrange, the chief of the staff, requested Reynier and Lanusse to furnish one, which should be laid before Menou for his approbation. This they did, and it was adopted by him almost mechanically.

The two armies were in presence of each other, occupying a bank of sand about a league broad and fifteen or sixteen long, upon which the English had landed at first. The French army was posted in front of Alexandria, upon elevated ground. Before their position extended a sandy plain, and here and there sand-hills, which the enemy had carefully intrenched, in such a manner as to form a continued chain of positions from the sea to the lake Mareotis. On the French left, over against the sea, an old Roman camp stood; it was a square species of construction, still entire; at a little distance in front of this camp was a small sand-hill, on which the English had thrown up a work. There it was that they had stationed their right, supported by the double fire of this work and a division of gun-boats. In the centre of the field of battle, at an equal distance from the sea and lake Mareotis, there was another sand-hill, larger than the preceding, more elevated, and crowned with an intrenchment. This the English had constructed for the support of their centre. To the full extent of our right, on the side of the lakes, the ground slanted downwards to the head of the dyke, about which the battle had taken place some days before. A succession of redoubts connected the central position with the head of the dyke. The English had protected their left, as well as their right, with a division of gun-boats, introduced into lake Mareotis[1]. The front of attack presented in its whole length the space very nearly of a league; it was defended by heavy artillery, which men had dragged to the spot, and by a part of the English army. The larger part of this army was disposed in order of battle in two lines behind the works.

It was agreed to move forward on the morning of the 21st of March, or 30th of Ventôse, before daybreak, in order to conceal the movements of the troops, and expose them less to the enemy's fire from the intrenchments. The intention of the French was to attack and carry the works by a sudden dash forward, then to pass them by, in order to attack the front of the English army, ranged in order of battle behind them. In consequence, the right, under Lanusse, was to move down in two columns upon the right wing of the English, which was supported by the sea. The first of the two columns was to advance directly and rapidly against the work erected upon the sand-hill in front of the old Roman camp. The second, passing as quickly as possible between this work and the sea, was to attack the Roman camp, and take it by assault. The centre of the French army, commanded by general Rampon, had orders to advance some way beyond the place of this attack, to pass between the Roman camp and the great redoubt in the centre, and to attack the English army beyond the works. The right wing was composed of the divisions of Reynier and Friant, but under the command of Reynier, and that wing was ordered to open out in the plain upon the right, and to make a feint of a formidable attack on the side of lake Mareotis, to deceive the English into a belief that the grand danger was upon that side. In order to strengthen this belief, the dromedary corps was to make an assault on the head of the dyke, by traversing the bottom of the lake Mareotis for that purpose. It was hoped, too, that this division would render the sudden attack intended by Lanusse on the side of the sea, more facile of execution.

On the 24th, or 30th of Ventôse, before daybreak, the army was in motion. The dromedary regiment performed the duty which was assigned to it with perfect success. It rapidly passed over the dry parts of the bed of the lake Mareotis, alighted before the head of the dyke, took the redoubt, and turned the artillery against the enemy. This was sufficient to deceive the English, and draw their attention towards the lake Mareotis. But to execute the plan agreed upon, on the side of the sea, demanded a precision very difficult to obtain, when the operation was to be executed in the dark; and still more difficult, when, at the head of the enterprise, there was no single ruling mind to direct the whole, competent to calculate time and distance with precision.

The division of Lanusse, manœuvring in the obscurity of the night, advanced without order, and threw into confusion the troops in the centre. The first column, under the orders of general Silly, marched up resolutely to the redoubt placed in advance of the Roman camp. Lanusse directed it in person, and led it on to the redoubt. He now discovered, on a sudden, that the second column had missed its way, and that in place of proceeding along the sea-shore, to attack the Roman camp, it had approached too near to the first. He went towards it for the purpose of directing it to the point designed. Unfortunately, at the same moment, he received a wound in the thigh, which proved mortal; a fatal event, which was attended with the most deplorable consequences. The troops suddenly deprived of their active and energetic officer, the spirit of the attack decreased. Day began to dawn, and indicated to the English towards what point they should direct their fire. The French, attacked at once by the fire from the gun-boats, the Roman camp, and the redoubt, showed admirable patience and courage. But very soon, all their superiors being wounded, they were left without leaders, and fell back behind some sand-hills, scarcely high enough to shelter them. While this was occurring, the first column, which Lanusse had left to proceed towards the second, had carried the first redan of the redoubt, thrown up on the hill towards the right. It then pushed on against the principal work, intending to storm it; but being defeated in the attempt upon the front, wheeled round to attack it in flank. The centre of the army, under Rampon, seeing the column thus baffled in the assault, turned from its own object, in order to tender support. The

[1] Quere. Lake Madieh?—*Translator.*

32nd demi-brigade, detached from the centre, came up also to storm this fatal redoubt. These concurrent efforts caused a species of confusion. They strove against this obstacle; and thus the rapid operation which, at first, was intended to carry, in succession, the line of works, became changed into a long and obstinate attack, in which much precious time was consumed. The 21st demi-brigade, which belonged to the centre, leaving the 32nd occupied before the redoubt so warmly contested, executed, by itself, the original plan, passed the line of intrenchments, and boldly advancing, opened out in the face of the whole English army. It received and returned a most dreadful fire. It required support; but Menou, during this time, incapable of commanding, rode up and down the field of battle, ordering nothing, and leaving Reynier to extend his line uselessly in the plain on the right, with a considerable force wholly unemployed.

Menou was now advised to make an attempt with his cavalry, which was twelve hundred strong, and of incomparable courage, upon the mass of the English infantry, that the 24th had advanced to encounter by itself. Menou, adopting the advice, gave the order to charge. The gallant Roize placed himself at the head of the twelve hundred horse, passed with rapidity the destructive lines of the enemy's fire, crossing right and left, from the guns of the two redoubts, which the French infantry vainly tried to carry by storm, opened on the other side, found the 21st demi-brigade closely engaged with the English, and at once charged home. This gallant cavalry first leaped a ditch which separated them from the enemy, and then dashed, with high courage, upon the first line of the English infantry, overturned and sabred a great number, forcing them back in disorder. The enemy was thus obliged to give way. If Menou, at this moment, or better still, Reynier, in his commander's place, had taken the right wing to the support of the cavalry, the centre of the English army, thus disordered and repulsed beyond their works, had left the French a certain victory. The works, isolated, would have fallen into our hands. But the case was very different. The French cavalry, after having broken the first line of the enemy, seeing other lines yet to be overcome, and having only the support of the 21st demi-brigade, fell back, repassing the exterminating fire of the redoubts.

From this moment it was impossible that the battle could have had a successful termination. The left, deprived of all spirit by the death of its leader, gave out a useless fire upon the intrenched positions, which returned it with a more murderous effect. The right formed in the plain to make a diversion near lake Mareotis, which had now no more any object, since the engagement, become general, had fixed every one in his post—the right rendered no service. An energetic general, there is no doubt, would have recalled it to the centre, and with such an additional force, renewing by that means the attack of general Roize, have attempted a second dash at the English mass. The result might have changed the fate of the battle. But general Menou gave no commands; and Reynier, who would have been, on this occasion, able to take the initiative, that he so often took, when he should not, in civil affairs, confined himself to lamenting that he had no orders from the commander-in-chief. The only thing to be done in such a situation was to retreat. Menou gave the order; and his divisions fell back, keeping up a bold front, but sustaining fresh losses from the fire of the redoubts.

What a spectacle is war, when the lives of men, and the fate of empires, are thus entrusted to incapable or divided leaders, and when blood flows in proportion to the incapacity or the dissensions of those who wield the chief authority in directing its operations!

It cannot be said that the battle was lost, the enemy not having made a single step in advance; but it was virtually lost, inasmuch as it was not completely gained: for it was essential that the success should be so complete as to drive back the English towards Aboukir, and constrain them to re-embark. The loss was great on both sides. The English had about two thousand men killed and wounded [1], among others the brave general Abercromby, who was carried on board the fleet in a dying state. The loss of the French was pretty nearly upon an equality. Exposed during the whole action to a downward fire in front and flank, they suffered severely. The spirit with which the cavalry charged filled the English with surprise and admiration. The number of officers and generals wounded was far more than is commonly the case. Generals Lanusse and Roize were killed; the general of brigade, Silly, commanding one of the columns of Lanusse, had his thigh shot away; and general Baudot was so severely wounded as to leave no hope of his recovery; general Destaing was badly wounded, and general Rampon had his uniform riddled with bullets.

The moral effect of the battle was still more mischievous than the physical. There was no longer any chance of forcing the enemy to re-embark. Soon the French would have upon their hands, besides the English who had landed at Alexandria, the Turks from Syria; the capitan pacha, who would arrive with a Turkish squadron, bringing six thousand Albanians to the coast of Aboukir, and six thousand sepoys brought from India by the Red Sea, and ready to land at Cosseïr in Upper Egypt. What was to be done in the midst of so many enemies, with troops whose courage was no doubt undiminished when called into action; but who, when the affairs of the colony did not proceed well, were too ready to exclaim that the expedition had been a brilliant act of folly, and that they were uselessly sacrificed to a wild chimera?

In the three engagements of the 8th, 13th, and 21st of March, nearly three thousand five hundred men had been lost to the service, of whom a third

[1] In all 1395. The English general, Hutchinson, who succeeded sir Ralph Abercromby, stated that the French were not pursued because the English had no cavalry; and that they retreated so quickly within their fortified lines, that it would have been useless. Sir Ralph Abercromby died of his wound seven days afterwards. Four other British generals were wounded, but not seriously; 10 officers, 233 men, and 2 horses, were killed; 60 officers and 1133 men were wounded; and 29 missing; belonging to the army: 24 sailors were killed and wounded. The English made 200 prisoners, not wounded; captured the colours of a distinguished French regiment, and two field-pieces.—*Translator.*

were killed, and another third seriously wounded, while the remainder would be incapable of duty for weeks to come. Although the army was much weakened, it could even now, as at the beginning of the campaign, manœuvre rapidly between the different bodies of the enemy that were tending to form a junction, beat the vizier if he entered by way of Syria, the capitan pacha if he tried to penetrate to Rosetta, the English if they attempted to march along the narrow tongues of land which communicate with the interior of Egypt. The three thousand five hundred men lost made this plan now more difficult than ever of execution. If three thousand men were left in Cairo, and two or three thousand in Alexandria, there remained scarcely seven or eight thousand to manœuvre in the field, even supposing that all the disposable force was united, and the secondary posts, without exception, were evacuated. With a very resolute and able general, the success of such an operation would still be uncertain, though possible—but what was to be expected from Menou and his lieutenants?

There remained one hope of retrieving the fortunes of the war—it was not to be despaired of, for it was announced day after day. This resource was Ganteaume with his vessels, and the troops which he had embarked on board. Four thousand men arriving at this moment would have saved Egypt. A despatch-boat had been sent to the admiral for the purpose of informing him where he might disembark his men out of sight of the English on a point of land upon the coast of Africa, twenty or thirty leagues west of Alexandria. Three thousand men might then have been left in that city; and uniting those who could be spared with those that were in Cairo, ten or twelve thousand might have manœuvred in the open country. But Ganteaume, though far superior to Menou, did not, in the present circumstances, act much better. After having repaired at Toulon the injury his fleet had sustained in sailing from Brest, he had, as already seen, sailed from Toulon on the 19th of March, or 28th of Ventôse, re-entered the port a second time in consequence of the Constitution, a ship of the line, getting on shore; and he had again gone to sea on the 22nd of March, or 1st of Germinal. This time he made sail towards Sardinia. The wind was favourable; a bold impulse of mind would have taken him to the coast of Egypt, because he had succeeded in adroitly escaping admiral Warren by altering his course. He was already only fifteen leagues from Cape Carbonara, the extreme point of Sardinia, ready to enter the channel which separates Sicily from Africa. Unfortunately on the evening of the 26th of March, or 5th Germinal, one of the captains commanding the Dix-Août, in the absence of captain Bergeret, who was ill, had the unskilfulness to run foul of the Indomptable, to receive considerable injury, and to inflict as much upon the other vessel as that ship herself received. Alarmed at the damage thus sustained, Ganteaume did not think himself in a condition to keep at sea any longer, and put back to Toulon again on the 5th of April, or 15th Germinal, just fifteen days after the battle of Canopus.

The French in Egypt were ignorant of the details of these proceedings at this date, and in spite of the time that had passed, they preserved a remnant of hope. At the appearance of the smallest sail they ran to see if it were not Ganteaume. In this anxious state they took no decisive step, but waited in fatal inaction. Menou caused some works to be thrown up around Alexandria, in order the better to resist any attack from the English, but he did no more. He had given an order for the evacuation of Upper Egypt, from whence he withdrew Donzelot's brigade as a reinforcement for the other troops in Cairo. He had sent some troops from Alexandria to Ramanieh to watch the movements taking place on the side of Rosetta. To complete the misfortune, Murad Bey, whose fidelity to the French was unshaken, had been taken ill of the plague, and had just expired, his Mamelukes coming under the command of Osman Bey, upon whom no reliance was to be placed. The plague began its ravages at Cairo. Thus every thing went on as ill as possible, and seemed tending towards an unfortunate conclusion.

The English on their side, fearful of the army before them, would not risk any thing. They preferred moving onward slowly but surely. They were waiting too until their allies, the Turks, in whom they had little confidence, were in a condition to second them. They had now been landed a month, without having attempted any thing more than the capture of the fort of Aboukir, which, gallantly defended, had sunk under the crushing fire of their vessels. At last, about the beginning of April, or middle of Germinal, they determined to abandon their state of inactivity, and that species of blockade in which they had been obliged to live. Colonel Spencer was ordered with a corps of some thousand English, and the six thousand Albanians of the capitan pacha, to cross by sea the roads of Aboukir, and to disembark before Rosetta. Their intention was to open by this means an access to the interior of the Delta, and thus to procure the fresh provisions of which they stood in need, and, in addition, to form a connexion with the vizier, who was advancing at the other extremity of the Delta, by the frontier of Syria. There were no more at Rosetta than a few hundred French, who could oppose no resistance to that force, and falling back they ascended the Nile. They joined, a little way in advance, a small body of troops sent from Alexandria. This body was composed of the 21st light, and a company of artillery. The English and Turks, masters of one of the mouths of the Nile, by which provisions could reach them, and having the way open to them into the interior of Egypt, began to think of profiting by their success, but without being in too great a hurry, because they waited still twenty days before they marched in advance. For an army sagacious and prompt it was an excellent opportunity to attack them. General Hutchinson, the successor of Abercromby, had not dared to diminish the number of his troops before Alexandria. He had sent scarcely six thousand English and six thousand Turks to Rosetta, although he had received reinforcements to cover his losses, and had twenty thousand men at his disposal. If General Menou, employing his time well, had devoted the past month to construct around Alexandria the works which were indispensable, had he thus frugally managed his means, so as to have left few troops

there, then he might have directed six thousand men upon Ramanieh, and drawn upon that point all the troops not necessary at Cairo, he might have brought into the field eight or nine thousand men against the English, who had just penetrated to Rosetta. This was force enough to drive them back to the mouth of the Nile, to elevate the spirit of the army, to secure the submission of the Egyptians, to retard the march of the vizier, to replace the English in their real state of blockade on the plains of Alexandria, and to bring back fortune. This was the last chance. He was advised to undertake this movement; but, always timid, he never followed but half the advice that was given to him. He sent general Valentin to Ramanieh with a force pronounced inefficient. Then he sent a second, under the chief of his staff, general Lagrange. The whole united force did not amount to four thousand men. He never commanded the march of the troops down from Cairo, and general Lagrange, who was besides a brave officer, was not a man equal to sustain himself with four thousand men before six thousand English, and the same number of Turks. Menou ought to have united at least eight thousand men under his best general. He was able to do this by a strong concentration of his forces, and by every where making a sacrifice of the accessory to the principal.

General Morand, who commanded the first detachment sent to Rosetta, had posted himself at El-Aft, on the banks of the Nile, near the town of Foueh, in a position which possessed some defensive advantages. At that spot general Lagrange joined him. The English and the Turks, masters of Rosetta and the mouth of the Nile, had covered that river with gun-boats, and would have quickly taken the small undefended town of Foueh. It became necessary, therefore, to fall back upon Ramanieh, during the night of the 8th of May, or 18th of Floréal. The site of Ramanieh did not offer any great defensive advantages, the strength of the place being scarcely sufficient to counterbalance the numerical superiority of the enemy. Still, if it were required to offer any where a desperate resistance, Ramanieh was the place for that purpose: because that position lost, the detached corps of general Lagrange would be separated from Alexandria, and compelled to fall back on Cairo. Thus the French army would be divided in two, one-half being shut up in Alexandria, the other half in Cairo. If, when it was united it was not equal to disputing the field with the English, it was impossible, cut in two, that it should oppose any effectual resistance. In such a case it had no alternative but to sign a capitulation. The loss of Ramanieh, therefore, would be the definitive loss of Egypt. Menou wrote to general Lagrange that he would come to his succour with two thousand men, which at least proves that he had that number at his disposal. There were not less than three thousand at Cairo; in consequence nine thousand, or at least eight thousand men, might have been assembled at Ramanieh. Thus, in an open country, with an excellent cavalry, and a fine light artillery, and with the resolution to conquer or die, success was certain. But Menou never came, and Belliard, who commanded at Cairo, received no orders. General Lagrange, at the head of four thousand men under his command, supported his rear upon Ramanieh, and the Nile, which washes with its current the houses of that little town. In that position he had at his back the English gun-boats, which were upon the river, and fired a shower of bullets into the French camp; and he had in front on the plain, without any thing for a cover but some field-works, the main body of the English and Turks. There were twelve thousand against four thousand. The danger was considerable; still it was better to fight, and if overpowered, to surrender at evening on the field of battle, after fighting the whole day, than to abandon such a position without a struggle. Four thousand men, all seasoned troops, had still some chances of success. But the chief of Menou's staff, though devoted to his general's views, and to the preservation of the colony, did not weigh the consequences of his retreat. He evacuated Ramanieh, and fell back upon Cairo, on the 10th of May, or 20th of Floréal. He arrived in the city on the 14th, in the morning, or on the 24th of Floréal. He sacrificed at Ramanieh a convoy of immense value, and what was more serious still, the ammunition of the army.

From that day nothing more that happened in Egypt is worthy of record, and scarcely of notice. The men thus descended with their fortunes, even below themselves; they exhibited in every thing the most shameful weakness, with the most deplorable incapacity. But in speaking of the men, it is only to the commanders that these terms are intended to apply; because the soldiers and the inferior officers, always admirable in their behaviour before an enemy, were, from the first to the last man, ready to die in the field. They never were seen, in a single instance, to do any thing unworthy of their former reputation and glory.

At Cairo, as at Alexandria, there remained nothing more to be done than to capitulate. They had no other merit to acquire than to retard the capitulation as long as possible. Sometimes we seem in appearance only defending our homes, when we really save our country. Masséna, in prolonging the defence of Genoa, had made the victory of Marengo practicable. The generals who occupied Cairo and Alexandria, in protracting a resistance beyond hope, were still able to second very usefully the serious negotiations then proceeding between France and England. They did not know of their existence, that is very true; but then when unaware of the services men may render to their country by prolonging a defence, it is proper to listen to the voice of honour, which commands them to hold out to the last extremity. Of the two generals now blockaded, the most unfortunate was Menou, because he had committed the greater faults; yet even he, by his obstinate protraction of the defence of Alexandria, was still useful, as it will be seen, to the interests of France. This was his consolation at a later period, and his main excuse to the first consul.

When the troops detached from Ramanieh had entered Cairo, there was an immediate consultation upon the conduct to be pursued. General Belliard was commander-in-chief, from his superior rank in the service. He was a cautious man, more cautious than resolute. He called a council of war. There were seven thousand effective men left, more than five thousand or six thousand sick, invalids, and

persons employed about the army[1]. The plague was at that time raging; there was but a small stock of money or provisions, and a city of immense extent to defend. Seven thousand men were too few to guard the whole extent. In no part of the circuit was there any work fit to make a resistance to European engineers. The citadel, it is true, was a defended work, but wholly insufficient to hold out against the heavy artillery of the English. Such a post was only calculated to make a successful defence against the population of Cairo. There evidently remained but two things to do; either to endeavour, by a bold march, to descend into Lower Egypt, accomplish the passage of the Nile by surprise, and rejoin Menou in Alexandria; or to retire upon Damietta, which would have been the surest and easiest course to pursue, more especially on account of the multitude of persons who, attached to the army, must have been taken with it. There it would have been found, that in the midst of the lagoons, communicating with the Delta by narrow tongues of land, seven thousand men of the army of Egypt might defend themselves against an enemy three or four times superior in number. There, too, an abundance of every thing was certain of being procured; the province was covered with cattle, the town of Damietta overflowed with corn, and the lake Menzaleh abounded with the best fish, well adapted food for the troops. As it was simply a question when to capitulate, the city of Damietta permitted the retardation of that melancholy result for six months. The officer of engineers, Hautpoul, proposed having recourse to this wise step; but in order to undertake it, the difficult question of the evacuation of Cairo was to be decided upon. General Belliard, who was capable a few days afterwards of giving up the city to the enemy, by means of a lamentable capitulation, would not consent to do it that day voluntarily, as the consequence of a forcible and clever military opinion. He accordingly determined to remain in the Egyptian capital, without knowing what he should do. By the left bank of the Nile the English and Turks were ascending from Ramanieh to Cairo; by the right bank the grand vizier, with twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand followers, collected from all sorts of miserable oriental troops, was coming from the side of Syria, by the road of Belbeïs, upon Cairo. General Belliard, remembering the trophies of Heliopolis, wished to march out and meet the grand vizier, upon the route followed by Kléber. He left Cairo at the head of six thousand men, and advanced towards the heights of Elmenaïr, about two days' march distant. Sometimes enveloped by a cloud of cavalry, he sent his light artillery after them, that here and there reached a few of them with its balls; but this was the utmost result which he could obtain. The Turks, this time well commanded, would not hazard a second battle of Heliopolis. There was but one mode of coming at them, and that was to attack their camp at Belbeïs. But general Belliard, received in every village by the fire of musketry, saw the number of his wounded increase every step of his advance, the distance, too, widening that separated him from Cairo. He began to fear that the English and the Turks might enter the city in his absence. He ought to have foreseen all this danger before he quitted Cairo, and have asked himself if there was time to reach Belbeïs. Having left Cairo without knowing what he would finally undertake, he returned in the same mind, after an operation without a result, which made it appear to the eyes of the inhabitants of Cairo as if he had been beaten. As with all the inhabitants of countries recently subjugated, the Egyptians turned with fortune, and though not discontented with the French, were much inclined to abandon them. Still there was no fear of an insurrection, unless the city had been condemned to sustain the horrors of a siege.

The French army, sickened at the humiliations to which it was exposed through the incapacity of its generals, became wholly possessed with the old feelings which induced the convention of El-Arisch. It consoled itself under its misfortunes with the idea of a return to France. If a resolute and skilful general had given the example which was given to the garrison of Genoa by Masséna, the troops would have followed it; but a similar course was not to be expected of general Belliard. Pressed on the left bank of the Nile by the Anglo-Turkish army from Ramanieh, and on the right by the grand vizier, who had accompanied it step by step, he offered the enemy a suspension of arms, which was eagerly accepted, because the English were more eager to obtain useful advantages than mere renown. That for which they were most anxious was the evacuation of Egypt, no matter by what means it was brought about. General Belliard then assembled a council of war, at which the discussions were very stormy. Grievous complaints were directed against his conduct as commander of the Cairo division. He was told that he had not understood when to evacuate Cairo in time to take up a position at Damietta, nor to maintain the capital of Egypt by well-concerted operations; that he had only made a ridiculous sally to fight the vizier, without succeeding in getting near him; and that now, not knowing which way to turn, he took the advice of his officers, whether he must negotiate or fight to the last, when he had previously resolved the question for himself, by the spontaneous opening of the negotiation. All these reproaches were made with much bitterness, more particularly by general Lagrange, the friend of Menou, and a warm advocate for the preservation of Egypt. Generals Valentin, Duranteau, and Dupas, all three asserted that, for the honour of their colours, it was absolutely necessary to fight. Unhappily, this was no longer possible, without cruelty to the troops, and more particularly, without cruelty to the numerous sick, and to the persons attached to the army. They had before them not less than forty thousand enemies, without counting the sepoys, who, disembarked at Cosseïr, were descending the Nile with the Mamelukes, that no longer owned allegiance to the French, since Murad Bey was no more. There was in their rear a semi-barbarous

[1] The number in Cairo for which embarkation to Europe was required of the English commander—an exact criterion—was 13,500, of whom 8000 were fit for duty, 1000 were sick, and the remainder invalided, persons in the employ of the army or civil service, including followers. The military were in all 10,000; not more than 500 were Greeks or Copts. There were embarked on lake Bourlos 700, being the garrison of Damietta; and 8000 soldiers and 1300 sailors from Alexandria; besides upwards of a thousand made prisoners in the forts and other places.—*Translator.*

population of three hundred thousand souls, infected with the plague, threatened with famine, and to the last man ready to rise against the French. The lines around the city were too extended for defence with seven thousand men, and too feeble to resist European engineers. The place might be carried by assault, and every Frenchman put to the sword. It was in vain that some of the officers raised their voices against a surrender that would dishonour the French arms; there was then no alternative. General Belliard, wishing to show himself ready for any thing, again raised the question whether a retreat to Damietta was practicable, a step now become too late to adopt; and to this he added another question, equally singular, as to whether a refuge might not be found by a retreat into Upper Egypt. The last proposition was perfect folly. It was only a ruse of his own mental feebleness, seeking to conceal its confusion under the false semblance of boldness. It was then determined to capitulate; nothing else could be effected, unless they all desired to be put to the sword after a ferocious assault.

Commissioners were sent to the Anglo-Turkish camp for the purpose of negotiating a capitulation. The enemies' generals accepted the proposition with much gratification: so much even then did they dread a turn of fortune. They acceded to the most favourable conditions for the army. It was settled that the French should retire with the honours of war, with their arms and baggage, their artillery[1], horses, in fact all they possessed; that they should be transported to France, and fed during the voyage. Such of the Egyptians as desired to follow the army, and there were a certain number compromised by their relations with the French, were to be allowed to join them, and to have the liberty of disposing of their property.

This capitulation was signed on the 27th of June, 1801, and ratified on the 28th, or 8th and 9th of Messidor, in the year IX. The pride of the old soldiers of Italy and Egypt was deeply wounded by it. They were about to re-enter France; not as they had entered it in 1798, after the triumphs of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli, proud of their glory, and of the services rendered to the republic. They were now to return almost conquered; but still they were going to return, and for hearts suffering after a long exile, there was an involuntary pleasure, which almost overcame them, even amid their reverses. There was, at the bottom of every heart, a satisfaction that was not avowed, but which still displayed itself in their countenances. Their commanders alone appeared thoughtful, from imagining the judgment which the first consul would give upon their conduct. The despatches which accompanied the capitulation were impressed with the most humiliating anxiety. There were chosen for the bearers of these despatches, such persons as, by their conduct and actions, had been most free from blame. These were Hautpoul, the officer of engineers, and Champy, who made himself so useful to the colony.

Menou was shut up in Alexandria, and, like Belliard, he had nothing to do but to surrender. There could be with neither the one nor the other, more than the difference of the time in the way of question. The plague had already taken off several persons in Alexandria; provisions were wanting, in consequence of the fault committed in the beginning of the siege, by not laying in a sufficient supply. It is true, that the Arab caravans, attracted by interest, still brought them some meat, butter, and grain. But they wanted wheat, and were obliged, in part, to make their bread of rice. Scurvy every day diminished the number of men capable of doing duty. The English, in order to isolate them completely, devised the emptying of the lake Madieh into that of Mareotis, which was half dried up, thus surrounding Alexandria with a continued sheet of water, and then to encircle it with gun-boats. To this end they cut the dyke which runs to Ramanieh from Alexandria, forming the separation between the two lakes. But as the difference of the level was only nine feet, the flowing of the water from one lake into the other proceeded slowly; and, in fact, the operation, desirable for the object of separating general Belliard from Menou, was no longer of the same utility, since the late events at Cairo. If it extended the space of action for the gun-boats, it had, for the French, the advantage of narrowing the front of attack; because the long plain of sand upon which Alexandria is built, communicates, by its western extremity, with the Libyan desert. The English were, therefore, desirous of completing the investment of the place; for this purpose, about the middle of August, or end of Thermidor, they embarked troops in their gun-boats, and landed not far from the town of Marabout. They also besieged the fort of the same name. From this moment the place, completely invested, could not hold out long.

The unfortunate Menou, thus reduced to idleness and inactivity, had ample leisure to ponder over his faults, with censures showered upon him from all parties. He consoled himself, notwithstanding, with the notion of an heroic resistance, like that of Masséna at Genoa. He wrote to the first consul, and assured him that a memorable defence should be made. Generals Damas and Reynier were shut up in Alexandria without troops. They made use of the most offensive language, and even in these last scenes of all, could not keep themselves under becoming restraint. One night, Menou had them arrested, in the most public manner, and ordered them to be embarked for France. This act of vigour, coming so late, produced but little effect. The army, with its usual good sense, severely censured Reynier and Damas; but did not esteem Menou the more. The only favour which they conferred upon him was that of not hating him. Hearing with coldness his proclamations, in which he announced his determination to die sooner than surrender, they were still ready, if needful, to fight to the last extremity, but did not believe it was worth doing in the existing state of circumstances. The army too well understood the result of what had occurred at Cairo, not to foresee the approach of a capitulation; and in Alexandria, as in Cairo, they consoled themselves for their reverses by the hope of speedily returning to France.

[1] This refers only to field-pieces, two 12-pounders to each battalion, and one to each squadron, with the carriages and ammunition belonging to them. The horses and camels were to be given up, at the place of embarkation, to the British.—*Translator.*

From that time, nothing more of importance signalized the presence of the French in Egypt; and the expedition may be said, in a certain sense, to have terminated. Praised as a prodigy of talent and boldness by some persons, it was condemned by others as a showy chimera, more particularly by such as affect to weigh every thing in the balance of frigid impassive reasoning.

The last opinion, with the appearance of wisdom, was, at bottom, but little founded in good sense or justice.

Napoleon, in his long and wonderful career, never devised any scheme more grand nor more likely to be eminently useful. Without doubt, if we feel that France has not preserved the Rhine nor the Alps, it must be granted, that Egypt, supposing we had held it for fifteen years, would at last have been taken from us, as well as our continental frontiers, or as that old and fine possession, the Isle of France, for which France was not indebted to the wars of the revolution. But to judge thus of these things, we might go so far as to ask whether the conquest of the line of the Rhine was not itself a folly and a chimera. In order to judge properly of such a question, it must be supposed, for a moment, that the protracted wars of France were differently terminated from the mode in which they actually were, and then inquire whether, in such a case, the possession of Egypt was possible, desirable, and of great importance or not. To the question thus put, the reply cannot be doubtful. In the first place, England was very nearly resigned, in 1801, to consent to the retention of Egypt by France, upon receiving equivalent compensations. These compensations, with which the French negotiator was made acquainted, had nothing in them unreasonable nor extravagant. It is not to be doubted, that during the maritime peace which followed, of which the conclusion will shortly be stated, the first consul, foreseeing the brevity of the peace, would have sent to the mouth of the Nile immense reinforcements in men and *matériel*. It is clear, that the splendid army sent to St. Domingo, where it was despatched to find an indemnity for the loss of Egypt, would have served to protect the new colony for a long time from any hostile attack. Such a general as Decaen or St. Cyr, who joined military skill and experience with talents for administrative governing, having, besides the twenty-two thousand men which remained in Egypt of the first expedition, the thirty thousand which perished so uselessly in St. Domingo; thus established with fifty thousand French, and an immense *matériel*, under a climate perfectly healthy, and a soil of exhaustless fertility, cultivated by a peasantry submissive to every master, and never keeping a musket by the side of the plough;—a general, it may be said, like Decaen or St. Cyr, would have been able, with such means, to defend Egypt triumphantly, and to found there a superb colony.

The success was incontestably attainable. We may add, that in the maritime and commercial contest that France and England maintained against one another, the attempt was in a certain sense required. England had just conquered the continent of India, and had thus gained a supremacy in the Eastern seas. France, until that time her rival, was she to yield up without dispute a similar supremacy? Did she not owe it to her glory, to her destiny, to contend for it? The politician can give no other answer to this question than the patriot. Yes, it was the duty of France to attempt a struggle in the region of the East, that vast field of ambition to maritime nations; it was proper France should strive to obtain some acquisition that would counterbalance that of England. This truth admitted, let the whole world be searched over, and who will say there is any where an acquisition better adapted than Egypt to the end proposed? It is of more value in itself than the finest countries; it borders upon the richest and most fertile, and those which are furnished with the fullest means for foreign trade. It would bring back into the Mediterranean, which would then be our sea, the commerce of the East; it would be, in one word, an equivalent for India, and, in any case, was the road to it. The conquest of Egypt was then for France, for the independence of the seas, and for general civilization, an immense service. Thus too, as will be seen soon, the success of France was desired more than once by the cabinets of Europe, in the short intervals of time when mutual hatred did not trouble the peace of cabinets. For such an object it was worth while to lose an army, and not only that which was sent the first time to Egypt, but those that were sent to perish uselessly at St. Domingo, in Spain, and in the Calabrias. Would to Heaven, that in the flashes of his vast imagination, Napoleon had projected nothing more ill-advised nor imprudent!

BOOK XI.

THE GENERAL PEACE.

LAST UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT OF GANTEAUME TO PUT TO SEA.—HE TOUCHES AT DERNE, BUT DARES NOT LAND TWO THOUSAND MEN WHOM HE HAS ON BOARD.—HE PUTS BACK TO TOULON.—CAPTURE OF THE SWIFTSURE ON THE PASSAGE.—ADMIRAL LINOIS, SENT FROM TOULON TO CADIZ, IS OBLIGED TO ANCHOR IN THE BAY OF ALGESIRAS.—BRILLIANT ENGAGEMENT OFF ALGESIRAS.—A COMBINED FRENCH AND SPANISH SQUADRON SAILS FROM CADIZ, TO ASSIST LINOIS' DIVISION.—RETURN OF THE COMBINED FLEET TO CADIZ.—ACTION BETWEEN THE REAR DIVISION AND ADMIRAL SAUMAREZ.—DREADFUL MISTAKE OF TWO SPANISH SHIPS, WHICH, IN THE NIGHT, TAKING EACH OTHER FOR ENEMIES, FIGHT WITH DESPERATION, AND ARE BOTH BLOWN UP.—EXPLOIT OF CAPTAIN TROUDE.—SHORT CAMPAIGN OF THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE AGAINST PORTUGAL.—THE COURT OF LISBON SENDS A NEGOTIATOR IN HASTE TO BADAJOZ, AND SUBMITS TO THE UNITED WILL OF FRANCE AND SPAIN.—EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN GENERAL SINCE THE TREATY OF LUNÉVILLE.—INCREASING INFLUENCE OF FRANCE.—VISIT TO PARIS OF THE INFANTS OF SPAIN DESTINED FOR THE THRONE OF ETRURIA.—RENEWAL OF THE NEGOTIATION IN LONDON BETWEEN M. OTTO AND LORD HAWKESBURY.—THE ENGLISH PRESENT THE QUESTION IN A NEW FORM.—THEY DEMAND CEYLON IN INDIA, MARTINIQUE AND TRINIDAD IN THE WEST INDIES, MALTA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.—THE FIRST CONSUL REPLIES TO THESE PRETENSIONS, THREATENS TO CONQUER PORTUGAL, AND, IN CASE OF NEED, TO INVADE ENGLAND.—WARM DISPUTE BETWEEN THE "MONITEUR" AND THE ENGLISH JOURNALS.—THE BRITISH CABINET GIVES UP MALTA.—RENEWS ALL ITS DEMANDS, AND REQUIRES THE ISLAND OF TRINIDAD.—THE FIRST CONSUL, TO SAVE THE POSSESSIONS OF AN ALLY, OFFERS TOBAGO.—IT IS REJECTED BY THE BRITISH CABINET.—FOOLISH CONDUCT OF THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE, WHICH FURNISHES UNEXPECTEDLY A SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY: HE TREATS WITH THE COURT OF LISBON, WITHOUT ACTING IN CONCERT WITH FRANCE, AND THUS DEPRIVES THE FRENCH LEGATION OF THE ARGUMENT DRAWN FROM THE DANGER OF PORTUGAL.—IRRITATION OF THE FIRST CONSUL, AND THREAT OF WAR AGAINST SPAIN.—TALLEYRAND PROPOSES TO FINISH THE WAR AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SPANIARDS, BY GIVING UP THE ISLAND OF TRINIDAD TO THE ENGLISH.—M. OTTO IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THAT CONCESSION IN THE LAST EXTREMITY.—DURING THE NEGOTIATION, NELSON MAKES THE GREATEST EFFORTS TO DESTROY THE FRENCH FLOTILLA OFF BOULOGNE.—SPLENDID ACTIONS OFF BOULOGNE BY LATOUCHE TRÉVILLE AGAINST NELSON.—DEFEAT OF THE ENGLISH.—JOY IN FRANCE, ALARM IN ENGLAND, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THESE TWO ENGAGEMENTS.—RECIPROCAL TENDENCY TO A RECONCILIATION.—THE LAST DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME, AND PEACE CONCLUDED IN THE FORM OF PRELIMINARIES, BY THE SACRIFICE OF THE ISLAND OF TRINIDAD.—UNBOUNDED JOY IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.—LAURISTON, SENT TO LONDON WITH THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BY THE FIRST CONSUL, IS DRAWN ABOUT IN TRIUMPH FOR SEVERAL HOURS.—MEETING OF A CONGRESS IN AMIENS, TO CONCLUDE A DEFINITIVE PEACE.—SERIES OF TREATIES SUCCESSIVELY SIGNED.—PEACE WITH PORTUGAL, THE OTTOMAN PORTE, BAVARIA, AND RUSSIA.—FÊTE IN CELEBRATION OF THE PEACE FIXED ON THE 18TH BRUMAIRE.—LORD CORNWALLIS, PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE CONGRESS AT AMIENS, IS PRESENT AT THE FÊTE.—HIS RECEPTION BY THE PEOPLE OF PARIS.—BANQUET IN THE CITY OF LONDON.—EXTRAORDINARY DEMONSTRATION OF SYMPATHY GIVEN AT THIS TIME BY BOTH COUNTRIES.

While the army in Egypt succumbed for the want of an able commander and seasonable reinforcements, admiral Ganteaume made a third attempt to leave the port of Toulon. The first consul had scarcely allowed the necessary time for the repair of the Dix-Août and of the Indomptable, and Ganteaume was forced to put to sea almost immediately. Admiral Ganteaume sailed on the 25th of April, or 5th Floréal. He had orders to pass close to the island of Elba, in order to make a demonstration before Porto Ferrajo, to facilitate its occupation by the French troops. The first consul intended to take this island for the purpose of annexing it to France, to which it was secured by treaties with Naples and Etruria; there was a small garrison in the island half Tuscan and half English. The admiral obeyed his orders, fired a few guns at Porto Ferrajo, and passed on lest he might hazard, by exposing himself to injury, the great end of his expedition. Had he proceeded at once to Egypt, he might have still been useful to the army there; because, as has been shown, the position of Ramanieh was not lost until the 10th of May, or 20th Floréal. He had yet time, therefore, departing on the 25th of April, to hinder the army from being cut in two, and obliged to capitulate one division after another. To do this he ought not to have lost a moment. But a species of fatality attached to all the operations of admiral Ganteaume. He has been seen coming out successfully from Brest, entering more fortunately still into the Mediterranean, suddenly losing confidence, taking four vessels for eight, and entering Toulon. He has been seen sailing again from that port in March, escaping admiral Warren, passing the southermost point of Sardinia, and stopped once more by the Dix-Août and Indomptable running foul of each other. This was not the end of his misfortunes. Scarcely had he quitted the sea around the isle of Elba, when a contagious disorder broke out on board his squadron. Judging it imprudent and useless to carry to Egypt such a number of sick, he divided his squadron, confiding three vessels to rear-admiral Linois, and placing

his sick soldiers and seamen in those three vessels, he sent them back to Toulon. He continued his voyage to Egypt with four sail of the line and two frigates, carrying only two thousand soldiers. But he was no longer in time to be of service, because it was near the middle of May, and at that time the French army was lost. Generals Belliard and Menou were separated from each other, in consequence of the abandonment of Ramanieh. Of this admiral Ganteaume was ignorant. He passed Sardinia and Sicily, showed himself in the channel of Candia, contrived several times to elude his enemies, sailing even into the Archipelago to escape them, and finally moored on the coast of Africa at Derne, a few marches distant from Alexandria to the westward, designated in his instructions as the place proper for disembarkation. It was thought that by giving the troops provisions and money for the hire of camels from the Arabs, they might be enabled to cross the desert, and reach Alexandria in a few marches. This was only a hazardous conjecture. Admiral Ganteaume cast anchor at this place for some hours, and hoisted out a part of his boats. But the inhabitants came down to the shore, and opened upon them a fire of musketry. Jerome Bonaparte, the brother of the first consul, was with the troops about to disembark. Vain efforts were made to gain over the natives, and conciliate them. The little town of Derne must have been destroyed, and the troops must have marched to Alexandria without water, and almost without provisions, fighting the whole distance. It would have been a foolish attempt without an object, because but one thousand at most of two thousand would reach the end of their journey. It was not worth while to sacrifice so many gallant men for the sake of so small a reinforcement. Besides an event, very easy to be foreseen, terminated all doubts. The admiral believed he saw the English fleet; he then deliberated no longer, took his boats on board, did not allow himself time to weigh his anchors, but cut his cables, not to be attacked at anchor, and then set sail; he escaped being overtaken by the enemy.

Fortune, which had behaved ill before, because she seconds, as has been often said, only adventurous spirits who repose confidence in her—fortune had in store some compensation for him. In crossing the channel of Candia, he fell in with an English ship of the line; it was the Swiftsure. To give chase to her, to surround, cannonade, and take her, was the work of a few moments[1]. It was the 24th of June, or 5th Messidor, that this fortunate rencontre took place. Admiral Ganteaume entered Toulon with this species of trophy, a poor compensation for his bad success. The first consul, inclined towards indulgence for those who had run great risks with him, was willing to accept this compensation, and published it in the *Moniteur*.

However, all these naval movements terminated in a mode less annoying to the French navy. While admiral Ganteaume was returning to Toulon, admiral Linois, who had gone into that port to land his soldiers and sailors sick of the fever, had sailed again, according to the express orders of the first consul. Linois, as quickly as possible, got on board fresh seamen, and embarked more troops, after white-washing the interior of his vessels, and then he got under weigh for his new destination. A despatch, which he was only to open at sea, commanded him to proceed to Cadiz, to form a junction with six more vessels at that port, fitted out under the orders of admiral Dumanoir, and five Spanish vessels from Ferrol, which, with the three of admiral Linois', would form a squadron of fourteen sail of the line. It was possible that the squadron from Rochefort, under admiral Bruix, might have arrived there, in which case a fleet of more than thirty sail of the line would be collected; and this fleet, for some months mistress of the Mediterranean, would take the troops from Otranto, and carry immense succours to Egypt. They were at this time unaware in France that it was too late, and that Alexandria was the only place left to defend; but to preserve that place was no indifferent matter.

Admiral Linois, in perfect obedience to his orders, set sail for Cadiz. On his passage he gave chase to several English frigates, which he was nearly capturing. He met with contrary winds at the entrance of the straits; but at length, about the beginning of July, or middle of Messidor, he was enabled to enter them. The English Gibraltar fleet was watching Cadiz; and this being made known to him by signal, he put into the Spanish port of Algesiras, on the 4th of July, or 15th Messidor, in the evening.

Near the straits of Gibraltar, in other words, towards the southernmost cape of that peninsula, the mountainous coast of Spain opens, and taking the form of a horse-shoe, forms a deep bay, the

[1] The extreme inaccuracy of our Parisian author in what relates to naval affairs, must stand excused by the English reader. M. Thiers observes most justly, in his chapter on "the neutrals," to apologize for his revelations of that scene of Russian barbarism, the assassination of Paul I., "C'est que la vérité est le premier devoir de l'histoire." Such a just sentiment will, therefore, excuse a quotation from the statement of the gallant captain Hallowell of the Swiftsure, 74, respecting this rencontre with the high-minded, fine-spirited Ganteaume, of whom captain Hallowell spoke in the highest terms, as well as of his officers. The Swiftsure had on board fifty-nine sick of a bad fever, caught from the army in Egypt. She was eighty-six short of her complement of men, and was going to Malta with all speed. The Swiftsure was only seven leagues from Derne when she distinguished an enemy's squadron, and endeavoured to escape, but found the ships were superior sailers; the Swiftsure practised every manœuvre in vain to get clear of them. At half-past three p. m. the Indivisible of eighty guns, and the Dix-Août, seventy-four, were within gun shot. They soon opened their fire, and a warm action ensued, the Swiftsure still in vain trying to get to leeward of them, and escape. At half-past four, p. m. the Jean Bart and Constitution, of seventy-four guns each, closed fast. The Indivisible on her larboard bow, and the Dix-Août on her larboard quarter, were soon warmly engaged. "Our fore-yard and foretopsail-yard were shot away, all our running, and part of our standing rigging cut to pieces, the fore-mast, mizzen-mast, and main-yard badly wounded, the deck lumbered with wreck and sails, all hope of succour cut off. I thought further resistance, in our crippled state, would be exposing the lives of valuable men without advantage. I ordered his majesty's colours to be struck, after *an action of one hour and five minutes*." The ship was obliged to be taken in tow, and, with all haste made to repair her, it was six days before she could be got under sail.—*Translator*.

opening of which is towards the south. On one of the sides of this bay stands Algesiras, and on the other Gibraltar; in such a manner that Algesiras and Gibraltar are opposite to each other, at about four thousand fathoms distance, or about a league and half. From Algesiras all that passes at Gibraltar may be distinctly seen with a common telescope. There was not a single English vessel lying in the bay; but the English rear-admiral, Saumarez, was not far off, as he was watching the port of Cadiz, with seven sail, where there were at that moment several naval squadrons, French and Spanish. Advertised of what had occurred, he hastened to avail himself of the opportunity of destroying the squadron of Linois, because he was able to oppose his seven vessels to three; he had detached one, the Superb, to watch the mouth of the Guadalquiver; he made the signal for her to join him, but the weather being unfavourable, he sailed for Algesiras with only six.

Admiral Linois, on his side, had received notice of his danger from the Spanish authorities; and therefore had recourse to all the precautions which the nature of the circumstances permitted him to take. On the side of Algesiras, in the bay of that name, situated as has already been said, right over against Gibraltar, the coast appears rather a roadstead than a port. It consists of a shore with scarcely any projection; but running quite straight, from south to north, without any point or shelter for vessels. At the two extremities of the anchorage alone, there were two batteries; the one to the north of Algesiras, on an elevated spot upon the shore, was known under the name of the battery of St. Jago. The other battery, to the south of Algesiras, was on an island, called Isla Verde. The battery of St. Jago was mounted with five eighteen-pounders, and that of the Isla Verde with seven eighteens. This was no great help; more particularly because of the negligence of the Spaniards, who had left all the forts on their coasts destitute of ammunition and artillery-men. Nevertheless, admiral Linois placed himself in communication with the local authorities, who did the best they were able to succour the French. The admiral ranged his three ships and his frigate along the shore, supporting the extremities of his short line by the two batteries of St. Jago and the Isla Verde. The Formidable was placed first to the north, supported by the St. Jago battery; next was the Desaix; in the centre and southernmost was the Indomptable, towards the battery on the Isla Verde. Between the Isla Verde and the Desaix, the Muiron frigate was stationed; a number of Spanish gun-boats were intermingled with the French ships.

On the 6th of July, 1801, or 17 Messidor, year IX, about seven o'clock in the morning, rear-admiral Saumarez, coming from Cadiz with the wind west-north-west, approached the bay of Algesiras, doubled Cape Carnero, entered the bay, and bore towards the line of the French anchorage. The wind, which was not favourable to the English vessels, separated them one from the other, and fortunately did not permit them to act together in the way most desirable. The Venerable, which took the lead, dropped astern, and the Pompée took her place, running along the whole French line, passing under the battery of the Isla Verde, the Muiron frigate, the Indomptable, the Desaix, and Formidable, giving each of them her broadsides, and taking up her station within musket-shot of the Formidable, bearing the flag of admiral Linois. An obstinate action took place between these two vessels almost within point-blank distance. The Venerable, unable to beat up to her place in the line, still endeavoured to assist the Pompée. The Audacious, the third of the English ships, destined to attack the Desaix, could not fetch so high, dropping anchor before the Indomptable, and commenced a heavy cannonade against that ship. The Cæsar and Spencer, the fourth and fifth English ships, were one of them behind and the other forced into the bottom of the bay by the wind, which was blowing from the west to the east. Lastly, the sixth, the Hannibal, was driven at first towards Gibraltar; but after much manœuvring to approach Algesiras, endeavoured to turn the flag-ship, the Formidable, and so get between her and the land. The engagement, with such ships as could come up, was very obstinate. In order not to drift towards Gibraltar from Algesiras, the English cast anchor. The French admiral, in the Formidable, had two enemies to fight, the Pompée and the Venerable, and would soon have had a third, if the Hannibal had succeeded in getting between her and the shore [1]. The captain of the Formidable, the gallant Lalonde, was killed by a cannon-shot. The action continued with great spirit amid cries of "The republic for ever! Long live the first consul!" Admiral Linois, who was on board the Formidable, brought the broadside of that ship to bear upon the Pompée, at a lucky moment, when she presented only her bow to him, and was successful in raking, dismasting, and very near disabling her. Taking advantage of a change of the breeze at the moment, which had veered round to the east, and blew upon Algesiras, he made the signal to his captains to cut their cables and suffer their ships to run aground, so as to prevent the English from passing between the vessels and the shore, and placing the French between two fires, as Nelson did at the battle of Aboukir. This grounding was attended with no inconvenience to the French ships, as it was ebb tide, and they were sure to be got off again at high water. The order given at the proper moment saved the squadron. The Formidable, after having dismantled the Pompée, took the ground without any shock of moment; for the wind, as it had changed its direction, had died away. In avoiding the danger by which she was threatened from the Hannibal, the Formidable gained, in respect to that ship, a most advantageous position. Moreover, the Hannibal in manœuvring had got aground herself and remained immovable under the fire of the Formidable, and the battery of St. Jago. In this perilous situation the Hannibal made every effort to get off; but as the tide ebbed she became irremediably fixed in

[1] On the trial of captain Ferris, by a court-martial, for the loss of his ship, it was deposed that he was endeavouring to take up a position to rake the Formidable, when the Hannibal grounded. He had made no attempt to get between the Formidable and the shore, and thus expose himself so close to the fire of the batteries, of the Formidable, and even of the British ship the Pompée, which lay outside the Formidable, the shot of which must have reached him. Captain Ferris was most honourably acquitted.—*Translator.*

her position, and received a tremendous discharge of artillery, as well from the shore as from the Formidable, and from the Spanish gun-boats. She sunk one or two of the gun-boats; but the fire she returned was not equal to that which was poured into her. Rear-admiral Linois, not thinking that the battery of St. Jago was well served, disembarked general Devaux with a detachment of French troops which he had on board[1]. The fire of this battery was then redoubled, and the Hannibal was overcome. But a new adversary completed her defeat. The second French ship, the Desaix, which was near the Formidable, in obeying the order to run on shore, and executing the order but slowly, in consequence of the slight breeze, thus found herself somewhat out of the line, and equally in reach of the Hannibal and Pompée, which the Formidable, until her going on shore, had covered from her fire. The Desaix, profiting by her new position, poured in a first broadside, and so handled the Pompée as to oblige her to strike her colours. The Desaix then directed her guns upon the Hannibal. The balls grazing the sides of the Formidable, made dreadful havoc on board the Hannibal, which being no longer able to sustain she struck her flag. Thus were two English vessels out of six forced to surrender. The four others, by dint of manœuvring, got into line once more, near enough to engage the Desaix and Indomptable. The Desaix, before she went on shore, had resisted them; while the Indomptable and the Muiron frigate, in going slowly towards the shore, had replied with a well-directed fire. These two last vessels had placed themselves under the bottom of the Isla Verde, the guns of which were worked by French soldiers who had been landed for the purpose.

The action lasted for several hours with great fierceness. Admiral Saumarez, having lost two ships out of six, and having no hope of any result from the action, for he could not get closer to the French without running the risk of grounding, as they did, hoisted the signal for retreat, leaving the French in the possession of the Hannibal, but determined to carry off the Pompée, which, quite dismasted, lay like a hulk on the scene of action. Admiral Saumarez, having sent to Gibraltar for boats, towed away the hull of the Pompée, which the French vessels, being on shore, could not prevent. The Hannibal remained a prize.

Such was the battle of Algesiras, in which three French vessels fought six English, destroyed two, and kept one as their prize. The French were filled with joy, although they had sustained a severe loss. Captain Lalonde, of the Formidable was killed; captain Moncousu, of the Indomptable, also perished gloriously. Upwards of two hundred men were killed, and three hundred wounded; in all, five hundred officers and men out of two thousand in the squadron. But the English had nine hundred men struck down by the French fire; and their ships completely riddled[2].

However glorious this action was, the business was not yet completed. It was urgently necessary, under the injury which the French ships had sustained, to withdraw from the anchorage of Algesiras. Admiral Saumarez was enraged, and swearing to avenge himself as soon as Linois left his anchorage to proceed to Cadiz, made great preparations. He employed all the vast resources of the port of Gibraltar to get his squadron ready, and even prepared fire-ships to burn the French vessels if he could not draw them out to sea. Admiral Linois had nothing wherewith to repair his damages, than such supplies as Algesiras could furnish, which were next to nothing. The arsenal of Cadiz, it is true, was close by; but it was no easy matter to bring what was wanted by sea, on account of the English, nor by land from the difficulty of transport; yet the yards of the French vessels were carried away, and some of their masts were gone, or otherwise much injured. Hardly any thing necessary for dressing the wounded could be obtained, and the French consuls in the ports near were obliged to send surgeons and medicines by post overland to them.

There happened to be at this moment in the harbour of Cadiz, just arrived from Ferrol, a Spanish squadron, besides the six ships given to France, and hastily equipped by admiral Dumanoir. The strength of these two divisions in regard to number was, no doubt, great enough; but the Spanish navy, always worthy by its bravery of the illustrious nation to which it appertains, had partaken of the general negligence. The squadron of admiral Dumanoir was ill-manned with seamen of all kinds, and was not capable of inspiring much confidence. None of the ships which composed it equalled those of Linois' division, exercised by long cruises, and elevated by its recent victory.

It was necessary to make the most urgent appeals to induce admiral Mazzaredo, the Spanish commander at Cadiz, ill disposed towards the French, to afford aid to admiral Linois. On the 9th of June, or 20th Messidor, he detached to Algesiras admiral Moreno, an excellent officer, full of courage, and well experienced, with five Spanish ships from Ferrol, one of the six vessels which Spain had given to France, and three frigates. The squadron took with it all of which Linois stood in need, and reached in one day the anchorage at Algesiras.

They worked day and night in repairing the three vessels which had fought so glorious a battle. They were all three again afloat on the first high water. Their rigging was refitted in the quickest mode possible. Topmasts were made for them out of the

[1] Here the author is at variance with the first consul's account of the affair in the *Moniteur*, which stated that Devaux and his troops were landed *in the night*,—the night, it is to be presumed, before the action; the natural course, after the French admiral had found the deficiency of defensive means in possession of the Spaniards. The Pompée never struck her flag. Her rigging was much cut up by the well-directed fire from the batteries, and she was partly dismasted, or her masts so injured, that it became necessary to replace them.—*Translator.*

[2] Our author's faith is of a most conflicting character, as a naval historian, to give such returns as these. The French must have well known the loss of the Hannibal, having got her as a prize; and she lost thrice any other English ship She had 75 killed and 68 wounded; the Audacious, 8 killed and 32 wounded; the Venerable, 8 killed and 25 wounded; the Spencer, 6 killed and 27 wounded; the Cæsar, 8 killed and 34 wounded; the Pompée, 15 killed and 69 wounded. Total, 375.—*Translator.*

gallant-masts, and on the 12th they were ready for sea. They bestowed the same care upon the English prize, the Hannibal, which was also to be taken to Cadiz.

On the morning of the 12th the combined squadron put to sea with the wind east-north-east, which carried it out of the bay of Algesiras into the straits. The squadron sailed in order of battle, the two largest of the Spanish vessels, the San Carlos and San Hermenegilda, each of one hundred and twelve guns, bringing up the rear. The two admirals, after the Spanish custom, were in a frigate, the Sabina. At nightfall the wind fell. They would not sail back to the anchorage at Algesiras, because it was a dangerous position to occupy in presence of an enemy's squadron, and the more, as it was feared the English squadron might be reinforced, which it was well known they expected. It was determined to leave the Hannibal behind, because she made no way although towed by the Indienne frigate, and she was sent back to the anchorage at Algesiras. The squadron then lay to in the hope that during the night the wind might rise. Admiral Saumarez, on his side, had ordered his squadron to set sail. He had but four vessels, for he had lost the Hannibal, and the Pompée was unfit for service. But he was now joined by the Superb, which made his division five vessels, besides many frigates, and some light vessels filled with combustibles[1]. He had carried his malice so far as to put on board his ships furnaces for heating red-hot shot. Though he had but five ships of the line, and the allies nine, he determined to brave them to make up for his humiliating check at Alge-

[1] Sir James Saumarez had with him only the Cæsar 80, Spencer 74, Audacious 74, Venerable 74, and Superb 74; total, 376 guns. He had also the Thames frigate. The rigging of the Pompée was not yet completed. He had no vessels with combustibles, no furnaces for red-hot shot,—a thing impossible to be used on board any ship; this report was invented by the French. They had nine sail of the line, viz. the San Carlos 112, San Hermenegilda 112, San Fernando 84, Argonauto 80, San Augustino 74 (Spanish); the Formidable 84, Indomptable 84, Desaix 74, St. Antoine 74 (French): total, 778 guns; four frigates, and the Wanton lugger of 12 guns. The French, our author says, were elated with victory, and yet they dared not come about and engage Saumarez. The British came up with the Franco-Spanish squadron in the evening. The Superb was the headmost ship, followed closely by the Cæsar; the other British ships were still behind. The Superb attacked the San Carlos about eleven o'clock, others of the allied vessels firing on the Superb, and striking each other. The Superb passed on, and engaged the St. Antoine, a French 74, which very quickly hauled down the tricolored flag; the Superb having only fifteen men wounded in the action. In the meanwhile the Cæsar came up to the San Carlos, which the Superb left to her care, and had scarcely opened her guns when it was seen that the Spanish vessel was on fire; the Cæsar at once ceased firing. In a short time the San Carlos was in a blaze, and the flames communicating to the San Hermenegilda, which was near and to leeward of the San Carlos, she took fire too, and both blew up. A very few men only were saved in a boat, and got on board the Superb. The other three British ships were by this time come up; but it began to blow hard, and in the morning the Venerable 74 and Thames frigate were the only ships seen ahead of the Cæsar, together with one of the French ships, the rest having made their escape into Cadiz. The Venerable was the only British ship near enough to chase the Formidable with a chance of success. The imaginative affair about combustibles and red-hot shot, reported by M. Thiers, is best answered by the following communication, for which history is indebted to the present lord Saumarez. In a letter dated "Cheltenham, May 19th, 1845," lord Saumarez, after denying that the Pompée ever struck, or any thing of the kind, answers the slander about the red-hot shot by stating that his father, then sir James Saumarez, wrote to the Spanish naval commander at Cadiz, contradicting in the fullest way the malignant charge. Admiral Mazzaredo replied like an honourable man and high-minded officer:—

"Isle of Leon, August 17, 1801.

"Esteemed Sir—The reports which have been current that the burning of the two royal ships on the night of the 12th and 13th of July, arose from the use of red-hot balls which were fired at them, have existed only among the ignorant public, and have not received credit from any persons of condition, who well know the manner of combating in the British navy. At the same time, they give the greatest credit to the assertion of your excellency, that nothing could be more foreign from the truth, from the characteristic humanity of the British nation, and from what I have myself experienced of the particular conduct of your excellency. I will avail myself of every occasion to assure your excellency of the esteem and consideration which I profess for your person.

"God grant you may live a thousand years.

"Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) "Joseph Mazzaredo.

"To his excellency rear-admiral Saumarez."

The author's ignorance of naval matters, and his reliance upon unfounded statements in consequence, is very unfortunate. A friend to the freedom of the press, M. Thiers has himself shown (see p. 212) that the government dictated to the *Moniteur* all that was to be said on military and naval affairs. As to England, where the liberty of the press flourished, the false statements of naval and military commanders—any thing wrong that came before the notice of those serving under them—would be sure to reach home, and they would be corrected in the newspapers A false return of killed or wounded on board ship, for example, would be detected and told. In France the *Moniteur* was the unchallenged authority for every thing, true or false, that could be made to serve an end. It will not be amiss to see how the first consul dictated the affair of Algesiras, and the flight into Cadiz. The following is the government report from the *Moniteur*, carrying fraud upon its face. It was read at the theatres, and made Paris alive with joy:—

"On the 4th of July rear-admiral Linois had anchored in the Bay of Algesiras, expecting to be attacked the next morning. In the night he landed the general of brigade Devaux, with a part of the troops, to man the batteries of the harbour. On the 5th, at 8 a. m., the cannonade commenced against the six English ships, which came without delay, and brought their broadsides to bear within gun-shot of the French ships; the battle then began to be warm. The two squadrons appeared to be equally animated with the desire of conquering. If the French squadron had some advantage from its position, the English had double the force, and *several ninety-gun ships*. The Hannibal 74 placed herself between the French squadron and the land. It was half-past eleven; this was the decisive moment. For two hours the Formidable, on board of which rear-admiral Linois was, made head against three English ships. One of the ships of the English squadron, which was stationed with her broadside to one of the French ships, *struck her flag* at three-quarters past eleven. An instant after, the Hannibal, exposed to the fire of the batteries and of three French ships, which poured broadsides upon her *from both sides (!)*, also struck her flag. At half-past twelve the English squadron *cut their cables*, and made sail. The Hannibal was towed by the Formidable. Of her crew of six hundred, *three hundred were killed*. The first English ship of the line which had *struck her flag* was disengaged by a great quantity of gun-boats and other embarkations sent from Gibraltar. The battle covers the French with glory, and proves what they

siras, and save himself from the much dreaded censure of the English admiralty. He followed closely the Franco-Spanish squadron, waiting for the first favourable moment to fall upon the rear ships with his refitted vessels.

Towards the middle of the night the wind blew fresh, and the combined squadron made sail again for Cadiz. The order of sailing was a little changed. The rear division of the fleet was formed of three ships in a single line, the San Carlos to the right, the San Hermenegildo in the middle, and the St. Antoine, a seventy-four, the last a French ship, on the left. They sailed at but a small distance from each other. The darkness of the night was very great. Admiral Saumarez ordered the Superb, a good sailer, to make all haste and attack the French rear ships. The Superb soon came up to the Franco-Spanish squadron. She had extinguished her lights, that she might be less liable to be perceived, keeping a little astern of the San Carlos, but on one side, she gave that ship the whole of her broadside; then repeating it without any interval, a second and a third time, firing red-hot shot. The flames instantly took the San Carlos. The Superb perceiving this remained astern, taking in sail. The San Carlos, a prey to the flames, ill-managed in the confusion, went to leeward, and in place of remaining in the line fell astern of two of her neighbours. She fired in all directions; her balls reached the San Hermenegildo, the crew of which taking her for the English leading vessel, poured all her fire into their own ship. Then a fearful mistake was committed by the two Spanish crews taking each other for enemies. They both ran up alongside each other, so close as to entangle their rigging, and engaged in an obstinate contest. The fire, become more violent on board the San Carlos, communicated itself soon to the San Hermenegildo, and the two vessels in that state continued to cannonade each other with fury. The opposing squadrons were equally ignorant in the darkness of the night as to what was proceeding around them, and, except the Superb, that must have known of the fatal error, because she had caused it, no vessel dared to approach another, not knowing which was Spanish or which English, which they ought to assist or attack. The St. Antoine, a French ship, had moved away from the dangerous neighbourhood. The mass of flame soon became immense, and cast a dull light over the whole surface of the sea. It would seem as if the fatal illusion which armed these brave Spaniards against each other was now dissipated, though too late. The San Carlos blew up with a terrible explosion, and in a few minutes afterwards the San Hermenegildo followed, and struck terror into the two squadrons, that were utterly ignorant to what vessels the disaster had occurred.

The Superb, perceiving the St. Antoine separated from the others, bore up, and boldly attacked her. This vessel, but recently fitted out, defended herself without that coolness and order which are indispensable to the movement of those vast engines of war. She suffered most severely; and two new adversaries, the Cæsar and Venerable, coming up at the moment, made her defeat inevitable. She struck her flag after being a complete wreck.

Admiral Saumarez was thus cruelly avenged without much glory to himself, but with a great loss to the Spanish navy. The two admirals, Linois and Moreno, on board the Sabina, kept themselves as near as possible to this frightful scene, but were unable to distinguish, in the darkness, what was passing, or to give an order. At break of day, they found themselves not far from Cadiz, with their squadron rallied, but lessened by three ships, the San Hermenegildo and San Carlos, which were blown up, and the St. Antoine, which had been captured.

A fourth vessel of the combined squadron remained in the rear, the Formidable, admiral Linois' vessel, which was covered with glory in the battle of Algesiras, and which still felt the effects of that engagement. Compelled to carry diminished sail in consequence of the loss of her masts, and sailing slowly, being near two of the burning vessels, and dreading the fatal mistakes of the night, she had kept in the rear, not believing it in her power to be of use to any of the vessels in action. It was thus, that in the morning she found herself alone, surrounded by the English, and attacked by a frigate and three vessels. Admiral Linois, having gone on board the Sabina, had left the command to one of his officers, captain Troude, of the Formidable. This able and valiant officer, judging with rare presence of mind, that if he tried to escape by making sail, he should be overtaken by vessels that sailed better than his own, resolved to find his safety in a skilful manœuvre, and in a courageous engagement. His crew shared in his feelings, not one of them would consent to the loss of the laurels of Algesiras. They were old sailors, well trained by long service at sea, and well accustomed to fighting, a thing much more necessary at sea than on land. The worthy captain Troude did not wait until his enemies, who pursued him, should be united against the Formidable; he bore down upon that which was nearest, namely, the Thames frigate, and poured such a terrible fire into her that he soon sickened her of the unequal contest. The Venerable, an English seventy-four, was coming up at full sail, the captain, thinking he was superior to her, his ship carrying eighty guns, waited until she came up, while the two other English vessels endeavoured to gain the advantage of her upon the wind, and cut her off from entering Cadiz. Ably manœuvring, and making his redoubtable broadside, thick with guns, to bear upon the unarmed bow of the Venerable, joining to his superior weight of metal, sent home with full effect, he riddled her with his shot, first struck down one mast, and then another, then a third, and made a mere hulk of her, lodging many shot between wind and water, which put her in danger of sinking. The unfortunate ship, horribly mauled, excited the alarm of the rest of the English squadron. The Thames frigate brought her help, and the two other English vessels, which had endeavoured to place themselves between Cadiz and the Formidable, soon came about. They were desirous of

can do. Rear-admiral Linois *is at Cadiz with the Hannibal, to repair it.*"

Not a syllable of the flight to Cadiz of the nine sail from five, nor of the St. Antoine's loss, nor of the burning of the Spanish ships, is here told!—*Translator.*

saving the crew of the Venerable, which they were afraid would go down, and, at the same time, of overwhelming the French ship, which made so noble a resistance. The latter, confident in his seamanship and his good fortune, fired successively into them the most rapid and well-directed broadsides; he discouraged them, and sent them off to the succour of the Venerable, ready to turn bottom upwards, if they did not come to her assistance speedily[1].

The brave captain Troude having disembarrassed himself of his numerous foes, sailed triumphantly into Cadiz. A part of the Spanish population, attracted by the cannonade and the explosions during the night, had gone down to the shore. They had seen the danger and triumph of the French vessel, and in spite of the sorrow naturally felt, for the loss of the two Spanish vessels was well known, they sent forth the most joyous acclamations at seeing the Formidable enter the harbour victorious.

The English could not deny that the glory of these engagements was upon the French side. If the French had lost one vessel, and the Spaniards two, the English had left one vessel in our power, and had had two so ill treated that they were quite unfit for further service. The battle of Algesiras and the return of the Formidable were among the number of the finest feats known to the French naval history. But the Spaniards were downcast; although admiral Moreno had behaved well, they were not indemnified by a brilliant action for the loss of the San Carlos and San Hermenegildo.

Still the events in Portugal were of some consolation to them. We left the prince of the peace preparing to commence hostilities against Portugal, at the head of the combined forces of the two nations, in the design, long ago explained, of influencing the negotiations that were carrying on in London.

According to the plan agreed upon, the Spaniards were to operate on the left of the Tagus, and the French upon the right. Thirty thousand Spaniards were assembled before Badajoz, on the frontier of Alentejo; fifteen thousand French were marching by way of Salamanca upon Tras-os-Montes. Thanks to the speedy efforts made, and to the loans advanced by the clergy, as well as the general sacrifices offered from all branches of the public service, provision was made for the equipment of thirty thousand Spaniards. But the train of artillery was very backward. The prince of the peace, calculating with reason upon the moral effect of the union between the French and Spaniards, was eager to proceed to hostilities at once, being anxious to gather his first laurels. He wanted to carry away all the honours of the campaign, and keep the French as a reserve, upon whom he could fall back in case of his meeting with a reverse. The French could well afford to leave the prince the pleasure of such a gratification. The French at that moment were not seeking for glory, but only to bring about useful results; and these results consisted in occupying one or two provinces of Portugal, in order to have new securities against England. Easy as the war appeared to be in regard to its object, there was still a danger to be feared, and that was lest it might become national. The hatred of the Portuguese against the Spaniards might have produced the most unpleasant results, if the approach of the French, placed a few marches in their rear, had not dissipated these dawning desires at resistance. The prince of the peace hastened to pass the frontier, and to attack the fortified places in Portugal, with field artillery in place of a battering train. He occupied Olivença and Jurumenha without difficulty. But the garrisons of Elvas and Campo-Mayor, shut themselves up and made a show of defence. The prince of the peace ordered those places to be invested, and during the interval marched forth to meet the Portuguese army, commanded by the duke d'Alafoens. The Portuguese made no resistance, and fled towards the Tagus. The blockaded towns opened their gates. Campo-Mayor surrendered; and the siege of Elvas was undertaken in a regular manner, a park of artillery having arrived from Seville. The prince of the peace followed the enemy triumphantly, traversing rapidly Azumar, Alegrete, Portalegre, Castello de Vide, Flor de Rosa, and arrived at last on the Tagus, behind which the Portuguese had hastened to seek a refuge. He succeeded in making himself master of nearly the whole province of Alentejo. The French had not yet passed the frontier of Portugal, and it was plain enough, that if the Spaniards succeeded alone in obtaining such results, the Spaniards and the French united must, in a few days, be masters both of Lisbon and Oporto. The court of Portugal, which had always refused to believe that an attack upon that country was seriously meditated, now saw that it had taken place, and hastened to tender its submission, and sent M. Pinto de Souza to the Spanish head quarters, to accept any conditions which it pleased the two combined armies to impose upon it. The prince of the peace, desiring that his master and mistress should be witnesses of his glory, influenced the king and queen of Spain to

[1] The fact was as follows. The Venerable 74, at daybreak, found herself a great way ahead of the English squadron, and approaching a ship the last of the combined nine line of battle ships and frigates not destroyed, taken, or escaped into Cadiz. She gave chase. Captain Hood said in his letter to Sir James Saumarez, "I could perceive her to be an 80-gun ship. At half-past 7 a. m., being within point-blank shot, the enemy commenced firing his *stern chase-guns*, which I did not return, for fear of retarding our progress, until light and baffling airs threw the two ships broadside to, within musket-shot, when a steady and warm conflict was kept up for an hour and a half, and we had closed within pistol-shot, the enemy principally directing his fire at our masts and rigging. I had at this time the misfortune to see the main-mast go overboard, and fore and mizzen-mast nearly in the same state," &c. The Venerable now got on shore, the affair being close in land, near the castle of Santè Petrè, and the Formidable made her escape. So that they were the stern chase-guns of the Formidable that were brought to bear on the Venerable's bows, as she endeavoured to get away, not her redoubtable broadside. The Thames frigate was never hurt, man or timber, by the Formidable; and the well-directed broadsides given as a caution to the other two English line of battle ships, were fired in the air, if fired at all, for the other English vessels were not come up within range. Our author seems ill informed in matters connected with maritime affairs, or he would have asked himself—as those who read his work must do—why, with nine powerful line of battle ships, and four fine frigates, Linois did not engage and capture five English ships of inferior rates, and one frigate; this would be the sensible mode of such a victorious commander as Linois in treating with an enemy not half as strong.—*Translator.*

come to Badajoz to distribute rewards to the army, and to hold there a species of congress. Thus this court, once so great and haughty, was dishonoured by a dissolute queen, and by an incapable but all powerful favourite, who was endeavouring to indulge in the illusion that he was directing the weightiest affairs. Lucien Bonaparte had followed the king and queen to Badajoz. Such were the events that had occurred up to the end of June or beginning of July.

The battles of Algesiras and Cadiz, which were achievements calculated to give confidence to the French navy, the short campaign in Portugal, which proved the decisive influence of the first consul in the peninsula, and the power that he possessed of treating Portugal like Naples, Tuscany, or Holland, compensated, up to a certain point, for the events so far known relative to Egypt. Neither the battle of Canopus, nor the capitulation signed at Cairo, nor the inevitable capitulation of Alexandria, had then been heard of. News was not at that time conveyed by sea with the same rapidity that it is at present. It was a month, and sometimes more, sometimes less, before an event taking place in the Nile was known at Marseilles. The only fact heard respecting Egypt, was the landing of the English, and the first battle on the plains of Alexandria; no notion could then be formed of what had afterwards occurred, and the ultimate termination of the struggle was still involved in doubt. The weight of France in the negotiations depending had in no way diminished; on the contrary, it was increased by the influence which day by day she acquired in Europe.

The treaty of Lunéville produced its inevitable consequences. Austria, disarmed and become powerless in the eyes of other countries, left France free to pursue her own objects. Russia, since the death of Paul I., and the accession of Alexander, was not disposed to act energetically against England, it is true, but she was not inclined, upon the other hand, to resist the objects of France in the west. Therefore the first consul took no pains to conceal his views. He determined to convert Piedmont into a French department, without troubling himself about the remonstrances of the Russian negotiators. He had declared that as to Naples, the treaty of Florence should remain the rule by which affairs with that country should be regulated. Genoa had submitted her constitution to him, that it might receive certain alterations, which were calculated to strengthen the executive authority. The Cisalpine republic, composed of Lombardy, the duchy of Modena, and the Legations, so constituted for the first time by the treaty of Campo-Formio, and a second time by the treaty of Lunéville, was now newly organized into an allied state, dependent upon France. Holland, after the example of Liguria, submitted her constitution to the first consul, in order that more strength might be given to the government, a species of reform, which was at that time effected in all the republics that sprung from that of France. Lastly, the minor negotiators, who not long before sought support from M. Kalitcheff, the arrogant minister of Paul I., were now sorry they had sought his protection, and demanded only of the first consul the favour of his ameliorating their condition. More particularly the representatives of the German princes, showed in this regard the most pressing eagerness. The treaty of Lunéville had arranged the secularization of the ecclesiastical estates, and their division among the hereditary princes. The ambition of all was kept awake to their future participations. The great as well as the smaller powers, each aspired to obtain for itself the most advantageous portions. Austria and Prussia, although they had lost little on the left bank of the Rhine, wished to participate in the promised indemnities. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, the house of Orange, all besieged the new chief of France with their solicitations; because, being the principal party to the treaty of Lunéville, he would have the greatest influence in the execution of that treaty. Prussia herself, represented in Paris by M. Lucchesini, did not disdain to descend to the part of a solicitor, and to give a higher character to the first consul by the meanness of her solicitations. Therefore, although the six months passed since the treaty of Lunéville had been distinguished by reverses in Egypt, it was true but imperfectly known in Europe, the ascendancy of the French government had supported itself, and time had only rendered that government more clear and effective. This concatenation of circumstances could not but have its influence upon the negotiations which had been left to languish for a moment, but which were about to be renewed, as if by common consent, with increased activity, through a singular conformity of ideas in the two governments. The first consul, upon learning the past proceedings of Menou, had looked upon Egypt as being lost, and he wished, before that result happened, which he clearly foresaw, to sign the treaty of peace in London. The English ministers, incapable of seeing, as clearly as he did, the termination of these events, and not less fearing some stroke of vigour on the part of the Egyptian army, so renowned for its valour, were desirous of profiting, by the first appearance of success, to push forward the treaty, in such a manner, that as both had been at one time inclined to temporize, so they were now equally inclined to conclude the negotiation.

But before again entering anew into the labyrinths of this great negotiation, wherein the most important interests of the universe were about to become the subjects of discussion, an event must be narrated which at the same moment occupied the attention of Paris, and completed the singularity of the spectacle which the consular government of France presented to the world.

The infants of Parma, destined to reign over Tuscany, quitted Madrid at the same time that the royal family of Spain left that city for Badajoz, and they had just reached the frontiers of the Pyrenees. The first consul considered it was of great importance that they should visit Paris before they went to Florence to take possession of the new throne of Etruria. All sorts of contrasts were agreeable to the lively and expanded imagination of Bonaparte. He greatly enjoyed this truly Roman scene, a king formed by himself with his own republican hands; he also liked to show that he had no apprehensions from the presence of a Bourbon, and that his own glory placed him above all comparison with the ancient dynasty in the place of which he stood. He enjoyed also in the

sight of all the world, even in Paris, so recently the scene of a sanguinary revolution, the display of a pomp and an elegance worthy of monarchs. All this must lead still further to an observation of the sudden change which had been operated in France under his restorative government.

The minute and exact foresight which he knew so well how to apply to a great military operation, he did not disdain to employ in these magnificent pageantries, in which he himself and his glory were to be displayed. He took the trouble to regulate the smallest details, to provide every thing applicable to the occasion, to arrange every one in his proper place; since all this was required to be done in a state of social order entirely new, created out of the wrecks of a world destroyed. Every thing to be re-edified again, even to matters of etiquette, of which there must be some forms even in a republic.

The three consuls deliberated for a long while upon the mode in which the king and queen of Etruria should be received in France, and what ceremonies should be observed towards them. In order to obviate many difficulties, it was agreed they should be received under the assumed titles of the count and countess of Livorno, and that they should be treated as guests of distinction, in the same way as had been done in the last century in regard to the young czar, afterwards Paul I., and the emperor of Austria Joseph II.; thus by means of an incognito, there was avoided the embarrassment to which the official rank of a king and queen would have given birth. Orders, consonant with this arrangement, were given, in consequence, over all the route of the expected personages, to the civil and military authorities in the departments.

Novelty delights the people of every age. This was a novelty, and one of the most surprising, to see a king and a queen, after twelve years of a revolution, which had overturned and threatened so many thrones; it was one, more particularly, that highly flattered the French people, because this king and queen were the fruit of their victories. Every where the infants were received under the liveliest acclamations; with infinite regard and respect. No disagreeable circumstance on their journey led them to feel that they travelled in a country that just before had been wholly convulsed. The royalists, who were in no way flattered by this monarchical piece of workmanship of the French revolution, were the only individuals who seized upon the opportunity to exhibit their malignity. At the theatre of Bordeaux they shouted loudly, with affected emphasis, "Long live the king!" and they were answered by the cry of "Down with kings!"

The first consul himself moderated, by letters from his own cabinet, the over excessive zeal of some of his prefects, because he did not wish too much noise to be made about the appearance of the royal couple. They arrived in Paris in June, to remain an entire month; and they were to take up their residence at the mansion of the Spanish ambassador. The first consul, although but the simple temporary magistrate of the republic, represented the French people; before this prerogative, all the privileges of the blood-royal gave way. It was agreed, that these two young sovereigns, making the first consul acquainted with their arrival, should visit him, and that he should return the visit on the following day. The second and third consuls, who could not be said to be, to the same extent, the representatives of France, were to pay the first visit to the infanta. Thus, with respect to the last, the honours of birth and rank were fully established. On the day following that of their arrival, the count and countess of Livorno were conducted to Malmaison by count Azara, the Spanish ambassador. The first consul received them at the head of that exclusively military household which he had established there. The count of Livorno, feeling a little youthful embarrassment, flung himself into the first consul's arms like a child, who, in consequence, embraced him with warmth. He treated the young couple with parental kindness and the most delicate attention, at the same time supporting all that superiority which belonged to difference of years and to his own power and glory. On the following day, the first consul returned the visit at the hotel of the ambassador. The consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, fulfilled, on their parts, the duties prescribed, and obtained from the young princes the attentions to which they were entitled.

It was arranged that the presentation of the young princes, by the first consul, to the people, should take place at the opera. On the day appointed for that purpose the first consul was indisposed. The consul Cambacérès supplied his place, and attended the royal infants to the opera. On entering the consuls' box, he took the young count of Livorno by the hand, and presented him to the audience, who answered by unanimous acclamations, wholly unmingled with any thing malicious or offensive. Still the idle part of the public, accustomed to give out their own wise interpretations to the commonest events, put a hundred different constructions upon the journey of these princes. Those who were only for showing their wit upon the subject, declared that Cambacérès had just made a present of the Bourbons to France. The royalists, who were obstinate in their expectations, that Bonaparte would do that which he neither could nor would effect, declared that all this was, upon his part, only a mode of preparing the public mind for a return to the old dynasty. The republicans, on the other side, asserted that by such royal pageantry he was preparing France for the re-establishment of the monarchy, but only for his own benefit.

The ministers were ordered to be lavish of fêtes and entertainments to the royal visiters. Talleyrand did not require the hint to be given to him. Considered a model of good taste and elegance under the old régime, he was still better entitled to that claim under the new. He gave, at his château of Neuilly, an entertainment of a most magnificent character, at which all the best society of France attended, the names of many of whom had long ceased to be announced in the circles of the capital. When night came on, in the midst of a most brilliant illumination, the city of Florence appeared all at once, represented with uncommon skill. The Tuscans were seen dancing and singing in the celebrated plaza of the Palazzo Vecchio, and offering flowers to the young sovereigns, and garlands of triumph to the first consul. This

magnificent spectacle cost a large sum of money. It united the prodigality of the directory to the elegance of other times, and that decorum in manner, which a severe master laboured to impress upon revolutionary France. The minister at war imitated the minister for foreign affairs, and gave a military fête, in commemoration of the battle of Marengo. The minister of the interior and the second and third consuls received the royal visiters in a most magnificent manner; and for a whole month the capital bore the aspect of a continued rejoicing. The first consul did not wish the royal couple to be present at the republican ceremonies in the month of July, and he therefore made the necessary dispositions for their departure from Paris before the anniversary of the 14th of that month.

In the midst of these brilliant representations, the first consul attempted to give some advice to the royal couple, who were about to ascend the throne of Tuscany. But he was struck with the utter incapacity of the young prince, who, when at Malmaison, gave himself up, in the waiting-room of the aids-de-camp, to amusements that were scarcely worthy the most ignorant boy. The princess seemed to possess some intelligence, and to be attentive to the advice offered by the first consul. He accordingly judged very indifferently of the future career of these new sovereigns, who were thus designed to govern a part of Italy, and easily foresaw that he should be obliged to intermeddle too often in the affairs of their kingdom. "You see," said he, publicly enough to several members of the government; "you see what these princes are, sprung from old blood, and more particularly those who have been educated in southern courts. How can we trust them with the government of nations! No matter; we have done no harm in exhibiting to the French people this specimen of the Bourbons. They will be able to judge from them, whether the members of these ancient dynasties are up to the level of the difficulties connected with such an age as the present."

Every one who had seen the young prince had made the same observation as the first consul. General Clarke was given to the young couple, to act as their Mentor, under the title of the minister of France at the court of Etruria.

In the midst of such pressing occupations, amidst fêtes, which in themselves were almost public business, the great object of a maritime peace had not been neglected. The negotiations carrying on in London between lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto were become public. They were kept the less secret now, as both parties were more desirous of coming to a conclusion. As already observed, to the wish of temporizing had succeeded the desire of terminating the business; because the first consul augured ill of the events which were passing on the banks of the Nile, and the English government dreaded some unexpected exploit by the army of Egypt. The new English minister, more particularly, wished for peace, because it was the sole reason for his going into office. If the war should be continued, Pitt was much more fit than Addington to be at the helm of affairs. All the events which had occurred, whether in the north or the east, though they might have improved the position of England, were only viewed by the minister as so many means for the attainment of a peace, more advantageous, more easy to be justified in parliament, than from any increased desire for the peace itself. They regarded, on the contrary, the occasion as most favourable, and were desirous of not imitating the fault with which Mr. Pitt was reproached—of not treating prior to the battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden. The king of England, as already shown, had come round to pacific views, through esteem for the first consul, and, it is probable, a little anger against Pitt. The people, suffering from want, and fond of change, hoped to see, with the termination of the war, some amelioration of their existing condition. Reasonable people, without exception, found that ten years of sanguinary warfare was enough, and that an obstinate continuance of the war would only furnish France with an opportunity for still further aggrandizement. Besides, they were not free, in London, from all apprehension on the score of invasion, the preparations for which were visible in the ports of the channel. One only class of men in England, who were absorbed in great maritime speculations, and who had subscribed to the enormous loans of Pitt, seeing that peace, opening the seas to the flags of all nations, and to that of France more particularly, would take from them the monopoly of commerce, and put a stop to the great financial operations by which they had gained—these were little inclined to support the peaceful policy of Addington. They were all devoted to Pitt and his policy; they all encouraged a feeling for war when Pitt began to consider peace as necessary. But these rich speculators of the city were obliged to be silent before the cries of the people and of the farmers, and above all, before the unanimous opinion of the reasonable men of the country.

The English ministry, therefore, was resolved not only to negotiate, but to do so promptly, in order to be able to present the result of the negotiations at the approaching meeting of parliament in the autumn. They had concluded a treaty with Russia upon very advantageous conditions. England had only a simple question of maritime law to arrange with that court. She had made some concessions to the new emperor, and obtained some from Russia, which this young inexperienced prince, anxious to satisfy the party which had placed him upon the throne, and more anxious to give his attention tranquilly to the idea of an interior reform, had the weakness to suffer to be extorted from him. Of the four essential principles of maritime law Russia had abandoned two, and established two. By a convention signed on the 17th of June between count Panin, the vice-chancellor, and lord St. Helens, the following articles were agreed upon:—

First, neutrals might navigate freely between all ports in the world, even those of belligerent nations. They were able to import every thing according to usage except articles contraband of war. The definition of this contraband was decidedly favourable to Russian interests; inasmuch as grain and naval stores, formerly prohibited to neutral vessels, were not to be treated as contraband of war. This was of great consequence to Russia, which produces hemp, tar, pitch, iron, masts, and corn. Upon this point, one of the most

important in maritime law, Russia had defended the freedom of general commerce in defending the interests of her own.

Secondly, the flag was not to cover the goods, unless such goods had been acquired on account of, and thus become the property of a neutral trader. Thus coffee, coming from a French colony, was not to be seized if it had become Danish or Russian property. It is true, that in practice this reservation saved a part of the neutral commerce; but Russia sacrificed the first principle of maritime law—"the flag covers the merchandise;" and did not sustain the noble character which she had borne under Paul I. and Catharine. This protection of the feeble, which Russia was so ambitious to display upon the continent, she sadly abandoned upon the ocean.

Thirdly, the neutrals, although permitted to navigate freely, were not, according to usage, to enter a blockaded port, that is a port so *bonâ fide*, the blockade of which it would be really dangerous to force. On this head, the great principle of a real blockade was rigorously maintained.

Lastly, the right of search, the origin of so many disputes, and the cause of the formation of the last league in the north, was to be understood in a way little honourable to the neutral powers. Thus it had always been contended that merchant vessels convoyed by a ship of war of the state to which they belonged, that by its presence attested their national character, and, above all, there being nothing contraband on board, should not be visited. The dignity of the military flag did not, in fact, admit that the captain of a ship, perhaps an admiral, should be stopped by a privateer provided only with a simple letter of marque. The Russian cabinet thought to preserve the dignity of its flag by means of a distinction here. It was decided that the right to visit in relation to vessels under convoy, should not be exercised by all vessels indiscriminately, but solely by vessels of war. A privateer furnished only with a simple letter of marque, had not longer the right to stop and examine a convoy escorted by a ship of war. The right of search could only, therefore, be exercised by one equal upon another equal. There was no doubt that in this mode of proceeding some inconvenience was escaped, but the foundation of the principle was sacrificed. This was the more discreditable to the court of St. Petersburg, as it was the particular principle of the four in dispute for which Copenhagen had been bombarded three months before, and for which Paul I. had tried to stir up all Europe against England.

Russia had thus sacrificed two great principles of maritime law, and had gained two. But England, it must be acknowledged, had made concessions, and in her desire to make peace, had desisted from enforcing a part of the arrogant pretensions of Pitt. The Danes, the Swedes, and the Prussians were invited to give their assent to this convention.

Delivered from any anxiety about Russia, and having obtained a first success in Egypt, England desired to obtain for an amelioration of her situation, a more speedy peace with France. Lord Hawkesbury sent for M. Otto to the foreign-office, and authorized him to make to the first consul the following proposition:—Egypt is at this moment invaded by our troops; considerable reinforcements must soon join them; their success is very probable. The struggle is not over, we are ready to admit. Stay this effusion of blood; let us agree on both sides not to attempt the permanent occupation of Egypt, which we will mutually evacuate, and restore to the Porte.

To this proposition lord Hawkesbury added the right to keep Malta; because, he said, Malta was not to be evacuated by England, but in the event of the voluntary evacuation of Egypt by France. The abandonment of Egypt by France being no longer a voluntary concession upon her part, but a forced consequence of the events of the war, there was no longer any reason for England handing over Malta as an equivalent.

In the East Indies the English minister insisted upon Ceylon, but was content with that only. He offered to restore the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch, and beyond that the territories taken from Holland in South America—Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo. But he demanded a large island in the West Indies, Martinique or Trinidad, either the one or the other, as France might prefer.

Thus the definitive result of the ten years of war would be for England, independently of Hindostan, and the isle of Ceylon in the East Indies, the isle of Trinidad or Martinique in the Antilles or West Indies, and the isle of Malta in the Mediterranean. The French cabinet had, in this mode, to make a free grant to England's pride in each of the three most important seas.

The first consul answered at once to the British offer thus tendered, that much was made of the events in Egypt to elevate the English demands; to oblige them to lower their pretensions, he dwelt upon the events which were going forward in Portugal. "Lisbon and Oporto," he replied to lord Hawkesbury, "will soon fall into our hands, if we are inclined to take them. They are at this moment negotiating a treaty at Badajoz, having for its object to save the provinces of the most faithful ally of England. The Portuguese propose to redeem their territory, but they will exclude England from their ports, and pay besides a heavy war contribution; and Spain is willing enough to agree to this concession. But every thing depends upon the first consul. He is able to accept or reject this treaty; and he is about to reject it, and will take possession of the chief provinces of Portugal, unless England consents to a treaty upon reasonable and moderate terms. The English require the evacuation of Egypt by the French; let it be so, but let England, upon her side, abandon Malta; let her no more require Trinidad nor Martinique, but content herself with the island of Ceylon, a fine acquisition, forming a grand appendage to the superb empire of India."

The English negotiator replied in a manner that could be but little satisfactory for Portugal, confirming, what was already well known, that England had very little regard for the allies whom she had compromised. "If the first consul should invade Portugal in Europe," lord Hawkesbury answered, "England will invade the territory of Portugal beyond the seas. She will capture the Azores and Brazil, and will take to herself securities, which in her hands are worth much more than the Portuguese continental possessions in the

hands of France." This plainly signified, that in place of defending her ally, England sought to avenge herself upon Portugal for the new acquisitions that France might make at her expense.

The first consul perceived that upon this occasion he must assume an energetic tone, and show what was passing at the bottom of his heart; in other words, his determination to struggle foot to foot with England, until he had brought her to more moderate terms. He declared that he would never consent to give up Malta upon any condition; that Trinidad belonged to an ally, whose interests he would sustain equally with his own, and he would not abandon this colony to the English; that they ought to be content with Ceylon, which made so perfect the conquest of the Indies; that none of the points contested, Malta excepted, were to be put into the scale with the suffering that would be inflicted on the world by the shedding a single drop of the blood which was about to flow.

To these diplomatic explanations he added public declarations in the *Moniteur*, and the recital of the armaments which he was preparing on the coast of Boulogne. Divisions of gun-boats, in fact, sailed from the ports of Calvados, the Seine Inferior, the Somme, and the Escaut or Scheldt. They coasted along the shore to Boulogne, and many succeeded in reaching that port in spite of the English cruisers. The first consul had not then fixed, as he did at a later period, on the plan of a descent upon England [1]; he only wished to intimidate that power by the noise and extent of his preparations; in short, he had made up his mind to complete his arrangements, and to carry his threats into effect if the rupture should definitively happen. He went into a long explanation of his views upon the subject during a deliberation of the council, at which the consuls alone were present. Placing full confidence in the devotion of his colleagues, Cambacérès and Lebrun, he opened his whole mind to them. He told them, that with the armaments actually in existence at Boulogne, he had not yet the means of attempting, with a chance of success, a descent upon England, an operation in war full of difficulty; that his object in making these preparations was to let England know what he contemplated doing; in other words, that he intended a direct invasion; upon the success of which he, Bonaparte, should not hesitate to risk his life, his glory, and his fortune: that if he did not succeed in obtaining from the British cabinet some reasonable concessions, his part was taken—he should complete the Boulogne flotilla so as to receive one hundred thousand men, and embarking with them himself, run all the chances of a terrible but decisive blow.

Desirous of gaining over public opinion to his side in Europe, and even in England itself, he attached to the notes of his minister, negotiating in England, addressed to the British ministry, a number of articles in the *Moniteur*, which were designed for the entire European public. These articles, which were models of neat and forcible argument, were written by himself, and devoured by the readers of all nations, whose attention was fixed upon this singular scene, he flattered the English ministers then in office, whom he represented as wise, reasonable, well-intentioned men, too much intimidated by the violence of the ex-ministers, Pitt, and, more particularly, Windham. He heaped sarcasms upon these last, more particularly upon Windham, because he regarded him as the head of the war party. In these articles he sought to quiet Europe upon the subject of French ambition, and to show that his own conquests were scarcely equivalent to the acquisitions Prussia, Austria, and Russia had made in the partition of Poland; that France had restored three or four times the extent of territory she had retained; that England, in like manner, was bound to restore a large part of her conquests; that in keeping possession of the continent of India, she remained in possession of a superb empire, to which the islands in dispute were nothing worthy of notice; that it was not worth the cost, for such islands, to continue to shed human blood; that if France, it was true, appeared to insist so strongly upon them, it was from a principle of honour in supporting her allies, and to preserve some few harbours in distant seas; that, on the other hand, if England was determined to continue the war, she might, most certainly, conquer more colonies, but that she had more already than her trade required; that France had made around her entire frontiers, acquisitions of great value, which, without designating, were obvious enough to all the world, since her troops occupied Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, Naples, and Portugal; that, in fact, the contest might be more simplified, and rendered less burthensome to other countries, by confining it to a contest between France and England alone. The first consul, in writing, took great care not to wound the national pride of England; but he did not fail to let his last resource of a descent be understood, and that, if the English ministry desired that the war should terminate by the destruction of one of the two nations, there was not a Frenchman who was reluctant to make a last and strenuous effort to decide this long dispute, in a manner that should end in the eternal glory and advantage of France. "But why put the matter upon this desperate ground! Why not terminate the misfortunes of humanity! Why thus risk the destiny of two great nations!" The first consul finished one of those articles by these beautiful and singular words, which, at a later time, were so sadly applicable to himself:—"Happy, most happy, are those nations, that, arrived at a high degree of prosperity, are blessed with wise rulers, who will not expose the many advantages they possess to the caprices and vicissitudes of a single stroke of fortune!"

These articles, remarkable for powerful logic and a vigorous style, attracted general attention, and produced a deep sensation upon the public mind. Never had any government held such open and startling language.

The language of the first consul, accompanied by very serious demonstrations along the coasts of France, was calculated to produce, and did produce a great effect on the opposite side of the channel. The formal declaration that France

[1] The first flotilla attempted in 1801 must not be confused with the great naval and military organization known under the celebrated name of the "camp of Boulogne," which happened in 1804.

would never give up Malta to England, made a great impression, and the British government stated its willingness to renounce the island, upon its being restored to the knights of St. John of Jerusalem; but, in that case, they demanded the Cape of Good Hope. They would also give up Trinidad, and even Martinique, if they obtained a part of the Dutch continent of America, of Demerara, Berbice, or Essequibo.

The abandonment of Malta was a step gained in the negotiation. The first consul would not cede either Malta, the Cape, or the Dutch possessions on the continent of America. In his view, Malta was to be considered as the equivalent for Egypt, if France retained that conquest; when the occupation of Egypt ceased to be a question for the French, that of Malta could not be admitted for the English, nor any similar equivalent.

The English cabinet finally gave up insisting upon Malta, but revived its demand for one of the great West India islands; and as it could no longer dare to speak of the French isle of Martinique, it demanded the Spanish island of Trinidad.

The first consul was as little inclined to cede Trinidad as Martinique. It was a Spanish colony, which furnished England with a dangerous footing upon the vast continent of South America. He kept his good faith so far towards Spain, as to offer the small French island of Tobago, in place of Trinidad. It was not an important colony; but England had an interest in it, because all the planters were English. With a feeling of exalted pride, only to be allowed to one who had raised his country to the highest pitch of glory and greatness, he added: "It is a French colony; this acquisition must please the pride of the English, which will be flattered thus to obtain, as a prize, one colonial spoil belonging to us; and the conclusion of the peace will thus become more easily effected[1]."

By this time it was about the end of July or commencement of August, 1801. The preparations making in France were imitated in England. The militia were exercised; and cars were constructed for the conveyance of troops, to enable them to reach more rapidly the points threatened by hostile attack. The English journals of the war party were filled with the most outrageous language. Supposed to be encouraged by Windham, some of them proceeded so far as to excite the people against M. Otto, and the French prisoners. M. Otto at once demanded his passports; and the first consul caused the insertion in the *Moniteur* of the most threatening articles.

Lord Hawkesbury went to M. Otto, and insisted upon his not going away. With some difficulty he succeeded, by giving him reason to expect a speedy conclusion to their negotiation. Still the national animosity seemed awakened so, that a rupture was anticipated. All the moderate persons in England deprecated and wished to prevent it. They almost despaired of success, because the first consul would not give way in surrendering the possessions of his allies, which the English persisted in keeping.

While the first consul was fighting the battle of Spain's noble colonies, the prince of the peace, with the thoughtlessness of a vain and frivolous favourite, made the king, his master, adopt the most unhappy step, and disengaged the first consul from every tie of friendship towards Spain.

It has not been forgotten that M. Pinto, envoy of Portugal, had arrived at the Spanish head-quarters, to submit to the law laid down by Spain and France. The prince of the peace was anxious to terminate a campaign, of which the beginning had been so brilliant and easy of achievement; but of which the continuance might be attended with difficulties, which, without the aid of the French, might become insurmountable. If he desired to get possession of Lisbon or Oporto, the aid of the French would be indispensable. The enterprise, now a simple ostentatious display, would then become a serious affair, and require another body of French troops. Foreseeing this necessity, the first consul had spontaneously made ten thousand men in addition march upon Spain, which increased the total number to twenty-five thousand. But the prince of the peace, who needlessly demanded this auxiliary aid, was now alarmed at what he had done, when he saw the troops arrive. Still they had preserved the most exact discipline, and shown towards the clergy, the churches, and the ceremonies of public worship, a respect which was by no means among them a common occurrence; Bonaparte alone had been able to inspire them with such a course of conduct. But now they were really on the soil of Spain, the people were ridiculously alarmed at seeing them. Either Spain should have abstained from inviting them there, or having invited them herself, she should have employed them in the object for which they came. This object could not have been merely the dispersion of a few bands of Portuguese, to obtain some millions in a contribution, or even to shut the ports of Portugal against the English. It evidently consisted in obtaining valuable pledges, which might serve to force from England the restitutions which she would not otherwise make. In order to do that it was necessary to occupy some of the provinces of Portugal, particularly that of which Oporto was the capital. This was the surest means to influence the British cabinet, by influencing the great city merchants too, who were deeply con-

[1] "The minister of foreign affairs to M. Otto, commissioner of the French republic in London.

"20th Thermidor, year IX., or 8th of Aug. 1801.

"In regard to America, as affects the peremptory instructions contained in the note, I further add here: The British government wishes to retain in the West Indies one of the newly-acquired islands, and this under the plea that it will be necessary to the preservation of her former possessions. This can in no way apply to the island of Trinidad. Avoid, therefore, any discussion upon that topic. Trinidad, by its situation, would be, not a means of defence for the colonies of England, but a position for the attack of the Spanish continent. The acquisition of the island would, besides, be for the British government of an importance and value scarcely conceivable. The discussion can only take place about Curaçoa, Tobago, St. Lucia, or some other island of that class. Though these two latter are French islands, still this government might be induced to abandon one, and perhaps the national pride of England be flattered, by thus retaining some one of our colonial spoils. You will not fail, citizen, to praise highly the value of the islands to the cession of which we give consent, and particularly Tobago. This island not long back belonged to the English, and is still inhabited by English planters; all its relations are English. The soil is unbroken, and the commerce of the island is susceptible of great increase."

cerned in the Oporto trade. Thus it was; the matter had been previously arranged in Madrid between the governments of France and Spain. Still, despite all which had been stipulated, the prince of the peace determined to accept the conditions of Portugal, and to be satisfied on behalf of Spain with the cession of Olivença, a fortified place, adding a contribution of 30,000,000 f. or 40,000,000 f. to be paid to France, and for the two allied powers the exclusion of all English vessels of war and commerce. For such stipulations the campaign thus begun was perfectly childish. It was no more than idling away time; a thing got up to amuse a favourite overloaded with royal bounties, and seeking military glory in the most ridiculous mode possible, completely on a level with his own culpable and foolish levity.

The prince of the peace awakened in the breast of his royal superiors paternal feelings not difficult to excite. But it must be said they were excited too late or too soon. He contrived to fill their bosoms with alarm at the presence of the French; an alarm tardily experienced, and in every view wholly groundless. It was impossible to be supposed by any human being that fifteen thousand Frenchmen could conquer Spain, or protract their stay there in a mode to create uneasiness. To suppose such an intention was to suppose that, of which the minutest germ never entered into the head of the first consul; it had nothing to do with projects conceived at a later period, subsequently to events wholly unparalleled, which at this time neither the first consul nor any one else could foresee. At this moment he thought of one thing only, which was to extort from England another island, and that island a Spanish colony.

In accepting the conditions proposed by the court of Lisbon, which consisted merely of the cession of Olivença to Spain, 20,000,000 f. to France, and the exclusion of the English from the Spanish ports, care had been taken to provide two copies, one to be signed by Spain, and the other by France. The prince of the peace affixed his signature to that destined for his own court, which was dated from Badajoz, because all the affair had been completed in that city. He then procured the ratification of the treaty by the king, who was on the spot. Lucien Bonaparte signed on his part the copy that was destined for France, and sent it away immediately to receive his brother's ratification.

The first consul received the communication at the moment when the negotiations of London were in their most excited state of discussion. The irritation which they caused him it is not difficult to conceive. Though his natural affection for his family was carried at times to weakness, he had a less command over his temper with his relations than with other persons; and most assuredly if he had cause for anger he might be pardoned for its exhibition upon the present occasion. In this particular instance he broke out into a passion almost without bounds at the conduct of his brother Lucien.

But the first consul hoped that the treaty might not yet be ratified, and sent off extraordinary couriers to Badajoz to announce the refusal of the ratification by France, and to intimate the fact to Spain. But the couriers found the treaty ratified by Charles IV., and the engagement became irrevocable. Lucien was mortified and confounded at the embarrassing and humiliating character reserved for him to play in Spain. His brother's anger he answered by an access of ill-humour, which was not uncommon with him, and he sent in his resignation to the minister for foreign affairs. On his side the prince of the peace became arrogant, and allowed himself the use of language which was senseless and ridiculous towards such a man as at that time governed France. He first announced that all hostilities against Portugal had terminated, and then demanded the withdrawal of the French troops; adding, that if fresh forces passed over the frontier of the Pyrenees, their passage would be considered a violation of the Spanish territory. He demanded further the return of the Spanish fleet blockaded in Brest, and an early conclusion of a general peace, in order to put a stop as soon as possible to an alliance that was become burdensome to the court of Madrid[1]. This conduct was highly improper, and contrary to the true interests of Spain. It must be observed, on the other hand, that the frightful misfortune which had befallen the two Spanish ships had struck the nation with grief, and contributed to the angry bearing that manifested itself in a manner at once so intemperate, and so adverse to the interests of both cabinets.

The first consul, in the highest state of irritation, replied instantly, that the French should remain in the peninsula until peace was concluded between Portugal and France in particular; that if the army of the prince of the peace made a single step of approach to the fifteen thousand French who were stationed at Salamanca, he would consider it as a declaration of war; and that if in addition to unbecoming language, they added any act of hostility, the last knell of the Spanish monarchy should sound[2]. He ordered Lucien to

[1] Note of July 26th.

[2] The first consul wrote short and animated notes, designed to furnish the leading ideas of the instructions he intended for his ministers, when they transmitted orders to the ambassadors abroad. The following is a note sent to the office for foreign affairs, to serve for the ground of a despatch which was to be forwarded to Madrid. Talleyrand, who had gone to take the waters, had been replaced by M. Caillard:—

"To the minister for foreign affairs.

"21 Messidor, year IX., or 10th July, 1801.

"Make known, citizen minister, to the ambassador of the republic at Madrid, that he is to repair to that court, and to assume the character necessary under the circumstances. He will state—

"That I have read the note of the general prince of the peace; that it is so ridiculous, it does not merit a serious answer; but that if this prince, bought over by England, induces the king and queen to take measures contrary to the honour and to the interests of the republic, the last knell of the Spanish monarchy has sounded.

"That my intention is, that the French troops shall remain in Spain until the moment when the republic has made peace with Portugal.

"That the least movement of the Spanish troops with the object of approaching nearer to the French forces, will be considered as a declaration of war.

"That still I desire to do all that is possible to reconcile the interests of the republic with the conduct and inclinations of his catholic majesty. [That

return to Madrid, there to await ulterior orders in his character of ambassador. This was enough to intimidate and restrain the worthless courtier, who with so much recklessness compromised the most important interests in the world. Soon afterwards he wrote most cringing letters in order to be again regarded with favour by the man whose influence and authority over the court of Spain he so much feared.

Still it was necessary to take some decisive course in consequence of this strange and unaccountable conduct on the part of the cabinet of Madrid. Talleyrand was at the moment absent on account of ill health, having gone to take the waters. The first consul sent him all the papers which had passed, and received in reply a sensible letter containing his opinion upon this very serious matter.

In the opinion of Talleyrand a paper war would produce no satisfactory conclusion of the difference, however triumphant might be the arguments adduced on the side of France, grounded upon the engagements so plainly laid down and the promises mutually entered into. A war against Spain would postpone the desirable object of a European peace; it was besides at utter variance with the sound policy of France, and ridiculous in the present pitiable state of the Spanish monarchy, with the French troops in the heart of Spain, and her fleet at Brest. That there was a much better mode of punishing her, which would be to concede the island of Trinidad to England, the sole and last difficulty through which the peace of the world had been withheld. Spain had clearly absolved France from all obligation to her or devotion to her interests. In this case we must lose time in Madrid and gain it in London, accelerating the negotiation with England by the cession of Trinidad [1].

"That come what may, I will never consent to the articles 3 and 6.

"That I do not object to the negotiations being renewed between M. Pinto and the ambassador of the republic, with a protocol of the negotiations drawn up day by day.

"That the ambassador must endeavour to make the prince of the peace clearly comprehend, and the king and queen as well, that words and offensive notes, where friendship subsists to the extent it does between us, may be passed by as mere family differences; but that the smallest act, or the least demonstration, will be without a remedy.

"That in respect to the king of Etruria, a minister was tendered to him on account of his having no one near him; and to govern men, some knowledge is necessary. That in the hope he will find at Parma men capable of advising him, I do not longer insist upon that point.

"That relative to the French troops in Tuscany, it is proper to let them remain there for two or three months, until the king of Etruria can himself organize his army.

"That state affairs can be carried on without falling into excitement; and that in other respects, my wishes to do something agreeable to the court of Spain would be ill returned, if the king suffered the corrupting gold of England, at the moment when, after so much toil and anxiety, we are about entering the port, to disunite two great nations; that the consequences must be fatal and terrible.

"That at this moment, less precipitation in making peace with Portugal, would have been the means of accelerating very considerably a peace with England, &c.

"You know the cabinet; you will therefore say in your despatch every thing that may serve to gain time, to hinder precipitating measures, to procure a renewal of the negotiation, and, at the same time, to produce an effect, by placing in their view the serious state of the affair, and the inevitable consequences of inconsiderate proceedings.

"Make the ambassador of the republic understand, that if Portugal would consent to leave the province of Alentejo in the hands of Spain until the peace, that would be a *sine qua non*, because by that means Spain would see that the preliminary treaty was executed to the letter.

"I would as soon accept of nothing as 15,000,000 f. in fifteen months.

"Despatch the courier whom I send you with this directly to Madrid. BONAPARTE."

[1] The following is the curious letter of Talleyrand:—

"20th Messidor, year IX., or 9th of July, 1801.

"GENERAL—I have read with all the attention of which I am capable the letters from Spain. If we desired to make it a matter of controversial dispute, it is very easy for us to prove we are in the right, simply by referring to the literal meaning of three or four treaties which we have this year entered into with that power; for these documents would establish our case *de factum* *. We must try whether this is not a favourable moment for the adoption of some definitive plan respecting the conduct of this our shabby ally.

"I start with the following data: Spain, to quote her own words, has made an *hypocritical* war against Portugal; she desires to make a peace definitively. The prince of the peace is, by what we learn,—and I can readily credit,—carrying on conferences with England; the directory thought he was bought over by that power. The king and queen are wholly dependent upon the prince's will. He was before only a favourite; now, in their opinion, he is a perfect statesman, and a great military character. Lucien is in an embarrassing position, from which it is absolutely necessary to free him. The prince makes a clever use of the words: '*The king has decided to make war upon his children.*' This mode of expression will produce an effect upon public opinion. A rupture with Spain is a ridiculous threat when we have her vessels in Brest, and our troops in the heart of the kingdom. It seems to me that such is our position with Spain; that granted, then, what are we to do?

"At this moment I feel that, for the last two years, I have not been accustomed to think by myself: and being no longer with you, my judgment and imagination are without any guidance. Thus I am probably about to write poor stuff; but it is not my fault; I am no longer perfectly myself when I am apart from you.

"It appears to me that Spain, upon the conclusion of every peace, has been a weight upon the cabinet of Versailles, through her enormous pretensions; she has in the present instance greatly relieved us. She has herself directed how we should proceed; we are now able to act with England as she has acted about Portugal. She has sacrificed the interest of her ally; which is placing at our disposal the island of Trinidad in the stipulations with England. If you should adopt this opinion, the London negotiation must be pushed onwards, while at Madrid we must have recourse to diplomacy, or rather to wrangling, being careful to maintain throughout all a mild tone of discussion, amid amicable explanations; making them easy respecting the position of the king of Tuscany, and speaking only of the interests of the alliance, &c. In fact, lose time at Madrid, and hurry it onwards in London.

"To change our ambassador under existing circumstances would be to attract an attention that should be avoided, if you would temporize as I propose. Why not permit Lucien to pay a visit to Cadiz, to inspect the armaments there, and also in the other ports? During his journey the business with England would proceed. You would not allow England to make conditions for Portugal; and Lucien

* Whether this be the diplomatic Latin of Talleyrand, or the Franco-Latin of the author, it stands thus in the French edition.—*Translator.*

This advice was grounded in sound reason, and appeared in that light to the first consul. Still, deeming it a matter of honour to defend an ally as long as possible, though that ally had broken his faith, he informed M. Otto of the new view of France respecting Trinidad, exhibiting his disposition to sacrifice that island, not immediately, but only at the last extremity. The first consul, therefore, ordered M. Otto again to induce England to accept Tobago if possible.

Most unfortunately the strange conduct of the prince of the peace had much weakened the arguments of the French negotiator in London. News recently received of the surrender of general Belliard in Cairo, had weakened them more. Still the resistance of general Menou in Alexandria, supported a doubt favourable to French pretension. To the flotilla at Boulogne the honour was due of terminating the difficulties of this protracted negotiation.

The minds of the people of England had never ceased to be occupied with the naval preparations made upon the shores of the channel. In order to calm the public, the English admiralty had recalled Nelson from the Baltic [1], and given him the command of the naval forces along the coasts. These were composed of frigates, brigs, corvettes, and light vessels of every dimension. The enterprising spirit of this celebrated English seaman led him to hope, that he should be able to destroy them by some bold stroke. On the 4th of August, or 16th of Thermidor, he appeared, at break of day, before Boulogne, with about thirty small vessels. He hoisted his flag in the Medusa frigate, and took up a position about two miles from the French line; that is, out of reach of our artillery, and only within range of our heavy mortars. His object was to bombard the flotilla. This flotilla had for its commander a brave seaman, full of the natural genius and ardour for war, and destined, if he had lived, to rise to the highest honours in his profession; this was the admiral Latouche-Tréville. He exercised the gun-boats every day, and accustomed our soldiers and seamen to embark and disembark at a moment's notice, with celerity and precision. On the 4th, the French flotilla was formed in three divisions, in a single line, at anchor, parallel with the shore, from which it was distant about five hundred fathoms. It was composed of large gun-boats, supported at intervals by brigs. Three battalions of infantry were embarked in these vessels, to second the bravery of our seamen.

Nelson arranged a division of bomb-vessels in front of his squadron, and opened his fire about five o'clock in the morning. He hoped, by showering his bombs, to destroy the flotilla, or, at least, oblige the boats to enter the port. He threw an amazing quantity during the entire day. These projectiles, thrown from heavy mortars, passed, for the most part, over the French line, and fell harmless upon the sands. The French soldiers and seamen, immoveable under this incessant fire, which was more alarming than dangerous to life, showed wonderful coolness, and much gaiety of spirit. Unfortunately, they had no means of returning the fire. The bomb-vessels, built in a hurry, could not resist the recoil of the mortars, only firing some ill-directed shots. The powder, taken from the old stores in the arsenals, was destitute of strength, and did not send the projectiles the proper distance. The crews eagerly desired that they might be allowed to advance within gun-shot, or to board the enemy. But the gun-boats, awkwardly built, without the experience exhibited at a later period in their construction, were not easily manœuvred, with the wind, at that moment, blowing from the north-west. They would have thus been driven, by wind and current, upon the English line, and obliged, in order to rejoin the coast, to present their sides to the enemy, when the guns were placed in their bows. They were, therefore, obliged to remain under this shower of projectiles for sixteen hours. The troops and seamen bore it all courageously, and laughed at the shells that passed over their heads. The brave commandant, Latouche-Tréville, was in the middle of them, with colonel Savary, the aid-de-camp of the first consul. Thousands of shells were thrown among them, and, by a sort of miracle, no one was seriously wounded. Two of the boats were sunk, without losing a man. One gun-boat, the Méchante, commanded by captain Margoli, was shot through in the middle. This brave officer put his crew on board the other boats, and then, keeping two sailors with him, made for the land as she was sinking, and ran her on shore, before that event could occur.

The English, in spite of the disadvantage of the French position and the bad quality of their powder, had suffered more than the French. They had three or four men killed or wounded, by the explosion of the French shells [1].

Nelson retired, threatening to return in a few days with more certain means of destruction. He was accordingly expected to re-appear, and the French admiral prepared to give him a warm reception. He reinforced the line, provided the best ammunition, animated the soldiers and sailors, who, besides, were full of ardour, and quite proud of having braved the English upon their own element. Three picked battalions, selected from the 46th, 57th, and 108th demi-brigades, were placed on board the flotilla, to serve in the same manner as in the battle of the 4th.

Twelve days after, on the 16th of August, or

would be in Madrid in time sufficient to treat definitively of the peace with her.

"I fear, general, that you will find my opinion smells not a little of the shower-baths and waters which I take with great regularity. In seventeen days I am certain to be in better health, and shall then be most happy to renew to you the assurance of my respect and attachment.

"Ch. Maur. Talleyrand."

[1] Nelson was not recalled for this purpose; he came home with part of the Baltic fleet, in consequence of their presence being no longer required in the north. Sweden having admitted English vessels, and proclaimed all hostile feeling to have ceased, on the 20th of May, two or three weeks afterwards the ships returned. The first bombardment of the Boulogne flotilla was on the 4th of August, when several were destroyed. "*The whole of the affair*," said Nelson, "*is of no further consequence than to show the enemy they cannot with impunity come outside their ports.*"—*Translator.*

[1] Captain Fyers, of the royal artillery, was very slightly wounded, as well as two seamen, by the bursting of a shell. There was no other casualty.—*Translator.*

28th Thermidor, Nelson made his appearance with a naval division, much more considerable than the former. Every thing indicated his intention to make a serious attack by boarding; the French desired nothing better.

Nelson had thirty-five vessels, many boats, and two thousand chosen men. About sunset he arranged his boats around the Medusa, distributed his men, and gave the necessary instructions. These boats, manned by English marines, were, during the night, to advance under oars, and make themselves masters of our line by boarding. They were formed into four divisions. A fifth, composed of bomb-vessels, was to be stationed, not in front of the French flotilla, as before, a position which showed such little execution during the bombardment of the 4th of August, but on one side of the flotilla, in order to attack it in flank.

About midnight, these four divisions, commanded by four intrepid officers,—captains Somerville, Parker, Cotgrave, and Jones,—pulled rapidly towards the shore at Boulogne. A small French vessel, manned by eight hands only, had been left as an advanced post. She was surrounded and boarded; the sound of her musketry, as she bravely defended herself before she submitted, served to give notice of the presence of the enemy.

The four English divisions approached as fast as their oars could pull. As soon as they were perceptible, a fire of musketry and grape was opened upon them. The division that came foremost was taken away to the eastward by the tide, out of its course, and beyond the right wing, which it was designed to attack. The two divisions of the centre, under captains Parker and Cotgrave, rowing at once against the middle of the line of defence, were the first to reach it, about one o'clock in the morning, and they attacked it manfully. The division of captain Parker, after exchanging a sharp fire with the French line, attacked one of the large brigs, which had been stationed among the boats to support them. This was the brig Etna, under the command of captain Pevrieu. Six boats surrounded her, with the intention of taking her by boarding. The English boldly mounted her sides, headed by their officers, and were received by two hundred infantry soldiers, and driven into the sea at the point of the bayonet. The brave captain Pevrieu, having engaged, in succession, with two English sailors, killed them both, although wounded, first with a poignard, and then with a pike. In a short time, the attacking party were thrown overboard, and a fire commenced upon the boats, which killed the greater number of those who were in them. The French boats resisted, with the same courage, those who attacked them, with bayonets and axes. A short way off, the division of captain Cotgrave bravely attacked the French line without success. A large gun-boat, the Surprise, surrounded by four English boats, sunk the foremost, took the second, and obliged the others to retreat. The soldiers rivalled the sailors in this manner of fighting, so well suited to their lively and audacious characters.

While the second and third English divisions were thus received, the first, which had attempted the assault on the right of the French, carried away to the eastward by the tide, could not get to the scene of action until a very late period. Making every effort to get from the east towards the west, it seemed to threaten the extremity of the French line of defence, and to be endeavouring to get between the land and the French vessels, a very common manœuvre of the English. This was, in the present case, rather an effect of their position than of their calculation. Some detachments of the 108th, posted along the shore, opened upon them a very effective fire. The English seamen, not at all discouraged, attacked the Volcano gun-boat, which protected the left of the French line. The ensign commanding it, whose name was Guéroult, an officer full of courage, met the boarders, at the head of his sailors and some infantry soldiers. He had an obstinate combat to sustain. While he was defending himself on the deck of his boat, the English, who were around her, endeavoured to cut her cable, and carry away the boat itself. Fortunately, it was moored with a chain, which resisted every effort to break it. The firing kept up from the shore and the other French boats upon the English, obliged to them quit her. This attack was successfully repelled, as well as those upon the two other points.

The day broke; the fourth division of the enemy which had been designed to attack the French left, having to make a considerable way to the westward in spite of the tide, which ran in the opposite direction, did not arrive in time. The bomb vessels of Nelson, thanks to the darkness of the night, did not do much mischief. The English were every where repulsed; the sea was covered with their dead bodies, and a considerable number of their boats were taken or sunk[1]. Daylight becoming stronger rendered their retreat necessary. They retired about four o'clock in the morning. The sun arose to lighten up their flight. This time it was not an unsuccessful attempt, but a positive defeat.

The crew were delighted. The French had not lost many men, and the English, on the contrary, had suffered considerably. That which added still more to the joy occasioned by this brilliant action was, that they had beaten Nelson in person, and had rendered vain all the menaces of destruction which he had publicly promulgated against the French flotilla.

The contrary effect was produced on the other side of the channel. Although this combat with the French vessels at anchor did not prove what a similar flotilla would be able to do on the sea when it had on board one hundred thousand men, still the confidence of the English in the enterprising genius of Nelson was greatly diminished, and the unknown danger which threatened them alarmed them in a still greater degree.

But the vicissitudes of the most important nego-

[1] On the 15th, Nelson, thinking he could cut out a number of the flotilla, made a serious attack. The French were apprized of his intention. They had used chains in place of rope for moorings, which could not be cut, and filled the boats with soldiers, as well as lined the shore close to which the boats lay, who fired upon the English boats, and often into their own vessels. The English were repulsed, and lost 44 killed and 128 wounded, bringing away only 16 soldiers and seamen and a lieutenant made prisoners. One boat in a sinking state was abandoned, from the leakage owing to the shot-holes.—*Translator.*

tiation between the two nations began to approach their limit. Being decided by the conduct of the Spanish cabinet, the first consul ordered M. Otto to give up Trinidad. This concession and the two engagements off Boulogne concluded the hesitation of the British cabinet. It consented to the proposed bases, with the exception of some difficulties in detail which yet remained to be overcome. The English cabinet, in giving up Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, stipulated that the island should be placed under the protection of some power which should secure its independence; because they had very little belief in the power of the order of St. John to defend it, even if the knights were successful in re-establishing themselves. They did not agree with France as to what state should be the power having this guarantee. The pope, Naples, and Russia, had been successively proposed, and rejected. In the last place, the drawing up of the words of the treaty exhibited some difficulty. As the effect of the treaty upon public opinion would naturally be considerable in both countries, upon both sides there was as much attention to be given to the appearance as to the reality. England made no objection to enumerate in the treaty the numerous possessions which she restored to France and its allies, but at the same time desired that those she had definitively acquired should be stated also. This was a just demand, more so than that of the first consul, who wished that the objects restored to Holland, France, and Spain, should be enumerated, and that the silence which should be kept in regard to the others should be for England the only manner of her acquiring a title to them.

Besides these differences, not very important in reality, there were others accessary, relative to prisoners, to debts, sequestrations, and more particularly to the allies of the two contracting parties, and the character they should assign to them in the protocol. Nevertheless it was necessary for the negotiators to conclude the matter, and thus put an end to the anxieties of the world at large. On one side the English cabinet wished to bring the affair to a conclusion before the meeting of parliament; on the other, the first consul feared every moment to hear of the surrender of Alexandria, because the prolonged resistance of that place still left open a doubt which was useful to the negotiation. Impatient for great results, he longed for the day when he should be able to make France listen to words so novel, so magical, not of peace with Austria, with Prussia, or Russia, but of a general peace with all the world.

In consequence it was agreed to secure immediately the great results already obtained, and to leave to an ulterior negotiation any difficulties of detail and form. To this end it was agreed at once to draw up the preliminaries of peace, and to sign them immediately afterwards, desiring the plenipotentiaries to embody a definitive treaty at leisure. Every difficulty, not of a fundamental character, the settlement of which might cause delay, was to be left for arrangement under the definitive treaty. In order to be more certain of all being quickly finished, the first consul wished to confine the negotiation to a fixed period. It was then the middle of Fructidor, the year IX., or the middle of September, 1801; he gave them until the 2nd of October, or 10th of Vendémiaire, year IX. At the end of that term he said he was resolved to avail himself of the fogs of autumn in aid of his designs against the coasts of Ireland and England. This was uttered with all the regard due to the feelings of a great and proud nation, but with that peremptory tone which left no doubt of the intention.

The two negotiators, M. Otto and lord Hawkesbury, were sincere men, and really wished for peace. They not only wished it for its own sake, but also from the ambition, natural and legitimate, of placing their names at the bottom of one of the most renowned treaties in the history of the world. Thus every facility compatible with their instructions was, on their part, bestowed to the arrangement of the preliminaries.

It was agreed that England should restore to France and her allies, in other words, to Spain and Holland, all the maritime conquests she had made, *with the exception of the islands of Ceylon and Trinidad, which she had definitively acquired.*

Such was the form adopted to conciliate the self-love of the two nations. In short, England retained the continent of India, which she had conquered from the native princes; the island of Ceylon, which she had taken from the Dutch, a necessary appendage to that vast continent; lastly, the isle of Trinidad, taken from the Spaniards in the West Indies. There was enough there to satisfy the fullest national ambition. England restored the Cape, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Surinam to the Dutch; Martinique and Guadaloupe to the French; Minorca to the Spaniards; and Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. As to the last, the guaranteeing power was to be designated in the definitive treaty. England evacuated Porto Ferrajo, which, with the isle of Elba, was to be restored to France. In compensation for this the French were to evacuate the state of Naples, in other words, the gulf of Tarentum.

Egypt was to be abandoned by the troops of both nations, and to be restored to the Porte. The independence of Portugal was secured.

Thus if only the great points are considered, putting aside all the minor restitutions so warmly disputed, and yet neither diminishing nor augmenting much the advantages obtained, the following may be considered the result of the treaty. In this contest of ten years England had acquired the empire of India, without the acquisition of Egypt by France to counterpoise it. But on the other hand, France had changed to her advantage the face of the European continent; she had conquered the formidable line of the Alps and of the Rhine, and repelled Austria from her frontiers by the acquisition of the Low countries; she had snatched from that power Italy, the object Austria continually coveted, and which had now nearly all passed under French domination; she had by the principle established by the secularization, considerably enfeebled the imperial house in Germany to the gain of the house of Brandenburg; she had checked Russia for her interference in the affairs of the west; she was all potent in Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy. No power in the world exercised an influence equal to hers; and if England was aggrandized on the ocean, France had still added to her coasts, those of Holland, Flan-

ders, Spain, and Italy, countries completely under her influence. These were vast means for the attainment of maritime power[1].

This was all secured to France by England, when she signed the preliminaries of the peace in London, at the expense, it is true, of the continent of India. France was hardly able to consent to this; her allies, well defended by her, recovered nearly all they had lost by the war. Spain was deprived of Trinidad by her own fault; but she gained Olivença in Portugal, and Tuscany in Italy. Holland abandoned Ceylon, but she recovered her colonies in India, the Cape, and the Guianas; she was delivered from the stadtholder.

Such were the consequences of this peace, the most noble and most glorious for France that her annals can exhibit. It was but natural that the French negotiator should have been impatient to complete the treaty. The 30th of September had arrived, and there were still some difficulties in drawing up the document. All these were finally overcome; and in the evening of the 1st of October, the day before that fixed by the first consul as the fatal term, M. Otto had the infinite satisfaction of placing his signature beneath the preliminaries of peace—a satisfaction so great as to be unequalled, because no negotiator before him had ever the happiness of securing, by such an act, equal advantage and glory to his country. It was arranged that this news should be kept a secret in London for twenty-four hours, in order that the courier of the French legation might be able to be the first to announce it to his government. This fortunate courier quitted London in the night, on the 1st of October, and arrived on the 3rd, or 11th Vendémiaire, at Malmaison, about four o'clock in the afternoon. At the same moment, the three consuls were holding a council. Upon opening the despatches, the sensation experienced was very great; they left off their business, and embraced each other. The first consul, who threw off all reserve most heartily, when he was with those in whom he placed full confidence, freely gave way to the feelings of which his heart was full. So many results obtained in so short a time,—order, victory, peace, given to France by his genius and unflagging efforts,—all this in two years; these were benefits from which he was most assuredly entitled to feel himself very happy and very proud. Amid their effusions of mutual satisfaction, Cambacérès said to him, "Now that we have made a treaty of peace with England, we have only to conclude a treaty of commerce, and thus remove all cause of dispute between the two countries." "Not quite so quick," answered the first consul, with animation; "political peace is made; so much the better; we will enjoy it. As to a commercial peace, we will make one, if we are able. But I will not, at any price, sacrifice French industry; I can remember the distress of 1786." This singular and instinctive regard for the interests of French industry must have been deeply rooted, to have displayed itself at such a time. But the consul Cambacérès, with his usual sagacity, had touched upon the difficulty which, at a little later period, was again to embroil the two countries.

The intelligence was immediately sent to Paris to be made public. Towards evening, the sound of cannon resounded along the streets, and every body inquired what fortunate event had occurred to occasion the rejoicings thus manifested. People ran to the public places, where commissaries of the government had received orders to make known the news, that the preliminaries of peace were signed. The same night the intelligence was announced in all the theatres, in the midst of a general joy, without example, for a very long time. This joy was perfectly natural, because peace with England was in truth universal peace; it consolidated the tranquillity of the continent, suppressed the ground of the European coalitions, and laid open the whole world to French commerce and industry. Paris was illuminated the same evening.

The first consul immediately ratified the preliminary treaty, and commissioned his aid-de-camp, Lauriston, to proceed with it to London. If the joy in France was great, in England it was almost carried to a pitch of delirium. The news, at first kept secret by the negotiators, at last transpired, and they were obliged to notify it to the lord mayor, by a special letter. This communication produced the greater effect, because, just before, there had been a rumour that the negotiations were broken off. The people at once gave themselves up to those violent transports of joy, which are so peculiar to the passionate character of the English. The public conveyances, upon leaving London, were marked with chalk, in large letters, "Peace with France." At every town they were stopped, the horses were detached, and they were drawn about in triumph. They thought that all the misery, from the scarcity and dearness of things, would at once be terminated. They dreamed of unknown, immense, impossible benefits. There are times when nations, like individuals, become weary of mutual hate, and feel a strong desire for a reconciliation, however illusive and transient it may ultimately prove. At this moment, unhappily so short, the English people were almost persuaded that they loved France; they praised the hero, the sage, who was at the head of the government, and cried with transport, "Long live Bonaparte!"

Such are the joys of humanity; they are only lively and intense in proportion to man's ignorance of the future. Let us thank God, who, in his wisdom, has thus closed to our sight the volume of mortal destiny! How every heart would have been chilled that day, if the veil which concealed the future could have been suddenly withdrawn, and the English and French could have been enabled to see in the future, fifteen years of atrocious hate, an obstinate and wasteful war, the continent and ocean inundated with the blood of both nations! How would France have been stricken with consternation, if, at the moment, when she thought herself at the summit of greatness—unchanging greatness—she had then seen, in a page of the terrible book of destiny, the treaties of 1815. The hero so victorious and wise, who then governed, how he would have been surprised and struck

[1] Our author seems very much mistaken about the means by which a formidable naval force is to be obtained. The possession of ports, and even of ships in addition, will go but a little way without seamen made by long habitude on the ocean, through the means of a great commercial navy.—*Translator.*

with consternation, if, in the midst of his noblest achievements, he could have observed his enormous errors; if, in the midst of the most merited prosperity, he could have read his fearful fall—his martyrdom! Oh, yes, Providence, in the depth of its mysterious workings, has done wisely to disclose to man no more than the present: full enough for his weak heart to know! We, who now know all that then passed, and that has since been accomplished, we will endeavour to cover ourselves in the ignorance of that day, in order to comprehend and partake in its lively and powerful emotions.

A slight doubt still prevailed in London, and somewhat troubled the public expression of pleasure, because the ratification of the preliminaries by the first consul had not yet arrived, and there was an apprehension of some unforeseen and sudden resolution on the part of a character so prompt, proud, and exacting in every thing relative to his country. This state of suspense was painful; until it was suddenly learned in London that one of the first consul's aids-de-camp, one of his companions in arms, colonel Lauriston, had arrived at the house of M. Otto, and that he was the bearer of the ratified treaty. The people, relieved from the only doubt which they felt before, no longer restrained themselves, and their delight was unbounded. They ran to the house of M. Otto, and found him entering his carriage, with colonel Lauriston, on his way to lord Hawkesbury, for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications. The people took out the horses, and drew the two Frenchmen all the way to lord Hawkesbury's house.

From lord Hawkesbury's the two negotiators had to proceed to Mr. Addington's, and from thence to the admiralty, to pay a visit to lord St. Vincent. The people were still obstinate to draw the carriage from the residence of one minister to that of another, and last of all, to the admiralty, where the crowd became so great, and the confusion so extraordinary, that lord St. Vincent, being apprehensive of some accident occurring, placed himself at the head of the procession [1], fearing the carriage would be overturned, and this extravagance of joy end in some painful accident. Several days passed in this state of excitement, testifying the extraordinary public satisfaction.

One fact worthy of remark is, that some hours after the signature of the preliminary treaty, a courier arrived in London from Egypt, bringing the news of the surrender of Alexandria, which took place on the 30th of August, 1801, or 12th Fructidor. "This courier," said lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, "has arrived eight hours after the signature of the treaty: so much the better. If he had arrived sooner, we should have been forced to have been more exacting in deference to public opinion, and the negotiation would very probably have been broken off. Peace is of more consequence than an island, more or less." This minister, a very excellent man, had reason on his side. But this is a proof that the resistance of Alexandria had been useful, and that even in a desperate cause, the voice of honour counselling the longest possible resistance, should always be heard.

It was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should meet in the city of Amiens, an intermediate point between London and Paris, in order to draw up the definitive treaty. The English cabinet selected an old and distinguished military officer, lord Cornwallis, who had had the honour of commanding the English armies in America and India, one of the most celebrated men of his time. He had been governor-general of Bengal, and viceroy in Ireland at the close of the last century. Lord Cornwallis had arranged a visit to Paris, in order to pay his compliments to the first consul, before he took up his post at the scene of negotiation.

The first consul, on the other hand, made choice of his brother Joseph, for whom he had a very particular affection, and who, by the amenity of his manners and mildness of his character, was singularly well adapted for a peacemaker, an office which had been constantly reserved for him. Joseph had signed the treaty of peace with America at Morfontaine; with Austria at Lunéville; and now was about to do the same with England at Amiens. The first consul thus made his brother gather the fruit which he had himself cultivated with his own triumphant hands. Talleyrand, seeing all the ostensible honour of these treaties devolve upon a personage who was nearly unacquainted with the arts of diplomacy, was unable to repress a passing sense of his vexation, which, though he made every effort to hide it, did not escape the keen eyes and invidious observations of the diplomatists resident in Paris, and it became the subject of more than one despatch. But the cautious minister well knew that it would be impolitic to make the family of the first consul his enemies, and besides, after granting what was due to the part acted by that great man, if any part of the glory remained for another concerned in these brilliant negotiations, the people of Europe would decree it to the minister for foreign affairs.

The negotiations proceeding with different states, and not yet concluded, were terminated almost immediately. The first consul understood well the art of producing striking effects upon the imaginations of men, because he himself possessed a very powerful imagination. He settled every difficulty with all the other courts, as if he desired to overwhelm France with all kinds of satisfaction in succession; to raise her wonder, and even to intoxicate her by the extraordinary results which he worked out for her advantage.

He settled the treaty with Portugal, and ordered his brother Lucien to sign at Madrid the conditions which he had refused at Badajoz, with only a few unimportant modifications. He no longer insisted upon the occupation of one of the Portuguese provinces, because the bases of the treaty of peace with England having been settled, since Trinidad had been relinquished, there was no reason for retaining the pledges with which at first he had been so anxious to furnish himself. An agreement was made regarding the expenses of the war; some commercial advantages were secured, such as the introduction of French cloths, and French products

[1] Lord St. Vincent only went to the garden-gate of the admiralty to receive colonel Lauriston and M. Otto; and he there addressed the mob, urging them to be careful: "Gentlemen, gentlemen! let me request you to be as orderly as possible; and if you are determined to draw the gentleman accompanied by M. Otto, I request you to be cautious, and not to overturn the carriage."—*Translator.*

were placed upon the footing of the most favoured country. The exclusion of English vessels of all kinds was formally stipulated until the conclusion of the peace.

The evacuation of Egypt terminated all the differences with the Ottoman Porte. Talleyrand concluded at Paris the preliminaries of peace with the minister of the sultan, which stipulated the restitution of Egypt to the Porte, the establishment of the former relations between the two governments, and the activity of all the anterior treaties of commerce and navigation.

Similar conventions were signed with the regencies of Tunis and Algiers.

A treaty was signed with Bavaria, by which that country was replaced in regard to the French republic, in the same state of alliance which formerly existed between the court and the old French monarchy, when that monarchy extended her protection to all the German states of the second rank against the ambition of the house of Austria. It was but a renewal of the old treaties of Westphalia and of Teschen. Bavaria abandoned to France directly all that she had formerly held upon the left bank of the Rhine. In return, France promised to employ her weight in the negotiations of which the affairs of Germany would soon become the subject, to procure for Bavaria a sufficient indemnity conveniently situated. France also guaranteed the integrity of the Bavarian territory.

Lastly, to achieve the great work of general pacification, the treaty with Russia, which legalized that peace to the letter which was already in existence, was signed, after a long discussion between M. Markoff and Talleyrand. The new emperor had shown, as before seen, less energy in his resistance to the maritime pretensions of England, but at the same time less ostentation, and less determination in the mode of protection extended to the minor German and Italian states, that had been parties to the coalition against France. Alexander never raised difficulties in regard to Egypt; but in any case these would have ceased in consequence of the late events in that country. He no more pretended to the grand mastership of the knights of Malta, which rendered easy the reconstitution of the order upon its old footing, agreeably to the arrangements which had been made with England. The only differences of moment with Alexander were relative to Naples and Piedmont. By persisting in her views, and by gaining time, France had vanquished the principal difficulties relative to these two states. The evacuation of the road of Tarentum had been promised to the English. Russia was satisfied upon this point, regarding it as the accomplishment of a condition essential to her own honour, in the integrity of the Neapolitan territory. Of the isle of Elba, Russia had ceased to say any thing. In regard to Piedmont, every day added to the silence of England upon the subject during the negotiations in London, had emboldened the first consul to refuse this important province to the king of Sardinia. Russia invoked the promise which had been made to her upon that subject. The first consul replied by saying, that Russia had promised in the same manner to maintain inviolable the maritime law in all its tenor, and that she had abandoned a part of it to England. An article was agreed upon, by which they bound themselves in a friendly way to consider favourably the interests of the king of Sardinia, and "to regard them so far as might be compatible with the existing state of things." This was taking a great freedom in relation to that prince, and particularly that of indemnifying him one day with the duchy of Parma or Piacenza, as the first consul had then thought of doing. The conduct of the king of Sardinia, and his devotion to the English during the last campaign in Egypt, had deeply irritated the head of the French government. The first consul, however, was governed by a better reason than his anger. He considered Piedmont as one of the finest Italian provinces for France its possessor; it always allowed of an army entering Italy, and the keeping an army continually there. It would be for France, in fact, what the Milanese had for a long while been for Austria.

The views of France had constantly been in agreement with those of Russia respecting the affairs of Germany; there was in consequence no difficulty upon this last subject.

The treaty was drawn up, therefore, upon these bases, in conjunction with M. Markoff, the new negotiator recently arrived from St. Petersburg. A public treaty was signed in the first instance, in which it was plainly and simply stated, that a good understanding was re-established between the two governments, and that they would not permit emigrants, who were subjects of either nation, to commit offences considered culpable in their former country. This article struck at the Poles on one hand, and at the Bourbons on the other. To this treaty was added a secret convention, in which it was declared that the two empires having acted in unison in the affairs of Germany at the epoch of the treaty of Teschen, now again united their influence to effect in Germany such arrangements of territory as would be most favourable to the equilibrium of Europe; that France should endeavour to procure an advantageous indemnity for the elector of Bavaria, the grand duke of Wurtemberg, and the grand duke of Baden (this last had been added to the *protégés* of Russia because of the new empress, who was a princess of Baden); that the state of Naples should be evacuated at the maritime peace, and in case of a war enjoy a neutrality; and that lastly, they should understand each other respecting the interests of the king of Sardinia, when it shall be needful, and "in the manner most compatible with the existing state of things."

The first consul immediately sent his aid-de-camp, Caulincourt, to St. Petersburg, to be bearer of a clever and courteous letter, in which he congratulated the czar upon the conclusion of peace, also communicating to him, with a species of complaisance, a multitude of details, appearing as if he was ready mutually to unite with him in the direction of the more important affairs of the world. Caulincourt was designed to fill the place of Duroc, who had returned in too much haste from St. Petersburg, and he was to remain until an envoy was appointed. The first consul had sent to Duroc a considerable sum of money, with an order for him to attend the coronation of the emperor, and to represent France upon the occasion with becoming brilliancy. Duroc, having departed, had not received the order. He had been induced to return from another cause. Alexander had sent him a letter

inviting him to attend at his coronation; but count Panin had not transmitted the invitation. At a later period an explanation upon the subject having taken place, the emperor, mortified at his orders not being executed, sent count Panin to his estates, and he was replaced by M. Kotschoubey, one of the members of the occult council. Thus the young emperor began to disembarrass himself of the men who had contributed to his coming upon the throne, and who sought to draw him into a system of policy exclusively English. Every thing now presaged an amicable state of affairs with Russia. The delicate attention and flattery of the first consul could not fail to render this result more certain.

The different treaties which thus completed the peace of the world, were signed nearly at the same time as the preliminaries of London. The satisfaction of the public was at its height, and it was determined to give a grand festival to celebrate the general peace. The day fixed was the 18th of Brumaire. It was not possible to choose a better day, because it was to the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire that all these glorious results were to be attributed. Lord Cornwallis was invited to be present. He arrived in Paris on the 16th Brumaire, or 7th of November, with a great number of his countrymen. Scarcely were the preliminaries signed, when the applications for passports to M. Otto became exceedingly numerous. Three hundred had been sent over to him, but they were not sufficient, and it became necessary to furnish him with an unlimited number. The owners of vessels intended to be sent to France for French commodities and to export those of England, were alike eager to obtain the same permissions. All these demands were granted with perfect good will, as the relations between the two countries were re-established immediately, with a promptitude and an alacrity almost incredible. By the 18th of Brumaire, Paris was already full of English, impatient to see the new France, that had become at once so brilliant; above all, to see the man, who at that moment was the admiration of England, as he was of the whole world. The illustrious Fox was one of the first of the English who started for France. On the day of the festival that was rendered so fine by the peaceful and profound joy of all classes of the citizens, carriages were prohibited from passing along the public streets. No exception was made except in the case of lord Cornwallis. The crowd opened respectfully before the honourable representative of the English armies, who came to make peace between France and his own country. He was surprised to find this same France so different from the hideous picture which the emigrants had painted of it in London. All his countrymen partook of the same feeling, and expressed themselves to the like effect with undisguised admiration.

While this entertainment was celebrated at Paris, a superb banquet was given in the city of London, and there, amidst the loudest acclamations, the following toasts were given :—

"The king of Great Britain."

"The prince of Wales."

"The liberty and prosperity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland."

"The first consul, Bonaparte, the liberty and happiness of the French republic."

Loud and unanimous applause accompanied the last toast.

France had thus made peace with all the nations of the world. There was still another peace to conclude, more difficult perhaps than that just made, because it demanded a different order of genius from that which commands in battle-fields. It was also very desirable, because it would establish peace in the minds of men, and unanimity in families. This peace was that of the republic with the church. The moment is now arrived to narrate the laborious negotiations with the representative of the holy see which had this for their object.

BOOK XII.

THE CONCORDAT.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH DURING THE REVOLUTION.—THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY DECREED BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.—THIS CONSTITUTION, IN ASSIMILATING THE ADMINISTRATION OF RELIGION TO THAT OF THE REALM, ESTABLISHES A DIOCESE IN EACH DEPARTMENT, DECLARES THE BISHOPS ARE TO BE ELECTED BY THE FAITHFUL, AND DISPENSES CANONICAL INSTITUTIONS.—OATH OF FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION EXACTED OF THE CLERGY.—REFUSAL OF THE OATH, AND SCHISM.—DIFFERENT CLASSES OF PRIESTS, THEIR CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE.—INCONVENIENCE OF THIS STATE OF THINGS.—MEANS THAT IT FURNISHED TO THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION TO TROUBLE FAMILIES AND THE STATE.—DIFFERENT SYSTEMS PROPOSED AS A REMEDY FOR THE EVIL.—THE SYSTEM OF INACTION.—THE SYSTEM OF A FRENCH CHURCH OF WHICH THE FIRST CONSUL SHOULD BE THE HEAD.—SYSTEM OF STRONG ENCOURAGEMENT TO PROTESTANTISM.—OPINIONS OF THE FIRST CONSUL ON THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS PROPOSED.—HE FORMS A SCHEME FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION, ADAPTING ITS DISCIPLINE TO THE NEW INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE.—HE WISHES FOR THE DEPOSITION OF THE ANCIENT TITULARY BISHOPS, AND A LIMITATION COMPRISING SIXTY SEES IN PLACE OF ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHT; THE CREATION OF A NEW CLERGY, COMPOSED OF RESPECTABLE PRIESTS OF ALL THE PARTIES; THE STATE TO HAVE THE REGULATION OF THE FORMS OF WORSHIP.—SALARIES FOR THE PRIESTS IN PLACE OF LAND ENDOWMENTS.—SANCTION BY THE CHURCH OF THE SALE OF NATIONAL PROPERTY.—AMICABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN POPE PIUS VII. AND THE FIRST CONSUL.—MONSIGNOR SPINA, CHARGED WITH THE NEGOTIATION AT PARIS, RETARDS IT THROUGH THE TEMPORAL INTEREST OF THE HOLY SEE.—SECRET WISH TO RECOVER THE LEGATIONS.—MONSIGNOR SPINA FINDS THE NECESSITY OF PROCEEDING MORE RAPIDLY.—HE CONFERS WITH THE ABBÉ BERNIER, WHO IS CHARGED WITH THE BUSINESS ON BEHALF OF FRANCE.—DIFFICULTIES OF THE PLAN PROPOSED IN SIGHT OF THE ROMAN COURT.—THE FIRST CONSUL SENDS HIS PLAN TO ROME, AND REQUESTS THE POPE TO EXPLAIN IT.—THREE CARDINALS CONSULTED.—THE POPE, AFTER THIS CONSULTATION, WISHES THAT THE CATHOLIC RELIGION BE DECLARED THAT OF THE STATE; THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO DEPOSE THE ANCIENT TITULAR BISHOPS, NOR OTHERWISE THAN BY HIS SILENCE SANCTION THE SALE OF THE CHURCH PROPERTY.—DEBATES WITH M. DE CACAULT THE FRENCH MINISTER AT ROME.—THE FIRST CONSUL, TIRED OF THE SLUGGISHNESS OF THE PROCEEDINGS, ORDERS M. DE CACAULT TO QUIT ROME IN FIVE DAYS, IF THE CONCORDAT IS NOT ADOPTED AFTER THAT DELAY.—TERROR OF THE POPE AND CARDINAL GONSALVI.—M. DE CACAULT SUGGESTS TO THE PAPAL CABINET THE IDEA OF SENDING CARDINAL GONSALVI TO PARIS.—THE CARDINAL SETS OFF FOR FRANCE, AND HIS APPREHENSIONS.—HIS ARRIVAL IN PARIS, AND KIND RECEPTION FROM THE FIRST CONSUL.—CONFERENCES WITH THE ABBÉ BERNIER.—UNDERSTANDING UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF A STATE RELIGION.—THE CATHOLIC RELIGION DECLARED TO BE THAT OF THE MAJORITY OF FRENCHMEN.—ALL THE OTHER CONDITIONS OF THE FIRST CONSUL, RELATIVE TO THE DEPOSITION OF THE ANCIENT TITULARS, TO THE NEW BOUNDARIES, TO THE SALE OF THE CHURCH PROPERTY, ARE ACCEPTED, EXCEPT SOME ALTERATION OF TERMS IN THE COMPILATION.—DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT UPON ALL THESE POINTS.—EFFORTS MADE AT THE LAST MOMENT, BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF WORSHIP, TO HINDER THE FIRST CONSUL FROM SIGNING THE CONCORDAT.—HE PERSISTS, AND GIVES HIS SIGNATURE JULY 15, 1801.—RETURN OF CARDINAL GONSALVI TO ROME.—SATISFACTION OF THE POPE.—THE RATIFICATIONS SOLEMNIZED.—CHOICE OF CARDINAL CAPRARA AS LEGATE À LATERE.—THE FIRST CONSUL WOULD HAVE WISHED TO CELEBRATE PEACE WITH THE CHURCH AT THE SAME TIME AS PEACE WITH ALL THE EUROPEAN POWERS.—NECESSITY OF APPLYING TO THE FORMER TO OBTAIN THEIR RESIGNATIONS, CAUSES A DELAY.—A DEMAND FOR THIS RESIGNATION ADDRESSED BY THE POPE TO ALL THE OLD BISHOPS, CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT.—WISE SUBMISSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BISHOPS.—NOBLE RESIGNATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE OLD CLERGY.—ADMIRABLE ANSWERS.—THE ONLY RESISTANCE IS FROM THE EMIGRANT BISHOPS IN LONDON.—EVERY THING READY FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF WORSHIP IN FRANCE, BUT A WARM OPPOSITION IN THE TRIBUNATE CAUSES FRESH DELAY.—NECESSITY OF OVERCOMING THIS OPPOSITION BEFORE GOING FURTHER.

THE first consul would have wished that on the anniversary of the 18th of Brumaire, devoted to the celebration of peace between France and the rest of Europe; it had also been possible to celebrate the reconciliation of France with the church. He had made great efforts in order that the negotiations with the holy see might terminate in due time for the admission of religious ceremonies, amid the national rejoicings. But it is much less easy to treat with the spiritual powers than with the temporal, because the winning of battles is not sufficient; but it is to the honour of the human mind that force cannot overcome it, unless that force be accompanied by persuasion.

It was the difficult task of joining persuasion and force that the conqueror of Marengo and Rivoli had attempted in regard to the Roman church, in order to reconcile it with the French republic.

The revolution, as has been already several times said, had in many things passed the desirable limit. To make it go back in these matters without going beyond or stopping short of the object in view, was a legitimate and salutary act which

the first consul had undertaken, and which he rendered admirable by the wisdom and ability he employed for the purpose he had in view.

Religion was clearly one of those things respecting which the revolution had exceeded all limits that were just and reasonable. In no case was there so much reparation demanded as here.

There had existed under the old monarchy a clergy of great power and influence, in possession of a large part of the land. It consisted of those who supported no part of the public expenditure, who presented such gifts as they pleased to the royal treasury; who were a constituted political body, and formed one of the three orders that in the states-general expressed the national will. The revolution had swept away the clergy and their fortunes, influence, and privileges; it had sent with them the nobility, the parliaments, and the throne itself. It was impossible for it to have done otherwise. A clergy, the members of which were proprietors of land, constituting a political power, might have been well enough adapted to society in the middle ages, and at that time have been useful to civilization; but it was inadmissible in the eighteenth century. The constituent assembly had done well in abolishing it, and substituting in its place a clergy devoted solely to the functions of religious worship, a stranger to political deliberations, and salaried in place of being landowners. But it was exacting too much from the holy see, to request its approbation of all these changes. If it was needful to obtain this consent, it would have been proper to stop there, and not to furnish the papal authority with a legitimate ground for saying, that religion itself was attacked in all which it held sacred and immutable. The constituent assembly, prompted by a desire for the regularity of system, so natural to a reforming spirit, assimilated the administration of the church to that of the state without hesitation. Some of the dioceses were too large, and others too limited; that body wished that the ecclesiastical boundaries should be the same as those adopted in the civil administration, and that dioceses should be created departmentally. Rendering elective all the civil and judicial functions, the ecclesiastical functions were also to be rendered elective. This arrangement appeared besides to be in conformity with, and a return to the times of the primitive church, when the bishops were elected by the faithful. The same blow struck down the canonical institution, or, in other words, the confirmation of the bishops by the pope; with all these dispositions there was constituted what was denominated the civil constitution of the clergy. The individuals who thus acted were animated by the most religious intentions; they were true believers, fervent Jansenists, but of narrow minds, their heads heated with theological disputations, and in consequence dangerous persons to direct human affairs. To complete this error, they exacted of the French clergy, that they should take an oath of fidelity to the civil constitution, a measure which could only give birth to a scruple of conscience among the more sincere, and a pretext to the badly-disposed priests. It was, in one word, to open the door to a schism. Rome, already aggrieved by the misfortunes of the throne, was now irritated at the infliction upon the altar. She interdicted the oath. A part of the clergy, faithful to the holy see, refused to take the oath; another part consented, and formed under the name of the "sworn clergy [1]," or the constitutional, that part which was acknowledged by the state, and alone admitted to the exercise of their sacred functions. The priests were not yet proscribed; they were contented to interdict them from the exercise of their professional duties, and to invest with them those who had taken the oath. But the discarded priests were the men who, for the most part, were preferred by those faithful to the doctrines of the church. For the conscience in religious persons is susceptible, quickly alarmed, and, above all, distrustful of arbitrary power. Here it inclined towards those ecclesiastics who passed for orthodox, and who appeared to be undergoing persecution. It turned away instinctively from those whose orthodoxy was in doubt, and who were supported by the government. There was consequently at the same time a public and a clandestine worship, the last having more followers than the first. Those whose sentiments were opposed to the revolution, leagued themselves with the party whose religious feelings had been outraged, and precipitated it into the errors of the spirit of faction. This schism soon led in the contest of La Vendée to a frightful civil war. The revolutionary government did not remain behind it, and from the simple privation of the ecclesiastical functions, it in a little time proceeded to persecute. It proscribed and transported the clergy. Then came the abolition of every form of worship, and in its place the proclamation of a Supreme Being. Then priests, sworn or unsworn, were one and the other treated alike, and all sent to perish upon the same scaffold, where royalists, constituents, Girondins, constitutionalists, and Mountains, all went to their death together.

Under the directory these sanguinary proscriptions ceased. A variable course was pursued, now inclining to indifference, now to rigour, and keeping the church still in a state of great anxiety. The first consul, by his power, and the continued evidence of his reparatory intentions, inspired hope in the ministers of religion who had suffered, on whatever side they were, and made them leave their places of concealment, or return home from their exile. But in thus bringing them forth to daylight, he rendered the schism more sensible to observation, perhaps more distasteful. To abrogate the difficulty about the oath, he ceased to exact it, substituting in its place a simple promise of submission to the laws. This promise, which could not alarm the conscience of the priests, had facilitated their return to France, but in some degree had added new divisions to those already in existence, by creating in the body of the clergy another and an additional class.

There were thus the constitutional or "sworn" priests, legally invested with the sacerdotal functions, and having the use of the edifices devoted to religion, which had been given back to them in virtue of a decree of the consuls. There were the "unsworn" priests, who, not having taken any oath, and after having lived in exile or in prison, appeared once more in a great number during the beginning of the consulate, but who only officiated in the

[1] Clergé assermenté.

houses of private individuals, and declared the worship performed in the churches to be of no effect. Finally, the "unsworn" priests were divided into those who had not promised to take the oath and those who had. The last were not completely approved by the orthodox. Rome was addressed upon this subject; but out of deference to the first consul she had declined giving any explanation. Cardinal Maury, who had retired into the Roman states, where he became bishop of Montefiascone, and the intermediate agent between the pope and the royalist party, having no desire at that moment to favour the submission of the priests to the new government, had interpreted the silence of the pope in his own manner, and sent to France on the subject of "the promise," disapproving letters, which caused new troubles to scrupulous consciences.

The priests, thus divided, had, each party, its own peculiar hierarchy. The constitutional priests obeyed the bishops elected under the civil constitution. Among these bishops some had died by violence, some by a natural death. Those who died were replaced by bishops who, not having been regularly elected, in the midst of the time of the proscriptions which struck alike at all forms of religion, had usurped their authority, or were elected by the clandestine chapters, a species of religious coteries, without any moral or legal authority. Thus the authority of the constitutional bishops themselves, regarded in their relation to the civil constitution, was contested among their own body, and brought into disrepute. There were among this body of clergy a certain number of respectable individuals; but in general they had lost the confidence of the faithful, because they were known to be at variance with Rome, and because they had lost the dignity of the priesthood by mingling themselves up in the religious and political disputes of the time. Some were, in fact, violent club-spouters, destitute of moral worth. The good among them were sincere men, whom the fury of Jansenism had driven to be schismatic.

The pretended orthodox clergy had also their bishops, who exercised a less public authority, but one more real, and exceedingly dangerous. The "unsworn" bishops were nearly all emigrants. They had gone to Italy, Spain, Germany, and, above all, to England, whither they were attracted by the allowances afforded them from the British government. Corresponding with their dioceses, by means of grand-vicars, chosen by themselves, and approved by Rome, they governed their sees in distant exile, under the impulses and passions to which exile naturally gives birth, and often to the advantage of the enemies of France. Those who were dead, and of these, in the course of ten years, the number was considerable, were every where replaced by concealed administrators, deriving their powers from the court of Rome. The mode of administering to vacant sees by the chapters, and not by the agents of the holy see, was one of the wisest precautions, as well as the more ancient, of the Gallican church; it was now completely abandoned. The Gallican church was thus robbed of its independence; because it came to be governed directly by Rome when it ceased to be under the bishops who had emigrated. In a little time more, the emigrant bishops being all dead, the entire of the French church would have been placed under ultramontane authority.

There are some who regard but little the moral aspect of a social community torn to pieces by a thousand sects, who are of opinion that the government should treat them with disregard, as strangers to their policy, or else respect as sacred all religious differences alike. There are grounds, however, which forbid the display of this arrogant indifference, as, in case of society being deeply troubled, and, more particularly, when the disturbance is ever ready to change into physical disorganization.

Each of these divisions of the clergy endeavoured to establish its power over the consciences of the orthodox in its own view. The constitutional clergy had very little power; they were merely subjects of recrimination for the Jacobins, who were in the habit of declaring that the revolution was every where sacrificed, more especially in the persons of the only priests that had supported its cause. In this, however, the government could evidently do nothing; because it did not belong to the rulers to dispose of the faithful, in favour of one part of the clergy above another. But the clergy reputed to be orthodox operated upon the minds of their flocks, in a sense contrary, entirely, to all established order. They endeavoured to estrange from the government all those, who, wearied out by the turmoil of civil dissension, felt inclined to rally around the first consul. If it had been possible to awaken the bad passions that had led to the civil war in La Vendée, they would have done it. Through their efforts, discontent and mistrust were sown all over the country. The south, in a less submissive state to the government than La Vendée, was kept in continual commotion; and in the mountainous districts, in the centre of France, the population gathered tumultuously around the orthodox priesthood. Every where the clergy alarmed the consciences and disturbed the peace of families, persuading those who had been baptized or married by the sworn priests, that they were out of the pale of the orthodox communion; that if they wished to be true Christians, they ought to be baptized and married over again, or give up the state of concubinage. In this mode the state of families, not indeed in any legal point of view, but in a religious sense, was brought into question. There were more than ten thousand married priests, who, led on by the rage of the time, or through terror, had sought in marriage, the one the gratification of passions they could not control, the others an abjuration of their vows, to escape the scaffold. They were husbands, the fathers of numerous families, and yet had no refuge from public contempt, as long as the pardon of the church was withheld from them.

The purchasers of national property, a body of men whom the government had the deepest interest in protecting, were living in a state of anxiety and oppression. They were assailed on the bed of death by the most sinister suggestions, and threatened with eternal damnation, if they did not consent to such an arrangement of their affairs as would despoil them of all their property. Confession thus became a powerful weapon in the hands of the emigrant priests, for attacking the rights of property, public credit, and, in a word,

one of the most essential principles of the revolution, the inviolability of the sale of the national property. The policy of the state and the power of the law were alike inert against evils of this character.

Such disorders as these it was impossible for any government to regard with indifference. When religious sects produce no other effect than to multiply over a vast territory, like that of America, in an endless succession, not leaving behind them more than the passing remembrance of ridiculous inventions or indecent practices, it may be imagined, that, to a certain extent, the state may continue inactive and indifferent. Society presents a deplorable moral aspect, but public order is not seriously affected. It was not thus in the midst of the old French society of 1801. It was not possible, without very great danger, to deliver over the care of souls to factions that were inimical to the state. It was not possible to abandon to their hands the torch of civil war, with the liberty of applying it, whenever they saw fit, in La Vendée, Britany, or the Cevennes. It was not to be permitted, that the repose of families should be troubled, the beds of the dying be besieged, to extort iniquitous conditions, to place in jeopardy the credit of the government, and, finally, to shake one class of property, which the revolution had stamped with perpetual inviolability.

The first consul's mode of thinking, in regard to the constitution of society, had too much depth as well as justice, to permit his observation of the religious disorders of France at this moment with an indifferent eye. He had, besides, other reasons of a more elevated nature than those already mentioned, for his interference in the present circumstances, if indeed there can be more elevated reasons than public order and the tranquillity of families.

There must be a religious belief; and some kind of worship must be extant in every state of human society. Man, cast into the midst of the universe, without a knowledge whence he comes or whither he will go, why he suffers or wherefore he exists; unknowing what rewards or what punishments may await the long struggles of life; besieged by the contradictions of his fellow-beings, some of whom tell him that there is a God, the profound and wise author of all things, and some that there is no God at all; one maintaining that there is a law of right and wrong, by which his conduct is to be regulated; another that there is neither good nor evil, but that these are inventions of the great and powerful and selfish of the earth—man, in the midst of these contradictions, finds the imperious necessity of having some fixed standard of belief. Whether true or false, sublime or ridiculous, he must have a religion. Every where, in all times and countries, in the days of antiquity as in those more modern, in civilized as in barbarous nations, he is found a worshipper at some altar, either venerable, ignoble, or sanguinary. Wherever there is no dominant form of belief, a thousand sects, given to obstinate disputations, as in America, or a thousand shameful superstitions, as in China, agitate and degrade the human mind; or thus, as in France, in 1793, when a passing commotion swept away the ancient religion of the country, at the very moment that he vowed his belief in nothing, man forswore himself directly afterwards, by the insensate worship of the goddess of Reason, inaugurated at the side of the scaffold, as if to prove that his vow was as vain as it was impious.

To judge man, therefore, by his constant and ordinary conduct, he has need of a religious belief; and such being the fact, nothing can be more desirable for a civilized society than a national faith, founded on the real feelings of the human heart, conformable to the regulation of a pure morality, hallowed by time, and which, without persecution or intolerance, can unite, at the foot of a venerable and respected altar, if not the universality, at least the large majority of the citizens.

A creed of this nature cannot be invented for the purpose, it must be the growth of ages. Philosophers, even the most sublime, may be able to create a new system, and may act, through science, upon the age which they honour; but they can only make men think, not believe. Warriors, covered with glory, may be able to lay the foundations of an empire, but they cannot found a religion. In past times, sages and heroes, there is no doubt, attributing to themselves celestial communications, have enslaved the popular mind with systems of belief. In modern days, the founder of a new religion would be regarded as an impostor; whether surrounded by the terrors of Robespierre, or the glory that encircled young Bonaparte, the attempt would equally terminate in ridicule.

There was nothing to be invented in 1800. The pure, moral, ancient faith existed; the old religion of Christ—the work of God according to some, of man according to others; but under all views, the profound work of a sublime reformer, a reformer commented upon for eighteen centuries, by councils, consisting of assemblies of eminent men of every age, occupied in discussing, under the title of heresies, every system of philosophy, adopting, successively, on each of the great problems upon the destiny of man, the most plausible opinions, and those most suited to society, and adopting such opinions by what might be called a majority of the human race. Thus, at last, they arrived at the production of that unvarying doctrine, often attacked, and ever triumphant, the *Catholic Unity*, at the foot of which the first men of genius prostrated themselves. That religion still existed; it was the same that had extended itself over every civilized people, formed their manners, inspired their songs, furnished the subjects of their poesy, their pictures, and statues; whose traces were stamped upon all national recollections, whose sign was emblazoned upon their colours, alternately vanquished and victorious. It had for a moment disappeared, during a raging tempest of the human mind; but that tempest blown over, the necessity of a religion returned, and it was found deeply seated in the bottom of the soul, the natural and indispensable faith of France and of Europe.

What more was indicated as necessary in 1800, than to raise up again the altar of St. Louis, of Charlemagne, and of Clovis, which had been for a moment overturned! Bonaparte would have rendered himself ridiculous if he had set himself up for a prophet or a dealer in revelation; he was in the true sphere assigned him by Providence, for

elevating again their venerable altar with his own victorious hands, and bringing back to the faith, by his own example, the population that for a time had wandered from its way. His glory alone was equal to such a task. Men of the greatest genius, not only among philosophers, but kings, Voltaire and Frederic of Prussia, had thrown contempt on the Catholic religion, and by their example gave origin to the railleries cast upon it for fifty years. General Bonaparte, who had as much mind as Voltaire, while he excelled Frederic in glory, was able of himself, by his example and aspect, to put to silence the jeers of the last century.

Upon this subject, he had in his mind not the smallest doubt. The double motive of re-establishing order in the state and in private families, of satisfying the mere want of souls, inspired him with the firm resolution to restore the Catholic religion to its former footing, deprived, indeed, of its political attributes, for he regarded these as altogether incompatible with the existing state of French society.

Is there then any necessity, with such motives for his guide, to inquire whether he acted through the inspiration of a religious faith, through policy or ambition? He acted under the influence of wisdom, in fact, through a profound knowledge of the human heart; that may suffice: the rest remains a mystery, that curiosity, always natural in observing the conduct of a great genius, may endeavour to penetrate, but which in reality imports little. It must still be observed thus far, that the moral constitution of Bonaparte inclined him to religious ideas[1]. An intelligence of a superior cast is always, in proportion to its innate superiority, struck by the beauties of creation. It is intellect which discovers and penetrates into the intellect of the universe; a great mind is more capable than an inferior one, of seeing the Supreme Being through his works. Bonaparte willingly entered upon controversial discussions upon questions of religion or philosophy with Monge, Lagrange, and Laplace, men of learning whom he greatly honoured and esteemed; and he often embarrassed them in their incredulity by the clearness, originality, and strength of his arguments. To this it must be added, that he was brought up in an uncultivated and religious country, under the eyes of a pious mother; and the sight of an old catholic altar awakened in him the recollections of his infancy, always so powerful in a sensitive and lofty imagination. In respect to ambition, to which certain detractors have ascribed his conduct in this circumstance, he had no other at the time than to act as was best for his object in every thing; and without doubt if he saw that any augmentation of power would accrue in the way of recompense, for a work so well accomplished, he may be well excused for indulging the feeling. It is the noblest, most legitimate, ambition, which seeks to ground its power in satisfying the real necessities of a nation.

The task which he proposed to perform, though apparently very easy, because it was directed to the satisfaction of a public want, was a very hard one. Those who surrounded him were, nearly all without exception, very little inclined to the re-establishment of the old system of worship. They were men who, whether magistrates, soldiers, men of literature or science, had been among the founders of the French revolution, the true and staunch defenders of the revolution now decried, and they were those with whom it was required to carry it out to completion, by the reparation of its errors and the definitive hallowing of its rational and legitimate results. The first consul was thus compelled to act opposite to his colleagues, supporters, and friends. These individuals, belonging to the ranks of the moderate revolutionists, had never, with Robespierre and St. Just, spilled human blood. There was no difficulty in their disavowal of the frantic excesses of the revolution; but they had become involved in the errors of the constituent assembly, and were accustomed to repeat, laughingly, the pleasantries of Voltaire. It was not easy for them to be made to acknowledge that they had mistaken, for so long a time, the stronger truths of social order. Men of learning, like Laplace, Lagrange, and above all, Monge, said to the first consul, that he was going to lay at the feet of Rome all the dignity of his government and of his age. Rœderer, the most furious monarchist of the day, who would have royalty restored in its most perfect form as quickly as possible, saw with trouble the project for the restoration of the old forms of worship. Talleyrand himself, the industrious promoter of every thing that might make the present approximate to the past, and France to the other states of Europe; Talleyrand, the second labourer in, and a useful and zealous labourer too, at the work of the general peace, even he regarded with great coolness what was usually denominated the religious peace. He was opposed to any further persecution of the priests, but he felt chagrined at certain personal recollections, and was not at all desirous of the re-establishment of the old Catholic church, with its discipline and regulations. The comrades in arms of the first consul, the generals who had fought under him, destitute, as most of them were, of the first rudiments of education, brought up amidst the vulgar railleries of camps, some of them declaimers in clubs, were repugnant to the restoration of worship. Although covered with glory, they appeared to apprehend the ridicule that would

[1] Bonaparte, upon his own authority, was much touched by early associations, as all men of genius are. This, if any thing besides but the sound policy that directed his conduct, will fully account both for the restoration of the Catholic church—very different in constitution from that the Revolution destroyed, it must be admitted—without attributing to him any participation in its peculiar doctrines. He was a believer in a Supreme Cause, but not in the doctrines of a Christian church, as the sense of our author would seem distinctly to leave to be inferred. Bonaparte said at St. Helena: "Every thing proclaims the existence of a God, *that* cannot be questioned; but all our religions are evidently the work of men. Why are they so many? Why has ours not always existed? Why does it consider itself exclusively the right one? What becomes, in that case, of all the virtuous men that have gone before us? Why do these religions revile, oppose, exterminate one another? Why has this been the case ever and every where? Because men are ever men; because priests have ever and every where introduced fraud and falsehood. However, as soon as I had the power, I immediately re-established religion. I made it the ground-work and foundation upon which I built," &c. Again: "I am assuredly very far from being an atheist; but I cannot believe all I am taught, in spite of my reason, without being false and an hypocrite." LAS CASES' ST. HELENA.—*Translator.*

fall upon them at the foot of the altar. Lastly, the brothers of the first consul, who associated a great deal with literary men, and were yet more imbued with the spirit of the writings of the preceding century, were apprehensive on account of their brother's power, fearing every thing that bore the aspect of offering a serious resistance, and not discovering that beyond the interested or ignorant resistance of those who were in opposition to the government, there was a real want, already felt by the popular masses—they endeavoured to dissuade their brother from what they deemed an imprudent and premature reaction.

The first consul was besieged with every kind of advice. Some wished to dissuade him from touching upon religious matters at all, to limit himself to putting a stop to the persecution of the priests, and leave the sworn and unsworn clergy to arrange their own differences. Others, who were aware of the danger of inaction and indifference, urged him to seize the occasion, and by making himself immediately the head of the French church, prevent the immense influence of religion being used in France by a foreign authority. Many proposed to him to urge on France to protestantism, saying, that if he would set the example of becoming a protestant, France would quickly follow his example.

The first consul resisted, with the utmost efforts of his reasoning and eloquence, these vulgar counsels. He had formed, for his own use, a small library of religious books, exceedingly well selected, the greater part relating to the history of the church, and above all to the relations of the church with the state. He had the Latin works of Bossuet upon this subject translated. He read all these with great earnestness in the short intervals which his public duties allowed him, and supplying with his genius that of which he was ignorant, as he did when he drew up the civil code, he astonished every body by the justice, variety, and extent of his knowledge upon the different forms of worship. According to his usual custom, when a thought occupied his mind, he entered upon its discussion, day after day, with his colleagues, the ministers, or the legislative body, in fact with all and every one with whom he believed it useful to regulate and correct an opinion. He successively refuted the erroneous systems proposed to him, and he did so with lucid, fair, and decisive arguments.

To the system, which consists in not meddling with religious affairs, he answered that the indifference so preached up by certain disdainful persons, was of small account with a people whom they had very recently seen, for example, take possession of a church by force, and threaten to pillage it because the rites of sepulture had been denied to an actress, who had been a public favourite. How was it possible to remain indifferent in a country wherewith the pretension of indifference to religion there was so little indifference in reality? The first consul asked besides, how it was possible to avoid interfering, when the priests, "sworn" and "unsworn," were continually disputing with each other for the religious edifices, and calling incessantly upon the government for its intervention to eject those in possession, and put their opponents in their places. He demanded what he was to do when the constitutional clergy, already little attended by the religious part of the community, should be entirely abandoned, and the party who had refused to take the oath, should alone be listened to and followed, and should be exclusively in possession of the privilege of performing duty, as had happened already, and of performing it too in the midst of clandestine congregations. Would it not be an imperious duty to restore the temporal part of the worship to those who could alone exercise the spiritual? Would not that be an interference? And then the priests, whose provisions in land had been seized during the revolution, must have the means of living, be placed on the list of state pensioners in the budget, or be permitted to organize, under the name of voluntary contributions, a vast system of taxation, the produce of which would be 30,000,000 f. or 40,000,000 f., the entire distribution of which would remain in their own hands, perhaps in the hands of foreigners, and go some day, without the knowledge of the government, to the support of the old soldiers of the civil war in La Vendée. However, it might be considered, the government would be soon forced, despite its inaction, to take some part either for the support of good order or for the disposal of the edifices of worship, for paying the priests itself, or watching the mode in which they exacted their remuneration. Thus, there would be incurred the charge of governing without the advantages, without being able, which it would be prudent to do, by an arrangement with the holy see, to secure to itself the religious administration, to bring back the clergy to the government, associate them in the work of reparation, re-establish the quiet of families, tranquillize the minds of the dying, the possessors of national property, the married priests and others: indeed all who had been committed by the part they had acted in the revolution.

Inaction, then, was a complete dream, according to the first consul, and it was, besides, no more than an excuse, devised by those who had no practical notion of the art of governing.

As to the plan of creating a French church free of all foreign supremacy, like that of England, having, in place of a spiritual head abroad, a temporal head at home, which could be no other than the government itself, or, in other words, the first consul, that was equally vain and contemptible. What he, a soldier wearing a sword and spurs, giving battles—he the head of a church, a species of pope regulating discipline and dogma! They would not surely attempt to make him as odious as Robespierre, the inventor of the worship of the Supreme Being, or as ridiculous as Laréveillère Lepeaux, the inventor of the theo-philanthropy! Who, in such a case was he to have for his disciples? Who would compose his flock of the faithful? They would not, most assuredly, be orthodox Christians, to whom the majority of Catholics belonged, but who had an aversion to following excellent priests, who had no other fault than that of taking the oath prescribed by the law. The only followers for whom he could hope, would be a few bad priests, a few runaway monks out of the convents, habituated to clubs, that, having led bad lives, and wishing to continue in the same course, awaited the head of the new church to obtain for the priests permission to marry! He could not, for his part, hope to number among his flock the abbé

Grégoire, who, in demanding in all things a return to the primitive church, still clung to continuing in communion with the successor of St. Peter! He could not have Laréveillère Lepeaux, who wanted to confine republican worship to some religious staves, and a few flowers strewed upon an altar! Was such the church of which they desired to make him the chief or head! Was that the character to which they were desirous he should be reduced, the victor at Rivoli and Marengo, the restorer of social order? Yet, was this scheme proposed to him by friends jealous of liberty! But in supposing that such a scheme might succeed, which was besides impossible to be the case, suppose it to succeed, and that to his temporal power, already so great, they should unite the spiritual, the first consul would become the most formidable of tyrants; he would be master of body and soul, not less than the sultan at Constantinople, who is at once the head of the state, of the army, and of the faith! Again the hypothesis was vain; he could only be a ridiculous tyrant, because he could only be successful by producing the most foolish schism of all. He who wished to be the pacificator of France and of the world, to terminate all the religious and political divisions, was he to become the founder of a new schism, only a little more absurd, and not less dangerous, than those that had preceded it? "Yes, without doubt," said the first consul, "a pope will be necessary for me; but a pope who will reconcile in place of dividing men's minds; who will reunite them, and gain them to the government sprung from the revolution, as the price for the protection which they will obtain. For this purpose the real pope, catholic, apostolic, and Roman, he, whose seat is in the Vatican, will suit me. With the French armies and due consideration, I shall always be sufficiently his master. When I shall again raise up the altars, protect the priests, feed them, and treat them as ministers of religion deserve to be treated in every country, he will do all I require of him for the interest of the general tranquillity. He will calm men's minds, reunite them under his own hand, and place them under mine. Less than this is only a continuance and an aggravation of the desolating schism which is eating us up, and towards me points a great ineffaceable ridicule."

The idea of urging protestantism upon France, appeared to the first consul beyond being ridiculous; it was odious. First, he thought he should succeed no better with it; according to him, people were wrong who fancied that in France it was possible for him to do what he wished. It was an error by no means honourable for those who fell into it, for it implied that France was destitute of opinion and conscience. He did what he wished, some said:—"Yes," he would reply, "but only in the sense of her real and sensible wants." France had been in deep troubles, and he had conducted her to perfect peace; he had found her the prey of anarchists, who even began to forget how to defend her against foreigners, and he had dispersed those anarchists, re-established order, sent at a distance from the frontiers the Austrians and Russians; given the peace for which she was so earnest; had put a stop, in a word, to the scandals of a feeble and dissolute government; was it at all astonishing that France had permitted him to do these things? Again, recently the opposition in the tribunate had desired to refuse him the means of clearing the high roads of the robbers which infested them. Yet after that there were some persons who pretended that he could do what he pleased. It was a mistake. He was able to do that which the necessities and opinions predominant in France gave him power to do, and no more. He could act better, more powerfully than another, but he could do nothing against the actual movement of opinion. That movement pointed towards the re-establishment of all things essential to society; and religion was the foremost. "I am very powerful at present," cried the first consul; "very well—were I to wish to change the old religion of France, she would array herself against me and conquer me. Do you know when the country was hostile to the catholic religion? It was when the government, in conjunction with it, burned books, and sent to the wheel Calas and Labarre; but you may be sure, that were I to become an enemy to religion, the entire country would join her. I should change those who were indifferent into staunch catholics. I should be a little less jested upon, perhaps, for desiring to push on protestantism, than if I set myself up for the patriarch of the Gallican church; but I should soon be an object of public hatred. Is protestantism the old religion of France? Is that the faith which after long civil wars, after a thousand contests, was definitively fixed as the faith most in conformity to the manners and genius of our nation? Is it not easy to be seen, that it is doing violence to desire to force one's opinion upon a people, to create for them usages, tastes, and recollections which they cannot feel? A principal charm of religion is in the recollections it recalls." "For my part," said the first consul one day in conversation, "when I am at Malmaison, I never hear the sound of the bell from the neighbouring village without emotion; who in France would be thus moved in those chapels were no one had ever gone in his infancy, and of which the cold and severe aspect accords so ill with the manners and feelings of our country." It may be thought advantageous, perhaps, not to be dependent upon a foreign head of the church. It is an error. Every where, and for all, there must be a head. There is no more admirable institution than that which maintains a unity of faith, and prevents, as much as possible, religious disputes. There is nothing more offensive than a crowd of sects disputing together, dealing out invectives, combating with arms in their hands, if in their first excess of passion; or if they have acquired the habit of living side by side, regarding each other with a jealous eye, forming coteries in the state which sustain each other, urging on their own partizans, keeping rival sects at a distance, and giving the government numerous embarrassments. The quarrels of religious sects are insupportable. Disputation is the province of science; it animates, sustains, and conducts it to discoveries. To what do religious disputes lead, if not to the uncertainty and ruin of all belief? Besides, when the spirit is directed to theological controversy, the controversy is so absorbing, that the mind of man is turned away from all useful research. Rarely do we encounter theological controversy combined with any great mental operation. Religious quarrels are cruel and sanguinary, or dry, bitter, and unfruitful

—none are more odious. Inquiry in matters of science; faith in matters of religion. Such is the truly useful course. The institution which supports a unity of faith, that is to say the pope, as the guardian of catholic unity, is an admirable institution. This head of the church is reproached for being a foreign sovereign. He is so, and it is right to thank Heaven for it. What—can there be imagined in any country a parallel authority by the side of the temporal government of the state? Thus united, such an authority would be the sultan's despotism; separate, hostile perhaps, to the political government, it must generate a fearful and intolerable rivalry. The pope is out of Paris; so far it is well. He is neither in Madrid, nor in Vienna; and it is on that account we support his spiritual authority. At Vienna and Madrid they congratulate themselves for the same reason. Do you think that if he were in Paris, the Viennese, the Spaniards, would pay attention to his decisions? It is fortunate that he does not reside among us, and that in residing away from us, he does not dwell among our rivals; that he inhabits the ancient Rome, afar from the hands of the emperors of Germany, afar from the kings of France or Spain, holding the balance between the catholic sovereigns, inclining a little always to the strongest, but soon recovering from that position if the strongest becomes an oppressor. Centuries have brought this about at last, and have done it well. For the government of souls it is the best, the most beneficent institution that one can imagine.

"I do not maintain these opinions," said the first consul, "with the warmth of a devotee, but by the rule of reason." "Listen," one day he said to Monge, whom he most highly esteemed of all the learned of that day, and whom he had constantly with him, "my religion, and such as mine, is very simple. I look at this universe so great, so complicated, so magnificent; and I say to myself, This could not have been produced by chance, but is the work, for whatever end intended, of an all-powerful, unknown Being, as superior himself to man, as the universe is superior to man's noblest machines. Search, Monge; get the assistance of your friends, the mathematicians and philosophers, you will not find one more powerful or more decisive argument than this; and whatever you may do to combat it, you cannot weaken its force. Yet this truth is too succinct for man. He wishes to know all about himself, about the future, and a whole crowd of secrets which the universe does not disclose. Allow religion, then, to inform him of all of which he feels the want of knowledge, and respect that which she will disclose. It is true, that what one creed advances as infallibly correct, is contradicted by another. As for me, I come to a different conclusion from M. Volney. Inasmuch as there are different creeds, which naturally draw conclusions against each other, he concludes that all are bad. I should rather find them all good, because all at bottom say the same thing. They are wrong only when they wish to proscribe one another: that must be prevented by good laws. The catholic religion is that of our country, that in which we were born; it has a government wisely conceived, which hinders disputes as much as it is possible to do so under the disputing temper of men; this government is out of Paris, that we must applaud; it is not at Vienna, it is not at Madrid, it is at Rome; therefore it is acceptable. If, since the institution of the papacy, there be any thing equally perfect, it is the relation of the Gallican church with the holy see, submissive and independent at the same time: submissive in matters of faith, independent in the policy of worship. The catholic unity and the articles of Bossuet show the true form of religious government. It is that we must re-establish. As to protestantism, it has a right to the strongest protection of the government; those who profess it have an absolute right to an equal participation in social advantages; but it is not the religion of France: this centuries past have decided. In proposing to make it the prevalent system, you propose an act of violence, and an impossibility. Besides, what is more frightful than a schism? What is more enfeebling to a nation? Of all civil wars, that which enters most deeply into the heart, which troubles families most painfully, is a religious war. We must finish all chance of this. Peace with Europe is concluded: let us maintain it as long as we are able to do so; but religious peace is the most pressing of all. That once concluded we have no cause for fearing any thing. It is doubtful if Europe will leave us long at peace; that she will be satisfied to see us always as powerful as we are now. But when France, as one man, shall be united; when the Vendéans and the Bretons shall march in our armies with the Burgundians, the Lorrainese, and the Franc-Comptois, we shall have no more to fear from Europe, though it be all in union against us."

Such were the kind of conversations continually held by the first consul with his more intimate counsellors, Cambacérès and Lebrun, who were of his opinion, and with Talleyrand, Fouché, and Rœderer, who were opposed to him on this question, also with a number of the members of the council of state, and of the legislative body, whose ideas generally differed from his. He spoke, in these discussions, with a warmth and perseverance of purpose quite unexampled. He saw nothing that appeared so useful, so urgent, as the putting an end to those religious differences and divisions, and he applied himself to the business with all the ardour with which he was accustomed to regard what was of pre-eminent importance.

He had decided upon his plan, which was simple, and wisely conceived. It has been successful in terminating all the religious divisions of France. The unfortunate disputes, which the first consul, when he became emperor, had, at a later period, with the court of Rome, occurred between him, the pope, and the bishops, and did not affect the religious peace established among the population of France. There was never seen to arise, in France, even when the pope was a prisoner at Fontainebleau, two different forms of worship, two orders of the clergy, and two classes of the faithful.

The first consul devised a scheme to reconcile the French republic and the Roman church, by treating with the holy see, on the basis of the same principles as were laid down by the revolution. The clergy were no longer to constitute a political power; there was to be no longer a clergy endowed with landed property; this, in 1800, had become an impossible thing. The plan of the first

consul consisted in a clergy devoted solely to their professional duties, receiving their incomes from the state—named by the state, but confirmed or ratified by the pope; a new boundary or circumscription of dioceses, which should consist of sixty in place of a hundred and fifty-eight, existing formerly on the territory of old and new France; the regulations of the places of worship transferred to the civil power, the jurisdiction over the clergy to the council of state in place of the parliaments, no longer in existence. This was the civil constitution of 1790, but modified so as to render it in some degree more acceptable to Rome. In other words, with the bishops nominated by the government and instituted by the pope, in place of being elected by their flocks. There was to be a general promise of submission to the laws in place of the oath exacted from the different religious communities, which served as a pretext to ill-disposed or timid priests to raise up conscientious scruples. In fact, it was the true reform in public worship, to which the revolution should have confined its changes, in order that they might have been rendered agreeable to the pope, a thing not to be lost sight of, because without the consent of Rome any effective religious establishment would be impossible.

It has been asserted[1] that a point of great importance was omitted; this was that the bishops nominated by the civil power should be accepted by the pope, whether he were inclined to accept them or not. In such a case the spiritual government of Rome would have been seriously enfeebled, which was a matter by no means desirable. The civil power, in nominating a bishop, indicates a subject in whom, with the good moral character of a minister of religion, it recognizes the political character of a good citizen, who respects, and will cause to be respected, the laws of his country. It is for the pope to say, that in such a subject he recognizes the orthodox priest, who will teach the real doctrine of the catholic church. To desire to fix a delay of some months, after which the institution of the pope should be considered as validly accorded, would have been to force the institution itself, to take from the pope his spiritual authority, and to renew no less an evil than the memorable and terrible quarrel of investitures. There are two authorities in matters of religion; the civil authority of the country in which the worship is performed, charged to watch and maintain the laws and established authority, and the spiritual authority of the pope charged to watch over and support unity of faith. It is necessary that both should concur in the choice of the clergy. The religious authority of the holy see, sometimes, it is true, refuses institution to the bishops selected by the state; it was thus made to violate the civil power: such cases have been seen to occur, but they are no more than a floating inevitable abuse. The civil authority may also, in its own turn, hang back, and such cases have been seen to happen under Napoleon himself, the most enlightened and courageous restorer of the catholic church.

The plan of the first consul left nothing more to be desired for the definitive establishment of public worship; but still it was necessary that he should attend to the transition or the passage from the present state of things to that which he was about to create. What was he to do in respect to the existing sees? How come to an understanding with the ecclesiastics of every grade, bishops or simple priests, the one sworn and attached to the revolution, publicly performing worship in the churches; the others unsworn, emigrants, or newly-returned ministers, clandestinely exercising their functions, and most of them in hostility to the government? Bonaparte devised a system, the adoption of which was a very great difficulty at Rome; since, for eighteen centuries, during which it had existed, the church had never done that which was about to be proposed for her sanction. This was a system which included the abolition of all the existing dioceses. To effect this, the former bishops, who were yet living, were to be applied to, and their resignation demanded by the pope. If they refused, he pronounced their deposition; and when a *tabula rasa* was thus effected, there were to be traced upon the map of France sixty new dioceses, of which forty-five were to be bishoprics, and fifteen archbishoprics. In order to fill them, the first consul nominated sixty prelates, taken indiscriminately from the sworn and unsworn clergy, but principally from the last class, which was the most numerous, the most respected, and the most highly esteemed among the faithful. He was to choose both the one and the other from among the ecclesiastics most worthy of the confidence of the government, purest in morals, and well reconciled to the changes brought about by the revolution. These prelates, nominated by the first consul, were to be instituted by the pope, and immediately enter upon their functions, under the superintendence of the civil authority and of the council of state.

Salaries, in proportion to their wants, were to be allotted them from the budget of the state. In return, the pope was to acknowledge as valid the alienation of the property of the church, interdicting the suggestions which the priests were in the habit of making at the beds of the dying, reconciling the married clergy to the church, assisting the government, and, in a word, putting an end to all the calamities of the time.

This plan was complete, and, with a few exceptions, as excellent for the present as for the future. It recognized the church, as nearly as possible, upon the same model as the state; it fused together differing individuals, by taking from all parties the wiser and more moderate men, who estimated the public good above revolutionary or religious hot-headedness. But it will be quickly seen how difficult it is to do that which is good, even when necessary, and even when the necessity of the case is most urgent; because, unhappily, although it be necessary, it does not follow upon that account, that it shall be a clear and evident notion to others beyond the power of contestation.

In Paris there was still the party of scoffers, of sectarists, still living in the philosophy of the eighteenth century; of old Jansenists become constitutional priests; and lastly, of generals imbued with vulgar prejudices: here were the obstacles on the part of France. At Rome, there were the adherence to ancient prejudices; the fear of affecting dogmas if discipline were touched; religious scruples sincere or affected; above all, an antipathy

[1] L'Abbé de Pradt, in "The Four Concordats."

to the French revolution; and, more particularly, a sort of complacence in respect to the French royalist party, composed of emigrants, priests, and nobles, some resident at Rome, others in correspondence with her, and all bitter enemies of France and the new order of things which had begun to be established there: these were obstacles on the side of the holy see.

The first consul persisted in his plan with a firmness and a patience altogether invincible, during one of the longest and most difficult negotiations ever known in the history of the church. Never did the spiritual and temporal powers meet under circumstances of greater moment, and never were they more worthily represented.

That young man, so sensible, and with such depth of view, but so impetuous in his determinations, who governed France,—that young man, by a singular dispensation of Providence, found himself placed on the stage of the world, in presence of a pontiff of rare virtue, of a physiognomy and character angelic, but of a tenacity capable of braving martyrdom, where he believed that the interests of the faith or those of the court of Rome were compromised. His countenance, animated and mild at the same time, well expressed the sensibility, somewhat elevated, of his mind. Aged about sixty, feeble in health, though he lived to a considerable age, holding down his head, endowed with a keen and penetrating glance, in language graceful and affecting, he was the worthy representative, not more of the imperious faith that under Gregory VII. commanded, and deserved to command, European barbarism, than of that persecuted religion, which, having no longer at command the thunders of the church, was no longer able to exercise over mankind any other power than that of mild persuasion.

A secret charm attached the pontiff to general Bonaparte. They had already met, as elsewhere observed, during the wars of Italy, and in place of those ferocious warriors generated by the French revolution, that had been painted in Europe as profaners of the altar, and assassins of the emigrant priests, Pius VII., then bishop of Imola, had found a young man, full of genius, speaking, like himself, the Italian language, exhibiting sentiments of great moderation, maintaining order, keeping the churches sacred, and, far from persecuting the French priests, using all his influence to oblige the Italian churches to receive and support them. Surprised and delighted, the bishop of Imola restrained the insubordinate temper of the Italians in his diocese, and returned to general Bonaparte the services which he had rendered to the church upon his part. The impression produced by this first acquaintance was never effaced from the heart of the pontiff, and influenced all his conduct towards the general when he became consul and emperor: a striking proof that in every thing, great or small, a good action is never lost. At a later time, in fact, when the conclave had assembled at Venice to give a successor to Pius VI., who died a prisoner at Valence, the recollection of the first acts of the general of the army of Italy had influenced, in a manner that may be styled providential, the choice of the new pope.

It will be in recollection, that at the same moment when Pius VII. was preferred by the conclave, in the hope to find in him a conciliator, who would reconcile Rome with France, and thus, perhaps, terminate the afflictions of the church, the first consul gained the battle of Marengo, and had thus become, by the same stroke of fortune, master of Italy and ruler of Europe, and that he had sent an emissary, the nephew of the bishop of Verceil, to announce his intentions to the pontiff then newly elected. He had sent the pope word that while ulterior arrangements were pending, peace should, in real fact, exist between France and Rome, on the footing of the treaty of Tolentino, signed in 1797; that there should no more be spoken of the Roman republic invented by the directory; that the holy see should be re-established and recognized by the French as in former times. As to the question of restoring to the church the three great provinces which it had lost, namely, Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, not a word was said. The pope was replaced upon his throne, and had peace. The rest he left to the care of Providence. The first consul, moreover, commanded the Neapolitans to evacuate the Roman states, which, in fact, they had evacuated, except the environs of Benevento and Ponte-Corvo. Besides, in all the movements of his armies around Naples and Otranto, the first consul had given orders to respect the Roman territories. He had himself sent Murat, who commanded the French army in Lower Italy, to bend his knee at the foot of the pontifical throne. M. Gonsalvi had thus guessed correctly, and he was amply recompensed, because upon his arrival at Rome, the pope had named him cardinal-secretary of state, first minister of the holy see, a post which he preserved during the greater part of the pontificate of Pius VII.

It was in the train of these events, in some sort partaking of the miraculous, that the pope, upon the request of the first consul, had sent M. Spina to Paris, a keen, greedy, devout, Genoese priest, in order to treat of both religious and political affairs. At first, M. Spina took no official title, so much did the holy father, in spite of his partiality for general Bonaparte, and his ardent desire for a reconciliation, dread to avow any relation with the French republic. But in a little time, seeing come to Paris, in the train of the ministers of Prussia and of Spain, who were already there, those of Austria, Russia, Bavaria, and Naples, in fact, of all the European courts, the holy father no longer hesitated, and permitted M. Spina to take upon himself his official character, and to avow the object of his mission. The emigrant party raised a great outcry, and made useless efforts to impede, by their remonstrances, the approximation of the church to France, well knowing, that if they failed to agitate the public mind under the plea of religious prejudices, the best offensive means would be lost to them. But Pius VII., although mortified, sometimes even intimidated by their remonstrances, showed a firm determination to place the interests of religion and the church above all considerations of party. One reason alone slackened, in a slight degree, this excellent resolution, that was the vague and unwise hope of recovering the Legations, lost under the treaty of Tolentino [1].

[1] There is not in existence a more curious negotiation, or one more worthy of meditation, than that of the concordat. There is none in which the archives of France are richer,

Monsignor Spina, arrived in Paris, had orders to gain time, that it might be seen if the first consul, master of Italy, as he was, and able to dispose of it at pleasure, might not entertain the fortunate idea of restoring the Legations to the holy see. A word that frequently dwelt upon the lips of the first consul, had given birth to more hopes than he intended it should bear—"Let the holy father only trust to me, let him throw himself into my arms, and I will be for the church a new Charlemagne." "If he is a new Charlemagne," said the priests, little versed in the affairs of their own time, "let him prove it by giving back to us the patrimony of St. Peter." They were unfortunately far enough out in their reckoning, for the first consul believed he had done much in the re-establishment of the pope at Rome, and in giving up to him, with his pontifical throne, the Roman state, besides offering to treat with him for the restoration of the catholic worship. In fact, considering the state of the public mind in France and in Italy also, he had done a vast deal. If the French patriots, still full of the ideas of the eighteenth century, saw with little satisfaction the approaching re-establishment of the catholic church, the Italian patriots saw with despair the government of the priesthood once more set up over them. It was impossible therefore for the first consul to push his complaisance towards the holy see so far as to give up the Legations to its authority again, which could not be of service in supporting the government of the priesthood, and were besides a promised portion of the Cisalpine republic. But the court of Rome, finding itself much distressed since it was deprived of the revenues of Bologna, of Ferrara, and of Romagna, reasoned very differently. In other respects the pope, who lived in the midst of the pomps of the Vatican like any anchorite, thought much less of terrestrial interests than cardinal Gonsalvi, and cardinal Gonsalvi less than monsignor Spina. This last moved with a stealthy pace in the negotiation, listening to all that was said to him relatively to the religious questions, having the appearance of attaching to them an exclusive importance, and still, by some random words let out from time to time about the misery of the holy see, attempting to bring back attention to the subject of the Legations. He did not succeed in making himself understood, and protracted the negotiations in order to obtain something which would meet the false hopes imprudently indulged by his court.

To treat with M. Spina the first consul had made choice, as already said, of the celebrated abbé Bernier, the pacificator of La Vendée. This priest, a simple curate in the province of Anjou, deprived of the external attractions which are obtained by a careful education, but endowed with a deep knowledge of human nature, of superior prudence, a long time exercised in the midst of the difficulties of a civil war, well versed in canonical affairs, had been the principal author of the re-establishment of peace in the western provinces. Attached to this peace, which was his own work, he naturally desired every thing which would confirm it, and regarded the approximation of France to Rome as one of the more certain means of rendering his labour definitive and complete. He did not cease, therefore, in addressing to the first consul the most earnest instances to hasten forward the negotiations with the church. Furnished daily with his instructions, he made known to the archbishop of Corinth the propositions of the French government already spoken of, namely, the dismission imposed upon all the former titular bishops; the new diocesan circumscription; sixty bishoprics in lieu of a hundred and fifty-eight; the composition of the new clergy formed of ecclesiastics of all the different parties; the nomination of the bishops by the first consul, and their institution by the pope; the promise of submission to the established government; the salaries out of the state budget; the renunciation of the property of the church, and complete acknowledgment of its sale; the police of worship conferred upon the civil power represented by the council of state; finally, the pardon of the church for those priests who had married, and their reunion with the catholic communion.

M. Spina was loud in his exclamations upon hearing these conditions announced; he declared them exorbitant and contrary to the faith, asserting that the holy father would never consent to admit them.

First, he required that in the preamble of the concordat, the catholic religion should be declared the "state religion" in France; that the consuls should make a public profession of it, and that the laws and acts contrary to this declaration of a state religion should be abrogated.

As to the new circumscription of the dioceses, he admitted the great number of the sees, but he pretended that the pope had no right to depose a bishop; that never had any of his predecessors dared to do so since the Roman church had existed, and that if the holy father permitted such an innovation he would create a second schism, directed this time against the holy father himself; that all that he was able to do upon this subject was to come to an amicable understanding with the first consul; those among the former bishops which showed themselves well inclined in regard to the French government, should be simply replaced in their dioceses, or in the diocese corresponding to that which they had formerly filled; and those, on the contrary, which had or were conducting themselves still in a manner not to merit the countenance of the government, should be left aside, and until their deaths, which, considering their age, could not be long, administrators chosen by the pope and the first consul should govern the sees in the interim.

M. Spina, therefore, did not admit the idea of a new clergy, taken from all classes of the priesthood, and from all parties, in order to fill the vacant sees. Still, further, he did not wish that the constitutionalists should share in it at all, unless they should make one of those solemn recantations,

because, besides the diplomatic correspondence of the French agents, and, above all, the correspondence of the abbé Bernier, there is the correspondence of M. Spina and of cardinal Caprara with the pope and cardinal Gonsalvi. The last was preserved by virtue of an article of the concordat, according to which the archives of the Roman legation, in case of a rupture, were to remain in France. The letters of M. Spina and of cardinal Caprara, written in Italian, are some of the most curious monuments of the time, and impart of themselves the secret of the religious negotiations of the period,—a secret very little known at present, notwithstanding the numerous works published relative to this subject.

which, a triumph for Rome, are also a recompense for the pardon which she accords.

As to the nomination of the bishops by the head of the republic, and their institution by the pope, there was little difficulty. The negotiations naturally commenced on the principle, that the new government had at the court of Rome all the prerogatives of the old, and that the first consul represented in every respect the king of France. On that account the nomination of the bishops appertained to him by right. Still the office of first consul for the present at least was elective. General Bonaparte, actually invested with the dignity, was of the catholic faith, but his successors might not be of that creed; and it was not allowed at Rome that protestant sovereigns should nominate catholic bishops. M. Spina demanded that this contingency should be provided for.

They were in agreement regarding the curés. The bishop was to nominate them with the agreement of the civil authority.

The promise of submission to the laws was admitted without exactly expressing the terms.

The sanction of the pope to the sale of the church property was a heavy task for the Roman negotintor. He acknowledged fully the utter impossibility of recalling those sales; but he demanded that the holy see should be spared a declaration which would imply the moral approbation of all that had passed in their regard. He conceded a renunciation of all ulterior examination, in refusing the formal acknowledgment of the right of alienation. "This property," said M. Spina, "called *vota fidelium, patrimonium pauperum, sacrificia peccatorum*, this property the church herself has no power to alienate. Still she is able to renounce all attempts to prosecute its recovery." In return she demands the restitution of such domains as are not yet alienated, and the faculty granted to the dying of bequeathing in favour of religious establishments, which implied the renewal of property in mortmain, and recommenced the old order of things, in other words, a clergy endowed with lands.

Lastly, the pardon granted to the married clergy and their reconciliation with the church, was a matter of mere indulgence, easy to be granted on the part of the court of Rome, which is always disposed to pardon, when the fault is acknowledged by those who have committed it. Still, two classes of priests were to be excepted, the old religious belonging to orders who had taken vows of celibacy and the bishops. This was no mode of conciliating with the holy see the kind wishes of Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs.

These pretensions of the court of Rome, although they did not imply an utter impossibility of coming to an understanding with the French government, at the same time implied serious differences of opinion.

The first consul perceived this, and exhibited the greatest impatience. He had several times seen M. Spina, and had declared to him that he would never depart from the fundamental principle of his design, which consisted in making a *tabula rasa*, in forming a new circumscription, and a new clergy, in deposing the old titularies, and taking their successors from every class of the priesthood. He had told him that the fusion of honest and able men of every party was the principle of his government; that he applied this principle to the church as well as to the state; that it was the only means he possessed to terminate the troubles of France, and that he should invariably persist in the same course.

The abbe Bernier, who, to an avowed ambition of being the principal instrument in the re-establishment of religion, joined the sincere love of doing good, addressed the most earnest entreaties to M. Spina, to level the difficulties which were opposed, on the part of the church of Rome, to the measure of the first consul. "To declare the catholic religion," he said, "to be the religion of the state is impossible; contrary to the ideas prevalent in France, and will never be admitted by the tribunate and legislative body in the wording of any law." It might be possible, according to him, to replace such a declaration by the substitution of the fact, that the catholic religion was that of the majority of Frenchmen. The mention of that fact would be as useful as the declaration desired by Rome. To insist on what was impossible, more out of pride than principle, was to compromise the real interests of the church. The first consul might attend in person at the solemn rites of the church, and the presence of such a man as he was at these ceremonies was an important thing; but it was necessary to renounce the demand of his going through certain practical forms, such as confession and communion, as being beyond the limits within which it was proper he should confine himself with the French public. It was necessary to gain back opinion, not to shock it, and above all, not to afford subjects for ridicule. The demand of the resignation of their sees, addressed to the former bishops, was quite simple, and was a consequence of the step which they had taken in regard to Pius VI. in 1790. At that period, the French prelates, in order to make their resistance appear to be on account of the interest of the faith, and not their own peculiar interests, had declared that they accepted the pope for an arbitrator, and that they resigned their sees into his hands; that if he believed it was their duty to abandon them in favour of the civic constitution, they submitted. There was now nothing more to do than to take them at their words, and exact the accomplishment of their solemn offer. If some among them, influenced by personal motives, stood in the way of so great a benefit as the restoration of public worship in France, they must no more be regarded as titular bishops, but be considered as having resigned their sees in 1790. The abbé Bernier added, that there was a precedent in point of the same kind in the church, namely, the resignation of three hundred bishops together in Africa, agreed to for the purpose of putting a termination to the schism of the Donatists. It was true they had not been deposed. Then as to the new selections; the principle of the fusion must be conceded to the first consul. The principle the first consul applied more particularly to the advantage of the unsworn priests; he would choose two or three who were constitutionalists, solely for the sake of example, but in the main he would select only the orthodox. The French negotiator here advanced on his own account more than he was justified in doing. It is true that the first consul had very little esteem for

the constitutional bishops, who were for the larger part bigoted Jansenists, or declaimers at the clubs; it is true that he only esteemed in that portion of the clergy the ordinary priests, who had in general taken an oath of submission to the laws for the purpose of pursuing the objects of their sacred ministry, and had not sought to gain by the agitation of the period, an elevation to the sacerdotal dignity. Still, if he had but small respect for the constitutional bishops, he adhered to his principle of fusion, and did not sell quite so cheaply as the abbé Bernier appeared to announce for him, the claims of the sworn clergy. These things were said by the abbé Bernier to favour the success of the negotiation. In regard to the nomination of the bishops by the first consul, it was needful only to surmount, according to the abbé Bernier, a difficulty very remote and very improbable, in having, at some time or another, a first consul who should be a protestant. There was no necessity, according to him, to glance at an event so little probable. In relation to the property of the clergy, it was necessary to lose no time, in settling the form of its disposal, as they were agreed upon the principle. The restitution of the unsold church property and testamentary bequests of houses and lands, were totally at variance with the political principles prevalent in France, which were wholly opposed to property in mortmain. The court of Rome must be content, in this regard, with the single concession of the validity of donations of annuities from the public funds.

"The time," said the abbé, "is now come for a conclusion, since the first consul is beginning to appear discontented. He believed that the pope had not strength of mind to break with the emigrant party in order to give every thing to France, and he would end the matter by renouncing the good which he had at first the idea of doing, and without persecuting the priests, leave them to themselves; he would leave the church to become what it could in France, without calculating that he should be holding in Italy a conduct hostile to the Roman court. It was," continued the abbé, "to have lost all discernment, not to profit by the dispositions of so great a man, the only man capable of saving religion. He had also great difficulties to overcome in regard to the revolutionary party; and for aiding him in vanquishing them, an opposite conduct should be pursued, by making such concessions as were needful to him for gaining over opinions little disposed in France to favour the catholic faith."

M. Spina began to be much embarrassed. He was convinced, but his covetousness overcame his convictions. Incessantly demanding wealth for his court, his most ardent desires were to make her as rich and prodigal as she was of old. The small success of his insinuations about the lost provinces singularly discouraged him. He perceived that the first consul, as wily as Italian priests were, would not explain himself to those who would not explain themselves. He saw, besides, all the other courts at his feet; he saw M. Kalitscheff, the Russian negotiator, who had wished in such an insolent mode to protect the petty Italian princes, depart in disappointment; all Germany dependent upon France for the partition of the territorial indemnities; Portugal in submission, and England herself fatigued into peace. In front of such a state of things, he was convinced that he had no other resource than to submit and to rely upon the will of the first consul alone, for all of which he was desirous. Disposed to concede, M. Spina was still fearful to adhere to the absolute conditions of the French cabinet, laid down with the evident resolution of not departing from them, because they were established upon the imperious necessities of her existing situation.

The first consul, with his accustomed ability, drew out the Roman negotiator from the embarrassment of his position. It was the moment, already described a little way back, when all the negotiations were proceeding together, especially with England. Thinking with a species of joy on the prodigious effect which a general peace must produce, that should even comprehend the church itself, he wished to finish all by a prompt and decided step. He had the plan of a concordat drawn up to be offered definitively to M. Spina. This business was arranged by two ecclesiastics who had thrown up holy orders, Talleyrand and Hauterive, who were both in the office for foreign affairs. Happily between these two was interposed the able and orthodox Bernier. The plan drawn up by Hauterive, and reviewed by Bernier, was simple, lucid, and decided. It contained, in the style of a law, every thing which the French legation had proposed. It was then presented to M. Spina, who was much troubled about it, and offered to send it to his court, declaring he was not able to sign it himself. "Why," they said to him, "do you refuse to sign? Can it be you have no powers? If so, what have you been doing in Paris for six months? Why do you put on the character of a negotiator, and yet cannot carry it out to the necessary term of its conclusion? Perhaps you think the conditions inadmissible? If so, be bold enough to tell us; and then the French cabinet, which can agree to no other conditions, will cease to negotiate with you. It may or may not break with the holy see, but it will have done with M. Spina."

The cunning prelate knew not what to answer. He affirmed that he possessed powers. Not daring to state that he thought the French terms inadmissible, he alleged that in matters of religion, the pope surrounded by his cardinals was alone able to accept a treaty, and he in consequence renewed his offer of sending the document to his holiness: "Let it be so," some one said to him, "but declare at least in sending your own approval of it." M. Spina refused on his own part any approbatory formula, and answered that he would impress upon his holiness the adoption of a treaty which would contribute to the restoration of the catholic faith in France.

A courier was then sent off to Rome with the scheme of the concordat, and an order to M. Cacault, ambassador of France at the holy see, to submit the document for the immediate and definitive acceptance of the pope. The same courier was the bearer of a present which caused great joy in Italy, the famous wooden virgin, the image of our lady of Loretto, taken away in the time of the directory from Loretto itself, and deposited as a curiosity in the national library at Paris. The first consul knew that, among many sincere and irritable believers, the placing this famous relic in

the national library, was deemed a matter of great scandal, and he ordered the pious restitution to precede the concordat.

This present was received in Romagna with a degree of joy difficult to be understood in France. The pope received the concordat better than was expected. This worthy pontiff, more occupied with the interests of the faith than with his own temporal advantages, did not see in that instrument any thing absolutely inadmissible, and believed that with some changes in the drawing up, he should be able to satisfy the first consul, an object which he regarded as of the utmost importance, since the re-establishment of religion in France was, in his view, the greatest and most essential part of the affairs of the church.

He appointed the cardinals, Cavandini, Antonelli, and Gerdil, to make a first examination of the plan thus sent from Paris. The cardinals Antonelli and Gerdil passed for the two most learned personages in the church. Cardinal Gerdil had himself become French, because by birth he appertained to Savoy. The pope enjoined it on all three to hasten this proceeding. The first examination over, they were to make their report to a congregation of twelve cardinals, chosen from among those who were at Rome, who best understood the interests of the Roman church. They were required to be secret by a promise made on the Evangelists. The pope, fearing the plots and outcries of the French emigrants, sought to keep from all party influence the decision of the sacred college. Upon his part the effort was made with perfect sincerity. He had near him a French minister entirely to his liking, in M. Cacault, a man of sensibility as well as of understanding, partaking in the recollections of the eighteenth century, to which he belonged by age and education, and equally in the feelings which Rome inspires in all those who live in the midst of her ruined grandeur, and her religious pomps. On leaving Paris, M. de Cacault asked the first consul for his instructions. He received in reply this noble remark: "Treat the pope as if he had two hundred thousand soldiers." M. de Cacault loved Pius VII. and general Bonaparte; and by his kind offices disposed them to love one another. "Confide in the first consul," said he to the pope, "he will arrange your affairs: but do what he asks of you, for he has need of what he asks of you in order to succeed." He said also to the first consul, "Take a little patience. The pope is the most holy, the most attaching of men. He has the wish to satisfy you, only give him time. It is necessary to habituate his mind, and those of the cardinals, to the arbitrary proposals which you send hither. They are at Rome much more confiding than you think. This court must be led by gentle means. If we ruffle her, we shall confuse her head. She will fix herself in the resolution of martyrdom, the sole resource for one in her situation." These wise counsels tempered the impetuosity of the first consul, and disposed him to suffer patiently the fastidious examination of the matter by the court of Rome.

Lastly, when the business was completed, the pope, and cardinal Gonsalvi, had several interviews with M. de Cacault. They communicated to him the Roman scheme. Finding it too distant from that of France, he made reiterated efforts to obtain modifications. It became necessary a second time to have reference to the congregation of the twelve cardinals, which occupied much more time, in such a manner that without obtaining any important results, M. de Cacault contributed himself to the loss of an entire month. The parties at length came as near as possible to an agreement; and all ended in a plan, the differences of which with that of the first consul were as follow:

The catholic religion was to be declared in France the "religion of the state:" the consuls were to profess it in a public manner: there was to be a new diocesan reconstruction and only sixty sees, according to the first consul's wish. The pope was to address the former bishops, demanding their voluntary resignation, on the ground of their offer of resignation made to Pius VI. in 1790. It was probable that a very great number would give in, and then the sees vacant by death or resignation would furnish the French government with an ample list of nominations to fill up. In regard to those who might refuse, the pope would take convenient measures that the administration of the sees should not remain in their hands.

The excellent pontiff said to the French consul, in an affecting letter which he wrote to him: "Spare me the public declaration, that I shall depose the old prelates, who have suffered cruel persecutions in the cause of the church. First, my right to do so is doubtful; and secondly, it grieves me to treat in this manner ministers of the altar in misfortune and in exile. What reply would you give to those who might require you to sacrifice the generals by whom you are surrounded, whose devotedness has rendered you so often victorious! The result which you wish will be the same in the end, because the greatest part of the sees will become vacant by death or by resignation. You will fill them up, and as to the small number that may remain occupied in consequence of refusing to resign, we will not yet nominate bishops to them; but we will administer to them by vicars, worthy of your confidence and our own."

Upon the other points, the Roman scheme was very nearly conformable to that of France. It granted the nominations to the first consul, except the first consul should happen to be a protestant; it contained the sanction of the sales of church property; but, while it persisted in demanding that the clergy might receive testamentary gifts of houses and lands, it granted to the married clergy the indulgence of the church.

Evidently the most serious difficulty was in the deposition of the former bishops, who might refuse to resign. This sacrifice was heavy to the pope, because it was no other than immolating, at the feet of the first consul himself, the old French clergy. Still this immolation was indispensable, in order that the first consul might in his turn suppress the constitutional clergy, and out of the different sects of priests make only one, composed of persons who were esteemed by all the sects. It was one of those occasions when upon every such conjuncture in every age, the papacy had never hesitated to save the church by taking strong resolutions for that end. But at the moment of resolving, the benevolent and timorous mind of the pontiff was a prey to the most grievous perplexities.

Whilst the time was thus employed at Rome,

whether in conferences of the cardinals among themselves, or in conferences of the secretary of state with M. de Cacault, the first consul at Paris had lost all patience. He began to fear that the court of Rome might be carrying on an intrigue either with the emigrants or foreign courts, more particularly with Austria. To his natural mistrust was joined the suggestions of the enemies of religion, who endeavoured to persuade him that he was deceived, and that he himself, so far-seeing and able, was the dupe of Italian cunning. He was but little disposed to believe that this wariness was greater than his own, but he wished to throw the lead into that sea which they had told him was so deep. On the same day that the courier, bearing the despatches of the holy see, was leaving Rome, he made at Paris a menacing demonstration.

He sent for the abbé Bernier, M. Spina, and M. Talleyrand, to Malmaison. There he informed them that he had no longer any confidence in the dispositions of the court of Rome; that the desire of deferring to the emigrants was evidently overbearing the desire to be reconciled to France—the interest of party being above the interest of religion; that he did not understand why they consulted courts that were known to be inimical, and perhaps even the heads of the emigrants themselves, to know whether Rome ought to treat with the French republic; that the church might receive through him immense benefits, and was bound to accept or refuse them at once, and not to retard the good of the people by useless hesitations, or by consultations still more out of place; that he would do without the holy see, since his efforts were not seconded by her; that he certainly would not expose the church to the persecutions of days gone by, but would deliver the priests over to one another, confining himself to the chastisement of the turbulent, and leaving the rest to live as they were best able; that he considered himself relatively to the Roman court as free of all engagements towards her, even from those in the treaty of Tolentino, since, in fact, the treaty was void the day war was declared between Pius VI. and the directory. In saying these words, the tone of the first consul was cold, positive, and repellant. He gave it to be understood, by the explanations following this declaration, that his confidence in the holy father was always the same, but that he imputed the delays which so annoyed him to cardinal Gonsalvi, and those who were more immediately around the pope's person.

The first consul had obtained his end, but the unfortunate Spina left Malmaison in a real disorder of mind, and went with all haste to Paris, in order to write to his own court despatches full of the same fears which agitated himself. Talleyrand, on the other hand, wrote to M. de Cacault a despatch, conformable to the scene at Malmaison. He enjoined upon him to visit the pope and cardinal Gonsalvi directly, and declare to them that the first consul, full of reliance upon the personal character of the holy father, had not the same feeling towards his cabinet; that he was resolved to break off a negotiation much too insincere, and that he, M. de Cacault, had orders to quit Rome in five days, if the plan of the concordat were not immediately adopted, or were not adopted with certain modifications. M. de Cacault had instructions to proceed to Florence without delay, and to wait there until the first consul should make known to him his future determination.

This despatch arrived at Rome about the end of May. It much mortified M. de Cacault, who was afraid, by the news of which he was the bearer, he should disconcert, perhaps push the Roman court to desperate resolutions. Above all, he feared to afflict a pontiff for whom he had been unable to escape feeling a sincere attachment. Still the orders of the first consul were so absolute, that he had no means of evading their execution. He therefore went to the pope and to cardinal Gonsalvi, and showed them his instructions, which caused to both very great distress of mind. Cardinal Gonsalvi, in particular, seeing himself clearly designated in the despatches of the first consul, as the author of the interminable delays in the negotiation, was ready to die with affright. Yet he was little to blame; and the superannuated forms of the chancery, the oldest in the world, were the sole cause of the slowness of which the first consul complained, at least since the matter had been transferred to Rome. M. de Cacault proposed to the pope and to cardinal Gonsalvi, an idea which at first troubled and surprised them, but which at last appeared to them the only way to a safe conclusion. "You do not wish," said M. de Cacault, "to adopt the concordat, with all its expressions as it is sent from Paris. Very well: let the cardinal himself go to France, furnished with full powers. He will become known to the first consul, and will inspire him with confidence; he will then obtain from him the indispensable changes required, and which you desire. If any difficulty should occur, the cardinal will be on the spot to obviate it. He will prevent, by his presence there, the loss of time, which so much irritates the impatient character of the head of our government. You will thus be extricated from great peril, and the interests of religion will be saved."

It was a great trouble thus to part with a minister with whom he could not well dispense, and who alone gave him strength to bear the pain of the chief government. He was plunged into great perplexity, feeling the advice of M. de Cacault to be wise, but the separation proposed a cruel hardship.

That implacable faction, composed not only of emigrants, but of all those in Europe who detested the French revolution, that faction, which desired to support an eternal war with France, which had seen with sorrow the termination of the war in La Vendée, and which saw with no less sorrow the approaching end of the schism, besieged Rome with letters, filled it with absurd talk, and covered its walls with placards. It was said, for example, in one of these placards, that Pius VI., to preserve the faith, had lost the holy see, and that Pius VII., to preserve the holy see, had lost the faith[1]. These invectives, of which he was the object, did not move this sensible pontiff, who was devoted to his duties, and his resolution to save the church, in spite of any party; but he suffered severely from

[1] Pio VI., per conservar la fede,
Perde la sede;
Pio VII., per conservar la sede,
Perde la fede.

them. Cardinal Gonsalvi was his confidant and friend, and to separate from him was a poignant grief. The cardinal, upon the other hand, feared his own presence in Paris, in that revolutionary gulf, which had swallowed up, as he had been told, so many victims. He trembled at the idea only, of finding himself in the presence of the formidable general, the object at once of so much fear and admiration, whom M. Spina had depicted to him as most of all irritated against the Roman secretary of state. These unfortunate and terror-stricken priests had formed a thousand unfounded notions in regard to France and her government; and ameliorated, even improved as it was, they trembled only at the thought of remaining for a moment in its power. The cardinal decided to go, but his decision was just that which any one feels who is determined to brave his death. "Since they must have a victim," said he, "I will devote myself, and be all resignation to the will of Providence." He had even the imprudence to write letters to Naples, in conformity with these notions, letters, which were communicated to the first consul, who fortunately regarded them rather as subjects for ridicule than anger.

But the journey of the secretary of state to Paris was very far from removing all the difficulties and anticipating all the dangers. The departure of M. de Cacault, and his retreat to Florence, where the head-quarters of the French army were situated, might be viewed perhaps as a fatal manifestation for the two governments of Rome and Naples. These two governments were, in fact, continually threatened by the repressed but always ardent passions of the Italian patriots. That of the pope was always odious to men who were unwilling to have priests any longer for their governors, and the number of such persons in the Roman states was very considerable; the government of Naples was detested for the blood which it had spilled. The departure of M. de Cacault would, it was possible, be considered as a species of tacit permission to the evil-minded Italians to make some dangerous demonstration. This was feared also by the pope. It was agreed, therefore, in order to prevent such an interpretation being put upon his departure, that M. de Cacault and cardinal Gonsalvi should set out together, and be travelling companions as far as Florence. M. de Cacault, on quitting Rome, left there his secretary of legation.

The cardinal and M. de Cacault left Rome on the 6th of June, or 17th of Prairial, and took the road towards Florence. They travelled in the same carriage, and wherever they stopped the cardinal designated M. de Cacault to the people, saying, "This is the French minister," so anxious was he to avoid having it supposed there was any rupture between the two powers. The agitation in Italy was lively enough upon the occasion; but it produced no vexatious consequences at the moment, because most persons waited for a more distinct explanation of the dispositions of the French government before they attempted to make a change. Cardinal Gonsalvi[1] separated from M. de Cacault at Florence, and took the road towards Paris with fear and trembling.

During this interval the first consul, on receiving from Rome the amended scheme, and discovering that the differences were more those of form than essence, became more calm upon the affair. The news that cardinal Gonsalvi was coming himself to endeavour to place in harmony the court of Rome with the French republic, completely satisfied him. He now saw the certainty of the approaching arrangement, and prepared accordingly to give the best reception to the prime minister of the Roman court.

Cardinal Gonsalvi arrived in Paris on the 20th of June, or 1st Messidor. The abbé Bernier and M. Spina hastened to receive him, and to assure him of the kindly disposition of the first consul.

[1] "François Cacault, minister plenipotentiary of the French republic at Rome, to the citizen minister for foreign affairs.

"Florence, 19 Prairial, year IX.

"CITIZEN MINISTER—Here I am at Florence. The cardinal secretary of state left Rome along with me. He called for me at my house. We have made the journey together in the same carriage. Our servants followed after the same fashion in a second carriage; and the expenses were paid by each of our separate couriers respectively.

"We were looked upon every where with an air of surprise. The cardinal greatly feared that they would imagine I was going away in consequence of a rupture. He said to every body continually, '*This is the French minister!*' This country, crushed by the miseries of the past war, shudders at the least idea of the movement of troops. The Roman government has yet greater fear of its own discontented subjects; above all, of those who have been tempted to take authority and to plunder by the sort of revolution gone by. We have thus prevented, and, at the same time, dissipated, mortal fears and rash hopes. I do not think that the tranquillity of Rome will be troubled.

"The cardinal spent here the 18th in great and manifest friendship with general Murat, who gave him a residence and a guard of honour. He offered me the same. I have accepted nothing. I am accommodated at an inn.

"The cardinal set out this morning for Paris. He will arrive shortly after my despatch, for he will travel with great rapidity. The poor man feels that if he fails in his object he will be lost beyond all hope, and all will be lost for Rome. He is anxious to know his doom. I have made him understand, that a great means of saving every thing is to use all speed, because the first consul had the most serious and weighty reasons for concluding quickly and executing promptly.

"I tried at Rome to get the pope to sign the concordat alone; and if he had conceded this point to me, I should not have left Rome; but this idea did not succeed with me.

"You judge well that the cardinal is not sent to Paris to sign that which the pope has refused to sign at Rome: but he is his first minister and favourite; it is the soul of the pope that is about to enter into a communication with you. I trust that an agreement will result respecting these modifications. It is a question of phrases, of words that may be turned in so many ways, that, in the end, a good one may be seized upon.

"The cardinal bears to the first consul a confidential letter from the pope, and the most ardent wishes for the termination of the business. He is a man of a clear mind. His person has nothing imposing; he is not made for grandeur; his elocution, somewhat verbose, is not attractive: his character is mild, and his soul will open itself to an overflow, provided he is encouraged by mildness to repose confidence.

"I have written to Madrid, to the ambassador Lucien Bonaparte, in order to explain the meaning of the noisy reports of cardinal Gonsalvi's journey to Paris, and of my retirement to Florence. In like manner, I have made known to the ministers of the emperor and of the king of Spain at Rome, that there is no likelihood of war with the pope.

"I salute you respectfully. CACAULT"

The costume was settled in which he was to be presented at Malmaison, and he went thither with considerable emotion at the idea of seeing general Bonaparte. The first consul, being aware of this, would not add to the cardinal's uneasy feeling. He displayed all that skill in language with which nature had endowed him, to impress himself upon the mind of his interlocutor, to explain to him his whole intentions frankly, benevolent as they were towards the church, to make him sensible of the weighty difficulties attached to the re-establishment of public worship in France, and particularly to make him comprehend that the interest which he himself had in yielding to French opinion, was of much more consequence than that which he would have in administering to the resentments of priests, of emigrants, or of deposed princes, despised and abandoned by all Europe. He declared to cardinal Gonsalvi, that he was ready to reconsider certain details in the drawing up which were obscure to the Roman court, provided in the main she would accord that which he regarded as indispensably needful to the creation of an ecclesiastical establishment entirely new, which might be his undertaking, and which might reunite the wise and respectable priests of all parties.

The cardinal left the first consul greatly encouraged by this interview. He seldom exhibited himself in Paris, supporting a very becoming reserve, equally distant from an overdone severity, and from that Italian freedom, which is so much the reproach of the Roman priesthood. He accepted a few invitations from the consuls and ministers, but constantly refused to show himself in public places. He went to work with the abbé Bernier to resolve the last difficulties of the negotiation. There were two points which more particularly formed an obstacle to the agreement of the two governments: one relative to the title of the "religion of the state," which was sought to be obtained for the catholic religion; the second regarded the deposition of the former bishops. Cardinal Gonsalvi wished that to justify the great concessions thus made in the face of all Christendom, they might be able to allege a solemn declaration of the French republic in favour of the catholic church; he wished that at least the catholic religion should be declared the "dominant religion," and that an abrogation of all the laws opposed to it should be proclaimed or promised; and, lastly, that the first consul should personally profess it. His example would be regarded as before all others puissant on the mind of the multitude.

The abbé Bernier, on the other side, replied, that to proclaim a "religion of the state," or a "dominant religion," would be to alarm the other religious persuasions, and create the apprehension of a return to an oppressive, intolerant, plundering religion, and so on; that it was impossible to go beyond the declaration of the one plain fact, that the majority of the French people were catholics. He added, that to abrogate anterior laws, it was necessary to have recourse to the agreement of the legislative power, and that this would throw the French cabinet into an inextricable embarrassment; that the government, as a government or ruling body, could not make a profession of any particular faith; that the consuls might individually profess such, but that this circumstance could not appear in a treaty, as it was an individual, and, in some respects, a private act. That as to the personal conduct of the first consul, the abbé Bernier said in an under tone, that he would attend at a "Te Deum" or a mass; but that as to the other practices of religion, it was not necessary to require them of him, and that there were things of which the cardinal ought to abandon the exaction, because they would produce an effect more vexatious than salutary. At last a preamble was agreed upon, which nearly met the views of the two legations, in union with the first article.

It ran thus:

"*The government recognizing that the catholic religion is the religion of the great majority of the French*"

"*The pope, on his part, recognizing that this religion had derived and still expected at this moment the greatest good from the re-establishment of the catholic worship in France, and from the particular profession which the consuls of the republic made of it*"

From this double motive, the two authorities, for the good of religion and the maintenance of internal tranquillity, laid it down:—

Article 1st.—*That the catholic religion should be exercised in France, and that its worship should be public, in conformity to the regulations of the police, judged necessary for the maintenance of tranquillity*"

Article 2nd.—*That there should be a new arrangement of dioceses*"

This preamble sufficiently met the intentions of all parties, because it proclaimed loudly the re-establishment of worship; rendered the profession of it as public in France as it was formerly; made the profession of this faith by the consuls an individual act, personal to the three consuls in its exercise, and placed the allegation in the mouth of the pope and not in that of the chief of the republic. These first difficulties then appeared to be happily overcome. Next came the contested points relative to the deposing of the former bishops. In the main these were agreed to by both parties; but cardinal Gonsalvi demanded that the pope should be spared the pain of pronouncing the depositions by a public act of the old bishops. He promised that those who refused to give in their resignation should no longer be considered titularies, and that the pope would consent to give them successors; but he did not wish that this should be formally stated in the concordat. The first consul was inflexible upon this point, and, without giving the precise terms, required that it should be positively stated, that the pope would address himself to the former bishops, demanding from them the resignation of their sees, which he expected with full confidence from their love of religion, and that if they refused the sees,—

"Should be provided with new titularies for their government under the new circumscription."

These were the true expressions of the treaty.

The other conditions did not become a matter of contest. The first consul was to name, and the pope to institute the new bishops. Still cardinal Gonsalvi required and the first consul conceded one reservation, by which it was stated that in case of a protestant first consul, a new convention should be had in order to regulate the mode of nomination.

It was stipulated that the bishops should nominate the curés, and that they should be chosen from among such subjects as were approved of by the government. The question of the oath was resolved by the simple adoption of that formerly taken by the bishops to the kings of France. The holy see claimed with justice, and it was accorded without difficulty, the right of establishing seminaries for the supply of the clergy, but without the obligation of any state endowment. The engagement that the holders of national property should not be troubled by the clergy was formed, and the ownership of acquired property was distinctly acknowledged. It was said that the government would take measures that the clergy should receive suitable incomes, and that the old religious edifices, and all the parsonages not alienated, should be restored to them. It was agreed that the permission to make pious donations should be granted to the faithful, but that the state should regulate the form of them. Upon this form it was secretly agreed that the payment should be out of the public funds, since the first consul would on no account hear of the re-establishment of property in mortmain. This arrangement was to be found in the ulterior regulations of the police for regulating the forms of worship, which the government had the sole power to make.

In regard to the married priests, the cardinal gave his word that a brief indulgence should be immediately published; but he requested that an act of religious charity emanating from the clemency of the holy father, should pursue its free and spontaneous character, and not pass as a condition imposed upon the holy see, and this was conceded accordingly.

Both parties had now finally agreed upon every thing, and on reasonable bases, guaranteeing at the same time the independence of the French church, and a perfect union with the holy see. Never had a more liberal convention, and at the same time one more orthodox, been made with Rome; but it must be acknowledged, that one weighty resolution had been forced upon the pope, perfectly justifiable under the circumstances, that of deposing the former titularies who might refuse to resign. It was necessary, therefore, to be satisfied, and to conclude.

Agitation was at work all this time about the first consul in order to defeat his definitive consent. Men, who had access to him in the customary manner, and who enjoyed the privilege of giving him their advice, combated his determination. The constitutional part of the clergy made a good deal of strife for fear of being sacrificed to the unsworn clergy. It had obtained the right of assembling and of forming a sort of national council in Paris. The first consul had granted these powers for the purpose of stimulating the zeal of the holy see, and making it feel the danger of delay. In this assembly many senseless things on the customs of the primitive church were debated, to which the authors of the civil constitution wished to bring back the French church. They asserted that the episcopal functions ought to be conferred by election, and that if this was not exactly possible, it was at least desirable that the first consul should choose subjects from a list presented by the faithful in each diocese; that the nomination of the bishops should be confirmed by the metropolitans, in other words by the archbishops, and that of these last only by the pope; but that the papal institution should not be granted to the holy see arbitrarily; but that after a certain determined time it should be compelled to ratify them. This was equivalent to a complete extinction of the rights of Rome. Every thing which was advanced in this sort of council, was not so destitute as this of practical reason. Some sound ideas were presented there upon the circumscription of dioceses, and the emission of bulls, and on the necessity of not allowing any publication emanating from the pontifical authority without the express permission of the civil power. They had an intention of uniting all these different observations in the form of votes, which should be presented to the first consul for the purpose of explaining their resolutions. That which they were fond of repeating very frequently in this assembly was, that during the reign of terror the constitutional clergy had rendered great services to the proscribed faith, that it had never fled nor abandoned the churches, and that it was not just to sacrifice those to them who, during the persecution, had assumed the pretext of orthodoxy to evade the dangers of the priesthood. All this was correct, more particularly as respected the ordinary priests, of which the larger part really possessed the virtues attributed to them. But the constitutional bishops, some of whom merited respect, were for the most part men of disputation, true sectarists, that ambition in some, and pride of theological arrogance in others, had completely enchained, and they were far inferior in worth to the simple and unostentatious men who were their inferiors. The individual at their head, who showed himself the most restless, the abbé Grégoire, was the leader of a sect. His morals were pure, but he was of a narrow spirit, had excessive vanity, and his political conduct was marked by a painful recollection. Without being exposed to the impulses or the terrors which gained from the convention a vote of death against Louis XVI., the abbé Grégoire, then absent, and free to hold his tongue, addressed a letter to the assembly which bore sentiments very little conformable to religion or morality. He was one of those to whom a return to sound ideas was the least adapted, and who endeavoured, though in vain, to combat the tendency imprinted upon every thing by the consular government. He had taken care to form attachments in the family of Bonaparte, and thus to lay before the head of that family a multitude of objections against the resolution in the course of preparation. The first consul allowed the constitutionalists to talk and act, and was ready to arrest their agitation if it proceeded to a scandal; but he was not sorry to make their presence disagreeable to the holy see, and apply that as a stimulant to its slowness. Although he had little taste for this part of the clergy, because they were in general theological wranglers, he wished to uphold their rights, and to impose upon the pope as bishops, those who were known by their pure manners and humility of spirit. More than this was not asked by the greater number, for they were far from repugnant to a re-union with the holy see. They rather desired it as the most sure and honourable means for them to escape from a life of agitation, and a state of too little consideration with their flocks.

The greater number did not, in fact, resist an arrangement with Rome but through the fear of being sacrificed in a body to the former bishops.

There was a yet more formidable opposition near the first consul, produced in the ministry itself. Talleyrand, wounded by the spirit of the Roman court, which had shown itself less easy and less indulgent than he had at first believed it, had become cold and ill-disposed towards it. He evidently acted counter to the negotiation, after beginning with right good will, when he regarded it as only another peace to be concluded. He had set out to take the waters, as has been already mentioned, leaving the first consul a plan completely laid down —a scheme of an arbitrary form, beautiful without utility,—which the court of Rome would not agree to on any consideration. M. d'Hauterive was charged to continue to fill Talleyrand's part, and half engaged in holy orders, from which he had freed himself at the time of the revolution, he was but little favourable to the wishes of the holy see. He opposed a thousand difficulties to the drawing up of the plan agreed upon between the abbé Bernier and cardinal Gonsalvi. In his opinion, there should be announced in it, in a manner far more express and plain, the destitution of the old bishops; there ought to be mentioned in it that pious bequests could only be made through the funds, and there should have been a formal article to specify the re-instatement of the married priests, with similar matters. M. d'Hauterive thus reanimated the very difficulties in the drawing up, before which the negotiation had nearly failed. Even on the day of the signing, he again sent, on these different points, a memorial to the first consul.

These discussions being all terminated, there was an assemblage of the consuls and the ministers, in which the question was definitively argued and resolved upon. There the objections already known were repeated; great weight was laid upon disturbing the French mind; upon adding to the budget the new charges; upon putting, they said, the national property in peril; upon awakening amongst the old clergy to be established in their functions more hopes than any one would be willing to satisfy. A scheme of simple toleration was spoken of, which should only consist in restoring their edifices to the faithful, as well to the unsworn as to the sworn clergy, and for the government to remain a peaceable spectator of their quarrels, except in any case in which they might materially disturb the public peace.

The consul Cambacérès, a very strong advocate for the concordat, expressed himself upon the subject with much warmth, and triumphantly met every objection. He argued that the danger of disturbing the French mind was only true in regard to some of the livelier spirits among the opposition; but that the masses would welcome most willingly the re-establishment of public worship, and already felt a moral want of it; that the consideration of the expense was a very contemptible matter in such a case; that the national property was, on the contrary, to be guaranteed more sacredly than ever, by the sanction of the sales obtained of the holy see. Cambacérès here was interrupted by the first consul, who, always inflexible when the national property became a question, declared that he made the concordat precisely for the interest of the holders of that property; that he would crush, with all his weight, those priests who were foolish or ill-disposed enough to abuse the great act about to be carried into effect. The consul Cambacérès, in continuation, observed how ridiculous it was, and how difficult of execution, was a scheme of indifference towards all religious parties, that would dispute among each other for the confidence of the faithful, the edifices of worship, and the voluntary gifts of public piety; who would give the government all the fatigue of active interference and not one of its advantages, and would end, perhaps, in the re-union of all the sects in one single hostile church, independent of the state, and dependent upon foreign authority.

The consul Lebrun spoke in much the same language; and, lastly, the first consul gave his opinion in a few words, but in a lucid, precise, and peremptory manner. He acknowledged the difficulties, even the perils of the undertaking; but the depth of his views went beyond some few momentary difficulties, and he was resolved. He showed himself so by his words. Thenceforward there was no more resistance, no more disapprovals, except occasional grumblings at his resolution out of his presence. Submission followed, and the order was issued to sign the concordat, that the abbé Bernier and cardinal Gonsalvi had definitively drawn up.

According to his custom to reserve for his elder brother the conclusion of the more important acts, the first consul designated as plenipotentiaries, Joseph Bonaparte, Cretet, the councillor of state, and lastly, the abbé Bernier, to whom the honour was so justly due, for the pains he had bestowed, and the ability he had displayed, during this long and memorable negotiation. The pope's plenipotentiaries were the cardinal Gonsalvi, M. Spina, and the father Caselli, a learned Italian, who had accompanied the Roman legation with the view of lending aid by his theological knowledge. They met together out of form at the house of Joseph Bonaparte; the documents were read over, some petty changes were made in the details, always reserved to the last moment, and on the 15th of July, 1801, or the 26th of Messidor, this great act was signed, the most important that the court of Rome had ever concluded with that of France, or perhaps with any Christian power, because it terminated one of the most frightful tempests that the catholic religion had ever encountered. For France it put an end to a deplorable schism, and brought about this end by placing church and state in a suitable position of union and independence.

Much remained to be done after the signature of the treaty, which has since borne the title of the Concordat. It was necessary to demand its ratification at Rome, then to obtain the bulls which must accompany the publication, as well as the briefs addressed to all the former bishops, calling for their resignation; it was needful, in the next place, to trace out the new circumscription of the dioceses; to choose sixty new prelates, and in every thing to proceed in full accordance with Rome. It was still an uninterrupted negotiation, down to the day when they were at last able to chant a *Te Deum* in Nôtre Dame, to celebrate the

re-establishment of the catholic worship. The first consul, eager to arrive at the result in every thing, wished that all this should be promptly perfected, to celebrate at the same time the peace concluded with the European powers, and the peace with the church. The accomplishment of such a wish was difficult. The greatest haste was made in expediting the details, in order to retard as little as possible the great act of the restoration of public worship.

The first consul did not at first make public the treaty concluded with the pope; it was previously necessary to obtain the ratifications: but he communicated it to the council of state, in the sitting of the 6th of August, or 18th Thermidor. He did not communicate the act in its tenor, but contented himself with giving a substantial analysis, and accompanied this analysis with an enumeration of the motives which had decided the government in its conclusion. Those who heard him on that day were struck with the precision, vigour, and loftiness of the language he used. It was the eloquence of a magistrate, the chief of an empire. Still, if they were struck at his simple, nervous, eloquence, which Cicero styled in Cæsar *vim Cæsaris*, they were little reconciled to the proceeding of the first consul [1]. They remained dumb and sullen, as if they had seen perishing with the schism one of the works of the revolution the most to be regretted. The act was not then submitted to the deliberations of the council; it neither discussed nor voted upon it. Nothing broke the silent coldness of the scene. They were dumb; they separated without saying a word, without expressing a single suffrage. But the first consul had shown what was his will, from thenceforth irrevocable, and that was enough for a great number of persons. It was, at least, the assumed silence of those who would not displease him, and of those also who, respecting his genius, and valuing the immensity of the good that he had conferred upon France, were decided to pass over even his errors.

The first consul, thinking that he had now stimulated the court of Rome sufficiently, deemed it necessary to put an end to the pretended council of the ecclesiastical clergy. In consequence, he commanded them to separate, and they obeyed; since not one among them would have dared to offend an authority that had sixty bishoprics to be distributed, elevated, this time, by pontifical institution itself. In separating, they presented to the first consul an act of a suitable form, which embodied their views relative to the new religious establishment. It contained the propositions which have been already detailed.

Cardinal Gonsalvi had left Paris to return to Rome, and to bring back M. de Cacault to the presence of the holy see. The pope was longing for this double return, because Lower Italy was dangerously agitated. The Italian patriots of Naples and the Roman state awaited with impatience the opportunity of a new disturbance, while the old Ruffo party, the cut-throats of the queen of Naples, desired nothing better than some pretext for falling upon the French. These men, so different in their intentions, were ready to unite their efforts to run every thing into confusion. The news of the accordance between the French and Roman governments, the certainty of the intervention of general Murat, placed in the neighbourhood, at the head of an army, restrained the bad spirits, and prevented these sinister designs. The pope was overjoyed at seeing cardinal Gonsalvi and the French minister return to Rome. He immediately convoked a congregation of cardinals, in order to submit to them the new work; and he caused the bulls, the briefs, in fact, all the acts necessary in consequence of the concordat, to be prepared. The worthy pontiff was pleased, but agitated. He felt the certainty of having done well, and of immolating nothing but the interests of a faction to the general good of the church. But the censures of the old throne and altar party broke forth at Rome with great violence, and although the holy father had put away from his presence all the evil-disposed, he heard their bitter language, and was disturbed by it. Cardinal Maury, judging, with his usual superiority of acuteness, that the cause of the emigrants was lost, and already seeing, perhaps with a secret satisfaction, the moment when all in a state of exile, far from their country, and sighing to return, would be again restored, kept himself at a distance, in his bishopric of Montefiascone, solely occupying himself in the care of a library, which formed the charm of his solitude. The pope, in order not to give umbrage to the first consul, had, besides, made the cardinal understand, that his absolute retreat at Montefiascone was, at that moment, a convenience to the pontifical government.

The pope then was satisfied, but full of emotion [1],

[1] Letter from Monsignor Spina to cardinal Gonsalvi, secretary of state:

"Paris, 8th August.

"Thursday last, the first consul being in the council of state, and informed that in Paris the convention which he had concluded with his holiness was the general subject of conversation; that every one, although ignorant of its precise tenor, spake of it and commented upon it, each after his own fancy, therefore took the opportunity of communicating to the council itself the whole details. I know for certain that he spoke for an hour and a half, showing the necessity and advantage of it, and I have been told that he spoke most admirably. As he did not ask for the opinion of the council, all the members of the council remained silent. I have not yet been able to learn what impression was produced upon the minds of the councillors in general. The good were delighted at it, but their number is very limited. I shall endeavour to find out what impression was made upon those who were adverse to it. It appears that the first consul is desirous of preparing the minds of those who are hostile to the measure, with the view of disarming their opposition; but he will not succeed, unless he adopts some more energetic proceedings against the constitutionalists, nor while he leaves the catholic worship exposed to the lash of the minister of police."

[1] Letter of M. de Cacault, minister plenipotentiary of the French republic at Rome, to the minister for foreign affairs.

"Rome, 8th August, 1801, or 20 Thermidor, year IX.

"Citizen Minister,—To inform you of the state of the affair of the pope's ratification, expected at Paris, I can do no better than transmit you an original letter which I have just received from cardinal Gonsalvi.

"The cardinal having been obliged to keep his bed, his holiness came to work to-day at the house of his secretary of state.

"The sacred college is to concur in the ratification; all the doctors of the first order are employed and in movement. The holy father is in agitation—the agitation and the de-

and pressed forward the completion of the business so fortunately begun. The congregation of cardinals was entirely in favour of the concordat, since it had been revised, and accordingly pronounced itself in an affirmative manner. The pope, thinking that he must henceforward throw himself into the arms of the first consul, to accomplish with eclat an undertaking which had so noble an end as the re-establishment of the catholic worship in France, desired that the ceremony of the ratification should be surrounded with splendour and great solemnity. In consequence he gave the ratifications in a grand consistory, and in order to add still more to the brilliancy of this pontifical ceremony, he named three cardinals. He received M. de Cacault in full pomp, and displayed, in spite of the narrowness of his finances, all the luxury that befitted the occasion. Having to make choice of a legate to send into France, he designated the most eminent diplomatist in the court of Rome, the cardinal Caprara, a personage distinguished by his birth, being of the illustrious family of the Montecuculi, remarkable by his intelligence, his experience, and his moderation. Formerly ambassador to Joseph II., he had witnessed the troubles of the church in the last century, and had often by his ability and his readiness of mind saved the holy see from inconvenience. The first consul had himself expressed his desire of having near his person this prince of the church. The pope hastened to satisfy this wish, and made, on his own part, great efforts to overcome the resistance of the cardinal, who was old, ill, and little disposed to recommence the laborious career of his early youth. At length his repugnance was vanquished by the earnest solicitations of the holy father, and the overwhelming interest of the church. The pope wished to confer upon cardinal Caprara the highest diplomatic dignity of the Roman court, that of legate *a latere.* This legate has powers of the most extended character; the cross is always borne before him; he has power to do every thing able to be done afar from the pope. Pius VII., upon this occasion, renewed the ancient ceremonies, in which was remitted to the representative of the holy father, the venerated sign of his mission. A grand consistory was convoked anew; and in presence of all the cardinals and of all the foreign ministers, the cardinal Caprara received the sacred cross, which he was bound to have carried before him in that republican France which had for so long a time been a stranger to the pomps of catholicism.

The first consul, sensible of the cordial conduct of the pope, testified towards him in return the kindest consideration. He enjoined it upon Murat to spare the Roman States from the passage of troops; he made the Cisalpine republic evacuate the little duchy of Urbino, which it had seized upon under the pretext of some dispute respecting boundaries. He announced the approaching evacuation of Ancona, and pending that evacuation remitted money there to pay the garrison, in order to relieve the papal treasury from the expense. The Neapolitans having persisted in keeping possession of two of the territories bordering upon their frontier belonging to the holy see, namely, Benevento and Ponte Corvo, were ordered to evacuate them. The first consul also caused one of the fine hotels of Paris to be prepared and furnished with every luxury for the purpose of lodging, at the expense of the French treasury, the cardinal Caprara.

The ratifications had been exchanged; the bulls approved; the briefs were in course of being expedited throughout all Christendom, to request the resignations of the former titularies. Cardinal Caprara hastened his journey to Paris, notwithstanding his advanced years. Orders were every where given to the authorities to receive him in a manner fully consonant with his exalted dignity. They had done so with solicitude; the population of the provinces seconding their zeal, had given to the representative of the holy see, such marks of respect as proved the influence of the old religion over the country population. There was some fear about putting to the same proof the jeering people of Paris; every thing was arranged so that the cardinal should enter the capital at night. He was received with every possible attention, and lodged in the hotel prepared for him. He was also given to understand, in the most delicate manner in which it could be stated, that a part of the expenses of his mission would be borne by the French government; and that this was a diplomatic custom it was intended to establish in favour of the holy see. The first consul sent to the residence of the legate two carriages drawn by his finest horses.

Cardinal Caprara was received as a foreign ambassador; not yet as a representative of the church. This last reception was adjourned until the time of the definitive re-establishment of the worship. To initiate the new bishops, chant the *Te Deum*, and tender to the cardinal legate the oath which was necessary to the first consul, was reserved for the same time.

The indispensable formalities which it was needful should precede the concordat, had taken much more time than it was thought they would occupy at the commencement, and had lasted up to the period when the preliminaries of peace were signed in London. The first consul wished to be able to establish coincidently the *fête* of the 18th Brumaire and the general peace with the great religious solemnization of the restoration of worship. But it was necessary that the resignations of the former titularies should be received at Rome, before the approval there of the new diocesan circumscription

sire of a young spouse, who dares not be merry on the important marriage-day. Never has the pontifical court been seen more collected, more seriously and more secretly occupied with the novelty which is on the point of breaking forth, while France, for which all this is done, for whom they labour, neither intrigues, promises, gives, nor shines here in the way of ancient usage. The first consul will soon enjoy the accomplishment of his views in regard to an accordance with the holy see, and that will take place in a novel, simple, and truly respectable mode.

"This will be the work of a hero and a saint, for the pope is a man of real piety.

"He has said to me more than once, 'Depend upon it, that if France, in place of being a dominant power, were low and fallen in the regard of its enemies, I should not do less for her than I am granting to-day.'

"I do not think it can have ever happened, that so great a result, on which the tranquillity of France and the welfare of Europe will in future mainly depend, could have been thus attained without violence and without corruption.

"I have the honour respectfully to salute you.

"CACAULT."

could take place, together with the choice of the new bishops. The resignations demanded by the pope of the ancient French clergy, were at that moment the object of general attention. There was a desire in all quarters to see how this great act of the pope and the first consul would be received, holding each other by the hand, and thus demanding of the old clergy, of the friends or enemies of the revolution, scattered over Russia, Germany, England, and Spain, the sacrifice of their position, their party affections, their pride of doctrine itself, that the unity of the church should triumph, and peace be established in the interior of France. How many of them would be found so far influenced by this double motive as to immolate so many personal feelings and sentiments at once. The result proved the wisdom of the great act which the pope and the first consul at that moment executed; it proved the dominion which the love of good can exercise over souls so nobly incited by a saintly pontiff and a hero.

The briefs addressed to the orthodox bishops and to the constitutionalist bishops were not alike. The briefs addressed to the orthodox bishops who had refused to acknowledge the civil constitution of the clergy, considered them as the legitimate titularies of their sees, demanded from them that they should resign in the name and for the interests of the church, in virtue of an offer made formerly to Pius VI., and, in case of refusal, declared them deposed. The language was affectionate, melancholy, but full of authority. The brief addressed to the constitutional bishops was equally paternal, and breathed the mildest indulgence of spirit, but made no mention of resignation, seeing that the church had never recognized the constitutional as legitimate bishops. It requested them to abjure their former errors, to enter into the bosom of the church, and to terminate a schism, which was at the same time a scandal and a calamity. This was a manner of inducing their resignation without demanding it, since to demand it would have been a recognition of their title by the holy see, which it was unable to grant.

Equal justice should be rendered to all those who facilitated this great act of unity. The constitutional bishops, of whom some had an inclination to resist, but of whom the majority, better advised, sincerely desired to second the wishes of the first consul, resigned in a body. The brief though highly cordial was annoying to them, because it only spoke of their errors, and not of their resignations. They devised a form of compliance with the wishes of the pope, which, without involving any retractation of the past, still implied their submission and resignation. They declared that they adhered to the new concordat, and as a consequence deprived themselves of their episcopal dignity. They were in number fifty; and all submitted except bishop Saurine, a man of an ardent imagination, and a zeal stronger than it was enlightened; but at the same time a priest of pure morals, whom the first consul afterwards called to the episcopal dignity after he had been made acceptable to the pope.

This part of the task was not the more difficult. It was besides that which it was the easiest to realize immediately, because the constitutionalists were nearly all in Paris under the arm of the first consul, and the influence of the friends who had constituted themselves their defenders and guides.

The unsworn bishops were scattered through all Europe, but still a certain number of them were at this time in France. The great majority gave a noble example of piety and evangelical submission. Seven were resident in Paris, and eight in the provinces, in all fifteen. Not one hesitated about his answer to the pope, and to the new head of the state. They replied in language worthy of the best times of the church. The old bishop of Belloy, a venerable prelate, who had replaced M. de Belsunce at Marseilles, and who was the model of the ancient clergy, hastened to give his brethren the signal of abrogation. "Full," said he, "of veneration for, and obedience to the decrees of his holiness, and wishing always to be of one heart and one spirit with him, I do not hesitate to deposit in the hands of the holy father my resignation of the bishopric of Marseilles. It suffices that he esteems it necessary for the preservation of religion in France that I should give in my resignation."

One of the most learned bishops among the French clergy, the historian of Bossuet and Fenelon, the bishop of Alais, wrote: "Happy to have the will to concur by my resignation, as much as is in my power, with the views of wisdom, peace, and conciliation, which his holiness has adopted, I pray God to bless his pious intentions, and to spare him the contradictions which would afflict his paternal heart."

The bishop of Acqs wrote to the holy father: "I have not a moment hesitated to immolate myself, as soon as I was aware that this painful sacrifice was necessary to the peace of the country and the triumph of religion. O may she arise glorious from her ruins! May she be elevated I will not say alone upon the wrecks of my dearest interests, of all my temporal advantages, but on my ashes themselves, if I could serve as her expiatory victim! May my fellow-citizens return to concord, to the faith, and to holy morals. Never shall I form other desires during my life, and my death will be too happy if I see them accomplished."

It must be confessed that it is a beautiful institution which commands such sacrifices and language. The more ancient names of the old clergy of France, the Rohans, Latours du Pin, Castellanes, Polignacs, Clermonts Tonnerre, Latours d'Auvergne, were found in the list of the bishops who had resigned. There was a general enthusiasm which recalled to recollection the generous sacrifices of the old French nobility on the night of the 4th of August. It was this wish to facilitate by a great act of abrogation the execution of the concordat, that M. de Cacault had called the labour of a hero and a saint.

The bishops that had taken refuge in Germany, Italy, and Spain, for the most part followed their examples. There remained the eighteen bishops who had retired into England. These last were waited for to see whether they would escape the influence of the enemies that surrounded them. The British government, at that time actuated by no unfriendly spirit towards France, wished to have nothing to do with their determination. But the princes of the house of Bourbon, the chiefs of the Chouans, the instigators of the civil war, the accomplices in the infernal machine, Georges and

his associates were in London, living on the means given to emigrants. They surrounded the eighteen prelates, determined to prevent them from giving in their adhesion, and thus completing the union of the French clergy around the pope and Bonaparte. Long deliberations took place. Among the number of the refractory was numbered the archbishop of Narbonne, to whom they attributed very temporal interests, because with his see he would be deprived of immense revenues; also the bishop of St. Pol de Leon, who had carved out a post for himself, reported to be lucrative, that of distributor of the British subsidies among the exiled priesthood. These acted upon the bishops, and gained over thirteen of them; but they encountered a noble resistance from the other five, at the head of whom were two of the most illustrious and imposing members of the old clergy. M. de Cicé, archbishop of Bordeaux, the old keeper of the seals under Louis XVI., a person who possessed a superior political mind; M. de Boisgelin, a learned bishop, and lord of great possessions, who had formerly displayed the attitude of a worthy priest, faithful to his religion, though by no means an enemy to the enlightenment of the age in which he lived. These sent in their adhesion with their three colleagues, D'Osmond, De Noé, and Du Plessis d'Argentré.

Nearly all the old clergy had submitted. The work of the pope was accomplished with less bitterness of heart than he had at first feared. All these resignations successively inserted in the *Moniteur*, by the side of the treaties signed with the European courts, with Russia, England, Bavaria, and Portugal, produced a great effect, of which contemporaries retain a strong recollection. If any thing made the influence of the new government felt, it was this respectful, earnest submission of the two inimical churches; the one devoted to the revolution, but corrupted by the demon of disputation; the other proud, haughty in its orthodoxy, and in the greatness of its names, infected with the spirit of emigration, animated with sincere loyalty, and besides thinking that alone would suffice to render them victorious. This triumph was one of the finest, most deserved, and most universally felt.

The 18th of Brumaire, fixed upon for the grand festival of the general peace, was approaching. The first consul was seized with one of those personal feelings, which in man are too frequently mingled with the noblest resolutions. He wished to enjoy his labour, and to be able to celebrate the re-establishment of religious peace on the 18th of Brumaire. To do this, there were two things needful: first, that the bull relative to the diocesan arrangements should be sent from Rome; and secondly, that cardinal Caprara should have the faculty of installing the new bishops. If these things had been done, the sixty bishops might have been nominated and consecrated, and a solemn *Te Deum* been sung in the church of Nôtre Dame, in their presence. At Rome they had waited, most unfortunately, for the reply of the five French bishops, retired into the north of Germany; and as to the faculty of canonical investiture, it had not been imparted to cardinal Caprara, because such a power had never been deputed, not even to a legate *a latere*. It was now the 1st of November, or 10th Brumaire, and there remained but a few days. The first consul sent for cardinal Caprara, and spoke to him in the bitterest manner, and with a warmth neither becoming nor merited, of the little assistance he obtained of the pontifical government towards the accomplishment of his objects, and thus produced in the excellent cardinal a deep emotion[1]. But he very quickly perceived

[1] Letter from cardinal Caprara to cardinal Gonsalvi:—

"Paris, 22nd November, 1801.

"Returning from Malmaison about eleven o'clock at night, I sit down to detail to you the result of an interview I have had with the first consul. He did not utter a word upon the five articles which I attached to my letter of the 1st of November; but with the proper vivacity attached to his character, he broke out into the bitterest complaints against all Romans, saying that they wished to lead him in a dance, that they were trying to ensnare him by their eternal procrastination in expediting the bull of circumscription, and that they added to the delay by not sending the pope's letters to the bishops in proper time, and further, by not sending them by couriers, as every government would do that felt an interest in a negotiation of this kind; that they were endeavouring to entrap him, for they tried to make a manikin of him, to frighten the pope from agreeing to the nominations which he might make of the constitutional bishops; and continuing to pour forth his words like a torrent, he repeated every thing exactly that the councillor Portalis told me yesterday night in presence of Monsignor Spina.

"After an assault so vehement and in language full of invective, I took upon myself the part of justifying the Romans whom he accused; when he said, interrupting me, 'I will listen to no justification. I make but one exception, and that is the pope, for whom I feel respect and affection.' As it appeared to me that he was now somewhat less transported than at the beginning of the conversation, I tried to make him sensible that, entertaining an affection for his holiness, he ought to give him some proof of it, by sparing him the pain of nominating the constitutional bishops. Upon my making this suggestion, he put on again his former angry tone, and answered me, 'The constitutional bishops shall be appointed by me, and their number shall be fifteen. I have yielded all in my power; I will not deviate one particle from the determination to which I have come.'

"As to the chiefs of the sectarians, counsellor Portalis, who was present, assured me that I might be at ease on that head, as well as upon the matter of the subordinates. On the subject of the submission being started, the first consul exclaimed, 'It is arrogance to demand such a thing, and it would be cowardly to yield to it.' Then without waiting for a reply, he entered into a wide space of discursive argument upon canonical institutions; and throwing aside entirely his military character, he discoursed for a long while in a mode well worthy of a canon. I will not assert that he tried to convince me, but only to keep me at a distance. At last he concluded by the observation, 'But the bishops do not make profession of faith, nor take the oath.' Counsellor Portalis having replied, 'Yes, they do;' 'Well, said he, 'that act of obedience to the pope is of more value than a thousand submissions.' Then turning round to me, he said, 'Endeavour to arrange that the bull of circumscription may be here soon; and that the other, respecting which I addressed you on a former occasion, may not meet at Rome with the same destiny which the pope's letters to the bishops have experienced, and which I learn were not received by any of the several parties in Germany until the 21st of last month.'

"Here the interview closed. I ought still to add, that at its conclusion, about one o'clock in the day, he took an airing with madame, and was absent about an hour; but he insisted previously that I should stay and dine, although I was already engaged with his brother Joseph, to whom, however, he sent off word. Without the smallest exaggeration, from dinner-time till ten at night, he never ceased talking to me, walking nearly all the time up and down the room, his customary way, and discoursing on every imaginary topic in politics and economy that concerned us."

his errors, and as quickly sought to repair them. He felt instantly that he had done wrong, and desiring to soften the effect which his warmth and vehemence had produced, he kept the cardinal at Malmaison the whole day, charming him by his grace and kindness, and consoling him for his hastiness of conduct in the morning.

Despatches were written to Rome, and a respectable priest was sent off to Germany, the curate of St. Sulpice, M. de Pancemont, since bishop of Vannes, for the purpose of obtaining the answer of the five prelates, which was awaited so impatiently. Nevertheless, the 18th Brumaire passed without the arrival of the acts so much desired. The brilliancy of that day was still great enough to make the first consul forget what might have been wanting in this addition. At last the answer arrived from Rome; the pope always inclined to do what he, whom he styled his "dear son," requested, sent the bull for the arrangement of the dioceses, and the power of instituting the new bishops, conferred upon the legate in an unprecedented manner. As a compensation for so much condescension, the pope desired only one thing, which he confided to the judgment of cardinal Caprara, which was, that he might be spared the chagrin of appointing constitutionists.

After this, nothing more opposed the proclamation of the great religious act, thus laboriously accomplished, but the propitious moment had been permitted to slip by. The session of the year X. was opened, according to usage, reckoning from the 1st Frimaire, or 22nd of November, 1801. The tribunate, the legislative body, and the senate were assembled; a warm resistance was announced, and scandalous speeches made, against the concordat. The first consul did not like that such an outbreak should trouble so august a ceremony, and resolved to wait, in order to celebrate the re-establishment of public worship, until he had brought back the tribunate to its senses, or crushed it altogether. Now the delays were to come from his side, and it was the holy see that was to show itself urgent in going forward. However, the sudden obstacles which he was likely to encounter, proved the merit and courage of his resolve. It was not to the concordat alone that a warm opposition was expected, but to the civil code itself, as well as to some of the treaties which had just secured peace to the world. Proud of his labour, strong in the public opinion, the first consul was resolute in proceeding to the last extremities. He spoke only of crushing those bodies that might resist him. Thus human passions were about to mingle their stimulants with the finest works of a great man and of a great epoch.

BOOK XIII.

THE TRIBUNATE.

INTERIOR ADMINISTRATION.—THE GREAT ROADS CLEARED OF HIGHWAY ROBBERS, AND PUT INTO REPAIR.—REVIVAL OF COMMERCE.—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF THE YEAR 1801.—MATERIAL RESULTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AS REGARDS AGRICULTURE, MANUFACTURES, AND POPULATION.—INFLUENCE OF THE PREFECTS AND SUB-PREFECTS ON THE ADMINISTRATION.—ORDER AND SPEED IN THE DESPATCH OF BUSINESS.—COUNSELLORS OF STATE ON CIRCUIT.—DISCUSSION OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE.—BRILLIANT WINTER OF 1801-2.—EXTRAORDINARY INFLUX OF FOREIGNERS TO PARIS.—COURT OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—ORGANIZATION OF HIS CIVIL AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.—THE CONSULAR GUARD.—PREFECTS OF THE PALACE AND LADIES OF HONOUR.—SISTERS OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—HORTENSE BEAUHARNOIS MARRIES LOUIS BONAPARTE.—FOX AND DE CALONNE VISIT PARIS.—PROSPERITY AND LUXURY OF ALL CLASSES.—APPROACH OF THE SESSION OF THE YEAR X.—WARM OPPOSITION TO SOME OF THE BEST PLANS OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—CAUSES OF THIS OPPOSITION SHOWN, NOT ONLY AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES, BUT AMONG THE DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.—CONDUCT OF GENERALS LANNES, AUGEREAU, AND MOREAU.—OPENING OF THE SESSION.—DUPUIS, AUTHOR OF THE WORK ON THE ORIGIN OF ALL RELIGIONS, IS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.—BALLOT FOR THE VACANT PLACES IN THE SENATE.—NOMINATION OF THE ABBÉ GRÉGOIRE, CONTRARY TO THE PROPOSITIONS OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—VIOLENT EXPLOSION IN THE TRIBUNATE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD "SUBJECT" INTRODUCED INTO THE TREATY WITH RUSSIA.—OPPOSITION TO THE CIVIL CODE.—DISCUSSION IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE RESPECTING THE COURSE TO BE ADOPTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.—IT IS RESOLVED TO AWAIT THE DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST SECTIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE.—THE TRIBUNATE REJECTS THE FIRST SECTIONS.—RESULT OF THE BALLOT FOR THE PLACES VACANT IN THE SENATE.—THE FIRST CONSUL PROPOSES OLD GENERALS, NOT SELECTED FROM AMONG HIS CREATURES.—THE TRIBUNATE AND LEGISLATIVE BODY REJECT THEM, AND AGREE TO SUPPORT M. DAUNOU, KNOWN FOR HIS OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT.—VEHEMENT SPEECH MADE BY THE FIRST CONSUL TO A MEETING OF SENATORS.—THREATS OF AN ARBITRARY MEASURE.—THE OPPONENTS INTIMIDATED, SUBMIT, AND PLAN A SUBTERFUGE TO ANNIHILATE THE EFFECT OF THE FIRST BALLOTS.—CAMBACÉRÈS DISSUADES THE FIRST CONSUL FROM ANY ILLEGAL MEASURE, AND ADVISES HIM TO GET CLEAR OF THE OPPOSITION MEMBERS BY MEANS OF ARTICLE XXXVIII. OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH PRESCRIBES THAT THE FIRST FIFTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY AND THE TRIBUNATE SHOULD GO OUT IN THE YEAR X.—THE FIRST CONSUL ADOPTS THE IDEA.—SUSPENSION OF ALL THE LEGISLATIVE LABOURS.—AN ADVANTAGE TAKEN OF THIS SUSPENSION TO ASSEMBLE AT LYONS AN ITALIAN DIET, UNDER THE TITLE OF THE "CONSULTA."—BEFORE LEAVING PARIS, THE FIRST CONSUL DESPATCHES A FLEET WITH TROOPS

FOR ST. DOMINGO.—PLAN TO RECONQUER THAT COLONY.—NEGOTIATIONS AT AMIENS.—OBJECT OF THE CONSULTA CONVENED AT LYONS.—VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONS PROPOSED FOR ITALY.—PLANS OF THE FIRST CONSUL RELATIVE TO THIS POINT.—CREATION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC.—BONAPARTE PROCLAIMED PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.—ENTHUSIASM OF THE ITALIANS AND FRENCH AT LYONS.—GRAND REVIEW OF THE ARMY OF EGYPT.—RETURN OF THE FIRST CONSUL TO PARIS.

We have seen by what persevering and skilful efforts, the first consul, after overcoming Europe by his victories, had succeeded in reconciling it to France by his policy: we have seen by means of what efforts, not less meritorious, he reconciled the church with the French republic, and put an end to the miseries of schism. His efforts to re-establish the security and perfection of the roads, to impart activity to commerce and industry, and to restore ease to the finances, and order in their administration, to draw up a code of civil laws appropriate to French manners, to organize, finally, every part of French society, had not been less continued nor less fortunate.

That race of robbers, which was formed out of deserters from the army and the licentious soldiers of the civil war, who attacked the rich landed proprietors in the country, the travellers on the high roads, pillaged the public chests, and spread terror through the country, had been repressed with the utmost rigour. These robbers had chosen the moment when nearly all the troops were beyond the frontier, and the interior of the country was deprived of the means of defence, to spread themselves over it. But since the treaty of Lunéville, and the return of a part of the troops to France, the situation was no longer the same. Numerous moveable columns, accompanied at first by military commissioners, and afterwards by those special tribunals of which the establishment has been already stated, had scoured the roads in all directions, and chastised, with pitiless energy, those who infested them. Several hundreds among them had been shot during six months, without a single voice having been heard in favour of those miscreants, the impure remains of civil war. The others, completely discouraged, had sent in their arms, and made their submission. Security was established on the high roads, so that, though in the months of January and February, 1801, it was hardly possible to travel from Paris to Rouen, or from Paris to Orléans, without running the chance of being murdered, at the end of the year it was possible to travel through the whole of France without being exposed to such an accident. There might still have been some remains of these bandits in the remoter parts of Britany, and in the interior of the Cévennes at the utmost; but it was not long before all these were completely dispersed.

It has already been seen how ten years of trouble had nearly interrupted the passage of the roads of France by their neglect; how the ancient *corvée* had been replaced by a toll at the different barriers; how, under the system of this incommodious and insufficient tax, at the same time, the roads had fallen into a state of complete ruin; how, finally, the first consul, in the last Nivôse, had devoted an extraordinary subsidy to the repair of twenty of the principal highways traversing the surface of the republic. He had himself watched the employment of this subsidy, and by continued attention to the matter, had excited, in the highest degree, the zeal of the engineers employed. Each of his aids-de-camp, or of the great functionaries who travelled in France, was questioned as to whether his orders had been duly executed. The funds this year had been voted rather late; the end of the year had been rainy, and there was also a deficiency of hands. This was caused by the bringing into cultivation at this time immense tracts of land, and above all, by the civil war. These various causes had retarded the progress of the work; but still the improvement already made was obvious. The first consul devoted a new subsidy, taken from the year x., or 1801-2, to the repair of forty-two other roads. Reckoning two millions not employed in the year ix., ten millions extraordinary assigned to the year x., and sixteen millions produced by the tax, the total sum devoted to the roads for the current year, would be twenty-eight millions. This was double or triple the sum devoted to them in anterior periods. Thus the repairs proceeded with great rapidity, and every thing announced in the course of 1802, that the roads of France would be restored to a state of perfect convenience for travelling. Orders were issued for making new communications between different parts of old and new France. Four great roads were in the course of formation between Italy and France. That of the Simplon, several times alluded to, advanced rapidly towards completion. The road designed to unite Savoy and Piedmont, was begun, passing over Mount Cenis. A third, by Mount Genèvre, to connect the south of France and Piedmont, was ordered to be made, and the engineers were traversing the ground to complete the plans. The repair of the great road by the Col de Tende, traversing the maritime Alps, was undertaken. Thus the barrier of the Alps, between France and Italy, was about to be lowered, by means of four roads, practicable for the heaviest civil or military transport. The miracle of the passage of the St. Bernard had become useless for the future, whenever it should be required to proceed to the succour of Italy.

The canal of St. Quentin was in course of execution. The first consul had been himself to see the canal of Ourcq, and had ordered the resumption of the work. The canal of Aigues-Mortes, at Beaucaire, confided to the care of a company, was in the course of execution. The government had encouraged a company by making over to it large grants of land. The new bridges over the Seine, granted to an association of capitalists, were nearly completed. These numerous and fine undertakings attracted the public attention in a remarkable manner. The minds of men, always lively in France, now directed themselves with a species of enthusiasm from the splendour of war to the splendour of peace.

Commerce had already made great advances during the year ix., 1800-1, although the naval war had continued through the whole of that year. The imports, which in the year viii. had been only 325,000,000 f. amounted in the year ix. to

417,000,000 f. An increase of nearly a fourth in the space of a single year. This augmentation was due to two causes: the rapid consumption which had accrued of colonial products, and the introduction of a quantity of raw materials adapted to manufactures, such as cotton, wool, and oil; an evident sign of the revival of the manufacturing interests. The exportations had felt much less this general movement towards increase, because the foreign commerce of France was in the year x. 1800-1, not yet re-established, and because the manufacture of productions must of necessity precede their exportation. Still the sum total of the exports, which in the year VIII. amounted to no more than 271,000,000 f., had arisen in the year x. to 305,000,000 f. This increase of 34,000,000 f. was mainly owing to the extraordinary export of vines and brandies, which had produced a considerable mercantile activity at Bordeaux. Here may be remarked also what a difference had been produced between the exports and imports by the ten years of naval warfare, since the imports amounted to 417,000,000 f., and the exports only to the sum of 305,000,000 f. But the restoration of the manufactures would soon make up for this difference.

The silks of the south again began to flourish. Lyons, the favourite city of the first consul, again applied itself to the manufacture of its beautiful productions. Of fifteen thousand looms formerly employed in the weaving of silk, only two thousand remained at work during the time of the late troubles. Seven thousand were already re-established. Lille, St. Quentin, Rouen, all participated in the like movement; and the sea-ports, about to be set free from blockade, were equipping numerous vessels. The first consul, on his part, was making preparations for the re-establishment of the colonies to an extent which will be very shortly exhibited.

It was desirable to discover the actual state in which the revolution had left France as far as respected agriculture and population. Statistical researches, rendered impossible while collective administrations managed provincial business, were become practicable since the institution of prefectures and sub-prefectures. Orders were given for a census, which returned very singular results, confirmed in fact by the councils-general of the departments which had met for the first time in the year IX. The returns of the population for sixty-seven departments out of one hundred and two, into which France was at that time divided, amounting in 1789 to 21,176,243, had increased in 1800 to 22,297,443, being an increase of 1,100,000 souls, or about a nineteenth. This result, scarcely credible had it not been confirmed by a number of councils-general, proves that after all, the evil produced by great social revolutions is more apparent than real, as far at least as material things are concerned, and that, at any rate, the mischief is made good with prodigious rapidity. Agriculture was found to be every where in advance. The suppression of the rangerships had been exceedingly beneficial in the greater part of the provinces. If in destroying the game, it had destroyed the least objectionable pleasures of the richer classes; it had, upon the other hand, delivered agriculture from ruinous vexations. The sale of a number of large estates had caused considerable tracts of land to be brought into cultivation, and made highly valuable a part of the soil before nearly unproductive. Much of the landed property of the church, which had passed out of the hands of a negligent holder into those of an intelligent and active proprietor, augmented every day the general mass of agricultural produce. The revolution, which had thus been made in landed property, and which, in dividing it among a thousand hands, had so prodigiously augmented the number of landed proprietors, as well as the extent of cultivated land; this revolution was now accomplished, and was already producing great results. Doubtless, the process of culture was not yet sensibly improved, but the extent of tillage was increased in an extraordinary manner.

The forests, whether belonging to the state or to the communes, had suffered from the disorder in the administrative management of the times. This was an object to which it was of the utmost importance to attend; lands planted with wood were cleared, while neither the property of the state nor of individuals was spared. The administration of the finances possessing a great quantity of forests by the confiscation of the property of the emigrants, did not yet know how to take care of them, or manage them to advantage. Many proprietors, absent or intimidated, abandoned the care of the woods of which they were the possessors, some really, others fictitiously, on account of the proscribed families. This was the consequence of a state of things which was, fortunately, about to cease. The first consul had given great attention to the preservation of the forest riches of France, and had already begun to restore order and respect for property. A rural code was every where required, in order to prevent the injury done by the cattle.

The new institution of prefects and sub-prefects, created by the law of Pluviôse, year VIII., had produced immediate results. To the disorder and negligence of the collective administration had succeeded regularity and promptitude of execution, consequences foreseen and necessary to the unity of power. The affairs of state and of the communes had equally profited, for they had, at last, found agents who attended to them with continued assiduity. The completion of the assessments and the collection of the taxes, formerly so neglected, were now no way retarded. Order began to be restored in the revenues and expenses of the communes. Yet many parts of their administration still required correction. The hospitals, for example, were in a very deplorable condition. The deprivation of a part of their revenues by the sale of their property, and by the deprivation of many of the rates now abolished, reduced them to extreme distress. In several towns they had recourse to the octroi, and attempted the re-establishment of the duties of the indirect contributions upon a small scale. But those duties, as yet badly placed, were neither sufficiently nor generally enough employed. The foundling department also partook of the general disarrangement. Great numbers of deserted children were to be seen, for whom public charity made no provision, or who were committed to the charge of unfortunate nurses, whose wages were not paid. The re-establishment every where of

the former sisters of charity was desirable for the service of the hospitals.

The civil registers, taken from the clergy and given to the municipal officers, were very negligently kept. It was necessary to set in order this part of the administration, so important for the state of families; there were demanded not only zeal and vigilance on the part of the administrators, but improvements in the law, which was yet insufficient and badly regulated. This was one of the objects which it was necessary the civil code should regulate, then actually under discussion in the council of state.

The too great division of communes was much complained of, as well as their infinite number, and the union of several of them into one was demanded. This beautiful system of French administration was then devised, which is now achieved, and surpasses in regularity, precision, and vigour every other European administration; it was organized rapidly under the healing and all-powerful hand of the first consul. He had devised one of the most efficacious means to be informed of every thing, and for carrying into this vast machine those improvements of which it was thought to be susceptible. He commissioned some of the more able counsellors of state to travel through France, and observe, on the spot, the mode in which the administration worked. These counsellors, on arriving at any given point, called together the prefects of the neighbouring departments and the chiefs of the different services, and thus held councils, in which these officers made statements to them of difficulties which could not have been foreseen, the unexpected obstacles which arose out of the nature of things, and the deficiencies in the laws or regulations made during the preceding ten years. They examined, at the same time, if this hierarchy of prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, fulfilled its functions with order and facility; if the individuals were well selected, and if they showed that they were well impressed with the intentions of the government,—if they were, like the government, firm, laborious, impartial, free of all factious spirit. These tours produced the best effect. The counsellors thus sent stimulated the zeal of the functionaries, and reported to the council of state many useful matters, either for the decision of current business, or the digesting and improving the administrative regulations. More especially incited by the energy of the first consul, they did not hesitate to denounce to him the feeble or incapable agents, or those who were animated by a wrong spirit.

The solicitude of the first consul was not limited to this review of the country by the counsellors of state in turn. The numerous aids-de-camp whom he despatched, now to the armies, now to the seaports, to communicate to them the energy of his own will, had orders to observe every thing, and to report every thing to their general. Colonels Lacuée, Lauriston, Savary, sent to Antwerp, Boulogne, Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, Genoa, or Otranto, had a commission, on their return to stop at every place, to hear, see, and take notes of every thing and to report on every thing,—the condition of the highways, the progress of commercial affairs, the conduct of functionaries, the wishes of the people, and the public opinion. None of them hesitated to obey, for none feared to speak the truth to his just and powerful chief. This chief, who then thought of nothing but good, because that good, infinite in diversity and extent, sufficed to absorb the ardour of his soul, welcomed, with warmth, the truth which he required, and turned, consequently, to profit, whither he struck at a culpable functionary, repaired a defect in new institutions, or turned his attention to an object which, until then, had escaped his indefatigable observation[1].

[1] Here are some specimens of the instructions given to his aids-de-camp on mission:—

"To citizen Lauriston, aid-de-camp.

"Paris, 7th Pluviôse, year IX., January 27, 1801.

"You will proceed, citizen, to Rochefort. You will inspect most minutely the port and the arsenal, addressing yourself for that purpose to the maritime prefect.

"You will bring back to me memorials on the following subjects:—

"1. The number of men exactly detailed on board the two frigates which are about to sail, and the inventory of every thing belonging to the artillery and other things which those frigates have on board. You will stay at Rochefort till they have sailed.

"2. How many frigates are left in the road?

"3. A report respectively of each of the three ships, 'the Foudroyant,' the 'Duguay-Trouin,' and the 'Aigle,' together with the time in which each of those ships will be ready to sail.

"4. A particular report respecting the frigates, 'La Vertu,' 'La Cybèle,' 'La Volontaire,' 'La Thétis,' 'L'Embuscade,' and 'La Franchise.'

"5. A return of all the muskets, pistols, swords, and cannon balls, which have arrived in that port for maritime equipments.

"6. Are there in the magazines provisions sufficient to supply six ships of the line for six months, independently of the three above-mentioned?

"7. Lastly, have all measures been taken for recruiting the sailors, and for obtaining from Bordeaux and Nantes, provisions, cordage, and whatever is necessary for the equipment of a squadron?

"If you foresee that you shall have to stay at Rochefort more than six days, you will send me your first report by post. You will not fail to inform the prefect that I am of opinion that the minister of marine has taken the necessary measures to enable nine sail to put to sea from Rochefort at the beginning of Ventôse. You must observe that this must be said to the prefect in great secrecy.

"You will avail yourself of every circumstance to collect, in all places through which you pass, particulars relative to the march of the administrations and on the state of public feeling.

"If the departure of the frigates is delayed, I authorise you to go to Bordeaux, and to return by Nantes. You will bring me a report upon the frigates which are equipping.

"I salute you. BONAPARTE."

"To citizen Lacuée, aid-de-camp.

"Paris, 9th Ventôse, year IX., Feb. 28, 1801.

"You will go, citizen, with all speed to Toulon; you will deliver the accompanying letters to rear-admiral Ganteaume You will inspect all the ships of the squadron, as well as the arsenal. You will take care to ascertain yourself the force and the number of the English ships blockading the port of Toulon. If less than that of rear-admiral Ganteaume, you will urge him not to allow himself to be blockaded by an inferior force.

"If circumstances decide general Ganteaume to continue his mission, you will prevail upon him to take on board at Toulon as many troops as he can carry. For this purpose

you will see the military commandant, to remove all obstacles, so that the troops may be furnished for him.

"You will give rear-admiral Ganteaume to understand that he has been, in general, a little blamed for his cruise to Mahon, because he has roused the attention of rear-admiral Warren, whose only object was to defend Mahon.

"If rear-admiral Ganteaume decides to complete his mission, you will stay at Toulon four days after his departure.

"If, on the contrary, news from sea should lead you to think that he will remain too long, you will return to Paris, after staying fifteen days in Toulon, six at Marseilles, four at Avignon, and five or six at Lyons.

"You will take care to bring back to me a return of every thing that has been put on board each ship; of the ships and frigates that have sailed from Toulon since the first Vendémiaire, year IX.; of the state of the arsenal; and notes relative to the public functionaries of the country through which you will pass, and also to the feeling that prevails there.

"You will take advantage of all the couriers despatched by the maritime prefect, to give me news of the squadron, of the sea, and of the English.

"You will encourage in your conversation all the captains of the vessels, and point out to them of what immense importance their expedition is to the general peace.

"I salute you. BONAPARTE."

"To citizen Lauriston.

"Paris, 30th Pluviôse, year IX., Feb. 19, 1802.

"I have received, citizen, your different letters, and your last of the 25th Pluviôse. I beg you to make secret inquiries concerning the administration of the provisions, the service of which seems to excite complaints.

"Contrive to bring me, on your return, a detailed statement of the northern merchandize furnished in the course of the year X. by Lechie and Co. They pretend to have, at this moment, 1,700,000 francs' worth in store.

"What quantity of timber has arrived at Havre since the peace; and are they at last at work finishing the five ships that are building?

"In repassing to L'Orient, see how many ships are building there, and the time when each will be ready for sea. Inspect all the gunners and grenadiers of the coast-guard, that you may be able to give me an account what sort of men they are, and what it will be possible to do with them at the moment of the definitive peace.

"Lastly, see at Nantes to ascertain what northern stores have been received in the year X., and what hemp there is left; and if the shipment of timber for Brest is going on. Stop two days at Vannes, to make suitable observations on the public feeling.

"In all these observations endeavour to see for yourself, and without the advice of the authorities.

"Let me know what character one Charron has left at L'Orient; and stop there three or four days, to observe the conduct of the administration in that port.

"In short, miss no opportunity of seeing for yourself, and fixing your opinion respecting the civil, naval, and military administration.

"Inform yourself in every department what prospect there is of the next harvest. I suppose you will bring me notes relative to the manner in which the troops are paid and clothed, and of the state of the principal military hospitals.

"I salute you. BONAPARTE."

A spectacle at this moment attracted universal attention: this was the discussion upon the civil code in the council of state. The necessity of such a code was certainly the most urgent of the necessities of France. The ancient civil legislation, composed of the feudal law, the common, and the Roman law, was no longer applicable to a society completely revolutionized. The old laws respecting marriage, and those which had been enacted respecting divorce and succession were not adapted either to a new state of society, or to an order of things regular and moral. A commission, composed of Portalis, Tronchet, Bigot de Préameneu, and Malleville, had drawn up the plan of a civil code. This plan had been sent to all the tribunals, in order to be made the subject of their examination and observations. In consequence of their examination, and these observations, the plan had been modified, and finally submitted to the council of state, which had to discuss it, article by article, for several months. The first consul, present at all these discussions, had displayed, while presiding at them, a method, clearness, and often a depth of view, which was a matter of surprise and astonishment to all. They were not surprised to find one who had been accustomed to direct armies and to govern conquered provinces, an administrator of civil government, because this quality is indispensable in a great general; but to discover that he should possess the qualities of a legislator appeared to them most extraordinary. His education in this matter was rapidly acquired. He interested himself in every thing, because he understood every thing. He asked the consul Cambacérès for certain law books, and especially for the materials prepared during the time of the convention, for drawing up the new civil code. He had devoured these documents, as he did the books of religious controversy, with which he had provided himself when he was busy with the concordat. Classifying quickly in his mind the great principles of civil law, joining to these some ideas rapidly collected, his own profound knowledge of man, and his perfect clearness of understanding, he had soon rendered himself adapted to direct this important work, and he even furnished the discussions with a great number of new, just, and profound ideas. Sometimes a deficient acquaintance with the details made him support singular notions; but he permitted himself to be led back quickly to the truth by the learned men who were around him; but he was master of them all when it became necessary to extract from their conflicting opinions the most natural and rational conclusions. The principal service which the first consul rendered, was that of bringing to this fine monument a firm mind and a will for persevering application, thereby conquering the two main difficulties which had so far defeated preceding attempts,—the infinite diversity of opinions, and the impossibility of working uninterruptedly at the task amidst the troubles and agitations of the time. When the discussion, which often happened, had been long, diffuse, and obstinate, the first consul knew how to sum up and decide by a word; and what was more, he obliged every body to toil by toiling himself for whole days together. The minutes of these remarkable meetings were printed and published. Before they were sent to the *Moniteur*, the consul Cambacérès revised them, and suppressed what was not adapted for publication: either when the first consul expressed opinions sometimes singular, or treated of questions relating to manners with a familiarity of language, which ought not to go beyond the limits of a privy council. There was left, therefore, in these minutes, nothing but the ideas of the first consul, sometimes rectified, often discoloured, but always striking. The public was struck, and came

to regard him as the sole author of every thing great and good that was done in France; it even took a kind of pleasure in seeing him as a legislator whom it had seen as a general, diplomatist, and ruler, and in those very different characters constantly superior.

The first book of the civil code was completed, and was one of the numerous measures which were about to be submitted to the legislative body. The pacification of France and its internal re-organization were in this mode proceeding at an equal rate. Though all the evil of civil war was not repaired, nor all the good accomplished, still the comparison of the present with the past, filled the minds of men with hope and satisfaction. All the good effected was attributed to the first consul, and not unjustly; for, according to the testimony of his fellow-labourer Cambacérès, he directed the whole of the proceedings, attended himself to the details, and "effected more in every department than those to whom it was especially committed."

The man who governed France from 1799 to 1815, had, in the course of his career, no doubt, days of intoxicating glory; but neither he nor France, which he had seduced, ever saw days like these, when greatness was accompanied by more wisdom, and above all by that wisdom which gains the hope of an enduring character. He had given after victory a most glorious peace, and what he never could again obtain, a maritime peace; he had given after chaos the most perfect order; he had still left a certain liberty, not all that was desirable, but as much as was possible on the day after a sanguinary revolution; he had done nothing but good to every party only excepting the transportation of the hundred and odd proscribed revolutionists, condemned without trial, after the affair of the infernal machine; he had respected the laws; and that act itself, culpable because of its illegality, was not thought about in the immensity of good effected. Finally, Europe reconciled to the republic, feeling, yet not saying, she had been wrong in her interference with a revolution which did not concern her, and that the unparalleled greatness of France was the just consequence of an iniquitous aggression heroically repelled—Europe came with eagerness to deposit her homage at the feet of the first consul, happy to be enabled to say, for the sake of her own dignity, that she had made peace with a revolutionist full of genius, the glorious restorer of social principles.

If it were possible to stop at the wonders of these past times, most certainly history, in speaking of this reign, would say that nothing greater or more complete had been seen upon earth. All this was written in the earnest admiring faces of the men of all ranks and of all nations who pressed around the first consul. An extraordinary influx of strangers had arrived in Paris to see France and Bonaparte; and the greater part of them were presented to him by the ministers of their government. His court, for he had formed one, was military and civil at the same time; austere and elegant. He had added to it somewhat since the preceding year; he had composed a military household for himself and the other consuls, and had given a princely establishment to madame Bonaparte.

The consular guard was formed of four battalions of infantry, each consisting of twelve hundred men, some grenadiers, others chasseurs, and two regiments of cavalry, the first of horse grenadiers, the second of horse chasseurs. Both the one and the other were composed of the finest and bravest soldiers in the army. A numerous and well-served artillery completed the guard, and formed a perfect war division of six thousand men. A brilliant staff commanded these superb troops. There was a colonel to each battalion, and a brigadier-general to every two united battalions. Four lieutenants-generals, one of infantry, one of cavalry, one of artillery, and one of engineers, commanded alternately the entire corps for one decade, and did duty about the consuls. The whole was a corps composed of picked men only, wherein the best soldiers found a recompense for their good conduct, and surrounded the government with a splendour perfectly in conformity to its warlike character, presenting on the day of battle an invincible reserve. It will not be forgotten that the battalion of grenadiers of the consular guard had nearly saved the army at Marengo. To this particular staff of the consular guard the first consul added a military governor in the palace of the Tuileries, accompanied by two officers of the staff with the title of adjutants. This governor was Duroc, the aid-de-camp always employed in the more delicate missions. No officer was better adapted to maintain in the palace of the government that order and decorum which was so much in consonance with the taste of the first consul and the spirit of the time. But it was needful to temper this entirely military appearance by that which should be of a civil cast. A counsellor of state, M. Benezech, had been appointed during the first year of the consulship to preside at the receptions, and to receive with their proper honours, either the foreign ministers or the high personages who were admitted to the presence of the consuls. Four civil officers, who bore the appellation of "prefects of the palace," were nominated successors to M. Benezech in this duty. Four ladies of the palace were given to madame Bonaparte, as assistants in doing the honours of the first consul's drawing-room. When it was known that this new organization of the palace was in the course of preparation, numerous candidates offered themselves even from among the families attached to the ancient dynasty. They were not yet the high nobility, those who formerly filled the palace of Versailles, that thus offered themselves as solicitous for place; the moment for their submission had not yet come. Still they belonged to families of distinction that had figured in past times, but not among the emigrants, who thus were the foremost to approach a powerful government, that by its glory rendered service near it honourable for all the world. Bonaparte chose four prefects of the palace, M. Benezech, who had already performed the duties, M. Didelot and M. de Luçay, who belonged to the old finance department, and M. de Rémusat, of the magistracy. The four ladies of the palace charged with the honours at the side of madame Bonaparte were mesdames de Luçay, de Lauriston, de Talhouet, and de Rémusat. The greatest slanderers among the emigrants in the Paris drawing-rooms could find no fault with the correctness of these selections; and reasonable men, who require no more

in courts than just what decorum may make necessary, had no point for severe criticism in the military or civil organization of the present. In a republic, as in a monarchy, the palace of the chief of the state must be guarded and surrounded by an imposing display of the police force; in the interior of the palace there must be men and women selected to do the honours of the residence, either to illustrious strangers or to distinguished citizens who are admitted to the first magistrate of the republic. In this respect the court of the first consul was imposing, and worthy of him. He received from his wife and sisters a certain grace; all being equally remarkable either for manners, understanding, or beauty. The brothers of the first consul have been before adverted to; the present may be a proper place to notice his sisters. The eldest sister of the first consul, madame Eliza Bacciochi, not remarkable in person, was a woman of a very superior understanding, and attracted around her the most distinguished men of letters of the time, such as Suard, Morellet, and Fontanes. The second, Caroline Murat, who had married the general of that name, was beautiful and ambitious; intoxicated with her brother's glory, she strove to make the best use of it she could for herself and her husband's advantage: she was one of the females who gave to the new court the most elegance and animation. The third sister, Pauline, who had married general Leclerc, and afterwards a prince Borghese, was one of the most conspicuous beauties of her day. She had not then so much provoked slander as she did subsequently, and if her thoughtless conduct was sometimes a grief to her brother, the great affection which she felt for him touched his heart, and rendered his severity powerless. Madame Bonaparte was above them all as wife of the first consul, and she delighted and charmed, by her exquisite graces, both the French and the strangers admitted into the palace of the government. Rivalries, inevitable and already visible between members of a family so near to the throne, were repressed by general Bonaparte, who, though he loved his relations, treated with military roughness those who were troublers of the peace which he desired to see reign around him.

An event of some importance had just passed in the consular family, and this was the marriage of Hortense Beauharnois with Louis Bonaparte. The first consul, who tenderly loved the two children of his wife, had wished to marry Hortense to Duroc, as he imagined that a reciprocal attachment existed between these young hearts; but this match being disapproved by madame Bonaparte, was not to be carried into effect. Madame Bonaparte, always tormented by the fear of a divorce, since she had no longer any hope of having more children, was for marrying her daughter to one of her husband's brothers, thus flattering herself that the offspring of such a marriage, bound to the new chief of France by a double tie, at the same time might serve him for heirs. Joseph Bonaparte was married; Lucien lived in a very irregular manner, and conducted himself to his sister-in-law like an enemy; Jerome was on board ship, expiating some youthful faults; Louis was the only one who suited the views of madame Bonaparte, and she selected him. He was prudent, intelligent, but ill humoured, and not matched in disposition with his destined wife. The first consul, knowing this, resisted the match at first, but finally yielded, to a marriage, which was not to make the new couple happy, but which seemed, for the moment, likely to give heirs to the empire of the world

The nuptial benediction was given by cardinal Caprara, and in a private house, as was then the practice with all the ceremonies of religion, when those priests officiated who had not taken the oath. On the same occasion the benediction was given to Murat and his wife Caroline, who had not yet received it, as was the case with many other husbands and wives of that time, whose marriages had only been contracted before the civil magistrate. Bonaparte and Josephine were in the same circumstances. The last pressed her husband repeatedly to add the religious to the civil tie which already united them; but whether from foresight, or the fear of avowing openly the incomplete obligations which united him to madame Bonaparte, he would not consent.

Such was then the consular family, since become the imperial. These personages, all on various accounts remarkable, happy in the prosperity and glory of the chief who made their greatness, constituted by him, and yet not spoiled by fortune, presented an interesting spectacle, which did not pain the sight like that directorial court, the honours of which were done for several years by Barras the director. If a few envious or disdainful Frenchmen, who were frequently under obligations to it, persecuted it with their sarcasms, foreigners, more just, paid it a tribute of curiosity and commendation.

Once in every decade, as elsewhere remarked, the first consul received the ambassadors and the foreigners, who were presented to him by the ministers of their nation. He went down the ranks of the assemblage, always numerous, followed by his aids-de-camp. Madame Bonaparte followed him, accompanied by the ladies of the palace. It was the same ceremonial as was observed in other courts, but with a less train of aids-de-camp and ladies of honour, but here with the incomparable brilliancy that surrounded the name of Bonaparte. Twice in the decade he invited to dinner the eminent personages of France and of Europe, and once in the month he gave, in the gallery of Diana, a banquet, at which sometimes a hundred guests were invited. On such days he held a drawing-room at the Tuileries in the evening, and admitted near him the high functionaries, the ambassadors, and persons of the highest French society, who were favourable to the government. Always carrying calculations into the minutest things, he prescribed to his family certain dresses, with the object of getting them generally worn through imitation. He ordered silk to be worn, for the purpose of encouraging as much as possible the manufactures of Lyons. He recommended to madame Bonaparte the stuff called lawn (*linon*), in order to favour the manufacture of St. Quentin [1]. As to himself, sim-

[1] Here is part of a letter written from St. Quentin to the consul Cambacérès:—

"St. Quentin, 21 Pluviôse, year IX., or Feb. 10, 1801.

"The interesting manufactures of St. Quentin and its

ple in every thing, he wore the plain dress of a chasseur of the consular guard. He obliged his colleagues to wear the embroidered dress of a consul, and to hold drawing-rooms in their apartments, for the purpose of repeating there, although with less brilliancy, what was done at the Tuileries.

The winter of 1801-2, or the year x., was extremely brilliant, from the satisfaction which prevailed among all classes, some happy to enter France, others to enjoy perfect security, or to see in the maritime peace the unbounded prospect of commercial prosperity. The foreigners contributed, by their influx, to the brilliancy of the winter *fêtes*. Among the personages that appeared in Paris at this epoch, there were two that excited general attention; the one was an illustrious Englishman, the other an emigrant, whose name was formerly much celebrated.

This illustrious Englishman was Fox, the most eloquent of English orators; the celebrated emigrant was M. de Calonne, formerly minister of finance, whose ready and fertile mind in expedients, continued to conceal for a few moments from the eyes of the court of Versailles, the abyss towards which it was rapidly hurrying. Fox displayed considerable impatience to see the first consul, towards whom, in spite of his British patriotism, he was attracted irresistibly. He arrived in Paris immediately after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, and was presented to the first consul by the English minister. He came to see France and its chief, and also to consult the French diplomatic archives, because at that moment the great Whig orator was occupying his leisure time in writing a history of the two last Stuarts. The first consul gave orders for all the archives to be thrown open to Fox, and gave him such a welcome as would have been sufficient to conciliate an enemy, but which charmed a friend whom he had acquired by his glory alone. The first consul threw aside all forms of etiquette on his own side with the generous stranger, brought him into close intimacy, and had with him long and frequent interviews, as if he seemed desirous to make in his person the conquest of the English people themselves. They were often of a different opinion. Fox was endowed with that warm imagination which makes attractive orators, but his intellect was neither positive nor practical. He was full of those noble illusions which the first consul, although he had as much imagination as depth of mind, had either never partaken or partook no longer. The young general Bonaparte was disenchanted, as any one is likely to be, after a revolution, begun in the name of humanity, and shipwrecked in blood. He had shaken off all the first enchantments of the revolution, except one, and that was greatness, which he pushed to an excess. He was too little of a liberal to please the chief of the Whigs, and too ambitious to suit the English taste. Each, therefore, sometimes ruffled the other, by contrary opinions. Fox made the first consul smile by a simplicity, an inexperience, which were singular in a man nearly sixty years of age[1]. The first consul sometimes learned the British patriotism of Fox, by the vastness of his designs, which he took no care to dissimulate. They were still in perfect harmony, in heart and understanding, and were enchanted with each other. The first consul took infinite care to make Fox acquainted with Paris, and sometimes was pleased to accompany him to the public establishments. There was then open an exhibition of the products of French industry, the second since the revolution. Every body was surprised at the progress of the French manufactures, which, amid the general commotion, had still participated in the impulse given to the public mind, and a number of new processes and improvements had been invented recently, or had been introduced. Foreigners, particularly the English, were particularly struck, the English being good judges of these things. The first consul took Fox to the halls fitted up for these exhibitions in the court of the Louvre, and sometimes enjoyed the surprise of his illustrious guest. Fox, amidst the attentions of which he was the object, suffered a sally to escape him which did honour to the sentiments and spirit of this noble personage, proving that in him justice towards France was joined to the most susceptible patriotism. There was in one of the halls of the Louvre a terrestrial globe, very fine and large, constructed with great skill, and designed for the first consul. One of the personages who followed the first consul making the globe turn round, and placing his hand upon England, made this ill-timed remark, that England occupied a very small space upon the map of the world. "Yes," exclaimed Fox, warmly, "yes, it is in that island which is so small that the English are born; and it is in that island that they wish to die; but," added he, extending his arms about the two oceans, and the two Indies, "during their lives, they fill the entire globe, and embrace it with their power." The first consul applauded this reply, so proud and appropriate as it was.

The personage next to Fox, who occupied public attention, was M. de Calonne. The prince of Wales had solicited and obtained permission for him to visit Paris. M. de Calonne held, from the time of his arrival, a language wholly unexpected, and which made a sensation among the royalists. He said he had no intention to serve the new government. He could not do it, attached as he had been to the house of Bourbon; it was his duty to speak the truth to his friends. No man in Europe was capable of making head against the first consul; generals, ministers, kings, were his inferiors and dependents. The English had passed from hatred of him to enthusiasm in his favour. This sentiment was now prevalent among all classes of the English population, and was carried to the extreme, as were all sentiments among the English. Europe must, therefore, not be calculated upon for overthrowing general Bonaparte; nor ought they to dishonour the royal cause by detestable plots,

environs, which employed seventy thousand persons, and brought into France more than fifteen million francs, have decreased five-sixths. It is desirable that our ladies should bring lawn into fashion, without giving such an absolute preference to muslins. The idea of reviving one of the most interesting manufactures which we exclusively possess, and of giving bread to such a vast number of French families, is, in fact, well calculated to bring lawn into fashion; besides, have not lawns been long enough in disgrace?"

[1] Just turned fifty years, being born in 1749.—*Translator.*

which filled honest men throughout the world with horror. They must submit and hope every thing, from time, and from the double difficulty of governing France without royalty, and of founding royalty without the Bourbon family. The infinite vicissitudes of revolutions could alone bring about the claims which did not now exist in favour of the exiled princes. But let whatever would happen, it was necessary to await from France alone, from France become enlightened, the return of better feelings, and nothing from foreigners or conspirators. This language, singular on account of its wisdom, above all from the mouth of M. de Calonne, caused real astonishment, and led to the belief that M. de Calonne would not be long before entering into relations with the consular government. He had seen the consul Lebrun, who, with the consent of the first consul, received royalists, and had held a conversation with him upon the affairs of France. It was even asserted that he was about to become in the finances what Talleyrand was in diplomacy, a reclaimed noble, lending his name and experience to the first consul. The surmise was unfounded; and besides, the first consul had less need of a brilliant mind, than of that application which M. de Calonne had never exhibited, but which the first consul had found in M. Gaudin, who had introduced the most perfect order into the finances. Nevertheless, upon this vague rumour a crowd of persons, recently entered into France, surrounded M. de Colonne, wishing to help out their fortunes by getting into office, and thinking that they could not find near the new government a fitter person to introduce them, or one who could better justify by his example their adherence to the first consul [1].

[1] There were agents of some of the exiled princes in Paris, and among these were men of talent and very well informed. These agents sent almost diurnal reports, to which allusion has been already made. The subjoined is an extract from one of these reports, relative to M. de Calonne.

"M. de Calonne returned to Paris about a month since. He had an interview with the ministers before he left England, and was perfectly well received by them. He was asked if, in returning to Paris, he did not intend to join the administration. He answered, that his principles, his conduct during the revolution, and his attachment to the royal family, all forbade him absolutely to accept a place at the hands of the new government; but that, attached to France by taste and by interest, he should not refuse to give his advice if it were asked, and if he believed it were of advantage to his country.

"His arrival in Paris has made a great sensation. He is every day beset by visiters and surrounded by creatures, as at the most brilliant time of his fortune and credit. The opinion that he is about to be raised to the ministry brings crowds of applicants to him, and to rid himself of them he is obliged to fly into the country. It does not seem, however, that this opinion is well founded; and if it is ever realized, it will not be at present. All that is known is, that he was to be presented a few days ago to Bonaparte, and to have a secret conference with him.

"He sees all his old friends, and opens himself to them with perfect freedom. Having been a witness of the weakness and nullity of foreign powers, he does not believe that there is to be found in them the smallest guarantee against revolutionary invasion, and still less any efficacious protection for the cause of the king. He repeats that which we have a long time known, that the men who govern in Europe are men without means and without character, who are unacquainted with the times in which they live, who know not how to judge of the present or to foresee the future, and who are alike destitute of the courage which incites to undertake, and the firmness which qualifies for perseverance. He considers them as all delivered over to Bonaparte, trembling before him, and ready to execute humbly all his commands. Thus he is persuaded that in France only is it possible to labour for the restoration of the monarchy, not by putting oneself forward and fomenting foolish and ridiculous plots,—more adapted to dishonour a cause than to prepare the way for real success,—but by striving, without noise and show, to re-establish public opinion, to destroy prejudice, to diminish fears, to unite all the servants of the king, and to keep them in readiness to take advantage of every thing in his favour, by all those events which the natural course of things must effect.

"M. de Calonne asserts that in England the enthusiasm for Bonaparte is not only general, but carried to a point of excess of which it is difficult to form an adequate idea. The court and city, the capital and the country, all classes of the citizens, from the minister to the artizan, are eager to proclaim his praises, and outvie each other in chanting his victories, and the splendour of his power. Moreover, this enthusiastic feeling is not peculiar to England; the whole of Europe is, so to say, infected by it. From all parts people hasten to Paris, that they may see the great man at least once in their lives; and the police have been obliged to threaten to apprehend certain Danes, who had publicly bent the knee before him whenever they saw him.

"This is one of the main causes of his strength and of his enormous power. How could the French dare to oppose him, as long as they see the powers of Europe thus prostrate at his feet!"

Who could believe that in the presence of so much good as was already effected, or was about to be so, that an opposition, and a hot one, too, would be raised! An opposition was nevertheless in preparation, and one of the most violent possible, against the measures of the first consul. It was not among violent partizans radically opposed to the government of the first consul, royalist or revolutionary, that this opposition was formed, but among the very same party that desired and seconded the overthrow of the directory as inefficient, and called for a new government that should be at the same time firm and able. The subaltern revolutionists, men of disorder and of bloodshed, were repressed, submissive, or transported, and were sinking daily deeper and deeper into obscurity, never more to emerge. The miscreants of royalty had a pressing necessity for drawing breath since the affair of the infernal machine, and they kept quiet; and besides that portion of them which had infested the high roads, had been put to death. The royalists of high rank, while holding in the saloons of Paris the most impertinent conversations, began, notwithstanding, to exhibit already the disposition which led them afterwards to play; the men, the part of chamberlains, the women that of ladies of honour, in the palace of the Tuileries, which the Bourbons no longer inhabited.

But the moderate revolutionary party called to compose the new government was divided, as is almost always the case, with every victorious party, which goes about to form a new government, and disagrees about the manner of its constitution. From the first days of the consulate, this party, which had concurred in various ways in the 18th of Brumaire, had appeared divided between two contrary tendencies, the one consisting in making the revolution terminate in a democratic and mode-

rate republic, such as Washington had established in America; the other, in making it end in a monarchy bearing more or less a resemblance to that of England, or if it must be the old French monarchy, divested of its old prejudices, without the feudal system, but retaining its grandeur. The consular government had now begun its third year, and, as usual, these two tendencies continued to exaggerate by the very contradiction of themselves. Some became once more almost violent revolutionists, upon seeing how things were going forward, observing the authority of the first consul on the increase, monarchical ideas spreading, a court formed at the Tuileries, the catholic worship restored, or nearly so, and emigrants returning in shoals. The others, become almost the royalists of the old time, were so eager to react and to refound a monarchy, that they were disposed to tolerate an enlightened despotism for the result of the revolution. In fact, an enlightened despotism, such as that which was at the same moment arising in France, had so much of genius in it, and insured such a sweet repose, that its seduction was great. Still the contradiction between the two was pushed so far on one side and the other, that a crisis might be soon expected to ensue.

The tribunate, during the preceding session, much agitated, at one time on account of the law of finance, at another on account of the special tribunals, was much more so this year at the aspect of all that was going forward, and at the sight of the government marching so fast towards its object. The concordat, above all, roused its indignation, as the most counter-revolutionary act that could well be imagined. The civil code was not, according to that assembly, sufficiently conformable with equality. The treaties of peace themselves, which comprehended the greatness of France, gave umbrage at their wording, as will very shortly be seen.

M. Sieyès, while endeavouring to prevent agitation by means of his constitutional precautions, as has been seen, had not prevented any; because constitutions do not create human passions, and are powerless for their destruction: they are thus only the stage upon which the passions appear. By placing all the weight, all the activity of public affairs, in the council of state, and the noise, declamation, and idle animadversion in the tribunate; in reducing the last to the character of a pleader for or against the acts of the government, before the legislative body, which could only answer yea or nay; in placing above an idle senate which, at long intervals, elected the men who had the duty of playing two vain characters in the legislative assemblies; in selecting the individuals of the government in the same spirit; in placing men fit for business in the council of state; men fit for public speaking, inclined to noise, in the tribunate; the obscure and superannuated in the legislative body, and the superannuated of a higher order in the senate—M. Sieyès had hardly hindered the passions of the time from exploding; he had even added, it must be confessed, a certain jealousy of these bodies towards one another. The tribunate felt the declamatory vanity of its character; the legislative body felt the ridiculous nature of its silence, and contained besides many who were formerly priests, who had quitted orders, organized by the abbé Grégoire, into a silent but vexatious opposition. The senate itself, which M. Sieyès had intended should represent an opulent quiet old man, was not so quiet as he had intended it to be. That body was a little wearied of its idle dignity; because the senators were deprived of public functions, and their electoral power, so seldom exercised, was far from filling up their time. All of these were jealous of the council of state, which alone partook with the first consul the glory of the great things that were daily accomplishing.

Thus this social body, which M. Sieyès had thought he should lull into a species of aristocratical stupor, after the example of Venice and Genoa, still restless, like one who has upon him the remains of fervour, and might be calmed and controlled by a master, could not be cast into a peaceful slumber as its maker had hoped.

It was singular that M. Sieyès, the inventor of all these constitutional arrangements, by virtue of which there was so much activity on one hand, and so little on the other,—M. Sieyès began to weary himself of his own inaction. Moderate, and even monarchical in his opinions, he ought to have approved the acts of the first consul; but causes, some inevitable, others accidental, commenced to embroil them. That great speculative mind, limited to seeing every thing and doing nothing, could not but feel jealous of the active and puissant genius, which was every day gaining the mastery of France and of the world. M. Sieyès, in the magnificent accomplishments of general Bonaparte, already observed the germ of his future errors, and if he did not yet indicate this openly, he sometimes showed it by his silence, or by some phrase as profound as his own thoughts. It is possible that if attention had been constantly paid to him, they might have calmed and attached him to the first consul. But Bonaparte considered himself acquitted with M. Sieyès somewhat too early by the gift of the estate of Crosne; and being, moreover, absorbed in immense labour, he had neglected the superior man too much, who had so nobly yielded to him the first place on the 18th Brumaire. Sieyès, idle, jealous, mortified, had faults to pick out even in the vast mass of present good, and showed himself a morose and chilling censurer. The first consul was not master of his temper sufficiently to leave all the wrong upon his adversaries. He spoke cavalierly of the metaphysics of Sieyès, of his impotent ambition, making a thousand remarks upon the subject, which were immediately repeated and envenomed by the malevolent. Sieyès had some friends at his side, such as M. de Tracy, a man of superior mind, but not religious, an original philosopher in a school that had but little originality, and a very respectable character; M. Garat, an eloquent philosopher, more pretending than profound; M. Cabanis, given to the study of material man, and seeing nothing beyond the limits of matter; M. Lanjuinais, a sincere, pious, vehement man, who had so nobly defended the Girondins, and was now equally warm in resisting the new Cæsar. These surrounded Sieyès, and already formed a perceptible opposition in the senate. The concordat seemed to them, as to many other persons, the strong proof of an approaching counter-revolution.

The first consul, seeing France and Europe en-

chanted with his proceedings, could not understand how it occurred that the only persons who exclaimed against these proceedings should be found precisely around him. Despite this opposition, he called the members of the senate, from whom it proceeded, idealogists, led on by a pouter, who grieved for the exercise of the supreme power, of which he was incapable; he styled the members of the tribunate busy-bodies, with whom he should know how to break a lance, and prove he was not to be frightened with noise; he called the discontented, more or less numerous of the legislative body, priests unfrocked, Jansenists, whom the abbé Grégoire, in accord with the abbé Sieyès, was striving to organize into an opposition against the government; he declared that he would break down all these oppositions—that they should not stop him, and prevent the good which he was endeavouring to accomplish. Never having lived among assemblies of men, he was ignorant of the art of winning them over, which Cæsar himself, powerful as he was, did not neglect, and which he learned in the Roman senate. The first consul expressed his displeasure boldly and publicly, with the full sense of his strength and his glory, scarcely listening to the wise Cambacérès, who possessed great skill in managing public assemblies, and urged him to use soothing and moderation. "You must prove to these people," replied the first consul, "that you are not afraid of them; and they will be frightened, on condition that you are not frightened yourself." Here were already, as may be seen, the manners and ideas of genuine royalty in proportion as the moment approached when royalty became inevitable.

The opposition was not only seen in the bodies of the state, but also in the army. The mass of the army, like the mass of the nation, sensible of the great results obtained during the last two years, was wholly devoted to the first consul. Still among some of the chiefs there were discontented men, some really so, others merely jealous. The sincerely discontented were the staunch revolutionists, who saw with mortification the return of the emigrants, and the obligation they were under to go and exhibit their uniforms in the churches. The discontented out of jealousy, were those who saw with chagrin an equal, who having in the first place surpassed them in renown, was now on the eve of becoming their master. The former belonged, for the most part, to the army of Italy, which had always been completely revolutionary; the last to the army of the Rhine, calm, moderate, but somewhat envious.

The chiefs of the army of Italy, for the most part devoted to the first consul, but ardent in their sentiments, had a dislike both to priests and emigrants; they complained that they were to be made churchmen; all this being spoken in the original, and not very becoming manner of soldiers. Augereau and Lannes, bad politicians but heroic soldiers, especially the second, who was a most accomplished soldier, held the most singular conversations. Lannes, become commander-in-chief of the consular guard, administered the military chest with a prodigality known and authorized by the first consul. A mansion was sumptuously furnished for the accommodation of the staff of the guard. There Lannes kept an open table for all his brother officers, and delivered invectives against the proceedings of the government. The first consul had no fear that the devotion of these idle soldiers towards himself personally was diminished. At the first signal he was certain to recal them all to him, and Lannes before the rest. Still it was dangerous to suffer such heads and such tongues to go on, and he sent for Lannes. Habituated to a great familiarity with his general-in-chief, he gave way to his passion, which was very soon suppressed by the calm superiority of bearing of the first consul. Lannes retired sorry for his fault, and regretful of the displeasure he had caused. From an honourable and susceptible feeling, he determined to liquidate the sums drawn from the chest of the guard, though with the consent of the first consul. But after all his campaigns in Italy, he scarcely possessed any property. Augereau, almost as inconsiderate as himself, but possessing an excellent heart, lent him a sum, being all which he possessed in the world, saying, "Here, take this money; go to that ungrateful fellow for whom we have spilled our blood; give him back what is due to the chest, and let neither of us be under any obligations to him." The first consul could not permit his old companions in arms, at once heroes and children, to throw off their affections towards him. He dispersed them. Lannes was destined to a profitable embassy in Portugal; Cambacérès, the consul, being charged with the arrangement: Augereau had orders to be more careful for the future, and to return to his army.

These scenes, highly exaggerated by the malevolence which propagated and disfigured them, produced a mischievous effect, more especially in the provinces. No voice, it is true, was raised against the first consul, whom every body was disposed to think must be right in the teeth of every opponent; but they excited uneasiness and apprehension of there being weighty difficulties in the way of the supreme authority, the re-establishment of which was so ardently desired [1].

The differences with the officers of the army of Italy, were scenes between friends who fall out one day and the next embrace. They were of a more serious character with the officers of the army of

[1] Here is a passage in a letter of Talleyrand, who had gone some time afterwards to Lyons, for the organization of the Italian consulta:

"Lyons, 7th Nivôse, year x., or Dec. 28th, 1801.

"General,—I have the honour to inform you of my arrival at Lyons to-day, at half-past one in the morning. The road through Burgundy, with the exception of six or eight leagues, is not very bad; and the prefects of the line of communication have availed themselves of the enthusiastic moment caused by the hope of your passage, to cause the active repair of the roads. Whenever I came to communes or habitations, I heard cries of 'Vive Bonaparte!' For the last ten leagues which I travelled in the middle of the night, every one came as I passed, light in hand, to repeat these words. It is an expression which you are destined continually to hear.

"The story about general Lannes has spread, and appears to occupy much attention. The sub-prefect of Autun and a citizen of Avallon talked to me about it, but with different circumstances, which letters from Paris had reported to them as anecdotes. I have had occasion to remark anew to what a degree all that relates to your person retains the public attention, and is immediately the subject of conversation throughout France."

the Rhine, who were more cool and malicious. Unfortunately, a fatal division now began to appear between the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, and the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine, or between Bonaparte and Moreau.

Moreau, since the campaign against Austria, the success of which he owed at least in part to the first consul, who gave him the command of the finest army of France—Moreau was reputed the second general of the republic. Really no one was mistaken respecting his worth; he was well known to possess a mind of moderate power, incapable of great combinations, and wholly destitute of political knowledge; but stress was laid upon his real qualities of a wise, prudent, and vigorous general, in order to make of him a very superior commander, capable of meeting the conqueror of Italy and Egypt. Parties have a wonderful instinct for discovering the weak points of eminent men. They abuse or flatter them alternately, until they have found a way to penetrate into their hearts, and infuse into them their own poison. They had soon found out the weak side of Moreau, which was vanity. While flattering him, they had inspired him with a fatal jealousy of the first consul, which was one day destined to be his destruction. The females of the families of Bonaparte and Moreau had quarrelled about some of the miserable matters for which women will fall out with one another. The family of Moreau endeavoured to persuade him that he ought to be the first and not the second; that Bonaparte was ill-disposed towards him; that he endeavoured to depreciate him, and make him play a secondary part. Moreau, who was wholly destitute of firmness of character, had listened too much to this kind of dangerous suggestion. The first consul, on his side, had never in any way done him wrong; on the contrary, he had loaded him with distinctions of all kinds; he had affected to speak of him higher than he thought, above all, in respect to the battle of Hohenlinden, which he in public proclaimed a master-piece of military art, whereas he considered it privately rather a piece of good luck, than a deliberate scientific combination. But when Moreau had once the idea that he was wronged, he would not be behindhand, and with the ordinary promptitude of his character, he promptly resented it. One day Bonaparte invited Moreau to accompany him to a review; Moreau drily refused, that he might not be last in the first consul's staff, alleging as an excuse that he had no horse. The first consul, vexed at this refusal, soon returned it in the same way. On one of the great entertainments, which he was frequently obliged to give, all the high functionaries were invited to dine at the Tuileries. Moreau was in the country, but returning the day before the dinner, upon some kind of business, he called upon Cambacérès, to speak to him about it. This consul, who continually made his business to conciliate, received Moreau with the utmost cordiality. Being surprised to see him in Paris, he ran to the first consul, and urged him, with some warmth, to invite the commander of the army of the Rhine to the grand dinner that was to take place on the day following. "He has given me one public refusal," replied the first consul, "I will not hazard the risk of receiving a second from him." Nothing could shake this determination. The next day, while all the generals and high functionaries of the republic were seated in the Tuileries, at the table of the first consul, Moreau avenged himself for having been neglected, by going publicly, in plain clothes, to dine at one of the most frequented restaurants of the capital, with a party of malcontent officers. This circumstance was much noticed, and produced a very mischievous effect.

From that day, being in the autumn of 1801, the generals Bonaparte and Moreau showed an extreme degree of coldness towards one another. The public were soon cognizant of this, and the hostile parties lost no time in turning it to advantage. They began by extolling Moreau at the expense of Bonaparte, and laboured to fill the hearts of both with the poison of hatred. These details may appear below the dignity of history. Yet whatever may serve to extend the knowledge of men, and the lamentable littleness even of the greatest, is not unworthy of history, since every thing that is capable of imparting instruction belongs to it. It is not possible too strongly to warn personages of note against the frivolous nature of the motives which too often embroil them, more especially when these differences become those of their country.

The opening of the session of the year x. took place on the 1st Frimaire, or 22nd of November, 1801, in accordance with the command of the constitution, which fixed that day for the purpose. Certainly, if ever any man had a right to feel pride in presenting himself before a legislative assemblage, it was that which the consular government carried with it. Peace concluded with Russia, England, the German and Italian powers, Portugal, and the Porte, and concluded with all these powers upon such glorious conditions; a plan for conciliation with the church, which terminated the religious troubles, and which, in reforming the church according to the principles of the revolution, still obtained the adhesion of the orthodox to the results of that revolution; a civil code, a monument since admired by the whole world; laws of high utility respecting public instruction, the legion of honour, and an infinite number of other important matters; financial plans which placed the expenses and the revenues of the state in perfect equilibrium—what more complete, more extraordinary, than such an assemblage of results to lay before the nation! No matter, all these things, as will soon be seen, were very thanklessly received.

The session of the legislative body was opened this time with a certain solemnization. The minister of the interior was charged with the presidency of the opening. Formal opening speeches were made on both sides, and there appeared some intention to imitate the forms customary in England on the opening of parliament. The new ceremonial, borrowed from constitutional royalty, was commented upon malevolently by the opposition. The tribunate and legislative body constituted themselves, and then commenced that kind of manifestation by which assemblies willingly reveal their secret sentiments, the election of members. The legislative body chose for its president M. Dupuis, author of the celebrated work, "*Sur l'Origine de tous les Cultes.*" M. Dupuis was not so strong an oppositionist as might be supposed from

his work; he had acknowledged to the first consul, in conversation, that the reconciliation with Rome was needful: but his name had a considerable signification at a moment when the concordat was one of the principal grievances alleged against the consular policy. The intention it was easy to infer; and it was comprehended by the public, above all, by the first consul, who, even in his own mind, exaggerated its importance.

The two assemblies exercising the legislative power, in other words, the tribunate and the legislative body, being constituted, three counsellors of state presented an exposition of the situation of the republic. This exposition, dictated by the first consul, was simple, yet noble, in language, but in regard to subject, magnificent. It made a strong impression on the public mind. On the day following, a numerous train of counsellors of state brought up such a series of bills as any government has rarely an occasion to present to its assembled chambers. They were bills designed to convert into laws the treaties with Russia, Bavaria, Naples, Portugal, America, and the Ottoman Porte. The treaty with England, concluded at London previously, under the form of preliminaries of peace, was on the point of receiving, at this moment, in the congress of Amiens, the form of a definitive treaty, and could not yet be submitted to the deliberations of the legislative body. As for the concordat, it was not thought right to expose it at once to the ill-nature of the opposition. Portalis, the counsellor of state, then read an address, which has ever since remained celebrated, upon the entire of the civil code. The three heads of that code were brought up at the same time by three counsellors of state: the first related to "the publication of the laws;" the second, to "the enjoyment and the privation of civil rights;" the third, to "the acts of the civil state."

It would seem that such a list of legislative labours ought to have put to silence every opposition; but it did nothing of the kind. When, according to usage, the bills were presented to the tribunate, the communication of the treaty with Russia produced a most violent scene. The third article of the treaty contained an important stipulation, which the two governments had devised in order to secure each other, in case of the evil-disposed working mischief reciprocally in either country. They had mutually promised, according to Article III., "not to suffer any of their *subjects* to carry on any correspondence whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, with the internal enemies of the governments of the two states, to propagate therein principles contrary to their respective constitutions, or to foment troubles." In this the French government had the emigrants in view, and the Russian government the Poles. Nothing was more natural than such a precaution, more particularly on the part of the French government, which had to fear the Bourbons, and to watch them continually. In alluding to the particular class of individuals who might attempt to disturb the repose of the two countries, the negotiators had used the word which most naturally occurred, as that oftenest adopted in the language of diplomatists, namely, the word "subjects." It had been used without any intention, because it was the word commonly employed in all treaties, as it was as usual to say the "subjects" of a republic as the "subjects" of a monarchy. Scarcely was the reading of the treaty completed, than Thibaut, a tribune, one of the opposition members, demanded to speak. "There has slipped," he said, "into the text of the treaty, an expression inadmissible in our language, and which ought not to be tolerated. I mean the word 'subjects,' applied to the citizens of one of the two states. A republic has no 'subjects,' but 'citizens.' Doubtless it was an error of the writer—it should be rectified." These words produced a very great agitation, such as is certain to be the case in an assembly previously excited, and in expectation of some event, and which is electrified by every circumstance, no matter how slight, that has pre-occupied the minds of the members. The president cut short the explanations about to be made, by the remark that the deliberations were not at that moment opened, and that such observations ought to be reserved for the time when, on the report of a commission, the treaty presented would be submitted for discussion. This appeal to the regulations hindered the tumult from breaking out at the moment, and a commission was immediately named.

This display increased the agitation which prevailed in the great bodies of the state, and irritated still more the first consul. These manifestations were continued through the character of the persons to be elected. There were several places in the senate to be filled up. One was vacant by the death of the senator Crassous. There were two others to be filled up, in virtue of the constitution. The constitution, as it will be remembered, had at first provided but sixty places for senators out of the eighty, which formed the total number. To reach this last number, two were to be appointed every year for ten years. At this time there were three places to be given away, counting in that which was vacant by the death of the senator Crassous. According to the rules of the constitution, the first consul, the legislative body, and the tribunate, were each to name a candidate, and the senate were then to choose from among the candidates thus presented.

The scrutiny was begun for this object as well in the tribunate as in the legislative body. In the tribunate the opposition supported M. Daunou, who had publicly quarrelled with the first consul, on the matter of the special tribunals, so much discussed in the preceding session. From that time he would not attend the meetings of the tribunate, saying that he should remain a stranger to any of the legislative proceedings, "as long as the tyranny endured." In fact, he had kept his word, and had not been seen there afterwards. The opposition therefore had chosen M. Daunou, as being the candidate the least agreeable to the first consul. The decided partisans of the government, in the same body, supported one of the framers of the civil code, M. Bigot de Préameneu. Neither the one nor the other were elected. The majority of the votes were united in favour of a candidate of no note, the tribune Desmeuniers, a moderate person in his sentiments, and who, through his relations, was not a stranger to the first consul. The legislative body more decidedly spoke out its sentiments, and elected the abbé Grégoire as its own candidate to the senate. This choice, after the

gift of the presidency to M. Dupuis, was a redoubled manifestation against the concordat. M. Bigot de Préameneu had in the assembly a certain number of votes that nearly amounted to two-fifths.

The first consul wished, on his side, to make a significant proposition. He might have waited until the two bodies, authorized to present candidates concurrently with the executive powers, had chosen those for the two places which remained to be filled up. It was probable that the legislative body and the tribunate, not willing to break definitively with a government so popular as that of the first consul, liable also to the oscillating movement of all assemblies, that ever fall back on the morrow when they have advanced too far the day before, would make a less obnoxious choice, and even adopt, for the two remaining candidateships, persons acceptable to the government. Thus M. de Desmeuniers, for example, was a person whom the first consul could perfectly approve, because he had promised to recompense his services by the place of senator. It was probable that the name of M. Bigot de Préameneu might issue in one of the ballots of the legislative body or the tribunate. The first consul would then be able to present, on his own account, those candidates adopted by the assemblies that would best suit his views; and, in that case, a name presented by two authorities out of three would almost have the certainty of being chosen by the majority of the senate. The consul Cambacérès advised this line of conduct; but it partook of that kind of management in its nature much used in representative governments, to which the first consul had a sovereign repugnance. The magistrate-general, a stranger to such a form of government, would not thus place himself, as it were, behind the legislative body and the tribunate, and await their opinion before he manifested his own. In consequence, he immediately presented to them, not one candidate alone, but three at once, and he chose three generals. Notwithstanding the hopes previously given to M. Desmeuniers, the first consul, displeased with him, because he had not pronounced his sentiments decidedly, left him out, and presented generals Jourdan, Lamartillière, and Berruyer. It is true that these selections were well suited to the moment. General Jourdan had appeared an opponent of the 18th Brumaire, but he enjoyed general respect; he had conducted himself with prudence, and had received, subsequently, the government of Piedmont. In presenting him to the senate, the first consul proved the real impartiality which became the head of the government. As to general Lamartillière, he was the oldest officer of artillery, and had made all the revolutionary campaigns. General Berruyer was an old officer of infantry, who, after having borne a part in the seven years' war, had been wounded in the republican armies. These were not, therefore, his own creatures, whom the first consul thus determined to reward, but the old servants of France under all the governments. This proud and decided conduct adopted, it was impossible to make a more worthy choice. A circumstance still more singular is, that this choice was justified as to motive, in a preamble. The sense of the preamble had a strong meaning:—"You have peace," the government said to the senate; "you are indebted for it to the blood which your generals have shed in a hundred battles; prove to them, that in calling them to your bosom, the country is not ungrateful towards them."

The senate assembled, and was much agitated by intrigues. Sieyès, who commonly lived in the country, left it upon the present occasion, to mingle himself up in them. Many persons very well disposed, like old Kellermann for example, were misled by being told that the legislative body, in case the abbé Grégoire, its own candidate, were preferred, would return the compliment, by proposing for the second vacant place, general Lamartillière, one of the three candidates nominated by the first consul, and that then, by choosing the general a little later, it would satisfy the authorities at once, the legislative body, and the government. These manœuvres succeeded; the abbé Grégoire was elected by a large majority.

While these elections were in agitation, and causing great pleasure to the opposition, the discussions in the tribunate and legislative body assumed a most mischievous character. The treaty with Russia, on account of the word "subjects," had become a ground of the most violent discussions in the committee of the tribunate. M. Costaz, the reporter of that committee, who did not belong to the opposition party, had applied to the government for certain explanations. The first consul had received him, and explained to him the real meaning of the article, so much attacked, and the motive of its insertion in the treaty; and as to the word "subjects," he proved to M. Costaz, by a reference to the dictionary of the academy, that the word in diplomacy, applied to the citizens of a republic as well as of a monarchy. He recounted to him, in order to his complete edification, the different details relative to emigrants concerning France and Russia. M. Costaz, convinced on the evidence of these explanations, made his report favourable to the article in question; but, intimidated by the violence of the tribunate, he censured the employment of the word "subjects," and related these things in a manner sufficiently awkward, and liable to give Russia the appearance of a very feeble government, delivering up the emigrants to the first consul, and to the first consul the appearance of a persecuting government, pursuing the emigrants into their most distant refuge. M. Costaz, as often happens to circumspect men, who wish to conciliate all parties, displeased the first consul and his opponents in an equal degree, and compromised the former with Russia.

The day of the discussion arrived, being the 7th of December, 1801, or 16th Frimaire, when the tribune Jard Panvilliers moved that the debate should take place in a secret committee, and this very wise proposal was agreed to. The tribunes were no sooner left to themselves by the public, which was by no means favourable to them, than they gave themselves up to the most inconceivable rage. They absolutely wanted to reject the treaty, and propose its rejection to the legislative body. If there was ever a culpable act, it was this; because for one word, right besides, and perfectly innocent, they would reject a treaty of such a nature, so long and so difficult to conclude, and which secured a peace with the first continental

power—it was acting like fools and madmen. Chénier and Benjamin Constant delivered the most declamatory and violent speeches. Chénier went so far as to state, that he had important things to say upon this question, but that he could only state them at a public sitting, because he wished that all France might hear them. He was answered that it was better he should communicate them to his own colleagues. He shrunk back from doing this, and an unknown member of the tribune, a simple, sensible man, restored the minds of his colleagues to their senses, in a short speech. "I know nothing," said he, "of diplomacy; I am a stranger alike to the art and the language; but I see in the proposed treaty a treaty of peace. A treaty of peace is a precious thing, and must be adopted entire, with all the words it contains. Do not believe that France would ever pardon you for its rejection; the responsibility resting upon you would be terrible. I demand that the discussion terminate, the sitting be declared public, and the treaty be immediately put to the vote." After these few words, delivered with simplicity and calmness, the assembly was about to vote, when the opposition members moved an adjournment until the next day, on account of the lateness of the hour. The adjournment was carried. The following day the tumult was as great as it had been the day before. Benjamin Constant delivered a written speech, very lucid and very subtle. Chénier declaimed anew, with great vehemence, saying that five millions of Frenchmen had died that they might cease to be "subjects," and that this word ought to have remained buried among the ruins of the Bastile. The majority, wearied by these violent proceedings, were about to terminate them, when a letter from Fleurieu, councillor of state, addressed to the reporter, M. Costaz, arrived. M. Costaz had treated as official the explanations which he had given in his report, and had made the assembly understand that they came from the first consul. "Furnish the proof positive of that!" was the answer made to him. He had thus forced a declaration from M. Fleurieu, who was the councillor of state, appointed to support the bill or "project." M. Fleurieu, after having received the orders of the first consul, sent the declaration desired, accompanied by many declarations, which the report of M. Costaz rendered indispensably needful; this revived the debate. Ginguené terminated it by an epigrammatic and not very fitting motion. Acknowledging that it was difficult, on account of an unpleasant word, to reject a treaty of peace, he proposed a vote in these words: "For the love of peace, the tribunate adopts the treaty concluded with the court of Russia."

M. de Girardin, who was one of the most reasonable and intelligent members of the tribunate, induced the assembly to pass over all these propositions, and to go immediately to the vote. After all, the majority of the tribunate intended to give the first consul signs of dissatisfaction by the choice of individuals; it had no desire to enter into a struggle, above all, in relation to a treaty of which the rejection would have drawn upon itself much public remark. It was adopted by seventy-seven votes to fourteen. Its adoption in the legislative body occurred without tumult, thanks to the forms of the institution.

In Paris this scene produced a painful effect. The first consul was not considered there as a minister exposed to the law of a majority, and no fear was in consequence felt for his political existence. He was considered a hundred times more necessary than a king in an established monarchy. But they saw with chagrin the least appearance of new troubles, and the friends of a wise liberty asked themselves how, with a character similar to that of Bonaparte, how, with a constitution, in which the framer had neglected to admit the power of dissolution, such a contest would terminate if it should be prolonged.

In effect, if a dissolution had been admitted, the difficulty would soon have been cleared away, since France, when convoked, would not have re-elected one of the enemies of the government. But obliged to live together until the renewal of one-fifth, the different powers were liable, as they were under the directory, to some violence, the one from the other; and if such a thing occurred, it was evidently neither the tribunate nor the legislative body that could triumph. It needed but an arbitrary action of the first consul to bring to nothing, both the constitution and those who made it serve such a purpose. Thus every wise man trembled at this state of things.

The discussion of the civil code did but increase these apprehensions. Now that time has obtained the esteem of all the world for this code, it is hardly possible to conceive all the objections at that time urged against it. The opposition expressed at first great astonishment at finding the code so simple, and that it had so little novelty. "How," said they, "what is that all?—there is in that no new conception, no great legislative creation, which is particularly adapted for French society, or able to mark it with a peculiar and enduring character; it is only a translation from the Roman and the common law. Its authors have taken Domet, Pothier, the institutes of Justinian, and digested into French all that they contain; they have divided this into articles by numbers more than by a logical deduction; and then they have presented this compilation to France, as a monument which has a claim to its admiration and respect." Benjamin Constant, Chénier, Ginguené, Andrieux, all of them men who might have employed their intellects to a better purpose, rallied the councillors of state, saying they were lawyers, under the direction of a soldier that had made this mediocre compilation, so pompously called the civil code of France.

M. Portalis and the men of sense, who were his assistants, replied, that on the matter of legislation the object was not to be original, but lucid, just, and wise; that here there was no new society to be constituted as with Lycurgus or Moses, but an old society to be reformed in some points, and in many others to be restored; that the French law had existed for ten centuries; that it was, at the same time, the product of Roman science, of the feudal system, of the monarchy, and of the modern mind, acting together for a long space of time upon French manners; that the civil law of France, resulting from these different causes, it was necessary to adapt in the present day to a society which had ceased to be aristocratic, in order to become democratic; that it was necessary, for example, to

review the laws upon marriage, upon paternal authority, upon succession, in order to divest them of every thing that was repugnant to the spirit of the present time; that it was necessary to purge the laws upon property of all feudal services, to draw up this mass of prescriptions in precise plain language, which would allow no room for ambiguities or for endless disputes, and to put the whole in excellent order; that this was the only monument to be erected, and that, if contrary to the intention of the authors, it should chance to surprise by its structure, if it should please a few scholars by new and original views, in place of obtaining the cold and silent esteem of lawyers, it would fail of its real object, though it might suit a few minds more singular than judicious in their sentiments.

All this was perfectly reasonable and true. The code under this view was a master-piece of legislation. Grave lawyers, full of learning and experience, knowing well the language of the law, under the direction of a chief, a soldier, it is true, but of a superior mind, able to decide their doubts, and to keep them at work, composed this beautiful digest of French law, purged of all feudal law. It was impossible to do otherwise, or to do better.

It is true that in this vast code it is possible to substitute here and there one word for another, to transpose an article from one place to another—this might be done without much danger, and also without much utility; and that it is which even the best intentioned assemblies are fond of doing, only to impress their own hand on the work which is submitted to them. Sometimes, in fact, after the presentation of an important bill, mediocre and ignorant minds get hold of a legislative measure, the result of profound experience and long labour, alter this, and spoil it, making of a well-connected whole, a formless incoherent thing, with relation to laws already in existence, or to the real facts of the case. They often act thus out of no spirit of opposition, but only from a taste for retouching the work of another. Only let it be imagined of vehement tribunes, persons of little information, exercising themselves in this sort of way upon a code of some thousand articles! It was enough to make the authors renounce their work.

The preliminary essay had to sustain the first assault of the tribunes. It had been sent before a commission, of which the tribune Andrieux was the reporter. This part contained, save in some few and unimportant differences in the verbal part, the same dispositions as were definitively adopted, and which now form what may be styled the preface to that fine monument of legislation. The first article related to the promulgation of the laws. The ancient system had been abandoned, in virtue of which the law could not be executed until the parliaments and tribunals had granted the registration. That system had produced formerly a contest between the parliaments and royalty; a contest which had, in its day, been a useful correction of absolute monarchy, but which would have been a great blunder at a time when representative assemblies were in existence, commissioned to grant or refuse taxes. There has been substituted for this system the simple idea of the promulgation of the law by the executive power, rendering it in full force in the chief place of the government twenty-four hours after its promulgation, and in the departments after a delay proportioned to their distances. The second article interdicts to the laws all retrospective effect. Some great errors of the convention upon this point rendered this article useful, and even necessary. It was requisite to lay it down as a strong principle, that no law should be permitted to disturb the past, but only to regulate the future. After having limited the action of the law as to time, it was necessary to limit its action as to place; to declare what laws should follow Frenchmen out of the territories of France, and bind them in all places, as those for example which regulated marriages and successions; and what laws should be obligatory in the territory of France only, and on that territory binding upon foreigners as well as natives of France. The laws relative to police and to property were to come under the latter category: that was the object of article three. The fourth article obliged the judge to try, even when the law might appear insufficient. This case had occurred more than once in the transition from one legislation to another. Often, in fact, the tribunals, from the fault of the laws, had been really embarrassed how to give judgment; often, too, they had fraudulently withdrawn themselves from the obligation to render justice. The court of cassation and the legislative body were encumbered with addresses, praying interpretations of the laws. It was necessary to prevent this abuse, by obliging the judges to decide in all cases; but it was at the same time needful to prevent them from constituting themselves legislators. This was the object of article five, which forbade tribunals from deciding any thing but the especial case submitted to them, and to pronounce in the way of a general disposition. The sixth, and last article, limited the natural faculty which all citizens have to renounce the benefit of certain laws by particular agreements. It rendered it absolute and impossible to elude the laws relative to public order, to the constitution of families, and to good manners. It decided that no one could withdraw himself from them by any particular agreement.

These preliminary dispositions were indispensable, because it was necessary to declare somewhere in legislation how the laws were to be promulgated, at what moment they became in full force, and how far their effects extended in regard to time and to place. It was necessary to prescribe to the judges the general mode in which the laws applied, to oblige them to try, but to interdict their constituting themselves legislators; it was necessary, lastly, to render the laws immutable which constituted social order and morality, and to restrain them from the variations of particular agreements. If it was indispensable to write these things, where was it more so than at the head of the civil code, the first, the most general, and the most important of all the codes! Would they have been better placed, for example, at the head of the code of commerce or of civil procedure! Evidently these general maxims were necessary, well written, and well placed.

It would be difficult at the present time to form an idea of the censures directed by M. Andrieux against the preliminary title of the civil code,

in the name of the commission of the tribunate. In the first place, according to him, these dispositions might be placed any where: they belonged no more to the civil code than to any other. They might, for example, be placed at the head of the constitution as well as at the head of the civil code. That was true; but when no one had thought of placing them at its head, which was natural, because they had no political character, where could they be better placed than in the code which might be denominated the social code?

Secondly, the order of these six articles, according to M. Andrieux, was arbitrary. It was as easy to put the first last, as the last first. This was not exactly correct; for on a close examination it was easy to discover a true logical deduction in the manner in which they were disposed. But in any case what matter is the order of the articles if one order be just as good as another? The last order, is it not that which eminent lawyers, after the most conscientious labour, have preferred? Were there not natural difficulties enough in this great work, without adding to them those which were puerile?

Lastly, according to M. Andrieux, the maxims were general, theoretic, appertaining more to the science of law than to positive law, which disposes and commands. This was false, because the form of the promulgation of the laws, the limit given to their effects, the obligation of the judges to judge and not to make regulations, the interdiction of certain particular agreements contrary to the laws, —all that was imperative.

The critical censures, then, were as empty as they were ridiculous. Nevertheless they made an impression on the tribunate, which judged them worthy of the greatest attention. The tribune Thiessé considered the disposition which interdicted to the laws a retractive effect as extremely dangerous, and counter-revolutionary. It was, he said, up to a certain point, annulling the consequences of the night of the 4th of August; because the individuals born under the system of the law of primogeniture and of substitutions would be able to say that the new law on the equality of property was retracted as regarded them, and in consequence void as far as they were affected by it.

Such absurd objections were supported, and the preliminary part was rejected by sixty-three votes against fifteen. The opposition, delighted with their commencement, determined to follow up this first success. According to the constitution, the tribunate nominated three speakers or orators to sustain against three councillors of state, the discussion of the laws before the legislative body. Thiessé, Andrieux, and Favard were, in consequence, charged to demand the rejection of the preliminary title. They obtained one hundred and forty-two voices against one hundred and thirty-nine.

This result, together with the different votes at the election of the proposed members, and the scene upon the word "subjects" was very serious. It was reported as nearly certain that two other parts already presented, that "On the enjoyment of civil rights," and "On the form of the acts of the civil state," would also be rejected. The report of M. Simeon "On the enjoyment and privation of civil rights," was in favour of its rejection. M. Simeon, that ordinary-minded, discreet person, had, among different animadversions, stated that the proposed law had neglected to say that the children born of French parents in the French colonies were by right born Frenchmen. This singular objection is quoted here because it excited astonishment and anger in the first consul. He convoked the council of state to advise with it what was best to be done in such an emergency. Was the government to go on in the course it had adopted or not? Must it change the mode of presentation to the legislative body? Would it not be best to put off this great work, so anxiously and impatiently expected, until another time? The first consul was exasperated. "What would you do," he cried, "with persons who, before discussion, say that the councillors of state and the consuls are nothing but asses, and that their labours ought to be flung at their heads? What will you do when such an one as Simeon accuses the law of being incomplete, because it does not declare that infants born of Frenchmen in French colonies are French? In truth, one stands astounded in the midst of these strange mental aberrations. Even with all the good faith brought to this discussion in the bosom of the council of state, we have had the greatest difficulty to come to an agreement; how is it possible then to succeed in an assembly five or six times more numerous, discussing with no sincerity at all? How is an entire code to be drawn up under such circumstances? I have read the speech of Portalis to the legislative body, in reply to the orators of the tribunate; he has left them nothing to say; *he has drawn their teeth.* But let a man be ever so eloquent; let him speak twenty-four hours in succession, he can do nothing against an assembly which is prejudiced and determined to listen to nothing."

After these complaints, expressed in bitter and warm language, the first consul asked the advice of the council of state on the best mode to be adopted to ensure the passing of the civil code by the tribunate and legislative body. The subject was not a new one in the council. It had already been foreseen there, and different means proposed for getting over the difficulty. Some had imagined that general principles only should be presented, on which the legislative body should vote, with the understanding that the developments should afterwards be added in the way of regulations. This was hardly to be admitted, because to comprehend the general principles of laws is difficult with the developments separately drawn up. Others proposed a more simple plan, which was to present the whole code at once. "You would have no more trouble," they said, "this way, for the three books of the code than for one. The tribunes would attack the first heads; they would then get fatigued, and let the rest pass. The discussion would be shortened this way by its very immensity." This was the most plausible and the wisest course to take. Unhappily, in order to make it succeed, there were many conditions wanting. The assemblies had not then the faculty of amending the propositions of the government, which permits such small sacrifices, by means of which the vanity of some is satisfied and the scruples of others disarmed, during the amelioration of the laws. There wanted also to the oppo-

sition a little of that good faith, without which all serious discussion is impossible; and, lastly, there wanted to the first consul himself that constitutional patience, which the habit of contradiction imparts to men fashioned under a representative government. He would not admit that good, honestly intended and toilingly prepared, should be delayed or spoiled to please "the babblers," as he styled them.

Some resolute spirits went so far as to propose that the civil code should be presented as treaties are presented, with a law of acceptance at its side, thus to get it voted in the mass by a "yea" or "nay." This method of proceeding was thought too dictatorial, and not seriously debated.

Under the opinion of the most enlightened members, more especially Tronchet, it was determined to wait and see what would be the fate of the other two heads presented in the tribunate. "Yes," said the first consul, "we can hazard two more battles. If we gain them, we shall continue the march that has commenced. If we lose them, we must go into winter-quarters, and consider what course we shall adopt."

This plan of conduct was adopted, and the result of the two discussions was awaited. Public opinion began to operate strongly against the tribunate. Then the leaders bethought themselves of a means to moderate the effect of these successive rejections, and that was to intermingle them with an adoption. The head relative to "the keeping of the acts of the civil state," pleased them greatly in itself, because it more strictly sanctioned the principles of the revolution in respect to the clergy, and absolutely forbade them the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, in order to attach the duty solely to the municipal officers. The head presented by the councillor of state, Thibaudeau, was excellent, but that would not have saved it had it not contained dispositions against the clergy. They decided upon its adoption. But in the order of presentation it should have come in the third place. It was introduced second, and voted without difficulty, to render more certain the rejection of the head entitled, "On the enjoyment and privation of civil rights." The last in its turn coming on for discussion was rejected by an immense majority of the tribunate. The rejection of it by the legislative body was not to be doubted. Thus the series of difficulties foreseen reappeared in entierty. These difficulties could not fail to be much increased when the laws upon marriage, upon divorce, and upon the paternal authority, came to be debated; as to the concordat, and to the bill relative to public instruction, there was evidently no chance of success in getting them adopted.

But that which pushed things to the extreme was a new ballot for members, which put on the character of direct hostility against the first consul. The election of the abbé Grégoire as senator, had been carried in opposition to the wishes of the government, and to afford a sign of disapprobation of its religious policy. There were, as just seen, two places to fill, and not only were the assemblies desirous of filling them, contrary to the propositions already known as having been made by the first consul in favour of three generals, but they were determined to make the choice which should be most disagreeable to him. This choice was that of M. Daunou. They endeavoured to force the obtainment of M. Daunou by the two legislative authorities at once, by the tribunate and legislative body, which rendered his nomination by the senate nearly an inevitable consequence.

The greatest activity was displayed, and votes were requested with a degree of boldness which excited wonder in every body, when in opposition to so formidable an authority as the first consul.

M. Daunou was balloted for in the legislative body with general Lamartillière, the government candidate. There were repeated ballotings. At last M. Daunou received one hundred and thirty-five votes to one hundred and twenty-two for general Lamartillière. He was, accordingly, proclaimed the candidate of the legislative body for one of the vacant places in the senate. In the tribunate M. Daunou had again general Lamartillière for an opponent, and he obtained forty-eight voices in place of thirty-nine given to the general. He was proclaimed the candidate. He had consequently two presentations for one. The scrutiny took place on the 1st of January, 1802, the 11th Nivôse, the same day as the rejection of the head of the civil code on the "enjoyment and privation of civil rights."

According to the ordinary rules of the representative system, it ought to have been said that the majority was lost. But in that case, the person who must have retired was the first consul, since he was the great object of the admiration of France, as well as of the hatred of his enemies. Still no one had come forward to exclude him, because there was no one had the means of so doing. It was, therefore, a real piece of trickery, wholly unworthy of men in earnest. It was the most puerile, and, at the same time, the most dangerous piece of spite, because they were urging to an extremity a violent character, full of the feeling of his own strength, and capable of any thing. Cambacérès himself, commonly so moderate, regarded these proceedings as decidedly out of all order: he repeated that such pointed hostility could not be suffered; and that, for his own part, he could not answer for his success in calming the anger of the first consul. The anger of the first consul was, in fact, extreme; and he loudly announced his determination to break down the obstacles which they were endeavouring to place in the way of all the good which he was desirous of effecting.

On the following day, the 2nd of January, or 12th Nivôse, was the day of the decade, when he gave an audience to the senators. A great number attended, and among them many who had acted against him. They came, the one party out of curiosity, the other out of weakness, and to disavow, by their presence, their participation in what had happened. Sieyès was found in the number of those who were present. The first consul was, according to custom, in uniform; his countenance appeared animated, and all expected some violent scene. A circle was formed around him. "You are determined then to nominate no more generals!" said he. "Yet you are indebted to them for peace; this would be a good time for showing them your gratitude." After these introductory words, the senators Kellermann, François de Neufchâteau, and others, were severely lectured, and

made poor defences. The conversation then became general once more, and the first consul, looking towards Sieyès, again began in a very loud tone: "There are people who want to give us a grand elector, and who are thinking of a prince of the house of Orléans. This system has its supporters I know, even in the senate." These words had relation to a scheme truly or falsely attributed to Sieyès, and by his enemies reported to the first consul. Sieyès, upon hearing these offensive words, retired blushing. The first consul, then addressing the senators around him, said: "I declare to you, that if you nominate M. Daunou a senator, I will take it as a personal affront; and you know that I have never yet put up with one."

This scene frightened most of the senators present, and afflicted the wise portion. They saw with pain, a man, so necessary and so great, with such little command over himself when in a state of irritation. The malevolent went away, saying that never had the members of any body in the state been treated with more insupportable indecency. Still the blow told home. Fear had penetrated into their spiteful but timid minds, and their noisy opposition was soon destined to humble itself sadly, before the man it had attempted to brave.

The consuls debated among themselves upon the course which should be taken. General Bonaparte seemed bent upon some act of violence. Had he possessed the legal power of dissolving the tribunate and legislative body, the difficulty would have been easily overcome in a regular way by a general election, and a majority would have been obtained favourable to the ideas of the first consul. It is true that a general election would have excluded the mass of men belonging to the revolution, and have brought forward new candidates, more or less animated by royalist sentiments, such as those against whom it had become necessary to act on the 18th Fructidor, which would have been a misfortune of another kind. Thus true it is that on the morrow of a sanguinary revolution, which had so deeply irritated men against each other, the free play of constitutional institutions was impossible. In order to escape from the hands of the unreflecting revolutionists, the government must fall into the hands of bad-intentioned royalists. But here in any case the resource of a dissolution was not to be found in the laws, and some other means must be discovered.

The first consul wished to withdraw the civil code, and to let the legislative body and the tribunate keep holyday, submitting to them nothing but the laws of finance; then when he had made all France feel that these assemblies were the sole cause of the interruption experienced in the beneficent operations of the government, to seize an opportunity for breaking the inconvenient instruments which the constitution had imposed upon him. Cambacérès, a man skilful in expedients, found milder means, and of a legality perfectly defensible, and in fact the only means practicable at the moment. He dissuaded the general, his colleague, from every illegal and violent measure: "You can do any thing," said he; "people will put up with it from you. They even allowed the directory to do what it pleased—the directory which had not the advantage of your glory, nor of your moral ascendancy, nor of your immense military and political successes. But the arbitrary proceedings of the 18th Fructidor, necessary as they might have been, ruined the directory. It rendered the directorial constitution so contemptible, that no one would afterwards take it in earnest. Ours is much better. For having the art to use it, much good may be effected with it. Let us not then deliver it up to public contempt, by its violation, on account of the first obstacle which it presents to us."

Cambacérès admitted that it would be right to withdraw the civil code, interrupt the session, place the deliberate bodies in idleness, and lay upon their shoulders the weight of so grave a reproach, the forced inaction to which the government was reduced. But this inaction was an impossible strait, out of which they must get. Cambacérès found the means of escape in article 38 of the constitution, which was thus conceived: "The first renewal of the legislative body and of the tribunate will not take place until some time in the course of the year x."

It was then the year x., 1801-2. The government had a right to choose any period of the year it might select for the renewal. It was able, for example, to proceed in the course of the winter, in Pluviôse or Ventôse. Then to dismiss one-fifth of the tribunate and of the legislative body, which would be twenty members for the tribunate, sixty for the legislative body: to remove in this manner the more hostile, and fill their places with prudent, peaceable men; and next to open an extraordinary session in the spring, in order to obtain the adoption of the laws, the passage of which was now arrested by the bad will of the opposition. This was clearly the best way of proceeding. By excluding twenty members of the tribunate, and sixty of the legislative body, the government would displace those restless men who drew in the inert mass, and intimidate such as might be tempted to resist. But if it wished to succeed in this plan, it would be necessary to gain the consent of the senate to two things. Firstly, as to the interpretation of article 38, in the sense of the design projected: secondly, the exclusion of the opponent members, and the filling up of their places by men devoted to the government. Cambacérès, well knowing the senate, and that the mass was timid, and the opposition of little courage, answered for it that the senate, when it saw to what an extent it was likely to be drawn in, beyond the limits of reason and prudence, would lend itself to all that the government desired of it. Article 38, the interpretation of which was become such an important point, did not specify the mode to be employed for the designation of the fifth part of the members that were to go out. Under the silence upon that point in the article, the senate charged to choose might, if it pleased, prefer the use of the ballot to that of the lot. Against such an interpretation of the law, it might be urged that the constant usage, when it was necessary to renew an assembly partially, was to have recourse to the lot, in order to decide the portion which should be first excluded. To this it might be answered, that recourse is had to the lot when no other mode can be adopted. It is not possible, in fact, to demand of several hundred electoral colleges the designation of a fifth that is to go out, for to address any one of such

would be to designate oneself that fifth; to address all would be to have recourse to a general election, and in a general election it is impossible to fix beforehand on the number of those excluded, for that would again be to designate oneself the fifth to be removed. The lot, therefore, is the only resource in the common system of election by the electoral colleges. But having here the senate, charged to elect, and easily able to designate, by ballot, the fifth to be excluded, it was more natural to have recourse to the clearsightedness of its votes than to the blind authority of any kind of chance. It made, for that is truth, the senate the arbiter of the question; but it conformed in this to the real spirit of the constitution; because in conferring upon the senate all the prerogatives of the electoral body, it would be rendered a judge of the conflicts which might arise between the legislative majorities and the government. In a word, it was re-establishing by a subterfuge, the faculty of dissolution, indispensable in every regular government.

The most important reason in favour of the step was, that the government got out of its embarrassment without extensively violating the constitution. The first consul said that he would admit this or any other plan, if it only got rid of persons who prevented him from pursuing measures that were conducive to the interests of France. Cambacérès took the charge of drawing up a memorial upon the subject. A message was prepared as well, which should announce to the legislative body, that the civil code was withdrawn. Bonaparte undertook to draw it up himself, in a noble and austere style.

Already they began to dread the outbreak of his anger, a manifestation of which it was rumoured would be speedily displayed. The day following the scene with the senators, the 3rd of January, or 10th Nivôse, a message was sent, by the president, to the legislative body. It was read in the midst of a profound silence, which indicated a species of terror. The message was couched in these terms:—

"Legislators,—The government has resolved to withdraw the bills of the law of the civil code.

"It is with pain that it finds itself obliged to delay until another period, laws awaited with so much anxiety by the nation; but it is convinced that the time is not yet come, when such important discussions can be carried on with the calmness and unity of purpose which they demand."

This deserved severity produced the strongest effect. Every government was not able and ought not to use such language; but it must still be permitted to do so when it has reason, when it has conferred upon a country immense glory and great benefit, and finds itself repaid by an inconsiderate opposition.

The legislative body, recoiling from the blow, fell at the feet of the government in a manner not very honourable. They demanded, while still sitting, that the ballot should take place for the presentation of a candidate for the third and last vacancy in the senate. Will it be credited? the same men who had so spitefully persisted in presenting Grégoire and Daunou, voted at the same instant for general Lamartillière, and he got two hundred and thirty-three out of two hundred and fifty-two votes. It was impossible for them to comply more quickly with the desires of the first consul. In consequence, general Lamartillière was declared the candidate of the legislative body.

This presentation furnished an expedient to the senate to satisfy the first consul without too deep a humiliation. They did not dream any more about the choice of M. Daunou, subsequent to the scene before the senators, at the audience of the 2nd of January. Still, M. Daunou had been presented by two of the state assemblies at the same time, the legislative body and the tribunate. To prefer the candidate of the government to a candidate who had upon his side the double presentation of the two legislative assemblies, was throwing themselves on their knees to the first consul a little too openly. They had recourse to a paltry subterfuge, which by no means preserved the dignity of the senate, and which served only to put their embarrassment in a clearer light. The senate assembled on the following day, the 4th of January, or 14th Nivôse. The presentation of M. Daunou, by the legislative body, had been determined upon on the 30th of December, that of general Lamartillière on the 3rd of January. The senate affected to suppose that the resolution of the 30th of December had not been communicated, while that of the 3rd of January only had been, and that, therefore, general Lamartillière was, in consequence, the only recognized candidate of the legislative body. It joined to this subterfuge a trick still more base. It filled up the second of the three places vacant. Now general Lamartillière was the first, and general Jourdan the second, on the first consul's list. It affected, therefore, to consider general Jourdan as the government candidate for the place still vacant. The senate thus drew up its decisions:—

"Having seen the message of the first consul of the 25th of Frimaire, by which he presents general Jourdan; having seen the message of the tribunate of the 11th of Nivôse, by which it presents the citizen Daunou; having, lastly, seen the message of the legislative body of the 13th of Nivôse, by which it presents general Lamartillière, the senate adopts general Lamartillière, and proclaims him a member of the conservative senate."

By this mode the senate appeared to have adopted, not the candidate of the first consul, but that of the legislative body. This was adding to the shame of submission the disgrace of a lie which deceived nobody. Certainly it was wise to give place to an indispensable man, without whom France would have been plunged into chaos, without whom not one of his opponents was secure of keeping a head upon his shoulders; but people who knew that they were not able to carry out the affront, should, at least, have taken care not to affront him.

The opposition in the tribune uttered loud cries against the weakness of the senate,—a weakness which they were soon to imitate themselves, and even surpass.

The plan adopted by the government was immediately carried into execution. The legislative labours were suspended, and it was publicly announced that the first consul quitted Paris to go to Lyons, on a journey which would last nearly a month. The object of this journey was marked by the customary quietness of the acts of Bona-

parte. It was undertaken in order to constitute the Cisalpine republic; and five hundred deputies of every age and rank, were about passing the Alps, in that rigorous winter, to form at Lyons a grand diet, under the name of a *consulta*, to receive from the hands of general Bonaparte, laws, magistrates, and an entire government. It had been agreed that they should meet him half way, and Lyons had been deemed, next to Paris, the most convenient place for such a rendezvous. Vast preparations had already been made in this city for an imposing public spectacle. He was also to be surrounded by a great military display, since twenty-two thousand men, the remainder of the army of Egypt, disembarked at Marseilles and Toulon by the English navy, were on their march upon Lyons, to be there reviewed by their former general.

Nobody now thought any thing more of the legislative body and the tribunate. They were abandoned to a state of total inactivity, without any sort of explanation of the plans which the government might have conceived. The constitution no more contained the faculty of prorogation than that of dissolution. The two assemblies were neither dismissed nor furnished with employment. The government had withdrawn, besides the bills of the civil code, a law relative to the re-establishment of branding for the crime of forgery. This crime, in consequence of the circumstances of the revolution, had increased to a frightful extent. Such a number of papers were required by the new regulations for the security of officers accountable to the government; so many certificates of civism, formerly absolutely needful for those who would not be considered suspected; so many certificates of presence demanded on the part of emigrants, to clear themselves of the effect of emigration; so many verifications of every kind required and furnished in writing, had given birth to a detestable class of criminals, that of forgers. They infested the avenues of business as bandits infest the highways. The first consul designed to have a special punishment for them, as he had wished to have a special jurisdiction for the robbers on the highway, and he had proposed branding. "The crime of forgery enriched," he said, "a forger, who has undergone his punishment; he returns into society, and his wealth causes his crime to be forgotten. There ought to be an indelible mark set upon him by the executioner's hand, which would forbid those complacent persons, who always pay their court to opulence, from sitting at the table of the enriched forger." This proposition had encountered the same difficulty as the civil code. It was withdrawn, and there no longer remained any thing for deliberation, because the laws relative to public instruction and the re-establishment of worship had not been presented. As to the law of the finances, that was reserved to form the pretext for an extraordinary session in the spring. This species of parliament therefore was left, neither dissolved nor prorogued, idle, useless, embarrassed by its inaction, and carrying, in the sight of France, the responsibility of a complete interruption of the good and useful labours of the government.

It was arranged during the absence of the first consul, that Cambacérès, who had a peculiar skill in managing the senate, should take care to get such an interpretation as was desirable put upon article 38 of the constitution, and that he should himself superintend the exclusion of the twenty and sixty members, that it was the design to remove from the tribunate and legislative bodies.

Before setting out, the first consul had to superintend two important affairs, the expedition to St. Domingo, and the congress at Amiens. The second detained him beyond the term fixed for his departure.

The desire to hold possessions at a distance was an old French ambition, that the reign of Louis XVI., very favourable to the navy, had aroused, and which the subsequent naval reverses of France had not yet extinguished. Colonies were then an object of ardent desire on the part of all commercial countries. The expedition to Egypt, conceived for the purpose of disputing with England the possession of India, was a consequence of that general wish, and its unsuccessful issue had rendered very strong the desire of compensating for the loss in some other manner. The first consul had prepared two measures for that purpose: one, the possession of Louisiana; the other of St. Domingo. He had given Tuscany, that fine and precious part of Italy, to the court of Spain, in order to obtain Louisiana in exchange, and he was at this moment pressing the execution of the engagement entered into by that court. He was, at the same time, determined to recover the island of St. Domingo. This island was, before the revolution, the first and most important of the Antilles, or West Indies, and the most desired among all the colonies which produce sugar and coffee. It furnished the French ports and shipping with the most important articles of traffic. The imprudence of the constituent assembly caused the slaves to revolt, and led to those lamentable scenes of horror by which the liberty of the blacks was first signalized in the world. A negro, endowed with real genius, had completed at St. Domingo something similar to what Bonaparte had done in France. He had quieted and governed the revolted population, and established a species of order. Thanks to him, the negroes no longer slaughtered each other in St. Domingo, and were beginning to work. Toussaint conceived a constitution, which he had submitted to the first consul, and he showed for the mother country a sort of national attachment. This negro had a strong aversion to an English connexion; he desired to be free and to be French. The first consul at first acquiesced in this state of things; but he soon conceived doubts of the fidelity of Toussaint l'Ouverture, and, without desiring to bring back the negroes to slavery, he devised the profiting by the maritime armistice resulting from the preliminaries of peace signed in London, to expedite a squadron of ships and an army to St. Domingo. With regard to the blacks, the first consul's plan was to retain them in the same situation as they had been placed in by the course of events. He wished, in all the colonies, where the revolt had not appeared, to continue the same slavery, but to relax its rigour; at St. Domingo he would allow the freedom which could not be again constrained. Still he intended to establish the authority of the mother country in the island, and

to keep an army there for the purpose. In the event of the blacks, on remaining free, becoming unfaithful subjects, or of the English renewing the war, he intended, while respecting the freedom of the blacks, to restore their old possessions to the colonists, who filled Paris with their miseries, their complaints, and imprecations against the government of Toussaint l'Ouverture. A considerable number of the French nobles, deprived already of their property in France by the revolution, were, at the same time, colonists of St. Domingo, despoiled of the rich habitations which they had formerly possessed in that island. Their estates in France were refused them, from having become national domains; but it was possible to restore them their sugar houses and coffee plantations in St. Domingo, and this was a compensation that might in some measure satisfy them. Such were the various motives that governed the proceedings of the first consul. To recover the finest of the French colonies; to hold it, not by the doubtful fidelity of a black raised to dictatorial power, but by force of arms; to keep possession of it against the blacks and the English; to restore the ancient colonists to their property, cultivated by free labour; to join, finally, to that queen of the Antilles, the mouths of the Mississippi, by acquiring Louisiana; such were the combinations of the first consul, combinations to be regretted, as will soon be seen, but required, so to say, by a general disposition of the public mind, general in France at that moment.

It was of importance to hasten, because although the definitive treaty of peace, negotiating at that moment in Amiens, was nearly certain to be concluded; yet it was necessary in all events, in case the English should raise new and inadmissible pretensions, to take advantage of the existing interval, to despatch the fleet while the sea remained open. The first consul caused a large armament to be prepared at Flushing, Brest, Nantes, Rochefort, and Cadiz, consisting of twenty-six ships of the line and twenty frigates, capable of embarking twenty thousand men. He gave the command of the squadron to admiral Villaret Joyeuse, and the command of the army to general Leclerc, one of the best officers of the army of the Rhine, become the husband of his sister Pauline. He insisted that his sister should accompany her husband to St. Domingo. He loved her with the tenderest affection; he therefore sent thither one of the objects dearest to him, and had no intention at the time, as party rancour since charged him, with transporting to an unhealthy climate, subject to dangerous fever, those soldiers of the army of the Rhine who had given him offence. Another circumstance shows the intention which directed him in the corps sent to St. Domingo. As the peace seemed likely to become general and solid, military men began to fear that their professional career would be terminated. A great number applied to be employed in the expedition, and it was a favour which he was obliged to bestow among them with a sort of regard to justice and equality. The brave Richepanse, that hero of the German army, was given as a lieutenant to general Leclerc.

The first consul applied himself to the preparations with his customary celerity, and pressed as much as possible the departure of the naval divisions, in ports from Holland to the southern extremity of the peninsula. Still, before the squadron could set sail, he was under the necessity of explaining to the English ministry, to whom this large armament caused considerable mistrust. He had some trouble to satisfy them on the point, although they were rather desirous the expedition should proceed. They were not then as ardent for negro emancipation as British ministers have since appeared. The sight of the freed negroes of St. Domingo made them apprehensive for their colonies, above all, for Jamaica. They therefore wished success to the French enterprise; but the extent of the means disquieted them, and they would have preferred that the troops had been sent over in transports. They became accessible to reason; and were at last resigned to let this vast armament pass, at the same time despatching a squadron of observation. They even promised to place all the provisions and ammunition, which the resources of Jamaica commanded, at the service of the French army, of course subject to payment for whatever might be supplied. The chief naval division, formed at Brest, set sail on the 14th of December, the others followed at a short distance of time afterwards. At the end of December the whole armament was at sea, and would consequently arrive at St. Domingo, whatever might be the result of the negotiations at Amiens.

These negotiations, conducted by lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte, proceeded slowly, without giving any reason to fear a rupture. The first cause of delay had been in the composition of the congress, which it was necessary should consist not only of French and English plenipotentiaries, but also of plenipotentiaries from Holland and Spain; because, after the preliminaries, the peace should be concluded between the two great belligerent nations and all their allies. Spain, which from an extreme of friendship had nearly gone into animosity, thwarted the first consul by not sending a plenipotentiary to the congress. As, at bottom, Spain knew that the peace was certain, and that she would only figure in the protocol as surrendering Trinidad, she was in no hurry to send a negotiator. The English, on their side, desired to see at the congress of Amiens a Spanish plenipotentiary, in order to obtain a formal cession of the island of Trinidad. She announced that she would not negotiate, if a Spanish plenipotentiary were not present. The first consul was obliged to take with the court of Spain a tone which should rouse it from its apathy. He ordered general St. Cyr, the ambassador in place of Lucien, to lay before the king and queen the extravagant conduct of the prince of the peace, and to declare to them, that if they "continued to conduct themselves on the same system, it would terminate in a thunder-stroke [1]."

[1] Here is a letter very important in order to appreciate the relations of France with Spain at this time:—

"10th Frimaire, year x., or 1st December, 1801.

"I can understand nothing, citizen ambassador, of the conduct of the court of Madrid. I specially charge you to take every step to open the eyes of this cabinet, so that it may adopt a regular and becoming conduct. The subject

The Spanish minister designed to figure in the congress of Amiens, M. Campo Arlange, was ill in Italy. Spain finally decided to give to M. Azara, ambassador in Paris, an order to proceed to the congress. This difficulty over with the Spaniards, there was another with the Dutch to overcome. The Dutch plenipotentiary, M. Schimmelpenninck, would not admit the base of the preliminaries, that is to say, the cession of Ceylon, before knowing how Holland would be treated with respect to the restitution of the ships in the possession of England; how with regard to the indemnities laid claim to on behalf of the stadtholder dispossessed; relative, finally, to some questions of limits on the French side. Joseph Bonaparte was ordered to notify to M. Schimmelpenninck, that he would only be received at the congress on the condition of his first admitting the preliminaries of London as the basis of the negotiation. Lord Cornwallis having expressed himself satisfied with this formality, the congress thus became constituted.

Still the English were anxious to introduce Portugal, under the pretext that she was an ally of England. The secret motive was to obtain an exemption for the court of Lisbon, from the contribution of 20,000,000 f., which had been imposed upon her by one of the articles in the treaty of Madrid. The first consul refused, by declaring that peace had been made between France and Portugal, and consequently there was nothing more to be done. This pretension disposed of, the congress set at work, and the basis was soon agreed upon.

To avoid incalculable difficulties, it was agreed that every demand out of the letter of the preliminaries should be rejected. "Nothing more nor less than the articles of London," was the reciprocal maxim admitted. The English had, in effect, brought into the discussion the abandonment by France of the island of Tobago. The first consul, on his side, had demanded an extension of territory in the region of Newfoundland, in order to benefit the French fisheries.

These claims were mutually rejected; and in order to finish, it was agreed not to entertain any claims in the way of concession, that were not contained in the preliminary treaty. Otherwise, by reviving difficulties, heretofore happily overcome, peace itself might be hazarded. This principle once adopted, it only remained to fix it, by the drawing up formally the stipulations of London.

There were two important points to be resolved; the payment of the expenses of the prisoners, and the government to be imposed upon Malta.

England had maintained a great many more prisoners belonging to France than France held of England, and she claimed to be reimbursed the difference. France replied that the principle generally acknowledged was that each nation maintained the prisoners whom they took; that if a different principle were admitted, France would have to demand reimbursement for the Russians, Bavarians, and other soldiers in the pay of England, whom she had taken and supported; that the combatants in the pay of England ought to figure in the number of prisoners which she was bound to maintain. "Besides," the French plenipotentiary added, "that is a mere question of money, which can be settled by means of commissioners, especially appointed for the liquidation of such balances."

In regard to Malta, the question was of a more serious import. The English and French were here at open mistrust. They seemed to have a glance into futurity, and to fear that at some future period, the island would fall into the hands of one or the other.

The first consul, by a singular instinct, proposed to destroy the military establishments of Malta to the very foundations, and to suffer nothing to remain but the dismantled town; to create there a sort of neutral lazaretto, common to all nations, and to convert the order into an hospital, order, or foundation, which would need no military force.

has appeared to me so important, that I have thought it my duty to write you myself upon the matter.

"The most intimate union subsisted between France and Spain when his majesty thought proper to ratify the treaty of Badajoz.

"The prince of the peace sent at that time to our ambassador a note, a copy of which I have ordered to be sent to you. This note was too full of offensive terms for me to pay it the least attention. A few days afterwards he sent to the French ambassador at Madrid a note, in which he declared that his catholic majesty was about to make a separate peace with England. I have also ordered a copy of that note to be sent to you. I then felt how little I was able to count upon the support of a power, the minister of which expressed himself so unbecomingly, and exhibited so much inconsistency in his conduct. Knowing well the intentions of the king, I would have had him acquainted immediately with the ill conduct of his minister, if his majesty's illness had not interfered with my intention.

"I several times intimated to the court of Spain, that its refusal to execute the convention of Madrid, in other words, to occupy a fourth of the Portuguese territory, would lead to the loss of Trinidad. No attention was paid to these remarks.

"In the negotiations which have taken place in London, France discussed the interests of Spain as she would have done her own; but as finally his Britannic majesty has never refrained from insisting upon Trinidad, I could no longer retain it, more especially as Spain, in an official note, threatened France with opening a separate negotiation: we could then no longer rely upon her succour for the continuation of the war.

"The congress of Amiens is sitting, and a definitive peace will be promptly signed; still his catholic majesty has not yet published the preliminaries, nor made known in what mode he is willing to treat with England. It becomes, nevertheless, highly essential for his consideration in the eyes of Europe, and for the interests of his crown, that he should immediately decide; without doing which, the definitive treaty will be promptly signed, and he will not be a participator.

"It has been reported to me, that at Madrid they wish to abrogate their bargain in the cession of Louisiana. France has never been wanting in the fulfilment of any treaty made with her, and she will never allow any power to be wanting on that point towards her. The king of Tuscany is upon his throne and in possession of his states; and his catholic majesty knows too well how to keep faith in his engagements, to refuse much longer our being put in possession of Louisiana.

"I desire that you will make known to their majesties my extreme discontent, and the unjust and inconsistent conduct of the prince of the peace

"During the last month, that minister has not spared either insulting notes or hazardous proceedings. All that he is able to do against France he has done. If this system be proceeded in, tell the queen and the prince of the peace, boldly, that it will end in some unexpected thunder-stroke."

The English were not satisfied with this proposal. They said that the rock was naturally so strong a defence, that even deprived of the fortifications accumulated there by the knights, it would still be a formidable place. They alleged the resistance of the Maltese population to the total destruction of their fine fortresses, and they proposed the reconstitution of the order, on a new and solid basis. They were willing to have a French language, provided that there should be instituted an English language, and also a Maltese, the last being granted to the population of the island, to give it a part in its government; they wished that this new establishment should be placed under the guarantee of some great power, Russia for example. The English hoped that with an English and a Maltese language, each of which would be devoted to them, they would thus get strength in the island, and hinder the French from having a hold upon it.

The first consul insisted upon the destruction of the fortifications, saying that at present the order would be very difficult to reconstruct; that Bavaria had already seized upon their property in Germany; that Spain, since Russia had extended her protection to Malta, contemplated acting in the same manner, and to take possession of the property in her dominions; that the institution of protestant knights would be a decisive reason for so doing in her eyes; that the pope, already very adverse to every thing which was done respecting the order, would not consent, at any cost, to the new arrangements, and that, finally, France was unable to furnish a French language, in consequence of her existing laws in no way admitting the re-establishment of any institution of nobility. The first consul was ready, if it were made a question, to agree to the re-establishment of Malta, upon its former footing, with the preservation of the existing fortifications, but without either a French or English language, and under the guarantee of the nearest court, that of Naples. Russia he rejected as a guaranteeing power.

None of the continental arrangements had been spoken about. The first consul had forbidden any thing relating to them to be said by the French legation. Still, as the king of England took a warm interest in the house of Orange, now deprived of the post of stadtholder, the first consul was not unwilling to secure to that prince a territorial indemnity in Germany, when the question of the German indemnities should come under consideration. He demanded, in return, the restitution, either in the ships or in money, of the Batavian fleet, which had been taken away by the English.

On the whole, there was in all this nothing absolute, nothing irreconcilable, because the question of the prisoners was one of money, always easy to be settled by means of two arbitrators. The question of Malta was the most difficult, because it was a matter of reciprocal mistrust. It was needful, and this was possible, to discover a plan which should render all parties secure against the contingency of a sudden occupation by either of the two great maritime nations. As to the affair of the stadtholder, nothing was more easily settled, because both parties were in pretty close agreement upon the subject.

The first consul wished to conclude affairs as soon as possible. He wished to have the treaty quite ready against his return from Lyons, seeing that he proposed to present the state document of the general peace, with the concordat, and the law of finances to the renewed legislative body. He therefore gave orders to his brother Joseph not to place any difficulties of detail in the way of the completion, but to get the treaty signed as quickly as possible.

The first consul left Paris on the 8th of January, or 18th Nivôse, with his wife, and a part of his military household, in order to reach Lyons. Talleyrand had gone there before him, in order to arrange every thing in such a manner, that upon his arrival he should have nothing more to do than to give his sanction to the results by his presence. The winter was very rigorous, and yet all the Italian deputies were already assembled there. They were impatient to see general Bonaparte, the great object of their journey to France.

The moment had arrived to regulate the affairs of Italy, and to constitute, a second time, the Cisalpine republic. Talleyrand was very adverse to such a constitution. He alleged the difficulty of making the business of the government run on smoothly in a republic, citing the republics of Batavia, Helvetia, Liguria, Rome, and Parthenope, and the embarrassments which had occurred and were still occurring in their regard. He said there were quite enough of these children of the French republic, and that not one more was necessary; and proposed a principality or a monarchy, like that of Etruria, which might be given to some friend or dependent upon France. He would not have objected to give this state to a prince of the house of Austria,—to the grand duke of Tuscany, for example, who was about to be indemnified in Germany, if he were not indemnified in Italy. This arrangement, highly agreeable to Austria, would attach her more strongly to the peace. It would equally satisfy the German powers who, by this plan, would have had one claimant less to indemnification with the lands of the ecclesiastical princes. It would, above all, be pleasing to the pope, who hoped that the Legations would be restored to him, when France was relieved from the promises made to the Cisalpine republic. This combination, in one word, was in unison with the taste of every body in Europe, because it extinguished a republic, left one territory more to be appropriated, and made a correspondent diminution of one state the less under the direct dominion of the French republic.

It was certainly a weighty reason for such a measure to render the greatness of France more supportable to Europe, and thus to give a better chance of the duration of peace. Now that France had the Rhine and the Alps for her frontier; now that she had under her immediate influence, Switzerland, Holland, Spain, and Italy; when she exercised her power directly upon Piedmont, by the general, but tacit, consent of all the powers; when she had arrived at that degree of greatness, the more moderate policy was, from that moment, the more prudent and rational. In this view of things Talleyrand had reason upon his side. Still, after all that had been effected, France was compelled, by her engagements, to reconstitute Italy; and as

Austria had been already deprived of it, there was a necessity for irrevocably detaching it from her, a result which could only be attained by constituting it in a mode that would render it strong and independent. By this act, the danger of a collision with Austria alone was increased; and one of the hundred battles since fought to create French kingdoms in Europe, would have sufficed to secure the definitive existence in Europe of the state of things which France chose to establish in Italy.

Under this system, France must have renounced the possession of Piedmont, because, if the Italians preferred the French to the Germans, they loved, in reality, neither the one nor the other, because both the one and the other were strangers to them. This was a natural and legitimate sentiment. The French protecting Italy without keeping possession of it, would have attached it for ever to themselves, and would not have prepared the way for those sudden revulsions of opinion, of which it has so frequently given the example; since, bandied from one to another, the Italians have done nothing but change masters. Under this arrangement, Etruria ought not to have been given to a Spanish prince. Uniting Lombardy, Piedmont, the duchies of Parma and Modena, Mantua, the Legations, and Tuscany, a noble kingdom might have been formed, extending from the maritime Alps to the Adige, and from Switzerland to the Roman states. It was easy to detach, either in Tuscany or Romagna, a portion of territory to indemnify the pope, whose attachment to France could not last long, unless, sooner or later, something was done to relieve his poverty. It would be needful, in such a case, to unite the different provinces under one federal government, in which the executive power should be strongly constituted, that it should be able to assemble its forces promptly, and give the French armies time to come to its assistance. The alliance, in fact, ought to be close between this state and France, because it could only sustain itself through her means; and Rome, on her part, would always have an immense and invariable interest in its existence.

An Italian state of ten or twelve millions of inhabitants, possessing the finest frontiers, washed by two rivers, having, on the first favourable war, the chance of increasing its territory by the addition of the Venetian states, and of extending itself along the natural frontiers of Italy, that is to say, to the Julian Alps, would be able, subsequently, to comprehend, by means of a simple federative tie, which left to each principality its own independence, the Genoese republic newly constituted, the pope, with the conditions necessary to his political and religious existence, and the state of Naples, delivered from an incapable and sanguinary court; such a state, so constituted, and with the accessions which the future could not fail to prepare, would be the foundation of Italian regeneration, and give to Europe a third federation, which, added to the two already in existence, the German and Swiss, would not fail to render immense service to the general balance of power.

In respect to the difficulty of governing Italy, that could be resolved by its being placed under the protectorate of France, which, if it extended over her for one entire reign, would thus conduct her by the hand in her first step to liberty and independence.

The plan followed at this moment did not exclude this bright future, because Piedmont might be one day restored to the new Italian state, and the duchy of Parma, at the decease of the duke, an event in all probability then not far distant; Etruria itself might be restored if it were found needful. It was easy then to adopt this plan at an ulterior period; and a firm and extensive foundation was now laid, by making an independent republic of the Cisalpine. Besides, it was, perhaps, better at that moment, not to avow openly the entire plan of Italian regeneration, in order not to frighten Europe. But to parcel out the fine provinces actually in our possession, as was proposed by M. Talleyrand, to construct a little Austrian monarchy, for the advantage of an Austrian prince, was to give Italy to Austria, because this prince, however things might appear to be, would be always Austrian; and the people themselves, whose hopes would have been dishonestly betrayed, would conceive towards France a well-merited hatred, and turn back towards the Germans, incited by despair and resentment.

Bonaparte, who had acquired his first, and perhaps his greatest glory, in the deliverance of Italy from the hands of Austria, would not permit himself the commission of this fault. He adopted a middle course, which did not forbid at a later time a vast system of Italian independence, and which indeed might even now be at its commencement.

He bestowed, therefore, upon the Cisalpine republic all Lombardy as far as the Adige, the Legations, the duchy of Modena, all, in fact, that it possessed at the treaty of Campo-Formio. The duchy of Parma remained in suspense; Piedmont at the moment belonged to France. The Cisalpine, as thus constituted, counted nearly five millions of inhabitants. It could easily be made to produce a revenue of 70,000,000 f. or 80,000,000 f., and to support an army of forty thousand men, which would not absorb more than half the revenue, and leave resources sufficient to pay the other expenses of the state very easily. It was covered in front by the Alps and the Adige; it had on the left Piedmont, now become French, on the right the Adriatic, in the rear Tuscany, placed under the protection of France. It was thus on every side surrounded by her powerful protection. Immense fortified works, ordered by general Bonaparte, with a quickness and justness of view as to the nature of the country, which no one possessed in an equal degree, would render it impregnable to the Austrians, and always afford time to render French succour available. The Adige was fortified from Rivoli to Legnago in such a manner that it was impossible to be forced. The environs of the lake of Garda, and more especially the Rocca d'Anfo, were so well closed, as to prevent the possibility of the line of the Adige being turned. The Mincio formed a second line in the rear. Peschiera and Mantua, with a large augmentation of territory, added greatly in strength to this second line of defence. Mantua more especially, improved under every aspect both of defence and healthiness, might defend itself if the Adige were forced. Other works erected had also for their object

to gain time for the arrival of the French armies. They were able to enter first by the Valais and the Milanese, following the road of the Simplon; secondly, by Savoy, or Provence, and Piedmont, following the routes of Mount Cenis, Mount Genevre, and the Col de Tende. It has been seen that works were ordered to render these four roads, approaching the country, practicable for every kind of transport. It was necessary also to create solid points of support and vast military establishments adapted both to receive the French army, which might be suddenly forced to evacuate the country, or, if necessary, to serve the same army as an outlet when in a state to resume the offensive. For this two places had been chosen, and were become objects of great expense: the one was the outlet of the road of the Simplon, the other at the opening of the three roads of Mount Cenis, Mount Genevre, and the Col de Tende. The first, and the least of the two, was situated at the extremity of Lago Maggiore. As it was marked out, it was sufficiently ample to contain the sick, the wounded, the *matériel* of the army in retreat, as well as a flotilla on the lake, so as to be able to defend itself for three or four weeks, until an army, traversing the road of the Simplon, could place itself in advance for its assistance. The second and the largest work, designed to restrain Piedmont, to receive all the resources of the French armies, and to serve for a point of support, and the means to descend at any time into Italy—this second, as large as Mayence, Metz, or Lille, capable of enduring a long siege, was constructed at Alexandria itself. This point, bordering on the field of battle of Marengo, was recognized as the most favourable to the great military combinations of which Italy might become the theatre. Turin was too much under the influence of a numerous population, in some cases hostile. Pavia was beyond the Po. Alexandria, between the Po and the Tanaro, at the real outlet of all the roads, united the greatest advantages, and was preferred upon that account. Vast works were ordered. These, being in Piedmont, were to be executed at the expense of the French treasury; all the others were to be executed at the cost of the Cisalpine government, because they belonged more immediately to, and were intimately concerned with the security of that state.

From these arrangements, France was always in a position to succour the Cisalpine republic, having under her hand middle and upper Italy, and by her influence ruling over the south. She was able to send to Rome and to Naples her less ostensible commands, but they would be punctually obeyed, as at Turin or Milan.

It was necessary to give a civil government to this Cisalpine republic. A commencement had been made by composing provisional authorities, consisting of an executive council of three members, M. de Somma-Riva, M. Visconti, and M. Ruga, with a consulta, a species of legislative assembly, not numerous, chosen from the wisest and most devoted men. But such a state of things could not be long continued.

The first consul had with him in Paris M. Marescalchi, and as well Messrs. Aldini, Serbelloni, and Melzi, envoys in France for the affairs of Italy. They were persons of the utmost consideration in their own country. He consulted them upon the organization to be given to the new republic, and, in concurrence with them, he drew up a constitution, resembling both the French and the ancient Italian.

In place of the notables of Sieyès, which began to be undervalued in France, the first consul and his colleagues devised three electoral colleges, permanent for life, and filling up their own vacancies in case of death. The first to be composed of great proprietors of land to the number of three hundred; the second of commercial persons to the number of two hundred; the third of literary and scientific men, and the more distinguished ecclesiastics, to the number of two hundred. These three colleges, or bodies, were to choose each from its own body a commission of twenty-one members, called the "commission of the censorship," whose duty it was to elect all the bodies of the state, and to perform the same electoral duty which the senate fulfilled in France.

This creative authority was afterwards to nominate, under the title of the "state consulta," a senate of eight members, charged, like the French senate, to watch over the constitution, to deliberate under extraordinary circumstances, to order the arrest of dangerous individuals, to place out of the pale of the constitution any department that might require it, to deliberate upon treaties, and to name the president of the republic. One of these eight members was to be the minister for foreign affairs by right.

There was to be a council of state under the name of the legislative body, composed of ten members, who were to draw up laws and regulations, and, finally, to support them before the legislative body, consisting of seventy-five members; which was to select from this number fifteen orators, whose duty it would be to discuss before it the laws upon which it might be afterwards required to vote.

Lastly, at the head of the republic there was to be a president and vice-president, named for ten years. They were, as has just been stated, to be nominated by the "state consulta," or senate; but all the other authorities could only be made on the choice of the "commission of censorship."

Considerable incomes were destined to the functionaries of all ranks.

It may be seen that this was the French constitution with certain corrections, which were emendations of the work of Sieyès. For the list of notables were substituted three electoral colleges, which were constituted for life. The senate, or "state consulta," had nothing to do with the elections; it only nominated the head of the executive power, but it deliberated upon treaties, which by their means were withdrawn from tumultuous examinations by the assemblies. The tribunate was confounded with the legislative body, and in place of three consuls, there was no more than a president.

When the first consul and Messrs. Marescalchi, Aldini, Melzi, and Serbelloni, had agreed upon the plan, it was necessary to occupy themselves with the personal relations of the new government. The choice of these was of the more importance, because the permanence of the principal bodies was greater, and the good or evil resulting from their

composition must be of the longer duration. Italy too was divided, like France, into parties difficult to conciliate. At one extremity were found the partisans of the past, devoted to the Austrian government; at the other extreme the outrageous patriots, ready, as every where else, for the most violent excesses, but who had not yet shed blood, from which they had been restrained hitherto by the French armies. Lastly, between the two were found the moderate liberals, charged with the weight of the government, and the unpopularity which attached to it, more especially in a time of war, when heavy burdens unavoidably pressed upon the country. With these different parties the elections could not, any more than in France, give very satisfactory results. The first consul, in order to supply the place of the elections, hit upon a plan which was not, on his part, the impulse of ambition, but the inspiration of sound sense. This was to nominate the personal portions of government himself, in the same mode as he had decided upon the structure, and for the first time to make all the nominations of his own authority. He was only impelled in the present case by a sentiment of good, and, in any case, he had a perfect right to act thus; because the new state had birth in his own pure act and will, and in creating it in this spontaneous manner, he had a right to create it conformably to his own idea, which, upon this occasion, was just and elevated.

But among all these nominations the most difficult to make was that of the president. Italy, always governed by priests or strangers, had never been in a situation to produce statesmen; she had not produced, of this class of men, one single name before which the others would consent to give up their pretensions. The first consul, therefore, had the idea of conferring upon himself the title of president, and of naming a vice-president chosen from among the principal personages of Italy, to whom he might delegate the detail of affairs, and reserve to himself the superior directions. In the infancy of the republic this was the sole practicable system of government. If it had been handed over to its own choice, and to an Italian president, it would soon have become, like a vessel without a compass, abandoned to the mercy of the waves. Governed, on the contrary, by Italians, and directed from a distance by the man who was its creator, and who would be for a long time its protector, it had a good chance, under this system, to be at the same time both independent and well governed.

For the foregoing end a solemn, imposing inauguration was necessary, during which the constitution should be given to the new state in proper form, and all the authorities be proclaimed. This creative act could not make too much noise. It was necessary it should speak at the same time to Italy and to Europe. The first consul devised the plan of a great meeting of all the Italians at Lyons, because it was too far for them to come to Paris, and too far for him to proceed to Milan. The city of Lyons, placed at the reverse of the Alps, and in which Italy in former days had assembled in council, was the place most naturally indicated. More than this, the first consul took a real interest in seeing mingled together in society the French and Italians. He believed, at the same time, that he served the re-establishment of the commerce of the two countries, because it was at Lyons that, formerly, the produce of Lombardy was exchanged for the produce of the eastern provinces of France.

Some portion of these views was communicated by Talleyrand to the Italians in Paris, or, in other words, to Messrs. Marescalchi, Aldini, Serbelloni, and Melzi. He was silent only upon the project of conferring the presidency upon the first consul. This he wished to obtain from the consulta by an outbreak of enthusiasm at the moment when it should assemble together. The views of the first consul were too conformable to the true interests of the entire country of Italy not to be welcomed. These individuals set out for Lyons accordingly, accompanied by M. Petiet, the minister of France at Milan, a wise and influential person, to labour at the accomplishment of the plan of organization which had been agreed upon at Paris.

The plan of the constitution met with no objection. It was received with great satisfaction, because the people were eager to leave the precarious existence in which they had lived, and to acquire the political existence which would be assured to them. The executive committee of the consulate, charged with the duties of the provisional government, accepted the plan with eagerness, save in some slight modifications of detail, which were transmitted to Paris, and accepted. But they were much puzzled how to give the new constitution vigorous motion, and as to the choice of the persons who were to set it going. M. Petiet communicated in secret to several influential personages the idea of giving to the first consul the entire nomination of the individuals who were to take a part in the government, from the president to the three electoral colleges. Scarcely was this idea of a supreme arbitrator, so well situated as not to partake in any of the passions which divided Italy, and having no desire but for her happiness—scarcely was this idea communicated to them, than it met instant success, and the provisional government gave to the first consul the power of selecting all the authorities.

A message was addressed to him for the purpose of announcing the acceptance of the constitution, and of expressing to him the wish of the Cisalpine population, that the first magistrate of the French republic should himself choose the magistrates of that of Italy.

There was nothing more than this said—not a word of the presidency. But it was necessary for this purpose to induce the Italians to come to Lyons, and that became the subject of a new communication to the members of the provisional government. They were made sensible of the great difficulty of constituting the Cisalpine republic, with the first consul remaining in Paris, and of selecting seven or eight hundred persons far from the individuals and their residences; the difficulty, on the other hand, for the first consul to go from Paris to Milan; the advantage, on the contrary, of dividing the distance, of uniting the Italians at Lyons in a body, and of the first consul meeting them there; the forming a sort of Italian diet, in which the new republic should be constituted, with a pomp and brilliancy which would give more of solemnity to the engagement made by the first consul upon its formation, to maintain and defend it. This idea had in it something great, which could not fail to please the Italian imagination. It suc-

ceeded, as all the other ideas formed beforehand had done, and it was immediately adopted. A plan was prepared, and immediately converted into a decree by the provisional government. Deputations were selected from the clergy, the nobility, the great landed proprietors, commercial men, the universities, the tribunals, and the national guards. Four hundred and fifty-two persons were designated, among the number of whom were found, venerable prelates, weighed down with years, of whom some might even succumb under the fatigues of the journey. They left in the month of December, and traversed the Alps during one of the most rigorous winters that had for a long time been experienced. All were anxious to attend at this proclamation of the independence of their country by the hero who had achieved it. The roads of the Milanese, of Switzerland, and of the Jura, were literally encumbered with travellers. The first consul, who thought of every thing, had given orders that nothing should be wanting, as well upon the roads as in Lyons itself, to the representatives of Italian nationality, who had come to recal by their presence the recollection of his first and most brilliant triumphs. The prefect of the Rhone had made immense preparations to receive them, and had fitted up grand and noble halls for the solemnities which were about to take place. A part of the consular guard had been sent to Lyons. The army of Egypt, formerly the army of Italy, and recently disembarked on their return, were on the point of arriving also. They hastened to clothe them magnificently, and in a manner adapted to the climate of France, which seemed quite new to these soldiers, embrowned by the sun of Egypt, and transformed into real Africans. The Lyonnese youth had been collected, and formed a body of cavalry, with the arms and colours of the ancient city of Lyons. Talleyrand, minister for foreign affairs, and Chaptal, minister of the interior, had preceded the first consul to receive the members of the consulta. General Murat and M. Petiet had hastened from Milan, as well as M. Marescalchi from Paris, to this common rendezvous. The prefects and authorities of twenty departments were collected at Lyons. The first consul kept them all in attendance at Lyons, because of the congress of Amiens, of which the negotiations had required his presence in Paris for some days longer. The Italian deputies began to be impatient. In the view of occupying them, they were divided into five sections, one for each province of the new state, and the project or scheme of the new constitution was submitted to them. They made many useful observations, that Talleyrand was requested to hear, to weigh, and to admit, unless they were calculated to affect the fundamental principles of the project. Except some dispositions of detail, which were modified, the new constitution obtained the general assent. It was proposed to the Cisalpine deputies, in order to beguile their impatience, to make out lists of candidates, with the view to aid the first consul in the numerous selections which he had to make. This turning over of names usefully occupied their time.

The first consul arrived on the 11th of January, 1802, or 21st Nivôse. The population of the country, collected along the roads by which he passed, had waited for him by day and night. They assembled around immense fires, and ran in advance of all the carriages coming from Paris, crying, "Long live Bonaparte!" The first consul at length appeared, and travelled the road to Lyons in the midst of continued transports of enthusiasm. He entered the city in the evening, accompanied by his wife, his adopted children, and his aides-de-camp, and was received by the magistrates, the civil and military authorities, an Italian deputation, the Egyptian staff, and the young Lyonnese cavalry. The city, all over illuminated, was as resplendent as at noon-day. He passed under an arch of triumph, that surmounted a noble emblem of consular France,—a sleeping lion. He descended at the Hôtel de Ville, which had been so fitted up as to serve him for a very convenient residence.

On the following day the first consul was employed in receiving all the departmental deputations, and after them, the Italian consulta, which reckoned four hundred and fifty members present, out of four hundred and fifty-two, a rare example of exact attendance, if the number of persons, the season, and the distance are considered; and still more, when it is known that one of the two absentees was the respectable archbishop of Milan, who had died of an apoplectic attack at the residence of Talleyrand. The Italians, to whom the first consul spoke their own language, were delighted to see him again, and to find united in him at once both the French and the Italian.

On the following days they all proceeded to the last labours of the consulta. The modifications prepared in the constitution having been agreed to by the first consul, the lists of candidates were stated. The plan was proposed of a committee of thirty members, taken out of the entire consulta, to discuss with the first consul the long series of selections which were to be made. This labour occupied several days, during which the first consul, after having employed a part of the day in seeing and entertaining the Italians, occupied himself also with French business, received the prefects, the departmental deputations, heard the expression of their wishes and their necessities, and thus learned, by seeing with his own eyes, the true state of the republic.

The enthusiasm daily increased, and in the midst of this general excitement it was, that the French and Italians, communicating with each other, the idea was promulgated of naming the first consul president of the Cisalpine republic. MM. Petiet, Marescalchi, Murat, and Talleyrand, saw, every day, the members of the committee of thirty, and conferred with them on the choice of a president. When they conceived that they were much embarrassed and greatly divided in their choice, which was, in reality, a very difficult matter, it was hinted to them in a manner as if to lead them out of their embarrassment, that they might confer the post of vice-president upon any Italian they might select, and then cover his insufficiency by the glory of the first consul, who might be named president. This idea, so simple, and still more useful to the Cisalpine, even more important to its existence and to the administration of its affairs, than to the greatness of the first consul, was generally approved, but still with the condition of an Italian vice-president. They then decided that citizen

Melzi should be charged with the vice-presidency under the first consul. All being ready, one of the members of the committee of thirty, made this proposition to the committee. It was received with joy, and in a moment turned into the draft of a decree. No time was lost; and on the following day, the 25th of January, or 5th Pluviôse, the project was presented to the assembled consulta. It was welcomed with acclamation, and Napoleon Bonaparte was proclaimed the president of the Italian republic. This was the first occasion in which the two names of Napoleon and Bonaparte were used together. The general was now to add to the title of first consul of the French republic, that of president of the Italian republic. A deputation was sent to him accordingly, in order to express this desire.

While this affair was under deliberation, the general of the armies of Italy and Egypt passed his old soldiers in review. The demi-brigades of the army of Egypt, which there had been time to assemble, had been united with the consular guard, numerous detachments of troops, and the Lyonnese militia. On that day, the fogs of winter were in a moment dissipated by a brilliant sun, amidst intense cold. Bonaparte passed along the ranks of his old soldiers, who received him with transports of joy almost inconceivable. The soldiers of Egypt and Italy, delighted to find this child of their labours grown so great, hailed him with their shouts, and endeavoured to make him know that they had never ceased to be worthy of him, although led for a moment by chiefs unworthy of themselves. He called some of the old grenadiers from the ranks, spoke to them of the battles in which they had fought, and of the wounds they had received; he recognized here and there officers whom he had seen in more than one battle, shook hands with them all, filling them with a sort of intoxication, of which he himself could not escape the contagion, in the presence of so many brave men who had helped, by their devotedness, to produce the marvellous good fortune which he enjoyed, and which France enjoyed with him. This scene occurred amid the ruins of the Place Bellecour, and effaced the sad recollections of that spot, as glory effaces those of unhappiness.

It was on entering the Hôtel de Ville after this review, that the first consul found the deputation of the consulta, received the expression of its wishes, declared his assent, and intimated, that the next day he would make his reply to this new act of the confidence of the Italian people.

The next day, being the 26th of January, or 6th Pluviôse, the first consul proceeded to the place where the general sittings of the consulta were held. It was a large church, disposed and decorated for the especial purpose. Every thing passed there in the same way of ceremony as is observed in France or England, when the monarch is present at a sitting. The first consul, surrounded with his family, the French ministers, and a great number of generals and prefects, was upon a dais. He spoke in the Italian language, which he pronounced perfectly well, a speech, precise and simple, in which he announced his acceptance of the dignity, his views regarding the government and prosperity of the new republic, and then proclaimed the principal selections which he had made, conformably to the wishes of the consulta. His words were drowned in cries of "Long live Bonaparte!" "Long live the first consul of the French republic!" "Long live the president of the Italian republic!" The constitution was then read, as well as the list of citizens, of all ranks, who were to carry it into effect. A long-continued acclamation expressed the harmony that prevailed between the Italian people and the hero who had freed them. This sitting was very imposing and solemn; it commenced in a worthy manner the existence of the new republic, which was thenceforth to be called the ITALIAN REPUBLIC. On this occasion, as upon many others, there could be only one thing to wish in favour of general Bonaparte; namely, that the genius of preservation had accompanied, with this favourite of fortune, the genius which created.

The first consul had now been twenty-one days at Lyons. The government of France demanded his presence in Paris, because he had given orders for the signature of the definitive treaty of peace, which was negotiating at the congress of Amiens. During this interval of time, the consul Cambacérès and the senate were labouring to disembarrass themselves of the unruly members who had so violently opposed the first consul at that moment of his career when he least deserved opposition. He was now about to be in a position to resume the long series of works which constituted the grandeur and happiness of France. He was therefore pressed to return to Paris, in order to proceed with his customary occupations, and, probably, to receive there, as the price of his labours, a new greatness, the just and most noble recompense of the most fertile ambition that ever actuated the spirit of man.

He set off on the 28th of January, or 8th Pluviôse, leaving behind him the enthusiastic Italians, full of hope, leaving, too, the Lyonnese delighted to have possessed, for a few days, the extraordinary man whose name filled the world, and who exhibited for their city such a marked predilection. He had received from the emperor Alexander the reply to a letter, in which he requested from that monarch some advantages for the manufacturers of Lyons. This letter, which announced the best dispositions on the part of Russia, was published, in substance, and produced the most lively satisfaction. Upon his departure, the first consul presented three scarfs to the three mayors of the city of Lyons, in memory of that glorious visit. The inhabitants of Bordeaux sent a deputation to him, requesting he would pass their city walls. He made them the promise they desired as soon as the definitive peace should allow him a little leisure time [1].

Passing by St. Etienne and Nevers, he arrived in Paris on the 31st of January, or 11th Pluviôse.

[1] The following are some extracts from the correspondence of the first consul during his stay at Lyons:—

To the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun.

"Lyons, 24th Nivôse, year x. (14th January, 1802.)

"I have received, citizen consuls, your letter of the 21st. The weather is excessively cold here, and I pass the mornings, from noon till six o'clock, in receiving the prefects and the notables of the neighbouring departments. You

know that at this sort of conferences one must talk a long while.

"This evening the city of Lyons gives a concert and ball. I am going there in about an hour.

"The labours of the consulta are in progress.

"The troops of the army of the east are now arriving in strength at Lyons; I am taking steps to have them clothed; I hope to review them on the 28th.

"I continue to be extremely satisfied with every thing I see, both with the people of Lyons, and with those of the south of France.

"The negotiations at Amiens appear to me advancing.

"I congratulate you on the manner in which every thing in your hands proceeds.

"Joseph writes me from Amiens that lord Cornwallis told him that the British cabinet has received favourable news about the French army at St. Domingo, and that division had manifested itself in Toussaint's forces."

To the same.

"Lyons, 26th Nivôse, year X. (16th of January, 1802.)

"I have received, citizen consuls, your despatches of the 22nd and 23rd Nivôse. The Lyonnese have given us a most magnificent fête. Annexed you will find the details, with the songs sung on the occasion.

"I proceed very slowly in my operations, because I pass the whole of my mornings in receiving the deputations of the neighbouring departments.

"It is very fine to-day, but very cold.

"The well-being of the republic, during the last two years, is observable. The population of Lyons has increased during the years VIII. and IX. more than 20,000 souls; and all the manufacturers that I have seen from St. Etienne, Annonay, &c., tell me that their works are in great activity.

"All minds seem to be full of activity,—not that which disorganizes empires, but that which re-establishes them, and conduces to their prosperity and riches.

"I shall, in a few days, review nearly six demi-brigades of the army of the east."

To the consul Cambacérès.

"Lyons, 28th Nivôse, year X. (18th of January, 1802.)

"I have just received, citizen consul, a deputation from Bordeaux. It has presented me a petition, soliciting me to visit their city, which I have promised to do, as soon as their relations with the Antilles and the Isle of France shall be in full activity.

"Your letter of the 25th communicates to me the deliberations of the senate. I beg you particularly to see that the twenty, and the sixty unruly members whom we have in the constituted authorities, are every one got rid of. The wish of the nation is, that the government should not be obstructed in its endeavours to do well, and that the head of Medusa shall not show itself any more, either in our tribunes, or in our assemblies.

"The conduct of Sieyès on the present occasion completely proves that, having contributed to the destruction of all the constitutions since 1791, he wants now to try his hand against the present. It is very extraordinary that he cannot see the folly of it. He ought to burn a wax candle to our Lady, for having got out of the scrape so fortunately, and in so unexpected a manner; but the older I grow, the more I perceive that each man must fulfil his destiny.

"I take it for granted that you have taken the proper measures for demolishing the Châtelet.

"If the minister of marine has need of the frigates of the king of Naples, he may make use of them. Indeed, it will be as well to despatch them to America as soon as possible. Every thing shall be arranged afterwards with the king of Naples.

"The cold is much diminished to-day.

"General Jourdan, who has arrived to-day from Piedmont, gives me a very satisfactory account of the state of that province.

"The operations of the consulta are in an advanced state, all their organic laws are arranging.

"I have been occupied part of the morning in a conference with the prefects.

"I recommend you to see the minister of marine, to ascertain whether the provisions for St. Domingo have been sent off."

To the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun.

"Lyons, 30th Nivôse, year X. (20th of January, 1802.)

"I should wish, citizen consuls, the minister of the public treasury to send Roger to the 16th military division, to examine into the accounts of the paymaster, and of the principal receivers of the departments composing that division.

"I also wish the minister of the public treasury would send to Rennes some individual like citizen Roger, to perform the same duty in the 13th military division.

"Despatch also the councillors of state Thibaudeau and Fourcroy, one to the 13th military division and the other to the 16th, to inspect these divisions, in the same way as they did on their preceding mission. One part of the complaint is, that the minister of war has not caused the compensation-money, in lieu of forage and lodging, for the first three months of the year X., to be paid over to the officers; that the receivers keep the funds a long time, and that the paymasters pay it as late as they can. The paymasters and the receivers are the greatest plagues in the state."

To the same.

"Lyons, 30th Nivôse, year X., or 20th Jan. 1802.

"I have received, citizen consuls, your letter of the 26th and 27th. At Lyons, as at Paris, the weather has become considerably milder.

"Yesterday I visited several factories. I was pleased with the industry and with the severe economy which I thought I perceived exercised by the manufacturers in the employment of their workmen.

"I ought to-day to have held my grand review, but I have postponed it till the 5th Pluviôse. The troops of the army of the east have not yet been clothed anew; I am in hopes that by the 5th they will be all ready, so that they will present a satisfactory appearance.

"I perceive, with much pleasure, the decision you have come to about the Châtelet. If the weather should become severe, I do not think the step you have taken, of allowing four thousand francs per month for the extraordinary workshops, will be sufficient.

"Besides the hundred thousand francs which the minister of the interior grants monthly to the committees of bienfaisance, it will be necessary to add twenty-five thousand francs extraordinary for the distribution of wood; and if the cold weather continues, it will be necessary, as in '89, to light fires in the churches and other great buildings, to warm a great many people.

"I calculate on being back in Paris in the course of the decade. I beg you to consider whether it will not be expedient to insert in the *Moniteur* the last message to the senate, and to add two lines at the end, to state that the senate has appointed a commission, which made its report in the sitting of the . . . , it is decided upon to proceed to a renewal of the chamber, in conformity with the 38th article of the constitution, &c. &c.

"Many rumours which have reached me lead me to believe that Caprara requires the priests to sign formula or professions of faith, couched nearly in these words: 'We rejoice, moreover, in hereby making a solemn profession of filial respect, of complete submission, and perfect obedience to,' &c. &c.

"This information has reached me, amongst the rest, from Maëstricht. I beg you to confer with Portalis. This formula appears to me quite inconceivable."

To the same.

"Lyons, 2nd Pluviôse, year X., or 22nd Jan. 1802.

"I only received to-day, citizen consuls, your letter of the 29th Nivôse, which reached me about three o'clock in the afternoon. The thaw and the inundations retarded your courier some hours.

"The forage department is entirely disorganized in the department of the Drôme. Ten thousand francs must be retained out of the ordonnance of Pluviôse until this branch of the service is in due course.

"The civil hospitals which are allowed only fourteen sous per day for the sick military, complain that they have not yet received any thing for the year X. That of Valence demands, besides the whole year X., an arrear for the month of Fructidor, IX.

"The order issued for the organization of the Piedmontese troops, which I signed more than a month ago, has not yet reached Turin, which occasions uncertainty amongst the troops. Generally speaking, there is a good deal of backwardness, and little activity, in the war department; this is the general opinion amongst all who have any thing to do with that department.

"It is indispensable that the minister of war should send a good and experienced commissary to Turin.

"All the most important arrangements of the consulta are decided upon. I still depend upon reaching Paris in the course of the decade.

"It would be desirable for the senate to name a dozen prefects, either to the tribunate or to the legislative body. The prefect of Mont Blanc should be amongst them.

"I should wish you to insert in the journals some articles respecting the roguery of Fouilloux, to turn into ridicule the foreign gulls who spread absurd reports founded on the manuscript bulletin of a small rogue, who was in want of a dinner, and duped them. It would be as well to recur to this subject several times."

To the same.

"Lyons, 6th Pluviôse, year X., or 26th Jan. 1802.

"I have received, citizen consuls, your letter of the 2nd Pluviôse.

"I had to-day a grand review on the place Bellecour. The weather was superb; the sun shone as if it were the month of Floréal.

"The consulta has appointed a committee of thirty individuals, which has made a report to the effect that, considering the interior and exterior circumstances of the Cisalpine republic, it was indispensable to leave me to perform the duty of the chief magistracy, until circumstances should permit, or I should deem it expedient, to appoint a successor. To-morrow I calculate upon presenting myself to the assembled consulta. The constitution will be read, with the list of the appointments, and every thing will be concluded. I shall be in Paris on decade."

To the same.

"Lyons, 6th Pluviôse, year X., 26th Jan. 1802.

"I have received, citizen consuls, your letter of the 3rd Pluviôse. I think it will be well to wait till the peace of Amiens is signed before we raise the state of siege of the city of Brest.

"At two o'clock I went to the hall of the sittings of the extraordinary consulta. I delivered a short speech in Italian, of which you will find enclosed a French translation. The constitution was read, the first organic law, and one relating to the clergy. The different nominations were published.

"I will send you to-morrow a minute of the whole proceedings of the consulta, in which will be found a copy of the constitution. The two ministers, four counsellors of state, twenty prefects, with the general and superior officers, accompanied me. This sitting exhibited both majesty and great unanimity; and I hope from the congress of Lyons all the results which I anticipated.

"I think it is useless, unless false reports are circulated about the congress of Lyons, to publish any thing before the arrival of the courier whom I shall send you to-morrow. Only in case of its being rumoured that the consulta has nominated me president, you can print the two papers enclosed, which will make known the exact turn that matters have taken.

"I shall be occupied to-morrow in bringing the whole business to a close, and I shall start in the night. On decade I shall be in Paris"

BOOK XIV.

THE CONSULATE FOR LIFE.

ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CONSUL IN PARIS.—SCRUTINY OF THE SENATE, WHICH EXCLUDES SIXTY MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY AND TWENTY OF THE TRIBUNATE.—THE EXCLUDED MEMBERS REPLACED BY PERSONS DEVOTED TO THE GOVERNMENT.—TERMINATION OF THE CONGRESS OF AMIENS.—SOME DIFFICULTIES ARISE AT THE TERMINATION OF THE NEGOTIATION, IN CONSEQUENCE OF JEALOUSIES EXCITED IN ENGLAND.—THE FIRST CONSUL OVERCOMES THESE DIFFICULTIES BY HIS MODERATION AND FIRMNESS.—THE DEFINITIVE TREATY SIGNED ON THE 25TH OF MARCH, 1802.—ALTHOUGH THE FIRST ENTHUSIASMS ABOUT PEACE ARE COOLED BOTH IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND, THEY WELCOME WITH NEW JOY THE HOPE OF A SINCERE AND DURABLE RECONCILIATION.—EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE YEAR X., DESTINED TO CONVERT INTO LAWS THE CONCORDAT, THE TREATY OF AMIENS, AND DIFFERENT BILLS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.—THE LAW REGULATING WORSHIP ADDED TO THE CONCORDAT UNDER THE TITLE OF "ORGANIC ARTICLES."—PRESENTATION OF THAT LAW AND OF THE CONCORDAT TO THE RENEWED LEGISLATIVE BODY AND TRIBUNATE.—COOLNESS WITH WHICH THOSE DOCUMENTS ARE RECEIVED, EVEN AFTER THE EXCLUSION OF THE OPPOSITION.—THEY ARE ADOPTED.—THE FIRST CONSUL FIXES UPON THE FIRST DAY OF EASTER FOR THE PUBLICATION OF THE CONCORDAT, AND THE FIRST CEREMONY OF THE RE-ESTABLISHED WORSHIP.—ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW CLERGY.—PART GIVEN TO THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS IN THE NOMINATION OF THE BISHOPS.—CARDINAL CAPRARA REFUSES, IN THE NAME OF THE HOLY SEE, TO INSTITUTE THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS.—FIRMNESS OF THE FIRST CONSUL, AND SUBMISSION OF CARDINAL CAPRARA.—OFFICIAL RECEPTION OF THE CARDINAL AS LEGATE A LATERE.—CONSECRATION OF THE FIRST PRINCIPAL BISHOPS AT NÔTRE DAME, ON PALM SUNDAY.—CURIOSITY AND EMOTION OF THE PUBLIC.—THE VERY EVE BEFORE EASTER DAY, AND OF THE SOLEMN TE DEUM WHICH WAS TO BE CHANTED IN NÔTRE DAME, CARDINAL CAPRARA WISHES TO IMPOSE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS A HUMILIATING RETRACTION OF THEIR PAST CONDUCT.—NEW RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—CAPRARA DOES NOT YIELD UNTIL THE NIGHT IS ADVANCED BEFORE EASTER DAY.—REPUGNANCE OF THE GENERALS TO PROCEED TO NÔTRE DAME.—THE FIRST CONSUL OBLIGES THEM TO GO.—SOLEMN TE DEUM AND OFFICIAL RESTORATION OF RELIGION.—ADHERENCE OF THE PUBLIC, AND JOY OF THE FIRST CONSUL ON SEEING THE SUCCESS OF HIS EFFORTS.—PUBLICATION OF THE "GÉNIE DU CHRISTIANISME."—PROJECT OF A GENERAL AMNESTY WITH REGARD TO THE EMIGRANTS.—THIS MEASURE HAVING BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE, BECOMES THE OBJECT OF A SENATUS CONSULTUM.—VIEWS OF THE FIRST CONSUL UPON THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE.—HIS OPINIONS ON SOCIAL DISTINCTIONS AND ON THE EDUCATION OF YOUTH.—TWO PROJECTED LAWS OF HIGH IMPORTANCE, ON THE INSTITUTION OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR AND ON PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.—DISCUSSION OF THESE TWO PROJECTS IN A FULL COUNCIL OF STATE.—CHARACTER OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THAT GREAT BODY.—LANGUAGE OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—PRESENTATION OF THE TWO PROJECTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE BODY AND TO THE TRIBUNATE.—ADOPTION, BY A LARGE MAJORITY, OF THE PROJECT OF LAW RELATIVE TO PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.—A LARGE MINORITY PRONOUNCES AGAINST THE PROJECT RELATIVE TO THE LEGION OF HONOUR.—THE TREATY OF AMIENS PRESENTED LAST, AS THE CROWNING WORK OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—RECEPTION GIVEN TO THE TREATY.—THEY TAKE THIS OCCASION TO SAY EVERY WHERE THAT A NATIONAL RECOMPENSE OUGHT TO BE DECREED TO THE AUTHOR OF ALL THE BENEFITS WHICH FRANCE THUS ENJOYS.—THE BROTHERS AND PARTIZANS OF THE FIRST CONSUL MEDITATE THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONARCHY.—THIS IDEA APPEARS TO BE PREMATURE.—THE IDEA OF THE CONSULATE FOR LIFE MORE GENERALLY PREVAILS.—THE CONSUL CAMBACÉRÈS OFFERS HIS INTERVENTION WITH THE SENATE.—DISSIMULATION OF THE FIRST CONSUL, WHO WILL NOT AVOW THAT OF WHICH HE IS DESIROUS.—EMBARRASSMENT OF THE CONSUL CAMBACÉRÈS.—HIS EFFORTS TO INDUCE THE SENATE TO CONFER THE CONSULSHIP ON BONAPARTE FOR THE REST OF HIS LIFE.—THE SECRET ENEMIES OF BONAPARTE PROFIT BY HIS SILENCE, TO PERSUADE THE SENATE THAT A PROLONGATION OF THE CONSULATE FOR TEN YEARS SHOULD SUFFICE.—VOTE OF THE SENATE UPON THIS CONSTRUCTION.—DISPLEASURE OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—HE THINKS OF REFUSING.—HIS COLLEAGUE CAMBACÉRÈS DISSUADES HIM FROM SO DOING, AND PROPOSES AS AN EXPEDIENT TO APPEAL TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NATION, AND TO PUT THE QUESTION TO FRANCE, "IF BONAPARTE SHALL BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?"—THE COUNCIL OF STATE CHARGED TO DRAW UP THE QUESTION.—OPENING OF REGISTRIES IN THE MAYORS' OFFICES, THE TRIBUNALS, AND OFFICES OF THE NOTARIES PUBLIC.—EAGERNESS OF ALL THE CITIZENS TO TENDER AFFIRMATIVE VOTES.—CHANGE WROUGHT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF SIEYÈS.—THE FIRST CONSUL RECEIVES THE CONSULSHIP FOR HIS LIFE, WITH POWER OF APPOINTING HIS SUCCESSOR.—THE SENATE IS INVESTED WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER.—THE LISTS OF NOTABILITY ARE ABOLISHED, AND REPLACED BY ELECTORAL COLLEGES FOR LIFE.—THE TRIBUNATE REDUCED TO BE A SECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE.—THE NEW CONSTITUTION BECOMES COMPLETELY MONARCHICAL.—CIVIL LIST OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—HE IS PROCLAIMED SOLEMNLY BY THE SENATE.—GENERAL SATISFACTION AT HAVING FOUNDED AT LAST A POWERFUL AND DURABLE GOVERNMENT.—THE FIRST CONSUL USES THE NAME OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.—HIS "MORAL" POWER IS NOW AT ITS CULMINATING POINT.—RECAPITULATION OF THIS PERIOD OF THREE YEARS.

THE journey of the first consul to Lyons, had for its end the constitution of the Italian republic, and to secure himself the government, for the interest of Italy and that of France. He had also the object in view to embarrass the opposition, and to bring it into discredit, by leaving it idle; thus proving that it was impossible to carry out good while it stood in the way; finally, to give the consul Cambacérès time to exclude from the legislative body and from the tribunate the more restless and troublesome members.

All thus desired was realized. The Italian

republic, constituted with pomp, found itself bound to the course of French policy without losing its own defined object. The opponents in the tribunate and in the legislative body, struck by the message which withdrew the civil code, left in Paris without a single projected law to discuss, did not know how to extricate themselves from their embarrassment. It was laid to their charge every where, that they interrupted the best labours of the government; every where they were censured for imitating mischievously, and without reason, the agitators of the old time; and while thus situated, Cambacérès gave them the last blow by the ingenious combination which he had conceived. He sent for M. Tronchet, the learned lawyer, introduced into the senate by his influence, and enjoying in that body the double weight of wisdom and character. He communicated to him his plan, and obtained his assent to it. It has been seen in the preceding book what this plan was; it has been seen that it consisted in the interpretation of article 38 of the constitution, which fixed the year x. for the going out of the first fifth of the tribunate and the legislative body, and gave to the senate the designation of the fifth which was to retire. There were many reasons for and against this mode of the interpretation of article 38. The best of all was the necessity of supplying to the faculty of dissolution that which the constitution had not attributed to the executive power. M. Tronchet, a wise man and excellent citizen, admiring and fearing at the same time the first consul, but judging him indispensable, and judging with Cambacérès, that if he were not delivered from the importunate opposition of the tribunate, he would have recourse to violent measures even from his anxiety to effect the good which he was thus prevented from effecting—M. Tronchet entered into the views of the government, and charged himself with the task of preparing the senate for the adoption of the projected measures. He succeeded without trouble, because the senate felt that it had been made the accomplice and dupe of the bad humour of the opposition. This body had already receded with great haste and little dignity in the business of the candidateships. Ruled by that love of repose and power, which had seized upon every body, it consented to turn out the oppositionists, whose plans it had at first approved and seconded. The scheme was well received by the principal persons of the body, Lacépède, Laplace, Jacqueminot, and others, and they proceeded without delay in its execution, under a message, dated the 7th of January, 1802, or 17th Nivôse, year x.

"Senators," said the message, "the article 38 of the constitution commands that the renewal of the first-fifth of the legislative body and of the tribunate shall take place in the year x., and we touch on the fourth month of that year. The consuls have believed it their duty to call your attention to the circumstance. Your wisdom will find in it the necessity of taking into consideration, without delay, the operations which will be necessary to precede this renewal."

This message, the intention of which it was easy to divine, struck with surprise the opposition in the two legislative assemblies, and naturally excited among them a great degree of irritation. From levity, or by impulse, they had thrown themselves into the career of opposition without foreseeing the result, and they were strangely surprised at the blow which impended, a blow which would have been more severe but for the intervention of the consul Cambacérès. They met for the purpose of drawing up a memorial, and they presented it to the senate. Cambacérès, who knew nearly all of them, addressed himself to those who were the least compromised. He made them sensible that in further distinguishing themselves by their resistance, they would not fail to attract individually the attention of the senate, and the power of exclusion, with which that body was to be invested. This observation quieted the greater part of them, and they waited in silence the decision of the supreme authority. In the sittings of the 15th and 18th of January, the 25th and 28th of Nivôse, the senate resolved the question arising out of the message of the consuls. By a very large majority it decided that the renewal of the first-fifth in the two legislative assemblies should immediately take place, and that the designation of this fifth should be made by ballot and not by lot. But a change of form was adopted, and in place of balloting for those who were to go out, it was decided that the ballot should be on the names of those who were to remain members. The measure had thus the appearance of a preference in place of that of an exclusion. By means of this softening of the mode of proceeding, they set about the designation of the two hundred and forty members of the legislative body without delay, and of the eighty-eight members of the tribunate destined to continue in the legislature. The senators more immediately under the influence of the government, were in secret possession of the names of the members who were to be preserved from exclusion, and during the last days of January, or the end of Nivôse, and commencement of Pluviôse, the ballots constantly repeated in the senate, effected the separation of the partisans and adversaries of the government. Sixty members of the legislative body, who had exhibited the greatest resistance to the projected measures of the first consul, above all, to the project for the re-establishment of worship, and twenty of the most active of the tribunate, were excluded; or, according to the term used at that time, were "eliminated." The principal among these twenty were Chénier, Ginguené, Chazal, Bailleul, Courtois, Ganiel, Daunou, and Benjamin Constant. The others, less known, men of letters, or business, ancient conventionals, or priests, had no other title to enter the tribunate than the friendship of Sieyès and his party; the same title sent them out of it.

Such was the end not only of the tribunate, which continued to exist for some time longer, but of the momentary importance which that body had acquired. It was desirable that the first consul, so full of glory, so indemnified by the universal adhesion of France for an unbecoming opposition, could have resigned himself to bear for a moment with a few impotent detractors. This resignation would have been more worthy of him, and also less hurtful to the species of liberty which he would have been able to leave to France at that time, in order to prepare her at a later period for a genuine liberty. But in this world wisdom is

much more rare than ability, more perhaps than even genius, because wisdom implies a victory over our own passions, a victory of which the great men are no more capable than the little. The first consul, it must be acknowledged, wanted wisdom upon this occasion, and one single excuse can alone be offered in his favour; it is, that such an opposition, encouraged by his patience, would perhaps become more inconvenient, more dangerous, and even insurmountable, if the majority of the legislative body and of the senate had at last borne a part in it, which was very possible. This excuse has a certain foundation, and it proves that there are times in which a dictatorship is needful even to a free country, or one destined to be so.

As to this opposition of the tribunate, it did not merit the praises which have been so frequently given to it. Uncertain and shuffling, it resisted the civil code, the re-establishment of the altars, the best acts of the first consul, and regarded in silence the proscription of the unhappy revolutionists, banished without a trial, on account of the infernal machine, of which they were not the authors. The tribunes were silent then, because the terrible explosion of the 3rd of Nivôse had frozen them with fear, and they dared not defend the principles of justice in the persons of men, of whom the greater part were blood-stained. The courage which they could not exhibit to censure a flagrant injustice, they found too sadly in order to impede excellent public measures. If, on the other hand, a sincere sentiment of liberty inspired many of them, among others there may be perceived the vexatious feeling of envy which animated the tribunate against the council of state, the men reduced to do nothing, against those that had the power to do all things. They committed then very serious faults, and unhappily provoked those not less serious upon the part of the first consul: a deplorable chain of circumstances, that history so often obscures in our agitated universe, the passions of which are in eternal motion.

It was necessary to replace the excluded fifths in the legislative body and the tribunate. The majority of the senate which had pronounced the exclusions, nominated the new admissions, and did so in a manner the most satisfactory to the consular government. They made use for the new elections of the lists of notability, invented by Sieyès as a principal basis of the constitution. Despite the efforts of the council of state to discover a convenient manner of forming these lists, none of the systems it devised had redeemed the inconvenience of the principle. They were slow and difficult to form, because they inspired little zeal in the citizens, who could not see in this vast mass of candidates, any very direct and immediate means to influence the composition of the first authorities. They were, in reality, only a mode of saving appearances, and of dissimulating the necessity then inevitable, for the composition of the great bodies of the state through themselves; since every election turned out badly, in other words, went to extremes. They had the greatest difficulty in completing these lists; and out of a hundred and two departments then existing, of which two, those of Corsica, were beyond the reach of the law; those on the left bank of the Rhine were not organized, eighty-three only had sent in their lists. It was agreed, therefore, that the selections should be made from the lists sent in, with a reservation of indemnity, by subsequent elections, to the departments which had not yet executed the law.

There were called to the legislative body a great number of the larger proprietors of land in the country, whom the new security, which they had been recently made to enjoy, had brought to quit the retirement in which they had hitherto endeavoured to live. There were also called to it some prefects and magistrates, who had been, for three years past, training to the practice of public business, under the direction of the consular government. Among those introduced into the tribunate, was numbered Lucien Bonaparte, returned from Spain, after an embassy more agitated than useful, affecting to desire nothing more than a quiet existence, employed to serve his brother in one of the great assemblies of the state. With him was introduced Carnot[1], who had just quitted the ministry at war, where he had not possessed the art of pleasing the first consul. The last was not more favourable to the consular government than the tribunes recently excluded; but he was a grave personage, universally respected, whose opposition could not be very active, and whom the revolution could not have laid aside without odious ingratitude. This nomination was a last homage to liberty. After these two names the most noted was that of M. Daru, a capable and upright administrator of a sage and cultivated intellect.

During the time that these operations were in execution, the first consul had reached Paris, after an absence of twenty-four days. He arrived on the 31st of January, in the evening, or on the 11th of Pluviôse. Every where there was submission, and that singular movement of resistance, that had not long before been seen in both legislative as-

[1] "After the 18th Brumaire, Carnot was recalled by the first consul" (he had fallen in Fructidor), "and placed in the war department. He had several quarrels with the minister of finance, Dufrèsne, the director of the treasury; in which, it is but fair to say, that he was always in the wrong. At last he left the department, persuaded that it could not longer go on for want of money. When a member of the tribunate, he spoke and voted against the establishment of the empire; but his conduct, open and manly, gave no uneasiness to the administration. At a later period he was appointed inspector of reviews, and received from the emperor, on his retirement from the service, a pension of twenty thousand francs. As long as public affairs went on prospering, the emperor heard nothing of Carnot; but after the campaign of Russia, at the time of the disasters of France, Carnot asked for employment. He was appointed to command the town of Antwerp, and he behaved well in his post. On his return in 1815, the emperor, after a little hesitation, made him minister of the interior, and had no reason to repent of his choice, having found him faithful, laborious, full of probity and sincerity. In the month of June, 1815, Carnot was named one of the commission of the provisional government, but he was duped." Such was Napoleon's account of him. He wrote upon projectiles, and started a new theory, which Napoleon proclaimed to be fallacious in practice. Carnot died in 1823, exiled by the Bourbons. He was one of the comparatively few men, who figured during the whole revolution, of whom France may be proud. He was a scientific, cool, sincere, courageous, patriotic, and independent man.—*Translator.*

semblies, was now completely ended. The new authority with which the first consul was clothed had itself acted strongly upon the public mind. It was not much, most assuredly, in addition to the power of the first consul, that the Italian republic had been added to that of France, which could thus vanquish and disarm the world; but it was that example of deference given to the genius of general Bonaparte by an allied people, which had produced this great effect. The bodies of the state all came eagerly to offer him their felicitations, and to address to him speeches, in which was perceptible, with that exaltation of language which he commonly inspired, a tone of marked respect. It seemed as if there were already seen, on that dominating head, the double crown of France and Italy.

He had all the power now for the organization of France, which was his first object, and for his personal aggrandizement, which was his second. He had no more to fear that the codes which he had drawn up, and which he had again caused to be revised, that the arrangements concluded with the pope for the restoration of the altars, would be defeated in intention by ill-will or the prejudices of the great bodies of the state. These plans were not the whole which he contemplated. For some months he had been preparing a vast system of public education, in order to fashion the young, in some sort, to the system of the revolution. He projected a plan of national recompenses, which, under the military form, adapted to the time, and to the warlike imagination of the French, might also serve to remunerate the great civil as well as military actions of the French. This was the legion of honour, a noble institution, for a long time meditated in secret, and certainly not the least difficult of the labours that the first consul would fain make agreeable to republican France. He desired also to put an end to emigration, one of the greatest and deepest maladies of the revolution. Many Frenchmen were still living in foreign countries, imbibing there those bad sentiments which are inherent in exile, destitute of family, fortune, and country. With the design to efface the traces of the great discords of France, and to preserve all that the revolution possessed which was good, while discarding all which was evil, emigration was not one of the results which could be suffered to remain in existence. Still, on account of those who had acquired national property, who were ever susceptible and distrustful, this measure was one of the most difficult, and demanded the most courage. Nevertheless, the time approached when such an act was likely to become possible. Finally, if, as it was said every where, it was necessary to consolidate the power in the hands of the man who had exercised it in so admirable a manner; if it was necessary to impart to his authority a new character, more elevated, more durable, than that of a magistracy, of which ten years, three had already passed away, the moment was again come; for the public prosperity, the fruit of order, victory, and peace, was at its full; it was felt at the instant with a force that time might cool, but could not lessen.

Still these designs for the public good and personal aggrandizement, that he nourished at the same time, needed for their accomplishment a last act, in the definitive conclusion of a maritime peace, then negotiating in the congress of Amiens. The preliminaries of London had laid down the basis of the peace; but as long as those preliminaries remained unconverted into a definitive treaty, the alarmists interested in disturbing the public repose, did not fail to report weekly, that the negotiation was broken, and that the country would soon be plunged into a maritime war, and by a maritime war into a continental one. Thus, after his return to Paris, the first consul impressed fresh activity upon the negotiations at Amiens. "Sign," he wrote every day to Joseph; "because, since the preliminaries are agreed upon, there is no more any serious question to debate." That was true. The preliminaries of London had settled the only important question, in stipulating the restitution of all the maritime conquests of the English, excepting Ceylon and Trinidad, which the Dutch and Spaniards were to sacrifice. The English had, as we have seen, demanded, at the congress of Amiens, the little island of Tobago; but the first consul had held it fast, and they had renounced it. From that time, there had been no further differences beyond questions altogether accessary, such as the support of the prisoners, and the government to be given to the isle of Malta.

The difficulty relative to the prisoners has already been explained. It was a pure question of money payment, always easy to arrange. The government to be given to Malta presented a difficulty more weighty, and a reciprocal mistrust rendered the views of the two powers exceedingly complicated. The first consul, by a singular presentiment, wished the fortifications of the island to be demolished, to reduce it to a rock, and make it a lazaretto common to all nations. The English, who regarded Malta as a half-way step to Egypt, said that the rock was of itself too important to be left always accessible to the French, that from Italy they might pass to Sicily, and from Sicily to Malta. They wished the re-establishment of the order upon its ancient basis, with the creation of an English language and a Maltese language, the last composed of the inhabitants of the island who were devoted to them. The first consul had not admitted these conditions, because, from the state of manners in France, it was not possible to hope for the composition of a French sufficiently numerous to counterbalance the creation of an English language. At last this point was arranged. The order was to be re-established without having any new language. Another grand master was to be named, because M. de Hompesch, who had in 1798 delivered up Malta to general Bonaparte, would not do for a governor again. During the time that the order was re-organizing, it was decided to demand of the king of Naples a garrison of Neapolitan soldiers, who were to occupy the island on the evacuation of it by the English. In the way of additional precaution, it was desirable that some great power should guarantee this arrangement, in order to shelter Malta from any of those enterprises which in five years had made it fall at one time into the power of France, at another into that of England. It was at first thought of requesting this guarantee of Russia, founding the request upon the interest which this power had testified for the order under Paul I. On all these points the two parties agreed

at the time of the departure of the first consul for Lyons. The fisheries established on their former footing, the territorial indemnity promised in Germany to the house of Orange for the loss of the stadtholdership, the peace and integrity of territory assured to Portugal as well as to Turkey, only presented questions already resolved. Still, since the return of the first consul to Paris, the negotiation appeared to languish; and lord Cornwallis, inquieted, seemed to draw back a step at every movement made by the French negotiation towards a conclusion. It was impossible to suspect lord Cornwallis, a good and estimable soldier as he was, who only wished for an amicable termination of the difficulties of the negotiation, joining to his great military services a great civil service, by giving peace to his country. But his instructions were become all of a sudden more rigorous, and the pain that he felt upon this account was very clearly delineated in his visage. His cabinet had, in effect, enjoined it upon him to be more particular and more vigilant in the wording of the treaty, and had imposed upon him conditions in detail, which he did not feel easy in submitting to the haughty and distrustful humour of the first consul. This brave soldier, who had thoughts to crown his career by a memorable action, had reason to dread the sight of his old renown being tarnished by the part he might be forced to play in a negotiation scandalously broken off. In his mortification he opened his mind frankly to Joseph Bonaparte, and made with him the sincerest efforts to vanquish the obstacles opposed to the conclusion of the treaty.

It will be demanded what motive could have all at once destroyed, or, at all events, cooled the pacific disposition of Mr. Addington's cabinet. The motive it is very easy to comprehend. It had made a sort of tack about, an ordinary thing in free countries. The preliminaries had been signed for six months, and in that intermediate state, which, save the sound of cannon, was near to war, little of the benefit of peace had been perceived. The greater commercial men who, in England, were the class most interested in the renewal of hostilities, because the war secured to them a universal monopoly, had been in hopes to repay themselves for what they were losing by making large shipments to the ports of France. They had met there with prohibitory regulations, which had originated during a violent contest, and which there had not been time to ameliorate. The people, who hoped for a fall in the price of provision, had not thus far seen their hopes realized, because it required a definitive treaty to overcome the speculators who kept the price of corn at a high standard. Lastly, the great landowners, who wished a reduction of all the taxes, and the middle classes, who demanded the repeal of the income-tax, had not yet gathered the promised fruits from the pacification of the world. A little disenchantment had therefore succeeded to that infatuated desire for peace, which six months before had so suddenly seized upon the English people—a people as subject to infatuation as the French. But, more than all the rest, the scenes at Lyons had acted on its jealous imagination. The taking possession of Italy, thus made manifest, had appeared for France and for her chief something so great, that British jealousy had been warmly excited by it. It was another argument for the war party, which already did not miss saying, that France was always aggrandizing herself, and England lessening in proportion. The recent news spread abroad acted equally upon their minds, namely, that of the considerable acquisition made by the French in America. Tuscany, it has been seen, was given away, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria, to an infant, without the price of this gift to Spain being made known. Now that the first consul claimed at Madrid the cession of Louisiana, which was the equivalent stipulated for Tuscany, this condition of the treaty was divulged; and the fact, joined to the St. Domingo expedition, revealed new and vast designs in America. To all this was to be added, that a considerable port was acquired by France in the Mediterranean, that of the Isle of Elba, exchanged for the duchy of Piombino.

These different rumours, spread abroad at once while the consulta, assembled at Lyons, was decreeing to general Bonaparte the government of Italy, had given some strength to the war party in London, which had been before obliged to keep itself in extreme reserve, and to greet with hypocritical welcome the re-establishment of peace.

Pitt, who had quitted the cabinet the year before, but who was still more powerful in his retirement than his upright and feeble successors were, when in full possession of their power, was silent upon the subject of the preliminaries. He had not said any thing of the conditions, but he had approved of the fact of the peace itself. His old friends, very inferior to himself, and, consequently, less moderate, Windham, Dundas, and Grenville, had censured the weakness of the Addington cabinet, and declared the preliminary conditions disadvantageous to Great Britain. On learning the departure of the fleet, carrying twenty thousand men to St. Domingo, they cried out aloud at the dupery of Addington, which had permitted a squadron to pass which would not fail to re-establish the French power in the Antilles, before the signature of the definitive treaty of peace. They prophesied that he would be the victim of his imprudent confidence. At the news of the events at Lyons, of the cession of Louisiana, and of the acquisition of the island of Elba, they exclaimed still louder, and lord Carlisle made a furious onset upon the gigantic ambition of France, and the feebleness of the new cabinet of England.

Pitt continued silent, thinking that it was necessary to suffer this attachment to peace, with which the London public appeared to be smitten, to wear itself out, and that it became him to protect, at least for a time, the cabinet destined to satisfy, in all probability, a passing taste. The English cabinet itself appeared to be moved by the effect thus produced upon public opinion; but it much more dreaded what would be said if the peace should be broken as soon as it was entered upon, and if a formal treaty were not to replace the preliminary articles. It confined itself therefore to sending out some ships of war to the West Indies, which had been prematurely re-called, in order to observe the French fleet, which had sailed to that quarter; and it sent to lord Cornwallis instructions, which, without changing the foundation of any thing, aggravated certain conditions, and

overloaded the definitive treaty with precautions, useless or disparaging to the dignity of the French government. Lord Hawkesbury wished for a precise stipulation of the money to be paid to England for the prisoners which she had to maintain; he wished that Holland should pay the house of Orange a money indemnity, independently of the territorial indemnity promised in Germany; he wished it to be formally stipulated, that the old grand master should not be again placed at the head of the order of Malta. He wished, above all, that a Turkish plenipotentiary should figure at the congress of Amiens, because always full of the recollections of Egypt, the British cabinet held itself determined to check the daring of the first consul in the East. He wished, in fine, to be an instrument which might enable Portugal to escape the stipulations of the treaty of Badajoz—stipulations by virtue of which the court of Lisbon lost Olivenza in Europe and a certain territorial space in America.

Such were the instructions sent to lord Cornwallis; still there was one proposition which was reserved to be made directly by lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto. This related to Italy: "We see," said lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, "that there is nothing to be got from the first consul touching Piedmont. To make any demand on that head, would be asking what is impossible. But let the first consul grant to the king of Sardinia the smallest territorial indemnity in any corner of Italy that he pleases, and in return for this concession, we will acknowledge at the same moment all that France has done in that country. We will acknowledge the kingdom of Etruria and the Ligurian republic."

The changes requested, whether by lord Cornwallis or by lord Hawkesbury, consisting more in form than in substance, were neither vexatious to the power nor to the pride of France. Peace was too fine a thing not to accept it as it was offered. But the first consul, unable to discover if these new demands were only a pure precaution of the English cabinet, with the intention of rendering the treaty more presentable to parliament, or if in effect this going back from points already conceded, accompanied by maritime armaments, concealed a secret idea of a rupture, acted, as he always did, by going resolutely to the mark. He conceded what he thought should be conceded, and flatly refused the rest. Relatively to the prisoners, he repelled the stipulation of the precise sum to be paid to England, but agreed to the formation of a commission which was to regulate the amount of the expenses, considering German or other soldiers who had been in the English service, as English prisoners. He would not agree that Holland should pay the stadtholder a single florin. He consented in a formal manner to the nomination of a new grand master for Malta, but without any expression applicable to M. de Hompesch, which might induce the idea that France allowed the abandonment of any who had done her service to be imposed upon her. He wished that the guarantee of Malta should be also demanded of Austria, Prussia, and Spain[1]. Finally, without admitting a Turkish or Portuguese plenipotentiary, he consented to an article in which the integrity of

[1] As the possession of the island of Malta was one of those points upon which the two countries had the greatest difficulty in completing the treaty, that part which related to it will make the subject better understood:—

"The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, shall be restored to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, to be held on the same condition on which it possessed them before the war, and under the following stipulations:—

"1. The knights of the order whose languages shall continue after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty, are invited to return to Malta as soon as the exchange shall have taken place. They will there form a general chapter, and proceed to the election of a grand master, chosen from among the natives of the nation which preserve their language, unless that election has been already made since the exchange of the preliminaries. It is understood that an election made subsequent to that epoch, shall alone be considered valid, to the exclusion of any other that may have taken place at any period prior to that epoch.

"2. The governments of the French republic and of Great Britain, desiring to place the order and island of Malta in a state of entire independence with respect to them, agree that there shall not be in future either a French or English language, and that no individual belonging to either the one or the other of these powers shall be admitted into the order.

"3. There shall be established a Maltese language, which shall be supported by the territorial revenues and commercial duties of the island. This language shall have its peculiar dignities, an establishment and an hôtel. Proofs of nobility shall not be necessary for the admission of knights of this language; and they shall be moreover admissible to all offices, and shall enjoy all privileges, in the same manner as the knights of the other languages. At least half of the municipal, administrative, civil, judicial, and other employments depending on the government, shall be filled by inhabitants of the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino.

"4. The forces of his Britannic majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months from the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner if possible. At that epoch it shall be given up to the order, in its present state, provided the grand master, or commissaries fully authorized according to the statutes of the order, shall be in the island to take possession, and that the force which is to be provided by his Sicilian majesty, as is hereafter stipulated, shall have arrived there.

"5. One-half of the garrison, at least, shall be always composed of native Maltese; for the remainder, the order may levy recruits in those only which continue to possess the language *(posséder les langues)*. The Maltese troops shall have Maltese officers; the commander-in-chief of the garrison, as well as the nomination of the officers, shall pertain to the grand master; and this right he cannot assign, even temporarily, except in favour of a knight, and in concurrence with the council of the order.

"6. The independence of the isles of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, as well as the present arrangement, shall be placed under the protection and guarantee of France, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia.

"7. The neutrality of the order, and of the island of Malta, with its dependencies, is proclaimed.

"8. The ports of Malta shall be opened to the commerce and navigation of all nations, who shall there pay equal and moderate duties; these duties shall be applied to the support of the Maltese language, as specified in paragraph 9; to that of the civil and military establishments of the islands as well as to that of a general lazaretto, open to all ensigns.

"9. The states of Barbary are excepted from the condition of the preceding paragraphs, until, by means of an arrangement to be procured by the contracting parties, the system of hostilities which subsists between the states of Barbary and the order of St. John, or the powers possessing the lan-

the Turkish and Portuguese territory should be formally guaranteed.

As to the acknowledgment of the Italian, of the Ligurian republic, and of the kingdom of Etruria, he declared that he would pass it by, and that he would not purchase it by any concession made to the king of Piedmont, whose dominions he was determined to keep definitively.

After having sent these answers to his brother Joseph, with ample liberty as to the settlement, in regard to the mode of drawing up, he recommended him to act with great prudence, in order to have a sufficient proof that the refusal to sign the peace came from England, and not from him. He caused it to be intimated, whether in London or at Amiens, that if they would not accept what he proposed, they ought to terminate the affair; and that at the same moment he would instantly re-arm the old Boulogne flotilla, and form a camp opposite to the English coast.

The rupture was not more wished in London than in Paris or Amiens. The English cabinet felt that it must succumb under the ridicule, if a truce of six months, following the preliminaries, had only served to open the sea to the French fleets. Lord Cornwallis, who knew that the English legation was not to be justified, because it was that which had raised the last difficulties, lord Cornwallis was highly conciliatory in the drawing up. Joseph Bonaparte was not less so, and on the 25th of March, 1802, in the evening, or 4th Germinal, in the year X., the peace with Great Britain was signed upon an instrument marked with all sorts of corrections.

It took thirty-six hours for the translation of the treaty into as many languages as there were powers concerned. On the 27th of March, or 6th Germinal, the plenipotentiaries met together at the Hôtel de Ville. The first consul wished that all should take place with the greatest parade. A good while before there had been sent to Amiens a detachment of the finest troops newly dressed; he had all the roads from Amiens to Calais, and Amiens to Paris, newly repaired, and sent relief to the labourers of the country deprived of work, in order that nothing might inspire the negotiator of England with an unfavourable idea of France. He prescribed certain preparations in the city of Amiens itself, in order that the signature might be given with a sort of solemnity. On the 27th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, detachments of cavalry went to the residences of the plenipotentiaries, and formed an escort to the Hôtel de Ville, where an apartment had been prepared for their reception. It took them a certain time to revise the copies of the treaty, and about two o'clock admittance was given at last to the authorities and to the people, who were eager to be present at the imposing spectacle of the two first nations in the universe becoming reconciled in the face of the world—becoming reconciled, alas! for too short a period! The two plenipotentiaries signed the peace, and then cordially embraced each other amid the acclamations of those present, full of emotion, and transported with joy. Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte were reconducted to their residences in the midst of the loudest acclamations of the multitude. Lord Cornwallis heard his name blessed by the French people, and Joseph entered his house hearing on all sides the cry, which was to be for a long time, and which it was possible might have always been the cry of France, "Long live Bonaparte!"

Lord Cornwallis set out immediately for London, in spite of the invitation which he had received to visit Paris. He feared that the facilities in drawing up the treaty, to which he had lent himself, might not be approved by his government, and he wished to secure the ratification of the treaty of peace by his presence.

The happy issue of the congress of Amiens, if it did not excite among the English people the same transports of enthusiasm as the signature to the preliminaries had done, still found them joyful and elated. This time, they said, they were going to enjoy the reality of the peace, the low price of produce, and the abolition of the income-tax. They believed it, and showed themselves truly satisfied.

The effect was just the same on the side of France. Less of external demonstration, but not less of real satisfaction; such was the spectacle afforded by the French people. Finally, it was felt that true peace, that of the seas, was procured, the necessary and certain condition of a continental peace. After ten years of the grandest, the most terrible contest that was ever seen among men, they had all laid down their arms; the temple of Janus was shut.

By whom had all this been performed? Who had rendered France so great and prosperous, Europe so calm? One sole man by the power of his sword, and by the depth of his policy. France proclaimed this, and the entire of Europe echoed to her. He had subsequently conquered at Jena, at Friedland, at Wagram, he had conquered in a hundred battles, had dazzled, startled, subdued the world; but he was never so great as then, because he was never so wise!

Thus all the great bodies of the state came to tell him anew, in speeches full of sincere enthusiasm, that he had been the victor, and that he was

guages, or concurring in the composition of the order, shall have ceased.

"10. The order shall be governed, both with respect to spirituals and temporals, by the same statutes which were in force when the knights left the isle, as far as the present treaty shall not derogate from them.

"11. The regulations contained in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10, shall be converted into laws and perpetual statutes of the order, in the customary manner: and the grand master, (or if he shall not be in the island at the time of its restoration to the order, his representative,) as well as his successors, shall be bound to take an oath for their punctual observance.

"12. His Sicilian majesty shall be invited to furnish two thousand men, natives of his states, to serve in garrison of the different fortresses of the said islands; that force shall remain for one year, to bear date from their restitution to the knights; and, if at the expiration of this term, the order should not have raised a force sufficient in the judgment of the guaranteeing powers to garrison the island and its dependencies, such as is specified in the paragraph, the Neapolitan troops shall continue there until they shall be replaced by a force deemed sufficient by the said powers.

"13. The different powers designated in the 6th paragraph, viz., France, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia, shall be invited to accede to the present stipulations."

now the benefactor of Europe. The young author of so much good, the possessor of so much glory, was very far from thinking he approached the end of his labours. He hardly enjoyed what he had done before he was impatient to do more. Devoted passionately to the works of peace, without being certain that peace would last long, he was anxious to complete what he denominated the organization of France, and to reconcile what was good and true in the revolution with what was useful and necessary at all times in the old monarchy. That which he had most at heart at this time was the restoration of the catholic worship, the organization of public education, the recal of the emigrants, and the institution of the legion of honour. These were not the only things that he contemplated; but they were, in his view, the most urgent. Master, for the future, of the minds of those who composed the great bodies of the state, he used the prerogatives of the constitution to order an extraordinary session. He had returned on the 31st of January, 1802, or 11th of Pluviôse, from the consulta held at Lyons; the treaty of Amiens had been signed on the 25th of March, or 4th of Germinal; the promotions to the legislative body and the tribunate were finished several weeks before, and the newly-elected members had taken their seats; he therefore convoked an extraordinary session for the 5th of April, or 15th Germinal. It was to last until the 20th of May, or 30th Floréal, that is to say, about six weeks. This would suffice for his plans, however great they might be, because the contradiction which he was likely to encounter for the future would not occasion him the loss of much time.

The first of these projects submitted to the legislative body was the concordat. It was still the more difficult of them to get adopted, if not by the popular masses, at least by the civil and military individuals who surrounded the government. The holy see, which had been so slow to grant the principles of the concordat at one time, at another the bull of the circumscriptions, and again, the faculty to institute the new bishops, had long since sent all that was necessary to cardinal Caprara, that he might be able to display the full powers of the holy see, at the moment that the first consul should judge most opportune. The first consul himself had thought with reason that the proclamation of the definitive treaty of peace was the moment when he should be able, under the favour of the public joy, to afford, for the first time, the spectacle of the republican government prostrate at the foot of the altar, thanking Providence for the blessings which had been conferred upon it.

He made every disposition for the dedication of the first day of Easter to this important solemnity. But the fifteen days which preceded this great act were not less critical nor less laborious than that day was likely to be. It was, in the first place, necessary, besides the treaty called the concordat, which, under the name of a treaty, was to be voted by the legislative body, it was necessary to draw up and to present a law which should regulate the police of worship, in unison with the principles of the concordat and of the Gallican church. It was necessary to appoint the new clergy who were designed to replace the former bishops, whose resignation had been required by the pope, and almost universally obtained. Sixty sees were to be filled up at one time, by the selection, from priests of all parties, of the most respectable individuals, taking every precaution not to give offence to religious opinions by those selections, nor to renew schism through an excess of a similar zeal to that used for its extermination.

Such were the difficulties that the tenacity, enveloped in mildness, of the cardinal Caprara, and the passions of the clergy, as great as those of other men, rendered very serious and very disquieting, up to the latest moment, even to the evening before the day when the great act of the re-establishment of the altars was to be consummated.

The first consul began with the law designed to regulate the police of worship, or that which, in the French code, bears the title of "Organic Articles." It was voluminous, and regulated the relations of the government with all religions, whether catholic, protestant, or Hebrew. It rested on the principle of the liberty of worship, granted to it security and protection, imposing on all respect and toleration to each other, and submission towards the government. As to the catholic religion, that which embraced nearly the totality of the population of the country, it was regulated according to the principles of the Roman church, sanctioned in the concordat, and the principles of the Gallican church, as proclaimed by Bossuet. It was first established that no bull, brief, or writing whatever of the holy see, could be published in France without the authority of the government; that no delegate from Rome, except him whom she publicly sent as her official representative, should be admitted, recognized, or tolerated: this caused the disappearance of the secret mandatories that the holy see employed to govern the French church clandestinely during the revolution. Every infraction whatsoever of the rules, resulting either from treaties with the holy see or from the laws of France, committed by a member of the clerical body, was denominated an "abuse," and referred to the jurisdiction of the council of state, a political and administrative body, animated by a sound spirit of government, which could not feel towards the clergy the hatred which the magistracy had avowed towards it under the ancient monarchy. No council, general or particular, could be held in France without the formal order of the government. There was to be one catechism only, approved of by the public authorities. Every ecclesiastic who devoted himself to the education of the clergy was to make profession of the declaration of 1682, known under the name of the "Propositions of Bossuet." These propositions, as it is well known, contain those fine principles of submission and independence, which so particularly characterize the Gallican church, while she, always submissive to the catholic unity, made it triumphant in France, and defended it in Europe; but independent in her internal government, faithful to her sovereigns, she has never ended in protestantism, like the German and English churches, nor in the inquisition, like that of Spain. Submissive to the head of the universal church in spirituals, submissive to the head of the state in temporals, such was the double principle

upon which the first consul desired that the French church should rest established. For this reason he formally stipulated that the clergy should be instructed in the propositions of Bossuet. It was arranged, in consequence, in the organic articles, that the bishops, nominated by the first consul, and instituted by the pope, should choose the curés; but before installing them, they should be obliged to submit them to the approval of the government. Leave was granted to the bishops to form chapters of canons in the cathedrals and seminaries of the dioceses. Every appointment of professors in these seminaries was to be approved by the public authority. No pupil of these seminaries could be ordained a priest until he was twenty-five years of age, unless he brought forward proof that he possessed property to the amount of 300 f. per annum, and that was approved of by the administration of public worship. This condition of property could not, in reality, be carried out[1]; but it was desirable, had it been practicable, because, in that case, the spirit of the clergy would have sunk less than it has since been seen to do. The archbishops received 15,000 f. of revenue; the bishops, 10,000 f.; the curés of the first class, 1500 f.; those of the second class, 1000 f., but without the addition of ecclesiastical pensions, which many priests enjoyed in compensation for alienated ecclesiastical property. The casual, or in other words, voluntary contributions of the faithful, for the administration of certain sacraments, was reserved, on condition of being regulated by the bishops. In all other cases it was stipulated that the offices of religion should be gratuitously administered. The churches were restored to the newly-appointed clergy. The presbyteries and the gardens attached, called, among the rural population, the "curés' houses," were the only portions of the former goods of the church which were restored to the priests, on the understanding that this formed no precedent regarding such a portion of the goods of the church as had been sold. The usage of bells was re-established for the purpose of calling the people to church; but they were forbidden to be used for any civil purpose, at least, without permission from the authorities. The sinister recollection of the tocsin had caused this precaution to be adopted. No fête or holiday, except that of Sunday, could be established without the authority of the government. Worship was not to be performed externally, that is, outside the buildings, in towns where there were edifices belonging to different religious denominations. Lastly, the Gregorian calendar was, in part, made to correspond with the republican calendar. This was, certainly, the most serious of the difficulties. It was impossible to abolish completely the calendar, which recalled, more than any other institution, the remembrance of the revolution, and which had been adapted to the new system of weights and measures. But it was not possible to establish the catholic religion again without the re-establishment of the Sunday, and with the Sunday, that of the week. In other respects, manners had already done that which the law dared not yet undertake, and the Sunday had again become every where a religious holiday, more or less observed, but universally admitted as an interruption to the labour of the week. The first consul adopted a middle term. He decided that the year and the month should be named after the republican calendar, and the day and week after the Gregorian. That there should be said, for example, for Easter Sunday, Sunday, 28th Germinal, year x., which answered to April 18, 1802. Lastly, he exacted that no one should be married in a church without the production, previously, of the writ of civil marriage; and as to the registers of births, deaths, and marriages, that the clergy had continued to hold from usage, he caused it to be declared that these registers should never be of any value in courts of justice. In the last place, every testamentary or other donation, made to the clergy, was to be constituted in the public funds.

Such is the substance of the wise and profound law which bears the name of "organic articles." It was for the French government wholly an internal act which regarded itself alone, and which, under this title, was not to be submitted to the holy see. It sufficed that it contained nothing contrary to the concordat, so that the court of Rome had no reasonable ground to complain. To submit it to Rome would be to prepare insurmountable difficulties—difficulties greater and more in number than had been encountered in the concordat itself. The first consul took care that he would not expose himself to these difficulties. He knew that when once religious worship was publicly re-established, the holy see would not come to a rupture of the peace between France and Rome on account of matters which concerned the interior policy of the republic. It is very true that, at a later period, these articles became one of the grievances of the court of Rome against Napoleon; but they were more a pretext than a real grievance. They had, besides, been communicated to cardinal Caprara, who did not appear to revolt at reading them[1], if a judgment can be formed of his opinion by what he communicated in writing to his own court. He made some reservations, advising the holy father not to afflict himself about them, hoping, he said, that the articles would not be too rigorously executed.

The law of the organic articles being drawn up and discussed in the council of state, it was necessary to give some attention to the individual appointments of the clergy. This was a task requiring considerable labour, because there was a multitude of selections to be made, each to be closely examined prior to a definitive decision. Portalis, whom the first consul had appointed to take charge of the administration of worship, and who was eminently proper either to treat with the clergy, or to represent that body in the council of state, and to defend it with a mild, brilliant eloquence, impressed with a certain religious unction, Portalis ordinarily resisted the holy see with a respectful firmness. On this occasion he made himself in some respects an ally of the cardinal Caprara in a pretension of the court of Rome, that of completely excluding the constitutional clergy from the new sees. The pope, affected still at an act as exorbitant in his

[1] It was not abolished until February, 1810.

[1] These assertions are founded upon the correspondence of cardinal Caprara himself.

own eyes as the deposition of the old titularies, wished at least to indemnify himself for it by keeping from the episcopacy the ministers of the worship that had made a compact with the French revolution, and taken an oath to the civil constitution. Since the concordat was signed, that is to say, for about eight or nine months, cardinal Caprara, who was filling *incognito* the functions of legate *a latere*, and who was continually seeing the first consul, insinuated to him with mildness, but constancy, the desires of the Roman church, advancing with more boldness when the first consul was in a humour to let him speak on, and retiring precipitately, with humility, when he was of a contrary humour. These desires of the Roman church, did not solely consist in excluding from the new composition of the French clergy those priests whom he denominated intruders, but were directed to the recovery of the lost provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna. "The holy father," said the cardinal, "is very poor since he has been despoiled of his most fertile provinces; he is so poor that he can neither pay troops to guard him, the administration of his states, nor the sacred college. He has lost even a part of his foreign revenues. In the midst of his grievances, the re-establishment of religion in France is the greatest of his consolations; but do not mingle bitterness with this consolation, by obliging him to institute priests who have apostatized, thus depriving the faithful clergy of the places already so much diminished by the new circumscription."

"Yes," replied the first consul, "the holy father is poor; I will assist him. All the boundaries of Italy are not irrevocably fixed; those of Europe are definitively arranged, but I cannot now take away the provinces from the Italian republic which has made me its chief. Meanwhile, the holy father is in want of more money than he possesses. He requires some millions, and I am ready to give them to him. As to the intruders," he added, "it is another affair. The pope promised, when the negotiations are sent in, to reconcile with the church all these without distinction, who shall submit to the concordat. He has promised—he must keep his word. I shall remind him of the matter; and he is neither a man nor a pontiff if he break his word. Besides, my object is not to make any one party triumph; my object is to reconcile one party with another, holding the balance equal between each. For a considerable time you have obliged me to read the history of the church. I have seen there that religious quarrels do not differ materially from political ones; because you priests, and we military men or magistrates, are all alike. They end only by the intervention of some authority sufficiently strong to oblige the parties to draw together and amalgamate. I shall therefore mingle some constitutional bishops with those whom you denominate the faithful; I will choose but a few, and I will choose them well. You will conciliate them with the Roman church; I will oblige them to submit to the concordat, and all will go on well. This is a matter resolved upon—do not recur to it again."

The "great consul," as the cardinal called him, because he admired, loved, and feared him in an equal degree, said to the holy father, "Do not let us irritate this man! he alone sustains us in this country, where every body is against us. If his zeal be suffered to cool for a moment, or if unhappily he should die, there would never more be a religion in France."

The cardinal, when he did not succeed, obliged himself to appear satisfied, because general Bonaparte loved to see people content, and was out of humour when any one presented himself with chagrin in his countenance. The cardinal always showed himself serene and mild, and had, through this means, discovered the art of pleasing him. He observed, besides, the troubles which beset Bonaparte, and he was not willing to add to them. The first consul, in his turn, endeavoured to make the cardinal comprehend the susceptibility and jealousy of the French feeling, and, notwithstanding his power, he made as strong efforts to convince his mind, as the cardinal could make on his own side to bring the first consul to his views. One day, impatient at the solicitations of the legate, he made him cease them by these words, not less gracious than profound: "Hold, cardinal Caprara! Do you still possess the gift of miracles! Do you possess it! In that case employ it to do me a very great service. If you have it not, leave me alone; and since I am reduced to human means, permit me to use them as I understand how, in order to save the church [1]!"

It was a picture very striking and curious, preserved entire in the correspondence of cardinal Caprara, of this powerful warrior displaying by turns a finesse, a grace, and an extraordinary vehemence in persuading the old theological diplomatic cardinal to come into his views. Both had thus reached the moment for the publication of the concordat without the one having worked conviction upon the mind of the other. Portalis, who upon this point alone agreed in opinion with the views of the holy see, did not dare, as he would willingly do, to exclude altogether the constitutionalists from the propositions for filling the sixty sees, but he only presented two of them. Having had an understanding with the abbé Bernier for the selections to be made among the orthodox clergy, he had proposed the wisest and most eminent members of the old episcopacy for that purpose, and a sufficient number of estimable curés distinguished by their piety, their moderation, and the continuance of their services during the reign of terror. He asserted with the abbé Bernier, that not to call any member of the old episcopacy, and to desig-

[1] It was what was called the faction of the "communes" that wound up the crisis of materialism, and left the different creeds the legacy of the last change. Thus during the revolution, and prior to the above measure being effected by Bonaparte, there was the ultramontane catholicism followed by the refractory clergy, or orthodox or unsworn clergy, divided into the unsworn and those who had promised; there were the Jansenist, or constitutional, or sworn clergy; there was deism, or the worship of the Supreme Being, instituted by the committee of public safety; and there were, at last, the materialists, who would worship only reason and nature —the creed of the infamous "commune." There were thus elements sufficiently discordant on the subject of religion, to require all the courage and ability of Bonaparte to overcome them. There were, more or less, numerous professors of all these opinions at that time in every part of France.—*Translator.*

nate none but curés, would be to create a clergy too new, and too destitute of authority: that on the contrary, to nominate the old bishops alone to the sees would be to neglect too much the inferior clergy, who had rendered real services during the revolution, and whose honest ambition would be thus grievously wounded. These views were reasonable, and were admitted by the first consul. But as to the two constitutional prelates, he was not at all satisfied about them.

"I mean out of these sixty sees," said the first consul, "to give one-fifth to the clergy of the revolution, or, in other words, to twelve. There shall be two constitutional archbishops to ten, and ten constitutional bishops to fifty, which is not too much" After having consulted with Portalis and Bernier, he made with them the best selections which could be conceived, saving one or two. M. de Belloy, bishop of Marseilles, the oldest and most respectable of the old French clergy, and the excellent minister of a religion of charity, who joined to a venerable appearance the most highly-endowed piety, was nominated archbishop of Paris. M. de Cicé, keeper of the seals under Louis XVI., formerly archbishop of Bordeaux, an ecclesiastic of a firm and politic mind, was promoted to the archbishopric of Aix; M. de Boisgelin, a noble by birth, an enlightened priest, well-informed, and of a mild temper, formerly archbishop of Aix, was made archbishop of Tours; M. de la Tour-du-Pin, formerly archbishop of Auch, received the bishopric of Troyes. This worthy prelate, as illustrious by his knowledge as by his birth, had the modesty to accept a post so inferior to that which he had resigned. The first consul subsequently recompensed him with a cardinal's hat. M. de Roquelaure, formerly bishop of Senlis, one of the most distinguished prelates of the former church, by his union of amenity and pure morals, obtained the archbishopric of Malines. M. Cambacérès, brother of the second consul, was called to the archbishopric of Rouen. The abbé Fesch, uncle of the first consul, a proud priest, who made it his glory to resist his nephew, was made archbishop of Lyons, in other words, primate of the Gauls. M. Lecoz, constitutional bishop of Rennes, a priest of good moral character, but an ardent and unaccommodating Jansenist, was nominated archbishop of Besançon. M. Primat, the constitutional bishop of Lyons, formerly an oratorian, a well-instructed and mild priest, having occasioned sad scandal in regard to schisms, but none in respect to morals, was promoted to the archbishopric of Toulouse. A distinguished curé, M. de Pancemont, much employed about the affair of the resignations, was taken from the parish of St. Sulpice to be sent to Vannes as a bishop. Lastly, the abbé Bernier, the celebrated curé of St. Laud d'Angers, formerly the hidden plotter in La Vendée, afterwards its pacificator, and under the first consul the negotiator of the concordat, received the bishopric of Orléans. That see was not commensurate with the high influence which the first consul had allowed him to take in the affairs of the French church; but the abbé Bernier felt that the recollections of the civil war attaching to his name, did not permit an elevation too sudden and too marked; that the real influence he enjoyed was of more value than external honours. The first consul had in view for him besides the hat of a cardinal.

When these nominations were all arranged, they were not to be published until after the conversion of the concordat into a law of the state; they were communicated to cardinal Caprara, who opposed to them a very warm resistance; he even shed tears, said that he was unprovided with powers, though he had received from Rome an absolute latitude, extending so far as to the extraordinary faculty of instituting prelates without having recourse to the holy see. Portalis and Bernier declared to him that the will of the first consul was irrevocable; that he must submit or renounce the solemn ceremony of the restoration of the altar, announced to take place in a few days. He submitted at last, writing to the pope that the salvation of souls, deprived of religion, if he persisted in his refusal, had in his mind obtained the advantage over the interests of the faithful clergy. "They will censure me," said the cardinal to St. Peter, "but I have obeyed that which I believed was a voice from heaven."

He consented, therefore, but reserved to himself the right of exacting from the newly-elected constitutional clergy a recantation which might cover this last condescension of the holy see.

All being in readiness, the first consul ordered the concordat to be laid before the legislative body, to be voted into a law, agreeably to the prescribed rules of the constitution. To the concordat were joined the "organic articles." It was the first day of the extraordinary session, or the 5th of April, 1802, or 15th Germinal, that the concordat was presented to the legislative body by the councillors of state, Portalis, Regnier, and Reynault St. Jean d'Angely. The legislative body was not in session when the treaty of Amiens, signed the 25th of March, had become known in Paris. It had not in consequence been among the authorities which had gone up to congratulate the first consul. At this first sitting it was proposed to send a deputation of twenty-five members to compliment the first consul upon the occasion of the general peace. In their propositions there was no mention of the concordat, which exhibits the spirit of the time, even in the heart of the renewed legislative body. The deputation was presented on the 6th of April, or 16th Germinal.

"Citizen consul," said the president of the legislative body, "the first necessity of the French people, attacked by all Europe, was victory, and you have conquered. Their next dearest wish was for peace after victory, and that you have given them. What glory for the past—what hopes for the future! All this has been your work. Enjoy, therefore, the *éclat* and happiness which the republic is in your debt!"

The president terminated this address by the warmest expression of gratitude, but upon the subject of the concordat he was perfectly silent. The first consul seized the opportunity to give him a species of lesson upon the subject, and to speak to those who spoke only of the treaty of Amiens, of the concordat alone. "I thank you for the sentiments you express toward me," said the first consul to the messengers of the legislative body. "Your session begins with the most important operation of all, that which has for its end to ap-

peace all religious differences. The whole of France is solicitous to see an end to these deplorable disputes, and to observe the re-establishment of the altar. I hope that in your votes you will be unanimous upon this question. France will see with lively joy that her legislators have voted peace of conscience, peace in families, a hundred times more important for the happiness of a people, than that upon the occasion of which you have come to felicitate the government."

These fine expressions produced the effect which the first consul hoped; the projected law, carried immediately from the legislative body to the tribunate, was there seriously examined, even favourably, and discussed with warmth. On the report of M. Simeon, it was declared to be carried, by seventy-eight votes to seven. In the legislative body it was carried by two hundred and twenty-eight for to twenty-one against the measure.

It was on the 8th of April, or 18th Germinal, that these two bills were converted into laws. There were no more obstacles. It was Thursday, and the Sunday following was Palm Sunday; the next would be Easter-day. The first consul wished to devote those solemn days in the catholic religion to the great festival of the re-establishment of public worship. He had not yet received cardinal Caprara officially as the legate of the holy see. He assigned the following day, Friday, for this official reception. The usage of legates *a latere* is to have a gold cross carried before them. This is the sign of the extraordinary power that the holy see delegates to its representatives of this character. Cardinal Caprara wished, conformably to the views of his court, that the exercise of worship might be as public and pompous as possible in France, and requested that, according to usage, on the day when he went to the Tuileries, the golden cross might be carried before him, by an officer, dressed in red, on horseback. This was a spectacle which there was some fear about exhibiting to the Parisians. A negotiation ensued, in which it was agreed that this cross should be carried in one of the carriages which were to precede that of the legate.

On Friday, the 9th of April, the cardinal repaired in full pomp to the Tuileries, in the carriages of the first consul, escorted by the consular guard, and preceded by the cross, borne in one of the carriages. Then the first consul received him at the head of a numerous circle of persons, consisting of his colleagues, of many councillors of state, and a brilliant staff. Cardinal Caprara, whose exterior was mild and serious, addressed a speech to the first consul, in which dignity was mingled with the expression of gratitude. He took the oath agreed upon, that he would do nothing contrary to the laws of the state, and to vacate his functions as soon as he should be requested so to do. The first consul replied to him in elevated language, destined, particularly, to resound elsewhere than in the palace of the Tuileries.

This external display was the first of all those which were prepared, and it was but little noticed, because, the people of Paris not being aware of it, were unable to yield to their ordinary curiosity. The next day but one was Palm Sunday. The first consul had already made the cardinal consent to the nomination of some of the principal prelates before agreed upon. He wished that their consecration should take place upon Palm Sunday, in order that they might be able to officiate on the Sunday following, which was Easter-day, in the great solemnity which he had projected. These were M. de Belloy, nominated archbishop of Paris, M. de Cambacérès, archbishop of Rouen, M. Bernier, bishop of Orléans, and M. de Pancemont, bishop of Vannes. Nôtre Dame was still occupied by the constitutional clergy, who kept the keys. It required a formal order before they would deliver them up. That fine edifice was found in a sad state of dilapidation; and nothing there was prepared for the consecration of the four prelates. They provided for this omission by means of a sum of money, furnished by the first consul, and it was done in such a hurry, that when the day of the ceremony came, there was no place found fitted up for a sacristy. A neighbouring house was obliged to be applied to this purpose. There the new prelates arrayed themselves in their pontifical ornaments, and in this dress had to cross the open space before the cathedral. The people having been informed that a grand ceremony was in course of preparation, repaired to the spot, and behaved quietly and respectfully. The countenance of the venerable archbishop Belloy was so fine and noble, that it affected the simple hearts of those who composed the crowd, and all of them, both men and women, bowed respectfully. The cathedral was full of that class of serious persons, who had grieved over the misfortunes of religion, and who, belonging to no faction, received with thankfulness the present made them that day by the first consul. The ceremony was affecting, even from the very defect of pomp by the sentiments which attached to it. The four prelates were consecrated in the customary manner.

From this time, it must be stated, that the satisfaction among the mass was general, and the approbation of the public was secured to the great manifestation that was fixed for the following Sunday. Except party men, revolutionists hotly obstinate in their own systems, or factious royalists, who saw with mortification the lever of revolt slipped out of their hands, all approved of what was passing; and the first consul was able to recognize already, that his own views were more correct than those of his councillors.

The Sunday following being Easter Sunday, was designed for a solemn *Te Deum*, in celebration, at the same time, of the general peace, and of a reconciliation with the church. This ceremony was announced by public authority, as a truly national festival. The preparations and the programme of it were published. The first consul wished to proceed to it in grand state, accompanied by all that was most elevated in the government. Through the ladies of the palace it was conveyed to the wives of the higher functionaries, that they would satisfy one of his most ardent wishes, if they would attend the metropolitan church upon the day of *Te Deum*. The greater number did not require to be pressed to attend. It is well known what frivolous motives are joined to those which are most pious in character, to augment the influx of attendance upon those solemnities of religion. The most brilliant women of Paris obeyed the wishes of the first consul. The principal among them

made the Tuileries the rendezvous, in order to accompany Madam Bonaparte in the carriages of the new court. The first consul had given a formal order to his generals to accompany him. This was the most difficult thing of all to obtain, because it was every where said that they held very unworthy and almost factious language. The conduct of Lannes has been already noticed. Augereau, tolerated at Paris, was actually one of those who spoke loudest. He was charged by his comrades to go to the first consul, and to express to him their wish not to attend at Nôtre Dame. It was at a consular sitting, in the presence of the three consuls and the ministers, that Bonaparte chose to receive Augereau. He stated his message, but the first consul recalled him to a sense of his duty, with that haughtiness of manner that he so well knew how to assume, more particularly with military men. He made him sensible of the impropriety of his conduct, and recalled to his recollection that the concordat was then the law of the land, and that the laws were obligatory upon all classes of citizens, as well upon the military as upon the humblest and most feeble citizen; that he should watch their execution, in his double capacity of general and chief magistrate of the republic; that it was not for the officers of the army, but for the government, to judge of the adaptation of the ceremonies ordered for Easter Sunday; that all the authorities had orders to be present, the military as well as the civil authorities, and that all should obey; that as to the dignity of the army, he was himself as jealous of it, and as good a judge of it, as any of the generals his companions in arms; and that he was sure he did not compromise it by assisting in person at the ceremonies of religion; that, to put an end to the question, they had not to deliberate, but to execute an order, and that he expected to see them all on Sunday at his side in the metropolitan church. Augereau made no reply, and carried to his comrades only the embarrassment of having done a thoughtless act, and the resolution to obey orders.

Every thing was ready, when, at the last moment, the later thoughts of cardinal Caprara were nearly defeating these noble designs of the first consul. The bishops chosen from the constitutional party had gone to the residence of cardinal Caprara, for the *procès informatif*, which is drawn out in behalf of every bishop presented to the holy see. The cardinal had required from them a retractation, by which they abjured their former errors, characterizing in the most self-condemnatory way, their adhesion to the civil constitution of the clergy. This was a very humiliating step, not only for them, but for the revolution itself. The first consul, upon hearing it, would not allow it, and he enjoined the clergy not to yield, promising to support them, and to force the representative of the holy see to renounce such unchristian pretensions. The cardinal had found no other excuse for his condescension, if he instituted those whom he called "intruders," than in a formal recantation of their past errors. But the first consul did not understand it in that point of view. "When I accept for bishop," said he, "the abbé Bernier, the apostle of La Vendée, the pope may be satisfied with Jansenists and oratorians, who have had no other fault than that of abiding by the revolution." He directed them to confine themselves to a simple declaration, which consisted in saying that they adhered to the concordat, and the wishes of the holy see expressed in that treaty. He insisted, with justice, that as the concordat contained the principles upon which the French and Roman churches agreed, no more was to be exacted, without an intention to humiliate one party to the advantage of another, which he declared he would never allow.

On the Saturday night, the eve of Easter, this dispute was not terminated. M. Portalis was then charged to go to the cardinal and announce that the ceremony of the following day should not take place, nor should the concordat be published, but that it should remain without effect, if he continued longer to insist upon the recantation thus demanded. This resolution, furthermore, was serious, and the first consul, in showing himself full of condescension for the church, would not give way upon such points as appeared to compromise the end itself, that is to say, the complete fusion of parties. He knew that it was necessary to be energetic, to be a conciliator, since it is nearly as costly to bring the parties to agree as it is to conquer them.

At last, the cardinal gave way, but not until the night was far advanced. It was agreed that the prelates newly elected from among the constitutional clergy, should go through the *procès informatif* at the cardinal's house, and that they should profess, *viva voce*, their sincere union to the church, and that, as a consequence, a declaration should be made that they and the church were reconciled, without saying how, or on what terms. It is a fact that the demanded recantation was not made.

The next day, being Easter Sunday, the 18th of April, 1802, or 28th Germinal, year x., the concordat was published in all quarters of Paris, with grand parade, and by the principal authorities. While this publication took place in the streets of the capital, the first consul, who wished to solemnize on the same day all that was for the good of France, was exchanging at the Tuileries the ratifications of the treaty of Amiens. This important formality accomplished, he set out for Nôtre Dame, followed by the chief bodies of the state, and a great number of functionaries of every class, a brilliant staff, and a crowd of ladies of the highest rank, who accompanied Madam Bonaparte. A long train of carriages composed this magnificent assemblage. The troops of the first military division, united in Paris, formed a double line from the Tuileries to the cathedral. The archbishop of Paris came in procession to meet the first consul at the door of the church, and presented him with the holy water. The new head of the state was conducted under a daïs, in a place reserved for him. The senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate were arranged on each side of the altar. Behind the first consul were seen standing, the generals in full uniform, more obedient than converted, and some of them affecting a demeanour not very becoming. As to himself, dressed in the red uniform of the consuls, motionless, with a severe expression of countenance, he displayed neither the perplexity of some, nor the devout expression of others. He was calm, grave, in the attitude of the chief of an empire, who was performing a great

act of his will, and commanded by his look submission from every body.

The ceremony was long and dignified, despite the bad humour of those whom it had been deemed necessary to assemble together there. In other respects the effect of it was destined to be decisive, because the example once given by the most imposing of men, the former religious habits would be resumed, and all opposition to them would subside.

There were two motives for this fête, the establishment of worship, and the general peace. The satisfaction was naturally general, and all who had not bad party feelings in their hearts, were happy at the public welfare. On that day there were grand dinners given by the ministers, at which the principal members of the different administrations attended. The representatives of the foreign powers were the guests of the minister for foreign affairs. There was a brilliant banquet at the first consul's, to which were invited cardinal Caprara, the archbishop of Paris, the principal of the new clergy just appointed, and the highest personages of the state. The first consul talked a long while with the cardinal, and testified to him his delight at having achieved so great a work. He was proud of his courage and of his success. One light cloud passed across his noble brow for an instant, and that was when casting a glance at certain of his generals, whose attitude and language had not become the occasion. He expressed his discontent to them, with a firmness of manner which admitted of no reply, and which left little fear of a return of such conduct.

To complete the effect which the first consul had wished to produce on this day, M. de Fontanes gave an account, in the *Moniteur*, of a new book, which at that moment made a great noise;—the "Genius of Christianity." This book, written by a young Breton gentleman, M. de Chateaubriand, related to Malesherbes, and long absent from his country, described, with infinite brilliancy, the beauties of Christianity, and extolled the moral and poetical influence of religious practices, which had been exposed, for twenty years, to the bitterest raillery. Criticised severely by Chénier and Ginguené, who charged it with false and extravagant colouring, and praised excessively by the party attached to religious restoration, the "Genius of Christianity," like all remarkable books, very much praised and very much attacked, produced a deep impression, because it expressed a real feeling, general at that moment in French society; this was the singular indefinable regret for that which no longer exists—for that which in possession was disdained or destroyed, and for which, when lost, there is such a melancholy desire. Such is the human heart! That which exists fatigues and oppresses it, and that which has ceased to exist acquires suddenly a powerful charm. The social and religious customs of the old time, odious and ridiculous in 1789, because then they were in all their force, and were also oftentimes oppressive, now that the eighteenth century, changing towards its close into an impetuous torrent, had swept them away in its devastating course, these now returned to the recollection of an agitated generation, and affected its heart, disposed to emotions by fifteen years of tragic scenes. The work of a young writer, strongly tinctured with this profound feeling, acted at the moment on men's minds strongly, and was marked with peculiar favour by the man who then dispensed all the glories. If it did not exhibit the pure taste, the simple and solid faith of the writers of the age of Louis XIV., it painted, as with a charm, the old religious manners that were no more. There is no doubt but the work might be censured as the abuse of a fine imagination; but after Virgil and Horace, there remained in the memory of mankind a place for the ingenious Ovid, and for the brilliant Lucan; and alone, perhaps, among the books of its day, the "Genius of Christianity" will live, strongly linked, as it is, to a memorable era; it will live as an ornament, sculptured upon the marble of a frieze, lives with the edifice that bears it.

In recalling the priests to the altar, and in drawing them out of their obscure retreats where they practised their religion, and often conspired against the government, the first consul had remedied one of the most vexatious disorders of the time, and satisfied one of its greatest moral necessities. But there remained still another disorder of a very sad character, which gave to France the aspect of a country torn up by factions; this was the exile of a considerable number of Frenchmen, living in foreign lands in indigence, sometimes in hatred of their country, and receiving from an enemy's hand the bread that many among them paid for by unworthy acts towards France. Exile is a frightful invention of civil discord; it renders the banished man unhappy; it denaturalizes his heart; it leaves him to an alms doled out by a stranger, and exhibits afar the afflicting picture of the troubles of his native land. Of all the traces of a revolution, this is that which should be the first effaced. Bonaparte considered the recal of the emigrants as the indispensable compliment to a general pacificator. It was an act of reparation of which he was impatient to brave the difficulties, and gather the glory. There already existed for the emigrants a system of recal very incomplete, partial, and irregular, which had all the inconveniences of a general measure, and yet had not its high character, or its eclat of beneficence; this was the system of the evasures, which were accorded to the emigrants best recommended, under the pretence that they had been unduly placed upon the lists. The amnesty in this mode was not always given to the most excusable or the most deserving.

The first consul formed the resolution, therefore, of permitting the return of the emigrants in the mass, with certain exceptions. Serious objections were made against this measure. At first all the constitutions, and principally the consular constitution, stated formally that the emigrants should never be recalled. They said this more particularly on account of the acquirers of national property, who were very suspicious, and regarded the exile of the former possessors of this property as needful for their safety. The first consul considered himself as the firmest supporter of these holders; having always expressed his determination to defend them, the only mortal having the power to do so, he believed himself strong enough in that public confidence with which he had inspired all, to be able to open the doors of France to the emigrants. He, therefore, ordered a resolution to be

prepared, of which the first clause purported to be the new and irrevocable consecration of the sales made by the state to the acquirers of the national property. He then had inserted in the same document a provision, by which all emigrants were recalled in a body, on their submitting to the surveyorship of the high police, and those who should at any time have provoked such an application, submitting to this surveyorship for the whole of their lives. There were still some exceptions to this general recal. The benefit was refused to those who had commanded armies against the republic, to those who had accepted rank in the armies of the enemies of France, to the individuals who had places or titles in the households of the princes of the house of Bourbon, to the generals or representatives of the people who had entered into a compact with the enemy (this related to Pichegru and certain members of the legislative assemblies), and finally, to such archbishops and bishops as had refused the resignations demanded of them by the pope. The number of excluded persons was, therefore, very inconsiderable.

The most difficult question to resolve was that which related to the property of the emigrants which had not yet been sold. If, with all reason, the sales made by the state should be declared irrevocable, it might appear hard not to restore to the emigrants that portion of their property still resting entire in the hands of the government. "I do nothing," said the first consul, "if I restore these emigrants to their country, and do not restore to them their patrimony. I wish to efface the traces of our civil wars, and in filling France with returned emigrants, who will remain in poverty while their property is under the sequestration of the state, I create a class of discontented persons, who will not leave us any rest. And these properties, kept under a state sequestration, who do you think will purchase them in presence of their former owners, now returned home?" The first consul was, therefore, resolved to restore all the unsold domains, except houses or edifices used for the public service.

This resolution, thus drawn up, was submitted to a privy council, composed of the consuls, ministers, a certain number of councillors of state and of senators. It was warmly discussed in this assembly, and seemed to excite considerable jealousies. Still, in the general bent towards reparatory measures, which tended to efface the traces of past troubles, the prestige of the general peace, the positive will of the first consul, all these causes in union led to the adoption of the principle of the recal of the emigrants. But there was care taken to insert in the resolutions the word "amnesty," in order to attach to emigration the character of a criminal act, that a victorious and happy nation was willing to forget. The first consul, wishing to do all things in the most complete way, was repugnant to the employment of the word "amnesty." He said that they ought not to humiliate those whose reconciliation with France they would fain bring about, and to treat them as criminals receiving pardon, would be to humiliate them deeply. He was answered, that emigration had originally been a crime, since it had for its principal object to make war upon France, and that it was needful it should remain condemned by the laws. The warmest contest took place relative to the property of the emigrants. The councillors called upon to deliberate, obstinately refused the restitution of the woods and forests, that the law of the 2nd Nivôse, year IV., had declared inalienable. It was in their opinion, to remit immense riches into the hands of the great emigration, depriving the state of enormous resources, and above all, of forests indispensable for the service of war and of the navy. Notwithstanding all his efforts, the first consul was obliged to give way; and he thus kept, without thinking of it, one of the most powerful means of influence over the ancient French nobility, that which afterwards served to bring them back to him almost wholly: this means was an individual restitution, which at a later period he made of their properties, to those of the emigrants who submitted to his government.

The resolution thus modified, it remained to know how a legal character should be conferred upon it. It was the desire to make it a law, yet it was intended if possible to give it the most elevated character. The idea was suggested of making it a *senatusconsultum*. The resolution affected the constitution itself, and in that sense it appeared more particularly to appertain to the senate. Already that body, by two considerate acts, that which had proscribed the Jacobins, falsely accused of the infernal machine, and that which had interpreted the 38th article of the constitution, and excluded the oppositions in the two legislative assemblies, had acquired a species of power superior to the constitution itself, because it had made extraordinary measures lawful, and new constitutional dispositions, of which the government believed it had need. After having performed these rigorous acts, it could not be otherwise than agreeable to the senate to be charged with an act of national clemency. It was then decreed that the resolution pronouncing the recal of the emigrants, should be first discussed in the council of state, as were the regulations, laws, senatorial consultations, and then be submitted to the senate, to be there deliberated upon as a measure affecting the constitution itself.

The thing was thus performed. The projected amnesty, discussed in the council of state of the 16th of April, or 26th Germinal, two days before the publication of the concordat, was carried ten days afterwards to the senate on the 26th of April, 1802, or 6th of Floréal. It was then adopted without any contest, and with some remarkable reasons.

"Considering," said the senate, "that the proposed measure is commanded by the actual state of things, by justice, by the national interest, and that it is in conformity to the spirit of the constitution:

"Considering that at different epochs, when the laws relating to emigration were enacted, that France, torn by intestine divisions, sustained against nearly the whole of Europe, a war of which history offers no example, and which caused a necessity for rigorous and extraordinary measures:

"That to-day peace being made abroad, it is of importance to cement it at home, by every thing which can rally Frenchmen, tranquillize families, and cause to be forgotten the evils inseparable from a long revolution:

"That nothing is better to consolidate peace at

home than a measure which tempers the severity of the laws, and causes to cease the uncertainty and delay resulting from the forms established for their erasures:

"Considering that this measure can only be an amnesty which grants pardon to the greater number, always more misled than culpable, and that may extend punishment to the principal culprits, by keeping them definitively upon the list of emigrants:

"That this amnesty, prompted by clemency, is, however, granted only upon conditions, just in themselves, tranquillizing for the public safety, and wisely combined with the national interest:

"That particular conditions of the amnesty, by defending from all attack the acts performed by the republic, consecrates anew the guarantee of the sales of the national property, of which the maintenance will be always a particular object of the solicitude of the conservative senate, as it is that of the consuls, the senate adopts the proposed resolution."

This courageous act of clemency was certain to obtain the approbation of every wise man who sincerely desired the end of the civil troubles of France. Thanks to the new guarantees given to the acquirers of national property—thanks to the confidence with which they were inspired by the first consul, this last measure of the government did not cause them too great an inquietude, and it satisfied that honest mass, fortunately the most numerous, of the royalist party, which received with a murmur the benefit conferred upon it. It encountered no inquietude but with the men of the highest class of emigrants, who were living in the saloons of Paris, and there paying in bad language for the benefits they received from the government. According to them, this act was insignificant, incomplete, and unjust, because it made certain distinctions between the persons—because it did not restore the property of the emigrants, sold or unsold alike. The approbation of these idle talkers could be well passed by. Still the first consul was so greedy of glory, that these miserable censures sometimes disturbed the pleasure which he received in the universal assent of France and of Europe.

But his ardour in doing well did not depend on praise or censure, and scarcely had he consummated the grand act which has just been stated, when he began to prepare others of the highest social and political importance. Disembarrassed from the obstacles presented to his fertile activity by the resistance of the tribunate, he was resolved, during this extraordinary session of Germinal and Floréal, to terminate, or at least to advance considerably the re-organization of France. It is right to relate his ideas in this respect.

By the acts of the first consul already known, above all, by the establishment of worship, it was easy to divine what was the ordinary tendency of his mind, and his particular manner of thinking upon questions of social organization. In general he was disposed to oppose the narrow or exaggerated systems of the revolution, or, to speak more correctly, of some revolutionists, because in its first movements the revolution had always been generous and true. It had desired to abolish the irregularities, the caprices, the unjust distinctions, derived from the feudal system, in virtue of which, for example, a Jew, a catholic, a protestant, a noble, a priest, a citizen, a Burgundian, a Provençal, a Breton, had not the same rights, the same duties, did not support the same burdens, nor enjoy the same advantages, in a word, did not live under the same laws. To make them all Frenchmen, whatever was their religion, their birth, or natal province, equal citizens in rights and duties, eligible to every thing according to their individual merit—here was what the revolution intended to do in its first starting, before contradictions had irritated it even to delirium; this is what the first consul wished to do, since that delirium had given place to reason. But that chimerical equality, of which demagogues had been for a moment dreaming, that it was necessary to place all men upon the same level, which scarcely admitted the natural inequalities arising from a difference of mind or talent, this equality he despised, either as a chimera of the spirit of system, or as a revolting sense of envy.

He wished then for a social hierarchy, on the different grades of which all men, without distinction of birth, should place themselves according to their merit, and in the grades of which should remain fixed those whom their ancestors had borne there, but without any obstacle whatever to the new comers, who tend to elevate themselves in their turn.

To this species of social vegetation, arising from nature itself, observed in all countries, and at all times, he intended to afford free play in the institutions that he occupied himself in founding. As with all powerful minds that apply themselves to discover in the sentiment of the masses the real instinct of humanity, and are fond of opposing that sentiment to the narrow views of the spirit of system, he searched in the dispositions manifested under his eyes, by the people itself, for the arguments in support of his opinions.

To those who, in matters of religion, had counselled indifference, he had opposed the popular movement, which had been recently exhibited at the door of a church to force the priests to give the rights of sepulture to an actress. "See," he said to the partizans of indifference, "mark how indifferent the people are! And yourselves!—why have you proclaimed the Supreme Being in the midst of a great revolutionary paroxysm? because at the bottom of the people's hearts there is something, no matter what, that inclines them to have a God."

"In respect to the manner of classing men in society," he said to those who would have no distinction, "wherefore then have you decreed muskets and sabres of honour? Is not this a distinction? an invention ridiculous enough, since men do not carry a musket or sabre of honour on the breast, and in such cases men like what is seen at a distance." The first consul had observed a singular fact, and would voluntarily remark upon it to those with whom he was in the habit of conversing. Since France, the object of the respect and attention of Europe, had become filled with the ministers of all the powers, or with strangers of distinction, who had come as visiters, he was struck with the curiosity with which the populace, and even persons above the populace, followed these foreigners, and were anxious to see their rich uniforms

and brilliant decorations. There was often a crowd assembled in the court of the Tuileries to attend their arrival and departure. "See," he observed, "these futile vanities that strong minds so much disdain; the populace is not of their opinion. It loves those many-coloured cordons as it loves religious pomps. The democratic philosophers call that vanity idolatry, and let it be vanity and idolatry. But that idolatry, that vanity, are weaknesses common to the whole human race, and from one and the other great virtues may be made to spring. With these baubles, so much despised, heroes are made! To the one as to the other of these pretended feeblenesses external signs are necessary; there must be a worship for religious sentiment, and there must be visible distinctions to inspire the noble sentiment of glory."

The first consul determined to create an order which should replace the old honour of arms, which might have the advantage of being given as well to the soldier as to the general, to the learned as well as to the military man, which consisted in decorations alike in form to those worn throughout Europe; and, in addition, useful endowments—useful, above all, to the simple soldier when he should return to his rural home. This was, in his view, another means of putting new France in relation with other countries. Since it was thus that in all Europe services were marked out for public esteem, why not admit the same system in France[1]? "Nations," he said, "should not seek to be singular any more than individuals. The affectation of acting differently from the rest of the world is an affectation reproved by sensible, and, above all, by modest persons. Cordons are in use in every country, let them therefore be used in France," said the first consul, "it will be one measure more established in common with Europe. In France alone they were not given; among our neighbours they are only given to men of birth; I will give them to the men who shall have served best in the army or in the state, or who shall produce the finest works."

A remark particularly struck the first consul, and became with him an object upon which he much meditated; it was, to what extent the men of the revolution had become disunited, without any bond between them, and without a bond of strength against their common enemies. While the old nobles gave the hand to each other—while the Vendéans were, although weakened and subdued, still secretly in coalition—while the clergy, although re-constituted, still formed a powerful corporation, and very equivocal friends of the government—the men who had formed this revolution were divided and even disavowed, it must be said by ungrateful and deceived opinion. Scarcely had the elections gone on alone before there were seen starting up new personages, to whom neither good nor evil could be charged, or, on the other hand, furious revolutionists, the recollection of whom inspired terror. In the eyes of a new generation, which bestowed no thanks for their efforts to those who, from 1789 to 1800, had suffered so greatly to enfranchise France, the best claim was to have done nothing. The first consul was convinced, and with good reason, that if this movement were aided, there would very soon not be one of the actors in the revolution left upon the stage. That there would be seen soon a new class produced, easy to incline towards royalty,—that there would at some moment be a revolutionary reaction, which would cause the reappearance of the men of blood,—that the elections effected under the directory, alternately royalist, after the mode of the club of Clichy, or revolutionist, after the fashion of Babœuf, were a proof of it, and that from convulsions to convulsions all would terminate in the triumph of the Bourbons and of the foreigners, or, in other words, in a complete counter-revolution.

He regarded it, therefore, as indispensable to retard the movement of free institutions, and by so doing to maintain in power the generation that had worked out the revolution, to maintain them in it, with the exception only of certain individuals, stained with blood, and even to secure to these oblivion for their past errors and a subsistence; to found with this generation a tranquil, regular, and brilliant society, of which he should be the head, of which his companions in arms and his civil colleagues should form the higher class, the aristocracy, if people would have it so, but an aristocracy always open to rising merit, in which they and their children should be placed, the men who had rendered the greatest services, and in which would always be found to take their place, men capable of rendering new services. The society thus formed, after the eternal laws of nature, he would wish to see surrounded with every kind of glory, and embellished by the arts, to oppose with advantage to the old order of things, existing as a living device in the recollection of the emigrants, existing as a reality in all Europe; and he hoped to attach to it the emigrants themselves, when time should have corrected them, and the attraction of high employments should tempt them; yet only upon the condition that they should come, not as disdainful protectors, but as useful and submissive servants. What degree of political liberty would he concede to a society thus constituted? He did not know. He thought that the present moment was not much fitted for it, because all the liberty conceded turned into cruel reactions; and he believed that liberty would arrest his own creative genius. In other respects, he then thought little of the matter; and the country, only anxious for the restoration of order, did not allow much time to think of it. He wished then to found this society upon the principles of the French revolution, to give it good civil laws, a powerful government, wealthy finances, and exterior greatness, in other words, every good, save one alone, leaving for

[1] "The emperor observed, that abroad they had the useful effect of appearing to be an approximation to the old manners of Europe, while, at the same time, they served as a toy for amusing the vanities of many individuals at home; 'for,' said he, 'how many really clever men are children more than once in their lives.' The emperor revived decorations of honour, and distributed crosses and ribands; but instead of confining them to particular and exclusive classes, he extended them to society in general, as rewards for every description of talent and public service. By a happy privilege, perhaps peculiar to Napoleon, it happened that the value of these honours was enhanced in proportion to the number distributed. He estimated that he had conferred about twenty-five thousand decorations of the legion of honour; and the desire to obtain the honour, he said, increased, till it became a kind of mania."—*Les Casas' Notes.*

others, at a subsequent period, the care of imparting to it, or of letting it take, as much public liberty as was convenient.

It was according to these notions that he conceived his system of civil and military recompenses, as well as his plan of education.

The arms of honour, devised by the convention, had not succeeded, because they were not adapted to the manners of the time. They had besides attached to them administrative perplexities, on account of the double pay attached to some, and refused to others. The first consul imagined a military order in form, but not destined for the military only. He denominated it the "legion of honour," wishing to impart the idea of a body of men devoted to cherish honour, and to the defence of certain principles. It was to consist of fifteen coherts; each cohort of seven great officers, twenty commanders, thirty officers, and three hundred and fifty legionaries, in all six thousand individuals of all ranks. The oath indicated to what course the members were to devote themselves, when they joined the legion of honour. Each member promised to devote himself to the defence of the republic, the integrity of its territory, the principle of equality, and the inviolability of the national property. It was in consequence a legion which would pledge its honour to make the principles and interests of the revolution triumphant. Decorations and endowments were attached to every grade. The great officers had an income of 5000f.; the commanders, 2000 f.; the officers, 1000 f.; and the simple legionaries, 250 f. An endowment in the national domains sufficed to cover these expenses. Each cohort was to have its seat in the province where its particular possessions were situated. The united cohorts were to be governed by a council, formed of seven members; the three consuls first, and then four of the great officers, of whom the first was designated by the senate, the second by the legislative body, the third by the tribunate, and the fourth by the council of state. The council of the legion of honour, thus composed, was charged with the management of the property of the legion, and with deliberating upon the choice of the members. Lastly, that which aided to complete the institution, and to indicate its spirit, was that civil services of all kinds, such as the administration, government, sciences, letters, and arts, were equally titles to admission with military service. Starting from the existing state of things, it was decided that the military, who had arms of honour, should be members of the legion by right, and be classed in its ranks according to their grade in the army.

This institution numbers now not more than forty years of existence, and it is already as much sanctioned as if it had been ages old; to such a degree has it become, in these forty years, the recompense of heroism, learning, and merit of every kind; so much has it been sought by the great and the princes of Europe, the proudest of their origin. Time, the judge of institutions, has therefore pronounced upon the dignity and the utility of this. Leaving aside the abuses which may have sometimes been made of such a recompense, by the different governments that have succeeded each other, abuses inherent in all recompenses given by man to man, and recognizing what was beautiful, profound, and new to the world which it possessed, an institution which was to place on the breast of the private soldier, of the modest man of letters, the same decoration which figured upon the breast of the heads of armies, of princes, and of kings; let it be acknowledged that this creation of an honorary distinction, was the triumph the most brilliant of equality itself, not of that which equalized in degrading men to a level, but that which equalized in elevating them; let it be acknowledged, finally, that if for the great men of the civil or military orders, it might only be a mere vain gratification, an empty satisfaction, it was for the simple soldier, returned to his native fields, an aid to the comforts of the peasant, at the same time that it was a visible proof of his heroism and good conduct.

After this fine system of recompense, the first consul employed himself, with not less zeal, upon a system of education for the youth of France. Education, at that time, was nearly null, or abandoned to the enemies of the revolution.

The religious corporations, formerly employed in bringing up youth, had disappeared with the ancient order of things. There was some tendency towards their revival, but the first consul had no intention of giving up the new generation to them, as he considered them the secret workmen of his enemies. The institutions by which the convention had sought to replace them, had proved no more than a chimera, which had already almost wholly disappeared. The convention intended to give primary instruction gratuitously to the people, and secondary instruction to the middle classes, in such a way as to make accessible, both one and the other, to every family. It had ended in doing nothing. The communes had given dwellings to the primary instructors, in general the parsonage-houses of the old country curés, but they had given them no salaries, or had done so in assignats. Poverty soon dispersed these unfortunate teachers. The central schools, in which secondary instruction was dispensed, placed in each chief place of the department, were, in a certain sense, academic establishments, in which public courses of lectures took place, at which youth might attend some hours in the day, and return afterwards to their families, or to the boarding-houses established by private speculation. The nature of their studies was conformable to the spirit of the times. Classical studies, considered as an old routine, had been nearly abandoned in them. The natural and exact sciences, and living languages, had taken the place of the ancient tongues. A museum of natural history was attached to each school. Such a mode of instruction had little influence in forming youth; a course that endured but one or two hours in the day, is not the mode to make an impression upon youth. Thus it was left for its mind to be formed by the heads of the boarding-schools, for the most part, at that time, enemies to the new order of things, or greedy speculators, treating youth as an object of trading speculation, not as a sacred deposit of the state or of families. The central schools, besides being placed in the hundred and two departments, one in each chief place were too numerous. There were not scholars enough for so many schools. Thirty-two only had succeeded in attracting auditors, and in becoming

nurseries of instruction. Some distinguished professors had appeared in these, preserving still the spirit of sound learning. But the political vicissitudes, there as well as elsewhere, had made their baneful influence felt. The professors, chosen by the juries of instruction, had succeeded each other as the different parties in power had done, appearing and disappearing in turn, and their profits with them. In fine, these schools, without bond, without unity, without a common direction, presented only scattered fragments, and not a great edifice of public instruction.

The first consul formed his design after the first intention, with the resolution of mind which was so natural to him.

At first, the finances of France did not permit the furnishing every where, without charge, even primary instruction to the people, who, on the other hand, had not leisure to receive its benefits, if the state had possessed money enough to bestow them. It was as much as could be done to provide for the expenses of the new clergy, and this it was possible to do, owing to a particular circumstance of the time, namely, the mass of ecclesiastical pensions, which were paid, in lieu of salaries, to the greater part of the curés. It was impossible to pay a primary institution in each commune. They were, therefore, contented to establish them amidst those populations that were able of themselves to defray their expenses. The commune gave a residence for the master, and a school-room, the scholars paying a sum for their instruction, calculated according to the wants of the teacher. This was all that could be then done.

For the moment the most important was the secondary instruction. The first consul suppressed, in his plan, the central schools, which were no more than public courses of lectures, without uniformity, and without effect upon youth. There were thirty-two central schools, which had succeeded more or less. This was an indication of the lack of instruction in the different parts of France. The first consul projected thirty-two establishments, which he named "Lyceums," a name borrowed of antiquity. There were boarding-schools, where the youth lived, and where it was retained during the principal years of adolescence, subjected to the double influence of a sound literary instruction and of an education, severe, masculine, sufficiently religious, altogether military, and modelled upon the system of civil equality. He wished to re-establish in them the old classical system, which gave the first place to the ancient languages, and only the second to the mathematical and physical sciences, leaving to the special schools the care of completing the education in these last. He was right in that as in the rest. The study of the dead languages is not only a study of words but of things; it is the study of antiquity, with its laws, its manners, arts, and history; so moral and deeply instructive. There is one age in which to learn these things, that of boyhood. Youth and its passions overcome, its exaggerations and false tastes, mature age, with its positive interests, life passes without a moment having been given to the study of a world dead as the languages that open the sources of its knowledge. If a tardy inclination leads us to it again, it is through the medium of faint and insufficient translations that this beautiful antiquity is to be explored. And in a time when these religious ideas are weakened, if the knowledge of antiquity disappear also, there would be formed only a society without a moral tie to the past, informed and occupied only about the present; an ignorant society, debased, and fitted exclusively for the mechanical arts.

The first consul, therefore, wished, that in his scheme, the classical studies should resume their place. The sciences should come afterwards. So much of them was to be taught as is useful in all the professions of life, and as much as was required to pass from the secondary to the special schools. Religious instruction was to be given by the chaplains, military instruction by old officers of the army. All the movements were to be made in the military step to the sound of the drum. This was necessary for a nation destined entirely to handle arms, either in the army or the national guard. Eight professors of ancient languages or the belles lettres, a censor of the studies, a steward charged with the care of the personal chattels, a head-master, styled a *proviseur*, constituted these establishments.

Such were the schools in which the first consul wished to form the French youth; but how was it to be drawn to them. That was the difficulty. The first consul provided for this by one of the means, certain and bold, which he was accustomed to employ when he wished seriously to obtain his end. He devised the establishment of six thousand four hundred gratuitous exhibitions, of which the state should bear the expense, and which at a moderate rate of from 700 to 800 f.[1], would represent a total expense of five or six millions[2], at that time a very considerable sum. This establishment of six thousand four hundred scholars would be sufficient to furnish a fund for the nucleus of the population of the Lyceums. The confidence of families, which it was hoped afterwards to acquire, would, at some after-time, dispense with the state continuing such a sacrifice. The produce of these six thousand exhibitions formed at the same time a resource sufficient for covering the greater part of the expense of the new establishments.

The first consul wished to distribute in the following manner the exhibitions which the government had at its disposition: two thousand four hundred were to be given to the children of such retired soldiers as were most straitened in their circumstances; to those of civil functionaries who had served the public usefully; and to those inhabitants of the provinces recently united to France. The four thousand remaining were destined for the establishments already in existence. There were, in fact, a great number of these established by private speculation. These the first consul deemed it right to suffer to remain; but he bound them to his plan by the most simple and efficacious means. These schools could not, in future, subsist without the authorization of the state; they were to be inspected every year by the agents of the government; they were obliged to send their scholars to the courses at the Lyceums, paying a trifling remuneration. Lastly, the four

[1] From £28 to £32 sterling.
[2] From £200,000 to £250,000.

thousand exhibitions were, after an annual examination, to be distributed among the pupils of the different schools, in proportion to the recognized merit and good order of each school. Thus attached to a general plan, these boarding-schools made, in every sense, a part of it.

Going next to special instruction, the first consul employed himself in completing that organization. The study of jurisprudence had perished with the old judicial establishment; he created six schools of law. The schools of medicine, less neglected, were three in number; he proposed to increase them to six. The polytechnic school existed; it was attached to this organization. There was added to these a school of public services, under the name of the "School of Bridges and Roads;" a school for the mechanical arts, at that time fixed at Compeigne, afterwards at Châlons-sur-Marne, being the first model of the schools of arts and trades at the present day judged to be so useful; lastly, a school of military art, intended to occupy the palace of Fontainbleau.

There still wanted one thing to complete the entire work, namely, a body of learned men, that might supply these schools with instructors, which should embrace them under its surveyorship; in fact, what has since been denominated "the University." But the moment for that had not arrived. It was already doing much to save from shipwreck the establishments for public instruction, and to create, all at once, with actual professors, colleges dependent upon the state, where the youth of all classes, attracted by gratuitous education, should be formed on one common, regular model, conformable to the principles of the French revolution, and to sound literary doctrines. The first consul said to the learned Fourcroy, "This is only a beginning; by and by we will do more and better."

These two important projects were first taken before the council of state, and were warmly discussed in that enlightened body. The first consul, who did not like public discussion, because it agitated those minds which had been too long in a disturbed state, sought, and even provoked it, in the council of state. This was his representative government. There he was familiar and eloquent; there he permitted himself every latitude, and permitted the same to others; and by the collision of his own mind on that of his opponents, there was struck out more brilliant corruscations than can be attained in a large assembly, where the solemnity of the tribune, and the inconveniences of publicity, continually hinder and repress true liberty of thought. This form of discussion would be the best for the elucidation of public affairs, if it did not depend upon an absolute master to confine it to the limits which his own will may dictate. But for an enlightened despotism, when it would be itself enlightened, it is the best of all possible institutions.

The council of state, composed of all the men of the revolution, and of some of those who had more recently sprang up, offered in its entirety the different shades of public opinion very little weakened, because if, on one part, there were Portalis, Rœderer, Regnaud St. Jean d'Angely, and Devaines, representing in it the party inclined to monarchical reaction; Thibaudeau, Berlier, Truguet, Emmery, and Berenger, represented the party staunch to the revolution, so much as even to defend sometimes its very prejudices. But within the council of state, with closed doors, the discussions were sincere, and eminently useful.

The plan of the legion of honour was violently attacked. Here, as in the concordat, the first consul was in advance perhaps of the intelligence of the day. That generation which very quickly afterwards threw itself at the foot of the altars—that soon covered itself with decorations in puerile vanity, resisted at the moment the re-establishment of the altars and the institution of the legion of honour!

It was discovered, even in the council of state, that the institution of the legion of honour would give a wound to equality, that it renewed the destroyed aristocracy, and that it was too avowedly a return to the ancient system. The object elevated and positive, declared in the oath, in other words, the maintenance of the principles of the revolution, only slightly convinced its opponents. They demanded if the obligations contained in the oath were not common to every citizen, if all did not agree to concur in defending the territory, the principles of equality, the national property, and the like; if to particularise this obligation for the one, was not to render it less strict upon the others. They inquired whether this legion had not too exceptional an object, as, for example, that of defending a power to which it was attached by a bond of benefits! Others alleging the constitution, objected that it spoke only of a system of military recompenses. They added, that the institution would be better understood, that it would raise fewer objections, if it had for its object to recompense warlike actions exclusively; that these actions were of a positive character, easily appreciable, and generally recompensed in all countries, so that no fault could be found if it were limited to this clear definable object.

The first consul replied to all these objections with the most forcible arguments. "What is there aristocratic," he said, "in a distinction, merely personal, given only for life, granted to a man who has displayed civil or military merit, and to him alone, not descending to his children! Such a distinction is contrary to aristocracy; because it is the property of aristocratic titles to be transmitted from him who has earned them to one who has never done any thing deserving of them. An order is the most personal, the least aristocratic of institutions. It may be said, 'After this something else will come.' That is possible," continued the first consul, "but let us see what is now given to us: we will judge of the rest by and by. It is demanded what this legion, composed of six thousand individuals, signifies! What are its duties! It is asked whether it has any other duties than those devolving upon the universality of citizens, all equally bound to defend the territory of France, the constitution, and equality! Firstly, to this question it may be answered, that every citizen is bound to defend the common country, and still there is an army upon which this duty is more particularly imposed. Would it then be so very astonishing if in that army there should be a choice corps, from which more devotion to its duties should be expected, more of a disposition to make

the great sacrifice of life? But do you want to know what this legion is to be?" cried the first consul, returning to his favourite idea; "here it is—an attempt at an organization for the men, authors, or partizans of the revolution, who are neither emigrants, Vendéans, nor priests. The *ancien régime*, so battered about by the revolution, is much more entire than it is believed to be. All the emigrants take each other by the hand; the Vendéans are still covertly enrolled; and with the words, legitimate king and religion, there might be assembled in a moment thousands of arms which would be raised to strike, be sure of that, if their fatigue and the strength of the government did not restrain them. The priests form a body, having at the core very little love for us all. It is necessary that on their side the men who have taken a part in the revolution should unite, bind themselves together, form, on their part, a solid body, and cease to depend upon the first accident that might strike one single head. It was but little that was wanting to fling you back into chaos by the explosion of the 3rd of Nivôse, and deliver you without defence to your enemies. For ten years we have made nothing but ruins; it is now necessary to construct an edifice for ourselves, in which we may establish ourselves and live. These six thousand legionaries made up of all the men who effected the revolution, who have defended it after having made it, who wish to continue it in all which is just and reasonable—these six thousand legionaries, military men, civil functionaries and magistrates, endowed with the national property, that is to say with the patrimony of the revolution, will be one of the strongest securities which you can have for the new state of things. Then too, depend upon it, the contest in Europe is not finished; you may be certain that it will recommence. Is it not well to have in our hands so easy a means to sustain and to excite the bravery of our soldiers? In place of that chimerical thousand million of francs, which you would not dare even to promise again, you may, with only three millions of revenue in national property, raise up as many heroes to uphold the revolution as there were found for undertaking it."

Such were the arguments used by the first consul. There were others which he had designed for those who demanded that the new order should be purely military, and only given to the army. "I am not inclined," he replied, "to form an army of pretorians; I will not recompense the military alone. My idea is, that the meritorious of all kinds should be brethren; that the courage of the president of the convention resisting the populace, should rank with that of Kléber mounting to the assault of St. Jean d'Acre. Some speak of the terms of the constitution. People ought not to suffer themselves to be so tied down by words. The constitution wished to say every thing, and has not always been able to do so: it is for you to supply the deficiency. It is right that civil virtues should have their share of reward as well as military ones. Those who oppose this, reason like barbarians; they recommend to us the religion of brute force. Intelligence has its rights before force; force itself is nothing without intelligence. In the heroic times, the general was the strongest and most dexterous man in body; in civilized times, the general is the most intelligent of the brave. When we were at Cairo, the Egyptians could not understand how it was that Kléber, with his imposing person, was not the commander-in-chief. When Murad Bey had closely observed our tactics, he comprehended that it was myself, and not another, who must be the general of an army so conducted. You reason like the Egyptians, when you would confine recompenses to military valour. The soldiers," added the first consul, "reason better than you. Go to their bivouacs; listen to them. Do you think that among their officers he who is largest and most imposing in stature, inspires them with the highest consideration? No, it is the bravest. Do you believe that it is even the bravest that is precisely the first man in their minds? No doubt they would despise him of whose courage they were suspicious; but they would place above the bravest him whom they believed most intelligent. Then as to myself, do you suppose that it is only because I am reputed an able general, that I command in France? No, it is because they attribute to me the qualities of a statesman and a magistrate. France will not tolerate a government of the sabre; those who believe it strangely deceive themselves. There must be fifty years of subjection before it would come to that. France is a country too noble, too intelligent, to submit merely to a material power, and to inaugurate with her the worship of brute force. Honour, in a word, then, intelligence, virtue, the civil qualities, in all the professions; recompense them equally in all."

These reasons, stated with warmth and energy, and coming from the greatest soldier of modern days, enchained and charmed the entire council of state. They were, it must be owned, sincere and interested at the same time. The first consul was desirous that it should be well understood, above all, by the military, that it was not as a general only, but as a man of genius and intellect that he was the ruler of France.

As it was not possible to make him renounce his project, he was exhorted to adjourn it, by telling him that it was too soon; that having advanced perhaps before the public intelligence in regard to the concordat, it would be needful to stop a moment, and give to opinion some short respite. He would listen to none of these counsels. His nature was ever, in all things, to be impatient of results.

His project relative to a system of public education, encountered also serious objections in the council of state. The party that was for monarchial reaction was not far from the desire of seeing religious corporations again established. The opposite party supported the central schools, and rather desired the amelioration than the abrogation of the system. This last party also discovered some distrust on the subject of the six thousand four hundred exhibitions left to the disposal of the government.

"The ancient corporations do not belong to these days," said the first consul; "besides, they are enemies. The clergy accommodate themselves to the actual government, they prefer it to the convention or the directory, but they would much more prefer the Bourbons. As to the central schools, they no longer exist; they are a cipher. A vast system of public education must be created

and organized in France. Some may imagine that it was for the sake of influence these exhibitions were created. This is to view the matter in a very narrow way. The actual government has more influence than it desires; there is nothing, in fact, which it cannot do at this moment, especially if it proposes to act against the revolution—to destroy what that created, and to re-establish that which it destroyed. This is called for on all sides. It is attacked by confidential writings of all kinds, in which each proposes the restoration of some part of the old system. It is needful to beware of yielding to such an impulse. Here six thousand exhibitions are necessary to organize a new society and to imbue it with the spirit of the age. In the first place it is needful to provide for the military and their children, for to them we owe every thing. They have not yet touched the thousand millions promised them. The least that can be done for them is to secure them the necessaries of life. The exhibitions are an indispensable supplement to the smallness of their pay. The civil functionaries deserve, in their turn, to be rewarded and encouraged, when they shall have served well and faithfully. They are, besides, as poor as the military. Both will give us their children to educate, and fashion under the new system. The five thousand exhibitions which we take in the boarding-schools, will be a nursery of subjects, which we shall secure for the same end. We are bound to form a new society, upon the principles of civil equality, in which every one finds his place, neither presenting the injustice of the feudal system, nor the confusion of anarchy. It is urgent to lay the foundation of this society, because no such thing exists. In order to found it, materials are necessary; the sole good ones are the young. We must consent to take them; and if we do not draw them to us by the attraction of gratuitous education, the parents will not give them to us of their own accord. We are all suspected as authors, accomplices, or defenders of the revolution; so much do people change—so much are they fallen away from the illusions of 1789. We shall not easily get the children of good families unless we take the measures to attract them. If we form lyceums without exhibitions, they will be yet more deserted than the central schools—a hundred times more, for parents can send their children without fear to a public course, in which Latin and mathematics are taught; but they would not be sent, without reluctance, to boarding-schools, in which the supreme authority wholly governed. There is but one way of attracting them, and that is by exhibitions; and then the inhabitants of the departments recently united to France will become French also. To accomplish this end, there is again only one way, and that is to take their children, even something against their will, and to place them with the sons of your officers, of your functionaries, and of your families in narrow circumstances, that the advantage of a gratuitous education shall have disposed to a confidence which they have not naturally. Then these children will learn the French language; and they will imbibe the French spirit. We shall thus mingle together the French of the former time with those of to-day: the French of the centre, the borders of the Rhine, the Escaut and the Po."

These sound reasons, repeated at more than one sitting, and under a thousand different forms, of which this repetition is only the substance, obtained the acceptance of the projected law. M. Fourcroy was commissioned to carry it to the legislative body, and to support it in the discussion.

This project and that of the legion of honour, were presented to the legislative body at nearly the same time, because the first consul would not suffer this short session to pass over without having laid the principal basis of his vast edifice. The law of public instruction did not meet any great obstacle, and supported by M. Fourcroy, who, after the first consul, was half its author, it was adopted by a considerable majority. In the tribunate it obtained eighty white balls to nine black; in the legislative body, two hundred and fifty-one against twenty-seven. But it was not thus with the law relative to the legion of honour. This encountered in the two assemblies a resistance equally warm. Lucien Bonaparte was nominated reporter; and by the warmth with which he urged its defence, it was but too evident that it was a family idea. The institution was strongly attacked in the tribunate by M. Savoie-Rollin and M. de Chauvelin, the last making a species of pretension to defend the principle of equality, in spite of the name which he bore. Lucien, who had the gift of public speaking, but who had not sufficiently practised it, answered with too little temper and moderation, which much contributed to dispose the tribune unfavourably. Notwithstanding the purgation to which the body had been submitted, the project obtained only fifty-six white balls to thirty-eight black. In the legislative body, the discussion, although entirely leaning one way, since the tribunate, having adopted the proposition of the government, had sent only orators to support it, was not successful in gaining over many minds. There were there only a hundred and sixty-six favourable votes to one hundred and ten against it. The project of law was then adopted; but it was rare that the majority had been so weak and the minority so strong, even before the opposition members were expelled. This arose from the shock which had been given to the feeling of equality, which was the only one that survived, and was still uppermost in the hearts of the men of that time[1]. This sentiment was

[1] The following remarks are stated by Mignet to be taken from Thibaudeau's unpublished memoirs, and exhibit the ideas of Bonaparte upon this measure. Thibaudeau was a councillor of state.

"In discussing this project of law in the council of state, he fearlessly made known his aristocratic intentions. Berlier, a councillor of state, having disapproved of an institution so contrary to the spirit of the republic, said that 'distinctions were the baubles of monarchy.' 'I defy you,' rejoined the first consul, 'to show me a republic, ancient or modern, in which there were no distinctions. You spoke of baubles. Well, it is by baubles that we delude mankind. I should not say this to a tribune, but in a council of sages and statesmen we ought to say every thing. I do not believe that the French people love liberty and equality. The French are not changed by ten years of revolution; they have only one sentiment—honour. We must, therefore, give aliment to this sentiment; we must create distinctions. Do you see how the people prostrate themselves before the ribbons and stars of the foreigners? they have been surprised by it; neither do they fail to wear them. We have destroyed every thing; we must now rebuild. We have a government,

assumed erroneously, there can be no doubt, because there can be nothing less aristocratic than an institution which has for its object to decree to the soldiers and to the learned a distinction purely for life, and the same that was to be borne by generals and princes. But every feeling which is too lively is susceptible and distrustful. The first consul proceeded too rapidly, and he admitted this. "We ought to have waited," he said; "that is true. But we were right; and when we are right we ought to be able to venture something. Besides, the project was badly supported, and the best arguments were not well urged home. If they had known how to urge them with truth and vigour, the opposition would have yielded."

The end of this session, so abundant in business, approached, and still the treaty of Amiens had not been laid before the legislative body to be converted into a law. This great act had been reserved for the last. It was intended to be, in a degree, the crowning measure of the first consul's labours and of the deliberations of this extraordinary session; and, more, it was deemed a fitting occasion for exhibiting the gratitude of the public towards the author of the blessings which were then enjoyed by the nation.

For some time, in fact, people had been asking if there should not be given to the man who, in two years and a half, had drawn France out of a chaos, and had reconciled her with Europe, the church, and herself, having already organized her, some great testimony of the national gratitude. This sentiment of gratitude was as universal as it was well-merited. It was easy to make this feeling subservient to the latent desires of the first consul, which were bent towards the obtainment, in perpetuity, of that power which had been entrusted to him for ten years only. The minds of most people too were already made up upon the subject, and except a small number of Jacobins and royalists, no one wished to see the supreme power lodged in any other hands than those of general Bonaparte. The indefinite continuation of his authority was regarded as a simple and most inevitable thing. To convert this notorious disposition of the popular mind into a legal act was, therefore, an easy matter; and if, eighteen months before, when the famous "parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and general Bonaparte," too early provoked the discussion of this question, which then encountered considerable opposition, this was now no longer the case. It required now that only the word should be suddenly spoken, offering to the first consul a real sovereignty, under whatever title might be chosen. It was sufficient to choose any fitting occasion, and to announce such a proposition, that it should be immediately welcomed for adoption.

The moment when many memorable acts succeeded each other so rapidly, was that, in reality, which the first consul, in his calculations, and his friends, in their interested impatience, and minds gifted with foresight, in their considerations, had designated, and that the public, sincere and plain in its sentiments, was ready to accept for a grand manifestation. General Bonaparte wished for the supreme power, which was natural and excusable. In doing good he had followed the bent of his genius, and in so doing he had hoped for his reward. There was nothing blameable or culpable in such a desire; besides the conviction of the truth that in fully achieving this good, an all-powerful chief would be required for a long while to come. In a country which could not dispense with a strong and creative authority, it was perfectly lawful to aspire to the supreme power, when a man was the greatest of his age, and one of the greatest men of all ages. Washington, in the midst of a democratic republican society, exclusively commercial, and for a long while pacific—Washington was just in exhibiting little ambition. In a society, republican by accident, monarchical by nature, surrounded by enemies, military in consequence, and not able to govern or to defend itself, without unity of action, Bonaparte had right upon his side in aspiring to the supreme power, no matter under what title. He was in error, not in taking the dictatorship, then necessary, but in not having always employed it when he did take it, as in the first years of his career.

General Bonaparte concealed in the profoundest depths of his heart those desires which all the world, even the simplest of the people, plainly perceived. If he mentioned his wishes to his brothers, it was as much as he ever did. He never said that the title of first consul for ten years had ceased to satisfy him. Without doubt, when the question presented itself under a theoretic form, when the necessity of a strong authority was spoken of in a general way, he came out, and spoke his thoughts fully upon the matter; but he never concluded by asking for a prolongation of his own power. At the same time dissimulating and confiding, he communicated certain things to one, certain things to others, and concealed something from all. To his colleagues, above all to Cambacérès, of whose great prudence he had a high opinion; to Talleyrand and Fouché, to whom he conceded a great share of influence, he spoke out fully of all that concerned public affairs, much more than to his brothers, to whom he was far from entrusting the secrets of state. Of those things which personally concerned himself, he said little to his colleagues or to his ministers, but much to his brothers. Still he did not discover to them the secret ambition of his heart; but it was so easy to guess, and his family were so anxious to bring it about successfully, that they spared him the trouble to be the first to declare it. They spoke to him of it continually, and left him in the more commodious position of having rather to temper than to excite a zeal for his aggrandizement. They asserted to him, therefore, that the moment was come to constitute in his behalf something better than an

we have powers; but the rest of the nation, what is it?—grains of sand. We have in the midst of us ancient privileges, organized from principles and interests, and which well know what they want. I can reckon our enemies; but as for us, we are scattered without system, without union, without contact. So long as I live I can answer for the welfare of the republic; but we must provide for the future. Do you believe the republic is finally settled? you would find yourselves greatly mistaken. We are able to do it; but we have not, nor shall we, if we do not throw upon the soil of France some masses of granite.' Bonaparte announced in these declarations a system of government directly opposite to that which the revolution proposed to establish, and which the new state of society demanded."—*Mignet's History.*

ephemeral and fleeting power; that he ought to think of attaching to himself a solid and durable authority. Joseph, with the peaceable mildness of his character, and Lucien, with his natural petulance, tended openly to the same object. They had for confidants and co-operators the men with whom they lived in intimacy, who, whether in the council of state, or in the senate, partook their sentiments, from conviction, or from the desire to please. Regnaud, Laplace, Talleyrand, and Roederer, the last always most ardent in the cause, were firmly of opinion that monarchy must be restored as soon and as completely as was possible. Talleyrand, the calmest, and not the least active among them, was strongly attached to a monarchy, as elegant and brilliant as it had been in the palace of Versailles, but without the Bourbons, with whom he believed it to be then incompatible. He repeated incessantly, with an authority which could belong to no one but him, that to negotiate with Europe it would be much easier to treat in the name of a monarchy than in that of a republic; that the Bourbons were, for kings, just like unaccommodating and disesteemed guests; that general Bonaparte, with his glory, his power, his courage in repressing anarchy, was the most desirable for them, and the most expected of all sovereigns; that as to himself, minister for foreign affairs, he affirmed, that to add, no matter how, to the existing authority of the first consul, was to conciliate Europe in place of offending her. Those intimate confidants of the Bonaparte family had much debated among themselves the question of the moment. Still, to leap at one spring into an hereditary sovereignty, whether to royalty or to an empire, would be too great a temerity. It would, perhaps, be better to reach it by passing through several intermediate stages. But without changing the title of first consul, which was much more convenient, it would be possible to give him an equivalent for the royal power, and even an equivalent for the hereditary succession: this was the consulate for life, with the power to designate his successor. In making a few modifications in the constitution,—modifications easy to obtain of the senate, which had become a sort of constituting power, it was possible to create a true sovereignty under a republican name. There would even be given to him the faculty of appointing a successor, the only advantage of an hereditary succession actually desirable; because the first consul not having children, and having only brothers and nephews, it would be better to confide the right of choice to those among them whom he should judge most worthy of succeeding to the power.

This idea appearing the wisest and the most prudent, seemed to be that adopted by consent in the Bonaparte family as preferable. This family was at the moment in a state of singular agitation. The brothers of the first consul, who had on their foreheads a ray of his glory, but which they did not deem sufficient, desired to see him become a real monarch, in order that they might be princes by right of blood. They were restless, complaining that they were nothing; that they had aided in the elevation of their brother, and had no rank in the state in proportion to their merits and services. Joseph, more peaceable in character, satisfied besides with the character of ordinary negotiator of peace, wealthy, and held in consideration, was less impatient. Lucien, who gave himself out for a republican, was still of all the brothers he who showed himself that he most desired to see the sovereign power of his brother elevated upon the ruins of the republic. Very recently he had refused to dine with Madam Bonaparte, saying that he would go when there should be a place there marked out for the brothers of the first consul. In the bosom of that family, Madam Bonaparte, the more worthy of interest, since she felt none of those ambitious longings, and had her apprehensions of them, she, on the contrary, was, according to her usual custom, more afraid than satisfied at the changes which were in preparation. She feared, as has been already observed, that her husband would be urged to ascend too soon the steps of the throne where she had beheld the Bourbons sit, and upon which it seemed incredible to her that any other person should be seated. She feared that his inconsiderate relatives, anxious to partake the grandeur of their brother, would imprudently hasten on his elevation, and by making him ascend too fast, precipitate her, him, and themselves, all, in fact, together into an abyss. In a certain degree relieved by the tenderness of her husband from the apprehension of a speedy divorce, she was haunted at the moment by one image alone, that of a new Cæsar, struck by the blow of a dagger at the moment when he attempted to place the diadem upon his brow.

Madam Bonaparte honestly avowed her fears to her husband, who made her hold her tongue by imposing silence sharply upon her. Repulsed here, she addressed herself to those who had some influence over him, supplicating them to combat the counsels of his ill-advised and ambitious brothers, and thus she gave to her dislikes and apprehensions a vexatious notoriety, which was displeasing to the first consul.

Among the personages admitted to the interior of the family, the minister Fouché entered more than any other into the views of Madam Bonaparte. Not that he had more pride of feeling than the other men by whom Bonaparte was surrounded, or that he was the only one among them all who was careless about pleasing his inevitable master, it was not that; but he was endowed with great good sense, and observed with apprehension the impatience of the Bonaparte family. He heard nearer than any other person the sullen, stifled cries of the vanquished republicans, few in number, but indignant at such a prompt usurpation; even he himself, amid the agitation of the hour, felt some emotions on account of what was about to be undertaken. Although he did not desire to lose the confidence of the first consul, which he was more than ever desirous of retaining, since the first consul was more than ever to become the arbiter of all destinies, he still permitted others to guess a part of what he thought. Intimate as a friend with Madam Bonaparte, he had listened to her expression of the apprehensions with which she was assailed and fearful of the resentment of her husband, had endeavoured to tranquillize them. "Madam," he said, "remain calm and quiet. You cross your husband to no purpose. He will be consul for life, king, or emperor, all that is

very possible to occur. Your fears annoy him; my counsels would wound his feelings. Let us remain in our places, and leave those events to their accomplishment, which neither you nor I can prevent."

The winding up of this agitated scene approached, in proportion as the term arrived of the extraordinary session of the year X., and the leaders of the party for the measure were heard repeating oftener and louder, that it was necessary to give stability to power, and a testimony of acknowledgment to the benefactor of France and of the world. Still they would not have been able to bring about the last act in a safe and natural manner, without the aid of one man in particular, and that man was the consul Cambacérès. His occult but real influence and able management of the mind of the first consul has been already alluded to. His power over the senate was equally great. That body had a real deference for the old lawyer, become the confidant of the new Cæsar. Sieyès, creator in some respect of the senate, had at first enjoyed there a certain ascendancy. But soon his evident intention of turning that body into an opposition having been detected and foiled, Sieyès was no more than he had always been, that is to say, a superior mind, chagrined, impotent, reduced at last to the part of finding fault with every thing at his seat of Crosne—the vulgar price of his great services. Cambacérès, on the contrary, had become the secret director of the senate. In the actual conjuncture, Bonaparte was not able to proclaim himself consul for life or emperor, having need in consequence of somebody that should take the initiative —this was evidently the senate, and in the senate, the person who directed it was evidently the man of the greatest importance.

Cambacérès, although devoted to the first consul, could not see with any great degree of pleasure the change which tended to place him at yet a greater distance from his illustrious colleague. Still knowing well that things could not remain as they were, that it would be trouble lost to throw an obstacle in the way of general Bonaparte, and that besides, within their actual limits, these desires were legitimate, Cambacérès determined to interfere spontaneously in order to cause all this internal agitation to terminate in a rational result, and to impart to the government a stable form, which ought to satisfy the ambition of the first consul without effacing too much the republican forms, which were still cherished in many hearts.

While those who surrounded the first consul were in lively conversation upon this subject, he himself listening, and even affecting to keep silence, Cambacérès put an end to the state of constraint, by speaking the first to his colleague upon the subject of what was passing. He did not dissimulate to him the danger of precipitation in an affair of such a nature, and the advantage there would be in preserving a modest and republican form altogether, to a power as real and as great even as his own. Nevertheless in offering him, in his own name and in the name of the third consul Lebrun, a devotedness without reserve, he declared to him that they were ready, both one and the other, to do whatever he wished, and to spare him the intervention of his own person in the matter, particularly under circumstances in which he ought to appear to receive and not to take the title himself, which it was in contemplation to give him. The first consul expressed his gratitude for such an overture and at such a moment; he conceded the danger that there would be in going too fast, and doing too much; he declared that he had formed no particular desire, being content with his existing position; that he had not pushed forward any change, and should take no steps to quit it; that still the constitution of the supreme power of the state was in his view precarious, and did not present a character sufficiently solid and enduring; that in his opinion there were several changes which ought to be effected in the form of the government, but that he was too directly interested in the question to mix himself up in it; that he would, therefore, wait, and not take any initiative.

Cambacérès answered the first consul, that without doubt his personal dignity demanded much reserve, and interdicted him from ostensibly taking the initiative, but that if he would fully and clearly explain himself to his two colleagues, and make them clearly acquainted with his innermost thoughts, they would spare him, when once his intentions were clearly understood by them, the trouble of manifesting them, and would go to work without delay. Whether he felt a certain degree of embarrassment which prevented his saying what he desired, or whether he desired more than was then destined for him, perhaps the sovereignty, the first consul covered himself with a new veil, and was contented to repeat that he had no fixed idea on the matter, but that he should see with pleasure his two colleagues watch over the movement of the public mind, and even direct it, in order to prevent those imprudent actions which might be committed by unskilful friends.

The first consul would never avow his thoughts upon the matter even to his colleague Cambacérès. To the natural restraint he felt in such a matter, he added an illusion. He thought that without any interference upon his own part, the people would come and lay a crown at his feet. This was an error. The public, tranquil, happy, and grateful, was disposed to sanction whatever might be done by the government; but having in a certain sense abdicated every participation in the affairs of the state, it was not forward to mix itself up with them even to testify the gratitude of which it was full. The bodies of the state, save with the exception of the interested leaders, were taken all at once with a sort of modesty, at the idea of coming in the face of heaven, to abjure the republican forms, which they had again recently sworn to maintain. Many individuals, little versed in political secrets, went so far as to believe that the first consul, satisfied with the omnipotence which he possessed, above all, since he had disencumbered himself of the opposition of the tribunate, had contented himself with the power to do all that he pleased, and to assume to himself the easy glory of a new Washington, with much more genius and glory than he of America. Thus when the managers and leaders in the matter asserted that nothing had been done for the first consul, who had done every thing for France, certain simple-minded persons answered in this innocent way: "What would you have us do for him? What would you have us offer him? What recompense

would be proportioned to the services which he has rendered to us! His true recompense is his glory."

Cambacérès was too wise to revenge himself for the dissimulation of the first consul, by leaving things in a stagnant state. He felt it necessary to finish the matter, and determined to set about the task immediately. In his opinion, and in that of many enlightened men, a prolongation of power for ten years granted to the first consul, which with seven years of the first term yet remaining, would carry up to seventeen years the duration of his consulship, was fully sufficient. This would, in fact, whether in France or in Europe, be crossing the enemies who had calculated on the existing legal term of his power. But M. Cambacérès well knew that this would not content the first consul, that something more must be offered him, and that with the consulship for life must be accompanied the right of naming his successor; all the advantages of an hereditary monarchy would be thus attained without the inconvenience of a change of title, and without the displeasure that this change would cause to many persons of good intentions and honest feelings. He, therefore, stopped at this idea, and endeavoured to propagate it in the senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate. But if there were members ready to vote any thing, there were others that hesitated, and would go no further than a prolongation for ten years.

The first consul had deferred until now, with the full intention of so doing, the presentation of the treaty of Amiens to the legislative body, to be converted into a law. Cambacérès, comprehending that this was the circumstance to use for drawing out a species of general approval of the proposed changes, disposed every thing in order to bring about such a result. The 6th of May, or 16th of Floréal, had been chosen to carry up to the legislative body the treaty which completed the general peace. The president of the tribunate, who was M. Chabot de l'Allier, was one of the friends of the consul Cambacérès. This last sent for him, and arranged with him the steps to be taken. It was settled between them, that when the treaty should be carried from the legislative body to the tribunate, M. Simeon should propose a deputation to the first consul, in order to testify the satisfaction of the assembly; that then the president, M. Chabot de l'Allier, should quit the chair, and should propose the following vote:—

"The senate is invited to give to the consuls a testimony of the national gratitude.'

Things being disposed in this manner, the project of law was carried on the 6th of May, or 16th of Floréal, by three councillors of the legislative body. These councillors were M. Rœderer, admiral Bruix, and M. Berlier. In the ordinary course of things, the projects were communicated purely and simply by the legislative body to the tribunate; this time, seeing the importance of the subject, the government determined to communicate directly to the tribunate the treaty submitted to the legislative deliberations. Three councillors of state, Regnier, Thibaudeau, and Bigot Préameneu, were charged with this duty. Scarcely had they finished making the communication, when the tribune Simeon asked leave to speak. "Since the government," said he, "has communicated to us, in a manner so solemn, the treaty of peace concluded with Great Britain, it is our duty to answer this proceeding by one of a similar nature. I propose that a deputation be addressed to the government, to congratulate it upon the re-establishment of the general peace." This proposition was immediately adopted. The president, M. Chabot de l'Allier, having given up the chair, and been replaced by M. Stanislaus de Girardin, and placing himself in the tribune, spoke as follows:—

"Among all nations public honours have been decreed to those men who, by their brilliant actions, have honoured their country and saved it from great dangers.

"What man has ever had a greater right than general Bonaparte to the national gratitude!

"What man, whether at the head of armies, or at the head of the government, honours his country more, or has rendered it more signal services!

"His valour and his genius have saved the French people from the excesses of anarchy and the evils of war. The French people are too great, too magnanimous, to suffer such benefits to remain without some grand recompense.

"Tribunes! be you its organs. It is to us, above all others, that it belongs to take the lead, when the object is to express, under circumstances so memorable, the sentiments and will of the French people."

At the conclusion of his speech, M. Chabot de l'Allier proposed to the tribunate the vote of some great manifestation of the national gratitude towards the first consul. He proposed, besides, to communicate this wish to the senate, the legislative body, and to the government. The proposition was unanimously adopted.

This deliberation was soon known in the senate, and that body decided immediately upon forming a special commission, in order to present its own ideas respecting the testimony of national gratitude which it would be suitable to give to the first consul.

The deputation which Simeon, the tribune, had proposed to send to the government, was received on the day following, the 7th of May, or 17th Floréal, at the Tuileries. The first consul was surrounded with his colleagues, a great number of high functionaries and generals. His attitude was modest and serious. M. Simeon spoke: he celebrated the great exploits of general Bonaparte; the marvellous things effected by his government, more great than those achieved by his sword. He attributed to him the victories of the republic, the peace which followed them, the re-establishment of order, the return of prosperity; and terminated at length with the following words: "I must break off in haste. I fear I shall appear to praise, when I only endeavour to be just, and to express in a few words a profound feeling, that ingratitude could alone have stifled. We expect the first body in the nation to become the interpreter of the general sentiment, the expression of which it is only permitted to the tribunate to desire and to vote."

The first consul, after having thanked the tribune Simeon for the sentiments which he had just testified in his behalf; after having said that he saw in it only the result of the more intimate communications established between the government

and the tribunate,—making thus a direct allusion to the changes operated in that body,—the first consul finished in these noble words :—

"As for me, I receive with the deepest gratitude the wish expressed by the tribunate. I desire no other glory than that of having fulfilled to the fullest extent the task imposed upon me. I have no ambition for any other recompense than the affection of my fellow-citizens ; happy if they are well convinced that the evils which they may encounter will always be to me the most serious of misfortunes ; that life is dear to me only for the services that it may enable me to render to my country; that death itself has no bitterness for me, if my last glances will but enable me to see the happiness of the republic as well assured as its glory."

It now only remained to fix upon the testimony of national gratitude to be given to general Bonaparte. No one was deceived about its nature ; every body well knew that it was by an extension of power that the illustrious general must be paid for the immense benefits which had been received. Some simple-minded persons imagined when voting that the public testimony in contemplation was a statue or monument. But those simple people were few in number. The mass of the tribune and senators perfectly well knew how it was to express its gratitude. During that day and the day following, the Tuileries and the hôtel of Cambacérès, who resided out of the palace, were thronged with people. The senators came in great numbers, eager to know how they should act. Their zeal was very warm ; it was only necessary to speak the word, and they were ready to decree whatever was desired. One of them even went so far as to say to the consul Cambacérès, "What does the general wish ? Does he wish to be king ? Only let him say as much ; I and my colleagues of the constituent body are quite ready to vote the re-establishment of royalty, and more willingly too for him than for others, because he is more worthy the honour." Curious to know the real sentiments of the first consul, the senators approached as near to him as they were able, and tried in a hundred ways, to have at least one word from his mouth, however trifling and insignificant. But he constantly refused to reveal his wishes, even to the senator Laplace, who was one of his particular friends, and who for that reason was charged to fathom his secret wishes. He uniformly answered, that whatever they did he should receive with gratitude, and that he had not fixed his mind upon any thing. Some wished to know if a prolongation of ten years of his consulship would be agreeable. He replied with affected humility, that any testimony of the public confidence, that or any other, would be sufficient for him, and satisfy his wishes. The senators learning little from these communications of the first consul, returned to the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, to get information as to the conduct which they had to pursue. "Name the consul for life," they replied, "that is the best step you can take." "But it is said he does not desire it," replied the more simple of the enquirers, "and that a prolongation for ten years will satisfy him—why go beyond his own wishes ?"

Lebrun and Cambacérès had difficulty to persuade them. The consuls apprized Bonaparte of it. "You are wrong," they said, "not to explain yourself. Your enemies, for you have enemies left in spite of your services, even in the senate, will abuse your reserve." The first consul neither appeared surprised nor flattered by the officiousness of the senators. "Let them alone," he replied to Cambacérès; "the majority of the senate is always ready to do more than is demanded of them. They will go further than you would believe."

Cambacérès replied that he was mistaken. But it was impossible to overcome this obstinate dissembling, and as will be seen, the consequences were singular. Despite the advice of Cambacérès and Lebrun, many good people who deemed it more convenient to give less than more, believed that the first consul thought a prolongation of the consulship for ten years a sufficient testimony of the public confidence, and a grand consolidation of his power considerable enough. The party of Sieyès, always spiteful, awoke up on this occasion, and acted secretly. The senators who were secretly allied to his party, circumvented their uncertain colleagues, and affirmed that the idea of the first consul was well known, and that he was contented with a prolongation of ten years, which he preferred to any thing else, that every body knew besides that it was better in itself ; that by this combination, the public power was consolidated, the republic maintained, and the dignity of the nation preserved. As in the affair of the elections of the senate, the gallant Lefebvre was one of those who listened to these persuasions, and who believed that in voting for a ten years' prolongation, they were doing that which general Bonaparte wished. They had been forty-eight hours deliberating, and it was necessary to conclude the matter. The senator Languinais, with all the courage of which he had given so many proofs, attacked that which he styled the flagrant usurpation with which the republic was threatened. His speech was heard with pain, and considered as somewhat superfluous. More able enemies had proposed a better manœuvre. They had gained a majority in favour of the plan for prolonging the powers of the first consul for ten years. This resolution was in fact adopted on the 8th of May, or 18th Floréal, towards the evening of the day. Lefebvre ran one of the first to the Tuileries, to announce what had taken place, believing that he brought the most agreeable of intelligence. It soon arrived from all quarters, and caused a surprise as unforeseen as it was painful.

The first consul, surrounded by his brothers Joseph and Lucien, learned this result with great displeasure. At the first moments he thought of nothing less than of refusing the proposition of the senate. He sent for his colleague Cambacérès immediately. He came to him forthwith. Too discreet and prudent to triumph at his own foresight and the fault of the first consul, he said that what had occurred was without doubt very vexatious, but it was easy to remedy ; that before all things it was necessary not to exhibit any ill humour; that in twice twenty-four hours all might be altered, but that it was necessary in order to do that to give the affair an entire new face, and that he would take the matter upon himself. "The senate offers you a prolongation of power," said M.

Cambacérès; "answer that you are most grateful for the proposition, but that it is not from the senate, but from the suffrages of the nation alone that you should hold your authority; that it is from the nation alone that you should receive the prolongation; and that you wish to consult the nation by the same means which were employed for the adoption of the consular constitution, or in other words by registers opened all over France. We will then have drawn up by the council of state, the formula which shall be submitted to the national sanction. By thus making it an act of deference to the popular sovereignty, we shall obtain the substitution of one plan for another. We will propose the question, not so as to know if general Bonaparte ought to receive a prolongation for ten years of the consular power, but if he ought to receive the consulate for life. If the first consul were to do such a thing himself," continued M. Cambacérès, "decorum would be wounded. But I, who am the second consul, and wholly disinterested in the matter, am able to give the impulse. Let the general set out in a public manner for Malmaison; I will remain alone in Paris; I will convoke the council of state, and by the council of state it is that I will have the new proposition drawn up, which shall afterwards be submitted for the national acceptance."

This able expedient was adopted with great satisfaction by general Bonaparte, and by his brothers. Cambacérès was heartily thanked for his ingenious combination, and the entire affair abandoned to him. It was agreed that the first consul should set out on the following day, after having himself agreed with Cambacérès upon the draft of the answer to be made to the senate.

The draft was made the next morning, being the 9th of May, or 19th Floréal, by Cambacérès and the first consul, and addressed immediately to the senate, in reply to its message.

"Senators," said the first consul, "the honourable proof of esteem delivered in your deliberation of the 18th, will remain for ever engraven in my heart.

"In the three years which have just terminated, fortune has smiled upon the republic: but fortune is inconstant; and how many men whom she has loaded with her favours have lived a few years too long!

"The interest of my glory, as well as that of my happiness, seems to have marked the term of my public life at the moment when the peace of the world is proclaimed.

"But the glory and happiness of the citizen ought to be silent, when the interest of the state and the public kindness demand him.

"You judge that I owe to the people a new sacrifice; I will make it, if the will of the people command what your suffrages authorize."

The first consul, without an explanation, indicated clearly enough that he did not exactly accept such a resolution of the senate. He set out for Malmaison immediately, leaving to his colleague Cambacérès to terminate the great business conformably to his wishes. Cambacérès summoned those of the council of state who were the most habituated to second the views of the government, and concerted with them the measures which it would be best to adopt at the meeting of the council. The following day, being the 10th of May, or 20th of Floréal, the council of state had an extraordinary meeting. The two consuls and all the ministers, except Fouché, attended. Cambacérès presided. He announced the object of the meeting, and appealed to the understanding of that grand body, under the important circumstances in which the government was placed. Bigot de Préameneu, Rœderer, Regnaud, and Portalis, at once spoke in turn, and alleged that the stability of the government was, at present, the first necessity of the state; that the foreign powers, to treat with France, that public credit, commerce, industry, and a return to prosperity, had need of confidence; that the perpetuity of the power of the first consul was the most certain means to inspire it; that this authority, conferred for ten years only, was an ephemeral authority,—without solidity, without grandeur, because it was without duration; that the senate, limited by the constitution, had not thought it possible to add more than a prolongation of ten years to the power of the first consul; but that in addressing the national sovereignty, as had been done before for all the anterior constitutions, there was no more limiting by the existing law, for then they should mount to the source of all the laws, and that it was necessary purely and simply to put this question,—"SHALL THE FIRST CONSUL BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?"

The prefect of police, Dubois, a member of the council of state, a man of a character independent and decided, stated the opinion generally held by the people of Paris. On all sides the proposition of the senate was deemed ridiculous; every body said that it was necessary France should have a government; that one had been found at last, strong, able, fortunate, and that such an one ought to be preserved; that there ought to have been no necessity for touching the constitution; but if it were to be interfered with, it had better be done once for all, and the government be so organized as to be always preserved. That which was thus stated by Dubois was true. Opinion was so favourable to the first consul, that the people were for settling the question at once, and giving to his power the duration of his life. After having heard the different speeches, Cambacérès inquired whether any member had objections to make to the proposed step; but the oppositionists remaining silent, being only five or six in number, as Bertier, Thibaudeau, Emmery, Dessoles, and Berenger, the resolution was put to the vote, and adopted by an immense majority. It was then agreed that a public vote should be taken upon the question,—SHALL NAPOLEON BONAPARTE BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?

This resolution being passed affirmatively, Rœderer, who was the boldest of all the members on the monarchical side, proposed to add a second question to the first; it was the following:—SHALL THE FIRST CONSUL HAVE THE FACULTY OF DESIGNATING HIS SUCCESSOR?

Upon this question M. Rœderer was extremely tenacious, and with reason. If they acted with good faith, if they concealed no after-thought of returning at some future time to what they were doing that day, if they wished to constitute definitively a new power, the faculty of designing a successor was the best equivalent to hereditary succession; sometimes superior to the effects of

hereditary succession itself, because it was by that means that the reign of the Antonines was given to the world. A consul for life, with the power of naming his successor, was a real monarchy under a republican appearance. It was a fine and powerful government, which, at least, saved the dignity of the existing generation, which had sworn to live a republic or to die. M. Rœderer, who was obstinate in favour of his own ideas, insisted upon the second question being put. It was put and adopted as the preceding had been.

It was necessary, in consequence, to decide on the form to be given to both. Some thought that this appeal made to the French people by means of registers opened in the communes, was an act which should belong to the government, because it was, so to say, a simple convocation; that it was natural, therefore, that it should be debated in the council of state; that the publication of this deliberation, which had taken place in presence of the second and third consuls, and in absence of the first, preserved all decent appearances, and that it was only necessary to find a suitable form of drawing up. A commission, composed of several councillors of state, was charged, during the sitting, with the drawing up of the result of the deliberation. This commission proceeded immediately to the task, and returned an hour after, with the act destined to be published on the following day.

The following was the document :—

"The consuls of the republic, considering that the resolution of the first consul is a striking homage paid to the sovereignty of the people; *that the people, consulted upon their dearest interests, ought to know no other limit than its interests themselves;* decree as follows :" &c. &c. "The French people shall be consulted upon these two questions :—

"1. SHALL NAPOLEON BONAPARTE BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?

"2. SHALL HE HAVE THE FACULTY OF APPOINTING HIS SUCCESSOR?

"Registers will be opened to this effect at all the mayoralties, at the offices of the clerks of all the tribunals, at the houses of the notaries, and these of all public offices."

The period allowed for giving the votes was three weeks.

Cambacérès went off immediately to the first consul, to submit to him the resolution of the council of state. The first consul, from a disposition of mind difficult to account for, obstinately resisted the second question.

"Whom," said he, "would you that I should appoint for my successor? my brother? But France, which has so well consented to be governed by me — would France consent to be governed by Joseph or Lucien? Shall I nominate you consul, Cambacérès? Will you venture to undertake such a task? And then the will of Louis XIV. was not respected; is it at all probable that mine would be? A dead man, let him be whom he may, is nothing." The second consul could not get over him upon this point; he was even angry with Rœderer, who, without taking the opinion of any one, and following the impulse of his own mind, had put forward the idea. He, therefore, ordered the second question, relative to the choice of a successor, to be struck out.

The motive of the first consul in the foregoing matter is very obscure. Did he wish, by leaving a vacancy in the organization of the government, to manage so as to have a sure pretext to say another time, and at a period a little later, that the government was without a future, without greatness, and it would be necessary to convert it into an hereditary monarchy? Did he dread family rivalries, and the troubles that would come upon him from possessing the faculty of choosing a successor from among his brothers or nephews? To judge of his language upon the occasion, this last conjecture appears to be the most probable. However it was, he struck out the second question of the act as it emanated from the council of state; and as they would not lose time by assembling the council again, the resolution, thus shortened, was sent to the official journal.

It appeared on the morning of the 11th of May, or 21st Floréal, in the *Moniteur*, two days after that of the senate. To announce that such a question was put to France, was to announce that it was determined upon. If public opinion become passive, did not take the initiative of great resolutions, it might be counted upon for sanctioning every thing with interest that might be proposed to it in favour of the first consul. It had for him confidence, admiration, gratitude, all the sentiments that a lively and enthusiastic people is capable of feeling for a great man, from whom it has received at one time so many benefits. Doubtless, if the questions of form had preserved any importance, at a time when constitutions had been seen to be made and remade so often, it would have been deemed strange that the senate, having proposed a simple prolongation of ten years, this proposition emanating from the sole authority which had the power to make it, should be converted into a proposition of a consulship for life, made by a body that was neither the senate, nor the legislative body, nor the tribunate, but only a council dependant upon the government. It is true that the council of state had at that time a high degree of importance, which rendered it nearly the equal of a legislative assembly; that the appeal to the national sovereignty was a species of corrective, which covered all the irregularities of this mode of proceeding, and gave to the council of state the apparent character of a simple arranger of the question to be submitted to France. Besides, at that time people did not examine so closely into matters. The result, that is to say, the consolidation and perpetuation of the government of the first consul was agreeable to all the world; and that which conduced to such a result in the most direct way possible, appeared the most natural and the best. The senate was exposed to some raillery, in fact, it was tolerably confused and ashamed, at not having been better acquainted with the wishes of general Bonaparte; and it kept silence, having nothing suitable to say nor to do, because it was unable either to recall its determination or to appropriate to itself the resolution of the council of state. As to offering any opposition, it had not the means, nor even the idea. Without doubt, the torrent was not so general but that censure was to be heard in some places; for example, in the obscure retreats where the faithful republicans hid their despair, in the brilliant hôtels of the faubourg St. Germain, where the royalists were

detesting the new power in the government which they had not yet began to serve. But this censure, nearly indistinguishable in the chorus of praises that from all sides arose around the first consul, and mounted even to his own ear, was of very little moment. Reflecting men only, and these are always very few in number, were capable of making singular reflections upon the vicissitudes of revolutions, upon the inconsistency of this generation overturning a royalty of twelve centuries, endeavouring in vain, amidst its delirium, to overthrow all the monarchies of Europe, and then reverting from its first enthusiasm to rebuild a ruined throne piece by piece, and eagerly seeking some one on whom to bestow it. Happily it had found for this purpose an extraordinary man. Nations, under such a necessity, do not always encounter a master who ennobles in the same degree their inconsistencies. The embarrassment of modesty had at the moment seized upon every body; the master himself, not daring at first to avow his wishes himself, the senate afterwards not daring to guess, and hesitating to satisfy them, until the council of state, throwing off all its false shame, had the courage to avow what was needful to be said and done by all.

These temporary difficulties soon gave place to a true ovation. The legislative body and the tribunate determined to go to the first consul, in order to give the signal of adhesion, by voting in a body the power into his hands for a perpetuity. The object to colour the step which they had devised was, that the members of the legislative body and of the tribunate being detained during this extraordinary session in their seats as legislators, were not able to be in their communes to give their votes there. This was deemed a valid reason, and they repaired to the Tuileries accordingly in a body. M. de Vaublanc spoke in the name of the legislative body, and M. Chabot d'Allier in the name of the tribunate. To quote here the speeches made upon this occasion would be tedious. They all expressed alike the same confidence in the government of the first consul. Such an example would not have failed to draw after it the citizens to the same vote had it been at all needful; but such a strong impulse was not necessary. The people went with alacrity to the mayoralties, to the notaries, and to the offices of the clerks of the tribunals, to inscribe their votes of approbation in the registers open for their reception.

The end of Floréal had arrived, and the government made haste to close this short and memorable session by the presentation of the financial law. The budget proposed was most satisfactory. All the sources of revenue were discovered to have augmented, for which the peace must be assigned as the cause, while, at the same time, the expenses of the army and navy were much diminished. The budget of the year X. amounted to 500,000,000f., or 26,000,000 f. less than that of the year IX.[1]; it was raised to 526,000,000 f. by the more recent estimates; and if to this be added the additional centimes for the service of the departments, which at that time were separately calculated, and amounted to 60,000,000 f.; if there were added the expenses of collection, which were not carried to the general budget, because each department of the taxes paid its own expenses, which amounted to 70,000,000 f., the total might be estimated at 625,000,000 f. or 630,000,000 f., the definitive budget of France at that moment.

Peace brought with it an economy or saving in some branches of the public service, and an increase in others; but by elevating considerably the product of all the taxes, it prepared the way for the re-establishment of an even balance between the revenue and expenditure, a balance so much desired, and so far from being foreseen two years before. The war administration, divided into two branches, that of the personal, and that of the *matériel*, was to cost 210,000,000 f. in lieu of 250,000,000 f. It will, no doubt, appear astonishing that there should be here no more than 40,000,000 f. between a state of war and that of peace; but it must be recollected that the victorious French armies had lived upon a foreign soil, and that having returned home, with the exception only of one hundred thousand men, they were now supported out of the French treasury. The navy, which it had at first been deemed right to estimate at 80,000,000 f., had, since the conclusion of the peace, been raised to 105,000,000 f. by the first consul, whose opinion it was that a time of peace was most advantageously employed in organizing the navy of a great empire. Other expenses considerably reduced, proved, by their reduction, the fortunate advance of credit. The obligations of the receivers-general, of which the origin, utility, and success have been seen, had at first been discounted at only one per cent. per month, and afterwards at three-quarters. These were now discounted at one-half per cent. per month, or six per cent. per annum. Hence the government had been able, without injustice, to reduce the interest of the securities from seven to six per cent. All these savings had operated to the reduction of the costs of the treasury negotiations from 32,000,000 f. to 15,000,000 f. There was no reduction which did so much honour to the government, nor better proved the high credit which it enjoyed. The five per cents., which had risen first from twelve to forty or fifty francs, were at that moment at sixty.

With these diminutions of expense there occurred some augmentations, which were the consequence of the wise financial arrangements proposed in the year IX., and so unjustly censured in the tribunate. The government had wished, as has been said in the proper place, to complete the inscription of the consolidated third, in other words, the third of the old debt, the only one excepted from the bankruptcy of the directory. In regard to the "mobilized" two-thirds, that is to say, the unliquidated portion of the debt, it had wished to give that a sort of value, by admitting it in payment for certain national property, or by permission to convert it into five per cent. consolidated, at the rate of one-twentieth of the capital which corresponded with the actual currency. The first consul, desirous of terminating these arrangements as soon as possible, had it decided under the law of the finances for the year X., that the two-

[1] The amount for the year IX. was at first fixed at 415,000,000 f., then at 526,000,000 f., and finally at 545,000,000 f.

thirds, "mobilized," should be converted by compulsion into the five per cent. stock, at the rate fixed in the law of Ventôse, year IX. The definitive inscription of the consolidated thirds, the conversion of the two-thirds, "mobilized," into five per cent., other liquidations which remained to make for the old credits of the emigrants, and for the transfer into the great book of the debts of the conquered countries, would carry the total amount of the public debt to 59,000,000 f. or 60,000,000 f. of five per cent. annuities. In the mean time it was of importance to satisfy the public mind regarding the sum to which these various liquidations were likely to raise the public debt. It was in consequence decided by an article of the budget itself of the year X., that it should not be carried, whether by loan, or whether in consequence of terminating payments, beyond 50,000,000f. of annuities. It was hoped that the redemption of the sinking fund, largely endowed with national property, would absorb, before it had time to be produced, that foreseen excess of 9,000,000 f. or 10,000,000 f. But in any case, by an article of the budget to be added, at the moment when the inscriptions should exceed 50,000,000 f., such a portion would be created for redemption, as should in fifteen years absorb the sum exceeding the amount thenceforward fixed for the national debt.

The title of this was also to be properly regulated. The different denominations of "consolidated thirds," "mobilized two-thirds," "Belgian debt," and others, were abolished, and replaced by the unique title of "five per cent. consolidated." It was arranged that this debt should be the first inscribed in the budget; that the interest of it should be paid before any other expense, and uniformly in the month following every half year. It was estimated that the life debt, at that instant amounting to 20,000,000 f., might ascend to 24,000,000 f.; but it was imagined that the extinctions proceeding as fast as the new liquidations, it would always be kept on the level of 20,000,000 f. The expenses which were susceptible of greater augmentation, were those of the interior, for the roads and public works; those of the clergy, for the successive establishment of new cures,—expenses rather to be greeted than regretted. As for those of public instruction and the legion of honour, they were lately provided for, as before seen, by means of an endowment out of the national domains.

In regard to these increasing expenses, the progress of the revenue afforded the prospect of an income still more rapidly accruing. The customs, the posts, the registration, the domains of the state, gave a considerable surplus. Besides these, there remained as a resource, the indirect taxes, which had been re-established at this time only for the advantage of the towns and the service of the hospitals. Heavy complaints had been made in the legislative body and in the tribunate this year, of the burden of the direct contributions, and new arguments had been urged for the re-establishment of taxes upon articles of consumption. Accurate calculations had exhibited, in a stronger light than ever, the enormous proportion of the direct contributions. The tax on land and houses reached 210,000,000 f.; on personal and moveable property, to 32,000,000 f.; on doors and windows, to 16,000,000 f.; on patents, to 21,000,000 f.; total, 279,000,000 f., more than one-half, consequently, in a budget of receipts of 502,000,000 f. The public compared these sums with those paid during the administration of Turgot and of Necker, and demanded the re-establishment of a more just proportion between the different taxes. Before 1789, in fact, the land and personal tax had produced 221,000,000 f.; the indirect taxes, 294,000,000 f.; in all, 515,000,000 f. The natural conclusion from all these complaints, was the re-establishment of the old duties upon provisions,—tobacco, salt, and the like. The first consul heard these remonstrances with pleasure; they furnished him with a potent reason for a new financial creation, which he had long secretly resolved upon in his mind, but which was not yet fully matured.

The situation of the finances was, therefore, excellent, and it was every day becoming better regulated. The 90,000,000 f. directed, by means of a creation of stock, for clearing off the arrears of the years V., VI., and VII., before the consulate, were found to be competent to that purpose; the 21,000,000 f. devoted to the liquidation of the debts of the year VIII., the first year of the consulate, sufficed equally for acquitting the entire service for which that sum was designed. Lastly, the service of the year IX., the first which had been regularly established, although amounting to 526,000,000 f., in place of 415,000,000 f., was wholly liquidated by the extraordinary increase in the product of the revenue. It has been already seen that the estimates of the current year, that of the year X., exactly balanced in income and expenditure.

To sum up, a debt in perpetual stock of 50,000,000 f., perfectly regulated, and reduced to one denomination, provided for by a sufficient endowment in the national domains; a debt in life annuities of 20,000,000 f.; in civil pensions, to the amount of 20,000,000 f.; 210,000,000 f. assigned to the war department; 105,000,000 f. to the navy; these composed, with other expenses less in amount, a budget of 500,000,000 f.; not excluding the additional centimes and expenses of the collection; a budget covered by a revenue, which was manifestly increasing with rapidity, and that without reckoning the re-establishment of the indirect contributions, left as a resource for new necessities that it was possible might subsequently arise.

Thus after a war of ten years, and after splendid conquests, the estimates returned a budget of 500,000,000 f., the budget of 1789, with this difference, that the debt composed a very small portion in a comparison with the revenue; and that this amount of 500,000,000 f., raised to 625,000,000 f. by the additional centimes and the cost of collection, represented the entire outgoing of the country, in fact, all the charges; while the revenue of 500,000,000 f. of the budget of Louis XVI. omitted, not only the expenses of the collection, but the revenues of the clergy, the feudal rights, the corvées, that is to say, many hundreds of millions of charges more. If in 1802 France paid 625,000,000 f. equally divided, France paid in 1789 from 1100,000,000 f. to 1200,000,000 f., with a territory one-quarter less. The revolution, without reckoning the benefits of a complete social reform, had therefore produced, at least in a most important point of view, something besides calamity. In all this prosperity in the

finances there was but one thing to be regretted, this was the bankruptcy, the result of paper-money; but this was in no way imputable to the consular government.

These financial propositions were not now received as those of the year IX. had been, by a violent opposition; they were satisfactory to the two legislative assemblies, and were voted merely with some observations on the direct and indirect contributions,—observations such as the government itself would have dictated, if they had not been thus spontaneously elicited.

The foregoing was the last act of this session of forty-five days, consecrated to these great and important objects.

The tribunate and the legislative body separated on the 20th of May, or 30th of Floréal, leaving France in a state in which she had never been before, and perhaps never will be again.

At this time the population was flocking to the mayoralties, to the offices of the clerks of the tribunals, and to the notaries, for the purpose of giving an affirmative reply to the question put to the country by the council of state. The number of votes which were or were about to be given, was estimated at between three and four millions. This is apparently but a small proportion out of a population of thirty-six millions of souls; but it is a large one, larger than is expected, and such as was not obtained in the greater part of the known constitutions, in which three, four, or five hundred thousand votes at most expressed the national will. In fact, of thirty-six millions of persons, one-half belong to the sex which has no political rights. Of the remaining eighteen millions, there are old people and children [1], who reduce the valid population of the country to twelve millions at most. It is therefore an extraordinary number, if the men who labour with their hands are considered mostly illiterate, and scarcely knowing under what government they live; it is an extraordinary number, that four millions out of twelve, were thus brought to form an opinion, and not only to form an opinion, but to express it.

It is true, there were republicans and royalists who were dissentients, and came to express a negative to the question, while they attested by their presence at such an act, the perfect freedom left to the public upon the matter. But it was a small and almost imperceptible minority. As to the rest, whether voting *pro* or *con*, they were tranquil, and produced by their attendance upon the act no sensible agitation, so satisfied and peacefully disposed were the people.

Around the government, on the other hand, there existed a species of fermentation of mind, on account of the changes which were sure to be made in the constitution, in consequence of the prolongation of the consulship for life. A thousand different rumours were spread abroad relating to the subject, having an origin in the wishes of each particular party.

The brothers of Bonaparte, Lucien in particular, had not entirely renounced his idea of a regular monarchy, which might immediately confer upon the brothers the rank of princes, and place them beyond a level with the great functionaries of the state. Rœderer, the friend and confidant of Lucien, was, of all others, the person who was most ready to give his opinion, being the most advanced in monarchical advocacy, much more from his natural inclination than through any interested suggestion. He was a councillor of state, who had the charge of public instruction, under Chaptal, the minister of the interior; and he made use of his post in order to address circular letters to the prefects, which were totally in opposition to the nature of his office, and had a direct relation to the questions which at that moment occupied the attention alike of the government and the public. These circulars, in which particulars of a certain kind were contained, requiring a reply, and requiring it in a truly monarchical sense, not emanating from the minister himself, but still being issued by a very distinguished authority, seemed to reveal some concealed scheme, that perhaps had its origin in a higher authority. They agitated the minds of the people in the provinces, and gave place to a thousand reports.

Rœderer, and those who were of his opinion, would, if possible, have raised in the departments a sort of spontaneous wish, that would authorize more boldness than had been recently exhibited. They did not fail to address the first consul with most earnest solicitations to arrange, in a more courageous mode, the questions which had been mooted. But the first consul was fixed. He believed with all the more discreet and prudent friends of the government, that it was sufficient, at least for the present, to establish the consulship for life; that it was perfect monarchy, more particularly if the power of designating a successor was appended to it. A movement of opinion easily enough perceptible among the men surrounding the supreme power, and even among the most devoted, had warned the first consul that no more ought to be attempted. He therefore determined to halt; and he qualified as most indiscreet, all that was said and done by the ill-judging friends about him, whose zeal was far from displeasing him, but was not partaken enough by others to meet approval.

In the mean time he employed himself to make certain changes in the constitution, which appeared indispensable to him. Although he was perfectly disposed to censure the work of Sieyès, he thought it right to preserve the groundwork of it, adding to it merely some conveniences for the government that were new.

A singular disposition of mind was produced in some persons. They demanded that the monarchy should be re-established, since the force of circumstances seemed to require it; but that in return there should be granted to France those liberties which in a monarchy are compatible with loyalty, that is to say, that there should be given to it purely and simply the English monarchy, with an

[1] According to the returns of the English population, of 10,000 males living, 5038 would be twenty years of age and under, 988 only being in their twentieth year. If this proportion be applied to 18,000,000 of males in France, who at twenty years of age and under could hardly exercise political rights, the result will be 9,000,000 above twenty years old. From these the infirm, very aged, dissentient politically, and the lowest and most ignorant class, must still be deducted. The number does therefore appear very considerable, proving the great popularity of Bonaparte at that moment—the moment of his brightest glory.—*Translator.*

hereditary royalty, and two independent chambers. Upon this subject M. Camille Jordan had published a work, very much a subject of remark by the small number of persons who still intermingled with political questions, because the large mass of the people had no other mind in the matter than to let the first consul do as he pleased. Thus this idea of a representative monarchy, that at the opening of the revolution had presented itself to Lally Tollendal and to Mounier, as the form necessary for the government of France, and which fifty years later was designed to become the last form, this idea again appeared to some persons like one of those elevated and far-off mountains, that in a long journey are perceived more than once before they are reached.

The sincere royalists who wished for a monarchy, even that of the Bourbons, if that of the Bourbons were not discovered to be impracticable, and with general Bonaparte, if it were not practicable without him, were strongly of this opinion, so were those also of the royalist party, but these last from different motives. They hoped that with the elections and a free press, every thing would soon fall into confusion, as was the case under the directory, and that from such a renewal of the chaos, there would finally arise the legitimate monarchy of the Bourbons, as the necessary term to the calamities of France.

The first consul had no idea of adhering to such a project, although it might bring with it royalty to his own person. It was not only out of his dislike to resistance towards his objects that would make him oppose such a form of government; it was from the sincere conviction of the impossibility of such an establishment in the existing state of things.

Those who are unwilling to see in him any other than the soldier, or at most an administrator of the government, not the statesman, imagine that he had no idea of the English constitution. This is a complete error. Seeing in England the only formidable enemy France had in Europe, he kept his eyes constantly fixed upon her, and he had penetrated into the most secret relations of her constitution. In his frequent conversations upon matters of government, he reasoned with rare sagacity. One thing much displeased him in the English constitution, and he expressed his sentiments in its regard with that vivacity of language which was peculiar to him; this was, to see the great affairs of state, such as demand, in order to ensure success, long meditation, a great succession of views, profound secrecy in the execution, laid open to publicity and to hazard through intrigue or eloquence.

"Let Fox, Pitt, or Addington," he said, "be more clever one than the other in the management of parliamentary intrigue, or more eloquent in one sitting of parliament, and we shall have war instead of peace; the world will be on fire anew; France will destroy England, or she will be destroyed by her. Give up," he exclaimed angrily, "give up the fate of the world to such influences!"

That great mind, exclusively preoccupied with the condition of a perfect execution in the affairs of state, forgot that if those affairs are not submitted to parliamentary influences, which are only, after all, the national influences, represented by passionate men, fallible there is no doubt, as all men are, they fall under influences, mischievous enough in a different way, under those of a Madam de Maintenon in an age of devotees, or of a Madam de Pompadour in a dissolute age, and even if a nation has the transient good fortune to possess a great man, like Frederick or Napoleon, they fall under the influence of ambition, which will waste it to exhaustion in the chance of battles.

This error aside, an error very natural with Bonaparte, he was struck, he agreed, with that liberty, free from storms, that the British constitution conferred upon England. He appeared only to doubt whether it would suit the French character, so hasty and lively. In this point of view he was in complete uncertainty. But he regarded it as perfectly impossible to suit France under existing circumstances.

The first consul insisted that such a constitution required in the first place a strong dose of hereditary right; that it required hereditary peers and an hereditary king; that in France these notions were cast aside; that the people in France were ready to take him (Bonaparte) for a dictator, but that they would not take him as an hereditary monarch, (which at that moment was true enough,) that it was the same thing with the senate, to which nobody would agree to grant hereditary rank, although ready to grant it an extraordinary constituent power; that the want of stability was felt so much by France, as that she would readily grant to any body the most extensive authority, but it must only be for life; that such was really the disposition of the public mind; that France had not within reach the elements of English royalty, because it had neither king nor peers; that the senators of Sieyès, aristocrats of yesterday, the greater part without fortune, living upon public salaries, would become ridiculous if it were attempted to convert them into English lords; that if in default of these the great landed proprietors should be selected, that would be to fling themselves into the arms of their most formidable enemies, because they were royalists in their hearts, more friends of the English and the Austrians than the French, thus they had not wherewith to make an upper chamber; that by taking the speakers from the tribunate, and dumb members of the legislative body, there might be found materials, in name at least, for forming a lower chamber; but that to render it seriously an imitation of England, there must be a tribune, press, and elections free, all these would recommence again the four years of the directory, of which he had been a witness, and which would never be blotted from his memory; that there were then seen formed in the electoral colleges a majority, which under the pretext of dispersing the men stained with blood, would only elect royalists more or less openly avowed; that there had been seen at the same time a hundred journals, all filled with raging royalism, all moving in the same sense, and that but for the 18th of Fructidor, without the assistance lent to the directory by the army of Italy, they would have aided in the triumph of this disguised counter-revolution; that soon, by an inevitable reaction, those royalist elections were succeeded by terrorist elections, which had alarmed all honest men, who demanded that they should be annulled; that if the way was again opened to

those people, the country would go on from convulsion to convulsion, to the ultimate triumph of the Bourbon and the foreigner; that it was necessary to arrest the torrent and terminate the revolution, by maintaining in authority the man who had accomplished it, and by consolidating, in wise laws, its just and necessary principles.

On this occasion, the first consul repeated his favourite thesis, which consisted in his saying, that in order to preserve the revolution, it was necessary first to protect its authors, and place them at the head of affairs; and that without his aid they would, by this time, have all disappeared, through the ingratitude of the existing generation. "See," cried he, "what have become of Rewbell, Barras, La Réveillère! where are they? Who thinks of them? None have been saved but those I have taken by the hand, placed in power, and supported despite the movement that drags us along. See Fouché, what labour I had to defend him; Talleyrand cries out loudly against Fouché; but the Malouets, Talons, and Calonnes, who offered me their places and aid, they would have quickly got rid of Talleyrand, had I chosen to lend myself to them. They spare military men a little because they fear them, and because it is not easy to take the place of Lannes or Masséna at the head of an army. But if they spare them to-day, they will not do so much longer. As to myself, I cannot tell what they would do with me. Have they not proposed to get me named constable to Louis XVIII.? Doubtless the spirit of the revolution is immortal; it will survive the men of the time. The revolution will be completed triumphantly; but by the hands of the society of the Manége? No; for there would be continually reactions, convulsions, and, for the conclusion, counter-revolution!

"At present," added the first consul, "it is necessary to make a government first with the men of the revolution, of those who have experience, and performed services; of those who have no blood upon their garments, unless it be the blood of the Russians and Austrians; next, to join with them a small number of men who have newly arisen, experienced judges, or men of the old times, if you will, taken from Versailles, provided they are men of capacity, provided they will come in as submissive adherents, not as disdainful protectors. The constitution of Sieyès is good, with some modifications, for the attainment of this object. It is necessary, above all, to consecrate the great principle of the French revolution, which is civil equality, that is to say, equal justice in every thing, in legislation, the tribunals, the administration, the taxes, the military service, the distribution of employments, and so on. At present, each department is on an equality with another department; every Frenchman is on an equality with any other Frenchman; every citizen obeys the same law, appears before the same judge, submits to the same punishment, receives the same recompence, pays the same taxes, furnishes the same military service, arrives at the same rank, whatever be his parentage, his religion, or the place of his origin. Here are the grand social results of the revolution, which are well worth the trouble we have suffered in attaining them, and which must be maintained invariably. After these results there is yet another that must be maintained with equal energy, and that is the greatness of France. The efforts of the press, the speeches of the tribune, do not now take our side; in other times they may be turned round in our favour. Now we must needs have order, repose, prosperity, well-conducted affairs, and the preservation of our external greatness. To preserve this greatness, the contest is not over, it will recommence; and to sustain ourselves, we shall have need of great strength, and the utmost unity of government."

Such is the substance of successive conversations of the first consul, with those whom he admitted to communicate to him their ideas, and with whom he contemplated modelling anew the consular constitution.

It is easy to recognize here his habitual manner of thinking. Without gainsaying what the future might present, and only disquieting himself about the present, he saw that the welfare of France consisted in the amalgamation of all parties, and in the maintenance and completion of the social reform brought about at the revolution; and, finally, in the development of the power acquired by the French arms. In regard to liberty, he rejected it as a return to the past troubles of France, and as an obstacle to all the good he wished to perform. It left in his mind the impression of a difficult problem, to solve which was no business of his, since twelve years of agitation had laid by the desire and necessity of it for a long while to come. Sieyès, with his aristocratic constitution, borrowed from the republics of the middle age when in their decline, with his senate clothed in the electoral power, with his lists of notability, a sort of unchangeable golden book, had discovered the constitution best adapted to the situation.

The first consul took care not to touch the senate; he wished, on the contrary, to render it more powerful; but he projected a primary alteration, which, in appearance at least, was a concession to the popular influence.

The lists of notability, which contained the five hundred thousand persons, from amongst whom it was necessary to choose the councils of the arrondissements and of the departments, and the legislative body, the tribunate, and the senate itself, which lists were never altered, save for the purpose of filling up the places of those who had died, or those caused by the names of parties struck out as unworthy, such as bankrupts, for instance; the lists of notability appeared too illusory, and left the government, as would be remarked at the present time, without any tie in common with the country. They were, besides, very difficult to form, because the citizens took no interest whatever in a matter of such trifling importance to themselves.

The first consul thought that the augmentation of authority which he was destined to receive, and some other modifications favourable to the power about to strengthen the constitution, ought to be repaid by some popular concession, at least in appearance. He therefore determined to establish electoral colleges.

In consequence, several kinds of colleges were devised. At first, meetings of the cantons were to be created, composed of all the inhabitants of

the canton that possessed the age and quality of citizens, who were charged to choose two electoral colleges, one of the arrondissement, the other of the department. The college of the arrondissement was to be formed according to the population, and to be composed of one individual out of five hundred. The college of the department was to be formed in the same mode, but of one only in a thousand persons. But the number of electors was not to exceed six hundred of those who were rated highest to the public taxes.

These two electoral colleges of the arrondissement and the department were to be elected for life by the central assemblies, which having once performed the duty of a general nomination, would have nothing more to do but to replace the deceased or excluded members.

The government appointed the presidents of all these assemblies, whether of those of the cantons or of the electoral colleges. It was to possess the power of dissolving an electoral college. In this case, the assemblies of the canton were to be convoked, to compose anew the college that had been dissolved.

These cantonal assemblies and the two electoral colleges of arrondissement and department, were to present candidates to the consuls, for the offices of justices of the peace[1], and the municipal and departmental authorities. The college of arrondissement presented two candidates for the vacant places in the tribunate; the college of department two candidates for the vacant places in the senate. Each of these two colleges presented two candidates for the vacant places in the legislative body, which made four together. Thus the tribunate originated from the council of the arrondissement; the senate from the council of the department, and the legislative body from both.

The senate still possessed the right of choosing the members of the tribunate, the legislative body, and also its own members, from the candidates thus presented.

Thus the kind of change made in the constitution may be easily perceived. In place of the various lists of notability, completed or modified, as time might render necessary, by the universal body of citizens, electoral colleges, chosen for life by the same universal body, were now to elect the candidates, and from these the senate was to select those whom it saw fit as being the body which generated all the rest. The alteration thus effected was not very considerable, because the electoral colleges chosen for life, sometimes modified, it is true, when death or bankruptcy might cause a vacancy, were very nearly as immutable as the lists of notability, but still they occasionally assembled to elect candidates. Under this operation the citizens might be said to have recovered some part of the power of the composition of the deliberative assemblies. Electoral tumults there was very little reason to apprehend with such a composition of citizens.

The legislative body and the tribunate were to be separated into five series of members, going out in turn one after another every year. The senate replaced the portion which went out, taking those for selection from among the candidates presented to them. The colleges for life replaced afterwards the candidates that the election of the fifth had absorbed out of their number.

After this concession, which at that time appeared so exorbitant that all the colleagues of the first consul went so far as to say, that he must feel very conscious of his own power, and very secure in his post, to yield so much to the popular influence; they went at work to complete the various powers of the senate conformably to the indications drawn from the recent events.

The senate was to retain at first the privilege of electing all the bodies of the state. It was further wished to confer upon it besides a more perfect constituent power. Already the government had made it exercise that power, by giving it the right of interpreting the 38th article of the constitution, in calling upon it to decide upon the recall of the emigrants, and in making it demand a prolongation of the authority of the first consul. It was exceedingly convenient to have at hand a constituent power, always ready to create that for which there might be any necessity.

It was then settled that the senate, at any time, by means of a *senatus-consultum*, denominated "organic," should have the faculty of interpreting the constitution for the purpose of completing it, and, in short, to do every thing that was necessary to make it work in its due course.

It was also arranged that by the *senatus-consultum* simply, the senate might pronounce the suspension of the constitution, and of trial by jury in certain departments, and determine in what cases an individual, confined on any extraordinary occasion, should be sent before the judges for trial in the ordinary way, or be detained in prison. Lastly, there were delegated to this body two extraordinary attributes, the one appertaining to royalty in a monarchy, the other not attaching to any power in a regularly constituted state; the first was the faculty of dissolving the legislative body and the tribunate; the second, that of cancelling the judgments of the tribunals, whenever they might be thought dangerous to the safety of the state.

The last attribute would be inconceivable if the circumstances of the times had not explained it. Certain tribunals had, in fact, pronounced judgments in cases relating to the national property, which were sufficient to drive to despair the numerous and powerful class of persons who had become possessed of it.

It was next decided that the senate, which in the course of ten years was to be increased from sixty to eighty members by means of two nominations annually, should be at once advanced to eighty. There were fourteen nominations to be made immediately. The first consul, in addition to these, had the power of appointing forty new senators, thus raising the number to a hundred and twenty. By these means the government was relieved from new inconveniences, such as those which it sustained at the commencement of the session of the year x.

The tribunate and the council of state were equally modified in their organization. While the council of state might be raised to fifty members, the tribunate was to be reduced to fifty, by the successive extinction of the members, and was to be divided into sections, answering to the sections

[1] Justices de Paix.

of the council of state. It was to make a first examination in sections, with closed doors, of the different laws preferred, which might be submitted to them afterwards in a general meeting of the whole body. These bills were still to be discussed by the three orators before the silent legislative body, opposed to three councillors of state, or on the same side with them, according as the project of the law might be approved or disapproved.

Henceforth, therefore, the tribunate was no more than a second council of state, whose duty it was to criticise with closed doors, and in consequence without energy, such measures as the first consul might prepare.

Finally, the prerogative of voting treaties was taken away from the legislative body and from the tribunate. The first consul recollected what had happened to the treaty with Russia, and would not again be exposed to a scene of the same kind. He devised a privy council composed of consuls, ministers, two senators, two counsellors of state, and two members of the legion of honour, having the rank of great officers, the one and the other alike designated by the first consul for each important occasion. This privy council alone was to be consulted upon the ratification of treaties. It was also empowered to draw up the organic *senatus-consultum*.

The creation of a privy council was a wrong done to the council of state, because it touched upon its duties; and of this that body appeared sensible. By such means the first consul withdrew from the cognizance of the council of state the treaties which it had before been accustomed to consider, because he began to think that thirty or forty individuals were too many to receive communications of this nature.

It remained to organize the executive power upon the new basis of the consulate for life. The first consul wished that the same power which was given to him for life, should also be conferred upon his colleagues for the same term. "You have done enough for me," he said to the second consul Cambacérès, "I ought now to assure to you your position." The principle of the continuance for life was then fixed in regard to the two other consuls, as well for the present as for the future. The great question of the designation of a successor to the first consul, remained still to be arranged, for by this the right of hereditary succession was in the present case to be determined. General Bonaparte wished at first to decline the power which it was desired to confer upon him of designating his successor. At length he yielded, and it was agreed that he should have the power of such a designation during his life. In case of such an appointment, the person named was to be presented in great state to the senate; he was to take an oath to the republic before the senate, in presence of the consuls, the ministers, the legislative body, the tribunate, the council of state, the tribunal of cassation, the archbishops and bishops, the presidents of the electoral colleges, the great officers of the legion of honour, and the mayors of twenty-four great cities of the republic. After this solemnity he was adopted by the existing consul and the French nation. He was to take rank in the senate with the consuls immediately after the third.

If, however, to spare the feelings of his family, the first consul should not during his life-time nominate a successor, and should only nominate him by will, in such a case he was, before his decease, to remit his will, so nominating his successor, sealed with his seal, to the other consuls, in presence of the ministers and the presidents of the counsellors of state. This will was to be deposited in the archives of the republic. But in that case it was necessary that the senate should ratify the voluntary testament which had not been produced during the life of the testator.

If the first consul should not have made his adoption during his life, or if he should not leave a will, or the will should not be ratified, then the second and third consuls were empowered to appoint a successor. They were to propose him to the senate, whose duty it was to elect him.

Such were the forms employed for securing the regular transmission of the consular authority. It was a substitute in place of hereditary succession; but there was nothing to prevent its being hereditary, because the chief of the state was left free to select his own son if he had one. He was only empowered to propose naming his heirs, or him whom he should deem to be most worthy.

The consuls were, by right, members of the senate, and were to preside at the sittings.

One grand prerogative was added to the power of the first consul. He received the right of granting pardon for offences. This was to assimilate as much as possible his authority to that of royalty itself.

On the accession of a new first consul, a law was to fix his allowance, or, to speak more correctly, his civil list. On the present occasion, the sum of 6,000,000 f.[1] was fixed for the first consul, and 1,200,000 f.[2] for his two colleagues, both sums were to be provided for in the budget.

To all these dispositions there were some new ones added, which concerned the regulation of the tribunals. The duties of the administrative government were better conducted than those of justice, because the former depended more immediately upon a firm and impartial master; the officials being revocable every moment by him, the ministers went forward exactly in his spirit. But justice used its independence, as all the liberty conceded by the state was used, in delivering itself over to the passions of the day. In some places it persecuted the acquirers of national property, in others unjustly favoured them. But no where did it exhibit that discipline and regularity which has been seen since, and which gave to the great body of the magistracy a dignified, but still a deferential, authority. To the disposition conferred in particular cases upon the senate of reviewing the judgments of the tribunals, a disposition quite extraordinary, and fortunately not permanent, a further power of regulating them was added. The tribunals of the first instance were placed under the regulation of the courts of appeal, and the tribunals of appeal under those of the tribunal of cassation. A judge who was wanting in his duty might be called before a superior tribunal, and reprimanded or suspended. At the head of the whole magistracy, a "grand judge" was to be

[1] About £250,000. [2] Nearly £50,000.

placed, having the power to preside at the tribunals if he saw fit, whose duty it was to watch over them, and to regulate them. He was thus minister of justice, while he was a public magistrate.

Such were the modifications introduced into the consular constitution, some devised by the first consul himself, others proposed by his councillors. They were all collected in the form of an organic *senatus-consultum*, which was to be presented to the senate, and adopted by that body.

They consisted, as already seen, in substituting for the lists of notability that vast, inert, and deceptive candidateship, electoral colleges chosen for life, which assembled at certain times to present candidates to the choice of the senate; to give to the senate already charged with electoral functions, and the care of watching over the constitution, the power of modifying that constitution, of perfecting it, and of removing every obstacle in its way; in fine, the power to dissolve the tribunate and the legislative body; to confer on general Bonaparte the consulship for life, with the faculty of designating his successor; to give him besides, the finest of the prerogatives of royalty, the right of pardoning criminals; to take from the tribunate its numerical strength, and nearly that of all publicity, making it in fact a second council of state, charged with censuring the labours of the first; to carry away from the legislative body and the council of state to a privy council, certain important public affairs, such for example as the approbation of treaties; finally, to establish among the tribunals a discipline and a hierarchy.

It was still the aristocratic constitution of Sieyès, apt to turn round to aristocracy or despotism, according to the hand which directed it; at this moment turning towards absolute power, under the hand of general Bonaparte, but after his decease, as capable of being transformed into a complete aristocracy, if before his death he did not precipitate the whole into an abyss.

In conferring for his own convenience such high attributes upon the senate, the first consul had insured to himself for life a most devoted instrument, by means of which he was able to do any thing which he desired; but after his death, that very instrument become independent, in its own turn would be all-powerful. Under a successor less great, less glorious, with the minds of men awakened, after a long slumber, an entirely new spectacle would present itself. The departmental aristocracy, of which the electoral colleges for life were composed, and the national aristocracy of which the senate was formed, one presenting candidates to the other, would be very well able, by a concurrence of objects, natural and even necessary, to create in the legislative body and the tribunate a majority which could not but be invincible to the monarchical power qualified as first consul, and thus to cause the renewal of a species of liberty, an aristocratic liberty it is true, but which is one, under ordinary circumstances, not less haughty, nor less consistent, nor the least durable of all others. Moreover, liberty is always secured when the power is divided, and its exercise subjected to the deliberations of an assembly. There cannot be, in effect, more than two plausible opinions regarding the important interests of a country. If the executive power has in its front an authority capable of resisting it, this last, aristocratic or otherwise, embraces, by an irresistible propensity for contradiction, the opinions which the former has repelled. It tends to peace in the presence of an executive which leans to war, and tends towards war in presence of an executive power that leans towards peace: it adopts a liberal policy when the government is inclined to conservative views. In a word, there exists contradiction, from whence arise discussion and liberty; as liberty in all countries principally consists in the free and bold discussion of the affairs of state, by the citizens, *pro* or *con*, no matter how it originates. This constitution of Sieyès, therefore, might, it is possible, at some future day, return to its primitive end, but at this moment it was no more than a mask for a dictatorship. A constitution, of whatever kind, always yields results conformable to the existing state of public opinion. There are times when opposition is the prevalent bias; there are others when there is a general tendency to support the governing power. At this time public opinion was inclined to adhere to the government; the form of the government in reality at the moment, was a matter of indifference.

It must be admitted that this nominal republic possessed unusual greatness; it recalled, in some respects, the Roman republic converted into the empire. The senate had the power of the ancient Roman senate, a power that it resigned to the emperor when he was strong, and took back for its own purposes when he was weak or liberal. The first consul had, in fact, the power of the Roman emperors; he had the hereditary succession, that is to say, the choice between the appointment of his natural or adopted successors. It may be added, that he enjoyed nearly the same power over the world.

The new constitution, thus remodelled, was now ready; the votes demanded of all the French citizens were given. The consul Cambacérès, ever conciliatory, proposed to the first consul a very wise step, which was, to confide to the senate the duty of counting the collected votes, and of proclaiming the numbers. "It is," said he, with sound reason, "a very natural mode of extricating a great body from a false position, caused by a mistake." The senate had, in fact, proposed a prolongation of ten years, and the first consul had assumed the consulship for life. Since that time the senate had become silent, and had not taken, because it could not take, any steps for giving that body the task of proclaiming the result; it would be made a party to the measure, and would be drawn out of the embarrassed state in which it was placed. "Come," said Cambacérès to the first consul; "come to the assistance of men who made a mistake in endeavouring to guess your wishes." The first consul smiled with a little more of sarcastic expression in his face than was customary, at the prudence of his colleague, and quickly consented to the politic proposal thus made to him.

The registers in which the votes had been entered were sent to the senate, to be counted and made up. A total of 3,577,259 citizens had voted, and out of that number, 3,568,885 had voted for the consulate for life. In this enormous mass of approving voters, there were only eight thousand

and some hundred dissentients; an almost imperceptible minority. Never had any government obtained such an assent; and none ever, in an equal degree, deserved it.

This result being verified, the senate issued a *senatus-consultum*, in three articles. The first of these articles was thus stated :—

"The French people *nominate*, and the senate *proclaims* NAPOLEON BONAPARTE first consul for life."

It was from this period that the prenomen of NAPOLEON began to appear in the public acts of the government, together with the family name of Bonaparte, which last was only, up to that moment, known to the world. This brilliant prenomen, that the voices of nations have so often repeated since, had been, until this time, but once employed, namely, in the constituent act of the Italian republic. In approximating to the sovereignty, the prenomen, being gradually separated from the family name, was soon to figure alone and conspicuously in the universal language of the world; and the general Bonaparte, called for one moment Napoleon Bonaparte, was soon to be called Napoleon, conformably to the manner of designating monarchs.

The second article of the *senatus-consultum* decreed that a statue of peace, holding in one hand the laurel of victory, and in the other the decree of the senate, should attest to posterity the gratitude of the nation.

Finally, the third article declared that the senate, in a body, should go and present to the first consul, with this *senatus-consultum*, the expression of the "confidence, love, and admiration" of the French people. These three expressions are those of the decree itself.

A day for a grand diplomatic reception was fixed upon, when the senate should proceed to the Tuileries. It was on the morning of the 3rd of August, 1802, or 15th of Thermidor. All the ministers of the different courts of Europe, now at peace, were assembled in a spacious hall, where the first consul had been accustomed to receive them, and where foreigners of distinction were presented. The levee had hardly begun when the senate was announced. At the same moment the entire body was introduced, when the president Barthélemy spoke as follows :—

"The French people," said he, addressing the first consul, "the French people acknowledge with gratitude the immense services which you have rendered it, and is desirous that the first magistracy should remain immoveably in your hands. In securing that office to you during the term of your life, it only expresses the desire of the senate, as explained in the *senatus-consultum* of the 18th Floréal. The nation, by this solemn act of gratitude, imparts to you the duty of consolidating our institutions."

After this exordium, the president briefly enumerated the grand actions of general Bonaparte, both in war and peace; predicted prosperity for the future, without the misfortunes that no one then foresaw; and repeated, finally, that which, at the moment, was proclaimed by the utmost voice of fame. The president then read the text of the decree; and the first consul, bowing to the senate, replied in these fine words :—

"The life of a citizen is the property of his country. The French people will that mine should be entirely consecrated to its service. I am obedient to its will.

"By my efforts, by your aid, citizens, by the assistance of all the authorities, by the confidence and the will of this great people, the liberty, the equality, the prosperity of France, will be sheltered from the caprices of fortune and the uncertainties of futurity. The best of people will be the most happy, as it is most worthy of being, and its happiness will contribute to that of all Europe.

"Content thus to have been called by the command of that power from which all emanates, to bring back to this land, order, justice, and equality, I shall attend my last hour without regret and without inquietude, reposing upon the opinion of future generations."

After receiving the affectionate thanks of the senate, the first consul accompanied that body back to the ante-chamber, and continued his reception of strangers, who were presented to him by the ministers of England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Bavaria, Hesse, Wurtemberg, Spain, Naples, and America, for the whole world was, at that moment, at peace with France. On the same day, lords Holland and Grey, the same that are known to the present generation, were presented to the first consul, with a number of other individuals of distinction.

On the following day, the 4th of August, the new articles, containing the modification of the constitution, were submitted to the council of state. The first consul presided at this solemn sitting; he read the articles one after another, and explained the motives for each with energy and precision. He expressed his ideas upon each article, as has been already stated. He even started objections to them, and answered them himself. On the designation of a successor, there was a short discussion, in which might be perceived still some traces of the resistance which he had before offered to the arrangement. Petiet and Rœderer asserted that the designation of a successor, made by will, should be as binding as if it were made by a solemn adoption, in presence of the great bodies of the state. The first consul would not agree that such a will was as binding upon the senate, for the reason, that when a man was dead, however great he had been, he was then nothing; that his last will might be set aside or disobeyed, and that in submitting it for the ratification of the senate, he should only yield to an unavoidable necessity. Upon this occasion, there were some singular expressions which he let fall, which prove that, for the instant, he thought nothing more of hereditary succession. He remarked, when speaking of it, at least in substance, that it was not in accordance with prevailing manners and opinions. His nature did not lead him either to falsehood or hypocrisy; but placed as men always are under the influence of the present moment, he repelled the idea of hereditary succession, because he perceived that the minds of the people were very little disposed towards its adoption; and that, invested as he was, besides, with a power altogether monarchical, he was satisfied with the reality without the title. To judge from his language in this respect, he had frankly stated his mind upon the subject.

There were certain objections afterwards made against the institution of the privy council, on the part of the council of state, the power of which was somewhat diminished by that institution. Upon this subject the first consul discovered a little embarrassment, respecting a body which he had always so far treated with a marked predilection, and that he thus seemed to despoil of a part of its importance. He said that the privy council was only instituted for very rare cases, which required a rigorous secrecy, impossible to preserve in a body of forty or fifty individuals; that still the council of state would preserve continually the same importance as before, and take cognizance of all great affairs.

After some modifications of detail, the *senatus-consultum* was carried to the senate, and after a species of homologue, converted into an organic *senatus-consultum*. The following day, being the 5th of August, or 17th Thermidor, it was published with the customary forms, and thus became the supplement to the consular constitution.

France exhibited the deepest satisfaction. The family of the first consul had seen neither all their wishes nor all their fears accomplished; yet still it shared in the general contentment. Madame Bonaparte began to be more tranquil, now all thoughts of royalty seemed to have evaporated. This species of hereditary succession, which left to the chief of the state the care of choosing a successor, was all which she desired, because she had no child by general Bonaparte, and possessed a beloved daughter, the wife of Louis Bonaparte, who was about to become a mother. She wished to have, and she flattered herself she should have, a grandson. She thought to see in him the successor to the sceptre of the world. Her husband shared in her views. The brothers of Napoleon—he will henceforth be called by that name—were less satisfied, at least Lucien, whose continual activity of mind nothing would keep quiet. But an arrangement had been devised to please them, by an introduction into the organic articles. The law of the legion of honour had enacted, that the grand council of the legion should be composed of three consuls, and one representative from each of the great bodies of the state. The council of state had nominated Joseph Bonaparte to this post; the tribunate, Lucien. A disposition of the *senatus-consultum* enacted, that the members of the grand council of the legion of honour should be senators by right. The two brothers of Napoleon were then principal personages in that noble institution charged with the distribution of all the recompenses, and they were, as members of the senate, naturally called to exercise a great influence in that body. Joseph, moderate in his wishes, seemed to desire nothing more. Lucien was only half contented, and it was not in his nature to be more so. The first consul, in getting his colleagues Cambacérès and Lebrun made consuls for life, had endeavoured to keep near his person individuals who were pleased at his own elevation. He had succeeded. One personage alone at this period, so favourable to the advancement of every other person, was rather ill used; this was Fouché, the minister of police. Whether his advice, personal with regard to the schemes of the Bonaparte family, was noticed, or whether the efforts made to injure him with the master were successful, or, which is more probable, that the first consul wished to add to all his recent acts of clemency and reconcilement, a measure which had still more than others the aspect of confidence and oblivion, the ministry of police was suppressed.

This minister, as has been said elsewhere, then possessed an importance which he could never have had under a regular regime, thanks to the arbitrary power with which the government was invested, and thanks to the funds of which he disposed without controul. Emigrants returned or about to return, Vendeans, republicans, priests unsworn, he had to watch all these agents of mischief, and he performed his duty with no scrupulous feelings. But although Fouché executed the duties of his office with tact and a great deal of intelligence, he was still odious to the parties whom he thus kept under restraint. The first consul suppressed the ministry, and contented himself with making of the police merely a general direction attached to the ministry of justice. Réal, the councillor of state, was charged with that direction. The administration of justice was taken from M. Abrial, a clever man, wholly devoted to his business, but whose slow and laboured method of fulfilling his official duties was disagreeable to the first consul. His place was given to M. Regnier, afterwards duke of Massa, a learned and eloquent magistrate, who had inspired the chief that disposed of the fortunes of all with regard and confidence. M. Regnier received with the administration of justice the title of grand judge, a title newly created by the organic *senatus-consultum*. The nature of his qualifications rendered him little proper to direct M. Réal in the difficult investigations of the police; and thus M. Réal, transacting business immediately with the first consul, became well nigh independent of the minister of justice. Unfortunately, with M. Fouché was lost a knowledge of men, and of their relations with different parties, which he alone possessed in the same degree. This sacrifice, hastily made in subservience to the ideas of the hour, was made with too little reflection, and, as will soon be seen, consequences followed to be regretted. Still it must not be supposed that M. Fouché was to appear disgraced. A place was reserved for him in the senate, as well as for M. Abrial. In the act which nominated him a senator, M. Fouché obtained a flattering mention of his public services. It was even stated in the document, that if the necessities of the time should cause a reconstruction of the office, then suppressed, M. Fouché would be sought for to fill his old office of police minister, even on the benches of the senate.

There were some other changes in the personal part of the government. Rœderer, who did not very well coincide with M. Chaptal, the minister of the interior, in his views upon public instruction, which duty was confided to his care, gave up the post to the learned Fourcroy, and received, as Fouché and Abrial had done, a seat in the senate as an indemnity. The first consul also raised to the senate the respectable archbishop of Paris, M. de Belloy. In acting thus, he had no design to give the clergy any influence in political affairs, but he wished that all the great social interests

should be represented in the senate, the interest of religion as well as every other.

On the 15th of August, or 27th Thermidor, for the first time, the birth-day anniversary of the first consul was celebrated in France. This was the progressive introduction of monarchical usages, in making the birth-day of the sovereign a national festival. On the morning of that day, the first consul received the senate, the tribunate, the council of state, the clergy, the civil and military authorities of the capital, the diplomatic bodies, who came to congratulate him on the public joy, and his own private happiness. A *Te Deum* was sung at noon in the church of Notre Dame, and in all the churches of the republic. In the evening, there were brilliant illuminations, representing in Paris, here a figure of victory, there one of peace, and further on, upon one of the towers of Notre Dame, the sign of the zodiac, under which was born the author of all these benefits, for which the nation had to be thankful to Heaven.

Some days afterwards, on the 21st of August, or 3rd Fructidor, the first consul went in great pomp to take possession of the presidency of the senate. All the troops of the division were formed *en haie*, from the Tuileries to the palace of the Luxemburg. The carriage of the new master of France, escorted by a numerous staff, and by the mounted consular guard, was drawn by eight magnificent horses, as were formerly the carriages of the French kings. No one partook with him the honour of its occupation. In the carriages which followed came the second and third consuls, the ministers and presidents of the council of state. On arriving at the Luxemburg, the first consul was welcomed by a deputation of ten senators. Seated upon a chair very similar to a throne, he received the oaths of his two brothers, Lucien and Joseph, become senators by right, in their quality of members of the grand council of the legion of honour. After this formality was completed, the councillors of state, chosen especially for that purpose, presented five projects, each in the shape of a *senatus-consultum*, relative, the first to the ceremonials to be observed by the great authorities; the second, to the renewal, by series, of the legislative body and of the tribunate; the third, on the mode to be followed in case of the dissolution of these two assemblies; the fourth, on the designation of the twenty-four great cities of the republic; and, lastly, the fifth, upon the union of the isle of Elba with the French territory.

In order to attach to the senate the influence promised it, in the greater affairs of state, Talleyrand read a report of great moment, upon the arrangements which were preparing in Germany, under the direction of France, for indemnifying with the ecclesiastical principalities the hereditary princes who had been dispossessed of property on the left bank of the Rhine. This was, as will subsequently be seen in the course of this history, the greatest affair of the time. That business being once concluded, the world, it seemed probable, would remain at rest for a considerable time. In publishing to the senate in this report the views of France, the first consul announced to Europe his ideas upon this important subject; or, to be more explicit, he intimated his will, because it was well known that he was not a man to withdraw from giving effect to a resolution which he had once publicly announced. The reading of the report finished, Napoleon withdrew, leaving to the senate the care of examining the five *senatus-consulta* which had been submitted to them.

Accompanied back again by the ten senators who had received him upon his arrival, and greeted on his way by the acclamations of the people of Paris, the first consul re-entered the palace of the Tuileries like a constitutional monarch who had just held a royal sitting.

The summer was now far advanced, and the end of August approaching. The first consul took possession of the chateau of St. Cloud, which he had refused when it was first offered him for a country residence. Having changed his determination upon the matter, he had ordered repairs to be made in the building, which, at first inconsiderable, soon extended over the whole chateau. They had been just finished. The first consul, therefore, profited by such a moment to take up his residence in that beautiful edifice. There he received, on fixed days, the great functionaries of the state of all classes, foreigners, and ambassadors. On Sunday mass was said in the chapel; and those who had opposed the concordat soon began to attend, as in former times they had attended at Versailles. The first consul, accompanied with his wife, heard a short mass, and afterwards held conversations in the gallery of the chateau with those who were on a visit to him. These, arranged in two lines, awaited him, and listened to his words as they listened to those of royalty, or to those of men of genius. In this circle no one was heard or regarded but him. No potentate upon earth ever obtained or merited in the same degree the pure homage of which he was at that time the object, both on the part of France and of the whole world.

It was already the imperial authority which he subsequently assumed, but it was with the universal consent of the people, with forms less regal, but more worthy of that dignity, as there still remained a certain republican modesty, which agreed well with the new authority, and which reminded the spectator of Augustus, retaining, amidst the supreme power, the external habits of a Roman citizen.

At times, after pursuing a long route over a very extensive and beautiful country, the traveller stops for a moment upon some elevated spot, in order to contemplate the district over which he has journeyed: let us imitate his example here, let us pause for a moment, and casting a glance at the past, contemplate the prodigious labours of Bonaparte subsequently to the 18th Brumaire. What a profusion of events, what variety, what greatness of achievement are displayed!

After traversing the seas by a miracle and attaining France, surprised and delighted at his sudden re-appearance, he overthrew the directory, took the reins of power, accepted the constitution of Sieyès, modified in regard to the executive power in some measure, and having introduced a degree of order into the administration, re-established on a fresh system the collection and payment of the taxes, he raised public credit, sent off the first relief to the armies then in a state of privation, profited by the winter season to overwhelm La Vendée by a sudden union of troops, rapidly

brought these troops back to the frontier, and in the midst of the apparent confusion of these movements, created at the foot of the Alps, wholly unnoticed, an improbable army, destined to fall suddenly in the midst of the enemy that still refused to credit its existence. Every thing being ready to enter upon the campaign, he had offered to Europe the choice of peace or war, and war having been preferred by Europe, he had ordered the passage of the Rhine to take place, sent Moreau on to the Danube, placed Massena in Genoa, there to stop and retain the Austrian forces; then Moreau having thrown general Kray upon Ulm, Massena having upon the other side kept Melas before Genoa by his heroic defence of that place, he had himself on a sudden passed the Alps over an unbeaten track, with his artillery drawn in the excavated trunks of trees, appeared in the centre of astonished Italy, cut off the retreat of the Austrians, and in one decisive battle, several times lost and gained, had taken their army, crushed all the designs of the coalition, and extorted from Europe, in a state of utter consternation, an armistice of six months' duration.

It was during these six months of truce that the labours of the first consul became even more surprising still. Negotiating and attending to the government at the same time, he had changed the political aspect of things, turned the affections of Europe towards France and against England, gained the heart of Paul I., brought the uncertain court of Prussia to a decision, imparted to Denmark and Sweden the courage to resist maritime violence, of which their commerce was the object, united the league of the neutral powers against Great Britain, closed against her the ports of the continent from the Texel to Cadiz and from Cadiz to Otranto, and prepared immense armaments for the succour of Egypt. While performing all these things, he had completed the re-organization of the finances, restored credit, paid the obligations of the state in hard coin, created the bank of France, repaired the roads, repressed highway robbery, opened magnificent communications over the Alps, founded hospitals on their summits, undertaken the great fortifications of Alexandria, improved Mantua, opened canals, erected new bridges, and commenced the compilation of the codes of law. At length, Austria still hesitating to conclude a peace, he pushed Moreau in advance, and that general, after destroying the power of Austria in the memorable battle of Hohenlinden, had forced the promise of that peace under the very walls of Vienna, which was soon afterwards signed at Lunéville.

It was at this moment that a frightful crime, in the infernal machine, put into hazard the life of the first consul, and having irritated his fiery spirit, he was urged to the commission of the only fault of which he was guilty during the time when he exhibited such unequalled talent and moderation, this was the transportation, without trial, of the hundred and thirty revolutionists. Sad are the vicissitudes of violent men in revolutionary times! The assassins of September, in their turn thus struck down, neither found laws nor courage for their defence; while the tribunate, which opposed itself to the best measures of the first consul, did not dare to offer one word on behalf of these proscribed persons.

All powerful on the continent, having thrown into discredit and then expelled from office the two ministers who had formed all the coalitions against France, M. Thugut of Vienna, and Pitt of London, the first consul had thrown upon England the entire of Europe. Nelson, by the blow inflicted on the Danes in Copenhagen, and the Russians by assassinating their emperor, had saved England from the disasters which threatened her; but in thus saving her from these disasters, they had not imparted to her the courage or the means to carry on the war.

The English nation, struck alike with fear and admiration of the achievements of Bonaparte, had finally consented to the peace of Amiens, the finest ever concluded by France.

The temple of Janus was thus closed; and then the first consul wished to add to the peace with the European powers a peace with the church. He hastened, therefore, to negotiate the concordat, to reconcile Rome with the revolution, to re-erect the altars, to render to France all that was necessary to civilized society; and having arrived at the third year of his consulship, he presented himself to the two legislative assemblies, bearing peace in his hand, both on land and sea, peace with heaven, an amnesty to all proscribed persons, a magnificent code of laws, an effectual system of public education, and a glorious scheme of public honours. Although he presented himself with his hands full of these gifts, he had still encountered an unexpected, violent, and senseless opposition, arising out of good and evil feelings, from envy in some, and in others from the desire of a liberty impracticable at that time. Delivered from this by the cleverness of his colleague Cambacérès, which, in his anger, he would else have violently crushed, he had at this point attained the end of his toils, and had succeeded in procuring the national assent to the treaties concluded with Europe, to the concordat, to his system of lay and national education, and to the legion of honour, and in receiving, as the recompense of his services, the consular power for life, and the greatness of a Roman emperor. At this moment he resumed the labour of forming the codes of law, became arbiter of all the clashing continental interests, reformed the German constitution, and distributed the territories to the different princes, with an equity and justice acknowledged by all Europe.

Now, if forgetting all which has passed subsequently, we imagine for a moment this dictator, then so necessary to France, remaining as discreet as he was powerful, uniting those opposite qualities, which God, it is true, has never yet united in the same individual, that vigour of genius which constitutes the great soldier, with that patience which is the distinctive trait in the founder of an empire, calming, by a long peace, the agitated state of the French social body, and preparing it by degrees for that freedom which is both the honour and necessity of modern nations; then after having made France so great, appeasing in place of irritating the jealousies of the European nations; changing into permanency the general policy and the territorial demarcations settled at Lunéville and Amiens, finally terminating his career by an act worthy of the Antonines, by finding, no matter where, the most worthy successor to himself, and

leaving to him this organized France, prepared to enjoy liberty, and for ever aggrandized; what man would have equalled him! But this man, in war great as Cæsar, politic as Augustus, virtuous as Marcus Aurelius, would have been more than man; and Providence has given the world no divinities to be its rulers.

Yet still at this period he appeared so moderate after having been so victorious; he exhibited himself so profound a legislator after proving his greatness as a soldier; he showed so much love for the arts of peace, having so much excelled in those of war, that he might well be able to raise illusions in France and in the world. Only a few among those who were in his councils, and were capable of observing the future through the present, were affected with uneasiness as well as admiration in observing the indefatigable activity of his mind and body, the energy of his will, and the impetuosity of his desires. They trembled even at seeing him do good in the way he performed it, so great was his impatience to accomplish it rapidly, and upon such an extended scale. The wise Tronchet, notwithstanding, who at once admired and loved him, regarding him as the saviour of France, observed one day to Cambacérès, with melancholy feeling, "This young man has commenced like Cæsar; I fear that he will end like Cæsar."

BOOK XV.

THE SECULARIZATIONS.

CONGRATULATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE FIRST CONSUL BY THE FOREIGN CABINETS, UPON HIS ACCESSION TO THE CONSULATE FOR LIFE.—FIRST EFFECTS OF THE PEACE WITH ENGLAND.—ENGLAND DESIRES A TREATY OF COMMERCE WITH FRANCE.—DIFFICULTY OF RECONCILING THE MERCANTILE INTERESTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.—PAMPHLETS WRITTEN IN LONDON BY THE EMIGRANTS AGAINST THE FIRST CONSUL.—RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH SPAIN.—THE DUCHY OF PARMA BECOMES VACANT, AND THE COURT OF MADRID WISHES TO ADD THAT DUCHY TO THE KINGDOM OF ETRURIA.—THE NECESSITY OF ADJOURNING ANY RESOLUTION UPON THE SUBJECT.—DEFINITIVE UNION OF PIEDMONT WITH FRANCE.—ACTUAL POLICY OF THE FIRST CONSUL IN REGARD TO ITALY.—GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH THE HOLY SEE.—MOMENTARY DISPUTE ABOUT THE PROMOTION OF FRENCH CARDINALS.—THE FIRST CONSUL OBTAINS THE GRANT OF FIVE AT ONCE.—HE MAKES A PRESENT TO THE POPE OF TWO BRIGS OF WAR, CALLED THE "ST. PETER" AND "ST. PAUL."—QUARREL WITH THE DEY OF ALGIERS PROMPTLY TERMINATED.—TROUBLES IN SWITZERLAND.—DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS CONSTITUTION.—THE UNITED AND THE OLIGARCHICAL PARTIES.—JOURNEY TO PARIS OF THE LANDAMMAN REDING.—HIS PROMISES TO THE FIRST CONSUL SOON BELIED BY EVENTS.—EXPULSION OF THE LANDAMMAN REDING, AND RETURN OF THE MODERATE PARTY TO POWER.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 29TH OF MAY, AND DANGER OF NEW TROUBLES, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE FEEBLENESS OF THE HELVETIC GOVERNMENT.—EFFORTS OF THE OLIGARCHICAL PARTY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE GREAT POWERS TOWARDS SWITZERLAND.—THEIR ATTENTION DRAWN EXCLUSIVELY TO THE AFFAIRS OF GERMANY.—STATE OF GERMANY AFTER THE TREATY OF LUNÉVILLE.—PRINCIPLE OF THE SECULARIZATIONS LAID DOWN BY THAT TREATY.—THE SUPPRESSION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL STATES BRINGS WITH IT GREAT CHANGES IN THE GERMANIC CONSTITUTION.—DESCRIPTION OF THIS CONSTITUTION.—THE PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC PARTIES; PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA; THEIR VARIOUS PRETENSIONS.—EXTENT AND VALUE OF THE TERRITORIES TO BE DISTRIBUTED.—AUSTRIA ENDEAVOURS TO OBTAIN INDEMNIFICATION FOR THE DOMAINS OF WHICH THE ARCHDUKES HAD BEEN DESPOILED IN ITALY, AND MAKES USE OF IT TO DISPOSSESS BAVARIA OF THE TERRITORY FROM THE INN TO THE ISAR.—PRUSSIA, UNDER THE PRETEXT OF INDEMNIFYING HERSELF FOR WHAT SHE HAS LOST UPON THE RHINE, AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HOUSE OF ORANGE FOR ITS LOSSES, IS IN HOPES TO CREATE FOR ITSELF A CONSIDERABLE ESTABLISHMENT IN FRANCONIA.—DESPAIR OF THE SMALLER COURTS, THREATENED BY THE AMBITION OF THE GREATER ONES.—ALL IN GERMANY FIX THEIR REGARD UPON THE FIRST CONSUL.—HE DETERMINES TO INTERPERE, IN ORDER TO SEE THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF LUNÉVILLE, AND TERMINATE A BUSINESS WHICH MIGHT IN A MOMENT EMBROIL ALL EUROPE.—HE CHOOSES TO ALLY HIMSELF WITH PRUSSIA, AND SUPPORT TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE PRETENSIONS OF THAT POWER.—THE SCHEME OF INDEMNITY AGREED UPON, IN CONCERT WITH PRUSSIA AND THE LESSER GERMAN PRINCES.—THIS SCHEME COMMUNICATED TO RUSSIA.—AN OFFER MADE TO THIS COURT TO CONCUR WITH FRANCE IN THE GREAT MEDIATORY INTERPERENCE.—THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER ACCEPTS THE OFFER.—FRANCE AND RUSSIA PRESENT TO THE DIET AT RATISBON, IN QUALITY OF MEDIATING POWERS, THE SCHEME OF INDEMNITY AGREED UPON AT PARIS.—DESPAIR OF AUSTRIA, ABANDONED BY ALL THE OTHER CABINETS, AND HER RESOLUTION TO OPPOSE TO THE SCHEME OF THE FIRST CONSUL, THE SLUGGISHNESS OF THE GERMANIC CONSTITUTION.—THE FIRST CONSUL DEFEATS THIS CALCULATION OF AUSTRIA, AND OBTAINS THE ADOPTION, BY AN EXTRAORDINARY DEPUTATION, OF THE PROPOSED PLAN, WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS.—AUSTRIA, TO INTIMIDATE THE PRUSSIAN PARTY, THAT FRANCE SUPPORTS, OCCUPIES PASSAU.—PROMPT RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST CONSUL, AND HIS THREAT TO HAVE RECOURSE TO ARMS.—GENERAL INTIMIDATION.—CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATION.—DEBATES IN THE DIET.—THE SCHEME SHACKLED FOR A MOMENT BY THE

AVIDITY OF PRUSSIA.—THE FIRST CONSUL, TO PUT AN END TO IT, MAKES A CONCESSION TO THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA, AND GRANTS TO IT THE BISHOPRIC OF AICHSTEDT.—THE COURT OF VIENNA YIELDS, AND ADOPTS THE TERMS OF THE DIET.—THE REGISTRY OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF FEBRUARY, 1803, AND DEFINITIVE REGULATION OF THE AFFAIRS OF GERMANY.—CHARACTER OF THIS FINE AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION.

The elevation of general Bonaparte to the supreme power, under the title of "consul for life," neither surprised nor displeased the European cabinets. The larger part among them, on the contrary, saw in it a new pledge of repose for every state. In England, where they observed with suspicious attention every thing that passed in France, the premier Addington expressed himself to M. Otto the satisfaction of the British government, and the entire approbation with which it saw an event destined to consolidate order and government in that country. Although the ambition of Bonaparte began to inspire some fears, he was still so far pardoned, because at that moment he was employed in rendering dominant the French republic. The re-establishment of the altars, and the recall of the emigrants, had delighted the English aristocracy and the pious George III. in particular. In Prussia the evidences of the same thing had not been less significant. This court, compromised in the esteem of the European diplomacy for having concluded a peace with the national convention, felt itself proud to maintain relations of amity with a government so full of genius, and esteemed itself happy to see the affairs of France definitively placed in the hands of a man of whom it hoped to obtain the concurrence in its own ambitious objects regarding Germany. M. Haugwitz addressed the warmest congratulations to the French ambassador, and he went so far as to say, that it would have been more simple to have finished at once, and to have converted into an hereditary sovereignty that life dictatorship which had been conferred upon the first consul.

The emperor Alexander, who affected to appear a stranger to the prejudices of the Russian aristocracy, and who carried on with the head of the French government a frequent and amicable correspondence, expressed himself, as far as regarded the later changes, in terms of courtesy and approbation. He complimented the new consul for life with as much earnestness as frankness. The ground of these congratulations was always the same. They were as full of praises in Petersburg as in Berlin or London, at seeing order secured in France in a manner that promised to be durable through the indefinite prolongation of the authority of the first consul. At Vienna, where they were fuller of resentful recollections, besides those arising from the blow struck by the sword of the conqueror of Marengo, a sort of good feeling seemed to be generated towards him. The hatred to the revolution had been so great in that capital of the old Germanic empire, that the victories of the general were pardoned to the energetic and obeyed chief magistate. They even affected to consider his government as altogether opposed to the revolution, when in reality it was no more than reparation. The archduke Charles, who then governed the war department, said to M. Champagny, that the first consul had made himself, by his campaigns, the greatest soldier of modern times; that by his administration of the government for three years, he had shown himself the most able of statesmen; and that in thus joining the merit of good government to that of arms, he had put the seal to his glory. That which seemed more remarkable still was, that the celebrated queen of Naples, Caroline, mother of the empress of Austria, a determined enemy of the French revolution, being in Vienna, and seeing there M. Champagny, charged him with her hearty congratulations for the chief of the French republic. "General Bonaparte," she said, "is a great man. He has done me much mischief, but the mischief he has done does not prevent my acknowledgment of his ability and genius. In repressing disorder in your country, he has rendered a service to us all. If he has arrived to be the head of the state in his own country, it is because he was most worthy of the honour. I constantly hold him up as the model for the young princes of the imperial family; I exhort them to study the conduct of that extraordinary personage; to learn from him how to govern nations—how, by the power of genius and glory, to render supportable the yoke of authority."

No suffrage in his favour could certainly be so flattering to the first consul as that of this queen, a vanquished enemy, as remarkable for her talent as for the warmth of her passions. The holy father, who had joined in common with the first consul in putting a hand to the great work of re-establishing public worship, and who, despite many things to produce a contrary idea, deemed this the glory of his reign—the holy father himself was delighted to see mount, step by step, towards the throne, the man whom he regarded as the most solid support of religion against the irreligious prejudices of the age. He expressed his satisfaction with a feeling of true paternal affection. Finally, Spain, where the frivolous and disjointed policy of the favourite had for a moment estranged France, did not remain silent upon this occasion, and showed itself satisfied at an event which she agreed with the other courts in regarding as fortunate for all Europe.

It was, therefore, in the midst of the applauses bestowed upon him by all the world, that this repairer of so many evils, this author of so much good, laid hold of the new power with which the nation was about to invest him. He was treated as the real sovereign of France. The foreign ministers spoke of him to those of France with such forms of respect as are only employed when speaking of monarchs themselves. The etiquette already observed was nearly monarchical. The French ambassadors had taken the livery of the first consul, which was green. This was found a simple, natural, and necessary thing. The unanimous adhesion to an elevation so sudden and prodigious, was sincere. Some secret apprehensions mingled here it is true; but they were in any case prudently dissimulated. It was possible, in fact, to discover in the elevation of the first consul his ambition, and in his ambition the approaching humiliation of Europe; but they were only those minds which were most gifted with foresight that were able to penetrate thus deeply into the future;

but these were the minds that felt most strongly the immensity of the benefit already received from the consular government. Still congratulations are but passing things; real business, as in the case of individuals, comes back to load the existence of governments, with its uniform and heavy preponderance.

In England they began to be sensible of the real effects of peace. These effects, as almost always happens in the world, did not answer to the expectations formed of its benefits. Three hundred British vessels arrived at once in the French ports, but were not able to dispose of their entire cargoes, because they brought over merchandize prohibited by the laws of the revolution. The old treaty of 1786, having opened imprudently the French markets to the productions of Great Britain, those of France, more particularly the cotton manufacture, had in a little time been destroyed. Since the renewal of the war, the prohibitory measures adopted by the revolutionary government had operated as a principle of new life to the manufactures of the country, that in the midst of the most fearful political convulsions had renewed their flight, and soared to a remarkable elevation. The first consul, as already noticed here, at the moment of the signature of the preliminary treaty in London, had taken care not to alter this state of things, nor to renew the evils which had resulted from the treaty of 1786. Importations from England were in consequence rendered very difficult of entry, and the merchants of the city of London made heavy complaints. Still a contraband trade remained, which was carried on to a great extent, either by the frontiers of Belgium, which were ill guarded, or by way of Hamburg. The merchants of this last place, while introducing English merchandize on the continent, and disguising its origin, managed as well to penetrate into France, as into the countries placed under its power. Despite the legal prohibitions, which attended the import of British goods into French ports, the contraband trade was able to discover inlets for itself. The manufactures of Manchester and Birmingham were disposed of with great activity.

This activity, the low price of bread, and the announced suppression of the income-tax, were subjects of satisfaction, which, to a certain point, balanced the discontent of the larger merchants. But this discontent was considerable, because the larger merchants profited little by speculations founded upon contraband trade. They found the sea covered with the flags of rivals or enemies; they were deprived of the monopoly of navigation, which secured trade during the war, and had now no longer an indemnity for themselves in the financial operations of Mr. Pitt. Thus they complained loudly enough of the illusions of the policy that supported peace, its inconveniences for England, and its exclusive advantages for France. The disarming of the fleets left idle an immense number of seamen, to whom the commercial marine of England could not, at that moment, give employment; these unfortunate men were seen wandering about on the wharfs of the Thames, sometimes even reduced to great misery; a spectacle as afflicting to the English as it would be for the French to see the victors of Marengo and Hohenlinden begging their bread in the streets of Paris.

Addington, always actuated by amicable feelings, had made the first consul sensible of the necessity of making some commercial arrangements which should be satisfactory to the two countries, and had pointed it out as the means most capable of consolidating the peace. The first consul partook in the disposition of Addington; he had consented to nominate an agent for the purpose, and to send him to London, in order to seek, in concert with the English ministers, what would be the best manner to adjust the interests of both nations, without sacrificing French industry.

But this was a problem difficult to solve. The impression upon the public mind in London was such regarding every thing which concerned the commercial arrangements, that the arrival of the French agent made a great noise. He was called Coquebert; they called him Colbert; they said he was a descendant of the great Colbert, and much commended the suitableness of such a choice for the conclusion of a treaty of commerce.

Despite the capacity and good will of this agent, a happy result from his labours was hardly to be hoped. Both on one side and the other, the sacrifices to be made were considerable, and nearly destitute of compensation. The manufactures of iron and cotton constitute, at this day, the better portion of the riches arising from the industry both of France and England, and are the principal objects of commercial rivalry. The French have succeeded in forging iron, in spinning and weaving cotton, in an immense quantity, and at a very low price, and are naturally little disposed to sacrifice these two branches of manufacture. The manufacture of iron was, at that time, not very considerable. It was, above all, in the weaving of cotton and in hardware that the two nations sought to rival each other. The English demanded that France should open her markets to their cotton and iron goods. The first consul, sensitive to the alarm of the French manufacturers, and impatient to develop in France manufacturing wealth, refused every concession which was contrary to these patriotic intentions. The English, on their side, were then no more inclined than they are now, to favour the special products of France [1]. The wines and silks of France were the articles which France wished to introduce into England. They refused to admit them for two reasons: the treaty binding England to give a preference to Portuguese wines, and the desire to promote the silk manufacture in England, which had begun to develop itself there. Whilst the interdiction of the communications between the two countries had made the cotton manufacture valued in France, the English, in like manner, had set a value upon the manufacture of silk. It is true, that the development of the manufacture of cotton in France had become immense, because nothing hindered its complete success; while that of silk in England, on the contrary, found only a middling success, in conse-

[1] This is hardly correct. French wine now pays no more duty than that of other countries. Then it paid a higher duty than Portuguese, under a treaty exhibiting a deplorable ignorance of the first principles of commerce, happily now no more.—*Translator.*

quence of the climate, and because of a certain inferiority of taste. Yet, still, the English would not sacrifice to France either the Methuen treaty, which bound them to Portugal, nor their beginning silk manufacture, of which they had conceived such exaggerated hopes.

To adjust such clashing interests was well-nigh impossible. It had been proposed to establish, upon the entry into both countries, on the merchandize imported into either the one or the other, duties equal to the benefits which the contrabandist received, in such a mode as to render free and profitable to the treasury of the public a commerce very beneficial to the smuggler. This proposition alarmed the French and English manufacturers. Besides this, the first consul, convinced of the necessity of great means to produce great results, considering at this time the interests of the cotton manufacturers to be the principal, the most desirable of all, determined to insure to it the vast encouragement of an absolute prohibition of the rival manufacture.

To escape all these difficulties, the French agent conceived a system very seducing at first sight, but nearly impracticable. He proposed to suffer the entrance into France of the productions of England, whatever they might be, with moderate duties, on the condition, that the ships which introduced them should immediately export an equivalent value in French productions [1]. It was to be the same for the vessels of France proceeding to England. This was, in a certain manner, to encourage the national industry in the same proportion as that of the stranger. There was, in this combination, another advantage, it was to take from the English a means of influence, of which they made a formidable usage in some countries, thanks to their vast capital—a means of influence which consisted in giving credit to the nations with which they traded, and thus rendering them creditors in considerable sums, and in some sort make themselves masters of their commerce. This conduct they had held in Russia and in Portugal. They were become possessors of a part of the capital circulating in these states. In giving this credit, they encouraged the consumption of their merchandize, and assured themselves besides of the superiority of him who lends over him who borrows. The impossibility that the trade of Russia should pass out of their hands, an impossibility so great, that the emperors were not free in the choice of peace or war, unless they chose to die under the poignard, sufficiently proves the danger of this superiority.

The combination proposed, which tended to inclose the commerce of England within certain limits, presented, unfortunately, so many difficulties in the execution, that it was not possible to adopt it. But, in the meanwhile, it employed the imaginations of the public, and left a certain hope to spread itself abroad. This incompatibility of commercial interests did not in itself suffice to cause the renewal of the war between the two countries, if their political views could be conciliated, and above all, if Mr. Addington should succeed in sustaining himself against the ministry of Mr. Pitt.

Mr. Addington, regarding himself as the author of the peace, well knew that it was his sole advantage against Mr. Pitt, and he wished to preserve the advantage. In a long conversation with M. Otto, he had spoken upon the subject in the most sensible and amicable manner. A treaty of commerce, he said, would be the safest guarantee, and the most lasting for the duration of the peace. In the mean time, it must be understood, that some management of the first consul, upon particular heads, will be found necessary to keep up a good disposition in the English public towards France. You have, in reality, taken possession of Italy by uniting Piedmont to France, and in conferring upon the first consul the presidency of the Italian republic; your troops occupy Switzerland; and you regulate the political affairs of Germany. Let us pass over all these extensions of the power of France; we leave to you the continent. But there are countries about which, at certain times, the minds of the English people are very apt to get into an excitement; as Holland and Turkey. You are masters of Holland; this is a natural consequence of your position upon the Rhine. But do not add any thing ostensible to the real domination which you actually exercise in that country. If you would wish, for example, to do as you have already done in Italy, by seeking to manage for the first consul to obtain the presidentship of that republic, the commercial men of England will see in that a manner of uniting Holland to France, and will become at once in a state of great alarm. As to Turkey, any new manifestation whatever of the ideas that produced the expedition to Egypt will cause in England a sudden and a universal explosion. I pray you then, do not create for us any difficulty of that nature; conclude an arrangement upon the subject of our commercial affairs; obtain the guarantee of the powers for the order of Malta, so that we may be able to evacuate that island, and you will see the peace consolidated, and the last signs of animosity disappear [1].

These words of Mr. Addington's were sincere, and he gave a proof of it in making use of the utmost diligence to obtain from the different powers the guarantee of the new order of things constituted at Malta by the treaty of Amiens. Unfortunately M. Talleyrand, by a negligence which he suffered sometimes to prevail in the most important business, had omitted to give to the French agents the proper instructions relative to the subject, and he left the English agents to solicit by themselves the guarantee which was the previous condition of the evacuation of Malta. Hence there resulted the most vexatious slowness, and still later the most

[1] A remarkable example of the ignorance of true commercial principles existing at that time is found here. How is all trade carried on but by the exchange of manufactures in the same way, only the operation is less direct, and not being perceptible, is on that account not credited? Wine is even now frequently exchanged for coals, directly conveyed from England to the south of France, in the natural course of trade, which is the same thing as if directly brought about by a similar treaty. They did not acknowledge this in 1802; and many do not think now, on the continent, that all trade is but this same exchange more indirectly effected.—*Translator.*

[1] These words are an exact summary of several conversations given in the despatches of M. Otto.—*Note of the Author.*

disagreeable consequences. Mr. Addington was therefore in good faith in his desire to maintain peace. Provided he was not overcome by the ascendancy of Mr. Pitt, he was justified in hoping for its preservation. But Mr. Pitt out of the cabinet was as powerful as ever. While Dundas, Wyndham, and Grenville, had publicly attacked the preliminaries of London and the treaty of Amiens, he kept himself at a distance, leaving to his friends the odium of these open provocations to war, profiting by their violence, keeping an imposing silence, preserving uniformly the sympathies of the old majority of which he had had the support during eighteen years, and abandoning it to Mr. Addington when he believed the moment came for his retirement. He did not allow himself to perform any act which could be construed into the resemblance of an hostile bearing towards the minister. He always called Mr. Addington his friend, but he knew at the same time he had only to give the signal for the overthrow of parliament. The king hated him, and wished him to remain out, but the commercial men of England were devoted to him, and had confidence in him alone. His friends, less prudent than he, carried on an undisguised war against Mr. Addington, and they were believed to be the true organs of Pitt's real opinions. To this tory opposition there joined, without any understanding with him, and even while combating it, the old whig opposition of Fox and Sheridan. These had constantly called for peace, and since he had procured it, had obeyed the common inclination of the human heart, always tending to love that least which it has in its possession. They seemed to appreciate no longer this peace, before so much cried up, and they suffered the exaggerating friends of Mr. Pitt to talk as they liked when they declaimed against France. Besides, the French revolution, under the new and less liberal form which it had assumed, appeared to have lost a part of the sympathy of the whigs. Mr. Addington had therefore two species of adversaries, the tory opposition and friends of Mr. Pitt, who had always complained of the peace and assailed it, and the whig opposition, which had begun to assail it but little less. If the ministry had been overturned, Pitt was the sole person who could have become minister, and with him a return to war would appear inevitable, an exasperated, cruel war, without any other end than the ruin of one of the two nations. By a misfortune, one of those faults which the impatience of oppositions often makes them commit, had procured for Mr. Pitt an unheard-of triumph. Although attacking already the minister Addington, in common, though not in concert, with the aggravating friends of Pitt, the whig opposition had for the last an implacable hatred. Sir Francis Burdett made a motion tending to provoke an inquiry into the actual situation in which Pitt had left the country at the end of his long administration. The friends of the minister rose with great warmth, and for this proposition substituted another, which consisted mainly of a motion to demand from the king some mark of national gratitude for the great statesman who had saved the English constitution and doubled its power. These were for going at once to the vote. The opposing party then drew back, and demanded an adjournment of some days. Pitt agreed to grant the adjournment with a sort of disdain. The motion was ultimately resumed, and Pitt thought proper to be absent, and in his absence, after a very warm discussion, an immense majority rejected the motion of Burdett, and substituted one which contained the finest possible expression of national acknowledgment for the ex-minister. In the middle of the contest the minister Addington disappeared. Pitt then became aggrandized by the hatred of his enemies, and his return to the head of affairs was at once a hazard for the repose of the world. Still more was supposed than was real, from the want of knowledge of his designs, while he never let fall a word from which it was possible to infer that he intended peace or war.

The English newspapers, without returning to their former violent language, were evidently more cool towards the first consul, and began to declaim anew against the ambition of France. They did not, however, make any approach to the odious violence to which they descended at a later period. This character was left, it must be spoken with sorrow, to the French emigrants, whom the peace had deprived of all their hopes, and who sought, in outrages upon the first consul and their country, to revive the discord between two nations, whom it was but too easy to irritate against one another. A pamphleteer, named Peltier, devoted to the service of the Bourbon princes, wrote against the first consul, against his wife, his sisters, and brothers, the most abominable pamphlets, in which he attributed to them all, every sort of vice. These pamphlets, received by the English with a disdain which a free nation, accustomed to the freedom of the press, condemned for its excesses, produced an effect in Paris totally different. They filled with bitter resentment the heart of the first consul; and vulgar writers, the instruments of the basest passions, had the power of reaching, amidst his glory, the greatest of men; like those insects that, by their nature, direct themselves to torment the noblest animals in the creation. Happy is the nation a long while accustomed to that freedom! The vile agents of defamation are there deprived of the means of effecting mischief; they are there so known, so despised, that they have no more the power to annoy great minds.

With these outrages were joined the intrigues of the famous Georges, and those of the bishops of Arras and of St. Pol de Leon, who were at the head of the recusant bishops. The police had surprised the emissaries of the party carrying about pamphlets in La Vendée, and endeavouring to arouse the hatred and animosity not yet quite extinct. These causes, despicable as they were, nevertheless produced a truly uneasy feeling, and finished by a demand on the part of the French cabinet, very embarrassing for that of England. The first consul, too sensitive to these attacks, more worthy of scorn than anger, requested, in virtue of the alien bill, the expulsion of Peltier, Georges, and the bishops of Arras and St. Pol from England. Mr. Addington, placed in the midst of adversaries ready to reproach him with the smallest condescension towards France, did not precisely refuse what was thus desired, and was fully authorized by the English law; but he endeavoured to temporize, and alleged the necessity of managing public opinion, remarkably sus-

ceptible in England, and at the moment ready to shift under the influence of party declamation. The first consul, accustomed to despise parties, but little comprehended such reasons, and complained of the feebleness of Addington, the English minister, in a way so haughty, as to be nearly offensive. During all this time, the relations of the two cabinets did not cease to be friendly. Both did their utmost endeavour to prevent a renewal of the war, scarcely just before terminated. Mr. Addington attached to that his honour and his existence as a minister. The first consul saw in the continuance of the peace, the ground of new glory for himself, and the accomplishment of noble ideas connected with the public prosperity.

Spain had begun to breathe after its long misery. The galleons were, as formerly, the sole resource of the government. Large quantities of dollars, kept, during the war, in the captain generalship's treasuries in Peru and Mexico, had been now brought into Europe. There had already been near three hundred millions of francs received. If any other government than that of an incapable and careless favourite had been in charge of her destiny, Spain had been able to redeem her credit, to restore her naval power, and to place herself in a state to appear in a manner worthy of herself in the wars with which the world was still threatened. But the metallic wealth of America, received and dispensed by the most unskilful hands, was not employed for the noble purposes to which it should have been directed. The smallest part served to sustain the credit of the paper money; the larger part to pay the expenses of the court. Nothing, or nearly nothing, was devoted to the arsenals of Ferrol, Cadiz, or Carthagena. All that Spain knew how to do, was to complain of the French alliance, to impute to it the loss of Trinidad, as if she had to impute to France the disgraceful part that the prince of the peace had played her, whether in war or in negotiation. An alliance is not profitable, unless it brings to an ally a real strength, which the ally appreciates, and which it is obliged to regard as of great consequence. But Spain, when she made common cause with France, drawn into a maritime war by the clearest evidence of her own interests, did not know how to support that cause in which she was engaged; became almost an embarrassment rather than a help to her ally, and so conducted herself subsequently as to be always discontented with herself and with others. It was thus that she passed, by little and little, from a state of intimate connexion to a state of hostility in regard to France. The French division of the army sent into Portugal, had been treated with indignity, as has been shown, and it had required one of the thundering menaces of the first consul to put a stop to the consequences of this insensate conduct. From that time the relations between the two countries had become a little better. There had been between the two powers, besides general interests, which for a century were common to both countries, certain interests of the moment, which were strongly borne in the hearts of the king and queen of Spain, and which were of a nature to make them draw near to the first consul. These were the interests arising out of the creation of the kingdom of Etruria.

The court of Madrid complained of the tone of superiority which the minister of France, general Clarke, assumed at Florence. The first consul had rectified this complaint, ordering general Clarke to give fewer counsels and milder advice to the young infants who had been called in to reign there. In regard to the court of Spain, the first consul had suffered the old grand duke of Parma, the brother of queen Louisa, to die in full enjoyment of the grand duchy. That prince being no more, the grand duchy belonged to France, in virtue of the treaty by which the kingdom of Etruria was constituted. Charles IV. and the queen, his wife, coveted Parma ardently for their children, because by this addition Etruria would become the second state in Italy. The first consul did not absolutely oppose by a direct refusal the wishes of the royal family of Spain, but he demanded time, not to give too much offence to the greater courts by doing an all-powerful act. By keeping this duchy in reserve, too, he left to the cabinets, which protected the old rulers of Piedmont, the hope of an indemnity for that unlucky dynasty; he left the pope to see the hope of an amelioration in his present condition, so painful to him after the loss of the Legations; he left the affairs of Italy, in fact, to their repose for a short time, having been so much before the eyes of Europe for many years past. Although differing, the new transactions on the subject of Parma had soon brought the two cabinets of Paris and Madrid back again towards one another. Charles IV. had gone to Barcelona with his queen and court in great pomp to celebrate a double marriage, that of the presumptive heir of the crown of Spain, Ferdinand VII., with a princess of Naples, and that of the heir of the crown of Naples with an infanta of Spain. There was exhibited in the capital of Catalonia upon this occasion the most extraordinary luxury, much too costly for the existing state of the Spanish finances. From this city the most gracious professions of kindness were exchanged with the consular government. Charles IV. was impressed with the idea of announcing this double marriage of his children to the first consul as to a sovereign friend. The first consul had answered with the same earnestness, and in a tone of the most frank cordiality. Always occupied with grave interests, he had profited of that moment to ameliorate the commercial relations of the two countries. He had not been able to obtain the introduction of the cotton goods of France, because the government of Charles IV. wished to nurture the incipient manufacturers of Catalonia, but he had obtained the establishment of the old advantages accorded in the peninsula to the larger part of the productions of France. He was, above all, desirous of succeeding in the introduction into France of the fine races of Spanish sheep, an object in his sight of the greatest importance. Anterior to this, the national convention had had the happy idea of inserting in the treaty of Basle a secret article, by which Spain should be obliged to permit to pass out of that country, for five years, a thousand ewes, a hundred merino rams per annum, with fifty stallions, and a hundred and fifty Andalusian mares. In the midst of the troubles of that time, neither sheep nor horses had been purchased for that purpose. By an order of the first consul, the

minister of the interior was ordered to send agents into the peninsula, with the mission of purchasing in one year that which it had been agreed to execute in five. The government of Spain, always jealous about the exclusive possession of these fine animals, obstinately refused what had been thus required of it, and alleged as an excuse the great mortality of several preceding years. There were still seven millions of these merino sheep calculated to be remaining, and five or six thousand it could not be difficult to find. After a considerable resistance, the Spanish government gave way to the wishes of the first consul, stipulating for some delays in the accomplishment. The relations between the two courts had thus become all at once amicable. General Beurnonville, recently ambassador at Berlin, quitted that city in order to take up his residence at Madrid. He was invited to attend the festivities of the royal family given at Barcelona.

The security of navigation in the Mediterranean in a particular manner occupied at this time the solicitude of the first consul. The dey of Algiers had been so ill advised as to treat France as he treated the Christian powers of the second order. Two French vessels had been stopped on their voyage, and conducted to Algiers. A French officer had been molested in the road of Tunis by an Algerine officer. The crew of a vessel, wrecked on the coast of Africa, had been retained prisoners by the Arabs. The fishery for coral was interrupted, and, in fact, a Neapolitan vessel had been captured by African corsairs, in the waters of the Hyeres Isles. On being questioned upon these different occurrences, the Algerine government dared to demand, in order to do France common justice, the payment of the same tribute as that exacted from Spain and the Italian powers. The first consul, indignant, sent off instantly an officer of his palace, the adjutant Hullin, with a letter for the dey. In that letter he reminded him that he had destroyed the empire of the Mamelukes, and announced to him that he would send a squadron and an army; he threatened him with the conquest of all that part of the coast of Africa, if the French and Italians were detained, and the captured vessels were not immediately restored, and if a promise were not made to respect in future the flags of France and Italy. "God has decided," he wrote, "that all those who are unjust towards me shall be punished. I will destroy your city and your port; I will invade your shores myself, if you do not respect France, of which I am chief, and Italy, where I command."

That which he thus said, the first consul had thoughts of executing, because he had before made the remark, that the north of Africa was a country of great fertility, and was able to admit of cultivation by the hands of Europeans, in place of serving for the abode of a den of pirates. Three vessels left Toulon, two were in the road, and five were ordered from the ocean up the Mediterranean. But all the preparations were useless. The dey soon learning with what sort of power he was dealing, threw himself at the feet of the conqueror of Egypt, gave up all the Christian captives whom he had detained, the Neapolitan and French vessels which had been taken, pronounced sentence of death against the agents of whom the French had to complain, and only granted them their lives upon the demand made for mercy towards them by the minister of France. He re-established the coral fishery, and promised for the French and Italian flags an equal and perfect respect.

Italy was quite tranquil. The new Italian republic had begun to be organized under the direction of the president which it had chosen, and who by his powerful authority repressed the disorderly movements to which a new republican state is always exposed. The first consul had at last decided the official union of the Isle of Elba and Piedmont with France. The Isle of Elba was exchanged with the king of Etruria for the principality of Piombino, that had been obtained of the court of Naples, and had now been evacuated by the English. It had also been declared a part of the French territory. The union of Piedmont, consummated in fact two years before, was passed over in silence during the negotiations of Amiens, admitted by Russia herself, who was bound to demand some kind of indemnity for the house of Sardinia, it was suffered as an inevitable necessity by all the great courts. Prussia and Austria were ready to confirm it by their adhesion, provided they were promised a good portion in the distribution of the ecclesiastical states. This union of Piedmont, officially announced by an organic *senatus-consultum* of the 24th Fructidor, year x., or September 11, 1802, astonished nobody, and was scarcely noticed as an event. Besides, the duchy of Parma was left vacant, as a hope for all the interests that had suffered in Italy. The fine country of Piedmont was divided into six departments: the Po, the Doire, Marengo, the Sesia, the Stura, and the Tanaro. These sent six deputies to the legislative body. Turin was declared one of the great cities of the republic. This was the first step taken by Napoleon beyond that limit which may be styled the natural boundary of France, in other words, beyond the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees. In the eyes of the cabinets of Europe, an aggrandizement is never a fault, to judge at least by their ordinary conduct. But there are still aggrandizements which are real faults, and the sequel of the present history will show this. They may be so considered when they pass the limits that are easy to be defended, and when they injure respectable and resisting nationalities. But it must be acknowledged, that of all the extraordinary acquisitions made by France in a quarter of a century, that of Piedmont was least to be censured. If it had been possible to constitute Italy immediately, that which it would have been wisest to do was to unite it entirely in one national body; but however powerful the first consul was at that time, he was not then sufficiently master of Europe to permit himself the creation of such a kingdom. He had been obliged to leave a part of Italy to Austria, which possessed the ancient Venetian states as far as the Adige; another part belonged to Spain, which had required for its two infants the formation of the kingdom of Etruria. He was bound to support the papal existence for the interest of religion, and the Bourbons of Naples for the interest of the general peace. To organize Italy definitively and completely, was therefore impossible at that moment. All that the first consul was able to do, was to manage things there in a transitory way,

better than in the preceding times, and proper to prepare for its future state. In constituting in the heart of Italy a republic which occupied the midst of the valley of the Po, he had there deposited the germ of liberty and of independence. In taking Piedmont, he had formed a solid basis for operations in combating the Austrians. He also gave them rivals when he called in the Spaniards. In leaving the pope and trying to attach him, and in supporting the Bourbons of Naples, he fell in with the ancient policy of Europe, yet without sacrificing to it the policy of France. That which he actually did was, in one word, a beginning, which excluded nothing at a later period, but prepared, on the contrary, for a better and a definitive state.

The relations of the first consul with the court of Rome became every day better affected. The first consul heard with great kindness the complaints of the holy father upon the subjects which grieved him. The sensibility of the venerable pontiff was extreme in all that affected the affairs of the church. The loss of the Legations had much reduced the finances of the holy see. The abolition of a number of dues formerly levied in France, an abolition which threatened to extend itself to Spain, had yet more impoverished his holiness. Pius VII. complained bitterly of this, not for himself, because he led the life of an anchorite, but for his clergy, whom it was with difficulty he could support. Still, spiritual interests were, in the eyes of this worthy pontiff, much above temporal ones, and he complained with mildness, but with a feeling of deep chagrin, of the famous organic articles. It will be recollected, that the first consul, having entered upon the treaty with Rome, qualified, in the concordat, the general conditions of the re-establishment of the altars, and had thrown into a law all which related to the police of worship. He had drawn up this law according to the maxims laid down in the old French monarchy. The prohibition to publish a bull or writing without the permission of the public authority; the interdiction to every legate of the holy see to exercise his functions without the previous acknowledgment of his powers by the French government; the jurisdiction of the council of state in appeal for abuses of the laws; the organization of seminaries under severe regulations; the obligation to profess the declaration of 1682; the introduction of divorce into the French laws; the prohibition to perform the religious rites before the civil bond of marriage; the complete and definitive attachment of the registers to the civil power and the municipal magistrates; were also objects upon which the pope addressed remonstrances, that the first consul heard without being willing to admit their validity, considering those subjects as regulated wisely and decisively by the organic articles. The pope perseveringly remonstrated, without yet having the desire to push his remonstrances to a rupture. Lastly, the religious affairs of the Italian republic, the secularizations in Germany, in consequence of which the church would lose a portion of the German territory, put the finish to his troubles; and without the pleasure which the re-establishment of the catholic religion in France brought to him, his life would have been no more, he said, than a long martyrdom. His language in other respects, breathed the sincerest regard for the first consul.

This last suffered the pope to go on with his complaints, showing an extreme patience under them, foreign to his character.

As to the loss of the Legations and the impoverishment of the holy see, he thought of it frequently, and nurtured a vague idea of increasing the domains of St. Peter; but he did not know how to obtain them, placed as he was between the Italian republic, which, far from being disposed to part with the Legations, demanded, on the contrary, the duchy of Parma; between Spain, that coveted the same duchy, and between the high protectors of the court of Sardinia, who wished to make it an indemnity to that house. Thus he had offered money to the pope, until he could ameliorate his position by extending his territories, —an offer which the pope would have accepted if the dignity of the church had permitted him so to do. In default of this kind of aid, the first consul took good care to pay for the support of the French troops during their passage across the Roman states. He ordered Ancona to be evacuated at the same time as Otranto, and all the south of Italy; he had forced the Neapolitan government to evacuate Ponte-Corvo and Benavente. Lastly, in the affairs of Germany he showed himself disposed to defend, to a certain extent, the ecclesiastical party, which the protestant party, or, in other words, Prussia, wished to weaken, even to destruction.

To the foregoing efforts for the satisfaction of the holy see, he joined actions of the most condescending courtesy. He had made the dey free all the subjects of the pope detained at Algiers, and had sent them to the holy father. As that sovereign prince did not possess a single ship to keep his coast clear of the African pirates, the first consul had taken from the Toulon arsenal two fine brigs, had them completely fitted out, armed, handsomely decorated, named them the St. Peter and St. Paul, and sent them as a present to Pius VII. As a scrupulous mark of attention, a corvette followed these vessels to Civita Vecchia, to bring back the crews to Toulon, and spare the pontifical treasury the smallest kind of expense. The venerable pontiff wished to receive the French seamen at Rome, to show them the pomp of the catholic worship in the great church of St. Peter, and to send them back loaded with the modest presents which the state of his fortune permitted him to make them.

A wish of the first consul, prompt and strong as were all those which he conceived, tended to raise up a difficulty with the holy see, happily transient, and soon passed away. He desired that the new church of France should possess cardinals, as the old church had done in past times. France had formerly reckoned as many as eight, nine, and even ten. The first consul wished to have at his disposition as many hats as then, or even more, if it were possible to obtain them, because he saw through this means a valuable mode of influencing the French clergy, greedy of high dignities, and further, a means of influence, still more desirable, in the sacred college which elects the popes, and regulates the great affairs of the church. In 1789, France counted five cardinals, de Bernis, la Rochefoucauld, de Loménie, Rohan, and Montmorency.

The three first of these were dead. M. de Rohan had ceased to be a Frenchman, as his archbishopric had become a German one. M. de Montmorency was one of those who had resisted the holy see, when the resignations were demanded. Cardinal Maury, nominated since 1789, was an emigrant, and then considered as an enemy. Belgium and Savoy comprehended two others, cardinal Frankenborg, formerly archbishop of Malines, and the learned Gerdil. The former archbishop of Malines was separated from his see, and thought no more of repairing to it again. Cardinal Gerdil had always resided at Rome, plunged deeply in theological studies, and not attached to any country. Neither the one nor the other could be considered French. The first consul wished that seven cardinals should be immediately granted to France. This was many more than it was possible for the pope to grant at the moment. He had, it is true, several vacant hats, but the promotion of the crowns approached, and he had to provide for that.

The promotion of the crowns was a custom, become nearly a law, in virtue of which the pope authorized six Catholic powers to designate to him a subject each, whom he might gratify with a hat upon their presentation. These powers were Austria, Poland, Venice, France, Spain, and Portugal. Two of these no longer existed, namely, Venice and Poland. But there still remained four, comprising France, and he had not hats enough vacant to fill up these, and to meet the demands of the first consul. The pope made this a valid reason for resisting what was thus required of him. The first consul, imagining that he had, beside the difficulty arising from the number vacant, which was real, the fear of exhibiting too much condescension towards France, carried himself warmly, and declared that if he refused him the hats which he required, he should pass over France in the promotion of the crowns, because he would not have one only; it was not to be suffered that the French church, if it had cardinals at all, should have less than other Christian churches. The pope, who did not like to make the first consul discontented, agreed, and consented to grant him five cardinals. But as there were hats wanting to suffice for this extraordinary promotion and that of the crowns at the same time, the pope begged of the courts of Austria, Spain, and Portugal, to consent to the adjournment of their just pretensions, which they all three agreed to do with much good feeling and grace. They were pleased thus to satisfy spontaneously those desires which they would soon have been obliged to execute by command.

The first consul consented to give the hat to M. de Bayanne, for a long time auditor of the rota for France and dean of that tribunal. He proposed afterwards to the pope, M. de Belloy, archbishop of Paris; the abbé Fesch, archbishop of Lyons, and his uncle; M. Cambacérès, archbishop of Rouen, brother of the second consul; finally, M. de Boisgelin, archbishop of Toura. To these five he would have joined a sixth, in the abbé Bernier, archbishop of Orleans and pacificator of La Vendée, the principal negotiator of the concordat. But the idea of including in a promotion so prominent and signal a man who had been so much noted in the civil war, much embarrassed the first consul. He opened his mind upon the subject to the pope, and begged him to decide, immediately, that the first vacant hat should be given to the abbé Bernier, but to keep this resolution *in petto*, as they say at the court of Rome, and to write to the abbé Bernier the reason of the adjournment. This was done, and it was this which became a matter of much mortification to that prelate, so far very little recompensed, considering the services he had rendered; he knew the good-will of the first consul towards him, but he suffered cruelly from the distress he felt to avow it publicly:—the just punishment for a civil war, fallen in other respects, upon a man who by his services deserved more than any other the indulgence of the government and of the country.

The pope sent to France the prince Doria, as the bearer of the cap to the cardinals newly elected. From that moment the French church, clothed with so large a part of the Roman purple, became one of the most favoured and most glorious of Christian churches.

There still remained the task of organizing the Italian church, and of placing it in perfect union with the holy see. The first consul made a demand of the pope for a concordat in the Italian republic; but upon this occasion the pope was not to be overcome, and maintained an inflexible resistance to the request. The Italian republic comprehended the Legations, and having once been the property of the holy see, to concede such a point would have been, according to his holiness, to acknowledge the abandonment of those provinces, because it would be entering into a treaty with the parties who had taken them away. It was arranged, finally, to settle the business by means of a succession of briefs, addressed to the regulation of each separate case in a special manner. Lastly, pope Pius VII. entered entirely into the views of the first consul in regard to the definitive constitution of the order of Malta. The priors or heads of the order were assembled in the different parts of Europe, that they might provide for the election of the new grand master, and in order to facilitate the election, they agreed this time to remit to the pope the power of choosing their head. On the advice of the first consul, who wished to organize the order as soon as possible, that the island of Malta might be placed under the grand master's authority, the pope chose an Italian, the bailiff Ruspoli, a Roman prince of a high and ancient family. The first consul preferred that a Roman should fill the office rather than a German or Neapolitan. The person thus chosen was, besides, a discreet and enlightened individual, well worthy of the honour which was adjudged to him. The only fear was, that his acceptance of the office did not appear a probable event. The greatest haste was made to ascertain this by writing to England, where he lived in retirement.

The French troops had evacuated Ancona and the gulf of Tarentum. They had entered within the limits of the Italian republic, which they were to occupy until that republic had formed its army. The execution of the roads across the Alps, and of the fortifications of Alexandria, Mantua, Legnago, Verona, and Peschiera, was in full activity. Six thousand men were kept in Etruria, awaiting the

arrival of a Spanish corps. All the conditions of the treaty of Amiens relative to Italy had, therefore, been executed on the part of France.

While the public mind in the greater part of the states of Europe began to be calmed down under the beneficent influence of the peace, in Switzerland tranquillity was far from being established. The inhabitants of the mountain country were the last to be in a state of disturbance, and were now in violent agitation. It might be said that discord, driven from France and Italy by Bonaparte, had taken refuge in the inaccessible fastnesses of the Alps. Under the names of "Unitarians" and "Oligarchs," two parties had come to blows, the party of the revolution and that of the old order of things. These two parties balanced pretty evenly in regard to strength, did not rest in equilibrium, but were in a continuous and unhappy state of oscillation. During eighteen months they were, by turns, in possession of the chief power, and exercised it without wisdom, justice, or humanity. It will be proper to state, in a few words, the origin of these parties, and their conduct from the commencement of the Helvetic revolution.

Switzerland was composed, prior to the year 1789, of thirteen cantons. Six of these were democratic, Schwitz, Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, Glaris, and Appenzel; seven oligarchic, Berne, Soleure, Zurich, Lucerne, Friburg, Bâle, and Schaffhausen. The canton of Neufchâtel was a principality, dependent upon Prussia. The Grisons, the Valais, and Geneva, formed three separate republics, allied to Switzerland, but living each under its own particular and independent government. The first of these, that of the Grisons, by its geographical position, was drawn into an attachment for Austria; the two others, the Valais and Geneva, for the same reason, were attached to France.

The French republic brought about a change in this state of things. To indemnify itself for the war, it seized upon the county of Bienne, and the ancient principality of Porentruy, and made of them the department of Mont Terrible, adding a portion of the former bishopric of Bâle. It also took Geneva, of which it formed the department of the Leman. It indemnified the Swiss by adding to their territory those of the Grisons and Valais. At the same time it reserved, in the Valais, the right to a military road, which should pass from the extremity of the lake of Geneva towards Villeneuve, ascend the valley of the Rhone, by Martigny and Sion, as far as Brigg, from which point the celebrated road of the Simplon commenced and opened upon the Lago Maggiore. After these territorial changes, which were the act of the French republic, followed those which were the natural consequence of their ideas of justice and equality, which the revolutionary party wished to see prevail in Switzerland, in imitation of what had been accomplished in France in the year 1789.

The revolutionary party in Switzerland was composed of all the men who were opposed to the oligarchical regimen, and these abounded as numerously in the democratical as in the aristocratical cantons, because they suffered as much in the one as in the other. Thus in the small cantons of Uri, Unterwalden, and Schwitz, where the whole of the people assembled once a year, chose their magistrates, and verified their administration in a few hours, this universal suffrage, destined to flatter for a moment the ignorant and corrupt multitude, was nothing more than a delusion. A small number of powerful families, become masters of every thing through time and corruption, arbitrarily disposed of every employment, and governed all public affairs. In Schwitz, for example, the family of Reding, at its own pleasure, distributed the commissions of rank in a Swiss regiment in the service of Spain[1]. These were the great objects of solicitude in the canton, because they were the sole objects of ambition among all those who did not desire to remain herdsmen or peasants. The small cantons had, besides, a dependence, in the way of the Italian bailwicks, and they were governed in the most arbitrary manner like the subject countries. These democracies, therefore, were not, as other pure democracies had come to be in the progress of time, oligarchies disguised under popular forms: and this it is which explains how it happened that even in the democratic cantons, the popular mind was deeply averse to the former state of things. Provinces thus subjected in the mode of Italian bailwicks, were found belonging to more than one canton. Thus Berne harshly governed the Pays de Vaud and Argovia. Finally, in the aristocratical cantons, the inferior citizens were excluded from all employments. Thus as soon as the signal was given for the entry of the French army into Switzerland in 1798, the insurrection of the people was prompt and universal. In the cantons that were subject provinces, the bailwicks oppressed rose against the chief places that oppressed them; while in the heart of the chief governing cities, the middle class rose against the oligarchy. Of thirteen cantons they desired to form nineteen, all equal, all uniformly administered, and placed under a central single authority, resembling the unity of the French government. They were governed in this by the necessity they felt for the even distribution of justice, and above all, by the ambition to leave that state of nullity peculiar to federal governments. The hope to figure a little more actively on the world's stage, was at that time very strongly felt in the hearts of the Swiss, proud of their former fame as a valorous people, and of the high character which they had once sustained in Europe, wearied, too, of that perpetual neutrality which had compelled them to sell their blood to foreign nations.

In this application to Switzerland of the ideas of the French revolution, arising as much from the necessity as from the spirit of imitation, they broke up some cantons in order to make others,

[1] There were four Swiss regiments in the Spanish service. The entire canton of Schwitz contained but thirty-six thousand souls, of which not a fourth part were males in possession of political rights. The larger part were indigent peasantry. That two or three families, by the influence of property and popularity, should possess considerable weight, is not wonderful, without attributing corruption to this gallant people. Another of the family in Spain, in 1808, defeated Dupont, the French general, at Baylen, and captured his entire army. The Redings have ever been distinguished for their patriotic conduct. The head of the family, Aloys Reding, who died in 1818, was always opposed to Bonaparte. —*Translator.*

as they had joined several separate districts to make a single canton. They divided the territory of Berne, which, with Argovia and the Pays de Vaud, formed a fourth of Switzerland, and made of Argovia and the Pays de Vaud two separate cantons. Uri was detached from the Italian bailwicks, to create with these the canton of Tessin. The canton of Appenzel was increased, by joining to it St. Gall, the Tokenburg, and the Rheinthal; to the canton of Glaris the bailwicks of Sargans, Werdenberg, Gaster, Uznach, and Raperschwill, were added. These additions granted to the cantons of Appenzel and Glaris had for their object to destroy for ever the ancient democratic system of rule, and to make them of such an extent as should render a return to such a system impossible. These nineteen cantons were constituted dependent upon a legislative body, which gave them uniform laws, and an executive power that executed those laws for all and in all the cantons. They had a ministry, too, in Switzerland, with prefects and sub-prefects.

The opposing party, against which all this uniformity was directed, adopted the contrary plan, and sought to establish the federative order of things, in its most exaggerated character, with the most extraordinary irregularities, and a complete isolation of the federal states, the one in respect to the other. They desired it also, because, under favour of these irregularities and of this isolation, each little oligarchy would be able to retain its own dominion. The aristocracies of Berne, Zurich, and Bâle, made an alliance with the democracies of Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwalden, and among themselves perfectly understood each other, because, at bottom, they all desired the same thing, in other words, the domination of several powerful families, as well in the little mountainous cantons as in the more opulent cities. The one party was known under the appellation of "Oligarchs;" the others, who desired to see justice and equality in the uniformity of the government, received the name of "Unitarians." Both the one party and the other had been scuffling for years, without ever being able to govern the unfortunate Swiss with something of moderation and constancy. Constitutions had succeeded each other as rapidly as in France, and at this moment they were agitated about the fabrication of a new one.

One circumstance rendered still more serious the troubles in Switzerland, and that was, the disposition of parties there to seek for support from foreigners,—a circumstance which always occurs in a country too feeble to elevate itself, and too important, from its geographical position, to be regarded with an indifferent eye by its neighbours. The oligarchical party had considerable connexions in Vienna, London, and even St. Petersburgh, where a Swiss, colonel la Harpe, had formed the mind and inclined the heart of the young emperor, and besieged all the courts, in the most pressing manner, on their side. He supplicated them not to suffer that France, in consolidating in Switzerland the revolutionary order of things, should also make it submit to its influence, a country which, in a military point of view, was the most important upon the continent. The party had also intimate connexions in England. The citizens of Berne, and of several governing towns, had lodged the capital of their municipal economies in the bank of London, a step which did them great honour, because while the free cities throughout Europe, and more especially in Germany, were irrecoverably in debt, the cities of Switzerland had amassed considerable sums. The English government, under pretext of the French occupation of the country, had, without scruple, seized upon the funds thus deposited. Since the peace, the money had not been restored. The oligarchs of Berne supplicated England, that if it did not come to their aid, it would, at least, retain the money they had remitted to the bank of London. They had confided to the bank of England ten millions, and two millions were lodged in that of Vienna.

The revolutionary party naturally sought its support from France; and it was easy to avail itself of this aid, when the French armies had not ceased to occupy the Helvetic territory. But a similar occupation could not be continued for a long time. Switzerland must soon be evacuated as Italy had been. For though the obligation to evacuate it was not as formally stipulated as the obligation to evacuate Italy, still the treaty of Lunéville guaranteed the independence of Switzerland; and the fulfilment of the treaties must be regarded as imperfect and the peace as unsafe, until the French troops had been withdrawn. Thus the political observers of things had their eyes fixed upon Switzerland most particularly as well as upon Germany, where the division of the ecclesiastical states was taking place, in order to discover if the attempt at a general pacification just attempted was likely to be durable. The first consul had formed the resolution in the plainest manner not to compromise peace, on account of what might happen either in one or the other of these countries, at least while the counter-revolution, of which he would have none on the French frontiers, did not attempt to establish itself in the middle of the Alps. He would have had no obstacle in getting himself accepted as the legislator for Helvetia, as he had been for the Italian republic, but the consulta of Lyons had produced such an effect in Europe, particularly in England, that he dared not repeat the same spectacle a second time. He kept himself therefore to tendering his advice, which had been heard, but was little followed, notwithstanding the presence of the French troops. He advised the Swiss to renounce the chimera of an absolute unity; a unity impossible in a country so uncertain as theirs, insupportable besides to the little cantons, that could neither pay heavy taxes, like those of Bâle and Berne, nor bind themselves under the yoke of a common government. He recommended them to create a central government for the exterior business of the confederation; and as to the interior affairs, to leave to the local governments the care of organizing them, according to the soil, the manners, and mind of the inhabitants. He advised them to take from the French revolution that which was beneficial and incontestably useful, equality between all classes of the citizens, equality in all parts of the territory; to leave detached from each other those provinces deemed incompatible, such as Vaud and Berne, and the Italian bailwicks of Uri, but to renounce certain junctions of territory, which would denationalize several cantons, such as those of Ap-

penzel and Glaris; to put a stop in the large cities to the alternate domination of the oligarchs and the populace, and to finish by a government of the middle class of citizens without the systematic exclusion of any class; in fine, to imitate that policy in action between all parties which had given France tranquillity. This advice, understood and felt by those of a clear comprehension, but contemned by passionate persons, who always form the largest number, remained without effect. Meanwhile as this advice tended to leave the revolution somewhat behind, the oligarchical faction, at that time oppressed, welcomed it with pleasure, nourishing illusions very similar to those made by certain French emigrants in Paris, and believing, because he was moderate, the first consul wished in reality to establish the old order of things.

A question relating to territory added a serious complication to this position of affairs. During the revolution, Switzerland and France being to a certain extent confounded one with another, had passed from a system of neutrality to one of offensive and defensive alliance. Under this system she had not hesitated to concede to France, by the treaty of 1798, the military road of the Valais bordering upon the foot of the Simplon. In the later treaties, Europe had not ventured to remonstrate against this state of things, the result of a long war; it had limited itself to a stipulation for the independence of Switzerland. The first consul, preferring upon system the neutrality of Switzerland to its alliance, intended to use the road of the Simplon, without being reduced to traverse the Helvetic territory, which was incompatible with its neutrality, and he therefore conceived the design for that purpose of obtaining possession of the property in the Valais. This was no great demand, because it was through France that Switzerland held the Valais, which had before been independent. But the first consul did not ask it without a compensation: he offered in exchange a province that Austria had ceded to him by the treaty of Lunéville. This was the Frickthal, a small territory, very important as a frontier, containing the road of the Forest Towns, and extending from the confluence of the Aar with the Rhine as far as the limit of the canton of Bâle, and connecting in consequence that canton with Switzerland. This little country, fronting the Black Forest, had besides its own value, a value arising from convenience by no means of small moment. By means of this exchange, France become proprietor of the Valais, had no necessity of the Helvetic territory for the passage of her armies, and would be enabled to return from the system of alliance to one of neutrality. The Swiss, as well the unitarians as the oligarchs, talked loudly upon the subject, having both one and the other the same wish. They were not willing at any price to cede the Valais for the Frickthal. They demanded other concessions of territory, along the Jura more particularly, the country of Bienne, Erguel, and some detached portions of the Porentruy. This was to give up to them a part of the department of Mont Terrible. Even under these conditions they were repugnant to cede the Valais; and as under the interests denominated "general," there are often concealed those which are very "particular," the little cantons, dreading the rivalry of the Simplon road over that of the St. Gothard, positively refused the proposed exchange. The first consul had provisionally occupied the Valais with three battalions, and would not take any further step until the general arrangement of the Helvetic affairs.

In awaiting the definitive organization of Switzerland, there had been formed a temporary government, composed of an executive council and a legislative body, small in number. Different projects for a constitution had been drawn up, and secretly submitted to the first consul. He had preferred one among the others, which appeared to him conceived in the wisest way, and had sent it to Berne accompanied with a species of recommendation of its adoption. The provisional government, composed of the more moderate patriots, had themselves adopted this constitution, and had presented it for the acceptance of a general diet. The unitarian party increased, numbered a considerable majority in the diet, or no less than fifty votes out of eighty. It soon declared the diet constituted, and drew up a new project after the idea of an absolute unity, affecting even to brave France, proclaiming the Valais an integral part of the soil of the Helvetic confederation.

The representatives of the lesser cantons withdrew, declaring that they would never submit themselves to such a constitution. Masters of the provisional government, the moderate patriots, seeing how matters were proceeding, concerted upon the subject with the French minister Verninac, and issued a decree, by which they dissolved the diet for having exceeded its powers, and having made itself a constituent assembly when it had not been called upon to become so. They themselves placed in action the new constitution of the 29th of May, 1801, and proceeded to the election of the authorities which that constitution instituted. These authorities were the senate, the lesser council, and the landamman. The senate was composed of twenty-five members; it nominated the lesser council, which was composed of seven persons, and the landamman, who was the chief of the republic. The senate not only nominated these two authorities, but it also advised them as a council. As the moderate patriots had upon their hands the exalted unitarians, who were dispersed upon the breaking up of the diet, they were obliged to manage with the opposite or oligarchical party. They chose from among them the more sage and discreet, in order to add them to their number and place them in the senate. They mingled them with the revolutionists in such a manner as to preserve a majority of the last. But in their irritation, five of the revolutionists refused to accept the offer made to them. The majority on that account changed in a vexatious manner, since when once formed, the senate would proceed to complete itself. It did, in fact, do this, and on the oligarchical side. Thus when it came to nominate the landamman, and had the choice of two candidates, M. Reding, who was the chief of the oligarchical party, and M. Dolder, who was at the head of the moderate revolutionists, Reding carried the day by one vote. Dolder was a discreet man, of considerable ability, but possessed only of a moderate degree of energy.

Reding was an old officer, not very enlightened, but energetic; he had served in the Swiss troops that were in foreign pay, and had carried on with great intelligence the mountain war against the French army in 1798. He belonged to the little canton of Schwitz, and was at the head of a privileged family, which disposed of all the commissions in the regiment of Reding. The oligarchy of Switzerland had adopted this head of a kind of clan, and had given him its confidence. Rough as he was, Reding did not want a certain degree of finesse. He was flattered with his new dignity, and endeavoured to preserve it. He knew that he would not long be able to retain it against the will of France. In accordance with his party, he determined to proceed rapidly to Paris, to endeavour to persuade the first consul, that the oligarchical party was that of honourable men, whom he ought to suffer in power, and permit to have their way, and that on these conditions he would find Switzerland devoted to France. The first consul received M. Reding with consideration, and listened to him with some attention. Reding affected to exhibit himself destitute of all partiality, and more of a soldier than an oligarch; he appeared flattered at the approbation of the first general of modern times, disposed as he was to place himself above party passions. He offered to make certain adjustments, which were accepted in order to see if his conduct answered to his promises. According to these adjustments, the senate was to be increased to thirty members, and the choice of five new ones was to be made exclusively among the patriots. A second landamman was to be chosen equally among that party, and to hold the reins of power alternately with the first. Cantonal commissions, composed half by the senate, and half by the cantons themselves, were to be charged with the task of giving to each the constitution which best fitted it. It was besides agreed, that Argovia and the Pays de Vaud should remain detached from Berne; and in return, that the agglomerations of territories, which had disfigured certain small cantons, should be revoked. Under these reservations the first consul promised to acknowledge the integrity of Switzerland, to replace it in a state of perpetual neutrality, and to withdraw the French troops. In order to assure to France the military road which was required, the Valais was dismembered by ceding to France that portion which is on the right bank of the Rhone. France, in exchange, obliged herself to cede the Frickthal and an arrondissement of the territory on the side of the Jura. Reding left Paris full of hope, believing he had acquired the favour of the first consul, and would be enabled to do in Switzerland thenceforth just what he chose.

But scarcely was the head of the oligarchical party arrived at Berne, before, drawn in by his friends, Reding became all that could and all that might be expected under such influences, and with ideas of government as little changed as his own. There were five new members added to the senate, taken from the very heart of the patriot party, and a colleague was given to Reding, charged to perform alternately with him the functions of landamman. This colleague was not M. Dolder himself, but M. Rugger, a considerable personage among the moderate revolutionists. The newly chosen, that in the lesser council charged with the executive power, procured a majority for the revolutionary party, left the majority in the senate to the oligarchs. Further, Reding, being landamman for this year, selected the authorities in the interest of his own party. He sent, whether to Vienna or to other courts, agents devoted to the cause of the counter-revolution, with instructions hostile to France, which soon became known to her. Reding more especially demanded that there should be accredited to him, representatives of all the powers, in order to second him against the influence of M. Verninac, the chargé d'affaires of France. The only agent whom he did not venture to replace was M. Stapfer, the Swiss minister at Paris, a respectable man, devoted to his country, who had known how to obtain the confidence of the French government, and for that reason difficult to recall. Reding had promised to leave independent the Pays de Vaud and Argovia; nevertheless, from every part there came petitions to provoke the restitution of these provinces to the canton of Berne. Despite the promise to free the Italian bailwicks, Uri demanded, in a high tone, and with threats, the Levantine valley. The cantonal commissions that were charged to draw up the particular constitution of each canton, were, except two or three, composed in a spirit contrary to the new order of things, and favourable to the re-establishment of the old. There was no more a question made of the Valais, nor of the road promised to France. Finally, the Vaudois, seeing a counter-revolution imminent, were in a state of insurrection, and sooner than submit to the government of Reding, they solicited a reunion with France.

Thus unfortunate Helvetia, delivered over a year before to the extravagances of the absolute unitarians, was this year a prey to the counter-revolutionary attempts of the oligarchs. The first consul therefore took his part in regard to the Valais, and declared that he detached it from the confederation, and restored it to its former independence. This was evidently the best solution of the difficulty, because giving one bank of the Rhine to France and another to Switzerland, was clearly contrary to the natural course of things. In leaving it entirely to Switzerland, and in creating a road and French military establishments, the Helvetic neutrality was rendered impossible. When he was apprised of this resolution, Reding made a noise about it, asserting that the first consul had broken his promises, which was untrue; and he proposed to the lesser council a letter so violent, that the council drew back from it in fear. The situation of the oligarchs of the large and small cantons was not longer tenable, labouring as they were to reconstruct the old order of things, and the revolutionists, arisen in the Pays de Vaud, to obtain a union with France. M. Dolder and his friends, in the lesser council, united themselves. In this lesser council, charged with the executive power, they were six against three. They profited themselves of the absence of Reding, who had gone for some days into the smaller cantons; they annulled all that had been done by him; they broke up the cantonal commissions, and called together at Berne an assembly of notables, consisting of forty-seven individuals chosen from

among the most respectable and moderate men of all opinions. They then submitted to them the constitution of the 29th of May, recommended by France, making in it the modifications which were judged indispensable; and they immediately organized the public authorities according to that same constitution.

To take from the oligarchical party the support of the senate, in which they had a majority, they pronounced the suspension of that body. On receiving intelligence of this event, Reding hastened to protest against the resolutions thus taken. But deprived of the support of the senate, which had been suspended, he retired, declaring that he did not renounce his character of chief magistrate; and he went into the smaller cantons in order to foment the insurrection. They considered him as having resigned, and confided to citizen Ruttimann the office of first landamman. Thus the Swiss, pulled about, in turn by the hands of the absolute unitarians and by those of the oligarchs, found themselves, by a succession of small *coups d'état*, replaced in the power of the moderate revolutionists. Unfortunately, these last had not at their head, as the moderate French had when they brought about the 18th Brumaire, a powerful chief to give to their wisdom the aid of strength. Still, enlightened by events, the partizans of the revolution, whatever was their difference with each other, were disposed to come to an understanding, and to accept as a boon the constitution of the 29th of May, introducing certain changes. But Reding was at work in the small cantons to arouse them into insurrection, and the necessity of having recourse to some powerful external aid, because there was none to be obtained in Switzerland, was at last inevitable. However evident was this necessity, no one dared to avow it. The oligarchs, who saw in the intervention of France their assured ruin, made it a crime in the revolutionists to desire such an interference. These, in order not to supply their adversaries with such a valid ground of complaint, repelled the charge in lofty terms. Lastly, the first consul himself, wishing to spare inquietude to Europe, was decided, unless in case of any very extraordinary event, not to compromise the French troops in the troubles of Switzerland. Thus, although thirty thousand French were spread over the middle of the Alps, none of their generals obeyed the requisitions of the different parties; and the French soldiers were present, with arms idle on their shoulders, amidst all these disorders. Their immobility became a subject of reproach, and the patriots said, with some appearance of reason, that a general peace reigning in Europe, the French army not having to defend them against the Austrians, would not defend them against internal insurrections, that they gathered no other fruit from their presence, than the trouble of sustaining them, and the disagreeable effect of a foreign occupation. The retreat of the French troops, therefore, became a sort of patriotic satisfaction, that the moderate party thought themselves obliged to agree to with all the other parties; and they demanded it of the first consul, while Reding aroused the flame of insurrection in the mountains of Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwalden. It seemed the more necessary to grant the request thus made, because the separation of the Valais, definitively resolved upon, was an act that was a sensible displeasure to the Swiss patriots. The first consul consented to the evacuation, willing to give to the moderate party the fullest and most entire moral support possible, but in reality much doubting the soundness of the experiment which he was going to make. Orders for the evacuation were immediately sent. There remained at the disposal of the new government three thousand Swiss troops. But there were left, besides, near the frontiers, the Helvetic demi-brigades in the service of France, and it was hoped that recourse might be had to them if needful, without any ulterior application to the French army. A momentary calm succeeded to these agitated scenes. The constitution of the 29th of May, adopted with certain modifications, was every where accepted. The lesser cantons alone refused to put it in force within their limits. Still they appeared willing to remain tranquil, at least, for the passing moment.

The separation of the Valais was accomplished without difficulty. This country was anew constituted an independent state, under the protection of France and the Italian republic. France, as a sole mark of sovereignty, reserved to herself a military road, that she was to support at her own expense, providing the magazines and barracks. The road was declared to be exempt from every kind of toll, a thing of immense benefit to the country. In thus opening the Simplon, there was created that grand highway which now traverses it. France thus made to the Valais a magnificent gift, equal in value, most assuredly, to the price which was exacted from her in obtaining it.

Thus the affairs of Switzerland remained in a sort of suspense. The oligarchs, at first, joyful at the retreat of the French troops, soon became alarmed. They dreaded in thus losing no very agreeable masters, that they had lost a useful protection in the probable contingency of a revolutionary convulsion. Those who thus reasoned were, it is true, among the wiser and better informed. The rest, flattering themselves that they should again be able to overturn the rule of the moderate patriots, ardently wished that the present evacuation of the French should be final; and through the mediation of their secret agents, they requested the different European courts not to consent that the French troops should again enter Switzerland. They had, they said, been able to tolerate their remaining as a consequence of the war; but their return could only be considered—in case it should so happen—as the violation of an independent territory, the integrity of which was guaranteed by all Europe.

The first consul was well acquainted with their intrigues, because the correspondence of the landamman Reding had been discovered and forwarded to Paris. It had little effect upon his feeling; he even explained his intentions freely and unconstrainedly upon the matter, as had been his custom upon such occasions. He said that he did not want to possess Switzerland, that he preferred a general peace to the conquest of such a territory; but that he would not suffer a government there which should be at enmity with France; that upon this point his resolution was irrevocable.

In England the solicitations of the oligarchical

party were not applied without a considerable effect; not, indeed, in the cabinet, but upon the party of Grenville and Wyndham, which endeavoured, out of every thing, to raise up new grounds of complaint against France. In Austria and Prussia they were too much occupied with the territorial arrangements of Germany to mingle themselves up with the affairs of Helvetia; they had there too much need of the favour of the first consul to dream of giving him the least ground of offence. Cobentzel, at Vienna, went so far in his attention as to show to the French ambassador, M. de Champagny, all the correspondence which had been forwarded to him by the party of Reding, and the replies which he had sent, discouraging the pressing entreaties of that party. Russia, perfectly aware of the views and intentions of the first consul, comprehended clearly enough that the troubles of Switzerland were a source of embarrassment to him, from which he would have been most willing to escape, much sooner than to find in it an opportunity, artificially prepared, to procure for himself further influence or additional territory.

However serious in themselves were the affairs of Switzerland, however serious, more particularly, they might become if the French troops were marched back upon the Helvetian territory, they had not the power at the moment to detach the attention of the great powers from the affairs of Germany. It has been before seen, that the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France, had deprived of their states a crowd of princes, and that it was agreed at Lunéville to indemnify them by secularizing the ecclesiastical principalities, of which old Germany was full. This was the necessary course of a general remodelling of the Germanic territory. Such an important question left no attention to be spared for any other in most of the northern courts.

Austria, wasted by a long contest, endeavoured to repair her dilapidated finances, and to elevate the credit of her paper money. The archduke Charles had obtained all the influence which M. Thugut had lost. This prince, who had commanded in war with great distinction, was the declared partizan of peace. He had seen in a moment the glory he had acquired on the borders of the Rhine, in combating the generals Jourdan and Moreau, effaced on the banks of the Tagliamento, in conflicting with general Bonaparte, and he was not inclined to make any new attempt against this formidable adversary. Motives still more elevated had a share in influencing his political predispositions. He saw his own reigning house ruined by long and sanguinary wars, which passion had more to do in promoting than reason; and he said that Austria was fortunate enough, although beaten, in finding in the acquisition of the Venetian states, an indemnity for the loss of the Low Countries and of the Milanese, which, in case of a third war, would, in all probability, be taken from her without compensation. This prince, now he was minister, set about the formation of an army which should be better organized, and be less expensive than that which Austria had possessed for ten years previously, and opposed in vain to the troops of France. The emperor, of a sober and more solid than brilliant intellect, partook in the opinions of the archduke, and thought of nothing but of drawing the utmost possible advantage from the business of the indemnities, hoping to find in that a favourable juncture for repairing the later reverses of his house.

Prussia, that in 1795 separated herself from the coalition, in order to conclude at Bâle a peace with the French republic, and which since that time had re-established her finances through the medium of her neutrality, had gained new provinces in consequence of the last division of Poland, now endeavoured to obtain a share of the good things belonging to the German church, and an opportunity to aggrandize herself in Germany,—a species of aggrandizement which she preferred to any other. She had a very young and discreet sovereign, who made it a matter of moment to pass for an upright man, and who was so in effect, but was unboundedly fond of territorial acquisitions, on condition, still, that they were not purchased by a war; besides, they possessed in Prussia a singular means of explaining every thing in the most honourable way in his regard. All equivocal acts, or such the uprightness of which might be contested, were attributed to M. Haugwitz, to whom they ordinarily imputed every thing which they could not tell how to justify, while M. Haugwitz suffered himself to be immolated to the reputation of the king his master, with the utmost good grace. This court having some degree of intellect and few prejudices, had known how to be on tolerable terms with the French convention and directory, and on very good terms with the first consul. On the accession of the first consul, she had shown herself willing for a moment to interfere between the belligerent powers, in order to force them to make peace; and when the first consul had effected this without her aid, she put forth the value of her good intentions at the least. She fawned upon him incessantly, and glanced at a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance at a future time, provided he favoured her in partitioning the spoils of the German church.

Russia, wholly disinterested in the territorial question that then occupied Germany, was neither required nor authorized to mix herself up with them by the treaty of Lunéville, but she would willingly play a character in the scene. To be required as an arbitrator flattered the vanity of the young emperor—a vanity which began to appear through his apparent modesty and ingenuousness. This prince at first suffered himself to be guided by the two individuals who had placed him upon the throne by means of a horrible catastrophe, the counts Pahlen and Panin. But his integrity and pride equally suffered under such a yoke. It cost him much to have at his side continually the men who recalled the most terrible recollections to his mind; and he felt humiliated to have ministers who treated him as a prince that was still a minor. It has been already said that he was surrounded by the companions of his early years, De Strogonoff, Nowosiltzoff, and Czartoryski, with a friend of riper age in M. Kotschoubey, but he delayed to possess himself, in connexion with them, of the management of public affairs. He took occasion of an opportunity which presented itself, through the imperious character of count Pahlen, to send him into Courland. He did much the same thing with count Panin, and he introduced M. Kots-

choubey into the cabinet. For his vice-chancellor, he took a former member of the Russian government, prince Kurakin, a statesman of an easy temper, fond of the eclat of power, and willing to lend his name, well known in Europe, with perfect complacency to four or five young personages, who began to govern the empire in secret. Under this singular association of a czar, twenty-four years old, and some Russian and Polish nobles of the same age, he indulged, as has been already stated, very odd ideas about every thing. Paul I. and Catherine herself were considered as barbarous unenlightened sovereigns. The partition of Poland was regarded as an outrage; and the war against the French revolution as the result of blind prejudices. Russia in future was bound to give her policy a new direction; she was bound to protect the feeble, to restrain the powerful, to oblige France and England to keep themselves within the bounds of justice, to force both to respect the rights and interests of other nations in the midst of their disputes. Happy intentions—noble ideas, if they had been real; if they had not resembled those liberal intentions of the French nobility, brought up in the school of Voltaire and Rousseau, ever expressing liberty and humanity, up to the time when the French revolution required them to render their theory and their actions conformable to each other! Then these philosophical nobles became the emigrants of Coblentz. Thus too, as there had been in France a minority of the nobility faithful to the end to the sentiments they first avowed, it was the same with these young rulers of Russia; two distinguished themselves by their stable upright principles, and by characters more in earnest. These were prince Adam Czartoryski and M. Strogonoff. The last exhibited a mind equally sincere and solid. Prince Czartoryski, steady, well instructed, and serious, was twenty-five years old, having gained a species of ascendancy over Alexander. He was full of the hereditary feelings attaching to his family, in other words, of the desire to restore Poland to her rights, and he bent himself, as will soon be seen, to make the combinations of the Russian policy contribute to that end. These distinguished youths, with the inclinations that moved them, began to be anxious to commence in Germany that equitable and decided arbitration which was so strongly seducing in their view. Austria, with her usual ability, had well known how to discover what were their dispositions, and had thought of serving herself through them. Clearly perceiving the predilection of the first consul for Prussia, she turned herself to the emperor Alexander; flattered him, and offered him the part of arbitrator in German affairs. There was no lack of ambition in the czar to take upon himself such a character; but it was not easy to take it in presence of general Bonaparte, that a formal treaty invested with the right and duty of interfering in the question of the German indemnities, and who was not the man to leave that for others to do which it appertained to himself to perform. But the emperor Alexander, although impatient to figure upon the world's great scene, exhibited a reserve meritorious at his age, above all with the ambitious feelings of which his heart was full.

It is necessary now to penetrate into the obscure and difficult question of the German indemnities. This question, entered upon at the congress of Rastadt after the peace of Campo-Formio, abandoned in consequence of the assassination of the French plenipotentiaries, and of the second coalition, resumed after the peace of Lunéville, often begun, and never terminated, was a serious question for Europe, a question it was impossible, when placed before it, that it could know how to arrange. It could not, in fact, be resolved but by the strong will of the first consul, because it was impossible that Germany was sufficient of herself to settle it.

By the treaties of Campo-Formio and of Lunéville, the left bank of the Rhine became French property from the point where that fine river leaves the Swiss territory, between Bâle and Huninguen as far as where it enters the Dutch dominions, between Emerick and Nimiguen. But by the cession of this bank to France, the German princes of every rank and state, as well hereditary as ecclesiastical, had sustained considerable losses in territory and revenue. Bavaria had lost the duchy of Deux Ponts, the palatinate of the Rhine, and the duchy of Juliers. Wurtemberg and Baden had been deprived of the principality of Montbeliard and other domains. The three ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, of Treves, and of Cologne, remained nearly without any estates at all. The two Hesses had lost several lordships; the bishops of Liege and of Bâle had been completely dispossessed of their bishoprics. Prussia had been obliged to renounce, for the advantage of France, the duchy of Gueldres and a part of that of Cleves, as well as the little principality of Mœurs, territories situated on the inferior course of the Rhine. Finally, a crowd of princes of the second and third order had seen their principalities and fiefs disappear. These were not all the losses brought about by the war. In Italy two Austrian archdukes had been forced to renounce the one Tuscany, and the other Modena. In Holland the house of Orange Nassau allied to Prussia, had lost the stadtholdership, as well as a great quantity of personal property.

According to the strict regulations of justice, the German princes should alone be indemnified on the German territory. The archdukes, uncles or brothers of the emperor, having for a long time had the rank of Italian princes, had no claim to the obtainment of establishments in Germany, save from being relations of the emperor. But it was the emperor who had forced unhappy Germany into the war, and thus exposed it to these considerable losses of territory, and the emperor now came to force it to indemnify his own relations, thus drawn in, against their will, to take a part in a foolish and badly-conducted war. The same may be said of the claim of the stadtholder; for if this prince lost his estates, it was not for Germany to pay for the faults which he had himself committed. But the stadtholder was the brother-in-law of the king of Prussia, and that king, not willing to do less for his own family than the emperor had done for his, demanded an indemnification in Germany for the house of Orange Nassau. It was therefore necessary besides the German princes, to indemnify as well the archdukes deprived of their Italian estates, and Orange Nassau dispossessed of the stadtholdership. It

had been demanded of France at the treaty of Lunéville, and before that at the treaty of Campo-Formio, to consent that the archdukes should receive an indemnity in Germany. Prussia at the congress of Bâle, and England at that of Amiens, had exacted that the stadtholder should be indemnified without designating the place, but with the avowed intention of choosing that place somewhere on the surface of the German territory. France, that had only to consider the indemnities in the point of view that affected the general balance—France, to whom it imported little that it was a bishop or a prince of Nassau who was established at Fulda, that it was an archbishop or an archduke who might be indemnified at Salzberg, had seen fit to consent.

The treaty of Lunéville being ratified by the diet, the weight with which the emperor pressed upon the German territory was accepted with regret, but in a formal manner. The treaties of Bâle and Amiens, that stipulated an indemnity for the stadtholder, were, it is true, strangers to the confederation; but England, with the influence which procured her the possession of Hanover, Prussia with her power in the diet, assured besides, both one and the other, of the concurrence of France, had not a refusal to apprehend in requiring a territorial indemnity for the stadtholder. It was therefore agreed, by a consent almost unanimous, that the stadtholder, as well as the two Italian archdukes, should have a part of the secularized bishoprics. To indemnify the German, Italian, and Dutch princes, there were certainly fine domains not wanting in Germany. There were many of these very considerable, under the ecclesiastical order. In secularizing them, there would be found a vast extent of country, covered with inhabitants, and rich enough in revenue to furnish states to all the victims of the war.

It would be difficult to tell the exact value in territory, revenues, and inhabitants of the entire of the German principalities susceptible of secularization. The peace of Westphalia had already secularized a great number; but those which remained formed about one-sixth of Germany, properly so called, as well in regard to extent as to population. In regard to revenue, if reported according to the estimates of the day, very incomplete and much contested, it might amount to thirteen or fourteen millions of florins. But it would be an error to consider this sum as the total revenue of the principalities in question here. It was the revenue, making the deduction of the expenses of collection and of administration; the deduction also must be made of a number of ecclesiastical benefices, such as abbeys, canonicals, and the like, which are not comprised in the net product thus announced, and which would, by the secularization, appertain to the new possessor; that is to say, if the produce of the country be calculated as it was calculated in France in 1803; and as calculations are more accurately made in the present day, it would lead to an estimate three or four times as considerable, and, consequently, to forty or fifty millions of florins, or from a hundred to a hundred and twenty millions of francs.

It is, therefore, impossible to value exactly the just amount of these estates, otherwise than in affirming that they comprised about the sixth part of Germany, properly so called. It suffices, besides, to cite them, in order to show that several of them are composed, at the present time, of flourishing provinces, and some of them the finest of the confederation. Commencing on the east and south of Germany, there are, in the Tyrol, the bishopries of Trent and of Brixen, that Austria considered as belonging to herself, and that for this reason, she would not permit to figure in the mass of German indemnities, but which had been arranged, in spite of her opposition, in the number of the disposable properties. The valuation of their product varied from two hundred thousand to nine hundred thousand florins. In passing from the Tyrol into Bavaria, the superb bishopric of Salzburg presented itself, now one of the most important provinces of the Austrian monarchy, comprising the valley of the Salza, producing, by one account, one million two hundred thousand florins, by another, two million seven hundred thousand florins, and possessing a race of excellent soldiers, as able tirailleurs as the Tyrolians. In the bishopric of Salzburg was comprised the prevotal of Berchtolsgaden, valuable by the production of salt. Upon entering directly into Bavaria, there were encountered, upon the Lech, the bishopric of Augsburg; on the Isar that of Freisingen, and, finally, at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, that of Passau, all three much desired by Bavaria, the territory of which they would very advantageously complete. The produce together of these was valued at about eight hundred thousand florins; but like the others, differently valued, according to custom, by those aspirants who disputed about them. On the other side of the Danube, in other words, in Franconia, was found the rich bishopric of Wurtzburg, the bishops of which formerly arrived at the title of dukes of Franconia, and were opulent enough to build at Wurtzburg a palace almost as fine as that of Versailles. The revenue of this benefice was estimated at one million four hundred thousand florins, and including the bishopric of Bamberg, which was contiguous, at more than two million. This was the lot which would best indemnify Bavaria for her immense losses, and round off her territory exceedingly well. Prussia had an eye upon these, because of their value, and their contiguity with the marquisates of Anspach and Bareuth. The bishopric of Aichstedt, in the same province, might be added, very inferior to the two preceding, but still very considerable.

There remained, too, the archbishoprics of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, situated on the right of the Rhine, archbishoprics and electorates at the same time, having a revenue very difficult to estimate. There remained portions of the electorate of Mayence, enclosed in Thuringia, such as Erfurth, and the territory of Eischsfeld. Then in descending towards Westphalia, the same duchy of Westphalia, the revenue of which was estimated at four or five hundred thousand florins; the bishoprics of Paderborn, Osnabruck, and Hildensheim, which were each supposed able to return four hundred thousand florins. And lastly, the vast bishopric of Munster, the third in revenue of all Germany, the most extended in territory, bringing in at that time one million two hundred thousand florins.

If to these archbishoprics, bishoprics, and duchies, to the number of fourteen, there be joined

the remains of the ancient ecclesiastical electorates, and the fragments of the bishoprics of Spires, Worms, Strasburg, Bâle, Constance, a quantity of rich abbeys, finally, forty-nine free towns, which it was not wished to secularize, but to incorporate in the neighbouring states, which was then styled "to mediatise" them, an idea may be formed, somewhat near exactness, of all the property which was disposable, to make the secular princes forget the misfortunes they had incurred by the war. It must be added, that if there had been no intention to indemnify the archdukes and the stadtholder, who, among the three of them, would ask a quarter part at least of the disposable domains, it would not have been necessary to suppress all the ecclesiastical principalities, and that they would have been enabled to spare to the Germanic constitution the destructive blow by which it was soon to be laid low.

It was, in effect, to give to the Germanic constitution a very deep wound, thus to secularize all the ecclesiastical states at one time, because they played in that constitution a very considerable part. Some details are necessary here, to make known this old constitution, the most ancient in Europe, the most respectable after that of England, about to perish by the cupidity of the German princes themselves.

The Germanic empire was elective. Although for a long time the imperial crown had not been borne out of the house of Austria, it was needful to have a formal election at the commencement of each reign. This had fallen to the heir of the house of Austria, who was in his own right king of Bohemia and Hungary, archduke of Austria, duke of Milan, Carinthia, Styria, &c., but not chief of the empire. The election was formerly made by seven, and at the epoch now alluded to, by eight princes electors. Of these, five were lay princes and three ecclesiastical. The five lay princes were the house of Austria for Bohemia; the elector palatine for Bavaria and the palatinate; the duke of Saxony for Saxony; the king of Prussia for Brandenburg; and the king of England for Hanover. The three ecclesiastical electors were the archbishop of Mayence, possessing a part of both banks of the Rhine in the vicinity of Mayence, the city of Mayence itself, and the banks of the Main as far as above Aschaffenburg; the archbishop of Treves, possessing the county of Treves, in other words, the valley of the Moselle from the frontiers of old France as far as the junction of that river with the Rhine towards Coblentz; lastly, the archbishop of Cologne, possessing the left shore of the Rhine, from Bonn as far as the borders of Holland. These three archbishops, following the general custom of the church, every where when royalty had not engrossed the ecclesiastical nominations, were elected by their chapters, save in canonical institution, which was reserved to the pope. The canons, members of the chapters and electors of their archbishops, were chosen from among the highest of the German nobility. Thus for Mayence, they must be members of the "immediate" nobility, in other words, of the nobility elevated directly by the empire, and not by the territorial princes with whom their domains might be situated. In such a mode neither the archbishop nor the canons charged to elect, could be subjects dependent upon any prince whatever, the emperor himself excepted. This precaution was needful for so great a personage as the archbishop elector of Mayence, who was chancellor of the confederation. He it was who presided at the Germanic diet. The archbishops electors of Treves and Cologne had no other title than that of an old function, which had passed away with time. The archbishop of Cologne was anciently chancellor of the kingdom of Italy; the archbishop of Treves, chancellor of the kingdom of the Gauls.

These eight princes decreed the imperial crown. During the first half of the last century, and the war of the Austrian succession, they were obliged to choose for an emperor a prince of Bavaria; but they soon returned, out of their old habits and a respect for tradition, to the succession of the house of Rodolphe of Hapsburg. Besides, the catholic electors found themselves in a majority, that is to say, as five to three; and the preference of the catholics for Austria was natural and secular. The empire was not only elective, it was,—if it may be so expressed in regard to an era having no analogy with our own,—it was representative. The electors deliberated in a general diet, which met at Ratisbon, under the presidency of the chancellor, the archbishop of Mayence.

This diet was composed of three colleges: the electoral college, in which the eight electors sat that have been just enumerated; the college of princes, in which all the lay and ecclesiastical princes sat, each of them for the territory of which he was the immediate sovereign, some houses having several votes, according to the importance of the principalities which they represented in the diet, others, on the contrary, having but a part of a vote, as for example, the counts of Westphalia; thirdly and lastly, the college of the cities, where they sat to the number of forty-nine, the representatives of the free cities, nearly all ruined, and having only a very slight influence in the government of old Germany.

The forms adopted in collecting the votes were extremely complicated. When the protocol was opened, each of the three colleges voted separately. The electors, besides their representation in the college of electors, had representatives in the college of princes, and thus they sat in two colleges at once. Austria sat in the electoral college for Bohemia, and in the college of princes for the archduchy of Austria. Prussia sat in the electoral college for Brandenburg, and in the college of princes for Anspach, Bareuth, &c. Bavaria sat in the college of electors for Bavaria, and in the college of princes for Deux Ponts, Juliers, &c., and the like with the other powers. They discussed nothing in a particular manner; but each state, called in hierarchical order, verbally gave its opinion through the intermediate agency of a minister. The votes were several times taken, so that each had time to alter or modify its own. When the colleges were of different opinions, they held conferences for the purpose of coming to an understanding. This was styled the "relativeness" and "correlativeness" between the colleges. They then made concessions to each other, and terminated by a common opinion, which was styled a *conclusum*.

The importance of these three colleges was not equal. That of the cities was scarcely reckoned

at all. Formerly, in the middle ages, when all the wealth was centred in the free cities, they had the means, in giving and refusing money, of being heard, and of maintaining their due influence. It was no longer thus, since Nuremburg, Augsburg, and Cologne, ceased to be the centre of commercial and financial power. Besides, the forms employed regarding them, forms which were humiliating, made little attention be paid to their votes. The electors, in other words, the great houses, with their votes in the college of electors, and with their votes and patronage in the college of princes, decided nearly all the questions for deliberation.

This constitution cannot be entirely understood, without it be further remarked, that independently of the general government, there was also one which was local, for the protection of particular interests and a common partition of the charges of the confederation. This local government was that of circles. The whole of Germany was divided into ten circles, of which the last, that of Burgundy, was no more than an empty title, because it comprehended provinces which, for a long space of time, had been beyond the power or domination of the empire. The most powerful prince of the circle was the director. He summoned the estates which composed it to meet and deliberate; he executed the resolutions there agreed upon, and came forward to the succour of those that were threatened with violence. Two tribunals of the empire, one at Wetzlar, another at Vienna, rendered justice among the members of a confederation so different from each other,—kings, princes, bishops, abbeys, and republics.

As it was, this constitution existed a venerable monument of perished ages. It offered every one of the characters which discriminate real liberty, not that, indeed, which protects individuals in modern society, but that which protects feeble states against the aggressions of those which are more powerful, by admitting of the defence, in the midst of a confederation, of their existence, their property, and their particular rights, and in appealing from the most powerful tyranny to the sense of justice in all. Hence there was germinated a certain development of opinion, a deep study of the law of nations, a considerable skill in managing the members in the assemblages, very much resembling that, although with apparent differences, which is practised in the representative governments existing in our time.

The secularizations could not but produce in such a constitution changes very considerable. At first they caused the disappearance from the electoral colleges of the three ecclesiastical electors, and from the college of princes of a great number of catholic members. The catholic majority, which had existed in the second college, of fifty voices against forty-three, was thus changed into a minority, because the princes who were called in to replace the ecclesiastical votes were nearly all protestants. This was a great grievance to the constitution and to the balance of strength. There is no doubt but the tolerance of the age has taken away from the words catholic and protestant party their old religious signification; but these words had acquired a political signification of a very grave character. The protestant party signified the party of Prussia, the catholic that of Austria. These two influences had for a good while divided Germany between them. It might be said that Prussia was at the head of the opposition in the empire, and that Austria was at the head of the government party. Frederick the Great, in raising Prussia to be a power of the first rank, by means of the spoils of Austria, had kindled between the two great German states a violent animosity. This animosity towards each other, a moment neutralized in presence of the French revolution, was quickly revived when Prussia, separating herself from the coalition, had made peace with France, and enriched herself by her neutrality, during the time that Austria was weakening herself to support the war that had been undertaken in common. Now more particularly, the war being over, and that it was necessary to divide the patrimony of the church, the greediness of the two courts added a new fermentation to the hatred which they mutually partook.

Prussia naturally desired to profit by the occasion of the secularizations to enfeeble Austria for ever. Austria was, at the end of the eighteenth century, as she had been in the thirty years' war, and in the wars of Charles V., the great support of the catholic party; not, indeed, that in all cases the protestants had supported Prussia and the catholics Austria; the jealousies of too close a vicinity, on the contrary, often altered such a relation to each other. Thus Bavaria, fervently catholic, but incessantly alarmed at the designs of Austria upon her territory, commonly voted with Prussia. Saxony[1], although protestant, was often opposed to Prussia, in consequence of the jealousy of her neighbourhood, and voted with Austria; but in general, the supporters of Austria were the catholic princes, and above all, the ecclesiastical states. These last voted in its favour when the question of the head of the empire was to be settled; they also supported the same vote in the assemblies, when the general affairs of Germany were discussed. Not levying troops themselves, they suffered the Austrians to recruit for soldiers in their dominions; and further, they furnished appanages to the younger children of the imperial house. The archduke Charles, for example, had received a rich benefice in the grand privilege of the Teutonic order, which had recently been conferred upon him. The bishop of Munster and the archbishop of Cologne being dead, the chapters of the two sees had named the archduke Antony to replace these defunct prelates. As in all the aristocratic countries, the church in Germany was devoted to furnish places for the younger sons of the higher families. Prussia naturally bore no good will to the ecclesiastical states, that thus furnished Austria with soldiers, appanages, and votes in the diet.

Once engaged in constitutional reforms, the German princes were brought to effect other changes still, more particularly the suppression of the free cities and the "immediate" nobility.

The free cities owed their origin to the emperors. In the same way as the kings of France had formerly freed the communes from the tyranny

[1] It must at the same time be observed, that at this moment the elector of Saxony was a catholic, while his people were protestant, and were reckoned as such.

of the lords, the emperors had given to the German cities, enriched by industry and commerce, an independent existence, acknowledged rights, and oftentimes peculiar privileges. It was thus that there had been introduced into the vast German feudality, by the side of feudal lords, and sovereign priests carrying the coronets of counts and dukes, democratic republics, known by their wealth or their talents. Augsburg, Nuremburg, and Cologne, for arts, manufactures, and commerce, had formerly well merited the praise of Germany and of all mankind. All these cities had fallen under the yoke of small local aristocracies, and for the most part were very deplorably governed. Those which had supported their trade and commercial prosperity, had escaped the general wreck of the past, and even presented republics tolerably prosperous. But they became objects of jealousy to the bordering princes, who coveted them for additions to their territories. Prussia particularly had the desire to incorporate Nuremburg in her own state, and Bavaria, Augsburg. Both these cities were much decayed from their ancient splendour.

The "immediate" nobility had its origin in a mode very similar to that of the free cities, because its title accrued from the imperial protection granted to the lords who were too feeble to defend themselves. Thus this species of nobility abounded more particularly in Franconia and Suabia, because at the time of the destruction of the house of Suabia, the lords of that country, finding themselves without a sovereign, were attached to the emperor. They were called "immediate," because they held directly from the emperor, and not the princes among whom their estates were situated. The same title of "immediate" was given to every state, city, fief, or abbey, holding directly of the empire. They denominated "mediate" every estate dependent directly upon the territory in which it happened to be enclosed. This "immediate" nobility, whose obedience was partaken between the local lord and the emperor, whom they acknowledged as their only sovereign, were proud of their more elevated vassalage, served in the armies and in the imperial chancelleries, and gave over to the Austrian recruiting officers, the population of the hamlets and villages which belonged to them.

The territorial princes, of whatever party they were, desired the double incorporation into their estates of the "immediate" nobility and of the free towns. Austria, cool enough upon the maintenance of the integrity of the free towns, of which she coveted a certain number for herself, was, on the contrary, ardent in support of the "immediate" nobility, for which she showed the most particular regard. Still she wished to preserve in its existing state all that she was able to retain in that position.

In a modern point of view, nothing can appear more natural and legitimate than the union of all these and similar parcelled out territories, cities, and lordships, with the body of every state. This, there is no doubt, would have been still more valuable, if, as in France in 1789, they had replaced in Germany these local liberties, by some system of general freedom, guaranteeing at the same time all the existences and all the laws belonging to such a state of things. But these incorporations only went to increase the absolute power of the kings of Prussia, the electors of Bavaria, and the dukes of Wurtemburg. For that reason the world cannot fail to view them with regret.

In the history of European monarchies there are two revolutions very different both in date and object; the first, that by means of which royalty conquered from feudality the smaller local sovereignties, thus absorbing, to form a single state, numerous particular existing ones; secondly, that by means of which royalty, after having formed a single state, is obliged to reckon in accordance with the nation, and to grant a degree of general liberty, uniform and regular in its character, most assuredly very preferable to the liberties exclusively afforded under a feudal system. France, in 1789, after having achieved this first revolution, undertook the second. Germany, in 1803, attempted the first, and she has not completed even that at the present hour. Austria, without any other object than to preserve her influence in the empire, would defend the old Germanic constitution, and with that the feudal privileges of Germany. Prussia, on the contrary, eager for incorporations, wished to absorb the free cities and the immediate nobility, became an innovator by ambition, and aimed at giving to Germany the forms of modern social life, or, in other words, to commence, without the desire to do so, and without the knowledge of the fact, the work of the French revolution in the old Germanic empire.

Thus if the constitutional objects of these two great powers were different, their territorial pretensions were not less in uniformity.

Austria wished to indemnify largely the two archdukes, and under that pretext to extend and amend the frontier of her own states. She troubled herself but little about the duke of Modena, a long while indemnified by the treaties of Campo-Formio and Lunéville, with the Brisgau, a small province of Baden, which he regarded little, as he preferred more to enjoy in quiet at Venice his immense wealth, accumulated by sterling avarice. But Austria occupied herself in good earnest about the archduke Ferdinand, the former sovereign of Tuscany. She coveted in his behalf the fine archbishopric of Salzburg, which would again attach the Tyrol to the main body of the Austrian monarchy, and, further, she desired the provost of Berchtolsgaden, enclosed in the archbishopric. These two principalities were formally promised to her, but she wished to obtain more. She wished to get for the same archduke the bishopric of Passau, which would assure to her the important fortified town of Passau, situated at the confluence of the Inn and Danube; the superb bishopric of Augsburg, extending lengthwise on the river Lech even to the middle of Bavaria; and, finally, the county of Werdenfels[1] and the abbey of Kempten, two possessions placed on the slope of the Tyrolese Alps, dominating both one and the other over the sources of the rivers which traverse Bavaria, as the Inn, Isar, Loisach, and Lech. If to these be added nineteen free towns in Suabia, twelve more great "immediate" abbeys, and if it is recollected

[1] This county was dependent upon the bishopric of Freisingen.

that Austria, independent of what she demanded for the archduke in Suabia, had a number of old possessions in that country, it is easy from that circumstance to judge of her designs. She wished by means of the pretended indemnity of the archduke Ferdinand, to take a position in the middle of Bavaria by Augsburg, above by Werdenfels and Kempten, and below by her possessions in Suabia, and in thus grasping with the talons of the imperial eagle, to obtain the cession of a part of the estates which she had for a long while coveted, that is to say, the course of the Inn, and perhaps also that of the Isar.

It was one of the oldest designs of Austria to extend her territory in Bavaria, in order to secure a better frontier, and at the same time to prolong her posts in the Tyrolean Alps as far as the frontiers of Switzerland. The possession of the line of the Isar was the dearest of her wishes, and would not have been the last had it been gratified. To have possession of the Inn, Austria would have to abandon to the house of Bavaria the bishopric and city of Augsburg, and, further, all her possessions in Suabia. Under this plan the city of Munich, situated on the Isar, would be found on the frontier, and could no longer be the seat of the Bavarian government; Augsburg would have been the new capital offered to the elector palatine. But this was to absorb nearly one-half of the electorate, and throw back the palatine house entirely upon Suabia. In default of the nonfulfilment of this too beautiful dream, the course of the Inn would console Austria for her misfortunes. She possessed only the lower part of the Inn from Braunau as far as Passau; but above, between Braunau and the Tyrolean Alps, Bavaria possessed both banks of that river. Austria would have preferred to possess the Inn through its entire course, from its entry into Bavaria at Kufstein as far as its union with the Danube. This line would have embraced less surface of country than that of the Isar, but it was very much finer, and, speaking in a military sense, much more solid. It was in the mode of exchange that Austria proposed to herself to acquire one or the other of these frontiers. Thus she did not cease, since the question of indemnities had occupied the different cabinets, to besiege with her offers, and when she was not listened to, with her threats, the unfortunate elector of Bavaria, who immediately communicated his anxieties to his two natural protectors, France and Prussia.

The foregoing is the mode in which Austria intended to save herself in the distribution of the indemnities—the following is the mode in which she intended to distribute those of the other claimants.

For the losses of Bavaria on the left bank of the Rhine, which surpassed those of all the other German princes, because that house had lost the duchy of Deux-Ponts, the palatinate of the Rhine, the duchy of Juliers, the marquisate of Bergen-ap-Zoom, and a multitude of estates in Alsace, Austria assigned her two bishoprics in Franconia, those of Wurtzburg and Bamburg, very well placed in situation in regard to Bavaria, because they were close to the high palatinate, but scarcely equal in value to two-thirds of what she had lost. Perhaps Austria would have added to this lot the bishopric of Freisingen, situated on the Isar, very near to Munich. To Prussia, Austria intended to give a large northern bishopric, Paderborn for example, perhaps two or three abbeys besides, as Essen and Werden; lastly, to the stadtholder a territory somewhere in Westphalia, or, in other words, about a quarter of what the house of Brandenburg desired for itself and its relatives. After having conceded to the two Hesses, to Baden, and to Wurtemburg, some of the spoils of the inferior clergy, and a certain number of abbeys to a crowd of little hereditary princes, who, she said, would think themselves happy to take what was tendered to them, Austria wished with the three considerable territories in the north and centre of Germany, such as Munster, Osnabruck, Hildesheim, Fulda, with the remains of the electorate of Cologne, Mayence, and Treves, to preserve the three ecclesiastical electors, and thus save her influence in the empire.

Of these three ecclesiastical electorates, the first, that of Mayence, had passed to the coadjutor of the last archbishop. This new titulary, a member of the house of Dalberg, was learned, ingenious, and a man of the world. The electorate of Treves belonged to a Saxon prince, still alive, who had retired into the bishopric of Augsburg, of which he had the title, with that of Cleves, forgetting, in the assiduous observation of his religious duties, and in the opulence that the pensions bestowed upon his family had procured for him, his lost electoral greatness. The electorate of Cologne was become vacant by the death of the recent titulary. The bishops of Munster, Freisingen, Ratisbon, and the provost of Berchtolsgaden, were also become vacant. Whether Austria was or was not an accomplice of the chapters, she had suffered the nomination, in presence of an imperial commissioner, of the archduke Antony, to the bishopric of Munster and the archbishopric of Cologne. Prussia, irritated, had complained loudly, saying that Austria, by this nomination of new titularies, wished to create obstacles to the secularizations, and hinder the free execution of the treaty of Lunéville. These complaints had for their object to hinder the filling up, in the same manner, of the benefices of Freisingen, Ratisbon, and Berchtolsgaden, which were at that moment vacant.

An idea tolerably just may be formed of the designs of Prussia, by considering them exactly as counter designs to those put forward by Austria. At first she judged, with some reason, that the losses of the archduke of Tuscany were exaggerated to at least double the truth. It was pretended at Vienna that he had sustained a loss of four millions of florins in revenue. This was an exaggerated assertion, and was founded upon a confusion of the rough with the net revenue. The net loss sustained by the grand duke was two millions five hundred thousand florins, at most. Prussia asserted that Salzburg, Passau, and Berchtolsgaden, equalled in revenue, if they did not surpass, Tuscany; without the addition that Tuscany, detached from the Austrian monarchy, had in that relation no value of position, while Salzburg, Berchtolsgaden, and Passau, were closely attached to the very body of that monarchy, gave it an excellent frontier, and in the mountains of Salzburg a numerous military population. It was thought that Austria would be able to levy there twenty-five thousand men. There

was, therefore, no proper ground to add to the lot of the archduke the bishoprics of Augsburg, Aichstadt, the abbey of Kempten, the county of Werdenfels, as well as all the free towns and abbeys demanded by Austria in Suabia. Still Prussia not less insisted on the exaggerated pretensions of Austria, than she insisted on the lawfulness of her own. She estimated at double their real value the losses which she asserted that she had sustained, and diminished a full half the value of the territory she claimed as an indemnity. At first she partook in one of the desires of Austria,—that of carrying herself towards the centre and south of Germany. She wanted to do that in Franconia which Austria endeavoured to do in Suabia; she would double her territory there if possible. It was the constant ambition of these two great powers to take advanced positions in the midst of Germany, whether against one another or against France, or whether to keep under their influence the states in the centre of the confederation. Under the first impulse of ambition, Prussia had not demanded less than the bishoprics of Wurtzburg and Bamburg, contiguous to the marquisates of Anspach and Bareuth, and intended, in the view of all the world, to indemnify Bavaria. This demand met with so many objections, particularly in Paris, that she was obliged to renounce it.

In default of Wurtzburg and Bamburg, Prussia, which had only lost the duchy of Guildres, a portion of the duchy of Cleves, the small principality of Mœurs, some tolls suppressed upon the Rhine, and the enclosed territories of Savenaer, Huissen, and Marburg, ceded to Holland, representing 700,000 florins of revenue according to Russia, and 1,200,000 according to France,—Prussia would have no less than a part of the north of Germany, in other words, the bishoprics of Munster, Paderborn, Osnabruck, and Hildesheim, besides the remains of the electorate of Mayence in Thuringia, such as Eichsfeld and Erfurth; then finally, Franconia, where she had not given up her pretensions, the bishopric of Aichstedt, and the celebrated city of Nuremburg.

Making in regard to the indemnity of the stadtholder the same kind of calculations as Austria in regard to the indemnity for the duke of Tuscany, she demanded for the house of Orange-Nassau an establishment contiguous to the Prussian territory, comprehending the following countries:—the duchy of Westphalia, the country of Recklinghausen, and the remains of the electorates of Cologne and Treves on the right of the Rhine. It therefore resulted for the stadtholder, besides the advantage to be backed by Prussia,—a great advantage both for her and himself,—that he was placed as well close to Holland, with the power of profiting on the turn of fortune. Now, if the falsity of the Prussian valuation is considered, if it is considered that after having exaggerated nearly double or even triple the amount of her losses, she dissimulated in the same proportion about the value of the objects she demanded as an indemnification; that, for example, she valued at 350,000 florins the bishopric of Munster, which in Paris, after the most impartial calculations, was valued at 1,200,000; that she estimated at 150,000 florins value that which at Paris was valued at 369,000, and thus of the rest, an idea may be formed of the idle exaggeration of her pretensions.

She showed herself a little more generous than Austria towards the princes of the second and third order, because they were all protestants to be introduced into the diet. She was of opinion that the ecclesiastical electors of Cologne and Treves should be suppressed, but that of Mayence was to be suffered to remain in existence, with the wrecks of his electorate on the right bank of the Rhine; to replace the two ecclesiastical electors thus suppressed by protestant electors, taken from among the princes of Hesse, of Wurtemburg, of Baden, or even of Orange-Nassau, if it were possible. The support of her pretensions which Austria endeavoured to gain from Russia, Prussia sought to obtain from France. She offered, if the first consul would second her in her claims, to unite her policy with that of the first consul; to engage herself to him by a formal alliance; to guarantee all the arrangements that had been made in Italy, such as the kingdom of Etruria, the new constitution given to the Italian republic, and the union of Piedmont with France. She made, at the same time, the greatest efforts to bring the negotiations to Paris, which Austria endeavoured to carry to St. Petersburg. She knew that out of Paris she would not be judged very favourably; that in all the other courts, they reproached her with having abandoned the cause of Europe for that of the French revolution; that if the pretensions of the emperor were criticised, hers would be judged with much more severity, because she wanted the excuse of the great losses sustained by the house of Austria during the last war; she knew, finally, that she had no hope of support but on the side of France; that to lend herself to the displacing of the negotiation, would be to disoblige the first consul, and to accept arbitrators ill disposed towards his views. Thus had she refused all the overtures of Austria, who in despair of the cause, made the offer that they should come to an understanding, take both one and the other the lion's share, and sacrifice all the princes of the second and third order, and then to address St. Petersburg directly afterwards, in order to obtain the sanction of the partition which they should have made, with the object, before all others, of delivering Germany from the yoke of the French.

The German princes, following the example of Prussia, addressed themselves to France. In place of soliciting for their cause in London, Petersburg, Vienna, or Berlin, they solicited in Paris. Bavaria tormented by Austria; the dukes of Baden, of Wurtemburg, and of Hesse, jealous one of the other; the lesser families affrighted at the avidity of the greater; the free towns threatened with losing their privileges; the "immediate" nobility exposed to the same danger as the free towns; all, great and little; republics or hereditary sovereigns; all pleaded their cause at Paris, the one intermediately by their ministers, the others directly and in person. The late stadtholder sent his son there, the prince of Orange, since then king of Holland, a distinguished prince, whom the first consul regarded with much favour; many other princes came there as well. All of them sedulously attended the palace of St. Cloud, where

the general of a republic was courted as the equal of kings.

Singular was the spectacle which Europe then presented,—a striking proof of the uncertainty of human passions, and of the depth of the designs of Providence!

Prussia and Austria had drawn Germany into an unjust war against the French revolution, and they had been vanquished. France, by the law of victory, a law incontestable when the victorious power has been attacked, had conquered the left bank of the Rhine. A part of the German princes thus found themselves deprived of their estates. It was natural that they should be indemnified in Germany, and that they only should have an indemnity. Nevertheless, Prussia and Austria, which had compromised them, wished to indemnify, at the expense of this same unfortunate Germany, their own relatives, whether Italians, as the archdukes, or Dutchmen, like the stadtholder; and that which is more strange still, under the name of their relatives, they wished to indemnify themselves, but always at the expense of Germany, the victim of their faults. Then these indemnifications—where did they seek for them? Why, in the property of the Church itself! In other words, the defenders of the throne and altar, returned home after being themselves beaten, undertake to indemnify themselves for the unfortunate issue of the war by despoiling the altar, which they went out to defend in the battle-field, and by imitating the French revolution, which they were come back from attacking. And a more extraordinary thing yet, if it be possible, they demanded of the victorious representative of this very revolution upon which they had been making war, to divide among them the spoils of their altars, which they were not capable of dividing honestly among themselves!

The first consul disturbed but little the movement going on around him to draw the negotiations to this or that place. He knew that it could take place only in Paris, because it was his desire it should do so, and that was the most decisive point. Free in his movements since the signature of the general peace, he listened successively to the parties interested; to Prussia, which only desired to act with him and by him; to Austria, which, while endeavouring to carry the negotiation to the arbitration of St Petersburg, neglected in the meanwhile nothing to dispose him in her favour; to Bavaria, which requested counsel and support against the threatening offers of Austria; to the house of Orange, which had sent its heir to Paris; to the houses of Baden, Wurtemburg, and Hesse, which proffered him their entire devotedness if he would act for their advantage; lastly, to the lesser princes, who claimed from their old alliance with France. After having heard the different pretensions of the parties, the first consul soon saw that without the intervention of a powerful will, the repose of Germany, and, as a consequence, that of the whole continent, would remain indefinitely in peril. He therefore decided to offer, and, in reality, to impose his mediation, by presenting arrangements which might do justice to the wisdom of France as well as her policy.

Nothing could be more sensible nor more admirable than the views of the first consul at this happy period of his life, when with as much glory as that with which he ever covered his name, he had not enough of material force to contemn Europe, and to dispense with a system of policy profoundly calculated. He saw well that with the dispositions of England so very uncertain, it would be right to consider and to prevent the danger of a new and general war; that to this end it was urgently necessary to manage for the provision of a solid continental alliance; that the alliance of Prussia was the most convenient; that this court, an innovator naturally, by origin and by interest, had with the French revolution certain affinities, which no other court was likely to possess; that in attaching it seriously, coalitions would be rendered impossible; because, according to the degree of power which France had attained, would be that, more or less, which would venture to attack her, when all the powers should be united against her; but if one power was wanting to the coalition, and if the power so wanting was gone over to the side of France, the chances of a new war would not be tempted. Still, in considering about allying himself with Prussia, the first consul comprehended with a rare correctness of judgment, that he must not make her so strong as that she might crush Austria, for then she would become in her turn the more dangerous power, in place of being a useful ally; that he must sacrifice neither the lesser princes, the old friends of France, nor the ecclesiastical states, without exception, estates little consistent, little military, and preferable as neighbours to lay princes and soldiers; nor, in fine, the free cities, respectable by the recollections attached to them, respectable above all by the title of republics, for the republic of France; that to sacrifice at the same time to Prussia all the little states, hereditary, ecclesiastical, and republican, this was to favour the realization of that German unity, more dangerous for the European equilibrium, if it were even constituted, than all the Austrian power had been of old; that in making the balance incline, in a word, towards the innovating protestant party, it would only be needful to incline, and not to overturn it, because that would be to push Austria to despair, perhaps to hasten it to a fall, to replace one enemy by another, and in some future time prepare for France a rivalry with the house of Brandenburg, to the full as formidable as that which had caused war with the house of Austria during several centuries.

Full of these wise reflections, the first consul endeavoured to bring Prussia into more moderate views. Arrived at an understanding with her, he wished to negotiate with the interests of the second order, and to get them to be satisfied with a just portion of the indemnity; he then designed to open at once at St. Petersburg a negotiation entirely courteous, to flatter the pride of the young emperor, which he had discovered clearly under a feigned modesty, and to obtain his alliance, by fair proceedings, to the territorial arrangements which should be decreed. With the concurrence of Prussia satisfied, and of Russia flattered, he hoped to render inevitable the assent of Austria, if, at the same time, care were taken not to exasperate her too much by the arrangements adopted.

In combinations so very complicated, it was necessary to wait, and to pass over several plans

before arriving at that which should be definitive. The idea of the first consul relative to the distribution of the German territory, had been, at first, to separate one from the other of the three great central powers of the continent, Austria, Prussia, and France, and to place between them the entire mass of the German confederation. In this view, the first consul would have conceded to Austria, not the total of her pretensions, that is, the course of the Isar, because in that case it would be necessary to transport the palatine house into Suabia and Franconia; but he would have conceded the Inn in its whole course, that is to say, the bishopric of Salzburg, the provostship of Berchtolsgaden, the country comprised between the Salza and the Inn, and further, the bishoprics of Brixen and Trente, situated in the Tyrol. Austria thus indemnified on her own account and that of the two archdukes, should have been bound to renounce all possessions in Suabia; she would have been placed behind the Inn entirely; she would have been compact, and covered by an excellent frontier; she would finally have found rest, and have given it to Bavaria, through the solution of the old question of the Inn.

At the same time that Austria would have renounced her establishment in Suabia, Prussia would have been made to renounce hers in Franconia, by demanding her abandonment of the margraviates of Anspach and Bareuth. With the margraviates and the contiguous bishoprics of Wurtzburg and Bamburg, and with the possessions of which Austria had made the sacrifice in Suabia, with the bishoprics of Freisingen and Aichstedt, enclosed in the Bavarian dominions, there would have been composed for the palatine house a territory well rounded, extending at once over Bavaria, Suabia, and Franconia, capable of serving as a barrier between France and Austria. At this price the palatine house would have been enabled to abandon the rest of the palatine on the Rhine and the fine duchy of Berg, placed at the other extremity of Germany, that is to say, towards Westphalia. Prussia, separated from Franconia, as Austria from Suabia, would have been carried back entirely to the north. To be wholly carried back it would be needful to remove the obstacle which intervened, that is to say, the two branches of the house of Mecklenburg; and these two families might be established in the territories become vacant in the centre of Germany. Prussia would be found upon the shores of the Baltic; she having received, besides, the bishoprics of Munster, Osnabruck, and Hildesheim. Indemnified thus for her losses, new and old, she would have to abandon all the duchy of Cleves, of which a part, situated on the left of the Rhine, had passed to France, and of which the part situated on the right bank would have increased the mass of indemnities. Then, already separated from Austria by the abandonment of Franconia, she had been so from France by her distance from the banks of the Rhine.

There would remain in the vacant duchies of Cleves, of Berg, and of Westphalia, in the remains of the electorates of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence, in the enclosed dependencies of Mayence, Erfurth, and Eichsfeld, in the bishopric of Fulda, and other ecclesiastical properties, in the fragments of the palatinate of the Rhine, in a great number of "mediate" and also of "immediate" allies, spread over all Germany—there would remain enough of which to compose a state for the house of Mecklenburg and that of Orange; to indemnify the houses of Hesse, Baden, and Wurtemburg, and a crowd of inferior princes. Finally, in the sees of Aichstadt, Augsburg, Ratisbon, and Passau, there would have been enough to keep two of the ecclesiastical electors out of three, a thing which had been contemplated by the first consul, because he did not wish to change too much the Germanic constitution, and he was pleased besides to protect the church in every country.

In this plan, profoundly conceived, Austria, Prussia, and France, were established the one at a distance from the other; the Germanic confederation was united in one sole body, and placed in the midst of the great continental powers, with a useful character, important and honourable, of separating them, and preventing collisions between them; the German states thus acquiring a perfect limitation, the Germanic constitution was usefully reformed, and not destroyed.

The plan which the first consul at first proposed to Prussia, was not immediately refused. It was an advantage to this power to become as compact in territory as possible, to border on the Baltic, and to occupy all the northern part of Germany. Her definitive consent depended upon the extent or quantity of territory offered to her when the details of the partition came to be settled. But if the princes of the centre of Germany, whose states, at that moment vested in them only upon the changeable will of the negotiators, were able to be moved with ease to the north or to the south, the east or west, it became another matter for the princes confined to the northern part of the confederation like the princes of Mecklenburg, strongly established in the midst of their subjects, whose affection they had possessed for many ages, strangers to all the territorial vicissitudes brought about by the war, and difficult to be persuaded into a displacement so very considerable. Besides, if they said a word to England, she would not fail to make a scheme miscarry which should deliver over the shores of the Baltic to Prussia.

Spontaneously or not, the princes of Mecklenburg refused, in a peremptory manner, the exchange which was offered to them. Yet Prussia, which had been charged with the opening of the negotiation, had clearly hinted to them that France, in making neighbours of them, wished also to make them her friends, and would show herself liberal towards them in the distribution of the indemnities.

Howsoever important that part of the plan of the first consul might have been which was thus refused, it was still worth while to carry out the realization of the rest. It was always a good object if possible to keep Austria behind the Inn, and thus to concede to her for once the long continued object of her wishes; it was always beneficial to concentrate Prussia in the north of Germany, and to exclude her from Franconia, where her presence was of no advantage to any body, and might possibly become dangerous to herself in case of a war, since the provinces of Anspach and Bareuth lay directly upon the route of the French and Austrian armies, and thus it would be difficult

to pay respect to her neutrality. The sequel of this history will reveal the serious inconvenience of such a situation.

But Prussia and Austria were very exacting in every thing that concerned themselves. Though Austria found the frontier of the Inn exceedingly attractive, she was unwilling to cede any thing in Suabia; she made demands of possessions there, even after she might acquire the frontier of the Inn. She demanded besides Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden, and besides the country between the Salza and the Inn, the bishopric of Passau. The bishops of Brixen and of Trent, which would be given over to her, were not in her view a gift, because they were in the Tyrol, and to Austria all which was in the Tyrol, all which was in that country, appeared so much her own property, that she affected to believe, in receiving them, she received nothing new. Prussia, on her side, would not depart from any of her pretensions in Franconia. Under this aspect of things the first consul adopted the plan of abandoning the beneficial for the possible, a painful necessity, but often needful in great and important affairs of state. He directed himself to the object of a clear understanding with Prussia, in order to concert measures subsequently with Russia, reserving for the latter part of the negotiation the agreement with Austria, that exhibited a despairing obstinacy in the matter, which it was not possible to succeed in overcoming but by the accession of united adhesions to the side opposed to her.

He announced primarily his firm resolution not to suffer any interest to be sacrificed; to give nothing to the greater states at the expense of the smaller; not to suppress all the free towns, not utterly to destroy the catholic party. General Beurnonville, the French ambassador at Berlin, was at the same moment upon leave in Paris. He had been ordered in the course of May, 1802, or Floréal, year x., to hold a conference there with M. Lucchesini, the minister of Prussia, and to sign a convention, in which should be stipulated the particular arrangements for the houses of Brandenburg and Orange.

Prussia now reproduced all her former pretensions, but she had no chance of treating advantageously with anybody but with France. She was then obliged to resign herself to an arrangement, which, although much inferior to that she desired to have, could not fail to appear to the whole of Germany an act of great partiality towards her.

This power had lost, as already seen, the duchy of Gueldres, on the left bank of the Rhine, a part of the duchy of Cleves, and the little principality of Mœurs; she had ceded to Holland some estates enclosed in that territory; and lastly, she had been deprived of the revenue arising from the tolls on the Rhine, in consequence of a general disposition relative to the navigation. These losses united drew after them a diminution of revenue, which Prussia valued at 2,000,000 of florins, that Austria estimated at only 750,000 fl., Russia at 1,000,000 fl., and France, wishing to favour her claim, at 1,200,000 fl. or 1,300,000 fl. By a convention, signed on the 23rd of May, 1802, or 3rd Priarial, year x., France promised to obtain for Prussia the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildesheim, a part of the bishopric of Munster, the territories of Erfurth and Eichsfeld, the remains of the ancient electorate of Mayence, and, lastly, some abbeys and free cities, the whole representing in value about 1,800,000 florins of revenue, or just 500,000 florins more than the estimated amount of the losses they were intended to compensate. Prussia obtained nothing in Franconia, which was to her a subject of deep regret, because her whole ambition was perseveringly directed to that quarter; but Eichsfeld and Erfurth were intermediate points, which might serve for stations towards her arrival in the provinces of Franconia. While feigning to resign herself to enormous sacrifices, she signed the treaty, satisfied at bottom with the acquisitions which she had obtained. On the following day a particular convention was concluded with her for the indemnity of the house of Orange-Nassau. This house was not placed in the state of Westphalia, as it would have wished, but in that of Upper Hesse. The bishopric and abbey of Fulda, the abbey of Corvey, at a little distance from Fulda, that of Weingarten and some others, composed this indemnity. By this arrangement, without being placed too near to Holland and the relations of the stadtholderate, it was, notwithstanding, sufficiently near the country of Nassau, where all the branches of this family were or ought to be indemnified.

These advantages were granted to Prussia and to her relative with the object of insuring their alliance. Thus, too, the first consul designed to profit by the opportunity—to obtain from her a formal adhesion to all which he had done in Europe. He demanded and obtained from the head of the house of Orange-Nassau, the acknowledgment of the Batavian republic, and the renunciation of the stadtholderate; he demanded of Prussia an acknowledgment of the Italian republic and of the kingdom of Etruria, and an implicit approbation of the union of Piedmont to France. The king, Frederick William, thus found himself bound to the policy of the first consul, in what to all the rest of Europe was the most objectionable. He still did not hesitate, but gave the adhesions required in the same document which assigned to him his own share of the German indemnities.

After having thus put a termination to the pretensions of Prussia to the indemnities, the first consul, faithful to his scheme of coming to an understanding successively and individually with the principals interested, signed on the same day a convention with Bavaria. He treated this country in the convention as the old ally of France. He insured to it all the ecclesiastical principalities enclosed in its own territory, the bishopric of Augsburg, but without the town, which was to be preserved as one of the free cities, and the bishopric of Freisingen; the places bordering on the Tyrol, much desired by Austria, such as the abbey of Kempten, and the country of Werdenfels; the fortress of Passau, without the bishopric, enclosed in the Austrian territory, and destined for the archduke Ferdinand; the bishopric of Aichstadt, on the borders of the Danube; the two grand bishoprics of Wurtzburg and of Bamburg, forming a noted part of Franconia; finally, several free towns and abbeys of Suabia, that Austria, in her

ambitious dreams, had demanded for herself, particularly Ulm, Memmingen, Buchorn, and others. The question of the Inn between Austria and Bavaria was not determined ; the case was left to the two powers interested to decide in the way of exchange. The palatine house, concentrated in Suabia and Franconia, thus obtained a compact territory. There was only the duchy of Berg, placed on the confines of Westphalia, which was separated from the main body of the state. With the view of agglomerating the Bavarian territory, that state had been made to abandon all the palatinate of the Rhine; but it was completely indemnified for all which was thus taken away, because if it lost 3,000,000 of florins in revenue, it had received 3,000,000 and several thousand florins more in the way of compensation.

The indemnities of Prussia and of Bavaria being thus fixed, the most difficult part of the labour was concluded. Two of the friends of France were contented, the two most considerable of the German states after Austria. No insurmountable opposition was afterwards to be apprehended. It remained still to make the agreement with Baden, Wurtemburg, and the two Hesses. Baden and Wurtemburg were clients and relatives of Russia. It was with Russia that their portion should be arranged. It entered into the first consul's plan, as has been already observed, to give the emperor Alexander a participation in the German arrangements, to interest him by treating those he patronized well, by flattering his pride, and by appearing to make a great account of his influence. First, he was obliged to follow this course by the secret articles annexed to the last treaty of peace, by which he was bound to enter into the affair of the German indemnities in concert with Russia. The first consul had thought it best not to leave the emperor time to put forward his right of intervention, and in his personal correspondence with the young emperor, he unbosomed himself with the utmost confidence regarding all the great affairs of Europe, and demanded his intentions in regard to the houses of Wurtemburg and Baden, which had the honour of being allied to the imperial family. In fact, the dowager empress, widow of Paul I., mother of Alexander, was a princess of Wurtemburg, and the reigning empress, the wife of Alexander, was a princess of Baden. This last was one of the three brilliant sisters, born at the little court of Carlsruhe, that were at this moment seated upon the thrones of Bavaria, Sweden, and Russia.

The czar, flattered at these advances, voluntarily accepted the offers of the first consul, and did not for a moment think of entering into the idea of Austria, that wished the negotiation to proceed at St. Petersburg. However pleased he might have been to see the most important business of Europe transacted in the imperial city, he had the good sense not for a moment to pretend that he should be so. He authorized M. Markoff, his minister, to negotiate the matter in Paris. Wurtemburg and Baden were for the emperor the last interests in this negotiation. His essential interest was to participate ostensibly in the entire work. The first consul left the emperor Alexander nothing to desire in respect to the exterior of the character he desired to play, and offered him a participation in a manner which allowed him to figure upon an equality with the cabinet of France, in proposing to him that France and Russia should be constituted mediating powers between the different states of the Germanic confederation.

This idea was one of the most happy possible. It was necessary, in fact, after having arranged with the principals interested, the part which should be made their own, to open a communication with the Germanic body assembled at Ratisbon, and to bring it to ratify the engagements individually subscribed. The first consul had the idea of uniting these arrangements in a general plan, and of presenting them to the diet at Ratisbon, in the names of France and Russia spontaneously, constituting themselves mediating powers. This form of proceeding would spare the dignity of the Germanic body, which would no more appear to be dictatorially organized by France, but that in the embarrassment into which it had been cast by the ambitious rivals raised up in its own bosom, it accepted as arbitrators the two greatest powers of the continent as the most disinterested. It was not possible to conceal under a form more agreeable to Germany, more flattering to the young sovereign, yet scarcely entered upon the stage of the world, the real will of France. The first consul, in thus accepting an equality of character with a prince who had yet done nothing, himself covered with glory, consummately versed in arms and politics, had exhibited the most able conduct, because owing to a little management he had brought Europe into his views. The character of a true policy is always to place the real result before the exterior effect. Besides this, the effect is inevitably produced when the real result is obtained.

The proposition of the first consul to the emperor Alexander being accepted, it was agreed to present a note to the Germanic diet, signed by the two cabinets, and containing a spontaneous offer of their mediation. It then remained to have an understanding upon the arrangements to be stated in the note itself. The first consul had much trouble to make M. Markoff accept the stipulations already agreed upon with the principal German powers, contrary to the views of Austria, without being seriously prejudiced. Whilst the young Alexander affected to partake in none of the passions of the European aristocracy, M. Markoff in Paris, and M. Woronzoff in London, displayed without any reserve all the passions that a French emigrant, an English tory, or a grandee of Austria could have exhibited. M. Markoff was a Russian full of stateliness, and wholly destitute of that attractive flexibility which is so often met with in the distinguished men of his own country, having some mind, but more pride, and continually giving of the power of his own cabinet a picture at that time altogether exaggerated. The first consul was not a man to tolerate the ridiculous haughtiness of M. Markoff, and knew how to keep the ambassador in his proper place, while observing for the sovereign he represented the proper degree of regard. The first consul offered for Wurtemburg, Baden, and Bavaria, advantages certainly superior to the losses that these three houses had sustained. But M. Markoff, indifferent to the imperial relationship, even to the Russian policy,

which begun after the peace of Teschen, to favour the smaller German powers, in his zeal for the cause of old Europe, exhibited himself not Russian but Austrian. It was for Austria that he appeared to interest himself exclusively. Prussia was odious to him; he contested all its statements, admitted on the contrary those of Austria, and demanded for that power as much as they would have asked for in Vienna. The bishopric of Salzburg, the prevost of Berchtolsgaden, accorded by general consent to the archduke Ferdinand, produced very nearly as much as Tuscany, or in other words, 2,500,000 florins. There were added further to these two principalities the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen. But M. Markoff would not admit of this addition going into the account. These last bishoprics were in the Tyrol, and on that account, according to him, so much Austrian, that it was to take them away from the emperor to give them to an archduke. This was answered by the statement that Trent and Brixen were ecclesiastical principalities, wholly independent, although enclosed in the Austrian territories, and that they could not become Austrian property until they should be formally conferred upon her.

Austria wished to have besides the bishopric of Passau, which would secure to her the important fortress of Passau, situated at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, and forming a fortified bridge-head towards Bavaria. It was agreed to give Austria the bishopric without the town, which was very possible, and at the same time convenient, because the territory of this bishopric is entirely comprised within the dominions of Austria, and the fortified town of Passau in Bavaria. To give Passau to Austria would be to give up to her a threatening offensive position in regard to Bavaria; nothing, therefore, was more consistent nor more natural, than to grant the bishopric to the archduke Ferdinand, and Passau to the elector palatine. But Austria regarded Passau as a capital position, and M. Markoff supported its grant to Austria with extreme warmth. However, it became necessary to terminate this long negotiation; and M. Markoff feeling the possibility that it might finish without Russia, consented at last to agree, and went into an arrangement with M. Talleyrand upon the definitive plan.

The advantages already conceded by the first consul to Prussia and the house of Orange, although warmly contested by M. Markoff, were inserted entire in the definitive plan. These were, as has been already stated, for Prussia the bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and Munster; this took only in part Eichsfeld, Erfurth, and some abbeys and free towns besides: and for the house of Orange-Nassau, Fulda and Corvey. There was inserted in the same plan the conditions already stipulated for Bavaria, in other words, the bishoprics of Freisingen and Augsburg, the county of Werdenfels, the abbey of Kempten, the city of Passau without the bishopric, the bishoprics of Aichstadt, Wurtzburg, and Bamburg, with several free towns and abbeys of Suabia.

Austria was to receive for the archduke of Tuscany, the bishoprics of Brixen, Trent, Salzburg, and Passau, the last without the fortress, and the prevost of Berchtolsgaden. This was a revenue of 3,500,000 florins, as an indemnity for a net revenue of 2,500,000, with the advantage of a contiguity of territory which was not offered by Tuscany. Austria obtained nothing in Suabia, but she kept her old possessions there. It was at her option to exchange these for the frontier of the Inn. The Brisgau was, as in anterior treaties, insured to the duke of Modena.

The house of Baden was very well treated, a matter that seemed to interest M. Markoff in a very moderate degree. The house had lost various lordships and estates in Alsace and Luxemburg, representing in value a sum of 315,000 florins of revenue at the utmost. Baden was secured territories at its own doors, such as the bishopric of Constance, the remnants of the bishoprics of Spires, Strasburg, and Bâle, the bailwicks of Ladenburg, Bretten, and Heidelburg, which amounted to 450,000 florins of revenue, without adding the electoral dignity which it was destined to receive.

The house of Wurtemburg was not treated less favourably. To this was conceded the prevost of Ellwangen and different abbeys, forming a revenue of 380,000 florins, in compensation for the 250,000 that it had lost.

The houses of Hesse and of Nassau were equally indemnified by means of territories situated at their own doors, and proportioned to their losses. The inferior princes were carefully defended by France, and preserved revenues pretty nearly equivalent to those of which they had been despoiled. The houses of Aremburg and Solms were placed in Westphalia. The counts of Westphalia obtained the low bishopric of Munster. There was little notice taken of England in this matter; she did not seem to take any great interest in the question of the German indemnities. Still it was not forgotten that George III. was elector of Hanover, and that he set a great value upon this ancient inheritance of his family. He regarded it even as a last resource in moments of melancholy, when he believed that he saw England overturned by a revolution. It was wished to dispose him favourably to the measure; and as he was also requested to abandon certain rights in favour of the cities of Bremen and Hamburg, and to make some small sacrifices in favour of Prussia, he received as an indemnity the bishopric of Osnabruck, contiguous to Hanover, an indemnity very superior to all that he had lost, but which had for its object to interest him in a strenuous way in the success of the negotiation.

A certain number of the "mediate" abbeys was reserved to complete the indemnities of the princes who might have been ill treated in the first partition, and also to furnish pensions to the members of the suppressed clergy. In general, the princes who received the ecclesiastical property were burdened with the payment of the pensions to all the living titularies, bishops, abbots, members of chapters, and officers attached to their service. It was the most obvious duty of humanity towards the incumbents from whom they took the property, and of whom they destroyed the princely rank. But if the suppressed clergy on the right bank of the Rhine were thus provided for, there remained those dispossessed upon the left bank; and these being, in consequence of treaties, without any resource against France, they were without the means of a livelihood. It was for the sustenance of these

that a good many of the "mediate" abbeys reserved were destined.

Such were the territorial dispositions agreed upon with M. Markoff. There had been distributed nearly 14,000,000 of florins in indemnities, to meet 13,000,000 of loss. That which well exhibits the greediness of the great courts, is the fact that Austria took nearly 4,000,000 for the archdukes; Prussia two for herself and half a million for the stadtholder; Bavaria 3,000,000, the exact equivalent of her loss; Wurtemburg, Baden, the two Hesses, and Nassau, about two; all the smaller princes united, about two and a half. Austria and Prussia therefore obtained the larger part for themselves, or for princes who made no part of the Germanic confederation.

The constitutional dispositions still remained to be made, and it was necessary to complete them. The first consul was at first inclined to preserve two ecclesiastical electors, but was afterwards thwarted by the obstinacy of Austria; deprived of resources by the greediness of the great courts, he found himself reduced to the preservation of only one. The elector of Cologne was dead, and was replaced, for form's sake alone, by the archduke Antony, but without any intention on the part of Austria to make the election valid. The elector-archbishop of Treves, a Saxon prince, retired to his second benefice, the bishopric of Augsburg, had nothing of which to complain or regret. There was adjudged him a pension of 100,000 florins. The actual elector of Mayence was a prince of the house of Dalburg, of whom mention has been already made. He had, independently of his personal qualities, a claim to be maintained by the importance of his see, to which was attached the chancellory of the empire of Germany, and the presidency of the diet. The quality of archchancellor of the empire was therefore preserved to him, as well as the presidency of the diet. The bishopric of Ratisbon was given to him where the diet held its sittings. Besides the bailwick of Aschaffenburg, he had left him the remains of the ancient electorate of Mayence; and it was agreed to make up for him, by means of reserved property, a revenue of a million of florins.

There would in consequence remain out of the three ecclesiastical electors, and with the five lay electors, in all but six. The first consul wished to augment the number, and to render it unequal; he proposed to have nine electors. The title was conferred on the margrave of Baden, for the good conduct of that prince towards France, and from his relationship with Russia; on the duke of Wurtemburg and landgrave of Hesse, from their weight in the confederation. These were three protestant electors more, which made six protestants against three catholics. The majority was thus changed in the electoral college to the advantage of the protestant side; but it was not, on that account, any way nearer taking away its legitimate influence from Austria, because Austria was at all times certain of the votes of Bohemia, Saxony, and Mayence, most frequently of that of Hanover, and in certain cases of those belonging to Baden and Wurtemburg.

It was agreed upon, that the princes indemnified with the ecclesiastical lands, should sit in the college of princes for the lordships of which they had acquired the title. This step yet more changed the majority in the college of princes to the advantage of the protestant party; but thanks to the respect inspired by the house which had for so long a time been imperial, and thanks to the interest that the petty princes have in preserving the Germanic constitution, the protestant votes newly introduced were not all hostile votes to Austria. If it be supposed that the protestant or Prussian party, as it shall be called, had, in consequence of the new arrangements, acquired a numerical majority in the colleges of electors and princes, Austria, with the old prestige with which she was surrounded, with the prerogatives attached to the imperial crown, with her influence directed on the elector of Ratisbon, with the power of ratification which she possessed in regard to all the resolutions of the diet, would have still the means to counterbalance the opposition of Prussia, and to remain sufficiently powerful to prevent anarchy from introducing itself into the Germanic body. It is estimated that in taking from Austria the numerical majority, there had been taken from her, in a greater or less degree, the power to domineer over Germany at her will, and to draw it into war on the promptings of her pride or her ambition. This was the opinion of the new archchancellor, who was well versed in the practical knowledge of the German constitution.

It was needful to organize, lastly, the colleges of the cities, having little influence at any former time, and destined not to have more in the time to come. Although the treaty of Lunéville had not spoken of the suppression of the free towns, but only of the suppression of the principal ecclesiastics, still the existence of many of these towns was so illusory, their administration so onerous for themselves, the exception that they formed in the midst of the Germanic territory so troublesome and so repeated, that it became necessary to suppress the greatest number. The protection which they had sought of old in their quality of "intermediate" cities, that is to say, cities dependent only upon the emperor, they now found in the sense of justice belonging to the present day, and in the observation of laws much more punctually executed than formerly. Still, to suppress all would have been too rigorous; yet it may be affirmed, that but for the first consul, the most celebrated would have sunk under the ambition of the surrounding governments. But he held it a matter of honour to preserve the principal among them. He would maintain the cities of Augsburg and Nuremburg, because of their historical celebrity; Ratisbon, on account of the presence of the diet; Wetzlar, from the imperial chamber being held there; Frankfort and Lubeck, because of their commercial importance. He devised the junction of two, which, although considerable, even the most considerable of all, Hamburg and Bremen, had not the rank of imperial cities. Bremen depended upon Hanover. It was detached at the price of a part of the bishopric of Osnabruck. Hamburg enjoyed real independence, but it had no voice in the college of cities. It was now comprised among them, and the first consul added some useful privileges to the exceptional existence of the free towns left. They were declared neutral for the future in the wars of the empire, exempt from all military charges,

such as recruiting, financial contingents, and the quartering of troops. This was a means of legitimatizing and rendering respected the neutrality which had been granted to them. Another benefit which they were to enjoy beyond any part besides of the Germanic states, was the suppression of the tolls, vexatious and onerous as they were, established on the great rivers of Germany. The feudal tolls on the Rhine, the Weser, and Elbe were suppressed. The losses which resulted from this suppression by the states bordering on these rivers had been calculated and compensated for beforehand. Some princes who had a property in certain free towns, such as Augsburg, Frankfort, and Bremen, were obliged to renounce them at the price of an augmentation of indemnity. It is to France alone, and its obstinate efforts, that these benefits were due. Thus the number of these cities was reduced in regard to such as had lost their importance, and augmented as to those that were richest, which until then had remained without the like advantages. Their position was aggrandized and improved; while they were placed in a situation to render great services to the freedom of trade, and to gather the benefits.

This work when completed, was embodied in a convention, signed on the 4th of June by M. Markoff and by the French plenipotentiary. Austria, informed day by day of the proceedings of M. Markoff, held herself back. On his side, the first consul having considered the matter a little, determined, as he had done at the beginning, to obtain the consent of the individual parties, in order to overcome the reluctant, by the gathering together of the consenting voices. With this view, direct conventions made with Wurtemburg and the other states, finished the details of the plan, as well as the particular or separate treaties of France with the countries indemnified.

M. Markoff would only enter into a conditional engagement, and refer it to his court. It was agreed upon, that if his court accepted the proposed plan, the note which should contain the acceptance should be immediately taken to Ratisbon, and presented to the diet in the names of France and Russia, constituting the mediators to the Germanic body. The first consul, in thus joining Russia to his project, in accord besides on the same thing with Prussia, Bavaria, and the principal states of the second and third order, would not fail to overcome the resistance of Austria. But he was fearful of the efforts she might make in St. Petersburg to stagger the young emperor in his resolution, to awaken his scruples, and interest his justice against his vanity, flattered as it was by the part he had been offered to play. He therefore desired general Hédouville, the French ambassador at Petersburg, to declare that he could not wait longer than ten days for the consent of the Russian cabinet, and the ratification of the convention of the 4th of June. He was to make this declaration in cautious but positive terms. It clearly signified, that if Russia did not appreciate sufficiently the honour of regulating, in common with France, the new state of Germany, that the first consul would pass on, and constitute himself the sole mediator. There had not been less of ability than timeliness in the condescension exhibited towards the court of Russia; and there had not been less in the firmness which was thus shown at the end of the negotiation entered upon in conjunction with her.

At this moment, the emperor Alexander was absent from St. Petersburg; he had had an interview at Memel with the king of Prussia. Although the Russian diplomacy was entirely favourable to Austria, and unfavourable to Prussia, of which it severely criticised the ambition and condescension towards France, the emperor Alexander did not participate in these dispositions. He was persuaded, without well knowing wherefore, that Prussia was a much more formidable power than Austria; he believed that the secret of the great art of war had remained, since the death of Frederick II., in the ranks of the Prussian army, and he remained of that opinion even up to the time of the battle of Jena. He had heard the world speak of the king who governed Prussia, of his youth, his virtues, his enlightened opinions, and his resistance to his ministers; and he believed he saw between that king's position and his own, more than one analogy; he had also conceived the wish to be personally acquainted with him. In consequence he had proposed an interview at Memel. The king of Prussia had met the proposition with much eagerness, because he was ever full of his design of being a mediator between Russia and France, and always persuaded that he could exercise a useful influence upon their relations, that he could make them live in perfect harmony, that holding the balance between them, he held that of Europe, and that to the importance of such a character was added that of the certainty of preserving peace, of which the maintenance was become the most constant of his occupations. This character, of which he dreamed for a moment, under the emperor Paul, became much more easy of attainment under Alexander, of whom the age and inclinations seemed to approximate to his own. Confirmed in these ideas by M. Haugwitz, he went to Memel with his head full of the most honourable illusions.

Frederick William and Alexander having met, appeared to agree well together, and they swore eternal friendship for each other. The king of Prussia was simple in his manners, and a little awkward; the emperor Alexander was neither simple nor awkward; he was, on the contrary, amiable, forward, and prodigal of demonstrations. He did not at all fear making some advances towards the descendant of the great Frederick, and to express towards him the kindliest affection. The beautiful queen of Prussia was present at this interview; the emperor Alexander directed towards her from that time an attention respectful and chivalrous. They separated perfectly charmed with each other, and fully convinced that they loved one another not as kings, but as men. It was, in fact, a known pretension of the emperor Alexander to appear a man upon the throne. He returned, repeating to all those who came near him, that he had at last found a friend worthy of him. To all that was stated to him regarding the Prussian cabinet, its greediness and ambition, he answered by the common explanation constantly employed when people spoke of Prussia, that what was remarked was very true of M. Haugwitz, but false applied to the young and virtuous king. He could not have desired a better thing than to see

explained in the same mode all the actions of the court of Russia.

At the moment when the two monarchs were on the point of taking leave of each other, a courier arrived at Memel, and brought a letter to the king Frederick William from the first consul. This letter cóntained a mention of the advantages accorded to Prussia, and of the definitive plan agreed upon with M. Markoff. "All now depends," added the first consul, "upon the consent of the emperor of Russia." The king Frederick William, delighted at such a result, wished to profit by the occasion, and to speak of German affairs to his young friend, whom he believed he had secured for life. But this friend evaded the topic, refused to listen, yet promised to reply as soon as he had received from his ministers a communication of the plan agreed upon in Paris.

It was the middle of June, 1802, or the end of Priarial, year x., and couriers awaited the emperor Alexander in St. Petersburg, where general Hédouville, very exact in his obedience, had already presented one note to announce, that if at the end of the time fixed for the delay, there was no explanation made to him, *pro* or *con*, he would consider it a negative reply, and send word to Paris. The vice-chancellor Kurakin, who was better disposed towards France than his colleagues, requested general Hédouville to recall his note, in order not to offend the emperor Alexander, promising that on the arrival of that monarch, the matter should be immediately submitted to him, and a reply be given without delay. The emperor, on his return to the capital, heard what his ministers had to say, and was much pressed by several among them to refuse his assent to the proposed plan. The cabinet appeared divided, but still more disposed for Austria than for Prussia. Alexander, seeing well enough with his precocious finesse, that the master of the affairs of the west abandoned to him but the appearance of a character of which he himself kept the reality; although he well understood that the conditions which were to be dictated in common at Ratisbon, had arrived ready-made from Paris, Alexander was moved by the external show of respect observed towards his empire, and satisfied with a precedent, which, added to that of Teschen, established in future the right of Russia to mingle itself up in German affairs. He was convinced that the first consul would go on without him if the Russian cabinet hesitated longer; further, the pretensions of Austria, which made at that moment their last efforts at St. Petersburg, appeared to him entirely unreasonable; and finally, the letters of the king of Prussia were every day more pressing; from all these motives, he decided in favour of the proposed plan, and ratified the convention of the 4th of June, it may be said, in spite of his ministers. While he gave his consent, the prince Louis of Baden arrived in St. Petersburg, to invoke the cause of his relatives, and obtain approval of a plan which augmented his fortune and the titles of his house; but he found his wishes already granted. Some days afterwards this unfortunate prince died in Finland, through an accident to his carriage, in going from visiting his sister the empress of Russia, to see his sister the queen of Sweden.

The emperor Alexander, though he had given his consent, had made two reservations, not expressly, but verbally, which he left to the courtesy of the first consul to take into consideration. The first was relative to the bishop of Lubeck, duke of Oldenburg, and his uncle. This prince lost by the suppression of the toll of Elsfleth on the Weser a considerable revenue, and requested an augmentation of indemnity. There were some thousands of florins to be made up. The second reservation of the emperor was in relation to the electoral dignity, which he wished to have conferred upon the house of Mecklenburg; he did not much regard the course of events as to the other states. This was more difficult, because the new favours bestowed already, carried to six the number of electors, and placed another protestant in the electoral college. This was a point, however, to be rectified at an ulterior time by the diet.

All had been disposed in such a way, that the couriers returning from St. Petersburg, were to make their route by Ratisbon, and remit the orders of Russia and France to act immediately. Russia had appointed as her minister-extraordinary for this negotiation M. Buhler, her ordinary representative at the court of Bavaria. The first consul, on his side, had chosen for the same post M. de Laforest, minister of France at Munich. M. de Laforest, to his knowledge of German affairs and his activity, united qualities well adapted to the difficult functions with which he was charged. The note announcing the mediation of the two courts had been drawn up beforehand, and sent to the two ministers of France and Russia, that they might be able to present them on the return of the couriers from St. Petersburg. Both ministers had orders to quit Munich in order to proceed immediately to Ratisbon. M. de Laforest executed the order immediately, and M. Buhler engaged to follow him without delay.

They arrived at Ratisbon on the 16th of August, or 28th Thermidor.

The diet had disburthened itself of the difficult labour of the new Germanic organization, by an extraordinary deputation composed from each of the principal German states. This was in imitation of that which had been done at other times and in similar circumstances, more particularly at the peace of Westphalia. The eight states chosen were Brandenburg by Prussia; Saxony, Bavaria, and Bohemia, by Austria; Wurtemburg, the Teutonic order, by the archduke Charles; Mayence, and Hesse-Cassel. These eight states were represented in the extraordinary deputation by the ministers transacting the business according to the instructions of their respective governments.

All the ministers were not present; M. de Laforest had great efforts to make in order to induce them to come to Ratisbon,—efforts the more laborious, because Austria, reduced to despair, had taken the determination to oppose to the vivacity of French action, the delays available in the Germanic constitution. The note before alluded to, in the form of a declaration, was delivered, in the name of the two courts of France and Russia, on the 18th of August, or 30th Thermidor, to the directorial minister of the diet, who had the duty of presiding over all the official communications. A copy was also given to the imperial plenipotentiary, because there was placed in the grand depu-

tation, as well as in the diet itself, a plenipotentiary exercising the imperial prerogative, which prerogative consisted in receiving communications of propositions addressed to the confederation, in examining them, and in ratifying or rejecting them on the emperor's behalf.

The note of the mediating powers, excellent, amicable, but firm, stated simply that the German states not having yet been able to come to an understanding for the execution of the treaty of Lunéville, and the whole of Europe being interested that the work of the peace should receive its last compliment in the arrangement of the affairs of Germany, France and Russia, powers friendly and disinterested, had offered their mediation to the diet, had presented it with a plan, and had declared :—

"That the interest of Germany, the consolidation of the peace, and the general tranquillity of Europe, demanded that all which concerned the regulations of the Germanic indemnities, should be terminated within the space of two months."

The time to be thus fixed had in itself something imperious, without doubt, but it made the proceedings of the two courts more serious in aspect; and, under all the bearings of the case, it appeared to be indispensable.

This declaration must have produced a very great effect. The directorial minister, in other words the president, immediately transmitted it to the extraordinary deputation.

While things proceeded in this determined manner at Ratisbon, an official proceeding took place at Vienna on the part of the French ambassador, in order to communicate to the Austrian court the scheme of the mediating powers, to declare that they had no intention willingly to hurt its feelings, nor wished to do so now ; but that the impossibility of coming to an understanding with her had obliged them to take a definitive part,—a part imperiously demanded for the repose of Europe. It was insinuated at the same time, that the plan did not regulate every thing in an irrevocable manner ; that there remained besides means enough to serve the court of Vienna, whether in its negotiations with Bavaria, or in its efforts for securing to the grand duke the succession of the Teutonic order and of the last ecclesiastical electorate ; that in all these things the condescension of the first consul would be proportioned to the condescension of the emperor. As to the rest, M. de Champagny, the French ambassador, had orders not to go into any detail, but to state, so as to be clearly comprehended, that all serious discussion should be exclusively entered upon at Ratisbon.

In the midst of these inevitable delays of diplomacy, the indemnified princes were very impatient to occupy the territories which had devolved upon them by virtue of the arrangements made ; and they had demanded their immediate possession. France had consented, in order to render the plan proposed as nearly as possible irrevocable. Immediately Prussia occupied Hildesheim, Paderborn, Munster, Eichsfeld, and Erfurth. Wurtemburg and Bavaria were not less impatient than Prussia, and sent detachments of troops into the ecclesiastical principalities which were assigned to them. The resistance on the part of the principalities could not be considerable, because they were in the hands of old prelates, or of chapters administering vacant benefices, not having means nor will to defend them. The hardship to these occupants was reckoned of no moment,—a hardship which, in a case of a similar kind, was made a reproach formerly against the French revolutionists. The natural protector of these unhappy ecclesiastics was Austria, whose duty it was to exercise the imperial power. But the greater part of those who suffered were placed far away from the Austrian territory ; and those that were near its frontiers, as the bishops of Augsburg and Freisingen, were not able to receive succour without a violation of the Bavarian territory, which would have been an act of the gravest character. In the mean time, there was one of those bishoprics that it was easy enough to protect from Bavarian occupation,—the bishopric of Passau. To undertake its defence was an act of vigour well adapted to elevate Austria from her very abased situation.

The geographical position of this bishopric has been already indicated. Entirely enclosed in Austria, it had only one point on the Bavarian territory, and that was the city of Passau. The court of Vienna wished, as already shown, that this place should be given to the archduke with the bishopric itself. The Austrian troops were at the gates of Passau, and had only one step to take in order to enter the city. The temptation was great, and the pretext was not wanting. In fact, the unhappy bishop, on seeing the Bavarian troops approaching, had addressed himself to the emperor, the natural protector of every state in the empire exposed to such a violence. The plan which gave his bishopric partly to Bavaria, and partly to the archduke Ferdinand, was as yet only a project or scheme, not a law of the empire; and until it was so, the execution of the plan might be considered an illegal act. Acts of a similar kind, it is true, were committed throughout all Germany; but where it was possible to prevent them, why not do so—why not give some sign of spirit and vigour !

Austria had aroused herself to the highest pitch of exasperation. She complained of every one ; of France, that without saying a word had negotiated with Russia the plan which changed the face of Germany; of Russia herself, that, at St. Petersburg, had kept secret her adoption of the plan of mediation; of Prussia and her confederates, who sought their support from foreign governments to overturn completely the German empire. These complaints had very little foundation in fact. She had no one to reproach but herself, her exaggerated pretensions, and her own ill-managed craftiness, for the state of abandonment in which she was left at that moment. She had wished to negotiate with Russia, concealing it from France, and France had negotiated with Russia, concealing it from her. She had been desirous of introducing foreigners into the affairs of the empire, in having recourse to the emperor Alexander of Russia; and Prussia and Bavaria, imitating her example, had called in France; with this difference, that Prussia and Bavaria had obtained the intervention of a power friendly to the Germanic body, and bound to interfere by the obligations of treaties themselves. Then as to the previous occupations, they were premature measures, it is true, and in the strictness of the law, illegal; but unfortunately for

the logic of Austria. she had herself occupied Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden.

However these things might be, still Austria, exasperated, determined to show that her courage was not lowered by a coincidence of unfortunate circumstances, and she did an act, in consequence, little in unison with her ordinary circumspection. She commanded her troops to pass the suburbs of Passau, and to occupy that fortress; at the same time she accompanied her act with explanations tending to extenuate their effect. She declared that in acting thus, she answered only the formal demand of the bishop of Passau; that she did not intend to decide by force one of the litigated questions submitted to the Germanic diet; that she only intended to do an act purely conservative; and that as soon after the decision of the diet as possible, she would withdraw her troops, and leave the contested city to the proprietor who might be legally invested with it, by the definitive plan of the general indemnities.

The troops of Austria entered Passau on the 18th of August. While they were marching there the Bavarian troops approached on the opposite side. Little more was necessary to produce a serious collision, which might have set all Europe in a flame. Fortunately, the prudence of the officers charged with the execution of this duty prevented such a misfortune; the Austrians remained masters of the place.

This was rather bold conduct, the bolder in that the place did not belong to Austria, and it was on an important point, opposing a formal act of resistance to the declarations of the mediating powers. The effect produced by this act at Ratisbon was very great, among the numerous public men of Germany who were there assembled. There were in that city representatives of all the states; those maintained or suppressed, satisfied or discontented, searching, the one to support and carry into effect the proposed plans, the others to change them in relation to what concerned themselves. Magistrates of free towns, abbots, prelates, and "immediate" nobles, were there in great abundance. The immediate nobles, above all, who filled the armies and the chancellories of the German courts, figured in great numbers as ministers of the diet. Even those who represented the courts which were benefited by the change, and which, under the circumstances, had appeared to be content, preserved notwithstanding their personal passions, and like German nobles, were very far from being perfectly satisfied. M. Goetz, for example, the minister of Prussia at Ratisbon, was the partisan of the plan of indemnities on account of his court; but in his quality of an "immediate" nobleman, he deeply regretted the loss of the old order of things. Several other ministers of German courts were in the same situation. These personages composed in themselves an impassioned public body, leaning strongly in favour of Austria. It was not from France that they wished for more, because they saw plainly that she was wholly disinterested about the whole matter, and had no other end but to put a term to the conflicting affairs of Germany; but they cast the severest blame upon Prussia and Bavaria. The greediness of these courts, their connexion with France, their desire to destroy the old Germanic constitution, of these they spoke in terms of unqualified bitterness.

The news of the occupation of Passau produced in the midst of such a public body the most lively and grateful sensation. There was a necessity, they said, for a vigorous step; France had no troops on the Rhine; the peace with England was not so solid that France was able to engage herself easily in the affairs of Germany; besides, the first consul had received a sort of monarchical authority, as a recompense for the peace procured for the world; he would not so soon withdraw a benefit for which so high a price had been paid. They had only, therefore, to show energy, to pass the Inn, and give a lesson to Bavaria, and thus lower the numerous hands lifted up at the moment for the destruction of the Germanic constitution.

The effect thus produced at Ratisbon was soon spread over all Europe. The first consul, who had been attentive to the progress of the negotiations, was much surprised. Up to this time he had carefully abstained from every step that might have a chance of causing injury to the general peace. His object had been to consolidate, not to put into peril. But he was in no humour to suffer himself to be publicly braved, and above all, to have a result compromised, which he had pursued with so much labour and with the best intentions. He felt what effect this hardihood of Austria might possibly produce at Ratisbon, if he did not repress it, above all, if he appeared to hesitate. He immediately sent for M. Lucchesini, the Prussian minister, and M. Cetto, the minister of Bavaria. He made them both sensible of the importance of a prompt and energetic resolution, in presence of the new attitude which Austria had thought fit to take, and the danger to which the plan of indemnities would be exposed in consequence, if, under the circumstances, the least hesitation were exhibited. These two ministers felt, as well as any person, that the interest of their courts sufficed to enlighten their minds upon such a subject. They adhered without a moment's consideration to the ideas of the first consul. He proposed to them to bind himself by a formal agreement, in which it should be declared anew, that he was disposed to employ all the necessary means to carry into effect the plan of the mediation, and that if in the sixty days assigned for the purpose of the labours of the diet, the city of Passau should not be evacuated, France and Prussia would unite their arms to those of Bavaria, to secure to the last the territory promised her in the plan of indemnity. This convention was signed the evening of the same day when it had been proposed, that is to say, on the 5th of September, 1802, or 18th Fructidor, year x. The first consul did not send for M. Markoff, because he would have raised a thousand difficulties upon his own part, caused by the interest he felt for the house of Austria. The first consul had not, besides, any need of the assistance of Russia to perform an energetic act. The convention itself became more threatening, thus signed by two powers, the convention that each of the two was seriously resolved to execute. The first consul therefore contented himself with communicating the fact to M. Markoff, and requested him to transmit a copy to St. Petersburg,

in order that his cabinet might be able, if it saw fit, to adhere to the resolution.

On the following day the first consul sent off his aid-de-camp, Lauriston, with the convention which had been signed, and with a letter for the elector of Bavaria. In this letter he requested the elector to be assured, that he guaranteed to him anew all that part of the indemnity which had been promised him, and announced to him, that at the time fixed a French army should enter Germany, to make the faith of France and of Prussia respected. The aid-de-camp, Lauriston, had orders to visit Passau, to see things for himself, and to judge with his own eyes what might be the number of Austrians that had been assembled upon the frontiers of Bavaria. He was after this to show himself at Ratisbon, to go to Berlin, and to return through Holland. He was the bearer of despatches also for most of the German princes.

This was more than was necessary to operate powerfully on the minds of the Germans. Colonel Lauriston set off immediately, and arrived at Munich without losing a moment. His presence there was the occasion of great joy to the unfortunate elector. All the details contained in the despatch from the first consul were repeated from mouth to mouth. Colonel Lauriston continued his tour without delay, made certain with his own eyes the conviction that the Austrians were in too few numbers upon the Inn, to do any thing more than exhibit in bravado, and he then proceeded to Ratisbon, and from Ratisbon to Berlin.

This promptitude of action surprised Austria; struck with alarm all the oppositionists in the diet, and proved to them that a power like France had not publicly engaged herself with another power like Prussia, in the success of a plan which she did not seriously desire to effect. Besides, the intention of the mediators was so evident, it had so much for its aim the repose of the continent, by terminating the disputed affairs of Germany, that reason must have united itself with the sentiment of a superior force, to make futile all resistance. There remained to be overcome, it is true, more formal differences, of which Austria had availed herself to delay the adoption of the plan, at least until she had obtained some concession which might alleviate her chagrin, and preserve the dignity of the head of the empire, which had been so much compromised upon this occasion.

The extraordinary deputation, which had been charged by the diet to prepare a *conclusum* for submission to the body, was at the same moment assembled. The eight states which composed it, Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria, Bohemia, Wurtemburg, the Teutonic order, Mayence, and Hesse-Cassel, were present in the persons of their ministers. The protocol was opened, and each began to give his opinion. Of the eight states, four admitted, without hesitation, the plan of the mediating powers. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, and Wurtemburg, expressed their gratitude to the great powers, which had been inclined to come to the succour of the Germanic body, and to draw them out of their embarrassment by a disinterested arbitration; declaring, besides, that the plan proposed was wise, acceptable in its contents, save in some petty details, in regard to which, the grand deputation would be able, without inconvenience, to give its opinion, and to propose useful modifications. They added, finally, relatively to the delay fixed, that it was urgent to finish as soon as possible, as much for the peace of Germany as for that of Europe. Still the four approving states did not explain themselves in a precise manner about the term of two months, which had been fixed for limiting their proceedings. It would have been a compromise of their dignity to recall that rigorous term, or propose to submit themselves to it, but they were right in what they were understood to intend, when they recommended to their brother states to finish their proceedings as soon as possible.

It was proper to await the approval of Mayence, when that old ecclesiastical electorate was the only one preserved, and provided with a revenue of a million of florins. But the baron Albini, the representative of the archbishop elector, a man of mind, and very adroit, wishing from the bottom of his heart full success to the mediation, was very embarrassed to give his approval, in presence of all the ecclesiastical party, to a plan which annihilated the old feudal church of Germany, and to approve it alone, because the electorate of his archbishopric was preserved. More than this, the archbishop was not perfectly satisfied at the combinations which related to himself. The bailwick of Aschaffenburg, the last fragment of the electorate of Mayence, formed the sole portion of the revenue secured to him, arising out of territorial acquirement. The rest was to arise from different assignments on the reserved goods of the church; and for this part of the promised million, by far the most considerable portion, as the bailwick of Aschaffenburg, scarcely reached 300,000 florins in value, he was therefore not without much disquietude.

M. Albini, for Mayence, therefore, gave in an opinion somewhat ambiguous, thanking the high mediating powers for their amicable intervention, deploring at length the unhappy circumstances of the German church, and distinguishing in the plan two different heads, one comprehending the distribution of the territories, the other the general considerations which accompanied it. As to the distributions of the territory, except the smaller indemnities, the minister of Mayence approved the propositions of the mediating powers. In regard to the general considerations, containing the indication of the regulations to be made, he thought they were insufficient, and the pensions of the clergy in a more particular manner did not seem to him sufficiently well secured. Under this head, it is proper to acknowledge that the observations of the representative of Mayence were not destitute of reason. His opinion, therefore, did not convey a formal approbation.

Saxony requested to reserve her vote at present; this was a step frequently adopted in the deliberations of the Germanic diet. As the suffrages were several times taken, it was possible for any member to reserve the statement of his opinion until a subsequent sitting. This state, very disinterested and discreet, commonly acting under the influence of Prussia, but in its heart giving a preference to Austria, being also catholic as respected the religion of its prince, although the people were protestant, suffered painful scruples, divided as it was

between reason and inclination—its inclination, which clung to old Germany, and its reason, which spoke strongly for the plan of the mediating powers.

Bohemia, and the Teutonic order, were states altogether Austrian. As to the first, it was more suitable to its position, the emperor being king of Bohemia; and in relation to the second, the cause was equally evident, when the archduke Charles, the brother of the emperor, his generalissimo, and his minister at war, was the grand master of the Teutonic order. They affected, both at Vienna and Ratisbon, to make a difference between the minister of Bohemia, for example, and the imperial minister. The minister of Bohemia, especially representing the house of Austria, was by this enabled to deliver himself up freely to the expression of the passions of that family; thus he was made to say the most cutting things regarding the question under consideration. The imperial minister, speaking in the name of the emperor, affected a much more grave expression, and made it a point of view to address himself to the general interest of the empire. He was less faithful to the truth, and much more pedantic. M. Schraut was the minister for Bohemia, M. Hugel for the emperor. The last was the most consummate of formalists; he was besides this very crafty, as most of those Germans are who have grown old in the diet, and who under the ridiculous pedantry of these forms, conceal all the cunning of the inmates of the palace. In respect to the minister of the grand master of the Teutonic order, M. Rabenau, he submitted entirely to the Austrian deputation, that instructed him even in his notes, in the sight and to the knowledge of the diet; from the character which this estimated minister thus played he felt much, and complained openly himself. M. Hugel, the minister for the emperor, directed the Austrian votes; he was ordered to struggle with artifices and delays against the Prussian party and the mediating powers.

During the first sitting, M. Schraut, on the part of Bohemia, complained in high terms of the conduct shown towards Austria, and answered with bitterness the reproach which had been addressed to his court, of never having drawn towards a conclusion, a reproach on which was principally grounded the interference of the mediating powers. This minister declared that for nine months previously, the imperial cabinet had not been able to obtain a single reply on the part of the French cabinet to the overtures it had proffered; that it had been left in the most complete ignorance of all that had been treated of in Paris; that its ambassador had not been able to obtain an initiation into the secret of the mediation, and that the plan of the same mediation had not been known to Austria until the same moment when the communication had been made at Ratisbon. M. Schraut afterwards complained of the lot assigned to the archduke Ferdinand, pretended that the treaty of Lunéville was violated, because the treaty secured to the archduke an indemnity for the entire of his losses, and he had been assigned as an equivalent for the 4,000,000 of florins he had lost, 1,350,000fl. at most. Salzburg, according to M. Schraut, produced no more than 900,000 florins, Berchtolsgaden 200,000 fl., Passau 250,000 fl. This was a pure falsehood. To finish, Bohemia did not concur in the plan.

The Teutonic order, more moderate in its language, would only admit the plan as a document which the diet might discuss.

There were thus four approving votes, Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, and Wurtemburg; one, that of Mayence, which at bottom was approving, but which it was necessary to bring round to be so openly; one, Saxony, which would follow the majority, when that majority was clearly pronounced; lastly, Bohemia and the Teutonic order opposed the plan wholly as far as concerned the satisfaction given to Austria.

This result was immediately communicated to the first consul. As soon as he became acquainted with the sentiments put forth by Bohemia, which imputed to the obstinate silence of France the impossibility of putting an end to the negotiations upon the affairs of Germany, he became determined not to remain silent under such an imputation. He replied immediately by a note, which M. de Laforest was commanded to communicate to the diet. In this note he expressed his regret to be forced to publish any thing relating to negotiations, which, from their nature, should have remained secret; but, he added, that he was obliged to do so, because his intentions had been publicly calumniated; he declared that the pretended overtures of Austria to the French cabinet had, for their object, not the general arrangement of the affair of the indemnities, but the extension of the Austrian frontier from the Isar as far as the Lech, or, in other words, the suppression of Bavaria from the number of German powers; that the pretensions of Austria, taken from Paris, where they had not succeeded, to St. Petersburg, where they had succeeded no better, finally, to Munich, where they had become threatening, had obliged the mediating powers to intervene, in order to secure the peace of Germany, and with the peace of Germany, that of the entire continent.

This reply, so well merited, but in one point exaggerated, namely, the imputation that Austria had endeavoured to extend herself to the Lech, she having in fact spoken only of the Isar, very much mortified the imperial cabinet. That cabinet now saw clearly that it was doing business with an adversary as resolute in politics as he was in warfare [1].

[1] The following is a copy of the document itself,—a remarkable one of the consular era:—

"The undersigned minister-extraordinary of the French republic to the diet of the Germanic empire, has taken the earliest opportunity of transmitting to his government the rescript communicated by the sub-delegate of Bohemia to the extraordinary deputation of the empire in the sitting of the 24th of August, and communicated also to the undersigned on the 28th of the said month. He is charged to transmit to the deputation the following observations. The first consul has been much affected to see that his intentions for securing the peace and prosperity of the Germanic body have been misunderstood, since they reproach him with not having answered the overtures made by his imperial and royal majesty since the conclusion of the treaty of Lunéville, and having thus retarded to Germany, that interesting portion of Europe, the advantages of the peace; he must declare that the overtures which, though confidential and secret, are at present publicly alluded to by the court of Vienna, far from being calculated to procure the execution

Nevertheless, it was necessary to proceed with the negotiations, and M. de Laforest, with the authority of his cabinet, employed the requisite means to bring about Mayence to give a decided vote. He promised M. Albini, the representative of the elector of Mayence, to secure his revenue to the archbishop chancellor, not in the stocks, but in the "immediate" territories not taken from any of the princes. To this promise, which was made in a formal manner,

of the 9th article of the treaty of Lunéville, could tend only to remove, rather than to indicate, the means of providing for the indemnification of so many secular princes who had sustained such considerable losses; their only object was to regulate the indemnification of the archduke Ferdinand, by employing lay and hereditary dominions. The project of the court of Vienna tended to extend its territory beyond the Lech, and their effect consequently would have been, to erase Bavaria from the number of the powers. Justice and generosity, which are always the first heard in the heart of the first consul, made it a law with him to forget what wrongs the elector might have done to the republic, and not to suffer to perish a state weakened and threatened, but, however, hitherto secured by the policy of the governments interested in maintaining a just equilibrium in Germany. For if the equilibrium of Europe requires that Austria should be great and powerful, that of Germany requires that Bavaria should be preserved entire, and protected from all further invasion. What would become of the Germanic body if the principal states which compose it should see their independence every moment endangered? And would not the honour of that ancient federation suffer, by weakening a prince whose house has concurred, in so honourable a manner, to the establishment and support of the Germanic constitution? It is not, then, at Paris that the insinuations of the court of Vienna, in regard to the affairs of Germany, could be received; and though it has since renewed them at St. Petersburg, they could not meet with better success; the great and generous soul of the emperor Alexander could not permit him to neglect the interests of Bavaria; which were recommended to him also by the ties of blood, and by every consideration of sound policy. Having been unable to succeed either at St. Petersburg or Paris, the court of Vienna nevertheless pursued at Munich the execution of its projects; and it was the communication of his uneasiness, made by the elector to the French and Russian governments, which contributed above all to make them feel the necessity of uniting their influence to protect the hereditary princes, secure the execution of the 17th article of the treaty of Lunéville, and not to suffer to fall to the lowest rank one of the oldest, and not long ago one of the most powerful, houses of Germany. The undersigned, therefore, is charged to declare to the deputation, that the states of his serene highness the elector palatine of Bavaria, as well as the possessions destined to him as indemnities, and as necessary for re-establishing the equilibrium of Germany, are naturally and indispensably placed under the protection of the mediating powers; that the first consul, personally, will not suffer the important place of Passau to remain in the hands of Austria, nor allow it to obtain any part of the territories which Bavaria possesses on the right of the Inn; for he considers that there would be no independence for Bavaria the moment when the troops of Austria should be near its capital. It remains to the undersigned to express to the deputation the regret which the first consul feels for divulging negotiations which took place only under the seal of confidence, and the secrecy of which ought consequently to have remained sacred; but he has been constrained to it by just reprisals, and by the value which he attaches to the opinion and esteem of the brave and loyal German people.

(Signed) LAFOREST.

[The Russian document was shorter, nearly to the same effect, but less circumstantial; it bore the same date, and was signed by the baron De Buhler.]

were added certain threats, very intelligent in their character, in case the plan should be rendered abortive. Thus the vote of M. Albini was decided. But still it was not possible to obtain the pure and simple admission of the plan. The honour of the Germanic body demanded that the extraordinary deputation, in settling upon it as the basis of its labours, should at least introduce some small alterations. The interests of several of the petty princes demanded many modifications in detail; and Prussia besides, from motives scarcely avowable, was of accord with Mayence in desiring to separate the general considerations of the plan itself, and to draw it up under a new form. In these considerations there was in fact one discoverable, relative to the "immediate" property of the church, which had been reserved to serve either to complete several of the compliments of the indemnity, or for ecclesiastical pensions. Many of these particular properties were enclosed in the Prussian territory, and that power, already so favourably treated, cherished the hope to preserve them to herself by some new assignment, and thus exclusively appropriate them. She therefore entered into the ideas of Mayence, and agreed with that state to remodel the part of the plan which included these general considerations; but she agreed at the same time to adopt the principal basis of the territorial partition, in a previous *conclusum*, stating that the charges which were there made, were in common agreement with the ministers of the mediating powers. It was further to be understood, that the entire labour was to be terminated by the 24th of October, 1802, or 2nd Brumaire, year XI., which just made two months, to be dated, not from the day of the declaration of the powers, but the day when their note had been dictated to the deputation, that is to say, read and transcribed in the *procès verbal* of the diet.

On the 8th of September, or 21st Fructidor, this previous *conclusum* was adopted in spite of all the efforts of the imperial minister, M. Hugel. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Hesse-Cassel, Mayence, or five states out of eight, admitted the previous *conclusum*, comprehending the whole of the plan, and some accessory modifications, that were introduced in accordance with the ministers of the mediating powers. In this sitting, Saxony took a step, and gave an opinion between the two extremes. This state desired that the plan might be received as a clue of directions in the labyrinth of indemnities.

Bohemia and the Teutonic order were opposed to the adoption of the *conclusum*. According to the constitutional forms, the minister was bound to have communicated the *conclusum* thus voted to the mediating ministers. M. Hugel was determined to do nothing of the sort. In other respects, he unceasingly endeavoured to excuse himself for the obstacles which he had caused in the negotiation, and made every possible effort to obtain an amicable overture from the ministers of France and Russia, every day repeating to them that the least advantage conceded to the house of Austria, for the purpose of saving its honour at least, would decide it in suffering the labour to be concluded. The whole of its policy now consisted in tiring out the two legations of France and Russia, in order to wring from the first consul a concession of territory

on the Inn, or a combination of votes in the three colleges, which should secure to Austria the preservation of her influence in the empire. The conduct M. de Laforest, consummate in this species of tactic, adopted, and that he made his cabinet adopt, was to march determinately forward to the end, in spite of the Austrian legation; to concede nothing at Ratisbon, but to send the Austrian minister to Paris, by saying that there perhaps they might obtain something of what they desired, not before, but after the facilities which might be obtained from them in the future course of the negotiation.

The imperial legation, in order to gain time to negotiate in Paris, directed itself to the object of passing a newly-modified *conclusum*, which should be sent to the mediating ministers, in order to come to an understanding with them upon the changes which it appeared most convenient to adopt. This attempt ended in nothing, but to impart a sort of ill-humour to the Saxon legation, and to attach that member of the grand deputation to the majority of six voices which had already been given.

Although the imperial *plenipotence* interposed itself "firm as a wall," according to the despatches of M. de Laforest, between the extraordinary deputation and the mediating ministers, because she was still obstinate in not communicating to them the acts of the extraordinary deputation; it was nevertheless agreed that the reclamations addressed to the diet by the petty princes, should be officiously communicated to those two ministers, that all this might be done by simple notes, and that the modifications, admitted in consequence of such reclamations, should be introduced into the resolutions, of which the whole together would form the definitive *conclusum*.

As soon as the road was open for reclamations, they did not lag behind, as it may be well imagined; but they came from the petty princes only, because the greater houses had made them in Paris during the time the general negotiations were proceeding. These petty princes moved heaven and earth to get themselves secured. Unhappily, and it was the only thing to be regretted in this memorable negotiation, the persons in the employment of the French, individuals brought up amid the disorders of the directory, suffered their hands to be soiled by pecuniary gifts, that the German princes, impatient to ameliorate their condition, lavished upon them without discernment. For the most part, the miserable agents who received those gifts, sold a credit which they did not possess. M. de Laforest, a man of the strictest integrity, and principal representative of France at Ratisbon, listened little to the recommendations that were addressed to him in favour of such or such a house, and he denounced them to his own government. The first consul, made aware of it, wrote many letters to the minister of police, in order to put a stop to so odious a traffic, which could only make dupes, because these pretended recommendations, paid for in money, would not exercise the least influence over the arrangements concluded at Ratisbon.

The greatest difficulty to be encountered did not by any means consist in regulating the supplemental indemnities, but in burthening the reserved property with them, which was designed for the pensions of the clergy who had lost their places. The efforts of Prussia, to save from this double charge the property situated in her territory, caused great contests, and lowered exceedingly the dignity of that court. It was necessary at first to find the sums required to make up the revenue promised to the prince arch-chancellor the elector of Mayence. A means was devised to satisfy this demand. Among the number of the free cities preserved, were Ratisbon and Wetzlar, the last maintained in its character of a free city, because of the imperial chamber which met there. Badly governed, both the one and the other, as the greater part of all the free towns were, they had no very desirable existence longer in that character. They were assigned to the prince arch-chancellor. There was in this a real convenience, because Ratisbon was the place where the diet sate, and Wetzlar that where the supreme court of the empire held its meetings. It was natural to give this to the prince director of the affairs of Germany. These two cities, that of Ratisbon before all, were rejoiced at their new distinction. The prince arch-chancellor, possessing Aschaffenburg, Ratisbon, and Wetzlar, had 650,000 florins of revenue secured in territory. It was necessary to find him three hundred and fifty thousand more. It was also required to have fifty-three thousand for the house of Stolberg and Isemburg; and ten thousand for the duke of Oldenburg, uncle and ward of the emperor Alexander. There was thus in all 413,000 florins to press upon the reserved property of the church, independently of the ecclesiastical pensions. Baden and Wurtemburg had already accepted the part to be paid from the reserved property situated in their states. Prussia and Bavaria had each to support half the charge of 413,000 florins remaining deficient. Bavaria was heavily charged in her finances, both by the number of pensions that had fallen to her, and by the debts which had been transferred from the old states upon the new. Prussia would not even support the payment of 200,000 florins out of the 413,000 still wanting. She had devised a means of procuring them, which was to lay the burthen of these 413,000 florins upon the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, of which she was extremely jealous. This greediness of spirit caused much scandalous talk at Ratisbon, and the minister of Prussia, M. Goertz, was so much mortified at it, that he was very near giving in his resignation. M. de Laforest only restrained him on account of the interests of the negotiation itself.

The power of reclamation accorded to the petty princes, renewed a number of almost forgotten pretensions. Another cause had contributed to the renewal: this was the rumour, already very largely bruited abroad at Ratisbon, that Austria was obtaining in Paris a supplementary indemnity in favour of the archduke Ferdinand. Hesse-Cassel, jealous of what had been done for Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, of all that had been done for Hesse-Cassel, Orange-Nassau, of what was rumoured to be done for the former duke of Tuscany, demanded supplementary indemnities to such an extent, that the other claimants would have been unable to obtain any. The occupation of the different territories by force of arms, continuing without interruption, added to the general confusion. The Germanic body found itself exactly in

the state which they had experienced in France under the constituent assembly at the moment of the abolition of the feudal regime. The margrave, who inherited Manheim, formerly the property of the house of Bavaria, was in dispute with the last house about a collection of pictures. Detachments of troops belonging to the two princes had just missed coming to blows. To complete this sad spectacle, Austria, having over a number of estates in Suabia certain pretensions of feudal origin, had the posts torn up with the arms, in the different towns and abbeys assigned in the plan of the indemnities to Baden, Wurtemburg, and Bavaria. Lastly, Prussia seized the bishopric of Munster, and would not put in possession the counts of the empire, co-partners with herself in that bishopric.

In the midst of these disorders, Austria feeling that she must ultimately agree, offered immediately to adhere to the plan of the mediating powers, if the bank of the Inn was conceded to her, provided she would abandon all her possessions in Suabia in favour of Bavaria. She proposed anew to this power the making Augsburg its capital. She demanded another thing in the creation of two new electors, of which one should be the archduke of Tuscany, now made the sovereign of Salzburg, and the other the archduke Charles, the actual grand master of the Teutonic order. Upon these conditions, Austria was ready to regard the archdukes as sufficiently indemnified, and to give herself up to the wishes of the mediating powers.

The first consul was no longer able, after what had passed in regard to Passau, to bring Bavaria to consent to cede the frontier of the Inn; and, above all, it would be difficult for him to make Germany accept three electors at once, taken alone from the house of Austria—Bohemia, Salzburg, and the Teutonic order. He was not willing to sacrifice the free town of Augsburg. He replied, that disposed to demand some sacrifices of Bavaria, it was impossible for him to exact from her the concession of the frontier of the Inn. He insinuated that he might perhaps go as far as to propose to Bavaria to abandon a bishopric like that of Aichstadt, but that it was impossible to go beyond that cession.

The time passed away; it was now Vendémiaire, or October, and the final term approached, fixed for the 2nd Brumaire, or 24th of October. The mediating powers were in a hurry to finish the affair. They had heard all the petty reclamations, received all those which were worthy of hearing, and put all in order, as well as the regulations which were to accompany the distribution of the territories. The electoral dignity, requested by the emperor of Russia, had not appeared to any one proper to be granted, because it was a new protestant electorate added to the six which already existed in a college of only nine. The disproportion was too great to be increased yet further. This reclamation was therefore discarded. A new distribution had been made of the "virile votes," for thus the votes in the college of princes were denominated; and they had transferred to the new states the votes of the princes dispossessed upon the left bank of the Rhine. There resulted in the college of the princes as in that of the electors, a considerable change in favour of the protestants, because they had replaced the prelates or abbots by secular princes of the reformed religion. Finally, to establish a sort of counterpoise, they had attached new votes to Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carniola, and Carinthia. But the catholic princes wanted the principalities, which might serve them as a pretext for the creation of new voices in the diet. In spite of all that they had done, the proportion which was formerly, as has been said, fifty-four catholic voices against forty-three protestants, was now actually thirty-one catholics against sixty-two protestants. Still it must not be concluded that Austria was inferior in proportion to these numbers. All the protestant suffrages, as before said, were not suffrages secured to Prussia; but with the imperial prerogatives with respect to the house of Austria, which was still in power, and with the fears that the house of Brandenburg had begun to inspire, the balance was able still to be kept up between the two rival houses.

As to the college of the cities, it had been organized in an independent manner, and had attempted to render it less inferior to the other two. The eight free towns were reduced to six, when Ratisbon and Wetzlar had been granted to the archbishop chancellor. Prussia wished to suppress the third college, and to attribute to each of the six cities a voice in the college of princes. This would have been a means of suppressing one or two more, especially Nuremburg, of which Prussia was ambitious to have possession. The French legation refused to agree to this, and gave a determined negative.

Nothing was said upon the state of the "immediate" nobility, which remained in the most cruel anxiety, because Prussia and Bavaria threatened them openly.

At last, the term of the 2nd Brumaire approaching, the new plan was submitted for deliberation in the extraordinary deputation. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wurtemburg, and Mayence, approved of it. Saxony, Bohemia, the Teutonic order, declared that they would take it into consideration, but that before they pronounced definitely, they desired to wait the termination of the negotiation going on in Paris on the part of Austria, because otherwise, they said, they should be exposed to vote for a plan that it would be needful to modify subsequently.

The extraordinary deputation had to deliver its definite vote, and there remained only three or four days to complete the term of the two months' delay. It was needful for the honour of the great mediating powers, to obtain the adoption of their plan within the time fixed. M. de Laforest and M. Buhler, who moved forward freely in accordance, made the greatest efforts in order that on the 29th Vendémiaire, or 21st of October, the *conclusum* should be finally adopted. They encountered infinite difficulties in consequence of M. Hugel reporting every where that a courier from Paris, bringing important alterations, was every moment expected to arrive; that at Paris even they wished for delay. He went so far as to threaten M. Albini, telling him that according to positive advices, orders would be received by him from the elector of Mayence, disavowing his conduct, and enjoining it upon him not to vote. This was done to shake one of the five favourable votes, and thus far one

of the most faithful. These menaces were pushed so far that M. Albini became offended, and in consequence became more firm in the resolution he had taken. To increase the embarrassment of the time, Prussia commenced at the latest instant to create new obstacles; she desired such a digest of the business as should dispense with her furnishing out of the reserved properties her part of the 413,000 florins, which remained to be made up. She even aspired to self-appropriate certain dependencies of the ecclesiastical property enclosed within her territories, and attributed to different princes by the plan of the indemnities. She had, in a word, a thousand pretensions, more vexatious, more out of place the one than the other, which arising in a most unexpected manner, at the conclusion of the negotiations, were of a nature to make the whole proceeding miscarry. It was not the minister of Prussia, M. Goertz, a very worthy personage, who thus cast a blush upon the character which he was made to play, it was a financier whom they had made his adjunct that caused these difficulties. At length, M. de Laforest and M. Buhler gave a last impulse to the affair, and on the 29th of Vendémiaire, or 21st of October, the definitive *conclusum* was adopted by the extraordinary deputation of the eight states, and the mediation might be said in a certain sense to be accomplished, within the term assigned by the mediating powers. On the last day, Saxony voted with the five states, forming the ordinary majority out of respect to that majority.

There still remained a number of details to be arranged. The partition of the territories and the regulations for the organization did not form the same act. It was required that the two should form but one resolution, which should take a title already known in the Germanic protocol, as that of the *recez*, a term applied by custom to the registration of the resolutions of the imperial diet. Afterwards, the labours of the deputation being accomplished, it was necessary to carry the result to the Germanic diet, of which the extraordinary deputation was only a commission. The precaution had been taken in the declaration of the definitive *conclusum*, of stating that the *recez* would be directly communicated to the mediating ministers. They desired by this means to prevent the refusal of the communication being made on the part of the imperial ministers to the mediating ministers, a refusal which had already been the cause of the most vexatious delays.

They now set to work immediately to resolve into one sole digest the principal act and the regulations. This was a new opportunity for M. Hugel to raise up embarrassing questions. Thus, on the proposal for the definitive digest being completed, he obstinately demanded, if there was not to be comprehended in the registry the charge on the salary of 413,000 florins, due to the arch-chancellor, to the duke of Oldenburg, and to the houses of Isemburg and Stolburg; he demanded if this was not the moment to provide the pensions of the archbishop of Treves, the bishops of Liege, Spires, and Strasburg, the states of which had gone with the left bank of the Rhine to France, and who did not know to whom to address themselves to obtain a provision; if no indemnity was to be accorded to the "immediate" nobility for the loss of their feudal rights, a loss for which they had an anterior promise of an indemnity.

To all the demands of new allocations, Prussia replied by refusals, or by references to the free cities. Bavaria said, and with reason, that she was much in debt, and that she saw her resources still further lessened by what would be accorded to Austria, in the treaty carrying on at Paris. M. Hugel replied, that it was not in this manner that people should meet their sacred debts.

These disputes produced at Ratisbon an extremely vexatious effect. They complained there above all things of the avidity of Prussia, and of the complaisant conduct of France towards her; we no longer acknowledge, people said, the great character of the first consul, which permits his name and favour to be so abused. Every mind reverted towards Austria, even those which did not commonly lean towards her side. People said, that in submitting to a preponderating influence in the empire, it was better to submit to that of the ancient house of Austria, that without doubt had formerly abused its supremacy, but had at the same time as often protected as oppressed the Germans. There sprung up among the states of the second order, such as Bavaria, Wurtemburg, the two Hesses, and Baden, a disposition to form a league in the centre of Germany, for resisting, as well the power of Prussia, as that of Austria.

At length, in spite of every art to extend these difficulties, the *recez* was digested and adopted by the extraordinary deputation, on the 2nd Frimaire, year XI., or 23rd November, 1802. No resource was indicated to supply the payment of the 413,000 florins, which yet remained without assignment. All wished also to know, before they put the last hand to the work, the result of the negotiations between France and Austria.

The imperial legation saw itself, therefore, vanquished at last, by the activity and constancy of the mediating ministers, who proceeded invariably on their way, supported upon their majority of five votes, sometimes even of six out of eight, when Saxony was brought back again to the majority by the obstinate resistance of Austria. M. Hugel decided to let things alone. It was necessary to carry the *recez* of this special commission, called the "extraordinary deputation," up to the diet itself. In order to pass it from one to the other of these bodies, the decision was taken to pass it intermediately, if the ministers of the emperor refused to transmit it. Nevertheless, the Germans, even those most favourable to the plan of indemnity, were inclined towards the exact and faithful observation of the constitutional regulations. They thought that the empire was quite sufficiently shaken, and besides, in the overturn of the constitution, they discovered a new species of domination, which was altogether more formidable than that which existed before. Even those who were originally the partisans of Prussia, now rallied with those who had always venerated Austria as the most perfect representative of the old order of things. They had arrived at that point, a point soon arrived at in revolutions, where the new masters are distrusted, and the old ones a little less hated. They did not wish, therefore, that the imperial ministers should be passed over in the matter, and the intelligence of a conference

at Paris, between Austria and the first consul, gave birth to the hope of an arrangement, which would be received with joy by every body.

M. Hugel, at last brought back to a system of condescension, consented to communicate the acts of the extraordinary deputation to the mediating ministers, to the end that the last should be able to address the diet, and require the adoption of the *recez*, as the law of the empire. But with the narrowness of mind of an old formalist, M. Hugel refused to send the *recez* itself, invested in the imperial colours; he communicated a simple impression, with a despatch guaranteeing its authenticity.

Without losing time, on the 4th of December, or 13th Frimaire, the two ministers of France and Russia communicated the *recez* to the diet, declaring that they entirely approved of it in the name of their respective courts; that they requested it should be immediately taken into consideration; and, as soon as possible, that it be adopted as a law of the empire. This promptitude to get hold of the diet was a means to bring in the ministers of the Germanic states that were absent, or the instructions of those who had not yet received them.

New precautions at this moment became necessary in relation to the composition of the diet. To admit to vote all the states on the left bank of the Rhine suppressed by the French conquest, and on the right bank by the system of secularizations, was to expose the diet, on their part, either to an invincible opposition, or else to condemn them to pronounce themselves their own suppression. It was agreed with the directorial minister, or in other words, with the arch-chancellor, to convoke exclusively those states which were preserved to the empire, whether their title was changed or whether it was not. Thus they did not convoke the electors of Treves nor of Cologne to the college of electors; but they convoked Mayence, of which the title was constituted *ex jure novo*. In the college of princes there were some suppressed whose territories had been incorporated in the French or Helvetian republics; such, for example, as the secular and ecclesiastical princes of Deux-Ponts, Montbalhard, Liege, Worms, Spires, Bâle, and Straburg. Those princes were provisionally maintained, who had gained new principalities, save in the regulation of the titles, at a later time, and the making them transfer themselves to the secularized territories which had devolved upon them. There were suppressed in the college of cities the whole mass of incorporated places; only six titles were preserved, — Augsburg, Nuremburg, Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck.

These precautions were indispensable, and they obtained the result which they awaited. None of the suppressed states made their appearance. In the first days of January the diet commenced their deliberations. The protocol was opened. The states in the three colleges were successively called. The one gave their opinions immediately, the others reserved theirs until a later period, according to the custom of the diet. They waited to pronounce definitively on the last submission of the vote of the proposed *conclusum*, until the negotiations entered into in Paris between France and the court of Vienna should be completed.

Things had proceeded so far, that the first consul it was wished should grant some satisfaction to Austria. In strictness, they might have passed on without her good wishes to the end of the business, and made the three colleges vote in spite of the Austrian opposition. The Germans, even those the most mortified, felt clearly enough that it was necessary to finish, and they were resolved to vote for the *recez*, after which, the different occupations already consummated would have been clothed with a species of legality, and the refusal of his sanction on the part of the emperor, would not have been able to hinder those who had received the indemnities from enjoying peaceably their new territories. Still the opposition of the emperor to the new constitution, however unreasonable it was, would have placed the empire in a false, uncertain position, little conformable to the pacific intentions of the mediating powers. It was better worth to come to an agreement, and to obtain the adhesion of the court of Vienna. This was the intention of the first consul. He would not have waited so long, had it not been for the purpose of having fewer sacrifices to make to Austria, and fewer to exact of Bavaria; because it was of the last, it would be necessary to demand all that should be granted to the former.

In effect, towards the end of December the first consul consented to hold a conference with M. Cobentzel, and at last came to an agreement with him upon some concessions in favour of the house of Austria. Bavaria had shown an invincible repugnance to cede the line of the Inn; whether because of the valuable salt mines which are found between the Inn and the Salza, or whether on account of the situation of Munich, which would be then too near the new frontier, it had been deemed necessary to renounce this plan of arrangement. Then the first consul was reduced to cede the bishopric of Aichstedt, placed upon the Danube, containing 70,000 inhabitants, with a rumoured revenue of 350,000 florins, and primarily destined for the palatine house. Provided this augmentation was acceded to the archduke Ferdinand, the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent were to be taken from his indemnification among the secularizations to the profit of Austria. This power avowed, in a manner clear enough, the interest which she kept concealed out of zeal for her relation. It is true, for the price of this secularization, she took from her own domains the little prefecture of Ortenau, in order to increase the indemnity of the duke of Modena, composed, as has been already said, of the Brisgau. Ortenau was in the country of Baden, and near the Brisgau.

Austria had required the creation of two new electors in her own house; one was conceded in the archduke Ferdinand, thus destined to be the elector of Salzburg. Thus there were ten electors in the room of nine, which was the number contained in the plan of the mediating powers, in place of eight, which had been the number under the old Germanic constitution. This was an improvement of the Austrian position in the electoral college. There were now, in fact, four catholic electors— Bohemia, Bavaria, Mayence, and Salzburg—against the six protestants of Brandenburg, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Wurtemburg, and Baden.

These conditions were inserted in a convention

signed at Paris on the 26th of December, 1802, or 5th Nivôse, year XI., by M. Cobentzel and Joseph Bonaparte. M. Markoff was asked to accede in the name of Russia; and there was no need of begging it of him as a favour, devoted as he was to Austria. Prussia remained cool, but offered no resistance. Bavaria submitted herself, demanding to be indemnified for the sacrifice which was exacted of her; and above all, not to be forced to pay any part of the 413,000 florins that nobody else would pay.

Austria had promised to oppose no further obstacle in the way of the mediation, and she nearly kept her word. Besides the concessions obtained in Paris, she wished to obtain another, which she was unable to negotiate any where but at Ratisbon itself, with those who had drawn up the *recez*. This concession related to the number of virile votes in the college of princes. While the protocol was open in the diet, and they there expressed their opinions one after the other, the extraordinary deputation was sitting at the same time, and reconsidering once more the plan of the mediation since the convention agreed upon in Paris. The diet thus delivered its opinion upon the plan that the grand deputation was daily reconsidering at the same time. The territorial changes agreed upon in Paris were included. They had comprised in their proceedings the creation of the new elector of Salzburg; they had, in fine, introduced the new virile votes, which changed the proportion of the catholic and protestant votes in the college of princes, carrying the votes to fifty-four catholics against seventy-seven protestants, in lieu of thirty-one against sixty-two. It was necessary to finish all these questions, and particularly that which related to the 413,000 florins. Bavaria, that had lost 350,000 florins with Aichstedt, was not able to pay 200,000. She had refused to pay this money, and the refusal was but natural. But Prussia, although she had lost nothing, was unwilling to support her part of this light burden. "They will not make war for 200,000 florins," said M. Haugwitz; sad words, which offended every body at Ratisbon, and placed the character of Prussia far beneath that of Austria; which last, in her resistance, at least defended her territories and her old constitutional principles.

The first consul, in point of fact, ought to have beaten down this avaricious spirit; but having need of Prussia, even to the last, in order to secure the success of his plans, he was obliged to humour her. They knew not how to pay neither the arch-chancellor, the pensions of the ecclesiastics, nor some other debts formerly assigned upon the reserved property. To repartition this charge, under the form of *mois romains*[1], on the totality of the Germanic body, was impossible, seeing the difficulty, almost insurmountable at all times on the part of the confederation, to obtain the payment of the common expenses. The state of the dilapidation of the federal fortresses was a proof of this. They were compelled to devise a means which somewhat diminished the liberality of the first French plan in regard to the navigation of the rivers. They had suppressed all the tolls on the Elbe, the Weser, and the Rhine. Still it was necessary to provide for some indispensable expenses to keep things in order; such as the towing-paths, for example, without which the navigation would have been soon interrupted. It was agreed to establish upon the Rhine a moderate *octroi*, or duty, very inferior to all the tolls of a feudal nature under which the river had formerly been oppressed; and upon the excess left of this duty to take 350,000 florins for the prince arch-chancellor, the 10,000 for the duke of Oldenburg, the 53,000 for the houses of Isemburg and Stolburg, and some thousand florins more yet, to place in accordance different princes who sent in assignments. In this way was satisfied the avarice of Prussia. The 200,000 florins were thus discharged from Bavaria, that she was bound to furnish for her part of the 413,000, thus reducing the loss which she had experienced in ceding Aichstedt; and the promise made to the archduke chancellor was fulfilled, securing to him an independent revenue. All the Germans wished this to be the case, because they judged that 1,000,000 of florins of revenue was only just sufficient for the prince who had the honour to preside at the Germanic diet, and who was the last representing the three ecclesiastical electors of the holy empire. He was constituted the only administrator of this duty, in concert with France, that had the right to watch over the expenditure laid out on the left bank. Under this point of view, France had not to complain of this arrangement, because from that moment, the prince arch-chancellor had every interest to maintain kindly relations with her.

Finally, the plan, revised for the last time, was adopted on the 25th of February, or 6th Ventôse, year XI., as a final act, by the extraordinary deputation, and sent immediately to the diet, where it was voted, very nearly unanimously, by all three of the colleges. It met with no opposition, except on the part of Sweden, of which the monarch, already beginning to exhibit the troubled mind which precipitated him from the throne, astonished Europe by his royal follies. He cast violent blame upon the mediating and the German powers, who had concurred in making an attack so serious upon the ancient Germanic constitution. This ridiculous freak of a prince, of whom nobody in Europe made the least account, did not alter the general satisfaction which was felt at seeing the long anxieties of the empire terminated at last.

The Germans, even those who regretted the old order of things, but preserved some small remnant of equity in their judgments, acknowledged that they had gathered upon this occasion the inevitable fruits of an imprudent war; that the left bank of the Rhine having been lost, in consequence of that war, it had become necessary to make a new partition of the Germanic territory; that the partition was, without doubt, more advantageous for the great than the small houses, but that without France, this inequality had been much more injurious still; that the constitution, modified under several heads, was still preserved in the base, and could not be reformed in a clearer spirit of conservation. They acknowledged, in fact, that without the vigour of the first consul, anarchy would have been introduced into Germany, in consequence of the pretensions of all kinds at that moment put

[1] *Mois romains* was the name of the common expenses divided over the whole of the confederation, after the old-established proportions.

forward. The circumstance which proves better than mere words the sentiment thus indulged for the chief of the French government is, that on the consideration of several questions, still remaining in suspense, they desired that his powerful hand should not be too suddenly withdrawn from the affairs of Germany. They wished that France, in the character of a guarantee, should be obliged to watch over her work.

In point of fact, there remained more than one question, general and particular, which the mediation had not settled. Prussia was in an open quarrel with the city of Nuremburg, and acted towards it in the most tyrannical manner. The same grasping power would not place the counts of Westphalia in possession of their part of the bishopric of Munster which it had seized. Frankfort was involved in a contest with the neighbouring princes, about a charge which had been imposed upon it in their favour, in the way of compensation for certain properties ceded by them. Prussia and Bavaria wished to take advantage of the silence of the *recez*, in order to incorporate in their estates the "immediate" nobility. Austria turned to her advantage in Suabia a quantity of feudal claims, of an obscure origin, being an invasion of the jurisdiction of the sovereignty of the dukes of Wurtemburg, Baden, and Bavaria. She committed, more particularly, a violation of property unheard of before. The ecclesiastical principalities recently secularized, deposited their funds in the bank of Vienna, funds belonging to, and arising out of, those principalities, which were to pass, with the principalities, to the princes whom they indemnified. The Austrian administration laid its hands upon these funds, amounting to no less than 30,000,000 of florins, an act which nearly reduced some of these princes to despair. All these acts of violence made it a matter exceedingly desirable that an authority should be instituted, which should watch over the execution of the *recez*, like that which was set on foot after the peace of Westphalia. The recomposition of the old circles, charged to watch over the defence of particular interests, was at this time much desired. It remained, finally, to reorganize the German church, which having been deprived of its princely existence, had need of receiving an organization altogether new.

The first consul had not been able to take upon himself the solution of these difficulties, because to have done so, it would have been necessary that he should constitute himself the permanent legislator of Germany. He had only deemed it his duty to occupy himself with the preservation of the equilibrium of the empire, which was a part of the equilibrium of Europe, and for this purpose determining what property should revert to each state, whether in territory or influence in the diet. The remainder that was to be done could only in performance belong to the diet itself, which was alone charged to exercise the legislative power. This was fully sufficient, seconded at times by France, to guarantee the new Germanic constitution, as it had been able to do the old. The feeble threatened by the strong, already invoked this guarantee. It was for the more powerful courts of Germany, to prevent by their moderation a new intervention of a foreign power. Unhappily, it was not long that it was possible to calculate thus, on observing the actual conduct of Prussia and Austria.

The emperor, after having delayed his ratification, sent it at last, but with two reservations: one had for its object the maintenance of the privileges of all the "immediate" nobility; the other a new distribution of the protestant and catholic votes in the diet. This was to keep only half his word, as given to the first consul, for the value received at the convention of the 26th of December.

In other respects, the difficulties, which might be truly denominated European, as those of territory, were overcome, thanks to the energetic and prudent intervention of general Bonaparte. If any thing had rendered evident his ascendancy in the affairs of Europe at this time, it was a negotiation thus ably conducted, in which, united with justice, address, and firmness, the ambition of Prussia, and the pride of Russia were made to serve by turns a resistance to Austria, reducing her power without pushing her to despair. Thus had the first consul imposed his own will upon Germany, for the benefit alike of Germany and the repose of the world; the sole case in which it is permissible and useful to interfere in the affairs of another country.

BOOK XVI.

RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

EFFORTS MADE BY THE FIRST CONSUL TO RE-ESTABLISH THE COLONIAL GREATNESS OF FRANCE.—THE SPIRIT OF HER FORMER COMMERCE.—AMBITION OF ALL THE POWERS TO POSSESS COLONIES.—AMERICA, THE ANTILLES, AND THE EAST INDIES.—MISSION OF GENERAL DECAEN TO INDIA.—EFFORTS MADE TO RECOVER ST. DOMINGO. DESCRIPTION OF THE ISLAND.—REVOLUTION OF THE BLACKS.—CHARACTER, POWER, AND POLICY OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE.—HE ASPIRES TO BECOME INDEPENDENT.—THE FIRST CONSUL SENDS OUT AN EXPEDITION IN ORDER TO SECURE THE AUTHORITY OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY.—DISEMBARKMENT OF FRENCH TROOPS AT ST. DOMINGO, AT THE CAPE, AND AT PORT-AU-PRINCE.—BURNING OF THE CAPE.—SUBMISSION OF THE BLACKS.—MOMENTARY PROSPERITY OF THE COLONY.—APPLICATION OF THE FIRST CONSUL TO THE RESTORATION OF THE MARINE.—MISSION OF COLONEL SEBASTIANI TO THE EAST.—CARE DIRECTED TO INCREASE THE INTERNAL PROSPERITY OF THE COUNTRY.—THE SIMPLON, MOUNT GENÈVRE, THE FORTRESS OF ALEXANDRIA.—CAMP OF VETERANS IN THE CONQUERED PROVINCES.—NEW TOWNS FOUNDED IN LA VENDÉE.—ROCHELLE AND CHERBURG. THE CIVIL CODE, THE INSTITUTE, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CLERGY.—JOURNEY TO NORMANDY OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—ENGLISH JEALOUSY INSPIRED BY THE GREATNESS OF FRANCE.—THE MONEY MERCHANTS OF ENGLAND MORE HOSTILE TO FRANCE THAN THE ARISTOCRACY.—OUTBREAK OF THE JOURNALS WRITTEN BY THE EMIGRANTS.—PENSIONS GRANTED TO GEORGES AND THE CHOUANS.—REMONSTRANCES OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—EVASIONS OF THE BRITISH CABINET.—ARTICLES IN REPRISAL INSERTED IN THE "MONITEUR."—CONTINUATION OF THE AFFAIRS OF SWITZERLAND.—THE SMALLER CANTONS REVOLT UNDER THE CONDUCT OF THE LANDAMMAN REDING, AND MARCH UPON BERNE.—THE MODERATE PARTY IN THE GOVERNMENT OBLIGED TO FLY TO LAUZANNE.—THE DEMAND OF AN INTERVENTION AT FIRST REFUSED, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO. BY THE FIRST CONSUL.—NEY ORDERED TO MARCH WITH THIRTY THOUSAND MEN.—THE DEPUTIES CHOSEN FROM ALL THE PARTIES ARE SUMMONED TO PARIS, TO FRAME A CONSTITUTION FOR SWITZERLAND.—AGITATION IN ENGLAND; CRIES OF THE WAR PARTY AGAINST FRENCH INTERVENTION.—THE ENGLISH CABINET, ALARMED BY THESE CRIES, COMMITS THE FAULTS OF COUNTERMANDING THE EVACUATION OF MALTA, AND OF SENDING AN AGENT INTO SWITZERLAND, TO UPHOLD THE PARTY IN A STATE OF INSURRECTION.—PROMPTITUDE OF THE FRENCH INTERVENTION.—GENERAL NEY MAKES THE SWISS SUBMIT IN A FEW DAYS.—THE SWISS DEPUTIES INVITED TO PARIS ARE PRESENTED TO THE FIRST CONSUL.—DISCOURSE WHICH HE HELD WITH THEM.—ACT OF MEDIATION.—ADMIRATION OF EUROPE AT THE WISDOM OF THIS ACT.—THE ENGLISH CABINET IS EMBARRASSED AT THE PROMPTITUDE OF THE PROCEEDING, AND AT THE EXCELLENCE OF THE RESULT.—WARM DISCUSSION IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.—VIOLENCE OF THE PARTY OF GRENVILLE, WYNDHAM, AND THEIR FRIENDS.—NOBLE SAYING OF FOX IN FAVOUR OF PEACE.—PUBLIC OPINION CALMED FOR A MOMENT.—ARRIVAL OF LORD WHITWORTH IN PARIS, AND OF GENERAL ANDREOSSY IN LONDON.—GOOD RECEPTION OF THE AMBASSADORS BY BOTH NATIONS RESPECTIVELY.—THE BRITISH CABINET REGRETS HAVING RETAINED MALTA, AND WISHES, BUT DARES NOT, EVACUATE IT.—ILL-TIMED PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT OF GENERAL SEBASTIANI ON THE STATE OF THE EAST.—MISCHIEVOUS EFFECT OF THIS REPORT ON ENGLAND.—THE FIRST CONSUL WISHES TO HAVE A PERSONAL EXPLANATION WITH LORD WHITWORTH.—LONG AND REMARKABLE CONVERSATION.—THE OPENNESS OF THE FIRST CONSUL ILL COMPREHENDED AND BADLY INTERPRETED.—EXPOSÉ OF THE STATE OF THE REPUBLIC, CONTAINING A PHRASE MORTIFYING TO THE PRIDE OF THE ENGLISH.—ROYAL MESSAGE IN ANSWER.—THE TWO NATIONS ADDRESS TO EACH OTHER A SORT OF DEFIANCE.—IRRITATION OF THE FIRST CONSUL, AND PUBLIC SCENE WITH LORD WHITWORTH IN PRESENCE OF THE DIPLOMATIC BODY.—THE FIRST CONSUL PASSES SUDDENLY FROM IDEAS OF PEACE TO THOSE OF WAR.—HIS FIRST PREPARATIONS.—CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO THE UNITED STATES, FOR EIGHTY MILLIONS.—TALLEYRAND SETS HIMSELF TO CALM THE FIRST CONSUL, AND OPPOSES HIS EFFORTS CALCULATED ACCORDING TO THE INCREASING IRRITATION OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.—LORD WHITWORTH SECONDS THE EFFORTS OF TALLEYRAND.—PROLONGATION OF THIS SITUATION OF THINGS.—NECESSITY FOR TERMINATING IT.—THE BRITISH CABINET FINISHES IT BY AVOWING THAT IT INTENDS TO KEEP MALTA.—THE FIRST CONSUL ANSWERS BY A SUMMONS TO EXECUTE SOLEMN TREATIES.—THE MINISTER ADDINGTON, OUT OF FEAR OF BEING BEATEN IN PARLIAMENT, PERSISTS IN DEMANDING MALTA.—SEVERAL MEANS DEVISED TO ARRANGE WITHOUT SUCCESS.—OFFER OF FRANCE TO PLACE MALTA AS A DEPOSIT IN THE HANDS OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER.—REFUSAL OF THAT OFFER.—DEPARTURE OF THE TWO AMBASSADORS.—RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS.—PUBLIC ANXIETY IN LONDON AND PARIS.—CAUSES OF THE BREVITY OF THE PEACE.—TO WHOM THE FAULT OF THE RUPTURE IS TO BE ASCRIBED.

WHILE the first consul regulated, as supreme arbiter, the affairs of the European continent, his ardent activity, embracing two worlds, extended as far as America and both Indies, with the view of re-establishing the former colonial greatness of France.

At this day, when the nations of Europe are become more of manufacturers than merchants; at this day, when they have arrived at the power of imitating all they once sought beyond the seas, if they do not surpass it; at this day, in fine, that the greater colonies, freed from the yoke of the mother country, have arisen to the rank of independent states; the aspect of the world is become so altered, that it is difficult to recognize it. New objects of ambition have succeeded to those which

then divided it, and it is not without trouble that it is now possible to comprehend the motives for which, within a century, the blood of man was poured out so lavishly. England possessed North America under the name of a colony; Spain, under the same name, possessed South America; France possessed the principal Antilles, or islands of the West Indies, and, indeed, the finest of all, in St. Domingo. England and France disputed for India. Each of these powers imposed upon its colonies the obligation not to export, save to itself, the tropical productions, nor to receive but from itself the productions of Europe, and only to admit its vessels, and bring up seamen solely for its own marine. Each colony was thus a plantation, a market, and a close port. England wished to draw exclusively from her provinces of America the sugars, the timber, and the raw cotton which she wanted; Spain would only permit herself to extract from Mexico and Peru the rich metals so desired in all countries; England and France wished to domineer in India; to export thence the cotton thread, the muslins, and the calicoes, objects universally coveted; they desired to furnish their own productions in exchange, and to carry on that trade solely under their own flags. At this day these ardent desires of the nations have given place to others. The sugar which it was necessary to extract from a plant indigenous to and cultivated in a land under the hottest sun, is taken from a plant cultivated on the Elbe and Escaut. The cottons woven with such skill and patience by Indian hands, are woven in Europe by machines, which are set in movement by the combustion of fossil coal. Muslin is woven in the mountains of Switzerland and of Forez. Calicoes woven in Scotland, Ireland, Normandy, and Flanders, printed in Alsace, fill America, and spread over the world even as far as the Indies. Except coffee and tea, productions which art is unable to imitate, all these things are equalled in excellence, if not surpassed. European chemistry has already replaced most of the colouring materials which were once sought for under the tropics. Metals are produced from the sides of the European mountains. Gold is brought from Oural; and Spain begins to find silver in her own bosom. A great political revolution has formed a conjunction with these revolutions of industry. France favoured the insurrection of the English colonies of North America; England contributed in return to the insurrection of the colonies in South America. Both the one and the other are either great nations, or are destined to become so. Under the influence of the same causes an African society, the state of which is hid in the future, has developed itself in St. Domingo. Finally, India, under the sway of England, is no other than a conquest ruined by the progress of European industry, and employed in supporting a number of officers, clerks, and magistrates from the mother country. In our days, nations desire to produce every thing for themselves. To make their neighbours possessing less skill, accept the excess of their productions, and not to be satisfied to borrow more than the raw material, even searching to obtain the material as near as possible to the limits of their own territory: witness the efforts making to naturalize cotton in Egypt and Algiers.

To the grand spectacle of colonial ambition there has succeeded, in this manner, a spectacle of manufacturing ambition. Thus the world changes without ceasing, and each stage stands in need of some efforts of memory and of intelligence to comprehend that which preceded it.

This immense, industrious, and commercial revolution, commenced under Louis XVI. with the American war, was completed under Napoleon by the continental blockade. The long contest of England and France had been the principal cause; because, while the first wished to monopolize to herself all the exotic productions, the second avenged herself by imitating them. The inspirer of this imitation was Napoleon, of whom the destiny was thus marked out to renew, under every bearing, the face of the world. But before throwing France upon the continental and manufacturing system, as he did at a later time, Napoleon, the consul, full of the ideas of the age which was just completed, more confident in the French marine than he ever was afterwards, attempted vast enterprises in order to restore the colonial prosperity of France.

This prosperity had been formerly great enough to justify the regrets and attempts of which it was then the object. In 1787, France drew from her colonies to the value of 250,000,000 f. per annum, in sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, and similar productions. She consumed herself from 80,000,000f. to 100,000,000f., and re-exported 150,000,000f. This she disposed of all over Europe, principally in the form of refined sugar. It would be needful to double this amount in value to find its correspondent worth in the present day; and most assuredly the colonies were deserving of esteem, and should be placed in the first rank of the national interests, that thus could furnish a sum of 500,000,000 f. to commerce. France discovered in this commerce a means of attracting to herself a portion of the money of Spain, that gave her silver in exchange for colonial and manufactured productions. At the time of which mention is now making, that is to say, in 1802, France, deprived of colonial produce, and more particularly of sugar and coffee, not having enough even for her own use, demanded it of the Americans, the Hanseatic towns, of Holland, Genoa, and, after the peace, of the English. She paid for them in bullion, not having as yet in her industry, scarcely re-established, the means to pay in the produce of her manufactures. Money having never, since the assignats, reappeared with its former abundance, was often wanting; which was shown by the continual efforts of the new bank to acquire the dollars which got out of Spain in a contraband manner. Thus there was nothing more common among the merchants and commercial classes, than to hear complaints upon the rarity of money, and on the inconvenience of purchasing with money, the sugar and coffee formerly drawn from the French colonies. This kind of language must, without doubt, be attributed to some erroneous ideas about the mode of establishing the balance of commerce. But it must be attributed also to a real fact, namely, the difficulty of procuring colonial produce, and the yet greater difficulty of paying for either in money, become scarce since the assignats, or in the still less abundant produce of French industry.

If there be added to this, the numerous colonists formerly rich, now ruined, who at that time filled Paris, and joined their complaints to those of the emigrants, it will be easy to have a complete idea of the motives which moved the mind of the first consul, and directed his attention towards great colonial enterprises. It was under these powerful influences, that he had given to Charles IV. Etruria, in order to possess Louisiana. The conditions of the contract were accomplished upon his side, when the infants were placed upon the throne of Etruria, and acknowledged by all the continental powers; he now wished that the conditions should be accomplished on the side of Charles IV., and he demanded that Louisiana should be immediately delivered to France. An expedition of two vessels and of several frigates was assembled in the waters of Holland, at Helvoetsluys, to carry troops to the mouth of the Mississippi, and place that fine country under the dominion of France. The first consul, having to dispose of the duchy of Parma, was ready to cede it to Spain for the Floridas, and for the abandonment of a small part of Tuscany, the Siennese, which he wished to have as an indemnity for the king of Piedmont. The indiscretion of the Spanish government having suffered the knowledge of these details of the negotiations to become known to the English ambassador, the jealousy of England supplied a thousand obstacles to the conclusion of this new contract. The first consul at the same time occupied himself with India, and had confided the government of Pondicherry and of Chandernagore to one of the most valiant officers of the army of the Rhine, general Decaen. This officer, whose intelligence equalled his courage, and who was adapted to the greatest enterprises, had been selected for the purpose, and sent to India, under far-seeing and profound views. The English, the first consul had said to general Decaen, in addressing to him his admirable instructions, the English were the masters of the Indian continent; they were restless and jealous in that country; he must not give them any offence, but conduct himself with mildness and plainness, to support in those countries every thing that honour allows to be supported; not to have with the neighbouring princes any relations but what were indispensable to the entertainment of the French troops, and the objects of the factories. "But," added the first consul, "it is necessary to observe the conduct of these princes and people, who resign themselves with grief to the English yoke; to study their manners, their resources, and the means of communicating with them in case of a war; to inquire out what European army would be necessary to aid them to shake off the domination of the English; with what *matériel* such an army should be provided; what, above all, should be the means of subsisting it; to discover the port which would be best adapted for the place of embarkation of a fleet carrying troops; to calculate the time and means necessary to take such a port by a *coup de main*; to digest, after six months' residence in the country, a first memoir upon these different questions; to send by an officer intelligent and capable of being relied upon, who having seen every thing, is capable of adding verbal explanations to the written ones of which he will be the bearer; six months afterwards to be able still to throw light upon these same points, according to the knowledge newly obtained, and to send this other memoir by a second officer, equally sure and intelligent; in order to recommence the same work and the same kind of envoy every six months; to weigh well, in getting up the memoirs, the value of every expression, because a single word might, it was possible, have an influence in forming the gravest resolutions; finally, in case of a war, to act according to circumstances, either to remain in Hindostan or to withdraw to the Isle of France, sending several light vessels to the mother country, to make known the determination come to by the captain-general."

Such were the instructions given to general Decaen, in the view, not of rekindling the war, but to profit ably by war, if it should be declared anew.

But the greatest efforts of the first consul were directed towards the Antilles, the principal seat of the colonial power of France. It was with Martinique, Guadaloupe, and St. Domingo, that French commerce had formerly kept up its most advantageous relations. St. Domingo, above all, figured for three-fifths, at least, in the 250,000,000 f. which France formerly drew from her colonies. St. Domingo was then the most desired, and most envied of all the French possessions beyond the seas. Martinique had been fortunate enough to escape the consequences of the negro revolt; but Guadaloupe and St. Domingo had been overturned from the foundation, and nothing less than an entire army was necessary to establish there, not slavery again, which was become impossible, at least in St. Domingo, but the legitimate dominion of the mother country.

In this island, a hundred leagues long and thirty wide, happily situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, resplendent in fertility, adapted to the culture of sugar, coffee, and indigo; on this magnificent island twenty and some odd thousand whites were proprietors of estates. Twenty and some thousand free men of colour, and four hundred thousand slaves cultivated the ground, and drew from the soil an amazing profusion of colonial produce, valued at 150,000,000 f., which thirty thousand French seamen were employed to transport to Europe, in order to exchange it for a proportional value in the productions of the national industry. What should we think at the present day of a colony which should give France 300,000,000 f. in produce, and procure for the country 300,000,000 f. in value of exports, since 150,000,000 f. in 1789, answers at least to 300,000,000 f. in 1845! Unhappily, among these whites, mulattos, and blacks, violent passions became at work, owing to the climate, and to a state of society in which the two social extremes met—arrogant riches, and horrible slavery. There were never seen in any colony whites so opulent and so infatuated; mulattos so jealous of the superiority of the white races; nor blacks so determined to fling off the yoke both of one and the other. The opinions professed at Paris in the constituent assembly, being again repeated in the midst of the passions natural to such a country, could not fail to provoke a frightful tempest, like the storms which are caused in the sea by the sudden meeting of contrary winds. The whites and mulattos

were scarcely sufficient to defend themselves if they had been united, they were divided; and after having communicated to the blacks the contagion of their passions, they had brought them to an open insurrection. They had undergone at first their cruelty, then their triumph, and, lastly, their domination. There had then come to pass that which happens in all societies where there arises a war against classes; the first had been vanquished by the second; the first and second by the third. But there was the difference here, not seen in such cases elsewhere, they all bore on their visages the marks of their different origins; their hatred was similar to that connected with the violence of physical instinct, and their rage was as brutal and ferocious as that of the most savage animals. Thus the horrors of this revolution in St. Domingo had far surpassed all that had been seen in France in 1793, and despite the distance which commonly attenuates sensation, Europe, so deeply stricken by the spectacles which had been witnessed on the continent, had been profoundly moved by the unparalleled atrocities, to which imprudent masters, sometimes themselves cruel, provoked the ferocious slaves. The laws of society, every where the same, gave birth here as elsewhere, after long storms, to that fatigue, which calls for a master to rule, a superior intelligence, proper to become a leader. Such a master was found who wore the black colour of the triumphant race. He was called Toussaint Louverture. He was an old slave, not having the generous audacity of Spartacus, but possessing deep dissimulation, and a talent for government, altogether of the most extraordinary kind. A middling soldier, knowing more or less of the art of laying ambuscades in a country difficult of access, and even inferior to some of his lieutenants in this respect, according to report, had by his intelligence and skill in directing the entire mass of public affairs, acquired a prodigious ascendancy. This barbarous race, which it had been the will of Europeans to contemn, was proud to have in its ranks a being of whom the whites themselves acknowledged the powerful mental faculties. It saw in him a living claim to freedom, and to the consideration of other men. Thus did he accept the iron yoke of toil, a hundred times heavier than that of the old colonists, and endure the hard obligation to labour, an obligation which, in a state of slavery, was that which he had most detested. This black slave become dictator, had re-established at St. Domingo a tolerable state of society, and accomplished things which one might venture to call grand, if the theatre had been different, and if they had been less ephemeral.

Upon this land of St. Domingo, as in every country that is a prey to a civil war, there was a division made between the race of soldiers fit for arms, and attached to the profession, and the labouring race, less given to conflicts, easy to bring back to labour, and ready to fling itself anew upon danger if the public freedom should be threatened. Very naturally the first class was ten times less numerous than the second.

Toussaint Louverture composed with the first of these classes a permanent army of about twenty thousand men, organised in demi-brigades, on the model of the French armies, having black officers, with some mulattos and whites. This force, well fed and paid, sufficiently formidable under a climate which they alone were able to sustain, and upon a broken surface covered with brushwood, tough and full of thorns, was formed into several divisions, and commanded by generals of his own colour, the greater part intelligent enough, but more ferocious than intelligent; such were Christophe, Dessalines, Moïse, Maurepas, and Laplume. All were devoted to Toussaint; they acknowledged his genius, and submitted to his authority. The rest of the population, under the name of cultivators, had been recalled to labour. They kept their muskets, which might serve them in case of need, or if the mother country should make an attempt upon their liberty; but they were constrained to return to the plantations abandoned by the colonists. Toussaint had proclaimed them free, but obliged them to labour five years more upon the estates of their old masters, with a claim to one-fourth of the raw produce.

The white proprietors had been encouraged to return, even those who, in a moment of despair, had associated themselves with the attempt of the English upon St. Domingo. They had been well received, and obtained their habitations again, covered with negroes, who called themselves free, to whom they abandoned, according to the regulation of Toussaint, a fourth of the raw produce, valued in usage in the most arbitrary manner. A considerable number of the former rich proprietors of estates, whether they had fallen in the troubles of the colony, or whether they had emigrated with the old French nobility, of which they had been a part, had neither reappeared nor sent delegates. Their property sequestered, as the national domains had been in France, had been confirmed to black officers, at a price which easily allowed them to enrich themselves. Certain generals, as Christophe and Dessalines, had acquired in this manner more than a million of francs in annual revenue.

These black officers had the quality given them of inspectors of culture, in the arrondissement where they happened to command. They made continual turns of inspection under this duty, and they treated the negroes with a severity peculiar to new masters. Sometimes they watched to see that justice was rendered them by the colonists; but more commonly they condemned them to be flogged for idleness or insubordination, and they kept up a species of continued hunt, with the object of making those return to culture who had contracted a taste for vagabondage. Frequent inspections in the parishes procured a knowledge of what cultivators had left their original habitations, and thus was furnished the means to bring them back. Often even Christophe and Dessalines had them hung under their own eyes. Thus the culture of the land recommenced with incredible activity under the new chiefs, who employed to their own profit the submission of the blacks pretending to be free; nor is it right to contemn such a scene, because these chiefs knew how to impose labour upon their own kind, even for their own exclusive advantage; the negroes knowing how to submit, without any great benefit to themselves, were indemnified solely by the idea that they were free. This feeling inspires more esteem than the sight of an ignoble and barbarous idle-

ness, given by the negroes left to themselves, in the colonies recently emancipated.

Thanks to the order established by Toussaint, the greater part of the forsaken habitations had been again occupied, and in 1801, after ten years of trouble, the island of St. Domingo, watered with so much blood, offered an aspect of fertility very nearly equal to that which it presented in 1789. Toussaint, independent of France, had given to the colony a freedom of commerce very nearly perfect. Such a state of liberty, dangerous in colonies of only a middling fertility, that produce little at a high cost, and therefore have an interest in taking the produce of the mother country for the object of her taking theirs—such a state of liberty is excellent, on the contrary, for a rich and fertile colony, having no need of any favour for the debit of her productions, and interested from that circumstance in treating freely with all nations, and in seeking objects of necessity or of luxury, where they are best to be had, and at the lowest cost. This was the case at St. Domingo. The island had felt the effects of the free presence of foreign flags, more particularly that of America, and found it of infinite advantage. Provisions were abundant; the merchandise of Europe was sold there at a good price; and the productions of the island were taken off by purchase the moment they appeared in the market. In addition to this, the new colonists, some black, become what they were by the insurrection; others, white persons reinstated, all free from their engagements towards the capitalists of the mother country, were not, like the old colonists of 1789, borne down by debts, and obliged to deduct from their profits the interest of enormous borrowed capitals. They were more opulent with the less property. The towns of the Cape, of Port-au-Prince, of St. Mark, and Cayes, had recovered a species of splendour. The traces of the war were nearly obliterated; there were seen in most of them elegant dwellings, constructed for the black officers, inhabited by them, and resembling in all respects the fine houses of the old white proprietors of the island, formerly so arrogant, so renowned by their luxury and their fall.

The chief black of the colony had put the finish to the recent prosperity, by the bold occupation of the Spanish part of St. Domingo. This island was formerly divided lengthways into two parts, of which one to the east, first presenting itself on coming from Europe, belonged to the Spaniards; the other part, placed to the west, turning towards Cuba and the interior of the Gulf of Mexico, belonged to the French. This western part, composed of two advanced promontories, which formed besides a vast interior gulf, a multitude of roads and small ports, was better fitted for plantations than the other, as they have need to be situated near the places of embarkation. Thus it was covered with rich establishments. The Spanish part, on the other hand, little mountainous, presented few gulfs or inlets, and contained fewer sugar and coffee plantations; but in return, it fed numerous herds, horses, and mules. United, these two portions of the island were capable of rendering a great service to each other, while separated by an exclusive colonial government, they were like two isles far distant, one having that of which the other stood in need, and yet not being able to help each other from their want of proximity. Toussaint, after having expelled the English, had turned all his ideas towards the occupation of the Spanish part of the island. Affecting a scrupulous submission to the mother country, every thing was conducted according to his sole will; he was armed with the treaty of Bâle, by which Spain ceded to France the possession of the whole of the island of St. Domingo, and he had summoned the authorities of Spain to deliver up to him the province which they had still retained. He found at the moment a French commissioner at St. Domingo, because since the revolution, the mother country had not been represented in the island, except by such commissioners, who were scarcely listened to. This agent, dreading the complications which might result in Europe from such a step, and besides, not having received from France any order upon the subject, had uselessly endeavoured to combat this resolution of Toussaint. The last, taking little account of the objections which were addressed to him, had put in movement all the divisions of his army, and had demanded from the Spanish authorities, incapable of the smallest resistance, the keys of Santo-Domingo. The keys had been sent to him, and he proceeded himself at once to take possession of all the towns, under no other title than that of the representative of France, but comporting himself in reality as a sovereign, and making himself be received in the churches with holy water and the dais.

The union of the two different parts of the island under one government had produced great and instantaneous results in favour of trade and interior good order. The French part, abundantly provided with all the products of the two worlds, had given a considerable quantity to the Spanish colonies, in exchange for cattle, mules, and horses, of which it had great need. At the same time, the negroes who wished to withdraw from labour, by becoming wandering vagabonds, no longer found in the Spanish part of the island an asylum against the unceasing researches of the black police.

It was by these united means that Toussaint had made the colony again flourish in the space of two years. No one could have had an exact idea of his system of policy, if it had not been known at the same time how he conducted himself between France and England. This slave, become free and a sovereign in power, preserved at the bottom of his heart an involuntary sympathy for the nation whose chains he had borne, and felt a great repugnance to see the English in St. Domingo. Thus he made noble efforts to expel them, and in this he succeeded. His political comprehension, profound, though uncultivated, confirmed him in his natural sentiments, and made him understand that the English were the most dangerous masters, because they possessed a maritime power which rendered their authority over the island effective and absolute. He would not, therefore, at any price, submit to their rule. The English, on evacuating Port-au-Prince, had offered him the royal power in St. Domingo, and the immediate acknowledgment of that power, if he would consent to insure to them the commerce of the colony. He had refused this, whether because he still clung fast to the mother country, or whether, affrighted at the news of the peace, he feared a French expe-

dition, capable of reducing his royalty to a cipher, is not known. Besides the vanity of belonging to the first military nation in the world, the secret gratification to be a general in the service of France, under the hand even of the first consul himself, had taken away Toussaint from all the offers of the English. He wished then to remain French, to hold the English at a distance, but to live peacefully with them; to acknowledge the nominal authority of France, and to obey her just so far as not to provoke any display of her forces; such was the policy of this singular man. He had received commissioners from the directory, and they had sent him men, particularly general Hédouville, pretending that they had overlooked the interests of the mother country, while they requested of him things that could not be expected, or that were unfortunate for her interests.

His policy within was not less worthy of attention than his policy out of the island. His manner of acting towards all classes of inhabitants, blacks, whites, or mulattos, answered to that about to be described. He detested the mulattos, because they bordered more upon his own race, and on the contrary, took extreme care to make much of the whites, provided that he obtained a few testimonies of their esteem, which made him feel that his genius caused his colour to be forgotten. He exhibited in this regard the vanity of a black upstart, of which all the vanity of the white upstarts of the old world cannot afford an idea. As to the blacks, he treated them with incredible severity, but still with a due attention to justice; he made use of religion, which he professed with great energy, and above all, he spoke of liberty, which he promised to defend, even to death. Of this indeed, he was for all men of his colour the glorious image, because there was seen in him that which, through liberty, a negro might become. His savage eloquence charmed his nation. From the elevation of the pulpit, where he often mounted, he spoke to them of God, of the equality of the human races, and in speaking of them, used the strangest and most happy similitudes. One day, for example, wishing to give them confidence in themselves, he filled a glass with grains of black maise, and mingling with them some grains of white, he then shook the glass, and made them remark how quickly the white grains disappeared among the black ones: "There," he said, "are the whites in the midst of you. Work; secure your well-being by your labour; and if the whites of the mother country wish to take from us our liberty, we will resume our muskets again, and we shall again vanquish them." Reverenced for these motives, he was at the same time feared for his extraordinary vigilance. Endowed with a surprising activity for his age, he had placed in the interior of the island relays of extremely fleet horses, and thus he transported himself, followed by several guards, with prodigious rapidity, from one part of the island to another, sometimes making forty leagues on horseback on the same day, coming to punish, like a thunder-clap, the offence of which he had received an account. Far-seeing and avaricious, he made hoards of arms and money in the mountains of the interior, where he buried them, it is said, in a place called the "Mornes du Chaos," near a habitation which had become his ordinary dwelling. These were resources for a coming time of combat, which he did not cease to regard as probable and even approaching. Attached continually to imitating the first consul, he gave himself a guard, and an enclosed circle, with a sort of princely dwelling. He received in this dwelling the proprietors of land of all colours, above all the whites, and used the blacks roughly who had not a bearing and manner sufficiently good. Frightful to the sight, even under his dress of a lieutenant-general, he had his flatterers, and his complaisant courtiers; and a thing melancholy to state, he obtained more than once the white females belonging to the oldest and wealthiest families in the island, who gave up their persons to him in order to benefit by his protection. His courtiers persuaded him that he was in America the equal to Bonaparte in Europe, and that he ought to occupy the same situation. At the time when he heard of the signature of the peace in Europe, and that he began to foresee the re-establishment of the authority of the mother country, he hastened to invoke a council in the colony, for the purpose of digesting a constitution. This council assembled, and did, in fact, draw up the scheme of a constitution, that was sufficiently ridiculous. According to the dispositions of this crude work, the council of the colony decreed all the laws, the governor-general sanctioned them, and fulfilled the duties of the executive power in full plenitude. Toussaint was naturally nominated governor-general, governor for life, with the power of designating his successor. This imitation of what had been done in France could not be plainer nor more puerile. As to the authority of the mother country, that was no longer a question of any moment. The constitution alone was to be submitted to it for approval, but that approbation being once given, the mother country had no longer any power over the colony, because the laws were enacted by the council. Toussaint governed, and was able, whenever he saw fit, to deprive the commerce of France of every advantage it might possess at the time; thus the state of things, which at that moment existed, and which the war had rendered excusable, was that which could not be tolerated for any longer time. When it was demanded of Toussaint what were the relations between St. Domingo and France, he replied, "The first consul will send commissioners to have a conference with me." All his wiser friends, and more especially colonel Francis Vincent, who had under his care the management of the fortifications, gave him advice in regard to the danger incurred by this course of conduct, telling him that he should defend himself from flatterers of every colour, that he would provoke the sending of a French expedition to the island, and that he would fall before it. The self-love of this slave then become his dictator, carried him away completely. He would have it, as he said, that the first of the blacks should be, both by right and fact, at St. Domingo, that which the first of the whites was in France, in other words, that he should be chief for life, with the power of naming his successor. He despatched colonel Vincent to Europe, with the view of explaining, and making the first consul agree to his new constitutional establishment. He demanded besides, the confirmation of all the mili-

tary grades which had been conferred upon the black officers.

This imitation of his own greatness, and this pretension to an assimilation with himself, made the first consul smile, and had not, it may be supposed, any effect upon his resolutions. He was ready to let himself be called the first of the whites, by him who called himself the first of the blacks, on the condition, that the tie of the colony with the mother country should be that of obedience, and that the ownership of the island, which had been French for centuries, should be real, and not nominal. To confirm the military grades that belonged to the black officers, was, in the eyes of the first consul, a point of no difficulty. He confirmed them all, and made Toussaint a lieutenant-general, and commandant of St. Domingo for France. But the first consul would have there a captain-general, to whom Toussaint should be the first lieutenant; without this condition St. Domingo could no longer be any thing more to France than it was at that moment. He resolved, therefore, to send out a general and an army. The colony had begun to flourish again; and it was now worth all which it had been worth in times gone by; the colonists in Paris demanded their property with loud entreaties; peace was at present enjoyed, it might not be for a very long time; there were plenty of idle troops, and of officers full of spirit, who only wanted an occasion to be on active service, no matter in what part of the world; he could not therefore resign himself to see such a fine possession slip out of the hands of France, without some attempt to retain it by means of the forces at his disposal. Such were the motives of the expedition of which the departure has already been stated. General Leclerc, the brother-in-law of the first consul, received his instructions how to manage with Toussaint; to offer him the post of lieutenant of France in the island, the confirmation of the rank and property acquired by his officers, a guarantee for the freedom of the blacks, but all with the authority of the mother country, represented by the captain-general. In order to prove to Toussaint the fair intentions of the government, his two sons, who were educated in France, were sent over to him at the same time, together with their preceptor, M. Coisnon. To this the first consul added a noble and flattering letter, in which, treating Toussaint as the first man of his race, he appeared to lend himself, in a kind way, to a comparison between the pacificator of France and him of St. Domingo.

But the first consul had provided against resistance to his intentions, and every measure was taken to conquer obstacles, if necessary, by main force. If he had been less impatient to profit by the signature of the preliminaries of peace, in order to pass the seas, now become free, the squadrons would have been obliged to wait for one another in some convenient place, in order that they might arrive altogether at St. Domingo, and thus have surprised Toussaint before he could place himself in a posture for defence. Unfortunately, in the uncertainty in which they were at the moment of the expedition, about the signature of the definitive treaty of peace, it was necessary to send the vessels from the ports of Brest, Rochefort, Cadiz, and Toulon, without obliging them to wait for each other, and with an order to arrive as soon as possible at the place of their destination. Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, sailing from Brest and l'Orient with sixteen vessels, and a force of about seven or eight thousand men, had received orders to cruise some time in the Gulf of Gascony, in order to attempt a junction, if possible, with admiral Latouche Treville, who was to sail from Rochefort with six ships, six frigates, and three or four thousand men. Admiral Villaret, if unable to meet and join admiral Latouche, was to pass on to the Canary Islands, in order to discover there, if possible, the division of admiral Linois coming from Cadiz, and the division of Ganteaume, which was to sail from Toulon, both the one and the other, with a convoy of troops. He was, lastly, to visit the Bay of Samana, the first presenting itself to a squadron arriving from Europe.

In conformity to the orders which they had thus received, the different squadrons searching for each other without losing time in uniting, arrived at different periods at the common rendezvous at Samana. Admiral Villaret appeared there on the 29th of January, 1802. Admiral Latouche followed close after. The divisions which had sailed from Cadiz and Toulon did not reach St. Domingo until a very considerable time afterwards. But admiral Villaret, with the squadrons from Brest and l'Orient, and admiral Latouche Treville, with the squadron from Rochefort, did not carry less than eleven or twelve thousand men. After a conference with the commanders of the fleet, the captain-general Leclerc thought that it was of the utmost importance not to lose time, and that it was the best course to present themselves before all the ports at once, in order to seize upon the colony before giving Toussaint time to take measures upon his own part. Moreover, many tidings coming from the Antilles, gave the expedition ground to fear a reception by no means of an amicable character.

In consequence of these impressions, general Kerversau, with two thousand men embarked in frigates, was ordered to appear before the town of Santo-Domingo, the capital of the Spanish part of the islands. Admiral Latouche Treville, with his squadron, which carried the division of general Boudet, was to attempt Port-au-Prince; lastly, the captain-general himself, with the squadron of admiral Villaret, was to make sail for the Cape, and obtain possession of it. The French part comprehends, with a considerable portion of the island, the two promontories which, advancing westwards, divide it into the departments of the north, west, and south. In the department of the north, the principal part was the Cape, as well as the chief place; in the department of the west it was Port-au-Prince. The Cayes and Jacmel were rivals in riches and influence in the south. In occupying Santo-Domingo for the Spanish part, with the Cape and Port-au-Prince for the French, nearly the whole island was kept in hand, except, it is true, the mountains of the interior, a conquest of which time alone could insure the achievement.

These naval divisions next quitted the bay where they had been moored, in order to proceed to their appointed destinations during the first days of February. Toussaint, informed that a great number of vessels were anchored in the bay of Samana, proceeded thither in person, in order to judge with his own eyes of the danger with which

he was thus threatened. No longer doubting, at the sight of the French squadron, the lot which had fallen to him, he took the resolution of having recourse to the last extremities sooner than submit to the authority of the mother country. He was assured that the negroes would not be again dragged into slavery; he was not himself possessed with such a belief; but he thought that they might place themselves in allegiance to France, and this motive sufficed him to decide upon resistance. He resolved, in consequence, to persuade the blacks that their liberty was in danger, to bring them back from agriculture to war, to ravage the maritime towns, massacre the whites, burn the houses, and then retire to the Mornes, a name given to mountains of a peculiar form, with which the French part of the island was every where covered, and to wait in those retreats until the climate weakened the whites so, that they might be able to fall upon them and complete their extermination. Moreover, hoping to stop the French army by simple menaces, perhaps also fearing, if he too early commanded the performance of atrocious actions, he should not be punctually obeyed by the black chiefs, who, following his example, had imbibed a taste for forming connexions with the whites, he ordered his officers to answer to the first summons of the squadron, that they had no orders to receive those on board; that then, if they insisted on landing, to threaten them, in such a case, with the total destruction of the towns, and, finally, if the disembarkation was effected, to destroy every thing, massacre all around them, and retire into the interior of the island. Such were the orders given to Christophe, who governed in the north, to the ferocious Dessalines, chief in the west, and to Laplume, a more humane black, commanding in the south.

The squadron of Villaret having arrived as far as Monte Christo, demanded pilots to take the ships into the roads of Fort Dauphin and the Cape, but had great trouble to procure them. Detaching the division of Magon towards Fort Dauphin, it arrived on the 3rd of February, or 14th Pluviôse, before the Cape. All the drawbridges were elevated, the forts armed, and a disposition to resist every where demonstrable. A frigate, sent to effect a communication with the land, received the answer which Toussaint had dictated. He had no instructions, was the reply of Christophe; he must await an answer from the commander-in-chief, who was at that moment absent; he would resist by fire and massacre every attempt at disembarkation by main force. The municipality of the Cape, consisting of whites and men of colour, went to express their terror to the captain-general Leclerc. They were, at the same time, happy to see the soldiers of the mother country arrive, and yet full of fear in considering the fearful threats of Christophe. The mind of the captain-general was much agitated, in finding himself placed under the necessity of fulfilling his mission, and at the same time exposing the white French population to the fury of the blacks. He reflected, he must land at all events. He therefore promised the inhabitants of the Cape that he would act with promptitude and vigour, in such a manner as to surprise Christophe, and not leave him time to fulfil his horrible instructions. He exhorted them strongly to arm in order to defend their persons and property, and he sent on shore a proclamation of the first consul, designed to make the blacks acquainted with the object of the expedition.

It became necessary afterwards to bear seawards in consequence of the state of the wind, which in that latitude is perfectly regular. The captain-general, once out at sea, arranged a plan of disembarkation with admiral Villaret-Joyeuse. This plan consisted in placing the troops in the frigates, and landing them in the environs of the Cape, beyond the heights which command the town, near a place called the embarking place of Limbé; then, while they attempted to turn the town of the Cape, to penetrate with the squadron into the passes, and thus to make at once a double attack by sea and land. It was hoped, that in acting with great celerity the town would be taken before Christophe had time to realise his sinister threats. Captain Magon and general Rochambeau, if they succeeded at Fort Dauphin, which they were ordered to occupy, were to second the movements of the captain-general.

On the following day the troops were transferred to the frigates and light vessels, and they were landed near the embarking place of Limbé. This operation took up the whole day. The day following, the troops moved on their march to turn the town, and the squadron became engaged in the passages. Two vessels, the Patriot and Scipio, anchored before the Fort Picolet, which fired red-hot shot, were soon reduced to silence. The day was advanced; the land breeze, which in the evening succeeded that from the sea, obliged the squadron to move again to sea, not to approach the land until the morning. While they thus stood out they had the grief to see a red light rise above the waves, and in a little time the flames had destroyed the town of the Cape. Christophe, although less ferocious than his commander, had still obeyed his orders; he had set fire to the principal quarters, and limiting himself to the massacre of a few whites, he obliged the others to follow him to the Mornes. While a part of these unfortunate whites expired under the swords of the negroes, or were carried away by them, the rest, following the municipality in a body, had escaped from Christophe, and sought for security by throwing themselves into the hands of the French army. The anxiety was great during that horrible night among the unfortunate persons exposed to so many dangers, and among the troops on sea and land, who saw the town on fire, and the frightful situation of their countrymen, without the power of getting to their succour [1].

The day following, being the 6th of February, while general Leclerc marched from all parts upon the Cape, turning the heights, the admiral set sail towards the port, and getting there, dropped anchor. All resistance had ceased by the retreat of the negroes. He immediately disembarked twelve hundred seamen under the command of

[1] Nothing can exhibit more the inferiority of the French in naval affairs than this landing at the Cape. It is worthy of being compared by the reader with the landing of the English army in Egypt, see page 249, where two divisions of 6000 men each were landed in one day, with their artillery, in face of a French army, at two disembarkations.—*Trans.*

general Humbert, in order to succour the town and snatch the wrecks from the fury of the blacks, while a connexion was thus kept up with the captain-general. The last arrived on his side, without being able to meet Christophe, who had already taken flight. They found that part of the inhabitants which had followed the municipality wandering about and cast down, but they were soon restored to joy on seeing themselves promptly aided and definitively saved from the danger which threatened them. They ran to the burning houses. The marine force helped to extinguish the fire, while the troops pursued Christophe into the country. This pursuit, actively followed up, prevented the blacks from destroying the rich dwellings on the plains of the Cape, and enabled the French to save from the enemy a number of whites whom they had not time to carry away with them.

While these events were passing at the Cape, the brave captain Magon had disembarked the division of Rochambeau at the entrance of the bay of Mancenille; he then penetrated with his vessels into the same bay, to second the movement of the troops. This vigorous conduct, which already presaged that which he exhibited at Trafalgar, concurred so well with the attack of Rochambeau's division, that they were enabled to take Fort Dauphin so suddenly, as to be masters of it before the negroes were able to commit any ravages. This second disembarkment achieved the work of driving the enemy from the environs of the Cape, and obliging Christophe to retire at once into the Mornes.

The captain-general Leclerc was established in the town of the Cape, where the fire had been extinguished. Happily the disaster had not corresponded to the fearful menaces of the lieutenant of Toussaint. The sole fact was that the houses had been burned. The number of whites massacred was not so great as there was at first reason to apprehend. Many of them came back again successively accompanied by their servants, who had remained faithful to them. The rage of the black hordes was above all glutted by the plunder of the rich magazines of the town. The troops and population employed themselves in the best way they were able to efface the traces of the ruin wrought by the fire. An appeal was made to the husbandry negroes, who were tired of the life of ravage and bloodshed in which their countrymen would involve them anew, and a number of them were now seen to return to their masters and to their accustomed labours. In a few days the town resumed a certain air of order and activity. The captain-general then sent vessels towards the continent of America, to endeavour to procure provisions, and replace the resources which had been destroyed.

During this interval the squadron of admiral Latouche Treville, which had gone to the west, had doubled the point of the island, and had come before the bay of Port-au-Prince, in order to disembark a division of the troops there. A white, engaged in the service of the blacks, named Agé, an officer full of good feeling, commanded at that place in the absence of Dessalines, residing at St. Marc. His repugnance to execute the orders he had received, the vigour of admiral Latouche Treville, the promptitude of general Boudet, the good fortune, in fact, that favoured this part of the operations, saved the town of Port-au-Prince from the misfortunes which had befallen that of the Cape. Latouche Treville ordered rafts to be constructed armed with artillery, then getting the troops disembarked suddenly at the point of Lamentin, he made sail in all haste towards Port-au-Prince. During this quick movement of the vessels, the troops on their side advanced upon the town. The fort of Bizoton lay in their road. They approached it without firing: "Let us kill without firing, if possible," said general Boudet, "in order to prevent a collision, and save if we are able our unhappy countrymen from the fury of the blacks." It was, in fact, the sole means to avoid the massacre with which the whites were threatened. The black garrison of the Fort Bizoton, on seeing the amicable and resolute attitude of the French troops, surrendered, and took their place in the ranks of the division of Boudet. They arrived at Port-au-Prince at the same time as admiral Latouche Treville approached it with his vessels. Four thousand blacks formed the garrison there. From the heights on which the army marched the blacks were seen lining the principal forts, or posted in advance of the walls. General Boudet ordered the town to be turned by two battalions, and with the main body of his force marched upon the redoubts which covered it: "We are friends," the nearest black troops cried out, "do not fire!" Trusting in these exclamations, the French soldiers advanced with their arms on their shoulders. But a discharge of musketry and grape, given nearly at the muzzle, struck down two hundred among them, some killed, others wounded. The gallant general Pamphile Lacroix was in the number of the last. The French instantly sprung on these miserable blacks with the bayonet, and immolated all those that had not time to make their escape. Admiral Latouche, who, during the passage had said without ceasing to the generals of the army, that a squadron was by its fire superior to any land position, and that he would soon convince them of it, placed himself under the batteries of the blacks, and in a few moments succeeded in silencing them. The blacks cannonaded so near, and assailed in the streets by the troops of Boudet's division, fled in disorder, without setting fire to the place, leaving the public chest full of money, and magazines containing an immense quantity of colonial produce. Unfortunately they took with them numbers of whites, treating them without pity in their precipitate flight, and marking its traces by incendiarism and the pillage of the habitations. Columns of smoke designated the line of their retreat in the distance.

The ferocious Dessalines, on learning the disembarkation of the French, had quitted St. Marc, passed behind Port-au-Prince, and by a rapid march occupied Leogane, in order to dispute with the French the department of the South. General Boudet sent there a detachment, which chased Dessalines from Leogane.

Information was received that general Laplume, less barbarous than his friends, distrusting, besides, a country full of mulattos, the implacable enemies of the blacks, was disposed to surrender himself. General Boudet, as soon as possible, despatched emissaries to him, and Laplume surrendered himself, and gave over entire to the French troops

that rich department, comprehending Leogane, the great and little Goave, Tiburon, the Cayes, and Jacmel. This was a fortunate event. The submission of the black chief Laplume saved a third of the colony from the ravages of the barbarians.

In the meanwhile the Spanish part of the island fell under the domination of the French troops. General Kerversau, sent to Santo-Domingo with some frigates and two thousand men, disembarked there. Seconded by the inhabitants and by the influence of the French bishop Mauvielle, he took possession of one-half of the Spanish part, in which Paul Louverture, the brother of Toussaint, was the governor. On the other coast, captain Magon, established at Fort Dauphin, had succeeded, by adroit negotiations, and the influence of the same bishop Mauvielle, in gaining over the mulatto general Clervaux, and in securing the rich plain of St. Jago.

Thus, in the first six days of February, the French troops occupied the flat country, the ports, the chief places of the island, and the larger part of the cultivated land. There remained in Toussaint's possession no more than three or four black demi-brigades, the generals Maurepas, Christophe, and Dessalines, with their treasures, and his collection of arms, hidden in the Mornes of the Chaos. But there were with him, most unfortunately, a number of whites, carried away as hostages, and cruelly treated, waiting until they should either be massacred or surrendered. It was necessary for the French to profit by the season, which was favourable, in order to complete the reduction of the island.

The mountainous and upturned region in which Toussaint had shut himself up, is placed to the westward, between the sea and mount Cibao, this being the central knot to which are attached all the mountain chains of the island. This region pours forth its scanty waters by several streams into the river of Artibonite, which falls into the sea, between Gonaïves and Port-au-Prince, very near St. Marc. It was necessary to march there from all points at the same time, in such a way as to place the blacks between two fires, and to drive them on Gonaïves, in order to surround them there. But to penetrate into the Mornes, it was needful to pass through narrow gorges, rendered nearly impassable by the vegetation of the tropics, and in the depths of which the blacks, lying close as tirailleurs, presented a resistance difficult to surmount. Yet the old soldiers of the Rhine, transported from thence across the Atlantic, had nothing to fear but the climate. That alone was able to overcome them; that alone had overcome them in this heroic age; they never succumbed except under the sun of St. Domingo, or upon the ice of Moscow.

The captain-general Leclerc was resolved to profit by the months of February, March, and April, in order to complete the occupation of the island, because at a later period the extreme heat and the rains made military operations impracticable. Thanks to the arrival of the naval divisions from the Mediterranean, commanded by admirals Ganteaume and Linois, the army disembarked was now carried up to a force of seventeen or eighteen thousand men. Some of the troops were ill, it is true; but there remained fifteen thousand in a state fit for duty. The captain-general, therefore, had all the means at hand to accomplish his task.

Before proceeding to the execution of his purpose, he determined to send a summons to Toussaint. This black leader, who was capable of the greatest atrocities in order to render his designs successful, was, nevertheless, susceptible of the natural affections. The captain-general, by the orders of the first consul, had brought with him, as already said, the two sons of Toussaint, grown up in France, in order to try the influence of filial solicitation upon his heart. The preceptor who had charge of their education was designed to conduct them to their father, to take him a letter from the first consul, and to try and attach him to France, by promising him the second authority in the island.

Toussaint received his two sons and their preceptor in his habitation of Ennery, his ordinary retreat. He pressed them for a long while in his arms, and appeared for a moment to be subdued by his emotion. His old heart, devoured by ambition, was moved. The sons of Toussaint and the respectable man whose pupils they had been, then described to him the power and the humanity of the French nation, the advantages attached to a submission, which would leave yet greater still his situation in St. Domingo, and which secured to his children a future prospect so brilliant; the danger of a ruin almost certain, on the contrary, if he continued to resist. The mother of one of the youths joined them in attempting to overcome Toussaint. Affected by these pressing entreaties, he wished to take some days to consider, and during these days he appeared to struggle greatly, now startled at the danger of the unequal contest, now governed by the ambition to be the sole master of the fine empire of Haïti, now revolting at the idea that the whites would perhaps replunge the blacks into slavery. Ambition and the love of liberty obtained the victory over paternal tenderness. He sent for his two children, he pressed them in his arms again, he left to them the choice between France, which was inhabited by civilized men, and himself, who had given them being, and he declared that he should continue to cherish them, even if they belonged to the ranks of his enemies. These unfortunate children, agitated and affected like their father, hesitated as he had done. One of them, nevertheless, flung himself on his neck, and declared that he would die a free black at his side; the other, uncertain, followed his mother to one of the estates of the dictator.

The answer of Toussaint no longer left any doubt of the necessity of the immediate resumption of hostilities. The captain-general Leclerc made his preparations, and then commenced operations on the 17th of February.

His plan was to attack at one time, by the north and the west, the thicket-covered country, nearly inaccessible, into which Toussaint had retired with his black generals. Maurepas occupied the narrow gorge called Three Rivers, which opened towards the sea at Port-de-Paix. Christophe was established on the sides of the Mornes towards the plain of the Cape. Dessalines was at St. Marc, near the mouth of the Artibonite, with orders to burn St. Marc, and to defend the Mornes du Chaos on the west and south. He had for support a

fort, well-constructed and defended, full of the munitions of war, amassed by the foresight of Toussaint. This fort, called Crête-à-Pierrot, was placed in the flat country that the Artibonite traverses and inundates, forming there a thousand sinuous windings before it falls into the sea. In the centre of this region, between Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines, Toussaint held himself in reserve with a chosen band.

On the 17th of February the captain-general, Leclerc, marched with his army formed in three divisions. On the left, the division of Rochambeau, leaving Fort Dauphin, was to march upon St. Raphael and St. Michel; the division of Hardy was to march by the plain of the north upon Marmalade; the division of Desfourneaux, by the Limbé, was to reach Plaisance. These three divisions had narrow gorges to pass, and steep heights to escalade, in order to penetrate into the region of the Mornes, and to possess themselves of the streams which form the upper course of the Artibonite. General Humbert, with a detachment, was charged to disembark at Port-au-Paix, remount the gorge of the Three Rivers, and drive back the black, Maurepas, on the Gros Morne. General Boudet had orders, while these five corps marched from north to south, to remount from south to north, and leaving Port-au-Prince, to occupy Mirebalais, the Verettes, and St. Marc. Thus assailed on all sides, the blacks had no other refuge than towards the Gonaïves, where the French had the hope to enclose them.

These dispositions would have been wise against an enemy that it was desirable to surround and pursue in front, rather than fight in a regular way. Each of the French corps had, in fact, a sufficiency of force to prevent it from receiving in any part a serious check. But against an experienced commander, having European troops, able to concentrate themselves suddenly upon a single corps of their assailants, the plan would have been defective.

Marching on the 17th, the three divisions of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Desfourneaux, fulfilled their task with great gallantry, scaling the most frightful heights, they travelled through dense and difficult thickets, and surprised the blacks by the boldness of their march, scarcely firing at all on an enemy that poured his fire upon them from all parts. On the 18th, the division of Desfourneaux was in the environs of Plaisance, the division of Hardy at Dondon, that of Rochambeau at St. Raphael.

On the 19th, the division of Desfourneaux occupied Plaisance, which was given up to him by Jean Pierre Dumesnil, a black tolerably humane, who surrendered to the French, with all his troops. The division of Hardy penetrated by main force into Marmelade, overturning Christophe, who was at the head of two thousand four hundred negroes, half of them troops of the line, the remainder cultivators. The division of Rochambeau carried St. Michel. The blacks were surprised at so rough an attack, not having before seen such troops among the whites. One only of the black leaders vigorously resisted the French. This was Maurepas, who defended the gorge of the Three Rivers against general Humbert. This last, not having troops enough, general Debelle had been sent by sea to his aid, with a reinforcement of twelve or fifteen hundred men. General Debelle was not able to disembark until very late at Port-au-Paix, and thwarted in his attacks by a frightful rain, he gained but little ground.

The captain-general, after having remained two days in the same place, in order to suffer the bad weather to pass away, pushed forward the division of Desfourneaux upon the Gonaïves, the division of Hardy upon Ennery, and that of Rochambeau upon the formidable position of the Ravine aux Colleuvres. On the 23rd of February, the division of Desfourneaux entered into Gonaïves, which they found in flames; the division of Hardy took Ennery, the principal habitation of Toussaint; and the gallant division of Rochambeau carried the Ravine aux Colleuvres. To force this last position, it was necessary to penetrate into a close gorge, bordered with heights, as if cut with a tool, bristling with gigantic trees and thorny bushes, and defended by blacks, who were good marksmen. Then it was necessary to open upon a small plain, that Toussaint occupied with three thousand grenadiers of his own colour, and all his artillery. The intrepid Rochambeau penetrated boldly into the gorge, in spite of a very annoying fire from the black tirailleurs, scaled two high banks, killing with the bayonet those blacks that were too late in retreat, and then came out upon the plain. On arriving there, the old soldiers of the Rhine completed the affair by a single charge. Eight hundred blacks remained on the field, and all the artillery of Toussaint was taken.

During this contest, general Boudet, executing the orders of the captain-general, had left in Port-au-Prince, general Pamphile Lacroix, with six or eight hundred men for a garrison, and had marched himself, with the rest of his forces, upon St. Marc. Dessalines was there, ready for the committal of the greatest atrocities. He himself, torch in hand, led the way in setting fire to a fine mansion, which he possessed in St. Marc, and he was imitated by his followers; then, on retiring, they massacred a party of whites, and dragged the rest after them into the horrible refuge of the Mornes. General Boudet could only occupy ruins inundated with human blood. While he pursued Dessalines, the last, by a rapid march, appeared before Port-au-Prince, which he imagined to be but feebly defended, but it was effectively held by a very small garrison. General Pamphile Lacroix united his little troop, and warmly harangued them. Admiral Latouche Tréville, learning the danger, landed with his sailors, saying to general Lacroix: "At sea, you are under my orders; on land I will be under yours; let us defend in common the lives and properties of our countrymen." Dessalines, repulsed, was thus unable to satiate his barbarity, and flung himself into the Mornes du Chaos. General Boudet, returning in all haste to Port-au-Prince, found it saved by the union of the land and sea forces; but in the midst of these marches and counter-marches, he had found it impossible to second the movements of the general-in-chief. The blacks they had not been able to surround, nor to push on to the Gonaïves.

Nevertheless, the blacks were every where beaten. The capture of the Ravine aux Colleuvres from Toussaint had completely discouraged them. The

captain-general Leclerc, wished to put a finish to this discouragement, by destroying the black general Maurepas, who ably sustained himself against generals Humbert and Debelle, at the bottom of the gorge of the Three rivers. Assailed on all sides, the black Maurepas had no other resource than to surrender. He submitted, with two thousand of the bravest blacks. This was the rudest blow yet given to the moral power of Toussaint.

It yet remained to capture the fort of Crête-à-Pierrot, and the Mornes du Chaos, having forced Toussaint in his last asylum, unless indeed he should go and, retiring into the mountains of the interior of the island, live as a partizan, deprived of all means of action, and despoiled of every prestige of power. The captain-general ordered the divisions of Rochambeau and Hardy on one side, and that of Boudet on the other, to march upon the fort and the Mornes. Several hundred men were lost in attacking with too much confidence the works of Crête-à-Pierrot, which were better defended than could have been supposed. It was necessary to undertake a species of regular siege, to execute works of approach, and to establish batteries. Two thousand blacks, good soldiers, commanded by some officers less ignorant than the others, guarded this depository of the resources of Toussaint, who endeavoured, seconded by Dessalines, to interrupt the siege by night attacks; but they did not succeed, and in a little time the fort was pressed so near that an assault became possible. The garrison in despair, then took the resolution to make a nocturnal sally, to pass the lines of the besiegers, and take to flight. At first, they succeeded in deceiving the vigilance of the troops, and in traversing the encampments; but being soon recognized, assailed on all sides, one part was driven back into the fort, and the other destroyed by the French soldiers. On taking this species of arsenal, there was found a considerable quantity of arms and warlike munitions, and a good many whites cruelly assassinated.

The captain-general immediately afterwards had all the Mornes around scoured over, in order not to leave any asylum to the fugitive bands of Toussaint, and to reduce them before the great heats of the season came on. At Verettes, the army was the witness of a horrible spectacle. The blacks had for a long time conducted with them troops of white persons, whom they forced by beating to march as fast as they did. Not hoping longer to be able to keep them from the army that was pursuing them, and was then very near, they massacred eight hundred, men, women, infants, and aged persons. The ground was found covered with this frightful hecatomb; and the French soldiers, who were so generous, who had fought so much in all parts of the world, who had been present at so many scenes of carnage, but had never before seen women and infants massacred, were struck with the deepest horror, and a degree of anger from humanity, which became fatal to the blacks whom they were able to overtake. They hunted them down to the last, giving no quarter to any whom they encountered.

It was April. The blacks had no more resources, at least for the present. Their discouragement was very great. The chiefs, struck with the kind conduct of the captain-general towards those who had surrendered, and to whom he had left their rank and estates, thought of laying down their arms. Christophe addressed himself to the captain-general, through the medium of the blacks already submitted, and offered to give in his submission, if the general would promise the same treatment to him as to generals Laplume, Maurepas, and Clervaux. The captain-general, who was possessed of as much humanity as good sense, consented with all his heart to the propositions of Christophe, and accepted his offers. The surrender of Christophe soon brought that of the ferocious Dessalines, and finally, that of Toussaint himself. He was left nearly alone, or only followed by a few trusty blacks attached to his person. To continue his wandering career up and down the interior of the island, without attempting any thing important which could retrieve his credit with the negroes, appeared to him a thing altogether useless, and only adapted to weaken yet more the zeal of his former partizans. Besides, he was beaten, and could preserve no hope of future success but such as might be inspired by the fatal nature of the climate. He had, in fact, been long accustomed to see the Europeans, and before all others, the military, disappear under the action of that devouring climate, and he flattered himself that he should soon find the yellow fever his frightful auxiliary. He then said to himself that he must await in peace the propitious moment, and that when it arrived, perhaps a new attempt, by force of arms, would give him the success he desired. In consequence, he offered to come to terms. The captain-general, who did not hope much that he should be able to take him, even in pursuing him to the utmost, throughout the numerous and remoter retreats of the island, consented to grant him a capitulation, similar to that which he had accorded to his lieutenants. He was restored to his rank and his property, upon condition that he lived on a designated spot, and did not change his residence, unless by the permission of the captain-general. His habitation of Ennery was the place fixed upon for his retreat. The captain-general Leclerc had great doubts that the submission of Toussaint was honest; but he kept a good watch upon him, ready to have him arrested on the very first act that implied upon his part a breach of faith.

To set off from this period of time, being the end of April and commencement of May, order was re-established in the colony, and the revival of that prosperity was seen returning which it had enjoyed under the dictator. The regulations which he had devised were put in force. The cultivators had nearly all entered again upon their plantations. A black gendarmerie pursued all idle vagabonds, and brought them back to the estates to which, in virtue of the anterior census, they had been attached. The troops of Toussaint, reduced in number, and submitted to the French authority, were tranquil, and showed no symptoms of any disposition to revolt, if they were but preserved in their existing state. Christophe, Maurepas, Dessalines, and Clervaux, maintained in their former rank and property, were as ready to accommodate themselves to the new order of things as they had been to that of Toussaint Louverture. It only sufficed for that purpose to secure to them the preservation of their riches and their liberty.

The captain-general Leclerc, who was a brave soldier, mild and discreet, applied himself to re-establish order and security in the colony. He had continued to admit foreign flags, in order to favour the introduction of provisions and necessaries. He had assigned them four principal ports of entry, the Cape, Port-au-Prince, the Cayes, and Santo-Domingo, forbidding them to touch elsewhere, in order to impede the landing of arms upon the coasts. He had not restrained importation, except so far as related to European produce, of which he had exclusively reserved the monopoly to the French merchants of the mother country. There had, in fact, arrived a great number of merchant vessels from Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, and there was reason to hope that soon the prosperity of St. Domingo would be re-established, not to the advantage of the English and the Americans, as under the government of Toussaint, but to the profit of France, without the colony being deprived of any of its advantages.

Still there was a double danger to be apprehended; on one part there was the climate, always fatal to European troops; on the other, there was the incurable mistrust of the negro population, which it was impossible, do all that might be done, to prevent from apprehending a return to slavery.

To the seventeen or eighteen thousand men already transported to the colony, new naval equipments, sailing from Holland and France, had added three or four thousand more, which raised to twenty-one or twenty-two thousand the number of soldiers sent upon the expedition. But four or five thousand were already dead; an equal number was in the hospitals, and only twelve thousand and a few more remained to meet a new contest, if the negroes should again have recourse to arms. The captain-general took every care to procure rest and refreshment for the troops, with salubrious cantonments, neglecting nothing to render definitive and complete the success of the expedition which had been confided to his care.

At Guadaloupe the gallant Richepanse landed with a force of three or four thousand men under his command, had daunted the revolted negroes, and had again subjected them to slavery, after having destroyed the heads of the revolt. This species of counter-revolution was possible, and was effected without danger in an island of so small an extent as that of Guadaloupe; but it produced this serious inconvenience, that it alarmed the blacks of St. Domingo about the fate ultimately reserved for them. In other respects the affairs of the French Antilles, or West Indies, went on as prosperously as could be hoped for in so short a space of time. In all parts vessels were preparing to recommence the rich traffic that France had formerly carried on with these islands; they were principally fitted out in her great European commercial ports.

The first consul, pursuing his task with great perseverance, had sent to sea the depôts of the demi-brigades serving in the colonies. He constantly forwarded recruits there, and availed himself of every commercial or naval expedition to send off fresh detachments. He had augmented the credits accorded to the naval service, and had carried to 130,000,000 f. the special budget of that department a considerable sum in a budget, the total of which was but 589,000,000 f., which may be reckoned equivalent to 720,000,000 f. in the present day. He ordered that 20,000,000 f. should be expended annually in the purchase of naval stores and materials in all countries where they were procurable. He arranged besides for the construction and launching of twelve vessels of the line every year. He perpetually repeated, that it was during the peace he must create a navy, because during peace, the sea, the field for manœuvring was free, and the road to provide all things necessary was open. "The first year of the minister," he wrote to admiral Decrès on the 14th February, 1803, "is your year of apprenticeship. The second commences your ministry. You have the French navy to re-establish: what a fine career for a man in the full vigour of his age, and yet finer, because our past misfortunes have been stronger evidence for us of its necessity. Fulfil your task without delay. *Every hour lost in the epoch during which we live is irreparable.*"

From the Indies and America the active mind of the first consul directed itself towards the Ottoman empire, the approaching fall of which appeared probable, and of which he was not inclined to see the wrecks serve to extend the possessions of the Russians and English. He had renounced all thoughts of Egypt while England respected the peace; but if the peace were broken on their part, he kept himself free to revert to his original ideas about a country which he always regarded as the road to India. In other respects, he projected nothing at the moment; his intention was solely to prevent the English from taking an advantage of the peace, to establish themselves at the mouth of the Nile. A formal engagement obliged them to evacuate Egypt within three months; but there had passed twelve or thirteen from the signature of the preliminaries of London, and seven or eight from the signature of the treaty of Amiens, and they did not yet seem disposed to quit Alexandria. The first consul then sent for colonel Sebastiani, an officer endowed with great intelligence and judgment, and ordered him to embark on board a frigate, and to sail along the shores of the Mediterranean, to visit Tunis and Tripoli, in order to make those states acknowledge the flag of the Italian republic, and then to proceed to Egypt to examine the position of the English there, and the nature of their establishment; to try and discover how long this establishment was to continue; to observe what was passing between the Turks and Mamelukes; to visit the Arab sheiks, and to compliment them in the first consul's name; to go into Syria and visit the Christians, and place them under French protection; to have an interview with Djezzar-Pacha, who had defended St. Jean d'Acre against the French, and to promise him the good friendship of France, if he would well treat and protect the Christians, and show favour to French commerce. Colonel Sebastiani had orders, lastly, to return by Constantinople, to renew to general Brune, the French ambassador there, the instructions of his cabinet. These instructions enjoined general Brune to display great magnificence, to make much of the sultan, to give him hopes of the continued support of France against all enemies, whoever they might be, and, in one word, to

neglect nothing to render France imposing and respected in the East.

Although much occupied with these distant enterprises, the first consul did not cease to give all due care to the interior prosperity of France. He had again taken up the digest of the civil code. A section of the council of state and one of the tribunate united themselves daily at the house of the second consul Cambacérès, to resolve the difficulties natural to a work of such magnitude. The reparation of the roads had been followed up with the same degree of activity. The first consul had distributed them, as has been already said, in series of twenty each, reporting successively the one to the other the extraordinary allocations which they had been allotted. The execution of the canals of Ourcq and of St. Quentin, had not been for a moment interrupted. The works ordered in Italy, as well those of the roads as of the fortifications, had continued to attract the attention of the first consul. He wished if the maritime war should recommence, and bring back a continental war, that Italy should be definitively allied to France by great public communications, and by powerful defensive works. The possession of the Valais having facilitated the execution of the great road of the Simplon, that wonderful creation was now very nearly completed. The works on the Mont Cenis road had been slackened in order to throw all the disposable strength possible upon the road of Mount Genevre, that at least one or the other might be completed in 1803. As to the fortress of Alexandria, it had become a subject of daily correspondence with the able engineer Chasseloup. There were prepared in that place barracks for a permanent garrison of six thousand men, hospitals for three thousand sick or wounded, and magazines for a large army. The recasting of all the Italian artillery had been commenced, with the object to bring the calibre of the whole train to six, eight, and twelve pounds. The first consul recommended to the president Melzi a great stock of muskets to be made. "You have only fifty thousand stand," he wrote to him, "that is nothing. I have in France five hundred thousand, independently of those in the hands of the army. I shall not stop until I am in possession of a million."

The first consul had begun to think of military colonies, the idea of which was first borrowed from the Romans. He had ordered a selection to be made in the army of soldiers and officers who had served long, and received honourable wounds, in order that they might be conducted into Piedmont, and receive a distribution of the national domains situated around Alexandria, in a value proportionate to their situation, from the soldier up to the officer. These veterans thus endowed, would marry Piedmontese females. They would meet twice a year to manœuvre, and at the first alarm of hostile danger fling themselves into the fortress of Alexandria with their most valuable property. This was a mode of introducing at the same time the blood and feelings of Frenchmen into Italy. The same kind of institution was designed to be established in the new departments of the Rhine, near Mayence.

The author of these fine ideas meditated something of a similar kind in the provinces of the republic still infected with a bad feeling of insubordination, such as La Vendée and Britany. He wished to found there at the same time both great establishments and towns. The agents of Georges coming from England landed from the isles of Jersey and Guernsey, bordering on the northern coasts; traversed the peninsula of Britany by Loudéac and Pontivy, and spread themselves either over the Morbihan or the Loire Inferieure, in order to keep up distrust among the population, and, if need be, prepare it for revolt.

The first consul, corresponding with the gendarmerie, and himself directing the different movements and researches that took place there, foreseeing the possibility of new troubles, had thought of constructing in the principal passages of the mountains and of the forests, towers surmounted with a piece of artillery turning upon a pivot, and capable of containing a garrison of fifty men, holding some provisions and ammunition, in order to serve as a support to the moveable columns. Full of the idea that he must think of civilizing a country as well as of retaining it, he commanded the completion of the navigation of the Blavet, in order to render the water-course navigable as far as Pontivy. It was thus that he formed the first design of that fine navigation which passes along the coasts of Britany from Nantes as far as Brest, penetrating by many navigable channels into the interior of the country, and assuring at all times the necessary provisions and stores for the arsenal at Brest. The first consul had determined to construct at Pontivy large vessels to receive troops, a numerous staff, tribunals, a military administration, and manufactories, which he would create at the expense of the state. He had ordered researches to be made of places most proper for the foundation of new towns, whether in Britany or in La Vendée. He made the works proceed at the same time upon the fortifications of Quiberon, Belle Isle, and Isle Dieu. The fort Bayard was begun, after his own plans, with the object of making the basin comprised between La Rochelle, Rochefort, the islands of Rhé and Oleron, one vast road, safe, and inaccessible to the English. Cherburg naturally attracted all his notice. Not hoping to be able to finish the dyke soon enough, he ordered the execution to be pressed more particularly upon three points, in order to make them approach in the water as near as possible to each other; and to establish three batteries, capable of keeping an enemy at a respectful distance.

In the midst of these works, undertaken for the maritime, commercial, and military greatness of France, the first consul knew how to find time to occupy himself with the business of the schools, of the institute, the progress of science, and the administration of the clergy.

His sister Eliza and his brother Lucien formed, with Sicard, Morellet, and Fontanes, what has been styled in the literary history of France, a *bureau d'esprit*. They affected there a great taste for the recollections of past time, above all for its literature; and it must be avowed, that if the taste of the past time is to be defended in any thing, it is above all for this branch of knowledge. But with a truly legitimate taste they mingled other and very puerile ones. They affected to prefer the older literary bodies to the institute; and they talked very largely

of a design to reconstruct the French Academy out of the men of letters who had survived the revolution, and did not feel much love for it, such as Sicard, La Harpe, Morellet, and others. The reports upon this subject which got abroad produced a very vexatious effect. The consul Cambacérès, attentive to all the circumstances which might prejudice the government, made the first consul acquainted with what was passing; and in his turn, the first consul made his brother and sister acquainted, in a rough way, with the displeasure which this kind of affectation had caused him.

On this occasion he himself took his place in the Institute. He declared that every literary society which took any other title than that of the Institute,—that would, for example, call itself "The French Academy,"—should be dissolved, if it affected to give itself any public character. The second class, that which then answered to the old French Academy, remained devoted to the belles lettres. But he suppressed the class of moral and political science, out of an aversion, before strongly pronounced, not exactly against philosophy,—as it will be seen hereafter what his mode of thinking was upon the subject,—but against certain persons who affected to profess the philosophy of the eighteenth century, in that which it held most contrary to the ideas of religion. He merged this class in that devoted to the belles lettres, saying that their object was a common one; that philosophy, politics, morals, and the observation of human nature, were the foundation of all literature; that the art of writing was no more than the form; that it was not necessary to separate that which should remain united; that a class consecrated to the belles lettres would be futile indeed, a class consecrated to the moral and political sciences very pedantic, if they were to be separated in good earnest; that the writers who were not thinkers, and the thinkers who were not writers, would be neither one thing nor another; and that, in fine, an age even affluent in talent was able scarcely to furnish a single one of such establishments with members worthy of it; they must therefore descend for them to mediocrity.

These ideas, true or false, were with the first consul more of a pretext than a reason to defeat a literary society which arose contrary to his political views in regard to the establishment of public worship. Of the two classes he made only one, adding to it Sicard, Morellet, and Fontanes; and he declared it to be the second class of the Institute, answering to the old French Academy. While he effected this union, he requested of the learned Haüy an elementary work on physics, which was yet wanting for public instruction; and he replied to Laplace, who had addressed to him the dedication of his great work, the *Mecanique Celeste*, in these words, so proudly elevated: "I thank you for your dedication. I wish that the coming generation, when reading your work, may not forget the esteem and friendship I bore towards its author[1]."

The first consul marked with attention the conduct of the clergy since the restoration of public worship. The bishops appointed were nearly all of them established in their dioceses. Most of them conducted themselves well; but some were still full of the sectarian spirit, and committed the error of not carrying themselves with mildness in their new functions, and with that evangelical kindness which can alone put an end to schism. If de Belloy at Paris de Boisgelin at Tours, Bernier at Orléans, Cambacérès at Rouen, and de Pancemont at Vannes, showed themselves to be true pastors, pious and sage, there were others who had suffered mischievous tendencies to appear in the exercise of their ministry. The bishop of Basançon, for example, a Jansenist and old constitutionalist, wished to prove to the priests that the civil constitution of the clergy was an institution truly evangelical and conformable to the spirit of the primitive church. Thus troubles arose in his diocese. It must still be acknowledged that he was the only constitutionalist of whom there was any reason to complain. The faults which were to be complained of among the clergy principally, were from the intolerance of the orthodox bishops. Several of these affected the pride of a victorious party, and harshly repelled the unsworn priests. The bishops of Bordeaux, Avignon, and Rennes, removed the priests from service in their parishes, endeavoured to humiliate them, and thus came into collision with that part of the population which was personally attached to them.

Nothing could be more energetic upon this subject than the language of the first consul. He wrote himself to certain of the bishops, or obliged the cardinal legate to write to them; he threatened to take away their sees, and to call before the council of state those prelates who thus troubled the repose of the new church. "I am willing," he said, "to restore the altars thrown down, to put an end to religious quarrels, but not to suffer one party to triumph over the other, above all, that party which is the enemy of the revolution. When the constitutional priests have been faithful to the regulations of their estate, and observers of good morals; when they have caused no scandal, I prefer them to their adversaries, because, after all, they are only decried for having embraced the cause of the revolution, which is our own cause;" so he wrote to the prefects. Cardinal Fesch, his uncle, seeming, in the diocese of Lyons, to forget the instructions of the government, the first consul wrote to him in the following terms:—"To wound the minds of the constitutional priests, to remove them, is to be wanting to justice, to the interest of the state, to my interest, to your own, M. le Cardinal; it is to be wanting to my express wishes, and to displease me very sensibly."

There was no limit in the extent of his gifts to the bishops who conformed to his firm and conciliatory policy. To one he gave ornaments for his church; to others furniture for their hotels; and to all considerable sums for their poor. He granted two or three times in a single winter fifty thousand francs to M. de Belloy, to distribute himself among the indigent in his diocese. He sent to the bishop of Vannes, who was the model of an accomplished prelate, mild, pious, and benevolent, ten thousand francs to furnish his episcopal hotel; ten thousand to remunerate the priests of whose conduct he approved; and seventy thousand to be given to the poor. In the current year, that of the year XI., he sent two hundred thousand francs to bishop Bernier, for the purpose of secretly helping the victims of the civil war in La Vendée, a sum of which that

[1] Dated Nov. 26th, 1802.

prelate made a humane and able employment. He drew for these largesses upon the chest of the minister of the interior, aided by different sums that did not then enter the treasury, and of which he purified the source by devoting them to the noblest purposes.

It was in the autumn of 1802; the weather was superb; nature seemed to dispense to this happy year a second spring. Owing to a temperature of extreme mildness the trees budded a second time. At this period the first consul expressed a wish to visit a district of which people had spoken to him in many different ways, the province of Normandy. Then, as at present, this fine country offered the interesting spectacle of rich manufactures, existing in the midst of the greenest and best cultivated lands. Participating in the general activity which at this time was awakened at once all over France, it presented the most animated appearance. Still some persons, and among them the consul Lebrun, had endeavoured to persuade the first consul that Normandy was royalist in feeling. It was easy to imagine this, upon recollecting with what energy it declared itself against the excesses of the revolution in 1792. The first consul wished to proceed there, to see things with his own eyes, and to observe what effect his presence would have upon the inhabitants on appearing in the ordinary way. Madame Bonaparte was to accompany him.

He employed fifteen days on his journey. He passed through Rouen, Elbeuf, Havre, Dieppe, Gisors, and Beauvais. He visited the open country and the manufacturing districts, examining every thing himself, showing himself without any guard to the population anxious to behold him. The pressing attentions he received delayed his journey. Every moment on his route he found the country clergy presenting him with the holy water; the mayors offering him the keys of their towns, and addressing to himself, and not only himself, but to madame Bonaparte, speeches such as they formerly addressed to the kings and queens of France. He was delighted at his reception, and above all, at the rising prosperity which he every where remarked. The town of Elbeuf pleased him much by the increase which it had received. "Elbeuf," he wrote to his colleague Cambacérès, "is increased one-third since the revolution. It is nothing else than one entire manufactory." Havre struck him in a singular way; he foresaw the great commercial destiny to which that port was to be called. "I find every where," he still writes to Cambacérès, "only the best spirit. Normandy is not that which Lebrun represented to me. It is frankly devoted to the government. I discover here that unanimity of sentiment which rendered so fine the days of 1789."

What he thus said was perfectly correct. Normandy was well selected to express to him the sentiments of France. She well represented the honest and sincere population of '89, at first enthusiastic for the revolution, then fearful of its excesses, accused of royalism by the pro-consuls, whose mad conduct she condemned, and now enchanted to find in a manner not hoped for, order, justice, equality, glory, liberty, less, it is true, of the last, of which, unhappily, she was out of conceit.

The first consul, by the middle of November, was on his return to St. Cloud.

In imagining an envious person present at the success of a formidable rival, an idea may be gained approaching pretty near the truth, of the sentiments which were at this time felt in England at the spectacle of the prosperity of France. This powerful and eminent nation had still enough left of its own greatness to console it for the greatness of another; but a singular jealousy preyed upon it. So far as the success of general Bonaparte had been capable of use as an argument against Pitt, they had welcomed it in England with a species of applause. But since these successes, continued and accumulating, were those of France, alone; since they had beheld her aggrandized by peace as well as by war, through policy as well as arms; since they had seen, in eighteen months, the Italian republic become, under the presidency of general Bonaparte, a French province; Piedmont added to France with the agreement of the continent; Parma, Louisiana, added to the French possessions by the simple execution of treaties; Germany, in fine, reconstituted by the sole influence of France; since they had seen all this peaceably accomplished, and naturally enough, as a thing flowing from a situation of affairs universally accepted, a manifest vexation seized upon every English heart; and this vexation was not dissimulated, any more than sentiments are ordinarily dissimulated among a passionate people, proud and free.

The classes which partook least in the advantages of the peace suffered more than any others, their jealousy too became visible. It has been already observed, that the manufacturers of Birmingham and Manchester, recompensed by a contraband trade for the difficulties which they encountered in the French ports, complained very little; but the larger merchants, finding the seas covered with rival flags, and the source of their financial profits dried up with the loans which were no longer necessary, regretted openly the discontinuance of the war, and showed themselves more discontented than even the aristocracy itself. The aristocracy, ordinarily so proud and so patriotic, that did not leave to any class in the nation the honour of serving or loving more than it did itself the greatness of England, was not displeased upon this occasion to be distinguished from the mercantile interest by more elevated and generous views. It regarded Pitt somewhat less than it had done, since he was made so much of by the commercial world; it ranged itself with eagerness around the prince of Wales, a model of the manners and licentiousness of the aristocracy, and more than all around Fox, who pleased them by the nobleness of his sentiments and his incomparable eloquence. But the mercantile interest, all powerful in London and the out-ports, having for its organs in parliament, Windham, Grenville, and Dundas, smothered the voices of the rest of the nation, and reanimated all the passions of the English press. Thus the London newspapers began to be hostile, and abandoned to the papers edited by French emigrants the care of outraging and maligning the first consul, his brothers, sisters, and all his family without reproof.

Unfortunately the minister Addington was destitute of all energy, and suffered every thing to move before the tempestuous gale that had begun to blow. He committed, through his feebleness,

acts of the grossest want of faith. He still paid Georges Cadoudal, whose perseverance in conspiring against the government of France was notorious; he placed at his disposition considerable sums of money for the support of his dependents, of whom a number passed incessantly from Portsmouth to Jersey, and from Jersey to the coast of Britany. He continued to suffer in London the presence of the pamphleteer Peltier, despite the legal means which he possessed in the Alien Bill of silencing him; he treated the exiled princes with a respect very natural, but he did not confine himself in his conduct to mere respect, they were invited to reviews of troops, and were received there with all the insignia of the former royalty. He acted thus, it is proper to repeat, out of real feebleness of mind, because no one doubted the probity of Addington. Had he been delivered from party influence, he would have been repugnant to such conduct. He well knew that in paying Georges he was supporting a conspirator; but he did not dare in the face of the party of Windham, Dundas, and Grenville, to send away, and perhaps to alienate these old tools of the policy of the English cabinet.

The first consul was deeply hurt at such conduct. To the reiterated demands for a treaty of commerce, he replied by demanding the suppressing of certain journals, the expulsion of Georges and Peltier, and the sending away of the French princes. Grant me, he said, the satisfaction which is due to me, and which you cannot refuse me without declaring yourselves the accomplices of my enemies, and I will endeavour to find the means to meet to your satisfaction the difficulties which affect your commercial interests. But in the demands of the first consul the English ministry could find none which they had a right to make. As to the suppression of certain journals both Addington and Hawkesbury answered with reason, the press is free in England; imitate us, despise its licentiousness. If you wish we will institute a prosecution, but it will be at your risk and peril in running the chance of procuring a triumph to your enemies. In regard to Georges, Peltier, and the emigrant princes, Addington had no legal excuse to make that was of any weight, because the Alien Bill gave him the power to remove them whenever he pleased to do so. He replied by observing upon the necessity there was of managing public opinion in England; a very poor argument it must be agreed, in regard to any of the parties whose expulsion was thus requested.

The first consul would not allow himself to be thus beaten upon the point; at first, he said, "the counsel that you give me to despise the licentiousness of the press would be good, if it aided me to despise the licentiousness of the French press in France. It can be understood that in one's own country it may be decided upon to support the inconveniences of the freedom of the liberty of writing, in consideration of the advantages that it may procure. That is a question altogether of interior policy, in which each nation is the best judge of that which it is the most convenient for it to do. But it ought never to be suffered that the daily press should malign foreign governments, and thus change the relations between state and state. This is a serious abuse, a danger without any compensation, and the proof of this danger is in the actual relations of France with England. We should be at peace without the journals, and here we are very nearly in a state of war. Your legislation is therefore bad in relation to the press. You are at liberty to permit what you please against your own government, but not against the governments of foreigners. Nevertheless, I lay aside the libels of the English papers. I respect your laws even in that which they have in them vexatious for other countries. It is a disagreeable thing arising out of our vicinity to which I must resign myself. But the French, who make in London so odious a usage of your institutions, who write such disgraceful and injurious things, wherefore are they suffered to proceed in this way in England? You possess the Alien Bill, which has justly for its object to prevent strangers from doing mischief; why not apply that law to them? Then there are Georges and his accomplices, as shown in the conspiracy of the infernal machine; there are the bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, publicly exciting to revolt the population of Britany,—why do you refuse to expel them? What thus becomes in your hands of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulates in express terms that no underhand practices should be suffered in either one of the countries against the other? You give an asylum to the emigrant princes, that is without doubt considerate and kind. But the head of the family is at Warsaw, why not let them all go to him? Wherefore, above all, permit them to carry those decorations which the French laws no longer acknowledge, and which are the occasion of very great inconvenience, when they are borne by the side of the ambassador of France in his presence, and too frequently at the same table? You ask from me a treaty of commerce and of close relations between the two countries; begin then by showing a less antipathetic spirit towards France, and then I shall be able to search out if there is any mode of conciliating our mutual interests."

There is nothing certainly that can be deemed reprehensible in these reasonings, nothing but the feebleness of a great man, who, governing in Europe, could give himself the trouble to put them forth. Of what importance, in effect, to the all-powerful victor of Marengo, were Georges, Peltier, and the count d'Artois with his royal decorations? Against the daggers of the assassin he had to oppose his good fortune; against the outrages of pamphleteers he had to oppose his glory; against the legitimacy of the Bourbons he had to place the enthusiastic love of France. Yet, O the weakness even of great minds! this man, placed on such a pinnacle, annoyed himself by what was really so contemptible. His error in this respect has been already deplored, and we are unable to prevent ourselves from again deploring it on approaching the moment when it produced such unhappy consequences.

The first consul could no longer keep his temper, and he avenged himself by replies inserted in the *Moniteur*, often written by himself, and when so, easily recognised in their origin by their incomparable vigour of style. He complained of the complaisance of the British ministry for the conspirator Georges and the libeller Peltier. He demanded why such guests were suffered in England, why

such acts were permitted towards a friendly government, when to remove them had become a duty by treaties, and an existing law allowed the means of repressing them! The first consul went yet further, and addressing the English government himself, he demanded in the articles inserted in the *Moniteur*, if the government approved, if it wished to see these odious practices continued, these infamous diatribes, when it thus tolerated them; or whether, if it did not wish to see them, it was too feeble to hinder them! And he concluded that no government could exist, where they were not able to repress calumny, prevent assassination, and protect social European order.

Then the English ministry complained in its own turn. They said that the journals in England, the language of which was so offensive, were not official; we are unable to answer for them; but the *Moniteur* is the avowed organ of the French government, and it is besides easy to discover in the language the source that inspires it. It calumniates us every day; we also,—and with much better ground,—we demand satisfaction.

These are the lamentable recriminations with which, during many months, the despatches between the two governments were filled. But all on a sudden events much more serious intervened, which furnished to the irascible dispositions of both a more dangerous subject it is true, but at least one much more worthy.

Switzerland, snatched from the hands of the oligarch Reding, had fallen into those of the landamman Dolder, the head of the party of the moderate revolutionists. The retreat of the French troops was a concession made to this party in order to confer upon it popularity, and to furnish a proof of the impatience of the first consul to disembarrass himself of the affairs of Switzerland. Still he did not gather the fruits of his good intentions. Nearly all the cantons had adopted the new constitution, and welcomed the men who were charged to carry it into vigorous execution; but in the little cantons of Schwitz, Uri, Unterwalden, Appenzell, Glaris, and the Grisons, the spirit of revolt, excited by Reding and his friends, had soon aroused all the inhabitants of the mountains. The oligarchs flattered themselves that they should be able to carry every thing by force, since the French troops had left the Swiss territory. They had assembled the people in the churches, and had led them to reject the proposed constitution. They had spread the rumour abroad, that Milan was besieged by an Anglo-Russian army, and the French republic was as near its fall as in 1799.

The constitution being thus rejected, they had still not been able to push events forward so far as to commence a civil war. The little cantons limited themselves to sending deputies to Berne, to declare to the French minister there, Verninac, that they had no intention to overturn the new government, but that they wished to separate themselves from the Helvetic confederation, to constitute their own government apart in the mountains, and to return to their own suitable system, which was a pure democracy. They even requested to regulate their new relations with the central government established at Berne, under the auspices of France. Very naturally the minister Verninac had thought it his duty to refuse to listen to these communications, and to declare that he knew no other Helvetic government than that which sat at Berne.

In the Grisons there were passing scenes of tumult, which revealed better than any thing else the influences under which Switzerland was at that time set in a state of agitation. In the middle of the valley of the superior Rhine, that was cultivated by the superior Grison mountaineers, is the lordship of Bazuns, belonging to the emperor of Austria. This lordship conferred upon the emperor the rank of a member of the Grison league, and gave him a direct action upon the composition of the government. He chose the landamman of the country from three candidates that were presented to him. Since the Grisons had been united by France to the Helvetic confederation, the emperor remained the proprietor of Bazuns, but managed his property by a superintendent. This superintendent had placed himself at the head of the Grison insurgents, and had taken a part in all the meetings, in which they had declared that they would separate themselves from the Helvetic confederation, in order to return to the ancient order of things. He had received and accepted the mission to bear their wishes to the feet of the emperor, and with their wishes, the prayer to be taken immediately under his protection.

Certainly nothing could more clearly show upon what European party these Swiss endeavoured to support themselves. To all this mental agitation there was joined something still more serious; they took up arms; they repaired the muskets left by the Austrians and Russians during the last war; they offered and paid eighteen sous per day to the old soldiers of the Swiss regiments which were expelled from France, and gave them the same officers they had before. The poor inhabitants of the mountains, believing in their simple minds that their religion and independence were threatened, came tumultuously to fill the ranks of the insurgent troops. Money was scattered about in abundance, advanced by the rich Swiss oligarchs, out of the millions deposited in London, and soon to be realized if they were triumphant. The landamman Reding was declared the chief of the league. Morat and Sempach were the recollections recalled by these new martyrs for Helvetic independence.

It is scarcely possible to comprehend so great an independence upon their part; for the French army lay bordering upon every side of the Swiss frontiers. But they had been persuaded that the first consul had his hands tied; that the great powers would intervene, and that he would not be able to send a regiment into Switzerland, without exposing himself to a general war, a menace that he certainly would not brave, merely to sustain the landamman Dolder and his colleagues.

Meantime, in spite of this agitation, the poor mountaineers of Uri, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, those most engaged in this sad adventure, had not come forward as fast as their chiefs desired, and they had declared that they would not leave their cantons. The Helvetic government had at its disposal about four or five thousand men, of whom a thousand or twelve hundred were employed to guard Berne; some hundreds were distributed in different garrisons, and three thousand in the can-

ton of Lucerne, upon the border of Unterwalden; the last were designed to watch the insurrection. A troop of the insurgents was posted close in the village of Hergyswil. In a little time they came to firing at each other, and there were some men killed and wounded on both sides. While this collision took place on the frontier of Unterwalden, general Andermatt, commanding the government troops, wished to place some companies of infantry in the city of Zurich, in order to guard the arsenal, and preserve it from the hands of the oligarchs. The aristocratical citizens of Zurich resisted this, and shut the gates of the city against the soldiers of general Andermatt. He fired some shells into the city in vain; the citizens answered him, that they would sooner burn it than surrender, and thus deliver Zurich to the oppressors of the independence of Helvetia. At the same moment, the partizans of the ancient aristocracy of Berne, in the county of Argovia and in Oberland, became so agitated, that there was reason to fear they were on the point of open insurrection. In the Pays de Vaud, the ordinary cry was heard for a union with France. The Swiss government knew no means of extricating itself from this perilous situation. Combated with open force by the oligarchs, it had neither on its side the ardent patriots, who desired an absolute unity, nor the peaceable masses, who were enough inclined for a revolution, but that they knew nothing of such an event save the horrors of war, and the presence of foreign troops. It may hence be judged what was the value of the popularity acquired at the price of the retreat of the French army.

In this embarrassment the government concluded an armistice with the insurgents, and then addressed itself to the first consul, soliciting, in a most pressing manner, the intervention of France, which had been demanded by the insurgents in like manner upon their side, when they wished that their relations with the central government should be regulated under the auspices of the minister Verninac.

When this demand of an intervention was made known in Paris, the first consul repented himself of having listened too readily to the ideas of the party of Dolder, as well as to his own wishes to get clear of Swiss affairs, and thus prematurely withdrawn the French troops. To make them re-enter now in presence of England, so malevolently disposed, complaining as she was already of the action of France being too manifest upon the continental states, was an act extremely serious. Besides, he knew not yet all that had taken place in Switzerland, nor to what an extent the provokers of the movement in the little cantons had revealed their real designs, in order to show what they really were, in other words, the actors in a counter-European revolution and the allies of Austria and England. He, therefore, refused an intervention, universally demanded, of which the inevitable consequences would have been the return of the French troops into Switzerland, and the military occupation of a state, the independence of which was guaranteed by all Europe.

This reply threw the Helvetic government into consternation. At Berne they knew not what to do, threatened as they were by the approaching rupture of the armistice, and an insurrection of the peasants of Oberland. Some members of the government proposed the sacrifice of M. Dolder, the landamman, and head of the moderate party, who under this title was detested equally by the oligarchs and the unitarian patriots. Both the one and the other promising to become tranquil upon this condition. They went to citizen Dolder, and committing a sort of violence upon him, obtained his resignation, which he had the weakness to give up to them. The senate, behaving with more firmness, refused to accept his resignation; but citizen Dolder persisted in giving it. Then they had recourse to the means ordinarily adopted in assemblies that know not what resolution they shall come to. They named an extraordinary commission, authorized to discover the best means to be adopted. But at this moment the armistice was broken; the insurgents advanced upon Berne, obliging general Andermatt to retire before them. These insurgents were composed of peasants, to the number of fifteen hundred or two thousand, carrying crucifixes and carbines, and preceded by the soldiers of the Swiss regiments, formerly in the service of France, old wrecks of the 10th of August. They soon appeared at the gates of Berne, firing some rounds of cannon with the bad pieces they had drawn after them. The municipality of Berne, under the pretext of saving the city, interfered and negotiated a capitulation. It was agreed that the government, in order not to expose Berne to the horrors of being stormed, should retire with the troops of general Andermatt into the Pays de Vaud. This capitulation was immediately executed; the government proceeded to Lausanne, where it was followed by the French minister. Its troops, concentrated since it had ceded the country to the insurgents, were at Payern, to the number of four thousand men, very well disposed, encouraged, besides, by the dispositions which prevailed in the Pays de Vaud; but they were incapable of reconquering Berne.

The oligarchic party soon established itself at Berne, and to make the state of things more complete, reinstated the "avoyer," or magistrate, who was on duty in 1798, at the same epoch when the first revolution took place. This avoyer was M. de Mulinen. There wanted nothing then to this counter-revolution, neither the foundation, nor the form; and without the silly illusions of parties, without the ridiculous reports, spread abroad in Switzerland, on the unfounded want of power in the French government, it is impossible to comprehend an attempt so exceedingly extravagant.

Still things being brought to this point, it was not possible to count much longer upon the patience of the first consul. The two governments sitting at Lausanne and Berne, both came to the resolution of despatching envoys to him; the one party to supplicate for his intervention, the other to conjure him to do nothing in their affairs. The envoy of the oligarchical government was a member of the same family of Mulinen. He was commissioned to renew those promises of good conduct of which M. Reding had been so prodigal, and which he had so badly kept, as to confer at the same time with the ambassadors of all the powers at Paris, and to put Switzerland under their special protection.

Supplications to do or not to do, were henceforth

useless, made to the first consul. In presence of a flagrant counter-revolution, which had for its object to deliver over the Alps to the enemies of France, he was not the man to hesitate about action. He refused to receive the agent of the oligarchical government; but he answered the intermediate party, ordering him to say to the agent of Berne, that his resolution was taken: "I cease," said he, "to be neuter and inactive. I have wished to respect the independence of Switzerland, and to spare the susceptibilities of Europe; I pushed my scruples to a real fault in the retreat of the French troops. But that is condescension enough for the enemies of France. As long as I have seen in Switzerland any conflicts which could alone terminate in rendering one party a little stronger than another, I have thought it my duty to leave it to itself; but now, when a privileged counter-revolution is agitated, accomplished by soldiers formerly in the service of the Bourbons, and since passed into the pay of England, I will not suffer myself to be cheated. If these insurgents wish to keep me under an illusion, they must let their conduct be marked with a little more dissimulation, and not place at the head of their columns the soldiers of the regiment of Bachmann. I will not suffer a counter-revolution any where, neither in Switzerland, Italy, Holland, nor in France itself. I will not deliver over to fifteen hundred mercenaries, paid by England, 'the formidable bastions of those Alps,' that the European coalition was in two campaigns unable to snatch from our toil-worn soldiers. They speak to me of the will of the Swiss people; I cannot see it in the will of two hundred aristocratical families. I esteem that brave people too much to believe that they wish to be under such a yoke. But in any case, there is something which I place to more account than the will of the Swiss people, and that is the safety of forty millions of souls over whom I rule. I shall go to declare myself the mediator of the Helvetic confederation, and give to it a constitution founded upon equal rights and the nature of the soil. Thirty thousand men will be on the frontier to insure the execution of my beneficent intentions. But if, contrary to my hope, I am not able to secure the repose of this interesting people, to whom I would fain do all the good which they merit, my part is taken. I will unite to France all that part which, by the soil and manners, resembles Franche-Comté; I will unite the rest to the mountaineers of the small cantons, giving them the same government which they had in the fourteenth century, and thus leave them to themselves. My principle is henceforth fixed; either Switzerland the friend of France, or no Switzerland at all."

The first consul enjoined upon Talleyrand to order the envoy of Berne to leave Paris in twelve hours, and to inform him that he was no better able to serve those who sent him any where than he would be at Berne, by counselling them to separate that moment, if they would not bring a French army into Switzerland. He then wrote with his own hand a proclamation to the Helvetic people, short and energetic, couched in the following terms:—

"Inhabitants of Helvetia, you have offered for two years an afflicting spectacle. Opposing factions have successively seized upon the government; they have signalized their rule by a system of partiality which proves their feebleness and incompetency.

"In the course of the year x., your government desired that the small number of French troops that were in Helvetia should be withdrawn. The French government voluntarily seized upon the occasion to do honour to your independence; but soon afterwards your different parties became agitated with fresh fury: the blood of the Swiss flowed by the hands of the Swiss.

"You have disputed among yourselves for three years without understanding each other. If you are left much longer to yourselves, you will destroy each other for three years to come, without coming to an understanding. Your history proves besides, that your intestine wars you have never been able to terminate without the intervention of France.

"It is true that I had determined not to mingle myself in your affairs; I have seen constantly your different rulers demand advice of me and not follow it, and sometimes abuse my name, according to their interests or their passions. But I am not able, nor ought I to remain insensible to the mischief of which you are a prey; I recall my determination. I will be the mediator of your differences; but my mediation shall be efficacious, such as will be consonant with the great people in the name of which I speak."

To this noble preamble were joined certain imperative dispositions. Five days after the notification of this proclamation, the government which had taken refuge at Lausanne had transported itself to Berne, the insurrectional government had dissolved itself, all the assembled armies, except that of general Andermatt, had dispersed themselves, and the soldiers of the old Swiss regiments had deposited their arms in the communes to which they belonged. In fine, all those men who had exercised public functions for three years, to whatever party they belonged, were invited to come to Paris, in order to confer with the first consul on the best means to terminate the troubles of their country.

The first consul ordered his aide-de-camp, colonel Rapp, to go immediately to Switzerland, in order to carry the proclamation to all the legal or insurrectionary authorities, to proceed first to Lausanne, then to Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne; every where, in fact, where he found there was any resistance to be overcome. Colonel Rapp was besides to concert measures for the movement of the troops with general Ney, who commanded them. Orders were already issued for the troops to march. The first detachment assembled at Geneva, was drawn from the Valais, from Savoy, and the departments of the Rhône, and consisted of seven or eight thousand men. Six thousand were united at Pontarlier, six thousand at Huningen and Bâle. A division of equal force was concentrated in the Italian republic, in order to be introduced into Switzerland by the Italian bailwicks. General Ney was to wait at Geneva the advices that he would receive from colonel Rapp, and at the first signal from the colonel, march into the Pays de Vaud with the column formed at Geneva, joining in its march that which had penetrated by Pontarlier, and so to march upon Berne with twelve or fifteen thousand men. The troops

coming from Bâle had orders to join in the smaller cantons the detachment which would arrive by the Italian bailwicks.

All these dispositions were arranged with extraordinary promptitude, because in forty-eight hours the resolution was taken, the proclamation drawn up, and the order to march expedited to all the different corps, in which time colonel Rapp had set off for Switzerland. The first consul awaited with audacious tranquillity the effect which would be produced in Europe by so bold a resolution, which, added to all that he had done in Italy and in Germany, contributed to render yet more apparent a power that already obscured all eyes. But let what would result, even war itself, his resolution was an act of wisdom, because he performed it for the purpose of keeping the Alps out of the reach of an European coalition. Energy employed in the service of prudence, is the finest spectacle that can be presented in the science of politics.

The agent of the Bernese oligarchy sent to Paris, had not missed, seeing himself so rudely received, addressing himself to the ambassadors of the courts of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England. M. Markoff, although he every day declaimed against the conduct of France in Europe, did not of himself dare to reply. All the other representatives of the powers were also silent, except Mr. Merry, the minister of England. The last, after having a conference with the envoy of Berne, immediately despatched a courier, in order to inform his court of all which had passed in Switzerland, and to announce that the Bernese government formally invoked the protection of England.

The courier of Mr. Merry arrived at lord Hawkesbury's at the same time that the French papers reached London. Immediately there was nothing but a cry all over England in favour of the brave people of Helvetia, who were defending, it was said, their religion and liberty against a barbarous oppressor. This emotion, which we have seen in our own days communicated to the whole of Europe, in favour of the Greeks massacred by the Turks, they affected to feel in England for the Bernese oligarchy, that had been exciting the unhappy peasants to arm in behalf of their aristocratical privileges. They affected in England great zeal for the Swiss, and opened subscriptions for them. Still the emotion was too factitious to be general; it did not descend below the elevated classes, who ordinarily set themselves in agitation upon the political affairs of the day. Grenville, Windham, and Dundas commenced in turn to alarm the public mind, and attacked with fresh vehemence that which they denominated the feebleness of Addington. Parliament was about to be dissolved and to be again assembled, in consequence of a general election. The English cabinet, between the Pitt party, which began sensibly to withdraw its support from the measures of Addington, and the Fox party that, somewhat milder since the peace had been concluded, did not cease to be its opponent, was at a loss to know where it should look for support. It very much dreaded the first meeting of the new parliament, and it deemed itself bound to take certain diplomatic steps, that might serve as arguments to be used against its adversaries.

The first step thus undertaken was to transmit a note to Paris, to remonstrate in favour of Swiss independence, and to protest against all active intervention on the part of France. This was not a mode to put a stop to the proceedings of the first consul, and was only a means of simply exciting an exchange of disagreeable communications. But the cabinet of Addington did not stop here; it sent an agent to the spot, Mr. Moore, with a commission to see and come to an understanding with the insurgent leaders, in order to judge whether they were well resolved to defend themselves, and to offer them in that case pecuniary aid from England. He had an order for the purchase of arms in Germany, that they might be sent forward to them. This proceeding was, it must be acknowledged, neither in good faith, nor easy to be justified. Communications, still more serious in import, were addressed to the Austrian court, in order to awaken its old aversion, and to irritate its recent resentment against France in consequence of the affairs of Germany, and, above all, to alarm it on account of the frontiers of the Alps. It went so far as to offer Austria a subsidy of 100,000,000 florins, or 225,000,000 f. if she would take a decided part in behalf of Switzerland. This is, at least, the information which was sent to Paris by M. Haugwitz himself, who had taken great care to observe every thing passing which could in any way be of moment to the maintenance of peace. A less open attempt was made on the emperor Alexander, who was well known to be deeply enough engaged in supporting the policy of France, in pursuance of the mediation which both had exercised at Ratisbon. England took no account of the Prussian cabinet, which was then notoriously attached to the first consul, and which on that account was treated with reserve and coldness.

These proceedings of the British cabinet, however little agreeable they were in a period of perfect peace, could not then have any material consequence, because that cabinet had found all the courts of the continent more or less leagued in the policy of the first consul; the one, as with Russia, because they were at present associated in his labours, the others, as Prussia and Austria, because they were at the moment endeavouring to obtain from him advantages altogether personal. It was, in fact, the moment when Austria solicited and finished by obtaining an extension of indemnities in favour of the archduke of Tuscany. But the English cabinet committed a much more serious act, and one which had at a later period the most momentous consequences. The order to evacuate Egypt had been sent out; that for evacuating Malta had not been yet forwarded. The delay so far arose from excusable motives, and was more imputable to the French than to the English chancellory. Talleyrand, as must be borne in mind, had neglected to complete the sequel to one of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. This stipulation purported that a demand was to be made on Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Spain, for their consent to guarantee the new order of things established at Malta. From the first days of the signature of the treaty, the English ministers pressed to obtain this guarantee, before the evacuation of Malta, had shown the greatest activity in endeavouring to obtain it from all these courts.

But the French agents had received no instructions from their government. M. de Champagny had the prudence to act at Vienna as if he had received the order, and the guarantee of Austria was given. The young emperor of Russia, on the contrary, partaking very little in the passion of his father for any thing which concerned the order of St. John of Jerusalem, thought the guarantee which had been demanded of him a burdensome thing, because it might, sooner or later, draw him into the obligation of taking a part against one power or the other, against either France or England, and he was not then well disposed to give what was thus demanded of him. The ambassador of France having no instructions to second the English minister in the business, would not venture to act in the matter, and the Russian cabinet was thus not pressed to explain itself, and took advantage of that circumstance to give no answer at all. The same circumstance, and from the same motive, occurred at Berlin. Owing to this negligence, prolonged for many months, the question of the guarantee had remained in suspense, and the English ministers, without any ill intention, were fully authorized to defer the evacuation. The Neapolitan garrison, which, according to the treaty, was to be sent to Malta, to be there during the time of the reconstitution of the order, had been received and landed, but it remained withoutside of the fortifications. The French chancellory was at last set in motion, but it was too late. This time the emperor of Russia, upon being pressed for an explanation, refused his guarantee. Another embarrassment had supervened. The grand master nominated by the pope, the bailly Ruspoli, alarmed at the fate of his predecessor, M. Hompesch, seeing too that the charge of the order of Malta no longer consisted in combating the infidels, but in holding the balance in equilibrium between two great maritime nations, with the certainty in the end to fall a prey either to the one or the other, was unwilling to accept the onerous and empty dignity which was thus tendered to him, and resisted all the entreaties of the Roman court, as well as the pressing invitations of the first consul.

Such were the circumstances which had caused the evacuation of Malta to be deferred until November, 1802. There then resulted the dangerous temptation to the English cabinet of deferring it yet longer. In point of fact, on the same day when its agent Moore left England for Switzerland, a frigate sailed for the Mediterranean, to carry an order to the garrison of Malta to remain there. This was a serious fault on the part of the English minister who wished to preserve the peace, because it went to excite in England a national covetousness, which no one would be able to resist after being once excited. What was more, it was a formal breach of the treaty of Amiens, in presence of an adversary who had taken a pride in executing it with punctuality, and who had set himself yet further upon seeing that it was executed by all who had signed it. It was a conduct at the same time imprudent and irregular.

The remonstrances of the British cabinet in favour of the independence of Switzerland were very badly received in the French cabinet, and the consequences of this bad reception it was easy to foresee; the first consul was not for a moment shaken. He persisted more than ever in his resolution. He reiterated his orders to general Ney, and prescribed to him the most prompt and decisive execution of them. He desired to prove that this pretended national movement of the Swiss was no more than a ridiculous attempt, provoked through the interest of certain families, and as soon repressed as it was attempted.

He was convinced that he obeyed in this instance a grand national interest; but he was again excited to it by a species of defiance which was thrown at him in the face of Europe, because the insurgents said loudly, and their envoys every where repeated, that the first consul had his hands bound, and that he would not venture to act. The reply, addressed by his orders to lord Hawkesbury, had something of the truth in it, which was very extraordinary. It is here given in substance, without imagining that it will be ever imitated: "You are desired to declare," wrote Talleyrand to M. Otto, "that if the British ministry, for the interest of its parliamentary situation, has recourse to any notification or any publication, from which it may be inferred that the first consul has not done such or such a thing, because he has been prevented, at that very moment he will not fail to do it. In other respects, as to Switzerland, whatever may be said or not said, his resolution is irrevocable. He will not deliver the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries in the pay of England. He will not have Switzerland converted into another Jersey. The first consul has no desire for war, because he believes that the French people will find in the extension of their commerce as much advantage as in the extension of their territory. But no consideration shall arrest it if the honour or the interest of the republic demand that he shall take up arms. You will not speak of war," Talleyrand wrote to M. Otto, "but you will not permit that it shall be spoken of to you. The least menace, however indirect it may be, must be taken with the greatest haughtiness. With what kind of war besides do you threaten us? With a maritime war? But our commerce has as yet scarcely had time to renew itself, and the prizes which we shall thus resign to the English will be of very small value. Our West India islands are provided with acclimated soldiers; St. Domingo alone contains twenty-five thousand. They will blockade our ports, it is true; but at the same instant that war is declared, England will find herself blockaded in her turn. The coasts of Hanover, Holland, Portugal, Italy, as far as Tarentum, will be occupied by our troops. Those countries which we are accused of governing too openly, Liguria, Lombardy, Switzerland, and Holland, in place of being left in an uncertain situation, by which they occasion us a thousand embarrassments, will be converted into French provinces, from which we shall draw immense resources; and we shall thus be forced to realize that empire of the Gauls, with which Europe will never cease to be affrighted. And what would next happen if the first consul, quitting Paris for the purpose of establishing himself at Lille or St. Omer, uniting all the flat-bottomed boats of Flanders and of Holland, preparing the means of transport for a hundred thousand men, should make England live

in the fear of an invasion, always possible, and very nearly certain to be accomplished! Can England support a continental war! But where will she find allies! Is it in Prussia or Bavaria, who owe to France the justice which they have obtained in the territorial arrangements of Germany! It is not surely in Austria, already worn out by having volunteered to serve the cause of British policy! In any case, if the war on the continent be renewed, it will be England that will have obliged us to conquer Europe. The first consul is but thirty-three, he has not yet destroyed any states but those of the second order. Who knows what he may be made to do in time, if he is forced, to change anew the face of Europe, and resuscitate the empire of the west!"

All the miseries of Europe, and all those of France, were contained in these formidable words, which it might be believed were written after the blow was struck, they are so very prophetic[1]. Thus it was that the lion become full grown, felt his strength, and made himself ready to exert it. Covered by the barrier of the ocean, England was pleased thus to excite him. But this barrier it was not impossible to pass over; it wanted but very little that it was not passed; and if it had been, England had bitterly mourned the excitement to which she had been carried by an incurable jealousy. It was, besides, a cruel policy in regard to the continent, because that had to suffer all the consequences of a war provoked, on its own part, without reason or justice.

M. Otto had orders neither to speak of Malta nor of Egypt, because it was not to be even supposed that England would violate a solemn treaty signed in the face of the whole world. He was limited to the circumscription of the whole of the French policy in these words: "All the treaty of Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens."

M. Otto, who was a very discreet individual, and very submissive to the first consul, but capable, in regard to a useful object, of putting a little of his own discretion into the performance of the orders he received, softened very considerably the haughty words dictated by his government. Nevertheless, even with this softened reply, he much embarrassed lord Hawkesbury, who, alarmed at the approaching meeting of parliament, wished to have had something satisfactory to say. He therefore insisted on having a note, which M. Otto had orders to decline giving, and consequently refused him, declaring, at the same time, that the meeting of the principal citizens of Switzerland at Paris had by no means for an object the imitation of the ceremony which had taken place at Lyons, where the Italian *consulta* was held there, but merely to give to the Swiss a wise constitution, based upon justice, and adapted to the nature of the country, without suffering one party to triumph over another. Lord Hawkesbury, who during this conference with M. Otto was expected by the English cabinet, assembled at this moment to receive the answer of France, felt himself much troubled and discontented. To the declaration: "All the treaty of Amiens, nothing but the treaty of Amiens," of which he well comprehended the drift, because it made the allusion to Malta, he replied by another maxim as follows: "The state of the continent at the epoch of the treaty of Amiens, nothing but that state."

This manner of placing the question provoked, on the other side from the first consul, a reply immediate and to the purpose. "France," said Talleyrand, by his orders, "France is ready to accept the conditions proposed by lord Hawkesbury. At the time of the signature of the treaty of Amiens, France had ten thousand men in Switzerland, thirty thousand in Piedmont, forty thousand in Italy, and twelve thousand in Holland—is it desired that all these shall be placed upon the same footing again! At this time the offer was made to England to place her in an understanding upon the affairs of the continent, but it was upon the condition that she should acknowledge and guarantee the states newly constituted. She refused this; she chose to remain a stranger to the kingdom of Etruria, and to the Italian and Ligurian republics. She had thus the advantage of not giving her guarantee to the new states, but then she lost also the right to mix herself up afterwards in what concerned them. In other respects, she knew all that was already done, all that was to be effected. She knew of the presidency conferred by the Italian republic upon the first consul; she was well aware of the design to unite Piedmont to France, seeing that it had been refused when an indemnity was demanded for the king of Sardinia, and in the front of all she signed the treaty of Amiens! Of what then does England complain! She stipulated one single thing, the evacuation of Tarentum in three months, and Tarentum was evacuated in two. Then in regard to Switzerland, it was well known that France had laboured to constitute the government there, and was it to be imagined by any one that France would suffer a counter-revolution to be effected in that country! But in any case, even under the view of strict right, what is there to object to it! The Helvetian government had claimed the mediation of France. The little cantons had also claimed that mediation, by demanding, under the auspices of the first consul, the establishment of their relations with the central authority. The citizens of all the parties, even those of the oligarchical party, as M. de Mulinen and M. d'Affry, are in Paris conferring with the first consul. Are the affairs of Germany new to England! Are they not the literal execution of the treaty of Lunéville, well known to the world, having been published before the treaty of Amiens! Wherefore has England signed the arrangements adopted in regard to Germany, if she thought it was a wrong step to secularize that country! Why did the king of Hanover, who is also king of England—why did he approve of the Germanic negotiation, by accepting the bishopric of Osnabruck! Wherefore, besides, was it that the house of Hanover was so largely endowed out of the indemnities, if it was not in consideration of England! The British cabinet has not for six months mingled itself up in the affairs of the continent; it chooses to do so now; let it do as it pleases. But has it more interest in the affairs of the continent than Prussia

[1] The despatch here spoken about, and of which the substance is thus given, is dated the 1st of Brumaire, year x.; it is written by Talleyrand to M. Otto, under the dictation of the first consul.

Russia, or Austria? Very well, then these three powers give in their adhesion at that moment to all that is passing in Germany. How is England more able to judge of the interests of the continent than these states? It is true that in the great Germanic negotiations, the name of the king of England has not appeared. There is no question about that, and it may perhaps mortify his people, who desire to hold, and who have a right to hold, a great place in Europe. But whose fault was it, if not that of England herself? The first consul desired nothing better than that friendship and confidence should be exhibited, to resolve in common with England the great questions that he had settled in unison with Russia; still for friendship and confidence shown there must be some return. But he finds shouted in England only cries of hatred towards France. They say that the English constitution is the reason why things are so. So be it; but that constitution does not command that there be suffered to live in London French pamphleteers, the inventors of the infernal machine, or that the reception and treatment of the Bourbon princes should be with all the honours due to the sovereignty of the members of that house. When England shall show better feelings towards the first consul, he will be brought to exhibit other feelings also, and to divide with England that European influence which he has hitherto partaken with Russia."

Unknowing whether or not our patriotic sentiments obscure our eyes, most assuredly, in searching out the truth, without suffering national considerations to prevail, it seems to us that there is no reply to be made to the vigorous reasoning of the first consul. England, when signing the treaty of Amiens, was not at all in ignorance that the influence of France domineered in the bordering states, in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, occupied too by her troops, nor that France was about to proceed to the settlement of the German indemnities; England was not ignorant of these things, and pressed to make peace, she signed it at Amiens, without at all embarrassing herself with the interests of the continent. Yet as soon as the peace had less attraction in her view than during the earlier days after it was concluded; now that her commerce found none of the advantages which she had at first hoped for; now that the party of Pitt began again to lift its head; now, finally, that a calm succeeding to the agitations of the war, permitted her to perceive more distinctly the power and the glory of France, England was seized with a fit of jealousy, and without the power to produce any single violation of the treaty of Amiens, she ventured the thought of its violation upon her own part, in the most audacious and unheard of manner.

It would seem that M. Haugwitz, with his rare correctness of judgment, had well appreciated the British cabinet, when upon one occasion he remarked to the French ambassador, "That feeble minister, Addington, was so pressed to conclude a peace, that he passed over every thing without making any objection; he now perceives that France is great and powerful, that she draws consequences from her greatness, and he would tear to pieces the treaty which he signed."

During the interchange of such warm communications between France and England, Russia, that had received the remonstrances of the Swiss insurgents, and the complaints of the English cabinet, had written to Paris a very cautious despatch, in which, without reproducing any of the recriminations of England, she insinuated, notwithstanding, to the first consul, that it was necessary in order to preserve the peace, to calm certain distrusts excited in Europe by the increased power of the French republic, and that it appertained to him, by his moderation, and by his respect for the independence of the neighbouring states, to do away with those suspicions. This was very wise counsel, that implied a hint at Switzerland, which had nothing of a nature to wound the first consul, and which suited well the character of the impartial moderator, a character that the young emperor seemed at that time willing to make the chief glory of his reign. As to Prussia, she had declared that she fully approved of the conduct of the first consul, in not suffering Switzerland to be made the focus of English and Austrian intrigues; that he had reason for hastening, and for not permitting his enemies to obtain time to profit by similar embarrassments; that he would thus have a better reason still, if he took away from them every pretext to complain of him, and kept himself from renewing in Paris the consulta of Lyons. As to Austria, in the last place, she affected not at all to mingle herself up in the question, and she did not dare to do it, having need of France still, in order to wind up the affairs of Germany.

The first consul was of the opinion of his friends: he wished to act quickly, and not to imitate at Paris the consulta of Lyons, that is to say, not to make himself be proclaimed the president of the Helvetian republic. As to the rest of the affair, this desperate resistance, which the patriotism of the Swiss might oppose to him, he said, had been only that which might be expected, an extravagant story of the emigrants. As soon as colonel Rapp arrived at Lausanne, he presented himself before the advanced posts of the insurgents, without being followed by a single soldier, and bringing with him only the proclamation of the first consul, he found all the party very well disposed to submit. General Bachmann expressed his regret not to have had twenty-four hours more time left, in order to fling the Helvetic government into the lake of Geneva; nevertheless, he retired upon Berne. There, colonel Rapp found some disposition to resistance on the part of the oligarchs. This party wished France absolutely to employ force, believing they should thus compromise her with the other European powers. Their desires were on the point of being satisfied, since force now arrived in great haste. In effect, the French troops placed upon the frontiers, under the orders of general Ney, entered the country, and from that moment the insurrectional government no longer hesitated to dissolve itself. The members of which it was composed withdrew themselves, declaring that they only gave way to force. They every where submitted easily, except in the little cantons, where the agitation was greater, and where, indeed, it had begun. Still, as well as in the others, the opinions of the reasonable people prevailed here at the approach of the French troops, and all serious resistance ceased in their presence. The French

general Serras, at the head of some battalions, seized upon Lucerne, Stanz, Schwitz, and Altorf. M. Reding was arrested with several other agitators; the insurgents suffered themselves to be successively disarmed. The Helvetic government, which had taken refuge at Lausanne, returned to Berne, under the escort of general Ney, who went thither in person, followed only by one demi-brigade. For a few days, the town of Constance, in which the English agent, Moore, had placed himself, was full of emigrants belonging to the oligarchical party, returning after having uselessly expended their money in England, and declaring aloud the ridiculous character of the whole enterprise. Mr. Moore returned to London, to give an account of the bad success of this Vendéan-Helvetic insurrection, which he had endeavoured to support among the Alps.

This promptitude of submission had one great advantage, since it proved that the Swiss, of whose courage there could be no doubt, even against very superior forces, did not feel bound, either in honour or interest, to resist the intervention of France. There thus fell to the ground at once every reason upon which the remonstrance of England was grounded. It was necessary to achieve this important work of the pacification, by giving a constitution to Switzerland; founding that constitution upon reason, and upon the nature of the country. The first consul, to take away from the mission of general Ney the too military character which it appeared to possess, conferred upon him, in place of the title of general-in-chief, that of French minister, giving him at the same time very precise instructions to conduct himself with moderation and mildness towards all the parties. He had, besides, no more than six thousand men in Switzerland; the rest remained upon the frontiers.

The first consul assembled at Paris the individuals of all shades of opinion, ardent revolutionists as well as decided oligarchists, provided they were individuals of influence in the country, and entitled to some consideration. The revolutionists of every colour, designated by the cantons, came without hesitation. The oligarchs refused to name representatives. They wished to remain strangers to all that was passing in Paris, and thus to reserve the right to protest against the proceedings there. It was needful that the first consul should designate himself the parties that were to represent them. He chose several; three of those chosen were very well known, M. de Mulinen, M. d'Affry, and M. de Watteville, all distinguished by their families, talents, and characters. These individuals persisted in not attending. Talleyrand made them understand that it was, on their part, only mistaken spite; that their presence was not requested with any view of making them parties to the sacrifice of opinions which were dear to them; that, on the contrary, they would thus hold the balance equal between them and their opponents; that they were good citizens, men of understanding, and that they ought not to refuse to contribute their aid to a constitution, by which it was endeavoured, in good truth, to conciliate all the legitimate interests, and by which, besides, the fate of their country would be settled for a long time to come. Moved by this invitation, they were in a good disposition to restrain themselves from the influence of faction, and they answered the honourable appeal thus made to them, by setting out immediately for Paris. The first consul received them with great distinction, informed them what were his wishes, that all the moderate men of every side ought to be of his opinion, because he wished the constitution to be of such a character as nature herself had designed for the Swiss, that was to say, the old one, with less inequality between citizen and citizen, canton and canton. After having endeavoured to encourage them, and particularly the oligarchical party, because it was against that he had been obliged to employ force, he designated four members of the senate, Barthelemy, Rœderer, Fouché, and Demeunier, and charged them to assemble the Swiss deputies, to confer with them, separately or together, and to bring them back as expeditiously as possible to reasonable views, reserving to himself always, it was to be clearly understood, the decision of those questions, upon which they had been unable to arrive at a mutual agreement.

Before they commenced their labours, the first consul gave an audience to the principal of those deputies, who were chosen by their colleagues for the purpose of being there presented, and he addressed them in an off-hand speech, which was full of good sense, of depth, and of originality of language. It was taken down at the instant by several persons, in order to be transmitted entire to the whole deputation.

"It is necessary," he told them in substance, "to remain as nature designed you, that is to say, in a union of petty confederated states, different in the rule of your internal government as you differ in soil, attached the one to the other by a simple federal lien—a lien which shall neither be onerous nor expensive. It is also necessary to put a stop to the unjust domination of canton over canton, which goes to render one territory subject to another: the government of the aristocratic citizens must be put an end to. This in the great towns occasions one class to be subject to another class. These are among the barbarisms of the middle ages, that France, called upon to give you a constitution, cannot tolerate in your laws. It is more important that true and real equality, such as that which is the glory of the French revolution, should triumph among you, as it has done among us; that every territory, every citizen, should be the equal of another in the sight of the law and in his social duties. This being granted, you will not admit inequalities, save the differences that nature herself has established between you. I do not imagine for you an uniform and central government like that of France. None will persuade me that mountaineers, the descendants of William Tell, are capable of being governed like the rich inhabitants of Berne or Zurich. There must for the former be an absolute democracy, and a government without taxation. Pure democracy, on the other hand, would be for the last class contrary to common sense. Besides, what good is a central government? Is it to possess greatness? It will no more come to you thus, than through the dreams of ambition of your unitarians. Would you have greatness after the mode of that in France? It must then be a central government,

richly endowed, having a permanent army. Would you pay for all this—would you be able to do so? And then by the side of France, that counts five hundred thousand men; by the side of Austria, that reckons three hundred thousand; or by that of Prussia with two hundred thousand; what would you do with fifteen or twenty thousand permanent and regular troops? You made a figure with great brilliancy in the fourteenth century against the dukes of Burgundy, because at that time all the states of Europe were parcelled out, and their forces disseminated. To-day Burgundy is but a point in France. You must measure your strength with France or with Austria entirely. If you desire this species of greatness, do you know what it will infallibly do—it will make you become French, confound you with a great people, make you participator in the cost to obtain its advantages, and then you will be associated in all the chances of its high fortunes. But you do not wish it; and more, I am not willing it should be so. The interest of Europe commands very differently. You have a greatness of your own, and it is well worth any other. It is your duty to be a neutral people, whose neutrality will be respected by all the world, because it will oblige all the world to pay it respect. To be in one's own home, free, invincible, and respected, is the noblest mode of human existence. To this end the federal system is the most valuable. It has less of that unity which dares, but it has more of that inertia which resists. It is not to be vanquished in a day like a central government, because it resides every where, in every part of the confederation. For the same reason a militia is better for you than a standing army. You are bound to be all soldiers the moment that the Alps are threatened. Then the permanent army is the entire people, and in your mountains your intrepid chasseurs are a force respectable both by sentiments and numbers. You need no soldiers paid and permanent like those you see exist among your neighbours, in order to teach you the military art. A confederation that leaves to each his native independence, the difference of his manners, and of his soil, such a confederation is invincible in the mountains; here is your true moral grandeur. If I was not a sincere friend to Switzerland—if I thought to retain it dependant upon myself, I should desire a central government, which could unite every part in one entire whole. In such a case I should say, 'do this'—'do that,' or I shall pass your frontiers in twenty-four hours. A federal government, on the contrary, preserves itself even by the impossibility of replying promptly; it saves itself by its very slowness of action. In gaining two months of time, it escapes from all external exigency. But in wishing to remain independent, do not forget that it is necessary you be the friends of France. Her friendship is necessary to you; you have had it for many centuries, and to her you are indebted for your independence. It must not be allowed, at any price, that Switzerland should become a focus of intriguers, and dumb hostility; that she be to Franche-Comté and to Alsace that which the Isles of Jersey and Guernsey are to Britany and La Vendée. She neither owes it to herself nor to France. Besides, I will never suffer it. I speak now only of your general constitution: in that I have spoken what I know. About your cantonal constitutions, it is you who are to enlighten me, and to put me in possession of what you stand in need. I will hear you; I will endeavour to satisfy you; by retrenching at times in your laws the barbarous injustice of days that are past. During all, do not forget that you must have a just government, worthy of an enlightened age, conformable to the nature of your country, simple, and, above all, economical. On these conditions it will endure, and I wish that it should endure; because, if the government which we are about to constitute together should fail, Europe will say either that I have willed it, in order to seize upon Switzerland myself, or that I did not know how to do better; but I am not willing to leave it the power to doubt my good faith, any more than my knowledge[1]."

Such was the exact sense of the words of the first consul. We have not changed the language except for its abridgment. It was impossible to think with more strength, justice, or loftiness. The hand was immediately set to the work. The federal constitution was discussed at a meeting of all the Swiss deputies. The cantonal constitutions were prepared by the deputies of each canton themselves, and then revised in the general assembly of all. When the passions are cooled, and good sense is supposed to prevail, the constitution of any people is easy to form, because it only consists in uniting some just ideas, which are found to dwell in the minds of all the world. The passions of the Swiss were far from being completely appeased; but their deputies at Paris were already much calmer. The change of place, the presence of a supreme authority, beneficent, and enlightened, had sensibly modified their feelings. The more as this authority was there to impose upon them just ideas, few in number, which would subsist alone after the stormy passions of the time had subsided.

The following dispositions were agreed upon:—

The chimera of the unitarians was discarded; it was settled that each canton should have its own constitution, its civil legislation, its judicial forms, and its own system of taxation. The cantons were confederated only for the common interests of all the confederations, and more particularly for the relations of the country with foreign states. This confederation was to have for its representation a diet, composed of an envoy from each canton; and this envoy was to enjoy one or two voices in the deliberations, according to the extent of the population which he represented. The representatives of Berne, Zurich, Vaud, St. Gall, Argovia, and the Grisons, of which the population was more than one hundred thousand souls, was to possess two voices. The other cantons were only to possess one each. Thus the diet consisted of twenty-five members. It was bound to sit for one month in every year, and each year to change its residence alternately in the following cantons: Friburg, Berne, Soleure, Bâle, Zurich, and Lucerne. The canton in which the diet sat was for the year the

[1] This speech was taken down by several persons; there exist different versions of it, of which two are found in the archives of foreign affairs. I have put together that which was common to all, and that which agrees with the letters written upon the subject by the first consul.—*Author's note.*

directing canton. The chief of that canton, avoyer or burgomaster, as he might be, was for that year landamman for the whole of Switzerland. He received the foreign ministers, accredited the Swiss ministers abroad, convoked the militia, exercised, in one word, the functions of the executive power of the confederation.

Switzerland was to have at the service of the confederation a permanent force of fifteen thousand men, carrying an expense of 490,300 f. The division of the amount of this contingent for each canton, both in men and money, was made by the constitution itself upon all the cantons, in the due proportion of their population and their riches. But every Swiss of sixteen years of age was a soldier, a member of the militia, and could, if required, be called to defend the independence of Helvetia.

The confederation had only one class of money common to the whole of Switzerland.

It had no longer any tariffs or customs' duties, save at the general frontiers, and the duties thus levied must be approved by the diet. Each canton placed to the account of its profits the sums which it might have collected on its own frontier.

The tolls of a feudal character were wholly suppressed. None remained but such as were necessary to keep the roads in order and preserve navigation. A canton which violated a decree of the diet, could be brought before a tribunal, composed of the presidents of all the criminal tribunals of the other cantons.

The attributes of the central government were very much restrained in power. The other attributes of the sovereignty, not stated in the federal act, were left to the care of the sovereignty of the cantons. There were nineteen cantons formed altogether, and the questions of territory, so much debated and disputed between the former sovereign states and the subject ones, were resolved into the separation or advantage of the last. Vaud and Argovia formerly subjects of Berne; Thurgovia formerly subject to Schaffhausen; the Tessin formerly subject to Uri and Unterwalden, were constituted independent cantons. The small cantons, such as Glaris and Appenzel, which had been enlarged in order to change their character, were disembarrassed of the inconvenient additions which had been made to them. The canton of St. Gall was composed of all that territory which had been bestowed upon Appenzel, Glaris, and Schwitz. Schwitz alone retained some addition of territory. If to the nineteen cantons which follow, viz., Appenzel, Argovia, Bâle, Berne, Friburg, Glaris, Grisons, Lucerne, St. Gall, Schaffhausen, Schwitz, Soleure, Tessin, Thurgovia, Unterwalden, Uri, Vaud, Zug, and Zurich, Geneva be added, then a French department, the Valais, constituted separately, and Neufchâtel, a principality belonging to Prussia, there are the twenty-two cantons which are at present in existence.

In regard to the particular system of government imposed upon each canton, this was made in all respects conformable to the former constitution of each state, with the exception that it was purged of all feudal and aristocratical abuses. The *landsgemeinde*, or assemblage of all the citizens of the age of twenty years, who met together once annually, to determine all public matters, and to nominate a landamman, was re-established in the small democratic cantons of Appenzel, Glaris, Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwalden. They could do no otherwise than reject this assemblage during the revolt. The government of the citizens was re-established in Berne, Zurich, Bâle, and the cantons of the same character, but on condition that it remained open to all ranks of citizens. Provided that an individual possessed a property of 1000 f.[1] income at Berne, and 500 at Zurich[2], he might become a member of the body of governing citizens, and eligible to all the public functions. There were in the cities, as formerly, a great council, to which the charge of making the laws was committed, and a little council, whose duty it was to see that they were properly carried into execution, an avoyer or burgomaster being charged with the executive functions, under the superintendence of the lesser council. In the cantons in which nature had given rise to particular administrative divisions, as the *Rhodes interior* and *exterior* in Appenzel, and the *Ligues* in the Grisons, these divisions were respected and maintained. The whole was, in fact, the ancient Helvetic constitution, corrected after the principles of justice and the superior knowledge of the time. It was old Switzerland remaining federative, but having in addition, the subject-countries raised to the rank of cantons, maintained in a state of pure democracy, in those places where nature had clearly marked out that it should be so, and in the state of citizen government, but not exclusive of rank, where the nature of things seemed to require that form.

In this undertaking, so just and so wise, each party gained and lost something — gained what it wished that was just, but lost that which it desired if it were unjust and tyrannical. The unitarians saw their chimera of unity and absolute democracy disappear, but they gained the freedom of the subject-territories, and the opening of the ranks of the citizenship in the oligarchical cantons. The oligarchs saw the subject-cantons disappear, Berne particularly, losing Argovia and Vaud, they saw the patrician pretensions put aside; but they obtained the suppression of the central government, and the consecration of the rights of property in the rich cities, such as Zurich, Bâle, and Berne.

Still this work remained incomplete, inasmuch as that, in arranging the form of the institutions, they did not at the same time settle the choice of the individuals who were to put it into action. In presenting the French constitution to the country in the year VIII., and the Italian constitution in the year X., the first consul had designated in the constitution itself the individuals who were charged with the great constitutional functions. This was wise, because when he was acting for the purpose of placing a country long agitated in a state of peace, the men who were to contribute to that object were not of less importance than the things.

The ordinary tendency of the first consul's conduct was to remit every thing immediately to its own proper place. To recall the higher classes of society to power, without making the men descend who, by their merit, had elevated themselves in the social body; and to secure to all those who

[1] About £41 13*s.* 4*d.* [2] About £20 16*s.* 8*d.* sterling.

should at a later time be worthy of it, the means to elevate themselves in their turn,—here is the system that he would have immediately followed in France if he had been able. But he had not attempted it, because the old aristocracy of France had emigrated, was scarcely returned from emigration, and from having been emigrant, was wholly strange to the country, its feelings, and public business. More than this, he was obliged to take his points of support in France itself, out of one of the parties into which the country was divided; and naturally he had chosen that point of support in the revolutionary party which was his own. In France, then, he was exclusively surrounded, at least during that time, by men belonging to the revolution. But in Switzerland he was more free to act; he had not to search for support in an exclusive party, because he acted from without, and from the summit of French power; he had no more any thing to do with an emigrant aristocracy. He did not therefore hesitate in giving way to the natural bent of his inclination, and he called into power, accordingly, an equal portion of the partizans of the old and new order of things. Commissions nominated in Paris were sent into each canton, in order to carry into effect the cantonal constitution, and to choose there the individuals who were designated to take their place among the new authorities. He had taken care to place equal numbers in each, thus balancing in equal strength the revolutionists and oligarchs. Having finally to choose the landamman of the Helvetic confederation, being the first who was to execute that office, he boldly selected the most distinguished personage, but the most moderate of the oligarchical party, M. Affry.

M. Affry was a discreet but firm man, devoted to the profession of arms, formerly belonging to the service of France, a citizen of the canton of Friburg, at that time the least agitated of the cantons of the confederation. In becoming landamman, M. Affry elevated his canton to the dignity of canton director. He was a man of the olden times, rational, military in his habits, attached to France by feeling, and the member of a tranquil canton. These were in the sight of the first consul very decisive reasons for the preference, and he nominated M. Affry. Besides, after having braved all Europe by his intervention, it was not necessary to multiply before it any more painful impressions, by installing in Switzerland the demagogues and their turbulent chiefs. He did not think it needful to do that, nor to attribute to himself the presidency of the Helvetic republic, as he had attributed that of the Italian republic. To settle Switzerland in a state of wise and discreet reform, to snatch it out of the hands of the enemies of France, and to leave it neuter and independent, such was the problem to be resolved, and it was resolved in a few days, courageously and prudently.

When this fine work, which, under the title of the "Act of Mediation," had procured for the Swiss a longer period of repose and good government than they had enjoyed for fifty years before—when this great work was finished, the first consul assembled the united deputies in Paris, and remitted it to them in presence of the four senators who had presided over the progress of the undertaking; made to them a short and energetic address; recommended to them union, moderation, impartiality, the same conduct, in fact, which he had adopted himself in France; and then sent them back to their own country, to replace the provisional and impotent government of the landamman Dolder.

In Switzerland there was astonishment enough; the feelings of some were deceived, distrust remained with many; but in the masses, uniformly susceptible of the real truth, there was submission and gratitude. This sentiment was more particularly conspicuous in the smaller cantons, that having been defeated in their object, were not treated as if they had been so. M. Reding and his friends were immediately set at liberty. In Europe there was as much surprise as of admiration at the promptitude of the mediation, and at its perfect equity. It was a new act of moral power, similar to those which the first consul had accomplished in Germany and in Italy, but much more able, and more meritorious still, if it be possible, because Europe was braved and respected in the performance of the act; braved as far as that act willed the interest of France, respected in its legitimate interests, which were the independence and the neutrality of the Swiss people.

Russia congratulated the first consul warmly on having made so prompt and so good an end to an affair so difficult. The Prussian cabinet, through the medium of M. Haugwitz, expressed its opinion to him in terms of the strongest approbation. England was stupified and embarrassed at being deprived of a grievance about which she had made such a great noise.

Parliament, so formidable to Addington and Hawkesbury, had consumed in animated discussions that time which the first consul had employed in reconstituting Switzerland. These discussions had been stormy, brilliant, and particularly worthy of admiration, when Fox made the voice of justice and humanity heard against the burning jealousy of his countrymen. They had revealed beyond a doubt the insufficiency of the Addington cabinet; but they had made reappear with fresh violence the war party, which had been for the moment much weakened in parliament, and that Addington now somewhat strengthened. According to that minister, the peace had recovered every one of its lost chances.

It was the speech from the throne, delivered on the 23rd of November, which had become the theme of these discussions.

"In my relations with foreign powers," his Britannic majesty had said, "I have been hitherto animated with a sincere desire to maintain the peace. But still it is impossible, in my view, to lose sight, for a single instant, of that wise and ancient system of policy which so intimately bound up our own interests with the interests of other nations. I cannot therefore be indifferent to any change in this strength, and in this relative position. My conduct will be regulated invariably by a just appreciation of the actual situation of Europe, and by a vigilant solicitude for the permanent good of my people. You will, without doubt, think with me, that it is our duty to adopt those measures of security which are the most proper to give to my subjects, the hope of preserving the advantages of peace."

To this speech, which designated the new position taken by the British cabinet in respect to France, there was found joined a demand for supplies in order to carry out the peace armament to the extent of fifty thousand seamen, an armament which, in agreement with the previous statements of Addington, was only to consist of thirty thousand. The ministers asserted, that in less than one month, on the first occasion that required it, they should be able to send to sea from the ports of England fifty sail of the line.

The debate was long and stormy, and the minister was now well able to perceive how very little he had gained by any of his concessions to the party of Grenville and Windham. Pitt affected absence. His friends took upon themselves, on his behalf, that violent character which he disclaimed. "How," cried Grenville and Canning, "how have the ministry come at last to discover that we have interests upon the continent, and that the care of those interests has ever been an important part of English policy, and that those important interests have not ceased to be sacrificed since the deceptive and fraudulent peace has been signed with France? What! is it then the invasion of Switzerland which has led the ministry at last to perceive this? Is it only now that it has begun to discover that we were excluded from the continent, and that our allies were there immolated to the insatiable ambition of this pretended French republic, which had not ceased to threaten the whole of European society with a demagogical overturn, before it threatened to govern it with a military despotism? Your eyes," they said to Addington and Hawkesbury, "were your eyes closed to the truth during the time that you negotiated the preliminaries of peace —during the negotiation of the definitive treaty, and during the time that treaty began to be carried into effect! You had scarcely signed the preliminaries of London, before our eternal enemy seized openly upon the Italian republic, under the pretext that it had decreed to him the presidency; adjudged Tuscany to himself under the pretext that it was conceded to the infant of Spain; and as the price of this false concession, seized upon the finest part of the American continent in Louisiana. Here is what was openly done on the very morrow of the preliminary treaty, while you were occupied with your negotiations in the city of Amiens, and even this never carried conviction to your sight. You had scarcely signed the definitive treaty, the wax with which you had stamped upon that treaty the arms of England was hardly cold, when already our indefatigable enemy withdrew from concealment the intentions which he had so adroitly hidden from you, united Piedmont to France, and dethroned the worthy king of Sardinia, that constant ally of England, who remained invariably faithful to her during a contest of ten years; who, when enclosed in his capital by the troops of general Bonaparte, was unable to save himself but by a capitulation, which he was unwilling to sign, because it contained an obligation to declare war against Great Britain! When Portugal and even Naples closed their ports against us, the king of Sardinia opened his, and he fell, because he was willing to have kept them always open to our vessels. But this is not all: the definitive treaty was concluded in March; in June, Piedmont was united to France; and in August the consular government merely signified in plain and simple terms to Europe, that the Germanic constitution had ceased to exist. All the German states were confounded, shared out in the lots that France distributed to whom she pleased; and Austria, the sole power, upon the strength and perseverance of which we had reason to count to restrain the ambition of our enemy, has been so much enfeebled, abased, and humiliated, that we scarcely know whether she will ever be able to lift up her head again! Then the stadtholder, to whom you had promised an indemnity should be made equal to his losses, this stadtholder has been treated in a manner utterly ridiculous towards himself—ridiculous on your part, that constituted yourselves the protectors of the house of Orange. This house received for the stadtholderate a miserable bishopric; it is the same with the house of Hanover, which is seen disdainfully despoiled of its personal property. It has been often said," repeated lord Grenville, "that England has heretofore suffered on account of Hanover; it need not be said this time, because it is on account of England that Hanover has suffered. It is because he is king of England that the king of Hanover has been thus despoiled of his ancient patrimonial property. They have not even observed the forms of civility, which have been the usage among all powers of the same rank; there was no communication made to your sovereign, that Germany, his former country, at this day his associate in the confederation—that Germany, the largest country on the continent, was about to be overturned from the foundations. Your sovereign knew nothing—nothing but what he was able to acquire in the way of information through a message from the minister Talleyrand to the conservative senate! Germany is not therefore one of those countries of which the situation is of any importance to England. Omitting that, the ministers tell us out of his majesty's mouth that they will not remain insensible to every considerable change in Europe, having now quitted their stupor and insensibility. Finally, within a few days, Parma has disappeared from the list of independent states—Parma is become a territory of which the first consul of the French republic is free to do as he pleases, or to dispose of at his own will. All these things were accomplished under your own eyes, and nearly without interruption. Not a month since the fruition of this unhappy peace—not a month has passed away without being marked by the fall of an allied state, or friend of England. You have seen nothing—perceived nothing of all this! Now on a sudden you awaken—wherefore? Why now? in favour of what object? In favour of the brave Swiss—a deeply interesting people most assuredly, and well worthy of all the sympathy of England; but are they more interesting, more worthy of sympathy, than Piedmont, Lombardy, or Germany? What have you discovered there so very extraordinary, so very injurious, above all which has been passed over during the last fourteen months? What! nothing attracted your attention on the continent, neither Piedmont, Lombardy, nor Germany? Why do the Swiss alone bring you to think that England ought not to remain insensible to the equilibrium of the European balance of power?" "You have shown your-

selves," said Canning, "the most incapable of men; since, in remonstrating about Switzerland, you have made England look ridiculous, you have exposed your country to the contempt of your enemy. At Constance there was an English agent well known to everybody; will you favour us with an account of what he did there, of what the character was which he played? It is publicly notorious that you have addressed remonstrances to the first consul of the French republic in favour of Switzerland; will you favour us with the answer which he made to you? What we all know is, that since your remonstrances, the Swiss have laid down their arms before the French troops; and that the deputies of all the cantons, assembled in Paris, have received laws from the first consul. You remonstrate then in the name of England, without requiring that you shall be listened to! It would be better to have been silent, as you were when Piedmont disappeared, and when Germany was overturned, rather than to remonstrate without being heard. And it must be thus, when that is inconsiderately spoken which should be concealed; when people speak without having prepared the means to be heard —without having a fleet, an army, or an ally. It is necessary to be quiet, or to elevate the voice with a certainty of being heard and comprehended. The dignity of a great nation ought not thus to be put in hazard. You demand supplies from us; to what purpose do you mean to apply them? If they are for peace, you ask too much; if they are for war, you do not ask for enough. We will, nevertheless, grant them to you; but it must be upon the condition, that you leave the care of employing them to him whom you replaced, and who is alone able to save England in the crisis into which you have so imprudently brought her."

The English ministers did not obtain even the price of their concessions to the party inimical to the peace, because it reproached them for their remonstrances in favour of Switzerland; and it must be acknowledged, they had only that fault, but then that fault was too well founded not to justify the reproaches of their adversaries. Their conduct under that head had been very puerile.

Still, in the midst of these declamatory speeches, lord Grenville had advanced something of a serious character, and particularly so for a former minister of foreign affairs. In reproaching Addington and Hawkesbury for having laid up the fleet, dismissed the army, evacuated Egypt and the Cape, he praised them for one point, which was, that of not having yet withdrawn the English troops from Malta. "Be it by negligence or by fickleness that you have acted in this way," he said; "fortunate fickleness, the only thing that we are able to approve in your conduct! We hope that you will not let this last pledge escape you, remaining by accident in our hands, but that you will retain it, in order to indemnify us for all the infractions of the treaties committed by our insatiable enemy."

It was impossible to proclaim more openly or boldly the violation of any treaty.

In the midst of this outrageous language, the eloquent and generous Fox made his voice be heard on the side of good sense, moderation, and the national honour, in the real acceptance of this last word. "I have little of relation with the members of the cabinet," said he, on addressing himself in reply to Grenville and Canning; "and I am, besides this, very little habituated to taking up the defence of his majesty's ministers; but I confess my astonishment at all that I now hear; I am astonished still more at reflecting upon the individuals who speak these things. I am certainly sorry, more so than any of the honourable colleagues and friends of Mr. Pitt, at the increasing greatness of France, which every day extends, both in Europe and America. I regret it, although I do not partake in the prejudices of the honourable members against the French republic. But, in fact, this extraordinary increase of power, which so surprises you, which so alarms you, when was it produced? Was it under the ministry of Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury, or under that of Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville? Under the ministry of Pitt and Grenville, had not France acquired the line of the Rhine, overrun Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, as far as Naples? Was it because she had not been resisted, because she had been suffered to act, through remissness on the part of others, that she had thus extended her vast arms? It appears to me not; because Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville had united the most formidable of coalitions, in order to put a stop to this ambitious France! They besieged Valenciennes and Dunkirk, and had already designated the first of these towns for Austria, the second for England. This France, which is so accused of interfering by force in the affairs of another country, they endeavoured at that time to conquer themselves for the purpose of imposing upon her a regime to which she would not submit—to make her accept the family of the Bourbons, whose yoke she repelled; and by one of those mighty movements, of which history will preserve the eternal recollection and advise the imitation of the example, France drove out her invaders. They did not succeed in seizing Valenciennes and Dunkirk; they did not dictate laws to France; she, on the contrary, dictates them to others! Very well; we, although deeply attached to the cause of England, we experienced an involuntary movement of sympathy for that generous effort of liberty and patriotism, and we are far from wishing to conceal such a fact. Did not our fathers applaud the resistance that Holland made to the tyranny of the Spaniards? Did not old England applaud every noble effort of free inspiration in every nation? And you, who to-day deplore the greatness of France, is it not you yourselves who have provoked her victorious career? Is it not you, who, in endeavouring to take from her Valenciennes and Dunkirk, brought her to conquer Belgium; you, who in wishing to impose laws upon her, have made her give them to half the continent? You speak of Italy; but was not that in the power of France when you entered into a treaty with her? Did you not know it? Was not that one of your lamentations? Did this circumstance prevent your signing the treaty of peace? And you, colleagues of Mr. Pitt, who then felt that this peace was become necessary, from the sufferings of a war of ten years' duration, how much it was needful to heal the evils which were the work of your own hands, you were consenting parties to all that which the existing ministers signed for you! Why did you not oppose them then? And

if you did not then oppose them, why not suffer them now to carry out the stipulations, and to execute the conditions which you approved? The king of Piedmont seems strongly to interest you; be it so; but Austria, of whom he was a closer ally than he was yours, Austria had given him up. She did not even mention him in the negotiations, for fear that the indemnity which would be granted to that prince should diminish the portion of the Venetian states, which she coveted for her own use. England had no pretence for the maintenance of the independence of Italy to place by that of Austria! You speak of the overturn of Germany; but what has been done in Germany? They have secularized the ecclesiastical states to indemnify the hereditary princes, in virtue of a formal article in the treaty of Lunéville,—a treaty signed nine months before the preliminaries of London, and more than twelve months before the treaty of Amiens,—and signed at what period? Why, during the time that Mr. Pitt and lord Grenville were ministers of England; when Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury came into power, this pretended partition of Germany was arranged, promised, decreed, in the sight and to the perfect cognizance of all Europe. This, in your understanding, is the overturning of all Germany; you should complain also, in this instance, of Russia, who with France consummated one-half of the affair. The elector of Hanover, you say, because, unhappily for him, he was king of England, has been very ill-treated. I have never heard it said before that he was very discontented with his lot in Germany; because, without any loss, he has obtained a rich bishopric. As to the rest, I strongly suspect that those who interest themselves so strongly for the elector of Hanover, who show so much solicitude upon his account, are seeking to obtain, by that intermediate means, the confidence of the king of England, and by this medium to worm themselves into his councils. Without doubt France is great, much greater than a good Englishman wishes to see her; but her greatness, of which the English ministers were the authors, we all knew before the preliminaries of London were signed, and before the negotiations at Amiens, and that ought not to be a motive for violating solemn treaties. Watch over the execution of those treaties; if they are violated, reclaim against broken faith: it is your right and your duty. But because France appears in your view to-day to be too great, greater than you had at first thought her to be, to break a solemn engagement, to retain Malta, for example, it would be an unworthy breach of faith, and would compromise the honour of England. If, in truth, the conditions of the treaty of Amiens are not fulfilled, and as far as it may be the case that they are not, we may keep Malta; but not a moment longer. I hope that the ministry are not able to say among themselves, that which was said by the French ministers after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, that they signed it with the secret determination to violate it upon the first opportunity. I believe Mr. Addington and lord Hawkesbury incapable of doing this; it would be a blot on the honour of England if they were. After all, these continual invectives against the greatness of France, those terrors which it is continually endeavoured to excite, they can only serve to nourish troubles and hatred between two great people. I am certain that if there were in Paris an assembly similar to that which meets for discussion here, it would speak of the English navy, and of the dominion of the seas, as we speak here in this place of the French armies, and of their domination over the continent. I comprehend well enough a noble rivalry between two powerful nations; but to think of war, to propose it because any nation becomes great, because it prospers, would be senseless and inhuman. If it was announced to you that the first consul had made a canal to bring the sea from Dieppe to Paris, there are persons who would believe it, and who, I doubt not, would immediately propose a war on that account. The manufactures of France and their progress are spoken about. I have seen those manufactures, and I have admired them; but if I must speak my real sentiments, I fear them no more than I fear the French navy. I am certain that the English manufactures will bear off the prize when a contest is established between them and the French. Let them then essay their strength; let them but sustain the combat at Manchester and St. Quentin. It is in those places that the lists are open; it is in those close fields that the two nations should try their strength. To make war to ensure success either for one side or the other, would be barbarous. We reproach the French that they interdict our produce arriving in their ports; but is that not the right which you yourselves exercise? And you complain; is there any nation which issues prohibitions as actively as you have done yourselves? A part of our commerce may, it is possible, suffer in consequence; but that is the result seen at every similar period, after the peace of 1763, and after the peace of 1782. There were then certain products of industry developed by the war above their ordinary proportion, which, at the peace, were found to enter within narrower limits, and there were others which in their turn partook of a more extended development. What of all that? Should we, to gratify the ambition of some of our merchants, shed torrents of English blood? As for me, my side of the question is taken. If it is necessary for the gratification of the mad passions of men, that millions be immolated, I will go back to the madness of antiquity; because I prefer sooner that blood should be spilled in the romantic expeditions of an Alexander, than in gratifying the gross cupidity of a few traders greedy of sordid gain."

These few words, in which the most sincere patriotism could not overshadow the dictates of humanity, because the two sentiments should be conciliated in every generous heart, produced a great effect in the English parliament. They had prodigiously exaggerated the French manufactures and navy. Both the one and the other had no doubt commenced flourishing; but they spoke of that as done and accomplished which was but just commenced; and these exaggerations, spread abroad by the higher class of merchants, were rumoured in a most unhappy manner among all classes of the British people. The eloquent and wise reasonings of Fox came at a proper moment to weaken the force of such mischievous reports, and they were accompanied with good effects,

while they wounded the national sympathies. Besides, although discontented, and alarmed at the greatness of France, they were not yet willing to go to war. The party of Grenville and Windham compromised itself by its violence. Fox was honoured by lending a support to the cabinet. Some thought he was approximating to office by this conduct, so entirely new. It was pretended that he would soon support more openly the feeble minister, who had played in debate a character full of mediocrity and uncertainty, approving all that was said on behalf of the peace, without daring to speak himself in its defence. In other respects, the address proposed in answer to the speech from the crown, was adopted without any amendment; and the supplies were voted in the same way. For a certain time the ministry appeared to be saved, a thing which pleased Addington, although he had little ambition, but was more pleasing to lord Hawkesbury, who earnestly desired to keep a minister's place. This species of success disposed these two statesmen to better relations with France, because they desired peace, knowing well that they had not come into office without it, and that if it passed away they should go out of office immediately. In fact, at the firing of the first cannon, Pitt could not fail to be called to take the reins of government by all classes of the nation.

The Swiss business terminated wisely and promptly, and removed the principal grievance. Lord Hawkesbury too desired that general Andreossy, the French ambassador, might be directed to proceed to London, offering at the same time to send lord Whitworth to Paris, as ambassador from Great Britain. The first consul readily agreed to the request, because, not without some feelings of anger which had been excited in his mind by the bad spirit shown towards him in England, and in spite of the images of unequalled greatness which he sometimes foresaw in the event of a war, his mind was entirely directed to peace. When he was provoked or irritated, indeed, he would bring himself, at times, to say, that after all, war was his natural vocation, his original calling, perhaps his only destiny; that he knew how to rule in a superior way, but that before governing he had known how to fight; that it was his profession, "par excellence;" and that if Moreau, with a French army, had reached as far as the gates of Vienna, he could go beyond that. He repeated these things too often, and, in fact, at this moment singular visions sometimes arose in his mind. He saw empires destroyed, Europe remodelled, and his consular power changed into a crown, which should not be less than the crown of Charlemagne; whosoever threatened or irritated him, raised, one after another, in the vast extent of his intellect, fatally seducing images of power and grandeur that become ascendant. It was easy to perceive these in the singular elevation of his daily conversation, in the despatches which he dictated to his minister for foreign affairs, in the thousand letters, in fact, which he addressed to the different agents of the government. At times he would remark, that this greatness would certainly not be wanting to him, sooner or later; but he found that the peace had been of too short a duration, that St. Domingo was not definitively conquered, that Louisiana was not occupied, that the French marine was not re-established. According to his own opinion, he wanted, before war should be recommenced, four or five years to come of continual efforts in the bosom of profound peace. The first consul shared in that passion for constructing great works, which has been deemed a part of the natural character of the founders of empires; he took a great interest in the strong fortresses which he constructed in Italy, in the extensive and grand roads which he cut through the Alps, in the plans of the new towns which he projected in Britany, and in the canals, by means of which it was his intention to unite the waters of the Seine and Escaut. He enjoyed absolute power, and attracted universal admiration, and all this in the midst of a state of profound peace, which could not but be acceptable to him after having fought so many battles, traversed so many countries, and committed to so many hazards his fortune and his life.

The first consul, then, was sincerely desirous of the preservation of the peace, and he consented readily to every thing which might contribute to ensure its duration. In consequence of this wish, he sent off general Andreossy to London, and received lord Whitworth with great distinction in Paris. This personage, designed to represent George III. in France, was a true English gentleman, simple in himself, although magnificent in his representative character, discreet, straightforward, but stiff and proud, as his countrymen in general are found to be, and wholly incapable of that nice and delicate system of management which was so necessary with a character, by turns passionate and kind, as was that of the first consul. There was wanted in such a position a man of ingenuity and comprehension rather than a great lord, and both one and the other blended, if it had been possible, in order to act successfully, in contact with a new government, which had need of being flattered and managed. Still it was not at the first instant that these defects of character exhibited themselves in their relations with each other. At the commencement, all passed off well. Lord Whitworth was received with marvellous distinction[1]; his wife, the duchess of Dorset, a high-born

[1] "Lord Whitworth's presentation to the first consul took place on the 5th of December, 1802, and was marked by the most distinguished honours. He was received with every possible attention which could be paid to the representative of the British sovereign. There were no less than eighty foreigners presented the same day, among whom were thirty-two English; but the English ambassador occupied nearly the whole of the first consul's care and respect; and the chief magistrate of the French republic seemed particularly anxious to give the most public and satisfactory proofs of his sincere desire to preserve unimpaired the established relations of peace and amity between the two countries." Such is the account of his lordship's reception from a periodical work published at the time in England. Our author is correct in his character of lord Whitworth, who was a plain common-sense English gentleman, sufficiently stiff, aristocratical, and well bred, but no more. Lord Cornwallis, or some man of a higher order of mind, and more accustomed to deal with newly-founded governments, was required for such an embassy, a man of a large scope of mind; a mere English official gentleman was a nonentity in such a position.—*Translator.*

English lady, was the object of the most distinguished and scrupulous attention. The first consul gave to the ambassador and his lady splendid entertainments, both at Versailles and at the Tuileries. Talleyrand, in order to do them the utmost honour in his power, displayed for their reception all that elegance and perfect good breeding for which he was so distinguished. The two consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, had orders to show every attention to them, and they did the best that was in their power. To all this was added the more flattering mark of respect in publishing these attentions.

There entered into the feelings of England in regard to France, a great deal of wounded pride, although interest had much to do in giving them their bias. These attentions, lavished by the first consul upon the British ambassador, produced the most sensible effect upon the public mind in London, and recalled for a moment better feelings and sentiments in every heart. General Andreossy felt the effects of the same momentary reaction, and was received in a most flattering manner, in every way similar to that with which lord Whitworth had been received in Paris. The months of December and January renewed a species of general tranquillity. The funds, which in both countries had fallen, rose considerably, and stood at the rate at which they had been during the time that the greatest confidence had prevailed. The five per cents. were at 57 f. and 58 f. in France.

The winter of 1803 was nearly as brilliant as that of 1802. It even appeared to be more calm, because within the limits of France every thing went on in a smooth course, whilst in the preceding year, the opposition of the tribunate, without causing any thing fearful, occasioned a certain degree of uneasiness. All the high functionaries, consuls, and ministers, had orders to keep open their houses, as much for the reception of those employed under them as for that of the society of Paris, and for foreigners who might be in the capital. The commercial classes were well satisfied with the general position and aspect of affairs. A sensation of well-being was every where prevalent, and finished by gaining over even the circles of the returned emigrants. Every day there was seen some personage bearing a great name, detaching himself from the idle, agitated, calumniating group of the ancient French nobility, in order to go and solicit a place, either magisterial or financial, in the grave and monotonous drawing-rooms of the consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun. Others went as far as to solicit madam Bonaparte to ask places for them in the new court. Those who had obtained them were spoken of contemptuously by those who at the bottom envied them, and were not very far behind in following their example.

This state of things had endured a part of the winter, and would have lasted longer still, but for a circumstance which began to make embarrassment be felt in the British cabinet; this was the delay which had occurred in the evacuation of Malta. In committing the serious error of countermanding the evacuation, there had been generated with the English people a temptation exceedingly difficult to overcome, namely, that of keeping a position which should domineer over the Mediterranean. It was necessary to have either a powerful ministry in England, or a concession on the part of France, to render possible the abandonment of so precious a pledge. But a powerful ministry did not exist in England, and the first consul was not inclined to be so accommodating as to create facilities for that which did exist, by making sacrifices. All that could be obtained from him, under existing circumstances, was, that he should not insist upon the execution of the treaty with a precipitation too great for their position.

A new circumstance rendered yet more pressing the danger of the present situation of things. Until now there had been a pretext for deferring the execution of the treaty of Amiens in regard to Malta; this was the refusal of the Russian cabinet to become one of the guarantees of the new order of things established in that island. But the Russian cabinet, appreciating the danger of its refusal, and wishing sincerely to concur in the maintenance of the peace, hastened to recall its first determination, by a movement of good feeling which did honour to the young Alexander. Solely in order to afford some motive for his change of opinion, he had attached some insignificant conditions to the guarantee, such as the acknowledgment by all the powers of the sovereignty of the order of the island of Malta, the introduction of natives into the government, and the suppression of the Maltese language. These conditions changed nothing in the treaty, because they are found nearly all contained in it[1]. Prussia being also equally impressed with Russia upon the necessity of preserving peace, had equally with her reviewed her first determination, and gave her guarantee in the same terms as Russia. The first consul was equally inclined to adhere to the new conditions, added to the article of the treaty of Amiens, and accordingly he formally adopted them.

The English cabinet could no more keep back; it must accept the guarantee as it was given, or it would place itself in the position of evident bad faith, because the new clauses devised by Russia were in themselves so insignificant, that they were not able, with any show of reason, to decline them. Although embarrassed by the difficulties which they had created themselves, they were still disposed to seize upon this last act of the Russian government as a natural excuse for evacuating Malta, save in exacting some apparent precautions in regard to Egypt and the east, when there came, all on a sudden, an unfortunate incident, which served as a pretext for their bad faith, if it was bad faith, and not a scarecrow to their feebleness, if it was only feebleness.

It has been already seen, that colonel Sebastiani had been sent to Tunis, and from Tunis to Egypt,

[1] If the reader will turn to page 341, he will find introduced in a note by the translator, the stipulations regarding Malta annexed to the article X. of the treaty. These stipulations, signed by Joseph Bonaparte and lord Cornwallis, expressly state that a Maltese language shall be established, to be supported out of the land revenues of the island. Vide Stipulation 3. Alexander could have no right to change the stipulations of a treaty as a reservation of his guarantee, unless France and England assented to the alteration. The guarantee thus proffered was therefore no guarantee at all, without England's express consent. How then can the author say, that conditions changed nothing in a treaty which violated its express stipulations?—*Translator.*

to examine whether the English were or were not ready to evacuate Alexandria; to observe all that was passing between the Mamelukes and Turks; to establish a French protection to the Christians; and to take to general Brune, the French ambassador at Constantinople, the new confirmation of his former instructions. The colonel had properly fulfilled his mission; he had found the English still established in Alexandria, and making no preparations to leave it; the Turks engaged in an obstinate war with the Mamelukes; and the French deeply regretted, since the inhabitants had now a comparison of their system of government with that of the Turks, the east resounded still with the name of general Bonaparte. He had stated all these things to his government, and had added, that in the present situation of Egypt, placed between the Turks and Mamelukes, it would not require six thousand French to reconquer it. This report, although made in measured terms, it was impossible to publish without producing disagreeable effects, because it had been written confidentially and solely for the government, and there were many things stated in it which it was only proper should be said to the government itself. For example, colonel Sebastiani complained bitterly of the English general Stuart, who then commanded in Alexandria, and who, by his discourse respecting him, had nearly got him assassinated at Cairo. This report showed that the English did not yet think of evacuating Egypt [1]. The last circumstance made the first consul come to the decision to insert an article in the *Moniteur* which related to the subject. He found that the English had taken great liberties in relation to the execution of the treaty of Amiens; and although he had not yet wished to show himself pressing upon the subjects of Malta and Alexandria, still he was not sorry to put the English in their proper light, by making known a document, showing their sluggishness in fulfilling their engagements, and the bad will their officers bore towards those of France. This report was inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 30th of January. Very little noticed in France, it produced in England a sensation as striking as it was unforeseen. The expedition to Egypt had left in the English an extreme susceptibility for all that related to that country; and they continually believed they saw an army of Frenchmen always ready to embark at Toulon for Alexandria. The recital of an officer exposing the miserable state of the Turks in Egypt, the facility with which they might be expelled, and the freshness of the recollection left behind them by the French, and above all, the complaint of the bad conduct of a British officer, alarmed, hurt them, and took them out of that state of calm feeling into which they had begun to re-enter. Still this aspect would have been only a passing thing if the spirit of party had not set about the task of aggravating it. Windham, Dundas, and Grenville, set themselves more laboriously at work than ever, and smothered the voices of the more generous and unprejudiced men, as Fox and his friends were. These last wearied themselves vainly in saying, that there was nothing in the report so very extraordinary; and if the first consul had designs upon Egypt, he would not thus make them public to all the world. They would not hear these truths; they declaimed only more violently; they said that the English army was insulted, and that there must be a public reparation made to avenge its outraged honour. The impression thus produced in London returned to Paris, as if it had resounded there by numberless echoes. The first consul, wounded to see his intentions continually misinterpreted, lost all patience at last. He found it singular, that individuals, who were themselves so behindhand upon two essential points of the treaty, the evacuation of Egypt and Malta, were so ready to complain when there were, on the contrary, any complaints to be preferred against themselves. He therefore ordered Talleyrand at Paris, and general Andreossy at London, to conclude all, and to have a categorical explanation upon the execution of the treaty deferred for so long a time.

The demand for an explanation came very awkwardly at that moment. The English ministers, scarcely daring to evacuate Malta before the publication of colonel Sebastiani's report took place, were still much less capable of effecting it afterwards. They refused to enter into any explanation, resting their refusal upon motives that, for the first time, suffered the suspicion of their intentions to be perceived. Lord Whitworth was ordered to state, that some compensation was due to England for every advantage obtained by France; that the treaty of Amiens had been founded upon this principle, because it was in consideration of the conquests made by one of these two powers in Europe, that there had been granted to the other numerous possessions both in America and India; that France having been adjudged, since the peace, new territories and a new extension of influence, there were equivalents due to England; that from this motive England would have been justified in refusing to give up Malta; but that from the desire to preserve peace, she was ready to evacuate that island, without the idea of demanding any such compensation, when the report of colonel Sebastiani made its appearance; and that since the publication of that report, the British cabinet had determined to agree to nothing in relation to Malta, but on the condition of receiving a double satisfaction; first, for the outrage committed by it upon the English army; and secondly, on the views of the first consul in regard to Egypt—views which were expressed in the report in question in such a manner as to injure and disquiet his Britannic majesty.

When this declaration was addressed to Talleyrand, he discovered the most extraordinary surprise. Although he well comprehended the distrust which was certain to be caused in England by all that related to Egypt, he was wholly unable to imagine that the inclination to give up Malta being true, this inclination could be changed for a motive so insignificant as the report of colonel Sebastiani. He communicated the matter to the first consul, who was, in his turn, equally surprised, and as well, after his natural character, greatly irritated. He judged, and Talleyrand with him,

[1] The English were bound by the treaty of Amiens to evacuate Egypt in three months after the date of the treaty, or after the 27th of March, 1802. It was nearly a year after the signature, that lord Whitworth announced its having occurred: this was undoubtedly an infraction of the treaty.—*Translator.*

that he must remove himself from a situation so intolerable, so painful, and so much worse than war. The first consul at once said, that the English wished to keep Malta, and that all their recriminations were but pure pretexts, designed to conceal that desire, that he must himself enter into an explanation clearly and fully with them, and give them to understand, that upon this subject to cheat him, tire him out, or move him, was equally impossible; that if, on the contrary, the inquietude which they stated they felt was really sincere, he should be able to remove their fears by making them acquainted with his intentions in language so true, that they could not remain in the least uncertainty upon the matter. He therefore resolved to see lord Whitworth, and to speak to the ambassador with unlimited frankness, in order to convince him that his mind was made up upon two points, the evacuation of Malta, which he was determined to exact absolutely and imperatively, and the peace, which he desired to maintain in perfect good faith, when he once obtained the execution of the treaty. This was a new essay which he was thus about to make; that of speaking out all, absolutely all, even in that which he had not otherwise ever said to an enemy, with a view to calm their mistrust, if they were really mistrustful, or to convict them of falsehood, if they were of bad faith. From this resolution there resulted, as will be observed, a very strange scene.

On the 18th of February, in the evening, he sent an invitation to lord Whitworth to come to the Tuileries, and he received the ambassador there with perfect kindness. A large writing-table occupied the middle of his cabinet; he made the ambassador sit at one end of this table while he took his seat at the other [1].

Bonaparte observed to lord Whitworth, that he had wished to see him in order to converse with him directly, with the object of convincing him of what were his real intentions and feelings, that none of his ministers could so well express as he could himself. He then immediately recapitulated his relations with England from their commencement, the care he had taken to make the tender of peace the same day that he had come to the consulate, the refusal with which his offer had been met, the eagerness with which he had renewed the negotiations as soon as he was able to do so with honour, and, finally, he spoke of the concessions he had made in order to arrive at the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens. He next expressed the disappointment he experienced to see all his efforts to live in amity with Great Britain meet with so ill a return. He recalled to recollection the bad proceedings which had immediately followed the cessation of hostilities, the outrageous abuse in the English papers, the license given to the journals of the emigrants, a license unjustifiable by the laws of the British constitution; he spoke of the pensions granted to Georges and his accomplices, of the continual descents of the Chouans from the Isles of Jersey and Guernsey; of the treatment shown to the French princes, who were received with the insignia of former royalty in France; of the sending agents into Switzerland and Italy, in order every where to increase difficulties to France. "Every breeze," said the first consul, "every breeze that blows from England brought me nothing but hatred and outrage. Now," he added, "we are in a situation from which we must absolutely get out. Will you or will you not execute the treaty of Amiens? I have on my own part executed it with scrupulous fidelity. The treaty obliged me to evacuate Naples, Tarentum, and the Roman states, in three months; and in less than two months the French troops had quitted all these countries. There are ten months passed away since the exchange of the ratifications, and the English troops have not yet evacuated Malta and Alexandria. It is useless to endeavour to deceive us in these facts: will you have peace or war? If you will have war, it is only for you to say as much; we will make it with obstinacy until one nation or the other is ruined. Do you desire peace? then you must evacuate Alexandria and Malta. Because," said the first consul in the accent of unshaken resolution, "this rock of Malta, on which so many fortifications have been constructed, has, there is no doubt, a very great maritime importance; but it has in my view a much greater importance than that—it is the interest it has connected with the highest point of French honour; what would the world say if we suffered the violation of a solemn treaty entered into with us? It would cast doubts upon our strength, upon our energy. As to me, my part is taken; I would much sooner see you in possession of the heights of Montmartre than of Malta!"

Portentous words! Unfortunately but too truly realized to the misfortune of France.

Lord Whitworth, silent, and fixed to his seat, not understanding sufficiently the scene in which he was a performer, replied briefly to these declarations of the first consul. He alleged the impossibility of calming in a few months the feelings of hatred that a long war had generated between the two nations; he made much of the impediment of the English laws in not giving the means of repressing the licentiousness of writers; he explained, lastly, that the pensions given to the Chouans were a remuneration for past services, but not as rewards for those to come (a singular avowal in the mouth of an ambassador!); that the reception given to the emigrant princes was an act of hospitality towards the unfortunate, an hospitality customary with the British nation. All this did not justify the toleration afforded to French emigrant pamphleteers, the pensions allotted to assassins, nor the insignia of the old regime permitted to be worn by the Bourbon princes upon public occasions. The first consul remarked to the ambassador how little tenable his reply was upon all these points, and then returned to the more immediate object, the deferred evacuation of Egypt and Malta. In regard to the evacua-

[1] The first consul recited this conversation the same day to the minister for foreign affairs, in order that he might make it known to the ministers of France at foreign courts. He also spoke of it to his colleagues, and to many persons who preserved it in memory. Lastly, lord Whitworth transmitted it in its proper state to his own cabinet. It was circulated throughout all Europe, and was reported in many different ways. It is from these versions, and by taking that which was incontestably true, as far as I can judge, that I have reproduced it here. I give not the exact words, but the real sense of the passages, of which I guarantee the correctness.—*Author's note.*

tion of Alexandria, lord Whitworth asserted, that it had taken place while it was the subject of the present conference. In regard to Malta, he explained that the retardation had arisen from the difficulty of obtaining the guarantees of the great powers, and through the obstinate refusal of the grand master Ruspoli; but, he added, that they were on the point of finally evacuating the island, when changes, unlooked for in Europe, and, above all, the report of colonel Sebastiani, had raised new difficulties. Here the first consul interrupted the English ambassador by saying: "Of what changes do you speak—surely not of the presidency of the Italian republic, which was conferred upon me before the signature of the treaty of Amiens? It cannot be the erection of the kingdom of Etruria, which was well known to you before that same treaty, because it was asked of you, and you gave hopes of your approaching acknowledgment of that kingdom; it cannot be of that which you speak? Is it of Piedmont? Is it of Switzerland? In truth, it can scarcely be these, since these two incidents have added little to the reality of existing things. But, however, it may be, you have not the right to complain, because, as regards Piedmont, even before the treaty of Amiens, I stated to all the world what it was my intention to do; I stated it to Austria, to Russia, to you. I have never consented, when it has been requested of me to promise the re-establishment of the house of Sardinia to its states; I have never even been willing to stipulate in its behalf for a determinate indemnity. You were then well acquainted with my intention of annexing Piedmont to France; and besides, this arrangement changes nothing in my influence upon Italy, which is absolute: I wish it should be so, and so it will remain. In regard to Switzerland, you must be well aware that I will never suffer a counter-revolution to take place in that country. But all these allegations can never be seriously intended. My power in Europe, since the treaty of Amiens, is neither more nor less than it was at that time. I should have called upon you to have taken a part in the affairs of Germany, if you had exhibited towards me different sentiments. You well know that in all which I have done, I have ever wished to complete the fulfilment of the treaties, and to secure the general peace. Now look, examine; is there any part of any state that I have threatened, or of which I am contemplating the invasion? There is none, you are aware there is none. That of which you speak in relation to colonel Sebastiani, is not worthy of mention in the relations of two great nations with each other. If you have suspicions regarding my views upon Egypt, my lord, I will attempt to remove your apprehensions. Yes, I have thought much upon Egypt, and I shall yet think about it, if you oblige me to commence war. But I shall not commit the peace which we have enjoyed for so short a time, in order to attempt the re-conquest of that country. The Turkish empire is threatened with ruin; for myself, I shall contribute to make it endure as long as possible; but if it gives way, I shall wish that France should have her share. For all that, be you sure that I shall not precipitate events. If I had wished it, the extensive armament which I sent to St. Domingo, I could have directed upon Alexandria. The four thousand men which you have there would have been no obstacle in my way. They might have been, upon the contrary, my valid excuse. I might have invaded Egypt on a sudden, and this time you would not have been able to snatch it from me any more. But I never imagined any thing of such a character. Do you believe that I deceive myself in regard to the power which I exercise at present upon the opinion of France and Europe? No, that power is not sufficiently great to allow me to commit with impunity any motiveless aggression. The public opinion of Europe would immediately turn against me if I did; my political ascendancy would be lost; then as to France, I am under the necessity to prove to her that war has not been made by me, that I have not provoked it, in order to obtain from her that impulse, that enthusiasm which I should wish to excite against you, if you bring me back to the contest. It is necessary that you carry all the wrong, and that I have not a single one to answer for. I do not meditate a single aggression. All that I had to do in Germany and Italy is done; and I have done nothing that I had not announced, avowed, or arranged beforehand by treaty. Now if you doubt my desire to preserve peace, hear me, and judge how far I am sincere. Still tolerably young, I have arrived at a degree of power, at a degree of renown, to which it will be difficult to add any thing. This power, this renown, do you believe I am waiting to risk in a desperate contest? If I have a war with Austria, I know very well how to find the way to Vienna. If I go to war with you, I shall take from you every continental ally; I shall interdict your access from the Baltic to the gulf of Tarentum. You will blockade us, but I will blockade you in turn; you will make the continent a prison for us, but I shall make one for you upon the extent of the ocean. Nevertheless, to end the matter, more direct means are necessary. I must assemble a hundred and fifty thousand men, an immense flotilla, attempt to pass the straits, and perhaps bury at the bottom of the ocean my fortunes, my glory, and my life. It is a singular temerity, my lord, to attempt a descent upon England!" After thus speaking, the first consul, to the great astonishment of his interlocutor, begun to enumerate himself the difficulties and the dangers of such an enterprise; the quantity of material, of men, of vessels which he must throw upon the straits, which he would not fail to throw there to attempt the destruction of England; and always at the same time insisting more, always showing that the chance of perishing was superior to the chance of success. Then he added, with an accent of extraordinary energy, "This temerity, my lord, is so great a temerity, that if you oblige me, I am resolved to tempt it. I shall thus expose to loss my army and myself; but with me this great enterprise will obtain chances of success which it would not have with another. I have passed the Alps in winter; I know how to render that possible which appears impossible to men in general; and if I succeed, your latest descendants will deplore in tears of blood the resolution which you have forced me to take. Consider, if it be probable, powerful, contented, peaceable as I now am, that I should desire to risk power, happiness, and quiet, in such

an enterprise, and if when I say that peace is my desire, I must not be sincere!"

Then in a calmer tone the first consul added,—"It will be best for you and for me, to give the satisfaction prescribed by treaty. Let Malta be evacuated; do not suffer those who attempt my assassination to have an asylum in England; let me be libelled if you will by the English newspapers, but not by the miserable emigrants who so dishonour the protection which you have accorded to them, and whom the alien bill permits you to expel from England. Act cordially towards me, and I promise you, on my part, the most cordial and entire return: I promise you continual efforts to conciliate our interests wherever they are reconcileable. Consider what a powerful influence we might exercise over the world, if we could attain the nearer approximation of the two nations! You have a navy that in ten years of consecutive efforts, and in employing all my resources, I should not be able to equal; but I have five hundred thousand men ready to march under my orders, wherever I choose to lead them. If you are masters of the sea, I am master of the land. Think, then, sooner of our becoming united than of making war upon each other, and we may at will regulate the destinies of the world. Every thing is possible within the interest of humanity with our double power,—France and England in union."

This language, so extraordinary by its frankness, surprised as well as troubled the English ambassador, who, unfortunately, though a very polite, obliging man, was not capable of appreciating the greatness and the sincerity of the language of the first consul. It would have been necessary for the two assembled nations to have heard a similar conversation and to have replied to it.

The first consul had not failed to inform lord Whitworth that he was going, in two days, to open the session of the legislative body, conformably to the prescription of the consular constitution, that fixed this opening for the 1st of Ventôse, or 20th of February; that according to usage, he presented upon that occasion an annual exposé of the state of the republic, and that they must not feel surprised in England, if they saw expressed therein, as freely, the intentions of the French government, as they had been expressed to the ambassador himself. Lord Whitworth then withdrew to send an account to his own cabinet of all he had just seen and heard.

The fact was, that the first consul had himself drawn up the statement of the situation of the republic; and it must be acknowledged, that the government never had to make so fine a statement of its situation, and never made it in terms and language so noble. The calm which had entered into every grade of the public mind; the re-establishment of public worship, completed with wonderful promptitude, and without any disturbance; the traces of civil discord every where effaced; commerce resuming its activity; agriculture making great progress; the revenue of the state increasing to the sight; the public works developing themselves with prodigious rapidity; the defensive works upon the Alps, on the Rhine, on all sides, moving forward with equal rapidity; Europe directed entirely by the influence of France, and without being under a difference with any power except England: such was the picture which the first consul had to present, having traced it with the hand of a master. The day following the opening, the 21st of February, or 2nd of Ventôse, three of the government orators took the document to the legislative body, according to the custom under the consulate, and the reading produced that startling effect which it produced every where else. But the passage relative to England, the object of the general curiosity, was pregnant with haughtiness little softened, and, above all, was marked with a precision so categorical, that it could not fail to bring a quick explanation. After having retraced the happy conclusion of the affairs of Germany, the pacification of Switzerland, the conservative policy of Turkey in relation to the Turkish empire, the document added, that British troops still occupied Alexandria and Malta; that the French government had a right to complain; that it had, nevertheless, heard that the vessels charged to transport the garrison of Alexandria to Europe were in the Mediterranean. That as to the evacuation of Malta, it did not say if that event was approaching or not; but it added these significant words:—

"The government guarantees to the nation the peace of the continent, and it allows itself to hope for the continuation of a maritime peace. Such a peace is required and wished by every people. In order to preserve it, the government will do whatever is compatible with the national honour, essentially connected with the strict execution of treaties.

"But in England two parties dispute for power. One has concluded the peace, and appears decidedly inclined to maintain it; while the other has sworn an implacable hatred to France. From this arises that fluctuation in opinion, and in the councils that attitude which is at once pacific and threatening.

"As long as this contest of parties continues, there are certain prudential measures necessary on the part of the government of the republic. Five hundred thousand men must and will be ready to defend and avenge it.

"What a strange necessity is imposed by miserable passions upon two nations, whose attachment arises from the same interest, and an equal inclination attaching them to peace!

"But whatever may be the success of intrigue in London, it will not succeed in drawing other nations into new leagues; and the government informs it, with well-founded pride, that alone, England cannot now contest against France!

"But let us entertain better hopes, and rather believe, that in the British cabinet there will be nothing heard but the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity.

"Yes; without doubt the peace will be consolidated, and the connexion between the two governments will assume that character of goodwill, so congenial to their mutual interests; a happy repose will cause the long calamities of a disastrous war to be utterly forgotten, and France and England, by contributing to their reciprocal happiness, merit the approbation of the whole world."

To judge well the character of this document,

we must not compare it with what is called in the present day, both in France and England, the "speech from the crown," but rather with the "message" of the president of the United States. In that were explained and justified the different details of public business into which the first consul had entered. He had wished to speak absolutely of the parties which divided England, to the end of having the means of expressing himself freely to his enemies, without it being possible to apply his words to the English government itself. It was a manner of acting, both bold and dangerous, thus to intermeddle himself in the affairs of a neighbouring country; above all, it was to inflict upon British pride a wound equally severe and useless, by advancing the pretension, in such haughty terms, that England was not able, reduced to her own forces, to combat France. The first consul thus inflicted an injury, in form, at least, although it was really nothing at bottom.

When this document, describing the situation of the republic, fine as it was in display, but too haughty, arrived in London, it produced a far greater effect than the report of colonel Sebastiani had done, much more too than the acts which the first consul was reproached with having done in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany [1]. These intemperate words, on the inability of England to encounter France alone, aroused all the spirit of the English people. Added to this, the first consul had accompanied this last document with a note, which demanded of the British government a definitive explanation relative to the evacuation of Malta.

The English cabinet was at last obliged to resolve upon something, and to declare to the first consul its intentions in regard to the island so much disputed, and the cause of such great events. Its embarrassment was very great, because it would not avow its intention to violate a solemn treaty, nor give a promise of the evacuation of the island, become impossible through its own feebleness. Pressed by public opinion to do something, and not knowing what to do, it determined to send down a message to parliament,—a step sometimes taken in representative governments,—as a way of occupying the public mind, and deluding its impatience, but a step which may possibly become very dangerous, when it is not clearly known how far it may go, or to what end it may lead, and is only put forward in order to discover and procure a momentary satisfaction.

In the parliamentary sitting of the 8th of March, the following message was brought down to the house of commons :—

"George Rex,

"His majesty thinks it necessary to acquaint the house of commons, that as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, he had judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his majesty refers are avowedly directed to the colonial service, yet as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his majesty and the French government, the result of which must at present be uncertain, his majesty is induced to make this communication to his faithful commons, in the full persuasion that, whilst they partake of his majesty's earnest and unvarying solicitude for the continuance of peace, he may rely with perfect confidence on their public spirit and liberality, to enable his majesty to adopt such measures as circumstances may appear to require, for supporting the honour of his crown, and the essential interests of his people.—G. R."

It is impossible to imagine a message more untimely, or more ill conceived. It rested its whole tenor upon errors in fact, and had besides something exceedingly offensive to the good faith of the French government. In the first place, there was not a single disposable vessel in any of the French ports ; all the nation possessed, in a state fit for sea, were at St. Domingo, armed, the greater part of them, *en flute*, and employed in the transport of troops. Many were, it is true, upon the stocks, and that was no mystery to any one ; but there was no thought of the equipment of a single vessel. France possessed in the Dutch port of Helvoetsluys alone, a weak expedition of two sail of the line, and two frigates, carrying three or four thousand men, notoriously destined for Louisiana. They had been detained some months by the ice, and the object of the voyage was well known to all Europe. To say that these armaments, in appearance destined for the colonies, had another object in view, was an insinuation of a most offensive character. To pretend, too, that there existed discussions of great importance between the two governments, was exceedingly imprudent, because, up to that time, all discussions had been limited to some few words relating to Malta, put by France, and remaining unanswered by England. To make a contested matter of these was to declare at once, that England refused to fulfil the treaty she had signed, for it cannot be pretended that some expressions taken out of the report of colonel Sebastiani, or from the document explanatory of the state of the French republic, constituted a sufficient grievance to oblige the whole of the forces of England to be set in activity. This message, therefore, would not bear a scrutiny, and was at the same time both incorrect and injurious.

Lord Whitworth, who now began to be a little better acquainted with the government to which he had been accredited, divined instantly the impression that the message to the parliament would produce on the mind of Bonaparte. He did not deliver a copy to M. de Talleyrand without expressing a deep regret, and pressing that minister to go to the general to calm him, and persuade him that it was not a declaration of war, but only a simple measure of precaution. Talleyrand went off immediately to the Tuileries, and did not very well succeed with the furious master who occupied that palace. He found him deeply angry at the initiative so sharply taken up by the British cabinet, because this strange message, for which there was no cause, seemed to be intended as a provocation, delivered in the face of all the world. He

[1] I have myself heard a great personage, and one of the most respectable members of the English diplomatic body, state, after forty years, when time had effaced in him all the passions of that epoch, that these words—where it was said that England, alone, was not able to combat against France —had aroused all the spirit of the English, and that dating from that day, the declaration of war was considered as inevitable.

felt himself publicly braved, he believed himself grossly outraged, and demanded very justly where the British cabinet had been able to gather all the glaring falsehoods contained in the message, because there was not in existence, he said, a single armament in all the ports of France, and there had not been even a declared subject of difference between the two cabinets.

M. de Talleyrand obtained the concession from the first consul, that he should put a rein upon his resentment, and that if war was to be resorted to, he should leave to the English the onus of the provocation. This was the intention of the first consul himself, but it was exceedingly difficult to make him bridle his resentment, so much did he feel himself injured. The message was communicated to parliament in England on the 8th of March, and it was known in Paris on the 11th. Unhappily, the next day but one was Sunday, the day on which the diplomatic body was received at the Tuileries. A very natural curiosity had attracted to the court all the foreign ministers, who were very curious to see the attitude which the first consul would assume under the circumstances, and above all, that of the English ambassador. While waiting the moment for the audience, the first consul was standing near madam Bonaparte, in his apartment, playing with an infant, which would then have been his heir, the newly-born son of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense de Beauharnois. M. de Remusat, prefect of the palace, announced to the first consul, that the circle was formed, and among other names, reported that of lord Whitworth. The name thus suddenly pronounced, made a visible impression upon the first consul; he left the infant with which he had been playing, hastily took the hand of madam Bonaparte, passed through the door which opened into the drawing-room where strangers were received on state occasions, passed along before the foreign ministers, who pressed upon his footsteps, went straight up to the ambassador of England, and said to him, in a state of extreme agitation,—

"My lord, have you news from England?"

Then, without scarcely awaiting a reply, he continued:—

"You wish for war, then?"

"No, general," replied the ambassador, with much deliberateness of manner, "we feel too much the advantages of the peace."

"You wish for war, then," continued the first consul, in a very loud tone of voice, and in such a way as to be heard by all who were present; "we have fought for ten years—you wish, then, that we should fight for ten years to come? How can they dare to say that France is arming itself? They have imposed upon the world. There is not a vessel in our ports; all the ships capable of service have been sent to St. Domingo. The sole armament that exists is at this moment in the harbours of Holland, and no one has been ignorant for four months past that it is destined for Louisiana. They say there is a difference between France and England; I know of none. I only know that the isle of Malta has not been evacuated within the prescribed time; but I do not imagine that your ministers will be wanting in good faith on the part of England, by refusing to execute a solemn treaty. At least, they have not yet made the assertion. I cannot suppose, further, that by your armaments, you have any desire to intimidate the French people; it is possible to kill them, my lord, but never to frighten them!"

The ambassador, surprised, and somewhat confounded, in spite of his presence of mind, replied that England neither wished for the one nor the other; but that, on the contrary, she would endeavour to live on a good understanding with France.

"Then she must respect treaties," replied the first consul; "evil be to them who do not respect treaties!"

The first consul then passed on before M. Azara, and M. Markoff, and said to them, in a voice sufficiently elevated, that the English would not evacuate Malta, that they refused to hold by their engagements, and that hereafter it would be necessary to cover the treaty with black crape. He continued to pass on, and perceiving the minister of Sweden, whose presence recalled to his mind the ridiculous despatches addressed to the Germanic diet, and at that moment made public, he said,—

"Your king forgets, then, that Sweden is no longer as she was in the time of Gustavus Adolphus—that she has descended to the third rank among the powers of Europe?"

He went round the circle, completed it, continually in agitation, his glance sparkling and alarming as that of power is when in anger, and wholly destitute of the calm dignity which usually sat so well upon him.

Feeling, nevertheless, that he had gone out of the proper track, in completing the circle, he came again to the English ambassador, and made enquiry, in a mild tone of voice, for the duchess of Dorset, his wife, expressing the hope that, after having passed the bad season in France, she might be able to pass the good there; he added, "that this did not depend upon him, but upon England; and that if recourse was obliged to be had to arms, the responsibility wholly and entirely, in the eyes of God and man, would rest upon those who refused to fulfil their engagements[1]."

[1] There is something of difference between the statement of our author as to this dialogue, and that put forth at the time in the English government papers. It is very probable that the latter exaggerated the language used; for there was at that moment so much prejudice, and so little of reason prevalent, to say nothing of the disregard of facts in party statements of all kinds at the time, that our author may very probably be correct. The statement given in the government papers of England was as follows:—

"Bonaparte entered with an unusual alertness of manner, and after saluting the company he addressed himself to lord Whitworth, in a tone sufficiently loud to be heard by all present. 'You know, my lord, that a terrible storm has arisen between England and France.'

"*Lord Whitworth.*—'Yes, general consul; but it is to be hoped that this storm will be dissipated without any serious consequences.'

"*Bonaparte.*—'It will be dissipated when England shall have evacuated Malta; if not, the cloud will burst, and the bolt must fall. The king of England has promised by treaty to evacuate that place; and who is to violate the faith of treaties?'

"*Lord Whitworth* (surprised at finding himself questioned in this manner, and before so many persons).—'But you

This scene must needs have deeply irritated the self-love of the English people, and brought about a vexatious reciprocity of ill-feeling. The English were wrong in the main, because their ambition, so little dissimulated in regard to Malta, had become a real scandal. It was more proper to have left the real wrong upon them, and not to have laid upon himself that of mere form. But the first consul, when offended, felt a species of gratification in the outbreaks of his anger being re-echoed from one end of the world to another.

The scene with lord Whitworth soon became public, because nearly two hundred persons were witnesses of it. Each rendered it in his own manner, and exaggerated it as he saw fit. It caused a very painful feeling throughout Europe, and added greatly to the perplexity of the English cabinet. Lord Whitworth, offended and hurt, complained to Talleyrand, and declared that he would never again appear at the Tuileries unless he received the formal assurance that he should no more be subjected to similar treatment. Talleyrand replied verbally to these just complaints. It was in such circumstances that his calmness of mind, address, and self-confidence, were a great aid to the political business of the cabinet, compromised by the natural vehemence of character of the first consul.

A sudden revolution at this time took place in the changing and passionate mind of Napoleon. From the perspective views during a fruitful and laborious peace, with which he recently loved to feed his active imagination, he passed at once to the future views of war, to the greatness that might be obtained by victory, to the renewal of the face of Europe, and to the re-establishment of the empire of the west, which presented itself too frequently to his mind. He suddenly flung himself from one of these objects towards the other. The benefactor of France and of the world, he had once flattered himself with becoming, he now wished to become its astonishment. A degree of anger, at once personal and patriotic, seized upon him; and to conquer England, to humiliate, to humble, to destroy her, became from that day the passion of his life. Persuaded that all things are possible to man, having the circumstances granted of sufficient intelligence, followers, and a determined will, he suddenly took up the idea of passing the straits of Dover, and of carrying into England one of those armies which had vanquished Europe. He had said to himself three years before, that the St. Bernard and the snows of winter, reported invincible obstacles by men in common, had not been so for him; he repeated the same thing of the arm of the sea which is between Dover and Calais, and he applied himself to consider the mode of crossing it, with the deepest conviction of success. It was from that moment, in other words, from the day when the message of the king of England was known, that he dated his first orders; and it was then that this extraordinary mind, which the conviction of its own power led astray in politics, became again a prodigy of human nature, when it acted in foreseeing and surmounting all the difficulties of a vast enterprise.

He at once sent off colonel Lacuée into Flanders and Holland, to visit the ports of these countries, to examine their form and extent, their population and naval stores. He enjoined it upon him to procure a statement, approaching as near as possible to fact, of all the vessels used for the coasting service and for the fishery, from Havre-de-Grace to the Texel, and capable of following under sail a squadron of men-of-war. He sent other officers to Cherburgh, St. Malo, Granville, and Brest, with orders to make an examination of all the boats serving for the larger fisheries, in order to ascertain their numbers, value, and total tonnage. He began to commence the repair of the gun-boats which had composed the old Boulogne flotilla in 1801. He ordered the engineers of the navy to present him models of flat-bottomed boats capable of carrying heavy cannon; and he required from them the plan of a large canal between Boulogne and Dunkirk, with the object of putting these two ports in communication. He ordered the armament to proceed along all the coasts and the islands from Bourdeaux as far as Antwerp. He prescribed an immediate inspection of all the forests which bordered upon the coasts of the channel, with the object of examining the nature and quantity of timber which they contained, and to discover what part it might be possible to use for the construction of an immense warlike flotilla. Hearing from certain rumours that the emissaries of the English government bought the wood of the Roman states, he despatched agents there, with the necessary funds to buy that wood, and with recommendations which did not leave the pope but little will in the choice of purchasers.

Three things ought, according to him, to sig-

know, general consul, the circumstances which have hitherto delayed the evacuation of Malta. The intention of my sovereign is to fulfil the treaty of Amiens. And you also know——'

"*Bonaparte.*—'You know' (with impetuosity) 'that the French have carried on the war for ten years, and you cannot doubt but they are in a condition to wage it again. Inform your court, that if on the receipt of your despatches orders are not issued for the immediate surrender of Malta, then war is declared. I declare my firm resolution is to see the treaty carried into effect; and I leave it to the ambassadors of the several powers that are present to decide who is in the wrong. You flattered yourselves that France would not dare to show her resentment whilst her squadrons were at St. Domingo; I am happy thus publicly to undeceive you on that head.'

"*Lord Whitworth.*—'But, general, the negotiation is not yet broken; and there is even reason to believe——'

"*Bonaparte.*—'Of what negotiation does your lordship speak? Is it necessary to negotiate what is concluded by treaty—to negotiate the fulfilment of engagements and the duties of good faith?' (Lord Whitworth was about to reply, Bonaparte made a sign with his hand, and continued in a less elevated tone.) 'My lord, your lady is indisposed; she may probably breathe her native air rather sooner than you or I expected. I wish most ardently for peace; but if my just demand be not instantly complied with, then war must follow, and God will decide. If treaties are not sufficient to bind to peace, then the vanquished must not be left in a condition to offer injury.'"

The above statement, that Bonaparte waved his hand in the midst of the dialogue, is not so consonant with probability as the statement of M. Thiers, that he came back to lord Whitworth, with whom he had begun the conversation, upon the completion of his going round the circle in attendance. Moreover, it was not Malta, but the king's threatening message, that caused the conversation.—*Translator.*

nalize the commencement of hostilities; the occupation of Hanover, of Portugal, and of the Gulf of Tarentum, in order to effect immediately the absolute shutting up of the coasts of the continent, from Dunkirk to the Adriatic. With this view he began by the composition at Bayonne of the artillery of a corps of the army; he united at Faenza a division of ten thousand men, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, designed to pass into the kingdom of Naples; he landed the troops embarked at Helvoetsluis for Louisiana. Thinking that it was too dangerous to send them to sea on the eve of a declaration of war, he directed a part of them upon Flushing, a port appertaining to Holland, but placed under the power of France while she was in the occupation of that country. He sent there a military officer, with a commission to put on all the powers which belong to a military commandant in time of war, and ordered him to arm the place without delay. The rest of the troops were sent to Breda and Nimiguen, two points of assemblage intended for the formation of a corps of twenty-four thousand men. This corps, placed under the orders of general Mortier, was to invade Hanover upon the first act of hostility committed by England.

Still it was not a thing politically easy to invade Hanover. The king of England, on the part of Hanover, was a member of the Germanic confederation, and had a right in certain cases to the protection of the confederated states. The king of Prussia, the director of the circle of Lower Saxony, in which Hanover was comprised, was the natural protector of that state. It was necessary, therefore, to have recourse to him for his consent, which could not fail to cost him much trouble, because to consent would be to compromise the north of Germany in the formidable quarrel in which France was about to be engaged, and perhaps to expose the Elbe, the Weser, and the Oder, to be blockaded by the English. The cabinet of Potsdam had affected, it was true, much attachment to France, which had procured for it such extensive indemnities; this attachment would, no doubt, be able to secure a refusal, on the part of Prussia, to all the objects of a coalition, and, in fact, influence that court to make every effort to prevent it, and even go as far as to induce it to give the first consul notice of such an intention; but in the existing state of things this intimacy was not converted into a positive alliance, so that, if France had need of some great devotional act, it might be seriously counted upon in the performance.

The first consul, in consequence, made his aide-de-camp Duroc leave Paris immediately for Berlin, knowing well as he did the Prussian court; and he gave him the commission to state to that court the danger of an approaching rupture between England and France; the intention of the French government to push the war to the utmost extremity, and its object of seizing upon Hanover. General Duroc was ordered to add, that the first consul did not wish to make war for the sake of war, and that if the monarchs who were strangers to the quarrel, as the king of Prussia and the emperor of Russia, could find a means of arranging the differences, and of bringing England to pay a respect to treaties, he would instantly put a stop in a road leading to the unsparing hostility into which he was ready to precipitate himself.

The first consul believed that he was bound thus to make a step agreeable to the emperor of Russia. He had treated up to this time with that sovereign upon some of the most weighty affairs of Europe, and he now desired to interest him on his own side and cause, and to constitute him a judge of what passed between France and England. He wrote him a letter, of which colonel Colbert was to be the bearer, and in which, recalling all the past events from the treaty of Amiens, he showed himself disposed, without directly demanding it, to submit himself to the emperor's mediation, in case Great Britain would submit upon her side; so much did he reckon, he said, upon the goodness of his cause, and the justice of the emperor Alexander.

To all these determinations, so promptly taken, another and last must be added relative to Louisiana. The four thousand men destined to occupy that country were to be disembarked. But what was to be done—what part taken in regard to that valuable possession? There was no reason to be alarmed about the other colonies. St. Domingo was full of troops, and there had been embarked in haste, in all the trading vessels ready to sail, the disposable soldiers of the colonial depôts. Guadaloupe, Martinique, and the Isle of France, were also provided with strong garrisons, and it would have demanded immense expeditions to have disputed them with France. But Louisiana did not contain a single soldier. It was a vast province that four thousand men were not sufficient to occupy in time of war. The inhabitants, although of French origin, had so often changed masters during the century past, that they regarded nothing more than their independence. The North Americans were little satisfied to see the French in possession of the mouths of the Mississippi, and of their principal passage with the Gulf of Mexico. They were even at the moment making advances to France, with the object of managing their commerce and navigation upon advantageous conditions of transit, in the port of New Orleans. It was, therefore, necessary to reckon if France wished to keep Louisiana, upon great efforts against the colony upon the part of the English; upon perfect indifference on that of the inhabitants; and upon real ill-will on the part of the Americans. These last in reality only wished to have the Spaniards for neighbours. All the colonial visions of the first consul had vanished therefore upon the appearance of the message of George III., and his resolution was immediately formed in consequence at that very moment.

"I will not keep," said the first consul to one of the ministers, "a possession which will not be secure in our hands, that may perhaps embroil me with the Americans, or may place me in a state of coolness with them. I shall make it serve me, on the contrary, to attach me to them, to get them into differences with the English, and I shall create for them enemies who will one day avenge us if we do not succeed in avenging ourselves. My determination is fixed; I will give Louisiana to the United States. But as they have no territory to cede to me in exchange, I shall demand of them a sum of money to pay the expenses of the extraordinary armament that I am projecting against Great Britain." The first consul would not con-

tract a loan; he hoped with a large sum which he should procure by extraordinary means, by a moderate augmentation of the taxes, and by some sales of national property slowly carried into effect, to support the expenses of the war. He sent for M. de Marbois, minister of the treasury, formerly employed in America, and for M. Decrès, minister of the marine, and wished, although he had made up his mind, to listen to their reasoning upon the subject. M. de Marbois spoke in favour of the alienation of the colony, and M. Decrès against it. The first consul listened to them very attentively, without appearing to be affected the least in the world by the reasoning either of one or the other; he heard them as he would often do, even when he had already made up his own mind, in order to convince himself that he had not been ignorant of some great point of the question submitted to his judgment. Confirmed rather than shaken in his determination by what he had heard stated, he requested M. de Marbois to call, without losing a moment, upon Mr. Livingston, the American minister, and to enter into a negotiation with him upon the subject of Louisiana. Mr. Monro had just arrived in Europe to regulate with the English the question of maritime law, and with the French the question of the transit on the Mississippi. Upon his arrival in Paris, he was welcomed with the unexpected proposition of the French cabinet. He was offered not merely some facilities of transit in passing through Louisiana, but the addition of the whole territory to the United States. He was not embarrassed a moment by any defect in his powers; he treated immediately, except as far as the ratification of his government was concerned.

M. de Marbois demanded the sum of 80,000,000f., of which 20,000,000 f. were to indemnify the Americans for the captures illegally made during the last war, and 60,000,000 f. for the French treasury. The 20,000,000 f. devoted to the first object would assure to France the good will of all the merchants of the United States. In regard to the other sum of 60,000,000 f. designed for France, it was agreed that the cabinet of Washington should create annuities, and that they should be negotiated with Dutch houses at an advantageous price some little distance from par. The treaty was, therefore, concluded on this basis, and sent to Washington in order to be ratified. It was thus that the Americans acquired this vast territory, which has completed their domination in North America, and rendered them masters of the Gulf of Mexico now and for all future time. They are therefore indebted for their rise and their greatness to the long contest between France and England. To the first act in this contest they owe their independence; to the second, this large addition to their territory. We shall see soon to what use this 60,000,000 f. was applied, and of what result it missed the attainment.

These precautions once taken, the first consul followed out with more patience the winding up of the negotiation. The involuntary fit of anger which he was unable to defend, on receiving the message of the king of England, being passed, he promised himself to maintain in future an unalterable moderation, to suffer himself even to proceed to the end so openly, that France and all Europe could not possibly deceive themselves about the real authors of the war.

Talleyrand, under the existing circumstances, conducted himself with rare wisdom, and contributed more than any to inspire the first consul with new dispositions. This minister well understood that a war with England, looking at the difficulty of making it decisive, and seeing that the influence of British subsidies soon making it continental, would be but the renewal of the war of the revolution with Europe, for the purpose of preventing the mischief of a universal conflagration, decided to make use of the inertia, which he had sometimes found to serve with the first consul, as a jet of water cast upon an ardent fire to moderate its violence. If on some occasions this inertia had its inconveniences, it was this time a succour of very great importance; and with any other cabinet than that which then reigned so feebly in England, it would have succeeded in preventing a rupture, or at least in retarding one for a long while to come. In consequence, after having had an interview with, and brought the first consul to agree, he drew up a calm, frank communication to the British cabinet, having for its object to make known to that cabinet that military precautions would commence on the side of France, but commence only from that day, in other words, from the date of the message of George III. to parliament. When arming is begun in England, said M. de Talleyrand, the British cabinet must not be surprised if Switzerland, which was just on the point of being evacuated, is not so: if a body of troops be set in march towards the middle of Italy with the view of occupying Tarentum; if a corps of twenty thousand men should enter Holland, and take up the nearest possible position to Hanover; if the *matériel* of a military division is united at Bayonne, to act in case of need against Portugal; if, in fine, works of mere construction in the French ports are changed into those of armament; doubtless there will result a redoubled movement of the public mind in England, the ordinary exciters of public opinion will conclude again that France meditates fresh aggressions—but what to do! There it must resign itself; when, in fine, the British cabinet has taken the initiative, by its own measures of precaution, which finish by being really measures of provocation. In fact, they are arming actively in England, and press-gangs are at work on the quays of the Thames in the very heart of the city of London. They are there preparing to send to sea fifty sail of the line, that according to the announcement made in parliament, will be ready in case of rupture, to set sail upon the day of the declaration of war!

The minister Addington, feeling that he was not equal to the circumstances of his position, had made some overtures to Pitt, in order to engage him to enter the cabinet, but Pitt had repelled his overtures with great haughtiness, and continued to live nearly always far from London, and the agitations of party. Feeling his own strength, foreseeing the events which would arise to render it necessary, he much preferred relying upon the power of those events, than on the feeble ministers who were the ephemeral holders of his place. He refused their offers, leaving them, by his refusal, in a state of cruel embarrassment. The ministry

had taken these steps without the consent of George III., who would have desired to keep his existing cabinet, because he had for Pitt a dislike scarcely to be overcome. He found in Pitt, with opinions that were his own, a minister who was nearly his master. He found in Fox, with his noble and attractive character, opinions which were odious to him. He did not wish to have either the one or the other. He desired to keep in Addington, the son of a physician, of whom he was fond; lord Hawkesbury, the son of lord Liverpool, his intimate confidant; he wished also to preserve the peace unbroken, if it were a thing possible to be done, and if not possible, he then would resign himself to a state of war, which to him was become a sort of habit, but then he wished it to be carried on with the existing ministry. Addington and Hawkesbury were strongly of this opinion; still they would wish if possible a reinforcement of strength; and after having been a ministry of peace, to constitute themselves a war administration. In default of Pitt, who had refused to join them, it was not practicable to unite themselves with Windham and Grenville, because their violence far surpassed the opinion of the English public. Addington and Hawkesbury would willingly have addressed themselves to Fox, whose pacific ideas were in consonance with theirs; but here the will of the king was an insurmountable obstacle, and they were reduced at last to remain as they were, alone, feeble, isolated, in parliament, and on that account kept at bay by the different parties. But the party which had at that moment the greatest strength, because it displayed the national passions, was that of Grenville, which on account of its violence had begun to be distinguished from that of Pitt, and which avenged itself for not arriving at the ministry, by obliging those in power to do that which, if there, it would have done itself. The feebleness of the cabinet then would bring on the war with nearly as much certainty as if it had numbered among its members Windham, Grenville, and Dundas.

Addington and Hawkesbury were now much embarrassed on account of all the noise they had made, whether about the events which had taken place in Switzerland, whether on the question of the retention of Malta, or in making answer to a haughty phrase of the first consul, by a message to parliament. They would have been heartily willing to find some expedient which might relieve them from their embarrassment; but unhappily they were placed in a situation from which any thing short of the definitive conquest of Malta would appear insufficient in England, and provoke an outrage under which they would have succumbed. As to Malta, there was no hope of obtaining that island with the consent of the first consul.

Talleyrand, to afford them aid, hinted to them the proposal of a convention, in which there might be arranged, for example, the evacuation of Switzerland and of Holland as the price of the evacuation of Malta, in which there should be an engagement to respect the integrity of the Turkish empire, as a means of calming public opinion in England, and of dissipating its suspicions.

This proposition did not answer the expectations of the English ministers, because Malta was the absolute condition which the masters of their feebleness had imposed upon them. It was necessary either to satisfy the covetousness which was brought about by their own fault, or to succumb before the parliament. Nevertheless, they felt that they should finish by covering themselves with ridicule in the sight of England, of France, and of all Europe, if they continued to remain in an equivocal position, not daring to say a word which they wished to say. They produced their pretensions at last on the 13th of April, 1803. The first consul had given them inquietude upon the subject of Egypt, and it was necessary, they said, to have possession of Malta as a means of overlooking that quarter to be capable of securing themselves. They offered two hypotheses; either the possession by England of the forts of the island for ever, leaving the civil government of the island to the order; or the possession of the island for ten years, and to give up the forts, not to the order, but to the Maltese themselves. In either case France should oblige itself to second a negotiation with the king of Naples to obtain the consent of that monarch to cede to England the island of Lampedosa, situated at a short distance from Malta, for the avowed end of forming there a naval establishment [1].

Lord Whitworth attempted to gain the assent of M. Talleyrand to these demands, and addressed himself the same request to the brother of the first consul. Joseph, who feared no less than M. Talleyrand the chances of a desperate contest, in which must be risked perhaps all the greatness of Bonaparte, Joseph promised to use with his brother all his influence, but at the same time without holding out a chance of succeeding. The only proposition which appeared to him to have any prospect of success, was to leave some time, but only for a short time, the possession of the fortresses of Malta to the English, maintaining the existence of the order with great care, in order that it might be possible to give up the fortresses to it soon, and to grant to France, in the way of compensation, the immediate acknowledgments of the new states of Italy. In consequence, Joseph

[1] The following is the statement put forth by the Addington ministry in England as the proposal on their part alluded to above, and also in page 463:—

1. The French government shall engage to make no opposition to the cession of the island of Lampedosa to his majesty by the king of the Two Sicilies.

2. In consequence of the present state of the island of Lampedosa, his majesty shall remain in possession of the island of Malta until such arrangements shall be made by him as may enable his majesty to occupy Lampedosa as a naval station, after which period the island of Malta shall be given up to the inhabitants, and acknowledged as an independent state.

3. The territories of the Batavian republic shall be evacuated by the French forces within one month after the conclusion of a convention founded on the principles of this project.

4. The king of Etruria and the Italian and Ligurian republics shall be acknowledged by his majesty.

5. Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French forces.

6. A suitable territorial provision shall be assigned to the king of Sardinia in Italy.

Secret Article.—His majesty shall not be required by the French government to evacuate the island of Malta until after the expiration of ten years. Articles 4, 5, 6, may be entirely omitted, or must all be inserted.

Bonaparte and M. de Talleyrand made the greatest efforts in their power to move the first consul to assent to this state of things. They made it a point with him to maintain the order of St. John of Jerusalem as an evidence before the eyes of the public that the occupation of the forts was but temporary, by this means preserving the dignity of the French government.

To this the first consul opposed an unflinching and obstinate resistance. All these tamperings with the question appeared beneath his character. He said that it was much better to give up the island of Malta purely and simply to the English; that this would be a sort of indemnification granted voluntarily to England for the pretended encroachments of France since the treaty of Amiens; that the concession thus explained had something frank, clear, and offered rather the appearance of an act of justice voluntarily accorded than the appearance of a weakness; that, on the contrary, the possession of Malta granted in reality (because the forts were in fact all the island, and some years were the same as for ever), and thus covered by dissimulation, was unworthy of him; that nobody should delude him, and that even in the efforts which he would make to dissimulate such a concession, the sentiment of his own weakness would be recognised. "No," said he, "either Malta or nothing! But Malta, it is the dominion of the Mediterranean. No person can believe that I can consent to give up the dominion of the Mediterranean to the English without its being supposed that I fear to contest it with them. I lose at one time the most important sea in the world in the opinion of Europe, which gives credit to my energy, which believes it superior to every danger."—"But," observed Talleyrand, "after all, the English hold Malta, and in breaking with them, you will not take it from them."—"Yes," replied the first consul, "but I shall not cede it without a contest at an immense advantage; I shall dispute it with arms in my hands, and I hope to bring the English to such a state that they will be forced to give up Malta and more than that; without counting that if I arrive at Dover, it is all finished with these tyrants of the seas. Besides, when one must combat, sooner or later, with a people to whom the greatness of France is insupportable, very well, it is better worth doing it to-day than at a later time. The national energy has not been enervated by a long peace: I am young: the English are in the wrong, more in the wrong than they have ever been; I should love better to finish now. Malta or nothing," he repeated unceasingly, "I am resolved—they shall not have Malta."

Still the first consul consented that the cession of Lampedosa to the English should be negotiated, or any other small island in the north of Africa, on the condition that Malta should be immediately evacuated. "That they should be given," said he, "a harbour in the Mediterranean, well and good. But I will not consent that they shall have two Gibraltars in that sea, one at the entrance, and one in the middle."

This reply caused great disappointment to lord Whitworth, and accommodating as he showed himself at first, when he had hopes of success, he became stiff, haughty, and almost unbecoming. But M. de Talleyrand promised he would do all he could to support him, to prevent, or at least to delay, the rupture. Lord Whitworth told M. de Talleyrand, that whether the first consul regarded it as a matter of honour or not, was of little importance to England; that she was not one of those petty states to which he was able to dictate his will, and force submission to all his modes of explaining honour and policy. Talleyrand replied with calmness and dignity, that England, upon her side, had no right, under the pretext of distrust, to exact the abandonment by France of one of the most important points on the globe; that there was no power in the world that had a right to impose upon others the consequences of its own suspicions, whether well founded or not; that a similar course would be a very commodious way of making conquests; and that in such a case it need only be said, one party suffered disquiet, to be authorized to place a hand upon any territory.

Lord Whitworth communicated this reply to the English cabinet, which seeing itself placed between the evacuation of Malta, which it regarded as its own downfall, or to commence war, took the culpable resolution of preferring war—a war against the only man who was able to run England into the most serious perils. This resolution once taken, the cabinet thought that it must, in order more to please the party under whose domination it was placed, be hasty, arrogant, and prompt to come to a rupture. Lord Whitworth was enjoined to demand the occupation of Malta[1], at least for ten

[1] The defence made by the Addington ministry for not evacuating Malta is in the main embodied in the following extract of its own declarations against France.

"Whilst his Britannic majesty was actuated by these sentiments, he was called upon by the French government to evacuate the island of Malta; his majesty had manifested from the moment of the signature of the definitive treaty, an anxious disposition to carry into full effect the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens relative to that island. As soon as he was informed that an election of a grand master had taken place under the auspices of the emperor of Russia, and that it had been agreed by the different priories assembled at St. Petersburgh to acknowledge the person whom the court of Rome should select out of those who had been named by them to be grand master of the order of St. John, his majesty proposed to the French government, for the purpose of avoiding any difficulties which might arise in the execution of this arrangement, to acknowledge that election to be valid; and when, in the month of August, the French government applied to his majesty to permit the Neapolitan troops to be sent to the island of Malta, as a preliminary measure for preventing any unnecessary delay, his majesty consented without hesitation to this proposal, and gave directions for the admission of the Neapolitan troops into the island. His majesty had thus shown his disposition not only to throw no obstacle in the way of the execution of the treaty, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the execution of it by every means in his power.

"His majesty cannot, however, admit that at any period since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens the French government have had a right to call upon him, in conformity to the stipulations of that treaty, to withdraw his forces from the island of Malta. At the time when this demand was made by the French government, several of the most important stipulations remained unexecuted. The election of a grand master had not been carried into effect. The 10th article had stipulated that the independence of the island should be placed under the guarantee and protection of Great Britain and France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. The emperor of Germany had acceded to the

years, the cession of the isle of Lampedosa, the immediate evacuation of Switzerland and Holland, a precise and determined indemnity for the king of Sardinia, and in return, an acknowledgment of the Italian states. To these orders to the ambassador were added, an injunction to demand his passports immediately, if the conditions of England were not accepted.

guarantee, but only on condition of a like accession on the part of the other powers specified in the article. The emperor of Russia had refused his accession except on the condition that the Maltese language should be abrogated; and the king of Prussia had given no answer whatever to the application which had been made to him to accede to the arrangement. But the fundamental principle, upon the existence of which depended the execution of the other parts of the article, had been defeated by the changes which had taken place in the constitution of the order since the conclusion of the treaty of peace. It was to the order of St. John of Jerusalem that his majesty was, by the first stipulation of the 10th article, bound to restore the island of Malta. The order is defined to consist of those languages which were in existence at the conclusion of the treaty, the three French languages having been abolished, and a Maltese language added to the institution. The order consisted therefore at that time of the following languages, viz., the languages of Arragon, Castile, Germany, Bavaria, and Russia. Since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the languages of Arragon and Castile have been separated from the order by Spain; a part of the Italian language has been abolished by the annexation of Piedmont and Parma to France. There is strong reason to believe that it has been in contemplation to sequestrate the property of the Bavarian languages, and the intention has been avowed of keeping the Russian languages within the dominions of the emperor. Under these circumstances, the order of St. John cannot now be considered as that body to which, according to the stipulations of the treaty, the island was to be restored; and the funds indispensably necessary for its support, and for the maintenance of the independence of the island, have been nearly, if not wholly, sequestered. Even if this had arisen from circumstances which it was not in the power of any of the contracting parties to control, his majesty would nevertheless have had a right to defer the evacuation of the island by his forces until such time as an equivalent arrangement had been concluded for the preservation of the independence of the island. But if these changes have taken place in consequence of any acts of the other parties to the treaty; if the French government shall appear to have proceeded upon a system of rendering the order whose independence they had stipulated, incapable of maintaining that independence, his majesty's right to continue in the occupation of the island under such circumstances will hardly be contested. It is indisputable, the revenues of the two Spanish languages have been withdrawn from the order by his catholic majesty; a part of the Italian language has, in fact, been abolished by France, through the unjust annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia, to the French; the elector of Bavaria has been instigated by the French government to sequestrate the property of the order within his territories; and it is certain they have not only sanctioned, but encouraged, the idea of the propriety of separating the Russian languages from the remainder of the order. As the conduct of the governments of France and Spain have, therefore, in some instances directly, and others indirectly, contributed to the changes which have taken place in the order, and thus destroyed its means of supporting its independence, it is to these governments, and not to his majesty, the non-execution of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens must be ascribed. Such would be the just conclusion if the 10th article of that treaty were considered as an arrangement by itself. It must be observed, however, that this article forms a part only of a treaty of peace, the whole of which is connected together, and the stipulations of which must, upon a principle common to all treaties, be construed as having a reference to each other.

The despatch was dated the 23rd of April, and reached Paris upon the 25th. The 2nd of May was the fatal term. Lord Whitworth made several attempts to accommodate affairs with M. de Talleyrand, because he was equally alarmed at the effects of such a rupture. M. de Talleyrand, on the other hand, made him understand, that there was no hope of his obtaining Malta, neither for ten years, nor for a less term, and that he must think of some other arrangement. But in the meanwhile, he applied himself so to word his despatches, as to evade an immediate conclusion. Lord Whitworth, entering entirely into his views, was still resolved not to extend the term beyond the 2nd of May. There was, in fact, nobody, however bold he might be, who did not contemplate with dread the consequences of such a war. There were none who were unshaken in mind about a conflict that the English ministers would inflict upon the world, in order to become the price of their miserable existence, and the first consul, braving all the chances of a frightful conflict, would sustain for the honour of his government, and the preponderance of France in the Mediterranean. Lord Whitworth and M. de Talleyrand reached the seventh day without a rupture.

Finally, on the 2nd of May, lord Whitworth, not daring to disobey the orders of his court, demanded his passports. Talleyrand, in order to gain a little more time, replied that he was about to submit his demand for passports to the first consul, exhorted him not to be too much in a hurry in any thing, affirming, that perhaps by dint of effort, some unforeseen mode of arrangement might be discovered. Talleyrand had an interview with the first consul, and a long conference with him, and from this conference, in order to keep the peace, there arose a new, and it may be added, a very ingenious proposition. This proposition was to place the island of Malta in the hands of the emperor of Russia, and to let it remain in his possession as a deposit to await the conclusion of the unexpected differences between France and England. Such a combination ought to deprive the English of all ground of mistrust, because the good faith of the young emperor could not for a moment be contested, and that might constitute him a good judge of the difference between the two countries. By a sort of apt concurrence of events, this prince had written, in reply to the communications of the first consul, that he was quite ready to offer his mediation, if it would be the means of preventing a war; and the king of Prussia, partaking in the same wish, had joined the emperor in making the same offer. It was, therefore, very certain that both these monarchs would be found disposed to take upon themselves the task of mediating between the two nations. If the offer were refused, it was sufficient to prove satisfactorily, that there were no real fears interposed, neither regarding Malta nor Egypt, when an impartial depositary for the island could not succeed in removing their fears, but that the ministry wished to have a triumph for the nation, as well as an acquirement and an argument to use in parliament.

Talleyrand, thinking himself fortunate to have hit upon such an expedient, went to lord Whit-

worth, in order to persuade him to defer his departure, and to request him to transmit a new proposition to his cabinet. The orders which the ambassador of England had received were so positive, that he did not dare to disobey them. Still he suffered himself to be moved by the fear of adopting perhaps an irreparable step in immediately taking his passports. He therefore despatched a courier to London, to transmit these last offers of the French cabinet, and to excuse himself for the delay which he had permitted himself to use in the execution of the orders of his court.

M. de Talleyrand, in like manner, sent off a courier to general Andreossy, who had not seen the English ministers since their last communication, and ordered him to make them a decisive offer. General Andreossy was not wanting in obedience, and made them listen to the voice of an honourable man. If it was not Malta which they wished to acquire, in defiance of treaties, it was not possible they could have any motive for refusing to deposit this precious pledge in hands powerful enough, disinterested, and perfectly safe. Addington appeared to be much moved, because in reality he wished for a pacific termination of the affair. The head of the cabinet replied, in terms plain enough, that he desired to be better informed on the matter, expressed his regret not to be sufficiently so for such a serious juncture, and remained suspended between the double fear of committing an act of weakness, or of provoking an unhappy war. Lord Hawkesbury, more ambitious and firmer, exhibited himself unshaken. The cabinet having deliberated, refused the proposition. The desire to gratify the national ambition, and to resign Malta into the hands of a third and disinterested party, was to miss the end they had in view. Besides, to give up the island to a third party, was most probably to lose it for ever; because it was very well known that there was no arbitrator in the world who would have decided in favour of England upon a similar question. They employed, in order to colour this refusal of the last proposition tendered, an argument which was altogether false. They had, they said, the certain knowledge that Russia would not accept the commission with which it was proposed to charge her. But the contrary was really the fact, because Russia had come forward to offer her mediation; and, at a later period, on learning the last proposition of the French government, she had hastened to declare her assent, notwithstanding the dangers attached to the deposit, which it was at the time contemplating to commit into her hands.

The English ministers, however, still reserved to themselves another expedient, by which they had another chance of keeping Malta, and they, in consequence, devised an expedient which it was impossible to accept. Judging of the first consul by themselves, they believed that he was anxious to keep the treaty respecting Malta solely out of fear of the public opinion. They proposed, therefore, in adding several patent articles to the treaty of Amiens, to throw into the treaty a secret article, which should make it obligatory upon the English troops to remain in Malta. The articles proposed were to state that Switzerland and Holland should be immediately evacuated; that the king of Sardinia should receive a territorial indemnity; that the English should obtain the island of Lampedosa; and, finally, that they should remain in Malta. The secret article was to limit their occupation of the island to ten years.

This answer, the result of a deliberation on the 7th of May, was sent off on the same day, and arrived in Paris on the 9th; on the 10th, lord Whitworth communicated it in writing to Talleyrand, with whom he was unable to have a personal interview, that minister being detained with the first consul's illness, caused by the overturning of his carriage. When this proposal was made to the first consul, he rejected at once the idea of a secret article, repulsing it haughtily altogether, and would not again suffer it to be spoken of under any consideration. In his turn, he devised a last expedient, which was an adroit mode of maintaining the ambition of both nations in equilibrium, not in regard to any real advantages, so much as to those which were apparent. This expedient consisted in leaving the English in Malta an indeterminate space of time, on condition that the French, during the same space of time, should occupy the Gulf of Tarentum. In this there were advantages quite great enough on the side of consistency. The English ministers obtained that species of pledge which they had formed in obtaining Malta; the French would occupy an equal position in the Mediterranean; very soon all the other powers would be tempted to intervene, and force the English to leave Malta, and the French to abandon the territory which belonged to Naples. Still, the first consul would not propose this new arrangement unless he had the hope to see it accepted. Talleyrand was, therefore, instructed to use, in this last proposal, an extreme measure of caution.

The following day, or the 11th of May, M. de Talleyrand saw lord Whitworth at noon, and told him that a secret article was not acceptable, because the first consul would not consent to deceive the people of France about the extent of the concessions which were accorded to England in the treaty; that, nevertheless, he had one proposition more to present, the result of which would be to cede Malta, on the condition of an equivalent cession to France. Lord Whitworth declared that he was unable to admit any proposition except that which had been sent by his own cabinet; and that after having taken upon himself to defer his departure once, he was not able to retard it a second time, without a formal adhesion to the proposal made by his government. M. de Talleyrand made no reply to this declaration; and the ministers quitted each other, both very desponding at not having been able to bring about an accommodation. Lord Whitworth demanded his passports for the following day, saying he should travel slowly, and that he should have time to write to London and to receive an answer, before he should be able to embark at Calais. It was agreed that the ambassadors should be exchanged on the frontiers, and that lord Whitworth should wait at Calais until general Andreossy had arrived at Dover.

Curiosity in Paris was on the tiptoe of expectation. A crowd pressed around the door of the hotel of the English ambassador, in order to observe whether he made preparations for his

journey. On the following day, the 12th of May, after having waited during the whole day, and left the French cabinet all the time possible for reflection, lord Whitworth set out on the road to Calais by easy journeys. The rumour of his departure produced a great sensation in Paris, and everybody foresaw that great events would soon signalize the new period of approaching war.

Talleyrand had sent a courier to general Andreossy to carry to him the new proposition, to let Tarentum be occupied by the French, in compensation for the occupation of Malta by the English. It was by M. Schimmelpennink, minister of Holland, that this new proposition was made, and not in the name of France, but as a personal idea of the minister of Holland, and of the success of which he was well assured. The idea, submitted to the British cabinet, was not received favourably, and general Andreossy had no choice but to quit England. The anxiety manifested at Paris was not greater than that manifested in London. The house of commons was filled for several days successively, every one demanding of the ministers what was the news relative to the negotiation. At the moment of this great attention to the state of things, the bolt of war fell, and all were astonished while they dreaded the consequences of an exasperated contest. The people of London little desired the renewal of the war. The Grenville party and the trading money-lenders were alone satisfied.

General Andreossy was accompanied on his departure from England with great respect and very sensible regret. He arrived at Dover at the same time that lord Whitworth reached Calais, on the 17th of May. Lord Whitworth was conveyed across the straits. On the moment of his arrival he hastened to visit the French ambassador, paid him the greatest testimonies of his esteem, and conducted him on board the vessel himself, in which he was about to return to France. The two ambassadors separated in presence of a crowd of persons, moved at the scene, both disquieted and saddened. In that solemn moment, the two nations seemed to bid adieu, no more to be visible to each other until after a frightful war, and the overturn of the whole world. How very different had their destinies been, if, as the first consul said, these two powers, the one maritime and the other continental, had been in complete and perfect union for the purpose of regulating in peace the interests of the universe! General civilization would have made more rapid strides; the future independence of Europe would have been for ever assured; and the two nations would not have prepared a domination for the north over a divided west.

Such was the melancholy termination of the short peace of Amiens.

We do not dissimulate the vivacity of our national sentiments: to give blame to France we reckon upon; we shall do it without hesitation, if she seems to us to merit its reception; and we know how to do it when unhappily she should receive it, because truth is the first duty of the historian. Nevertheless, after long reflection upon a subject so serious, we are wholly unable to blame France for the renewal of the war between the two countries. In this instance the first consul conducted himself with the most perfect good faith. He committed, we are ready to avow, faults in form, but of these faults even he did not commit all. In a single essential point he was not to blame. The complaints of England, bearing upon the changes operated in the relative situation of the two states subsequent to the peace, were without foundation. In Italy the Italian republic had chosen the first consul for a president; but this in reality did not change any thing in the state of dependence of that republic upon France, which existed but by means of France, and could not exist without her support. Besides, this event took place in February, and the treaty of Amiens did not take place until the month of March, 1802. The constitution of the kingdom of Etruria, the cession of Louisiana and of the duchy of Parma to France, were all well-known public facts before the same period of March, 1802. It must be added, that England, at the congress of Amiens, had well-nigh given her promise to recognize the new Italian states. The union of Piedmont was equally known and avowed in the negotiations at Amiens, when the English negotiator made several efforts to obtain an indemnity in favour of the king of Piedmont. Switzerland and Holland had never ceased to be occupied by French troops, whether during the war or since the peace; and in more than one conversation, lord Hawkesbury had acknowledged that the influence of France over those states was a consequence of the war; that provided their independence was definitively recognized, there would be no ground of complaint made. England could not then imagine that France would suffer a counter-revolution to be accomplished in Switzerland or in Holland, in other words, at her own door, without interfering with it. As to the secularization, that was an act obliged to be executed by treaty, an act full of justice and moderation, in part executed as well by Russia, consented to by all the states of Germany, comprising Austria herself, and enforced by the adhesion of the king of England himself, who had, as king of Hanover, adhered to a partition of the indemnities, extremely advantageous for himself. For what then had France upon the continent merited to be reproached?—for her greatness only, a greatness secured by treaties, and admitted by England in the congress of Amiens, become, it is true, more sensibly witnessed during the tranquillity of the peace, and in the midst of negotiations, that her influence and ability decided in an irresistible manner.

The reproach of pretended designs upon Egypt was a false pretext, because the first consul had none at the time, and colonel Sebastiani had been sent merely to observe what was going forward, with the sole end of discovering whether the English were ready to evacuate Alexandria. The examination of the more secret documents of this mission leave not the least doubt upon the matter.

On what then were they able to found a charge of that strange violation of the treaty of Amiens relative to Malta? It is necessary, in order to explain more fully, to recall to memory the events which had occurred during fifteen months.

The English, passionate, as all great nations are, wished in 1801, after ten years of war, to have some respite, and they desired it ardently as they

would desire every change from the actual state of things. This feeling, rendered stronger by the misery of the working-classes in 1801, became one of those impulsions that, under free governments, overturn or raise up ministries. Pitt retired from office; the feeble minister Addington succeeded him, and the peace was made upon the clearest and most explicit conditions, perfectly well known to the nation and to the whole world. It conceded the advantages acquired by France during the preceding ten years, because on other conditions the peace would have been impossible. After several months, this peace did not seem to bring all the benefit which was expected to the country: has it ever occurred that the reality is equal to the anticipations of hope? The English came to France, grown great by the war, become great by negotiation, and great by her works of manufacture and trade. Jealousy was anew lit up in their hearts. They demanded a treaty of commerce, which the first consul refused to grant, convinced that the French manufactures, recently created, could not sustain themselves except under a strong protection. Notwithstanding this, the English manufacturers were satisfied, because the contraband trade opened to them still an outlet sufficiently large for their products. But the monied merchants of London, affrighted at the appearance which threatened them from the flags of France, Spain, Holland, and Genoa, being once more upon the seas, deprived of the advantage of loans and contracts, allied themselves with the war-party of Pitt, Windham, and Grenville, thus becoming openly hostile, more hostile than the English aristocracy itself. It had intimate connexions with Holland, and complained continually of the influence which France exercised over that country. A counter-revolution taking place in Switzerland, owing actually to the good faith of the first consul, who had been too hasty in evacuating that country, he was again necessitated to enter it. This was a new pretext. Very soon the whole discontent broke loose; and the war-party, composed of the monied men, having Pitt at their head, absent from parliament, and Grenville present at every discussion, pushed affairs visibly on towards a rupture. The press of England gave itself up to frightful outrages, and the French emigrant press took the opportunity of greatly outdoing all the violence of the English papers.

Unfortunately a feeble ministry, wishing to have peace, but in continual dread of the war-party, affrighted at the noise which had been made about the invasion of Switzerland, committed the fault of countermanding the evacuation of Malta. From that moment peace was irrevocably sacrificed, because this rich prey of Malta at once became an object indicated to English ambition; and it was no longer possible to deny the gratification. The promptitude and moderation of the French intervention in Switzerland having dissipated the grievance which it had created, the English ministry would have been willing to evacuate Malta, but it dared not take such a step. The first consul summoned them, in the language of justice and of wounded pride, to execute the treaty of Amiens; and summons upon summons only led to the deplorable rupture which has been just related.

Thus the English commercial aristocracy, much more active in the matter than the old aristocratic nobility, leagued with the ambitious among the Tory party, aided by French emigrants, ill restrained by a debilitated minister,—this commercial aristocracy and its associates excited to the utmost a character naturally impetuous, full of the double sentiment of the justice of his cause and of its strength; such were the real authors of the war. We believe ourselves to be correct and just in signalizing them under this view to that posterity which, in other respects, will weigh our wrongs to all in balances much more exact than our own; we say more exact, because it will hold them with cold and impassive hands.

BOOK XVII.

THE CAMP OF BOULOGNE.

MESSAGE OF THE FIRST CONSUL TO THE GREAT BODIES OF THE STATE, AND REPLY TO THE MESSAGE.—WORDS OF M. FONTANES.—VIOLENCE OF THE ENGLISH NAVY IN ITS CONDUCT TO FRENCH MERCHANT VESSELS.—REPRISALS.—THE COMMUNES AND DEPARTMENTS, BY A SPONTANEOUS MOVEMENT, OFFER TO THE GOVERNMENT FLAT-BOTTOMED BOATS, FRIGATES, AND SHIPS OF THE LINE.—GENERAL ENTHUSIASM.—RETURN OF THE FRENCH NAVY TO THE EUROPEAN SEAS.—STATE IN WHICH THE WAR PLACED THE COLONIES.—SEQUEL OF THE EXPEDITION TO ST. DOMINGO.—ATTACK OF THE YELLOW FEVER.—DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.—DEATH OF THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL LECLERC.—INSURRECTION OF THE BLACKS.—DEFINITIVE RUIN OF THE COLONY OF ST. DOMINGO.—RETURN OF THE SQUADRONS.—CHARACTER OF THE WAR BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.—FORCES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES COMPARED.—THE FIRST CONSUL RESOLVES BOLDLY TO ATTEMPT A DESCENT.—HE PREPARES FOR IT WITH EXTRAORDINARY ACTIVITY.—CONSTRUCTION OF VESSELS IN THE DIFFERENT PORTS AND IN THE INTERIOR BASINS OF THE RIVERS.—FORMATION OF SIX CAMPS WITH TROOPS, FROM THE TEXEL TO BAYONNE.—FINANCIAL MEANS.—THE FIRST CONSUL WILL NOT HAVE RECOURSE TO A LOAN.—SALE OF LOUISIANA.—SUBSIDIES OF ALLIES.—CONCURRENCE OF HOLLAND, ITALY, AND SPAIN.—INCAPACITY OF SPAIN.—THE FIRST CONSUL DISPENSES WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF ST. ILDEFONSO, UPON THE CONDITION OF A SUBSIDY.—OCCUPATION OF OTRANTO AND OF HANOVER.—MANNER OF THINKING AMONG ALL THE POWERS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NEW WAR.—AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA.—THEIR ANXIETIES AND VIEWS.—RUSSIA PRETENDS TO LIMIT THE MEANS OF THE BELLIGERENT POWERS.—SHE OFFERS HER MEDIATION, WHICH THE FIRST CONSUL ACCEPTS WITH CALCULATING EAGERNESS.—ENGLAND REPLIES COLDLY TO THE OFFERS OF RUSSIA.—DURING THESE INTERCHANGES OF COMMUNICATION, THE FIRST CONSUL SETS OUT ON A JOURNEY TO THE COASTS OF FRANCE, IN ORDER TO PRESS FORWARD THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE GRAND EXPEDITION.—MADAM BONAPARTE ACCOMPANIES HIM.—THE MOST ACTIVE LABOUR IS MINGLED WITH THE POMPS OF ROYALTY.—AMIENS, ABBEVILLE, BOULOGNE.—MEANS DEVISED BY THE FIRST CONSUL TO TRANSPORT AN ARMY FROM CALAIS TO DOVER.—THREE SPECIES OF VESSELS.—THEIR QUALITIES AND DEFECTS.—FLOTILLA OF WAR AND FLOTILLA OF TRANSPORT.—IMMENSE MARITIME ESTABLISHMENT RAISED AT BOULOGNE, AS IF BY ENCHANTMENT.—PROJECT TO CONCENTRATE TWO THOUSAND VESSELS AT BOULOGNE, WHEN THE CONSTRUCTION SHALL BE COMPLETED IN THE PORTS AND RIVERS.—PREFERENCE GIVEN TO BOULOGNE BEFORE DUNKIRK OR CALAIS.—THE STRAITS, THE WINDS, AND THE CURRENTS.—EXCAVATIONS OF THE PORTS OF BOULOGNE, ETAPLES, WIMEREAUX, AND AMBLETEUSE.—WORKS DESTINED TO PROTECT THE ANCHORAGE.—DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS ALONG THE SEA-SHORE.—THEIR LABOUR AND MILITARY EXERCISES.—THE FIRST CONSUL, AFTER HAVING SEEN AND REGULATED ALL THINGS NECESSARY, QUITS BOULOGNE TO VISIT DUNKIRK, CALAIS, OSTEND, AND ANTWERP.—PROJECTS REGARDING ANTWERP.—SOJOURN AT BRUSSELS.—ASSEMBLAGE IN THAT CITY OF MINISTERS, AMBASSADORS, AND BISHOPS.—CARDINAL CAPRARA IN BELGIUM.—JOURNEY OF M. LIMBARD TO BRUSSELS, THE SECRETARY OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—THE FIRST CONSUL ENDEAVOURS TO REMOVE THE FEARS OF KING FREDERICK WILLIAM, BY THE FRANKNESS OF HIS COMMUNICATIONS.—RETURN TO PARIS.—THE FIRST CONSUL TERMINATES THE MEDIATION OF RUSSIA, AND ANNOUNCES WAR TO THE UTMOST EXTREMITY AGAINST ENGLAND.—HE IS AT LAST OBLIGED TO OBTAIN AN EXPLANATION FROM THE KING OF SPAIN, AND TO FORCE THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY OF ST. ILDEFONSO, LEAVING HIM THE CHOICE OF THE MEANS.—STRANGE CONDUCT OF THE PRINCE OF THE PEACE.—THE FIRST CONSUL TAKES THE STEP, IN REGARD TO THE KING OF SPAIN, OF DENOUNCING TO HIM THE FAVOURITE AND HIS BASENESS.—MELANCHOLY ABASEMENT OF THE COURT OF SPAIN.—SHE SUBMITS, AND PROMISES A SUBSIDY.—CONTINUATION OF THE PREPARATIONS AT BOULOGNE.—THE FIRST CONSUL FEELS DISPOSED TO EXECUTE HIS ENTERPRIZE IN THE WINTER OF 1803.—HE MAKES FOR HIMSELF A TEMPORARY RESIDENCE NEAR BOULOGNE, AT PONT-AU-BRIQUES, WHERE HE FREQUENTLY MAKES HIS VISITS.—UNION IN THE CHANNEL OF ALL THE DIVISIONS OF THE FLOTILLA.—BRILLIANT COMBAT OF THE GUN-BOATS AGAINST THE BRIGS AND FRIGATES.—CONFIDENCE ACQUIRED IN THE EXPEDITION.—INTIMATE UNION OF THE SOLDIERS AND SEAMEN.—HOPE OF THE APPROACHING EXECUTION OF THE DESIGN.—UNEXPECTED EVENTS, WHICH FOR A MOMENT RECALL THE ATTENTION OF THE FIRST CONSUL TO THE AFFAIRS OF THE INTERIOR.

THE taste for war which it may be naturally supposed was possessed by the first consul, would have tended to render him suspected by the public opinion of France, and perhaps made him be accused of too much precipitation in coming to a rupture, if England, by the manifest violation of the treaty of Amiens, had not completely acquitted him of the charge. For it was evident to every mind that she had not been able to resist the temptation of appropriating Malta to herself, and thus of procuring some compensation for French greatness by means not very legitimate. The French people then accepted the rupture as a necessity both of honour and interest, although they made no allusion to the consequences. It was well known that a war with England might always become a war with Europe; that its duration was as incalculable as its extent, because it was not as facile to go and finish the contest in London as it was to go and terminate at the gates of Vienna a quarrel with Austria. Such a war, it was more, could not fail to do a mortal injury to commerce,

because the sea would soon be closed. Nevertheless, there were two considerations which much lessened the chagrin of France. Under such a chief as Napoleon, war could not any more be the signal for new internal disorders, and people flattered themselves, that by the assistance of something marvellous in his genius, a single blow might terminate the long rivalry of the two nations.

The first consul, who upon this occasion wished to take great care in managing public opinion, conducted himself as he would have been enabled to do in the representative government that was more anciently established. He convoked the senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate, and communicated to them all those papers relating to the negotiation which it was necessary should be known. He was able, in fact, to dispense with all concealment in what, with the exception of some display of warmth in temper, he had in reality nothing with which to reproach himself. The three bodies of the state replied to the advances of the first consul, by means of their deputations, which were ordered to carry to the head of the government the most complete approbation of his measures. An individual, who excelled in that species of eloquence, studied and grave, which sits so well on one who is at the head of a great assembly, M. de Fontanes, recently introduced into the legislative body through the influence of the Bonaparte family, came to express to the first consul the sentiments of that body, and addressed him in terms fit to be recorded in history.

"France," said he, "is ready again to place herself under the protection of those weapons which have before vanquished Europe. Evil befall the ambitious government which recalls us to the field of battle, and, envying humanity so short an interval of repose, would again plunge it into the calamities from which it had but just before escaped. England will no more be able to say that she defends the conservative principles of society—menaced in their very foundations; it is we who are now able to use that language, if the flame of war be again kindled; it is we who shall then avenge the rights of the people and the cause of humanity in repelling the unjust attack of a nation which enters into a negotiation for the purpose of deception; that asks for peace only to recommence war, and signs treaties for the object of breaking them alone. Do not doubt if the signal is once given, that France will rally at a unanimous movement around the hero whom she admires. Every party that he holds in silent respect around him will dispute no more except in zeal and courage. All think that they have need of his genius, and acknowledge that he alone is able to bear the weight and the greatness of our new destinies.

"Citizen first consul, the French people will in future have sentiments as lofty and heroic as your own. It conquered before in order to obtain peace; it desired it as you do, but, as with you, it will never feel apprehension from the chances of war. England believes herself well protected by the ocean; why will she not reflect that the world sometimes produces men of rare power, of whom their genius executes that which, before they made their appearance, was deemed impossible to human skill? And if one of these rare men should now have come before the world, ought she to bid him an imprudent defiance, and force him to obtain all that justice from his good fortune which he had a right to expect he should receive at her hands! A great people are capable of performing every thing with a hero at their head, determined never to separate from him its glory, interests, and happiness."

In this brilliant and pointed language it is not possible to recognize the enthusiasm of 1789, but there may be traced in it the immense confidence that all the world reposed in the hero who held in his hand the destinies of France, and from whom it awaited that humiliation of England which was so ardently desired. One circumstance, easy besides to foresee, singularly increased the public indignation. Almost at the moment of the departure of the two ambassadors, before any regular manifestation or any notice whatever of the commencement of hostilities, the vessels of the English navy were let loose upon the commerce of France. Two frigates, in the bay of Audierne, captured some merchant vessels that were seeking a shelter in the harbour of Brest. To these acts there were soon added many others, of which intelligence was received in all the ports. This was a violence little in conformity with the law of nations. There had been a formal stipulation on the subject in the last treaty signed between America and France on the 30th of September, 1800, art. 8; there was no parallel example, it is true, in the treaty of Amiens. That treaty did not stipulate, in case of rupture, any delay in commencing hostilities against the commerce of either country. But this delay naturally resulted from the moral principles of the law of nations, which must be placed far above all their written stipulations. The first consul, in whom this new situation of affairs called up all the natural ardour of his character, determined to use reprisals at the same moment, and drew up a decree which declared prisoners of war all the English who were travelling in France at the moment of the rupture. When they made fall upon simple merchants, innocent of the politics of their own government, the consequences of those politics, the government is fully authorized to retaliate, and to assure itself the means of exchange by constituting prisoners of war the subjects of England actually remaining upon the French soil. This measure, although prompted by the conduct of Great Britain, nevertheless presented a character of rigour which it was probable might shock public opinion, and raise the fear of a return to the violences of the last war. Cambacérès remonstrated strongly on the subject with the first consul, and obtained a modification of the projected dispositions. Thanks to these efforts, the dispositions only applied to those British subjects who served in the militia, or who held any commission whatever from their government; these were to be prisoners of war; the rest were simply to be prisoners upon their parole in different fortified towns.

[1] This decree was dated Paris, May 25th, 1803, and was as follows:—

"The maritime prefect of Brest having announced the capture by the English of two vessels in the bay of Audierne, it is in consequence decreed as follows:—

"Art. 1.—It is prescribed to every commander of a squa

A considerable commotion was soon visible throughout all France. Since the last century, that is to say, since the English navy had appeared to gain an advantage over the French, the idea of terminating by an invasion the maritime rivalry of the two nations had entered into every mind. Louis XVI. and the directory had made preparations for such a descent. The directory, more especially, had kept during many years a certain number of flat-bottomed boats on the coasts of the channel; and it must be remembered, that in 1801, not long before the signature of the preliminaries of peace, the admiral Latouche-Tréville had repulsed the reiterated efforts of Nelson to carry away by boarding the flotilla of Boulogne. It was a sort of tradition become popular, that with flat-bottomed boats an army might be transported from Calais to Dover. By a move altogether electric, the departments and the large towns, each according to its means, offered the government flat-bottomed boats, corvettes, frigates, and even vessels of the line. The department of Loiret was first taken with this patriotic idea. It imposed upon itself a sum of 300,000f. in order to construct and arm a frigate of thirty guns. At this signal the communes, the departments, and even the corporations, answered to the same call, at one universal impulse. The mayors of Paris opened subscriptions, which were soon covered with a multitude of signatures. Among the models of the boats proposed by the navy, there were many of different dimensions, costing each from 8000f. to 30,000f.

Each locality was enabled in consequence to proportion its zeal to the means which it possessed of meeting it. The small towns, such as Coutances, Bernay, Louviers, Valogne, Foix, Verdun, Moissac, gave simple flat-bottomed boats of the first or second dimensions. The more considerable towns voted frigates, and even vessels of the line. Paris voted a vessel of a hundred and twenty guns, Lyons one of a hundred, Bordeaux one of eighty, and Marseilles one of seventy-four. These gifts of the cities were independent of those made by the departments; thus, although Bordeaux had offered a vessel of eighty guns, the department of the Gironde subscribed 1,600,000f. to be employed in naval construction. Although Lyons had given a vessel of a hundred guns, the department of the Rhône added a patriotic gift, amounting to one-eighth of its contributions in taxes. The department of the Nord added a million to the funds voted by the city of Lille. The departments generally imposed upon themselves a gift from 200,000f. up to 900,000f. or a million. Some brought their contributions in merchandize of the country which was necessary for naval purposes. Thus the department of the Côte d'Or made a present to the state of a hundred pieces of cannon of large calibre, which were cast at Creuzot. The department of the Lot and Garonne agreed to an addition of five centimes to their direct contributions, during the payments of the years XI. and XII., to be expended in sail-cloth in the department. The Italian republic, following this impulse, made an offering to the first consul of four millions of francs in Milanese currency, to construct two frigates, to be called the President and the Italian Republic, and twelve gun-boats, to bear the names of the twelve Italian departments. The great bodies of the state would not remain behind, and the senate presented on its own part a vessel of a hundred and twenty guns. The simple commercial houses, as the house of Barillon, the persons employed in the finance department, such as the receivers-general for example, offered flat-bottomed boats. Such a resource was not to be despised, because it amounted in value altogether to 40,000,000f., which, upon a budget of 500,000,000f., was of very great importance. Joined to the price of Louisiana, which was 60,000,000f., to the different subsidies obtained from the allies, and to the natural augmentation of the produce of the taxes, it enabled the government to dispense with having recourse to any expensive means of raising money, and nearly impossible at such a moment that of borrowing upon stock.

The creation of the flotilla will shortly be detailed. It was to be capable of carrying one hundred and fifty thousand men, four hundred pieces of cannon, and ten thousand horses, which could not fail to complete in a moment the conquest of England, if it made the passage. For the present it suffices to state, that the conditions imposed by the navy for the dimensions of the flat-bottomed boats of all sizes were, that they should not draw more than six or seven feet of water when all was on board, and when empty not more than three or four. They were thus able to be set afloat upon all the rivers of France, and to descend to their mouths, to be afterwards united in the ports of the channel, and sent along the coast. This was a great advantage, because the ports of France would not have been equal, from their want of timber, planks, and workmen, to the construction of 1500 or 2000 vessels, which it would be necessary to complete in a few months. By constructing them in the interior of the country, this difficulty was removed; the banks of the Gironde, of the Loire, the Seine, the Somme, the Oise, the Schelde, the Meuse, and the Rhine, were suddenly covered with timber-yards. The workmen of the country, directed by the masters' mates of the navy, sufficed perfectly well to achieve these singular creations, which at first astonished the population,

dron or division of republican ships, to attack all those of the king of England and his subjects, and to bring them into the ports of the republic.

"Art. 2.—Commissions shall be delivered to the owners of French privateers, conformably to the existing laws and regulations.

"Art. 3.—All the English enrolled in the militia between the ages of eighteen and sixty, or who hold commissions from his Britannic majesty, now in France, shall be immediately constituted prisoners of war, to answer for the citizens of the republic who may have been detained and made prisoners by the vessels or subjects of his Britannic majesty before the declaration of war. It is with reluctance that the government of the republic has seen itself compelled, in order to make reprisals, to declare prisoners of war all the English who are in the French territory. It will leave to England the task of commencing every thing illiberal; but the French people are bound to act towards England as England acts with respect to France."

Every officer bearing an English commission and a prisoner of war, was entitled to and had his parole. What difference our author can make between these and others in this treatment, it is not easy to discover; there was really none.—*Translator.*

at times furnishing them with subjects of raillery, but that soon, nevertheless, became for England the cause of serious alarm. At Paris, from La Rapée to the Invalids, there were ninety gunboats building, in the construction of which were employed more than a thousand workmen.

The first care taken upon the breaking out of the new war was to rally the French navy, then spread over the West Indies, and occupied in reducing the colonies under the authority of the mother country. It was to this that Napoleon had directed his first thoughts. He felt himself obliged instantly to recall the different squadrons, ordering them to leave at Martinique, at Guadaloupe, and at St. Domingo, all that they could spare of men, munitions, and stores. The frigates and light vessels were alone to remain in the islands. But it was not possible to deceive himself. The war with England, if she were unable to capture the smaller islands, such as Guadaloupe and Martinique [1], must infallibly occasion the loss of the most precious of them all, that for the preservation of which an army had been sacrificed, it is needless to say, that allusion is here made to St. Domingo.

It has already been seen, that the captain-general, Leclerc, after operations exceedingly well conducted upon his part, but with the loss of a considerable number of men, had become master of the colony, and able to flatter himself that he had restored it to France; that Toussaint had retired to his habitation of Ennery, regarding the month of August as the term of the reign of the Europeans on the soil of Hayti. This terrible black had predicted justly, in foreseeing the triumph of the climate of America over that of the soldiers of Europe. But he was not to enjoy his triumph, since he was destined to succumb himself under the rigour of the French climate. Melancholy retaliation in the war of two races, obstinate in disputing between them the regions of the equator!

Scarcely had the army begun to re-establish itself, than the plague, so common in these burning regions, but this year more murderous than ever, made its appearance, and struck down the noble soldiers of the Rhine and of Egypt, who had been conveyed to the Antilles. Whether the climate this year, by some unknown decree of Providence, was more destructive than ordinary; whether its action was more great and rapid upon the fatigued and toil-worn soldiers, accumulated together in considerable numbers, thus forming a more powerful focus of infection; or whatever might be the cause, death seized upon them with a rapidity and violence of the most frightful character. Twenty generals were taken off nearly at the same time; the officers and soldiers perished by thousands. To twenty-two thousand men that arrived in the various expeditions, of whom five thousand had fallen in action, and five thousand had been attacked with various disorders, the first consul had added, towards the end of 1802, about twelve thousand men more. Those who had newly arrived were attacked at the moment of their disembarkation. Fifteen thousand men perished in less than two months, and the army was reduced to nine or ten thousand only, acclimated, it is true, but the greater part of them convalescent, and very unfit at the moment to take up arms [1].

On the first ravages of the yellow fever, Toussaint Louverture, enchanted to see his sinister predictions realized, seemed to feel the renewal of all his hopes. From the retirement of his residence at Ennery, he set himself to correspond secretly with his confidential friends, ordering them to keep ready, recommending them to inform him exactly what progress the sickness was making, and more particularly of the state of health of the captain-general, upon whose head his cruel impatience was eager for the fever to strike the blow. His secret practices were not so well concealed but that some of them reached the ears of the captain-general, and more particularly the black generals. These hastened to inform the French authorities of it. They were jealous of Toussaint, though all of them obeyed him, and this feeling had not a little contributed to their prompt submission. Those "gilt blacks," or *noirs dorés*, as they were denominated by Napoleon, were content with the ease and the opulence which they enjoyed. They had no desire to recommence the war, and they feared to see Toussaint, again become all powerful, make them expiate their desertion of his cause. They therefore made known what they knew to general Leclerc, in order to engage him to seize the recent dictator. The concealed act contemplated by Toussaint, revealed itself in an alarming manner. The negroes who formerly composed his guard, and who were scattered abroad among the colonial troops which had passed over to the service of the mother country, quitted their ranks to return, they said, to the cultivation of the ground, but in reality, to throw themselves into the Mornes around Ennery. The captain-general, pressed between a double danger, the yellow fever, which destroyed his army, on one hand, and on the other by the revolt, which was announced on every side as about to take place, having also instructions from the first consul, which enjoined him, on the first sign of disobedience, to disembarrass himself of the black chiefs, resolved to have Toussaint arrested. Besides these orders, intercepted letters sufficiently authorized this step. But it was necessary to dissimulate in order to seize this potent chief, surrounded as he was already by an army of insurgents. A demand was made of him in the way of advice, regarding the best means of making the negroes who had escaped from the cultivation of the land return to their duty, and about the choice of the best stations for re-establishing the health of the army. This was the means of drawing Toussaint to an interview, because it attracted his vanity to be thus consulted. "You see," said

[1] Both were subsequently lost to France, but came into her possession again by restoration in the peace of 1814.—*Translator.*

[1] This is an enormous mortality, even for the West Indies, and must be ascribed to some unusual cause, besides the landing at an improper season. At a period of more than usual sickness in Jamaica, the deaths of the soldiers at Up Hill Camp, for six years, averaged only one in five, in other stations one in six, seven, or eight; in the healthier stations of the island, one in ten, fourteen, or sixteen; and on the height of Maroon town, in the interior, only one in sixty-four. One in three have died on severe visits of fever in a very unhealthy season.

he, "these whites cannot get on without old Toussaint." He attended the place of rendezvous accordingly, surrounded by a troop of blacks. Scarcely had he arrived before he was laid hold of, disarmed, and conducted as a prisoner on board a vessel. Surprised, abashed, yet resigned, he said nothing but a few fine words:—"In overthrowing me, you have only overthrown the trunk of the tree of negro liberty; but the roots remain; they will push out again, because they are numerous, and go deep into the soil." He was sent to Europe, where he was kept in the fort of Joux.

Unhappily, the spirit of insurrection had propagated itself among the blacks; it had entered into their hearts, from a distrust of the object of the whites, and with the hope to conquer them. The news of what had happened at Guadaloupe, where slavery had been re-established, had reached as far as St. Domingo, and had produced there a most extraordinary impression. Certain words pronounced in the tribune of the French legislative body, on the re-establishment of slavery in the Antilles,—words which could only be applicable to Martinique and Guadaloupe, but which they were able, with a little mistrust, to extend to St. Domingo, had contributed to inspire the blacks with the conviction that it was intended to reduce them again into slavery. From the simple cultivators of the ground up to the generals, the idea of falling again under the yoke of slavery made them tremble with indignation[1]. Some of the black officers, more civilized, more worthy of new fortunes, such as Laplume, Clervaux, even Christophe, who did not aspire, as Toussaint had done, to be dictators in the island, accommodated themselves perfectly to the state of things, that gave the predominance to the mother country, provided she would respect the liberty of their race; and they expressed themselves with a warmth which did not permit any doubt of the real state of their sentiments. "We are willing," they said, "to remain French and submit; to serve the mother country faithfully, because we do not desire to recommence a life of rapine; but if the mother country intends to make slaves of our brethren and our children, she must make up her mind to slaughter us to the last man." General Leclerc, whom their fidelity much affected, put them in confidence for some days, when he declared, upon his honour, that the intentions ascribed to the whites were utterly unfounded; but at bottom the distrust had become incurable. Although the general-in-chief did this, it was impossible to tranquillize them. If Laplume and Clervaux, sincerely attached to the mother country, reasoned as is here stated, Dessalines, a real monster, such as might well be supposed to have been formed by slavery and by revolt, only thought of urging on with deep perfidy the blacks upon the whites, and the whites upon the blacks, to irritate the one by means of the other, and to triumph in the midst of the general massacre, in order to replace Toussaint Louverture, of whom he had been the first to demand the arrest.

In this fearful perplexity, the captain-general having no more than a feeble part of his army left, of the remains of which he saw some perish every day, menaced at the same time by an approaching insurrection, believed it was his duty to disarm the negroes. This measure appeared but reasonable and necessary. The black chiefs who were faithful, as Laplume and Clervaux, approved of it; the black chiefs, filled with perfidious purposes, such as Dessalines, urged the measure forward with warmth. It was proceeded with immediately, and demanded a degree of violence to succeed. Many of the negroes fled away into the Mornes, others sooner suffered themselves to be tortured than resign their muskets, which they regarded as identical with their liberty itself. The black officers, in particular, showed themselves unrelenting in this species of search and exaction. They had many men of their own colour shot; some acting in this manner in order to prevent a renewal of the war, and others, on the contrary, to excite it. There were procured in this way, notwithstanding, about thirty thousand muskets, the greater part of English make, purchased through the foresight of Toussaint. These vigorous proceedings excited insurrections in the north and in the west, even to the environs of Port-au-Prince. The nephew of Toussaint, Charles Belair, a black, who had a certain superiority, like those of his relative, in his manner, mind, and intelligence, and who, for these reasons, his uncle would have made his successor,—Charles Belair, irritated at some executions which had taken place in the western department, threw himself into the Mornes, and raised the flag of revolt. Dessalines, then resident at St. Marc, requested very earnestly to be ordered in his pursuit, and thus gave a double occasion of showing the deceptive zeal which he put on, at the same time avenging himself upon a rival, who had been the cause of great suspicions to himself. He therefore directed against him a war of the most obstinate character. He succeeded in capturing Belair and his unfortunate wife, and sent both one and the other before a military commission, which ordered these two unfortunate persons to be shot. Dessalines excused his conduct to the blacks by alleging the unrelenting purposes of the white people, and, at the same time, profiting not less by the occasion to get rid of one whom he abhorred. Horrible atrocities, which prove that the passions of the human heart are every where the same, and that

[1] What could be more natural than such an effect? It was a just inference, that those who had restored slavery in the other islands, from the facility of its restoration there, would restore it in St. Domingo, if they possessed the power. It was also an irresistible conclusion, that those who made professions based only upon the inability of acting opposite to them at the moment, would take the first opportunity of violating those professions; and therefore the blacks were justified in securing themselves by every means. Had the French, establishing themselves by their overwhelming force in Guadaloupe and Martinique, made the slaves in those islands free labourers, they would have kept St. Domingo. England may congratulate herself on her own wisdom in slave emancipation, when she contemplates this picture of a government acting justly only upon compulsion, and unjustly upon choice; preferring policy to justice in a matter of humanity, and by adopting a conduct morally wrong on the same question in one place, from possessing power to do so, and morally right in another, from not having the power of doing wrong, commending the poisoned chalice to its own lips. Would, in the affairs of all governments, the result could be the same, then there might at last be seen that analogy so long desired between moral and political justice!—*Trans.*

climate, time, or the differences of visage, do not make a sensible difference in the character of man! All now seemed to portend a revolt of the blacks; the sombre mistrust which made itself apparent among them, the vigorous precautions it was necessary to take in regard to them, and the ferocious passions which divided them,—passions which were obliged to be suffered, and often even to be employed.

To these unfortunate circumstances in situation, there were faults, due to the confusion that reigned, that the sickness, the danger appearing every where at the same time, and the difficulty of communicating between one part of the island and another, had begun to introduce into the colony. General Boudet had been before taken from Port-au-Prince, in order to be sent to the windward islands, that he might replace general Richepanse, who had died of the yellow fever. General Rochambeau had then been substituted for him, a brave soldier, as intelligent as he was intrepid, but he had contracted in the colonies in which he had served, all the prejudices of the creoles who inhabited them; he hated the mulattos as did the former colonists themselves. He declared them dissolute, violent, and cruel. He said that he loved the blacks better, because, according to him, they were more simple, more sober, more hardy in war. General Rochambeau, commanding at Port-au-Prince and in the south, where mulattos abounded, showed regarding them, on the approach of the insurrection, as much mistrust as he had of the blacks, and imprisoned them in great numbers. He still more increased their irritation by sending away general Rigaud, the former chief of the mulattos, for a long while the rival and enemy of Toussaint, vanquished and expelled by him, who naturally profiting by the victory of the whites to return to St. Domingo, was entitled to hope for a good reception. But the error which the whites had committed in St. Domingo at the commencement of the revolution, in not having allied themselves with the people of colour, they persisted in to the end. General Rochambeau repelled general Rigaud, and ordered him to embark again for the United States. The mulattos, offended and aggrieved, tended from that time to unite themselves to the blacks, which was a vexatious thing, more especially in the south, where they were the most numerous class.

These causes united, made the insurrection general, which at first was only partial. In the north, Clervaux, Maurepas, and Christophe, fled into the Mornes, not without expressing their regret, but led on by a sentiment much stronger in their bosoms, the love of their liberty, which was threatened. In the west, the barbarous Dessalines, flinging off the mask, joined those who were in a state of revolt. In the south, the mulattos uniting themselves with the blacks, gave themselves to the ravage of that fine province, which until then had stood untouched and flourishing, as in the finest times of the colony. No one remained faithful but Laplume, definitively attached to the mother country, preferring it to the barbarous government of the men of his own colour.

The French army, reduced to eight or ten thousand men, scarcely in a state to serve, possessed no more territory in the north than the Cape and some of its surrounding positions; in the west, Port-au-Prince and St. Marc; and in the south, Les Cayes, Jeremie, and Tiburon. The anguish of mind of the unfortunate general Leclerc, was extreme. He had his wife with him, whom he had sent to Turtle Island, in order to keep her out of the way of the pestilence. He had seen perish the wise and able M. Benezech, with some of the most distinguished generals of the armies of the Rhine and Italy; he had just learned the death of general Richepanse; he was present every day at the deaths of his most valiant soldiers, without the power to aid them, and now felt the moment rapidly approaching, when he should no longer be able to defend against the blacks the small part of the territory that remained in his possession. Tormented by these grievous reflections, he was more exposed than any other person to the attacks of the malady that was destroying the army. In fact, he was at last seized in his turn. After a short illness, which, taking the character of a continued fever, finished by destroying all the strength he had left, he expired, never ceasing to speak in the finest manner, and not appearing occupied with any thing but his wife and his companions in arms, that he left behind him in such a frightful situation. He died in November, 1802.

General Rochambeau took the command, as the officer of senior rank. It was not bravery nor military talent that was wanting to the new governor of the colony, but the prudence, and the coolness of a chief who was a stranger to all the passions of the tropics. General Rochambeau thought to be able to repress the insurrection every where; but he had now no time for such a purpose. At most, if he had concentrated his forces at the Cape, and abandoned the west and south, he might have been able to sustain himself there, but desiring to keep a front upon all points at once, he was able to do no more on any than to make energetic and unavailing efforts. He had returned to the Cape in order to take the chief command. He arrived there at the same moment as Christophe, Clervaux, and other black chiefs of the north, had made an attack, and attempted to take this capital of the island. General Rochambeau had no force to defend the place except a few hundred soldiers and the national guard of the Cape, composed of landed proprietors, brave as all the men of those countries are. Christophe and Clervaux had already taken one of the forts; general Rochambeau retook it with uncommon gallantry, seconded by the energy of the national guards, who comported themselves so well, that the blacks, thinking a fresh army had reinforced the island, beat a retreat. During this heroic defence, there passed in the roads a most frightful scene. Upwards of twelve hundred blacks had been sent on board the vessels, as it was not known how to guard them on shore, and to suffer them to go away would have been to reinforce the enemy. The crews of the ships, decimated by the fever, were become weaker than their prisoners. At the moment of the attack on the Cape by the blacks, fearing to be murdered by them, the crews, it must be stated with horror, threw overboard a good part of their prisoners, and they perished in the waves. At the same time, in the southern part of the island, a mulatto, named Bardet, was subjected to

the same treatment, being drowned merely from an unjust and atrocious mistrust of his intentions. From that day the mulattos, until then wavering, joined the negroes, slaughtered the whites, and completed the ravage and ruin of the fine southern district of the island.

Terminating here these gloomy details, in which history has nothing more useful to record—at the epoch of the renewal of the war between France and England—the French, shut up at the Cape, at Port-au-Prince, and Aux Cayes, defended themselves with great difficulty against the blacks and mulattos united. The European war then came to add to their despair. They had only to choose between the blacks, more ferocious than ever, and the English, who were before the island, and they were obliged to surrender to them, being sent as prisoners to England, after having been despoiled of the wrecks of their property [1].

Of from thirty to thirty-two thousand men sent from the mother country, there did not remain more than eight thousand at the end of September. More than twenty generals perished, among them was Richepanse, the most regretted of them all. At the same time, Toussaint Louverture, that sinister prophet, who had predicted and heartily hoped for all these evils, died of cold in France, a prisoner in the fort of Joux, while the French soldiers were succumbing beneath the effects of a burning sun. But a deplorable compensation this death of a black chief of genius and talent for the loss of so many heroic whites!

Such was the sacrifice made by the first consul to the old commercial system of France, a sacrifice with which he was bitterly reproached. Still, to judge truly of the actions of the chiefs of a government, it is necessary to keep in recollection all the circumstances under which they have acted. When peace had been made with the whole world, when the notions connected with the old commercial system had re-acted like a torrent, when in Paris and in all the ports the merchants and the ruined colonists called aloud for the re-establishment of the commercial prosperity of France, when they required that the government should give back to their country a possession which had formerly been the source of riches and of pride to the old monarchy, when thousands of officers saw with mortification their active career interrupted by the peace, and were offering to serve any where that there was a need of their employment, was it possible to refuse to the requests of the one, or to the activity of the others, such an opportunity of restoring her old commercial advantages to France! What did not England do to preserve North America! Spain to preserve South America! What did not Holland do to keep Java! Nations do not suffer any of their great possessions to escape without attempting to retain them if they have no chance of success. It will be seen if the American war will serve as a lesson to the English, and if they will not attempt to defend Canada the day that this colony of the north shall give way to the natural feeling which draws it towards the United States of America.

The first consul had recalled to Europe all the ships of the expedition to the West Indies, except the frigates and light vessels. They had all come into French ports, one squadron only excepted, consisting of five sail, which had been obliged to put into Corunna. A sixth vessel had taken refuge in Cadiz. It was necessary to reunite these scattered elements, in order to undertake a contest strength to strength with England.

It was a difficult task for the most able and most solidly-established government to enter into a contest with England. Most assuredly it was easy for the first consul to place himself under the safeguard of his own power; but it was also as easy for England to place herself under her own. England and France had conquered an empire pretty nearly equal, the first on the sea, the second on the land. Hostilities begun; England displayed her flag in both hemispheres, took, perhaps, some of the Dutch and Spanish colonies, and with more difficulty some of the French. She attempted to interdict the navigation of the ocean to every people, and to arrogate it to herself exclusively. But by herself she could do no more. The appearance of English troops upon the continent had only been to her the source of such disasters as that of the Halder in 1799. France, on her side, was able, either by force or by influence, to interdict to England the shores of the European continent from Copenhagen to Venice; to reduce her merely to touch the shores of the Baltic; to oblige her to cause a descent from the heights of the pole, of those colonial productions of which, during war, she became the sole depository [1]. But in this contest of two great

[1] The French held out until September, with a constancy and bravery worthy of a better cause. St. Marc was besieged by Dessalines, and the place reduced to the last extremity of misery. Captain Walker, of the Vanguard, seventy-four, being off the coast, interfered to prevent his putting the garrison to death. He engaged the black chief to march the garrison to the Mole, and he would take them off, and secure the shipping; but the French commander, general Hunin, sent a flag of truce on board, and then came off himself. The garrison was safely embarked; it had long lived upon horse-flesh. The number was 850. At Aux Cayes the commander entered into a convention with the British officers off the coast. Port Dauphin was taken by the Theseus man-of-war; the acting commandant, surrendering at discretion, was embarked with most of the inhabitants, and landed under a flag of truce at the Cape, by captain Bligh of that ship. He afterwards spiked the guns, and brought away a frigate, called La Sagesse, which he had found there. Captain Bligh was fortunate enough to recover general Dumont and suite, who had fallen into the hands of the blacks, and he was also sent to the Cape. General Rochambeau behaved in a manner no way reflecting credit upon his character, at the surrender of the Cape. He had entered into a treaty with Dessalines for the surrender of the forts and town, and after the blacks were partially admitted, treated with the English, who were fortunately enabled to save the garrison. Dessalines would have sunk them all with red-hot shot; they were saved with great difficulty by the English. General Noailles also surrendered to the British at the Mole. The French troops were all sent to Jamaica, with the frigates and other light vessels captured in the harbours. —*Translator.*

[1] The disadvantage here is greater to the continent than to England. The carriage of goods or produce into the Baltic from England is the merest trifle additional, which is inevitably charged on the continental consumer, who has to pay, in addition, for the internal carriage of such goods or produce from the port where it is consigned; so that France, by this exclusive scheme, taxed the people of the continent grievously, while she did little comparative mischief to England.—*Translator.*

powers, that dominate each upon one of two elements, without the means of going beyond their bounds to combat each other, it was to be feared that, as they were hardly induced to menace without striking, the world, oppressed by them, would not remain without revolting against one or the other, with the object of putting an end to the continuance of such a fearful quarrel.

In similar circumstances, success would appertain to that power which knew how to pass out of the element in which she governed in order to reach her rival; and if such an effort became impossible, to that which knew how to render her cause sufficiently popular in the world to gain over a party. To attach any of the nations to themselves was difficult for either to effect, because England, in order to monopolize commerce, had been induced to trouble the neutral powers; and France, in order to close the continent against the commerce of England, had been induced to offer violence to all the European states. It was then necessary, if the conquest of England was resolved upon, to solve all of these problems; either how to pass the ocean and march to London, or how to domineer over the continent, and oblige it, whether by force or policy, to refuse all British produce; to realize, in one word, either a descent or a continental blockade. It will be seen, in the course of this history, by what a chain of events Napoleon was successively carried from the first of these enterprises to the second; by what a chain of prodigies he at first approached his object, and was near its attainment; by what a combination of faults and misfortunes he subsequently fell away from it, and finished by succumbing. Happily, before the arrival of that deplorable term, France had done such things, that a nation to which providence has permitted similar accomplishments must remain for ever glorious; perhaps the greatest among the nations.

These are the proportional differences which the character of the war between France and England would inevitably take. The war had been from 1792 to 1801 the contest of the principles of democracy against those of aristocracy; without ceasing still to carry that character, it had become, under Napoleon, the contest of one element against another, with much more difficulty on the side of the French than of the English, because the entire continent, through its hatred for the French revolution, and from jealousy of the power of France, hated France much more than the neutrals detested England.

With his piercing glance the first consul soon perceived how the war bore, and he took his resolution unhesitatingly. He formed the design of passing the straits of Dover with an army, and of terminating in London even the rivalry of the two nations. He will be seen during three consecutive years applying all his faculties to this prodigious enterprise, and remaining calm, confident, even happy, so much was he filled with confidence, in the front of an attempt which must conduct him either to the absolute mastership of the world, or to the engulfment of himself, his army, and his glory, deep to the bottom of the ocean.

It will be said, perhaps, that Louis XIV. and Louis XVI. had not been reduced to such a necessity for entering into a contest with England, and that numerous fleets disputing on the plain of the ocean with her were sufficient for their objects. But it may be replied, that from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, England had not yet seized upon universal commerce, nor acquired the largest maritime population upon the globe, and that the means of the two navies were much less unequal. The first consul had decided to make immense efforts to restore the French navy; but he much doubted of success, although he possessed a vast extent of sea-shore—although he had at his disposition the ports and building-yards of Holland, Belgium, old France, and Italy. It is needless also to add those of Spain, which were at that time too miserably managed to be a useful ally. He had not, counting all his naval strength, actually united but little more than fifty ships of the line to send to sea in the course of the year. He was able to procure four or five in Holland; twenty-one or two in Brest; two at Lorient; six at Rochelle; five in port at Corunna; one at Cadiz; and ten or twelve at Toulon; in all about fifty. With the timber which covered his extensive empire, and which arrived, descending the rivers, at the ship-yards of Holland, the Low Countries, and Italy, he was able to construct fifty other vessels of the line, and to make his glorious tricoloured flag be borne by a hundred ships of the line. But then he must have more than one hundred thousand seamen to man them, and it was with the utmost pains he could muster sixty thousand. England had seventy-five sail of the line quite ready to send to sea; it was easy for her to carry her total armament to a hundred and twenty sail, with a number of frigates and small vessels in proportion. She was able to send to sea one hundred and twenty thousand seamen, and still more, if giving up terms with the neutrals, she carried the impress into their commercial vessels. She possessed besides experienced admirals, confident, because they had conquered, who comported themselves upon the ocean as the French generals Lannes, Ney, and Masséna did upon the land.

This disproportion of the two navies, resulting from time and circumstances, was therefore very considerable; nevertheless, the first consul did not despair. He wished to build vessels every where, in the Texel, the Schelde, at Havre, Cherburgh, Brest, Toulon, and Genoa. He thought of comprehending a certain number of land soldiers in the composition of his crews, and by that means to lessen the inferiority of the French maritime population. He had been the first to perceive that a vessel having a crew of six hundred good seamen and two or three hundred well chosen landsmen, kept for two or three years at sea, exercised in manœuvring and firing, was capable of meeting any opposing force. But even in employing this means and others besides, he said it would be necessary to have ten years to create a navy. But he was not able to wait ten years with his arms crossed, that his navy, going to sea in small detachments, might in time be rendered fit to meet the English in a day of battle. To employ ten years in forming a fleet, without any thing of moment to execute in the interval, would have been a long confession of weakness grievous for any government, and more insupportable for him who had made his fortune, and who had to continue it, by dazzling the eyes of the world.

It became needful, therefore, to apply every means to reorganize the French naval force, to attempt boldly the passage of the straits, and at the same time to serve himself by the fear which his sword had inspired, in obliging Europe to shut out England from all access to the continent. If to his genius for the execution of great enterprises he joined good policy, he thought he should be able by these means united, either to destroy in London itself the British power altogether, or to ruin it at length by ruining its commerce.

Many of the French admirals, more especially the minister Decrès, advised him to proceed by a slow recomposition of the French navy, which should consist in forming small naval divisions, and in sending them to sea until they should be well enough skilled to manœuvre in large squadrons; and, at the same time, exhorted him to stop there, regarding as very doubtful all the plans devised for passing the channel. The first consul would not come into these views of the subject; he proposed as well to restore the French navy, but at the same time to make a more immediate and direct attempt to strike at England.

In consequence of this conclusion, he ordered numerous vessels to be built at Flushing, of which place he could dispose in consequence of his power over Holland; at Antwerp, which was become a French port; at Cherburg, Brest, Lorient, Toulon, and at Genoa, which France occupied in the same manner as Holland. He had the twenty-two sail of the line at Brest put in repair and made ready for sea; he had the two at Lorient completed, and the five at Rochelle set afloat and armed. He demanded means from Spain to refit and revictual the squadron that had sheltered in Corunna, and sent from Bayonne all that it was possible to get conveyed there by land in men, stores, and money. He took the same precautions respecting the vessels at Cadiz. He ordered the completion and armament of the fleet at Toulon, consisting of twelve vessels. These different squadrons, joined to three or four in Holland, thus carried up, as already observed, the naval force of France to about fifty sail of the line, without reckoning those which it might be able to obtain at a later period from the Dutch and Spanish naval forces, or counting those which it might be possible to construct in the ports of France, armed with a mixture of seamen and land soldiers. Still the first consul did not flatter himself, with such a force as this, to conquer in a regular battle the superiority or even a maritime equality in regard to England; he wished it to go to sea, and after visiting the colonies, to return, and open for a little time the straits of Dover, through the movements of squadrons, of which the deep combination will soon be judged.

It was towards the straits that he concentrated all the efforts of his genius. Whatever were the means of conveyance required, he must first have an army, and he formed the design of composing one which should leave nothing to desire in respect to number and organization; to distribute it in several camps from the Texel to the Pyrenees, and to dispose it in such a manner that he might be able to concentrate it with great rapidity upon points of the shore carefully selected for that purpose. Independently of a corps of twenty-five thousand men united between Breda and Nimeguen, to march upon Hanover, he ordered the formation of six camps, one in the environs of Utrecht, a second near Ghent, a third at St. Omer, a fourth at Compeigne, a fifth at Brest, and a sixth at Bayonne, this last destined to overawe Spain from certain motives which will be subsequently made known. He commenced by forming parks of artillery on each of the six points of assemblage, a precaution which he ordinarily took before any other, saying that he found the artillery was always the most difficult thing to organize. He then directed upon each of the camps a sufficient number of demi-brigades of infantry to carry the numbers up at least to twenty-five thousand men each. The cavalry was assembled more slowly, and in a less proportion than is customary, because, on the hypothesis of an embarkation, he would be able to carry but very few horse. It was necessary that the quality and quantity of the infantry, the excellence of the artillery, and the number of guns, should compensate in such an army for the numerical inferiority of the cavalry. In this double relation the French infantry and artillery united all the desirable conditions. The first consul had taken care to assemble on the coast, and to form in four grand divisions, all the dragoons. This class of soldiers being able to serve on foot or on horseback, would embark only with their saddles, and be useful as infantry until they were able to be mounted as horsemen, when a sufficient number of horses should be taken from the enemy.

The dispositions were made for arming and harnessing four hundred pieces of field artillery, independently of a vast park of heavy guns for sieges. The demi-brigades, which were then in three battalions, were to furnish two war battalions, each of eight hundred men, taking from the third battalion to complete the two first. The third battalion was left in depôt, to receive the conscripts, instruct and discipline them. Still a certain number of these conscripts was sent immediately to the war-battalions, so that among the old soldiers of the republic should be mingled in a sufficient proportion young soldiers, well selected, possessing the ardour, vivacity, and docility of youth.

The conscription had been definitively introduced into the French military legislation, and regulated under the directory, on the proposition of general Jourdain. The law which established it still presented some deficiencies, which had been made up by a new law of the 26th of April, 1803. The contingent had been fixed at sixty thousand men per annum, levied at the age of twenty years. This contingent was separated into two divisions, of thirty thousand men each. The first was always to be levied even in time of peace; the second formed the reserve, and might be called out, in case of war, to complete the battalions. It was the middle of the year XI., or June, 1803, that the demand was made for a right to levy the contingents of the years XI. and XII., without touching the reserve of these two years. There were then sixty thousand conscripts to take immediately. In thus calling them out in advance, there was time to instruct them, and to accustom them to the military service in the camps formed along the coasts. It was possible to recur, if needful, to the reserve of these two years, which still presented sixty thousand disposable men,

whom it would not be reckoned needful to call upon for service except in case of a continental war. Thirty thousand men demanded from each class was a trifling sacrifice, which could very little burthen the population of one hundred and nine departments. Besides, there remained to call out the contingents of the years VIII., IX., and X., which had not been required, owing to the peace enjoyed under the consulate. An arrear of men in this way is as difficult to recover as an arrear of taxes. The first consul made, upon this matter, a sort of liquidation of claims. He demanded on the contingents in arrear a certain number of men, chosen among the more robust, and the most disposable; he exempted a greater number on the coast than in the interior, imposing upon the last not called out, the duty of guarding the coasts. In this way he was able to arm still an army of fifty thousand men, older and stronger than the conscripts of the years XI. and XII. The army was thus raised to four hundred and eighty thousand men, spread over the colonies, Hanover, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and France. Of this effective body, about one hundred thousand employed to guard Italy, Holland, Hanover, and the colonies, were not maintained at the charge of the French treasury. Subsidies in money, or provisions furnished on the spot where the troops were stationed, covered the expense of their maintenance. There were three hundred and eighty-four thousand paid wholly in France, and entirely at the public disposal. The deficiencies in this number of three hundred and eighty thousand, might be reckoned forty thousand for the ordinary deficiency, in other words, for the sick, those absent for a short time, or *en route*, &c.; forty thousand for gensdarmes, veterans, invalids, and instructors; about three hundred thousand men might therefore be reckoned upon as active and disposable, disciplined, and capable of entering immediately upon active service. If of these one hundred and fifty thousand were destined for the contest in England, there still remained one hundred and fifty thousand more, of whom seventy thousand, forming the depôts, were sufficient to guard the interior, and eighty thousand might proceed towards the Rhine, in case of any inquietude arising in that part of the continent. It is not of its numbers by which the value of such an army is to be judged. These three hundred thousand men, nearly all tried men, broke in to the fatigues and toils of war, conducted by experienced officers, were worth six or seven hundred thousand, or perhaps a million, of those who are found ordinarily at the close of a long peace, because between a soldier tried and one who is not, the difference is infinite. Under this head, therefore, the first consul had nothing to desire. He commanded the finest army in the world.

The great problem next to be resolved was, the union of the means of transport, in order to transport this army from Calais to Dover. The first consul had not yet definitively arranged his ideas in this respect. One thing alone was definitively fixed upon after a long series of observations, this was the form of the vessels to be constructed. Vessels with a flat bottom, adapted to run aground, and to move with sail and oar, appeared to all the naval engineers the means best adapted for the passage; besides this, there was the advantage of being able to construct them everywhere, even in the higher basins of the rivers. But it remained to unite them, and to shelter them in ports conveniently placed, to arm and equip them; and, finally, to discover the best system of manœuvres to move them in order before the enemy. It was needful for that purpose to have a succession of long and difficult experiments. The first consul had the design of establishing himself in person at Boulogne, on the borders of the channel, to live there often and so long, as to study the places, the circumstances of the sea and weather, and to organize himself all the vast enterprise which he contemplated.

While waiting until the different works constructing in all parts of France were sufficiently advanced to make his presence upon the coast of service, he occupied himself in Paris with two essential things, the finances and the relations of France with the powers of the continent, because on one part there must be funds sufficient for his intended enterprise, and on the other, there must be the perfect certainty of not being troubled during the execution of his scheme by the continental allies of England.

The financial difficulty was not the least of the difficulties that presented themselves upon the renewal of the war. The French revolution had devoured, in the form of assignats, an immense mass of national property, and ended in bankruptcy. All the national property had been nearly consumed, and credit for a long time ruined. In order to preserve from alienation the 400,000,000f. of national property remaining in 1800, it had been divided between different public services, such as public instruction, the invalids, the legion of honour, the senate, and the sinking fund. Changed also into dotations, it aided the budget of the state, and presented an immense future value, owing to the augmentation of the worth of landed property, an augmentation constant at all times, but always greater on the morrow of a revolution. The same property too had been diminished by certain portions restored to the emigrants, not very considerable indeed, because the property not alienated had been in nearly its entire totality the property of the church. There must be added to these remains the property situated in Piedmont and in the new departments of the Rhine, valued at about 50,000,000 f. or 60,000,000 f. Such were the resources disposable in national domains. In respect to credit, the first consul was resolute in never having recourse to it. It will be remembered, that when he completed in the year IX. the liquidation of the past debts, he took advantage of the elevation of the public funds to acquit in stock a part of the arrears of the years V., VI., VII., and VIII.; but this was the sole operation of the kind he was ever willing to permit, and he paid fully and in money the liabilities of the years IX. and X. In the year X., the last budget voted, he laid it down as a principle that the public debt should never surpass 50,000,000 f. in stock, and that if such a circumstance should occur, there should be created immediately a resource to redeem the excess in fifteen years. This precaution had been deemed needful in order to sustain confidence, because in spite of a generally healthy state of things, credit

had been so much injured, that the five per cent. stock arose but little above fifty-six, and had not passed sixty at the moment when it was the highest at the peace.

For a long time in England, and for a little time in France, the public funds have been an object of regular traffic, in which the largest houses participate, always disposed to treat with the government, and to furnish it with the sums of which it may stand in need. It was not so at the epoch in question. No house in France would have expressed a wish to subscribe to a loan. It would have lost all credit in avowing that its business was connected with the state; and if the boldest speculators had consented, they would at the most have given fifty francs for stock of five, which would have exposed the treasury to support the enormous interest of ten per cent. The first consul would not have any thing to do with a resource so costly. There was then another mode of borrowing; it was to get into debt with the great companies of contractors, who had the duty of supplying the armies, by not paying them up their full demands. They indemnified themselves by charging for the different services two or three times more than the things supplied were worth. Then the bold speculators, who were fond of dealing largely, in place of attaching themselves to loans, gave themselves up with eagerness to government contracts. There was then the means in consequence, upon addressing them, of getting the supplies upon credit; but this means was yet more expensive than that of the loans themselves. The first consul meant to pay the contractors regularly, in order to oblige them to execute their contracts regularly, and at reasonable prices. He would not avail himself of any resources arising from the alienation of the national property, which could not then be sold to advantage, nor of the resource of loans, then too difficult to obtain and too costly, nor of the great contractors, a mode that brought in its train abuses difficult to calculate. He flattered himself, with great order and economy, added to the natural increase of the product of the taxes, and some accessory receipts which will be presently made known, to escape the hard necessity to which speculators and money-mongers make governments submit that are at the time destitute of revenue and credit.

The last budget, that of the year x., or from September, 1801, to September, 1802, had been fixed at 500,000,000 f. or 620,000,000 f., with the expenses of collection, and including the additional centimes. The sum had not been exceeded, a circumstance due to the peace. The taxes alone had exceeded in their produce the calculations of the government. A revenue of 470,000,000 f. had been estimated, and a very small alienation of the national domains had been voted to make the receipts and disbursements balance. But the taxes had surpassed the estimate by 33,000,000 f., and from that fortunate circumstance the alienation had become useless. This unexpected augmentation of the resources accruing from the registering, which, owing to the number of private transactions, had produced 172,000,000 f. in place of 150,000,000 f.; the customs duties, that owing to the revival of commerce, had produced 31,000,000 f. in place of 22,000,000 f.; finally, from the posts and some other branches of revenue less important.

In spite of the renewal of the war, it was hoped, and the event proved there was no deception in the expectation, that a similar augmentation of the produce of the taxes would again happen. Under the vigorous government of the first consul, neither disorders nor reverses were apprehended. Confidence continued to maintain itself, private transactions, the internal trade, the exchanges every day becoming more considerable with the continent, were all certain to follow an increasing progression. Maritime trade alone was exposed to suffer, and the revenue of the customs, which then appeared to return 30,000,000 f. to the budget of receipts, expressed sufficiently that there could not result from this suffering any enormous loss to the treasury. They counted, therefore, and with reason, on more than 500,000,000 f. of receipts. The budget of the year xi., or from September, 1802, to September, 1803, was voted in March, with the fear, but not with the certainty, of war. It had been fixed at 589,000,000 f., without the expenses of collection, but comprehending a part of the additional centimes. This was, consequently, an augmentation of 89,000,000 f. The navy was increased from 105,000,000 f. to 126,000,000 f.; the war department, raised from 210,000,000 f. to 243,000,000 f., had obtained a part of this augmentation. The public works, worship, the new civil list of the consuls, the fixed expenses of the departments, inscribed this time in the general budget, took up the remainder of the increase.

This augmentation of the expenses had been met, by the supposed increase in the produce of the taxes, by the additional centimes before devoted to meet the fixed expenses of the departments, and by several foreign receipts coming from the allied countries. The current budget, therefore, might be considered as at an equilibrium, except the excess indispensable for the expenses of the war. It was not to be supposed, indeed, that 20,000,000 f. added to the support and increase of the navy, and 30,000,000 f. added for the army, would be sufficient to meet the demands of the new position of affairs. The war with the continent ordinarily cost little enough, because the victorious troops of France, passing the Rhine and Adige, from their entrance upon operations, were fed at the expense of the enemy; but here this was not the case. The six camps that were established on the coast from Holland to the Pyrenees, were to be supported on the French soil up to the day when the soldiery should embark to pass the straits. It was necessary to provide, besides, for the new expenses of the naval constructions, and to place along the coast an enormous mass of artillery. A hundred millions more per annum were scarcely sufficient to meet the necessities of the war with England. The following are resources which the first consul intended to serve for the purpose of meeting this increase.

There have been already mentioned some sums as received from foreign countries, and carried to the budget of the year xi., in order to cover a part of the sum of 89,000,000 f., at least, which 89,000,000 f. was the same sum the budget of the year xi. surpassed that of the year x. These re-

ceipts were from Italy. The Italian republic not having yet formed an army, and not, therefore, being able to do without the French in their country, still paid 1,600,000 f. per month, or 19,200,000f. per annum for the French army. Liguria, in the same position, paid 1,200,000 f. per annum; Parma, 2,000,000 f. This was a resource of 22,500,000 f., already carried, as before stated, to the budget of the year XI. It remained, therefore, to find the entire sum of 100,000,000 f., which would infallibly be added to the 589,000,000 f. of the budget of the year XI.[1]

The voluntary gifts, the price of Louisiana, and the subsidies of the allied states, these were the means upon which the first consul calculated for the foregoing purpose. The voluntary gifts of the cities and departments amounted to about 40,000,000 f., of which 15,000,000 f. were receivable in the year XI., 15,000,000 f. in the year XII., and the remainder in the years following. The price of Louisiana, alienated for 80,000,000 f., of which 60,000,000 f. were lodged in Holland, to the credit of the French treasury, and 54,000,000 f. might be immediately made available, the expense of the negotiation deducted, presented a second resource. The Americans had not yet accepted the agreement in a legal form, but the house of Hope already offered to anticipate, by an advance, a part of the sum. In distributing between two years this resource of 54,000,000 f., there were 27,000,000 f. added to the 15,000,000 f., accruing from voluntary gifts, which would carry up to 42,000,000 f., or nearly the annual supplemental expenses for the use of the years XI. and XII., or from September, 1802, to September, 1804. Finally, Holland and Spain were to furnish the surplus to be made up. Holland, delivered from the stadtholderate by the French army, defended against England by the French diplomacy, that had secured the restoration of the greater part of its colonies, would have now been willingly freed from an alliance which involved it anew in war. Holland wished to remain neutral between France and Great Britain, and to make a profit of a neutrality, happily situated as she was between the two countries. But the first consul had taken a resolution of which the justice cannot be denied: this was, to make all the maritime nations concur in the contest of France against England. Holland and Spain, he said, were lost if the French should be vanquished. All their colonies in India and in America would be taken, destroyed, or pushed into revolt by England. Without doubt these two powers would have found it exceedingly commodious to have taken no part, to have aided in the defeat of the French, had they been beaten, or to have profited by their victories, if they came off victorious, because if the enemy were beaten, it would be as much to their advantage as to that of France. But they knew it could not be so; they combated with France, and like her on an equality. Justice sanctioned it, and also their own interests, because their resources were indispensable to the success of France. It was at the most a question whether uniting their means to all the rest, the French might be able to conquer the rulers of the seas. Isolated, and each reduced to its own strength, that of the French would be insufficient for the contest, and be beaten. The first consul, therefore, came to the conclusion, that Holland and Spain must render their aid; and it may be said, with perfect truth, that when he forced them to concur in his designs, he only obliged them to look forward in contributing to their own interests. However this may be, in order to make the language of reason comprehended, he had the argument of force as respected Holland, because the French troops occupied Flushing and Utrecht, and in regard to Spain, he had the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonzo.

In other respects, at Amsterdam, all the enlightened and really patriotic minds, M. Schimmelpenninck at their head, thought as the first consul did. There was, therefore, no trouble in getting their consent, and it was agreed that Holland should give her assistance in the following manner. She was to engage to feed and pay a corps of eighteen thousand French and of sixteen thousand Dutch soldiers, in all thirty-four thousand men. To this land force she promised to join a naval squadron, composed of ships of the line, and a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. The ships of the line were to consist of five vessels, also five frigates in addition, and vessels necessary to transport twenty-five thousand men and two thousand five hundred horses from the Texel to the coast of England. The flotilla was to consist of three hundred and fifty flat-bottomed boats of all dimensions, adapted to transport thirty-seven thousand men and fifteen hundred horses, from the mouth of the Schelde to that of the Thames[1]. In return, France guaranteed to Holland her independence, the independence of her empire, European and colonial, and in case of success against England, the restitution of her colonies lost during the later wars. The aid obtained by means of this arrangement was considerable, both in regard to men and money, because eighteen thousand men ceased at once to burden the French treasury; sixteen thousand Dutchmen were added to the military force of France, and finally, the means of transport for sixty-two thousand men and four thousand horses were added to the naval resources of the expedition. It will be difficult to say for what sum such an aid might figure in the extraordinary budget of the first consul.

It remained to obtain the concurrence of Spain. This power was still less disposed to devote itself to the common cause than even Holland. It has been already seen, under the capricious influence of the prince of the peace, that she wavered about miserably in directions the most contrary, now drawing towards France, in order to obtain an establishment in Italy, now towards England, to free herself from the efforts imposed upon her by a courageous and indefatigable ally, and by these fluctuations losing the precious island of Trinidad.

[1] This sum appears very small, judging after the amount of the modern budgets of France; but it is necessary always to refer to the value of things at the time, and to say that 100,000,000 f. then would answer, perhaps, to 200 or 250,000,000 f. at the present day, when it is applied to military expenses.

[1] This pressure upon so small a territory as Holland, was greatly out of proportion to her means and population as compared with France, being bound to find means for transporting nearly half the numerical force of the expedition. This and other burdens laid upon her by France were complained of as almost insupportable under the circumstances of the time.—*Translator.*

As a friend or enemy equally powerless, it was not possible to know what to make of her, either in peace or war: not that this noble nation, full of patriotism, not that the magnificent soil of the peninsula, containing the ports of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, was to be contemned, this would be a great mistake to suppose. But an unworthy government betrayed, by its deplorable incapacity, the cause of Spain and that of all the maritime nations. Therefore, having well reflected upon the matter, the first consul thought only of drawing from the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonzo, nothing more than a grant of subsidies. This treaty, signed in 1796, under the first administration of the prince of the peace, bound Spain to furnish to France twenty-four thousand men, fifteen sail of the line, six frigates, and four corvettes. The first consul determined not to demand these succours. He said, with reason, that to draw Spain into the war was not to render any service to Spain nor himself; that she would make no very brilliant figure in the contest; that she would find herself immediately deprived of her only resource in the dollars of Mexico, of which the arrival would be interrupted; that she was unable to equip either an army or a fleet; that she could consequently be of no service, while she would only furnish the English with a pretext, a long while sought for, to raise an insurrection in the whole of South America; that if, in truth, the participation of Spain in hostilities, changed into shores inimical to the English vessels all the coasts of the peninsula, none of its ports could have a useful influence in the contest, like those of Holland, in co-operation for a descent upon Great Britain; that from this, the interest which she could have in such a disposition of affairs could not be great; that under the commercial aspect of the question, the British flag was already excluded from Spain by her tariffs, and that the produce of France continued to find there in peace as in war a decided preference. Under these united considerations, the first consul spoke secretly to M. Azara, the ambassador of Charles IV. at Paris, and said that if his court was repugnant to the war, he would consent to its remaining neuter, upon the conditions of its paying to France a subsidy of 6,000,000 f. per month, or 72,000,000 f.[1] per annum, and the signature of a treaty of commerce, which should open to the French manufacturers a larger outlet for their goods than they at present enjoyed.

This offer, so very moderate, did not encounter at Madrid the reception which it merited. The prince of the peace was then in intimate relation with England, and openly betrayed the alliance. It was from this motive that the first consul, suspecting the treason, had placed at Bayonne itself one of six camps destined to operate against England. He was resolved to declare war against Spain, sooner than to permit her to abandon the common cause. He ordered general Beurnonville, his ambassador, to explain himself in this respect in the most peremptory manner. The English, in usurping an absolute authority over the ocean, obliged him to exercise a similar authority upon the continent, for the defence of the general interests of the world.

[1] About £3,000,000 sterling per annum.

To the aid of the allied states it was necessary to join that which might be obtained from the states inimical to France, or at least ill disposed towards her. Hanover would suffice for the support of thirty thousand men. The division formed at Faenza, and on its march to the gulf of Tarentum, was to be supported at the expense of the court of Naples. Well informed by his ambassador, the first consul knew very correctly that queen Caroline, governed by her minister Acton, was wholly in an understanding with England, and that a long time would not pass before he should be obliged to expel the Bourbons from the territory of Italy. He therefore did not refrain from expressing his determination freely to the queen of Naples. "I will not suffer," he said, "the English to be in Italy any more than in Spain and Portugal. On the first act of concert with England, a war shall do me justice for your animosity: I am able to do you much good and a great deal of mischief. It is for you to choose. I do not want to take your territory from you; it is sufficient for my designs if it serve them against England; but I shall certainly take possession of them if they are employed so as to be useful to my enemy." The first consul spoke with sincerity, because he was not yet made the chief of a dynasty, and did not think about conquering kingdoms for his brothers. He demanded, in consequence, that a division of fifteen thousand men, established at Tarentum, should be supported by the Neapolitan treasury. He considered this charge as a contribution imposed upon his enemies, as well as that which was also about to press upon the kingdom of Hanover.

In recapitulating what has gone before, it will be found, therefore, that the resources of the first consul were the following: Naples, Holland, and Hanover, were to support about sixty thousand men. The Italian republic, Parma, Liguria, and Spain, were charged with the payment of a regular subsidy. America proposed to pay him the price of Louisiana. The patriotism of the departments and of the great towns furnished him with supplemental taxes which were altogether of a voluntary character. Lastly, the public revenue promised an augmentation of the produce of the taxes, even during the war, thanks to the confidence inspired by a vigorous government having the repute of being invincible. It was with all these means that the first consul flattered himself to add to the 589,000,000 f. of the budget of the year XI. the extraordinary resource of 100,000,000 f. per annum for two, three, or four years. He had, too, for the future, the indirect taxes. He was thus secure of the ability to support an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men upon the coasts; another army of eighty thousand upon the Rhine; the necessary troops for the occupation of Italy, Holland, and Hanover; fifty vessels of the line; and a flotilla of transports of unknown extent, without example until the present time, by which he contemplated the embarkation of one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, ten thousand horse, and four hundred pieces of cannon.

The world was agitated and affrighted, it may be truly said, at the preparations for this gigantic conquest between the two most powerful nations on the globe. It was difficult to suppose the con-

sequences that would be the result; would the war remain solely between France and England, while the neutrals were compelled to sustain the vexations inflicted upon them by the British naval forces, and would they refrain from lending themselves to the designs of the first consul, either in shutting their ports or in suffering incommodious and expensive occupations of their territories! In reality, all the powers gave the wrong to England in provoking the rupture. The claim to retain Malta had appeared to all, even to those least given to judge in favour of France, as a manifest violation of the faith of treaties that nothing had justified which had occurred in Europe since the peace of Amiens. Prussia and Austria had sanctioned by formal conventions all that had been done in Italy and Germany, and approved by notes all that had taken place respecting Switzerland. Russia had little less decidedly expressed her approbation of the conduct of France, except, indeed, in certain remonstrances, in form of an appeal, made in behalf of the indemnity to the king of Sardinia, which had been too long deferred; she had, indeed, approved of nearly all France had done. She had particularly remarked upon the intervention of France in regard to Switzerland as having been ably conducted and equitably terminated. None of the three powers of the continent were able to discover, in the events of the last two years, any justification for the usurpation and appropriation of Malta, and they explained themselves freely upon the subject. Still, in spite of this manner of delivering their opinion, it was plainly to be seen that they leaned more towards England than France.

Although the first consul had taken every care in his power to suppress anarchy, the other powers were unable to hinder themselves from contemplating in him the image of the French revolution triumphant, and much more glorious, than it was agreeable to their feelings to behold it, in its effects. Two among them, Prussia and Austria, had too little of maritime interest to be much touched with any great anxiety about the liberty of the seas. The third, that is to say, Russia, had an interest in this liberty too distant for it to preoccupy her attention very strongly at this time. All three were very differently affected by the preponderance of the French on the continent than by the preponderance of England upon the ocean. The maritime law which England desired to establish seemed to them an attack upon the justice and the interest of commerce in general; but the domination that France already exercised, and was about to exercise still more in Europe, was an immediate and pressing danger which troubled them deeply, as coming more home to themselves. Thus they were not pleased with England for having provoked this new war, and they said as much aloud; but they returned to their ill disposition towards France, which the wisdom and glory of the first consul had suspended for an instant, by a sort of surprise that his genius had imparted to their aversion.

Several words escaped from the great personages of the day which proved, better than all which can be said upon the subject, the sentiments of the European powers in regard to France. M. Philip Cobentzel, ambassador at Paris, and cousin of M. Louis Cobentzel, minister for foreign affairs at Vienna, was in conversation at table with admiral Decrès, who, by the liveliness and vivacity of mind, provoked vivacity in the minds of other persons, when M. Cobentzel was not able to prevent himself from saying, "Yes, England is all in the wrong; she puts forth pretensions which cannot be sustained, that is true. But, in frankness, you have made all the world fear you too much to think now of being afraid of England[1]."

The emperor of Germany, Francis II., who terminated of late years a long and good life, and who hid great penetration under the appearance of simplicity, one day speaking to the French ambassador, M. de Champagny, respecting the new war, and expressing his mortification with evident sincerity, affirmed that he was, as far as regarded himself, resolute to remain in peace, but that he was seized with an involuntary uneasiness of which he scarcely dared to explain the motive. M. de Champagny encouraging the emperor's confidence, he said, after a thousand excuses and a thousand protestations of esteem for the first consul, "If general Bonaparte, who has accomplished so many miracles, should not accomplish that which he is now preparing; if he should not pass the straits, it is we who will be the victims, because he will throw himself back upon us, and combat England in Germany."

The emperor Francis, who was timid, seemed to regret advancing so far, and endeavoured to recall his words; but there was not time to do so. M. de Champagny forwarded them to Paris immediately by the first courier[2]. This remark was upon the part of the emperor a proof of rare foresight, which, however, was of very little service to him, because it was he himself who came forward at a later period to give Napoleon the opportunity to combat, to use his own words, "England in Germany."

Furthermore, of all the great powers, Austria was that which had least to dread the consequences of the present war, if she had known how to resist the suggestions of the court of London. She had not, in fact, any maritime interest to defend, because she neither possessed commerce, ports, nor colonies. The sandy port of old Venice, which had been just given to her, could not have created for Austria any interest of this character. She was not situated like Prussia, Spain, or Naples, the sovereign of extensive coasts, that France desired to occupy. It was an easy matter for her to have rested quiet out of the quarrel. She had gained, on the contrary, a full liberty of action in the affairs of Germany. France, obliged to turn her front to England, was now unable to press with all her weight upon Germany. Austria, on the contrary, was enabled to have her full play in regard to the questions still remaining unsettled. She wished, as has been seen before, to change the number of voices in the college of princes, to appropriate to herself in a fraudulent manner all the moveable wealth of the secularized estates, to prevent the incorporation of the "immediate" nobi-

[1] I read this anecdote in a note written in the hand of M. Decrès, and addressed immediately afterwards to Napoleon.

[2] It need scarcely be remarked, this recital is an extract from an authentic despatch of the French ambassador.

lity, to seize upon the Inn from Bavaria, and by all these means united regain her superiority over the empire. The advantage of resolving all these questions as she desired might have well consoled her for the renewal of the war, and without her extreme prudence have served to inspire her with high gratification.

The two powers of the continent who were at this moment the most chagrined were Prussia and Russia, from motives, it is true, very different, and not in the same degree. The most affected was Prussia. It is easy to comprehend, with the known character of her monarch, who hated war and expense, how much the prospect of a new European conflagration must have been painful to him. The occupation of Hanover, besides, had for his kingdom great inconveniences. In order to prevent this occupation, he had attempted an arrangement which would have been able to accommodate both France and England. He offered England to occupy the electorate with Prussian troops, promising that it should be no more than an amicable deposit, upon the condition that the navigation of the Elbe and Weser should be allowed to remain open. On the other part, he offered the first consul to keep Hanover on account of France, and to pay over into the French territory the whole revenue of the country. This double zeal, shown towards the two powers, had for its object, first to preserve the navigation of the Elbe and Weser free from the blockade by England; secondly, to spare the north of Germany the presence of the French troops. These two interests were for Prussia most important. It was by the Elbe and Hamburgh, and by the Weser and Bremen, that he exported all the produce of his dominions. The cloths of Silesia, which composed the largest part of the exports, were bought by Hamburgh and Bremen, and exchanged in France for wines, and in America for colonial produce. If the English blockaded the Elbe and Weser, all this trade would be stopped. The interest in keeping the French out of the north of Germany was no less important. In the first place their presence disquieted Prussia. Then she was exposed to the bitter reproaches of that portion of the German princes which made her patronage their support. They said, that allied to France for ambitious purposes, she abandoned the defence of the German soil, and even contributed by her easy complaisance to attract the invasion of the foreigner. They went so far as to argue that she was, by the law of Germany, obliged to intervene for the purpose of preventing the French from occupying Hanover. These princes were most assuredly wrong, according to the rigorous principles of national law, because the German states, although bound to each other by a federal alliance, had the individual right of peace and of war, and were able to be, each upon his own account, in a state of peace or war with any other power, the confederation not finding itself in the same circumstances with such a power. It would have been, in fact, strange if king George III. was able to call himself at war for England, which is inaccessible, and to declare himself in peace for Hanover, which is accessible. This manner of understanding the state of public law would be convenient, and the first consul, when they wished to make it valid, replied by an apologue equally true and ingenious. "They had," said he, "among the ancients a right of asylum in certain temples. A slave sought a refuge in one of these temples and had nearly passed the threshold, when he was seized by the foot. They did not forget the law so long established—they did not snatch the slave from his place of refuge, but they cut off the foot that remained outside the temple." Prussia negotiated then before deciding definitively herself about the occupation of Hanover, when it was announced besides by the first consul as near and certain.

The rupture recently broken out between France and England was a disagreeable surprise to the court of Russia, in consequence of the cares with which, at that moment, this court was taken up. The young emperor had adopted a new step in the execution of his projects, and delivered to his young friends a little more of the affairs of the empire. He had thanked the prince Kourakin for his services, and had called to the head of his councils a considerable personage in M. Woronzoff, the brother of count Woronzoff, who was ambassador of Russia in London. He had given to M. Woronzoff the title of chancellor, minister of foreign affairs, and divided the government of the state into eight departments of the ministry. He applied himself to setting at the head of these different departments, men of well-known merit, but taking care, at the same time, to place near them as adjuncts, his friends prince Czartoryski, M. Strogonoff, and Nowosiltzoff. Thus prince Adam Czartoryski was attached to M. Woronzoff, as adjunct in the department of foreign affairs, M. Woronzoff, on account of his health, was often obliged to be absent on his estate, and prince Czartoryski became charged, almost alone, with the external relations of the empire. M. Strogonoff was the adjunct in the department of justice; M. Nowosiltzoff, in that of the interior. These eight ministers were to deliberate in common on the affairs of the state, and render annual accounts to the senate. It was a first and considerable change to make the ministers meet in deliberation, and a still greater yet, to make them give in their accounts to the senate. The emperor Alexander considered these changes as approximations towards the institutions of free and civilized countries. Entirely occupied with internal reforms, he was painfully affected to see himself recalled into the immense and perilous field of European politics, and showed a sensible displeasure to the representatives of the two belligerent powers. He was discontented with England, whose unreasonable pretensions and bad faith in relation to the affair of Malta troubled Europe anew; he was also ill-contented with France from other motives. France had made a matter of no great moment of his demand, so often reiterated, of an indemnity for the king of Piedmont; and more, in granting an apparent influence to Russia in the affairs of Germany, she had too plainly arrogated to herself that which was real. The young emperor had soon seen this. Exceedingly jealous, young as he was, he began to mark with a sort of displeasure the glory of the great man who governed in the west. The disposition of the court of Russia, therefore, was that of general discontent with all the world. The emperor deliberating with his ministers and friends,

decided upon offering the mediation of Russia, invoked openly enough as it had been by France, and thus upon attempting by that means to prevent a universal quarrel, at the same time resolving to speak the truth to all; neither to dissimulate to England, how much her pretensions to Malta fell short of being legitimate, nor of making the first consul feel the necessity of acquitting himself justly towards the king of Piedmont, and of managing kindly, during this new war, the smaller powers, that composed dependants or solicitors of the court of Russia.

In consequence, through the medium of M. Woronzoff, conferring with general Hedouville, and through M. Markoff to M. Talleyrand, the Russian cabinet expressed its lively displeasure at the new troubles brought to the general peace by the ambitious rivalry of France and England. He acknowledged that the pretensions of England to Malta were ill-grounded; but he made it be understood that the continual enterprises of France had given birth to these pretensions without justifying them; and he added, that France would do well to moderate her actions in Europe, if she did not wish to render peace impossible with all the powers. He offered the mediation of Russia, however painful it was for her to intermeddle in differences, that, being strange to him so far, would perhaps end, if he meddled with them, in becoming personal with himself. He concluded by saying, that if, in spite of his good will, his efforts to establish peace should be without success, he, the emperor, hoped that France would be reasonable in her proceedings with the friends of Russia, especially with the kingdom of Naples, which became her ally in 1798, and the kingdom of Hanover, guaranteed by Russia the title of a German state. Such was the sense of the communications of the Russian cabinet.

The youth brought up in dissipation is ordinarily full of levity in his conversation; the youth bred up seriously becomes too readily dogmatic, because discretion is the most difficult thing to youth. It is this which fully explains how the young governors of Russia gave lessons to the two most powerful governments upon the globe, one led by a great man, the other by great institutions. The first consul smiled, since he had divined, for a good while, all the inexperience and pretensions which the cabinet of Russia contained. But knowing how to govern for the advantage of his own vast designs, he would not render complicated the affairs of the continent, nor raise up on the Rhine a war which should attract him from the war for which he was preparing upon the borders of the channel. Receiving, without appearing to understand, the lessons which he received from St. Petersburg, he was resolved to cut short all the reproaches of the young czar, and to constitute him the absolute arbitrator of the great quarrel that then occupied the world. He therefore offered, by M. de Talleyrand and general Hedouville, to the Russian cabinet, to bind himself by a promise, in virtue of which he would engage himself to submit, whatever the result was, to the decision of the emperor Alexander, trusting entirely in his sense of justice. This proposition was as wise as it was dexterous. If England refused, she avowed that she mistrusted either her cause or the emperor Alexander; she would thus place herself in the wrong; she would justify the first consul in making war to the last extremity. The closing of all the ports under the influence of France, and the occupation of all the territory appertaining to England, became thus a legitimate consequence of the war. Still, as regarded the kingdoms of Naples and of Hanover, the first consul, taking the decided tone which suited his objects, declared that he would do all the war that had been begun required, that war which he had not commenced.

After having adopted the altitude which to his own mind appeared the best at the moment as regarded the continental powers, the first consul proceeded immediately to attend to the occupations already prepared and announced. General St. Cyr was at Faenza in the Romagna, with a division of fifteen thousand men, and a considerable artillery *matériel*, such as he required for the defence of the road of Tarentum. He received the command, which he immediately carried into execution, to traverse the Roman states in good order, and to reach the extremities of Italy, paying for all on the road, not to incommode the holy father. After the conclusion of a convention with the court of Naples, the French troops were to be supported at the expense of the Neapolitan government. General St. Cyr, judged, as he merited to be, by the first consul, that is to say, as one of the first generals of his time, principally when he operated alone, had an embarrassing position, in the midst of an enemy's kingdom; but he was capable of making a front to all his difficulties. His instructions, besides, left him an immense latitude of action. It was prescribed to him, on the first sign of an insurrection in the Calabrias, to quit those provinces and march at once upon the capital of the kingdom. Having already conquered Naples once, he knew better than any other person how it must be taken again.

The first consul ordered Ancona to be occupied besides, after having given the pope all the satisfaction which might tend to ameliorate so disagreeable an act. The French garrison was to pay rigidly for every thing which it consumed, in nothing to trouble the civil government of the holy see, even to aid against the disturbers of the peace, if there should be any such.

Orders had in the meanwhile been sent for the invasion of Hanover. The negotiations of Prussia had remained unsuccessful. England declared that she would blockade the Elbe and Weser if the states of the house of Hanover were touched, whether the troops employed were French or Prussians. This was assuredly the most unjust of pretensions. That she should hinder the French flag from circulating in the Elbe and Weser was perfectly legitimate; but that she should stop the trade of Bremen and of Hamburg, because the French had invaded the territory in the midst of which these towns found themselves enclosed, that she should exact that the entire of Germany should brave the war with France for the interests of the house of Hanover, and that she should punish a forced inaction in destroying their commerce, was the most iniquitous conduct. Prussia was reduced to complain bitterly of the injustice of such a proceeding, and in the end to suffer the

British flag at the mouths of the two German rivers, as well as the presence of the French in the heart of Hanover. She had no more the same interest in charging herself with the occupation, since her trade would be, in any case, met by an interdiction. The first consul expressed his regret to Prussia, promised her not to pass the limit of Hanover, but excused himself for the invasion by the necessities of war, and the immense advantage that it gave him in enabling him to close against the English the two greatest commercial highways of the continent.

General Mortier had orders to march on. He passed forward with twenty-five thousand men to the northern extremity of Holland, on the frontier of the low bishopric of Munster, belonging, since the secularizations, to the house of Aremberg. He was well assured of the consent of that house, and he passed from thence to the territory of the bishop of Osnabruck, recently joined to Hanover itself. By that road it was possible to dispense with touching upon the Prussian territory, a management on the march indispensable towards the court of Prussia. The first consul had recommended to general Mortier to be careful to act well in the country through which he passed, and, above all things, to show himself full of respect for any Prussian authorities which he might encounter upon the frontiers of Hanover. This general, discreet and upright, as well as brave, was perfectly well selected for such a difficult mission. He set out on his march to traverse the arid sands and marshy heaths of Frisland and of Lower Westphalia; he penetrated by Meppen into Hanover, and arrived in June on the shores of the Hunte. The Hanoverian army occupied Diepholz. After some cavalry skirmishes, it fell back behind the Weser. Although composed of excellent soldiers, it knew that all resistance was idle, and that it would only be to draw down misfortunes upon the country in persisting obstinately to resist. It therefore offered to capitulate honourably, to which general Mortier willingly consented. It was agreed at Suhlingen, that the Hanoverian army should retire, with arms and baggage, behind the Elbe; that it should engage, under its word of honour, not to serve in the present war, unless by means of the exchange of an equal number of French prisoners; that the government of the country, and the collection of the revenues, should thenceforth appertain to France; respect was to be paid to individuals, to private property, and to the different forms of religious worship.

This convention, styled that of Suhlingen, was sent to the first consul and to the king of England, to receive their double ratification. The first consul gave his immediately, not being willing to reduce the Hanoverian army to despair, by imposing upon it harder conditions. When the convention was presented to old George III. he was seized with a violent fit of anger, and went so far, it is said, as to fling it in the face of the minister who presented it to him. This old king, in his sombre reveries, had always considered Hanover as being one day to become the last asylum of his family, of which it had been the cradle. The invasion of his patrimonial states put him in despair; he refused to sign the convention of Suhlingen, thus exposing the Hanoverian soldiers to the cruel alternative of either laying down their arms, or of being slaughtered to the last man. His cabinet made as his excuse upon this very singular determination, that the king would remain a stranger to all which had been undertaken against his states; that to ratify this convention was to consent to the occupation of Hanover; that this occupation was a violation of the German soil, and that he should appeal to the diet for the violence done to his subjects. This was the strongest sort of argument, and the least sustainable that could be used under any point of view.

When this news reached Hanover, the gallant army, commanded by marshal Walmoden, was struck with consternation. It was drawn up behind the Elbe, in the middle of the territory of Luneburg, established in a strong position, and resolute to defend its honour. On the other side, the French army, which for three years had not fired a musket, demanded nothing better than to be led to a brilliant combat. But the opinion of the wisest prevailed. General Mortier, who joined humanity to valour, did all that was in his power to soften the fate of the Hanoverians. He demanded no more than that they should surrender prisoners of war, and contented himself with their being disbanded, agreeing that they should leave their arms in their camp, and retire to their homes, promising at the same time never to be armed or reunited again. The warlike stores contained in the kingdom were very considerable, and were all delivered over to the French. The revenue of the country was to belong to them as well as the personal property of the king of Hanover. In the number of these were found the fine stallions of the Hanoverian breed, which were sent to France. The cavalry dismounted, delivered up three thousand five hundred superb horses, which were employed in remounting that of the French.

General Mortier did not himself interfere in the active government of the country except in a very indirect manner; he left the greater part in the hands of the local authorities. Hanover, if it were not too much pressed, could perfectly well support thirty thousand men. This was the amount of force which it had been intended to maintain there, and a promise had been made to the king of Prussia that the number should not be exceeded. It was requested of this monarch, in order that the French might avoid the long circuit by Holland and Lower Westphalia, that he would consent to a road, with establishments, across the Prussian territory, for the entertainment of the troops going to or returning from Hanover, paying the contractors exactly and in advance for their support. The king of Prussia consented to oblige the first consul. A communication was then directly established. This communication served the purpose also of sending to Hanover a great number of horsemen on foot, who returned with three horses, mounting one and leading two. The possession of this part of Germany became very useful to the French cavalry, and served soon to render it as excellent in regard to horses as it was already in respect to men.

During the execution of his various occupations, the first consul followed his preparations on the shores of the channel. He had caused materials for the naval service to be purchased in Holland,

and more especially in Russia, in order to be provided before the dispositions of that power, little encouraging, should be carried so far as to refuse to dispose of naval stores. On the basin of the Gironde, the Loire, the Seine, the Somme, and the Escaut, there were flat-bottomed boats of all dimensions in the course of active construction. Thousands of workmen were employed in cutting down the forests near the coasts. All the founderies of the republic were in activity to fabricate mortars, howitzers, and artillery of the largest calibre. The Parisians saw on the quays of Bercy, of the Invalids, and of the military school, a hundred gun-boats in the course of construction. People began to comprehend that such a prodigious degree of activity could not be for a simple demonstration, destined alone for the purpose of making England uneasy.

The first consul had promised to set out for the shores of the channel as soon as the naval constructions, thus undertaken, should be a little more advanced, and he should have put in order some of his most urgent affairs. The session of the legislative body had been peaceably devoted to offering the government perfect approbation for its diplomatic conduct towards England, in order to lend it the most complete moral support possible, to vote the budget, of which the principal dispositions have been already recorded, and finally, to discuss, without noise, but with deep earnestness, the first titles of the civil code. The legislative body was at this time no more than a great council, a stranger to politics, and uniformly devoted to its public duties.

The first consul found himself at leisure towards the end of June. He proposed, therefore, to pass along the coasts as far as Flushing and Antwerp, to visit Belgium, which he had never yet seen, the departments of the Rhine, of which he knew nothing, and, in a word, to make both a military and a political journey. Madam Bonaparte was to accompany him, and partake in the honours that awaited him. For the first time, he requested on this occasion from the minister of the public treasury, who had them under his care, the diamonds of the crown, in order to compose a set for the dress of his wife. He wished to show himself to the new departments, and on the borders of the Rhine, almost in sovereignty, because they regarded him as a sovereign personage, since he was consul for life, and was empowered to choose his successor. His ministers had received the rendezvous, some at Dunkirk, others at Lille, Ghent, Antwerp, and Brussels. The foreign ambassadors were invited to the same places. Willing to exhibit to the people a fervent spirit of catholicism, he judged it useful to appear among them accompanied by the pope's legate. Upon the simple expression of his desire to that effect, cardinal Caprara, in spite of his great age and infirmities, decided, after having obtained the pope's permission, to increase the consular attendance in the Low Countries. Orders had been accordingly given to receive this prince of the Roman church in the most magnificent manner.

The first consul set out on the 23rd of June. He first visited Compiègne, where they were constructing vessels on the banks of the Oise, as well as Amiens, Abbeville, and St. Valery, where the same kind of work was going on upon the banks of the Somme. He was welcomed with enthusiasm, and received with the honours commonly paid to royalty. The city of Amiens offered him four swans of dazzling whiteness, which were sent to the garden of the Tuileries. His presence was every where signalized by attachment to his person, aversion for the English, and zeal to combat and conquer the old enemies of France. He listened to the authorities and the inhabitants with extreme kindness; but his attention was evidently absorbed altogether in the great object which occupied him at that time. The building yards, the magazines, and the stores of all kinds, exclusively attracted his ardent solicitude. He visited the troops which had begun to muster in Picardy, inspected their equipments, treated with kind notice the old soldiers whose countenances were known to him, and left them all full of confidence in his vast undertaking.

Scarcely had he completed visits of this kind, when he entered within doors, and although worn out with fatigue, dictated a multitude of orders, which still exist, for the lasting instruction of governments that are carrying great preparations for war into effect. Here the treasury had delayed sending the funds to the undertakers of the work; there the minister of the navy had neglected to ensure the arrival of the naval stores; besides this, the directors of the forests, through various formalities, had retarded the cutting down of the necessary timber; in another place, the artillery had not sent on the cannon nor the necessary ammunition. The first consul repaired all these evils from neglect, and removed the obstacles in the way by the power of his own will. He thus arrived at Boulogne, the principal centre to which all his efforts tended, and the point for the presumed departure of the grand expedition projected against England.

This is the moment to make known in detail the immense armament devised to transport one hundred and fifty thousand men across the straits of Dover, with the number of horses, cannon, stores, and provisions, that were supposed to be required for such a force. It was already an extensive and difficult operation to transport twenty or thirty thousand men across the sea. The expedition to Egypt, executed fifty years ago, and the expedition to Algiers, executed in the present time, prove this. What then must the difficulty be attending the embarkation of one hundred and fifty thousand men, ten or fifteen thousand horses, and three or four hundred guns, with their trains! A vessel of the line might carry six or seven hundred men, in a condition to make a voyage of some time, and a large frigate half that number. There would be required then two hundred sail of the line to embark such a force, in other words, a chimerical navy, that the alliance of England and France for the same object could alone render imaginable. It was therefore, in consequence, an impossible enterprise to throw one hundred and fifty thousand men into England, if England had been situated at the distance of Egypt or of the Morea; but there were only the straits of Dover to be passed, that is to say, about eight or ten marine leagues. For such a passage there was no need to employ large vessels. There was, indeed,

no possibility of using them if they existed, because between Ostend and Havre there is not a single port capable of receiving them; and there is not even upon the opposite coast, at least without a considerable circuit, a deep port where they are able to gain access. The idea of small vessels, seeing the nature of the passage and that of the ports, had therefore presented itself to every body. Besides, these small vessels sufficed for all the circumstances of the sea that they could be expected to encounter, or to which they could be otherwise exposed. Long observations, collected upon the coasts, had conducted to the discovery of all those circumstances, and had determined the size and form of the vessels which were best adapted to meet them. In summer, for example, there are in the channel nearly perfect calms, sufficiently long to be able to reckon upon forty-eight hours of the same kind of weather. It would require nearly that number of hours, not to cross over, but even to get out of port the immense flotilla which was in contemplation. During such a calm, the English vessels being immoveable, those which were constructed to move with the oar as well as the sail would be able to pass over with impunity, even in sight of an enemy's squadron. Winter had also its favourable moments. The thick fogs of the cold season, met with when the winds are lulled or very slight, offered another means of making the passage in presence of an enemy's force either becalmed or deceived by the fog. There yet remained a third favourable occasion, namely, that offering at the equinoxes. It often happened that, after the tempests of the equinox, the winds suddenly died away, and left a sufficient time to cross the straits before the return of an enemy's squadron, obliged by the storm to keep off shore. These were circumstances universally pointed out by the sailors living upon the borders of the channel.

There might be a case in which at any season, whatever the weather was, short of a storm, that it might be possible to pass across the straits; this was when, by able manœuvring, there should have been brought into the channel, for some hours, a large squadron of line-of-battle ships. Then the flotilla, protected by such a squadron, would be able to set sail without troubling itself about the enemy's cruisers.

But the circumstance of bringing a large French squadron between Calais and Dover, depended upon such a variety of difficult combinations, that it was to be reckoned upon as the least possible thing that could happen. It was necessary then to construct the flotilla for the transport of the army in such a fashion, that it should be able, in appearance at least, to pass without any auxiliary force, because if it had demonstrated by its construction that it was impossible to keep at sea without the succour of an auxiliary squadron, the secret of the grand operation would have been made known at once to the enemy. Aware of this, they would have concentrated all their naval force in the straits, and prevented every manœuvre or attempt of the French squadrons endeavouring to proceed there.

To the considerations of the nature of the winds and of the sea in the straits, were joined those arising from the configuration of the coasts. The French ports in the straits were all tide ports, or, in other words, were dry at low water, and presented no more than a depth of eight or nine feet at high tide. The vessels, therefore, must be of such a class as that when they were laden they should not need more than seven or eight feet of water to float them, and must be able to take the ground without injury. In regard to the English coast, the ports situated between the Thames, Dover, Folkestone, and Brighton, were very small; but such as they might be, it was necessary, in order to effect so vast a disembarkation, to run simply upon the shore, and for this reason vessels that would take the ground were alone proper. They were these different reasons which had made flat-bottomed boats be adopted, able to move with the oar, in order to pass whether in calm or fog; able to carry heavy cannon, without drawing more than seven or eight feet of water, in order to move freely in the French ports of the channel, and to run aground without injury upon the beaches of England.

In order to meet these several objects, large gun-vessels were devised, having flat bottoms, solidly constructed, and built of two different classes. The vessels of the first class, which were more especially styled gun-vessels, were constructed in such a manner as to carry four heavy guns, from twenty-four to thirty-six pounders, two forward and two astern, and thus consequently, by weight of metal, to answer the fire of the ships and frigates. Five hundred of these gun-vessels would thus be equal to the fire of twenty vessels of a hundred guns[1]. They were rigged like brigs, with two masts, and manœuvred by twenty-five seamen. They were each capable of containing a company of infantry of one hundred men, with their staff, their arms, and ammunition.

The boats of the second species or class, in order to distinguish them from the first, denominated gun-boats, were less heavily armed, less wieldy, but designed to carry, independently of infantry, the field artillery. These gun-boats were provided in the bow with one twenty-four pounder, and had a piece of field artillery in the stern mounted upon its carriage, with the necessary apparatus for embarking and disembarking in a few minutes. Each carried, besides, an artillery caisson, filled with ammunition, disposed upon the deck in such a manner as not to hinder the working of the vessel, and with the power of being landed in a moment. They all contained, besides, in the centre of the hold, a small stable, in which were lodged a couple of artillery horses, with provisions for several days. This stable, placed in the centre, opened above, having a moveable covering, and was combined with the mast in such a mode that the horse could be seized on the land by means of a yard, be rapidly elevated, and then lowered into his cabin with the greatest facility. These gun-boats, inferior in their armament to the

[1] Only in number alone, not in effect; because each boat would have a separate motion from the waves, and its cannon a varying direction accordingly, while the fire of the line-of-battle ship would be concentrated under one common movement, far less in the angle, or a vast deal slower, and therefore beyond all comparison more effective. There is no analogy between the fire of a gun-boat in motion and a battery on shore, for example, the last being much more effective from its absence of all motion.—*Translator.*

gun-vessels, but able to throw heavy metal, and to fire grape by means of a field-piece placed on the deck, had the advantage, besides, of carrying a part of the infantry and all the artillery of the army, with two horses to draw the guns into line at the moment of landing. The rest of the artillery horses were to be placed in transports, of which the organization will presently be seen. Less fit than the gun-vessels to manœuvre and fight, they were rigged like the large coasting barks of the French side of the channel, and had only three large sails attached to three masts, without topmast or topsail. They were manned by only six seamen, and were capable of containing, as well as the gun-vessels, a company of infantry with its officers, two artillery drivers, and some artillery men. If three or four hundred of these vessels be supposed ready, they would be able to carry, independently of a mass of infantry very considerable in number, three or four hundred field-pieces, with carriage and ammunition sufficient for one battle. The rest of the ammunition, with the other artillery horses, would follow in the transport vessels.

Such were the flat-bottomed boats of the first and second class or species. It was thought necessary to construct a third kind, yet lighter and more manageable than the preceding, drawing only two or three feet of water, and made to take the shore every where. They were large ships' boats, like canoes, sixty feet long, having a moveable bridge, which could be projected or drawn in at pleasure, and were distinguished from the others by the name of pinnaces. These long boats, provided with sixty oars, could carry also, if it were required, a light sail, and move with extreme speed. When sixty soldiers, brought to manage the oar as well as seamen, set them in movement, they glided over the sea like the light boats that are sent from large vessels, and surprised the eye by the rapidity of their way. These pinnaces could each take sixty or seventy soldiers, besides two or three seamen to work them. They carried for defence a small howitzer, and a four-pounder gun, and had no lading beyond the arms of those on board, and some marching provisions disposed as ballast.

After numerous experiments, these three kinds of vessels were definitively fixed upon as answering every end for the passage, and when ranged in order of battle, presenting a formidable line of fire. The gun-vessels, easier to manœuvre, and more heavily armed, occupied the first line; the gun-boats, being inferior in these two respects, were to form the second line, facing the intervals between the gun-vessels, in such a manner that there would be no opening not covered by the effect of their fire. The pinnaces, which only carried small howitzers, and which were formidable for their musketry, disposed sometimes in advance of the line of battle, sometimes in the rear, or on the wings, would be able to pull up rapidly, to board in case of meeting with a fleet at sea, to throw their men on shore if they wished to effect a disembarkment, or to steal away, if they should be exposed to a fire of heavy artillery.

These three species of boats were to be united to the number of twelve or fifteen hundred. They were to carry at least three thousand cannon of large calibre, without reckoning a great number of pieces of artillery of small dimensions, in other words, their fire would be equal in metal to that of the strongest squadron. Their effect, too, would be dangerous, because their fire would graze along the line of the sea level. Engaged against large vessels, they presented an object difficult to strike, firing themselves at one not easy to miss. They were able to move every way, to disperse themselves, or to surround an enemy. But if they had the advantage of division, they had also its inconveniences. To introduce order of movement into a floating mass so prodigiously numerous, was a problem extremely difficult to solve. In order to attain this object, admiral Bruix and Napoleon applied themselves to it incessantly for three years. It will be seen hereafter to what a degree of precision in manœuvring they had reached, and how far the problem had been resolved by them [1].

What effect would a squadron of ships of the line have produced dashing at full sail into this mass of small vessels, pressing them together, running down those ahead, sinking those which were struck by their shot, but, on the other side, surrounded by a cloud of enemies receiving in every direction a dangerous fire in return, assailed by the musketry of a hundred thousand men, and perhaps entered by intrepid soldiers trained to boarding! This would not be very easy to discover, because it is impossible to form an idea of so strange a scene, one which never had a precedent to which the mind might have recourse in considering the different chances as to the result. Admiral Decrès, a man of superior mind, but given to underrate in his opinions, ad-

[1] This problem never could have been resolved, because in no case did the Boulogne flotilla dare to venture far enough from the shore in a mass sufficient to make the trial. Confusion in presence of an experienced and practised enemy with heavier vessels would be unavoidable at sea. It happened from the time spoken of by our author, down to the abandonment of the enterprise, that a number of these craft were captured by the English light vessels, such as brigs or cutters, and many driven on shore; but their small draught of water, and the artillery moving with them on land, and covering them, prevented the capture of a large number, as they stole along from port to port. Some that were taken off Audierne, it was not thought safe, from their fragile character, to send across to Plymouth, the weather being but moderately fresh. The men were taken out, and they were sunk. Ten were captured in one week, with their complement of soldiers on board. The resistance of these boats was in no case formidable, where the water admitted of an approach to them, and the shore was not armed for their protection. The only desire of the English was to get them out from the land. The late lord Exmouth spoke of their resistance to English vessels as impossible. In the judgment of experienced English seamen, such an unmanageable mass of boats had no chance of crossing but in a dead calm, which could hardly be expected to last long enough for the flotilla to embark its proposed armament, move out of port, and cross the channel under oars. In case of the lightest breeze, the inevitable destruction of the flotilla, in presence of an English squadron, must have ensued. There were between four and five hundred English vessels protecting the coast, all manned by experienced seamen. The fire of a mass of boats in the confusion inevitable upon being attacked in several places at once, would be as dangerous to themselves as to an enemy; and their crowded state would enhance the confusion and the havoc that must be thus inevitably produced.—*Translator.*

mitted that by sacrificing a hundred of the boats and ten thousand men, it might be possible to pass the straits. "That number are lost in a single battle continually," observed the first consul; "and then what single battle has ever produced such results as we may hope for from the invasion of England?"

But the most unfavourable point of view was taken in imagining there would be a rencontre with the English cruisers. There always remained the chance of crossing in a calm, during which the movements of the English would be paralyzed; or during a fog, which would conceal the flotilla from view; and, lastly, the chance more encouraging still, of the sudden appearance for some hours of a French squadron in the straits.

In any case, the boats had strength enough to defend themselves, to run upon the shore, and to sweep it with their fire, thus depriving the enemy of all hope of aid from a friendly squadron, and to afford confidence to the soldiers and seamen belonging to it. Nevertheless, these boats presented certain inconveniences, arising out of the form adopted in their construction. Having in place of a keel deeply immersed a flat bottom, which went but a little way beneath the water, and being heavily masted, they possessed but little stability, so that they inclined with too much facility to the wind, and even overset, if they were taken by a sudden squall; a circumstance that really occurred once in Brest roads to a gun-vessel badly stowed. This accident happened before the eyes of admiral Ganteaume, who, under considerable apprehension, immediately wrote to the first consul, stating the occurrence. But this kind of accident did not again occur. With proper precautions in the mode of distributing the stores, which were made to serve as ballast, the boats belonging to the flotilla acquired sufficient stability to carry themselves in rough weather; and there occurred no further accident than that of running aground, which was a natural consequence in navigating along shore, and was often voluntarily done on their part with the view of escaping from the English. The following tide got them afloat, when they had thus been obliged to run ashore.

These boats offered an inconvenience still more vexatious, which was that of driving, or, in other words, yielding to the currents. This was caused by their heavy make, which presented a greater hold to the water than their masting presented to the winds. This inconvenience was aggravated when, deprived of wind, they were under the oar. They had no more than the strength of their rowers to combat the force of the current. In such a case they might possibly be carried far from their object, or, what was still worse, might arrive one after another completely separated, because being of different forms, they must become subject to an unequal deflection. Nelson had himself experienced this in his attack upon the Boulogne flotilla in 1801. His four divisions were unable to act all at the same time, and made only unconnected efforts. A similar obstacle, vexatious in any sea, existed yet more in the channel, where two very strong counter-currents prevailed every tide. When the tide flowed or ebbed, it produced alternately an ascending or descending current, the direction of which became determined by the configuration of the shores of France and England. The channel is very wide at the western extreme, between Cape Finisterre and the Land's End, Cornwall; and very narrow on the east, between Calais and Dover. The tide in flowing enters rapidly by the larger opening, and this produces at the flow an ascending current from the west to the east, or from Brest to Calais. The same effect occurs in a contrary direction at ebb-tide, it being then more rapid towards the larger issue, and there results in consequence a current from the east to the west, from Calais to Brest. This double current, receiving near the coasts, from their form itself, different inflexions, could not fail to cause a degree of disturbance in the progress of these two thousand vessels, a disturbance to be more or less dreaded, according to the weakness of the wind and the strength of the tide. This would much diminish the advantage of crossing in a calm, the time otherwise most desirable. However, the channel between Boulogne and Dover was not only very narrow, but of small depth, permitting anchorage at an equal distance from both shores. The admirals, therefore, thought it was practicable to anchor in case of too great a deflection from the course, and to remain until the return of the contrary current, a delay that would not cause a loss of more than three or four hours. This was a difficulty, therefore, but one not insurmountable [1].

The foregoing inconvenience, arising from the currents, caused the abandonment of a species of boats called praams. These altogether flat, without any curvature in the sides, having three keels, were truly floating bridges, or pontons intended for the carriage of a good many men and horses. It was at first resolved to construct fifty, which would offer the means of transporting two thousand five hundred horses, and six hundred pieces of cannon; but the inferiority of their sailing soon made them be laid aside, and no more than twelve or fifteen were constructed. No allusion has been made to the heavy barks, short and broad, armed with a twenty-four pounder astern, which were dedominated *caïques*, nor to the corvettes, drawing little water, and carrying a dozen heavy cannon, both the one and the other were built as specimens, of which a proper experience forbade the multiplication. The total of the flotilla was composed almost exclusively of the three species of vessels of which a description has been before given, that is, of gun-vessels, gun-boats, and pinnaces.

Each gun-vessel and gun-boat was able to carry a company of infantry; every pinnace, two-thirds of a company; thus five hundred gun-vessels, four hundred gun-boats, and three hundred pinnaces, united, in all, twelve hundred conveyances, would afford the means to embark one hundred and twenty thousand men. Supposing the Brest squadron to carry fifteen thousand or eighteen thousand more, and that of the Texel twenty

[1] All that I have stated here is extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the admirals, principally that of admiral Bruix with the minister of marine and with Napoleon. It is to be clearly understood, that I conjecture nothing myself, but that I make a summary, as far as I am able, and with historical precision, of all that is of essential importance in this correspondence, that I believe I am justified fully in styling admirable.—*Author's note.*

thousand, the whole would amount to one hundred and fifty thousand or one hundred and sixty thousand men. Thus there would be flung upon the English shore one hundred and twenty thousand in one mass on board the flotilla, and thirty thousand or forty thousand in detached divisions on board of the two squadrons that would sail, the one from Holland, the other from Brest.

This would be a force sufficient to vanquish and reduce this proud nation, which pretended to domineer over the world from the security of an inviolate asylum.

But it was not men alone that were to be carried; there must be conveyed besides men, stores, provisions, arms, and horses. The war flotilla, properly so called, would take the men, the ammunition indispensable for the first battles, and provisions for twenty days, with the field artillery, and a complement of two horses for each gun. But there must also be conveyed the remainder of their trains, not less than seven or eight thousand cavalry horses, munitions for an entire campaign, provisions for one or two months, a large park of siege artillery in case there should be walls to breach or batter. The horses more particularly were very difficult to carry, and it would be necessary to have not less than six or seven hundred vessels to carry seven or eight thousand.

For this last purpose there was no necessity to construct vessels. The pilot boats and those belonging to the deep sea fishery furnished a naval supply always ready at hand for transport, and very considerable.

There could be bought up upon the entire of the coasts, from St. Malo as far as the Texel, and even in the interior of Holland, vessels measuring from twenty to thirty tons, built for pilotage and for the cod and herring fisheries, perfectly strong, excellent sailors, and very capable of receiving any thing with which it was wished to load them, thus providing a convenient mode of carriage. A commission was formed for the sole purpose of buying up from Brest to Amsterdam all the suitable vessels of this kind, costing, on an average, from 12,000f. to 15,000f. each. Some hundreds were purchased, and many more, if required, it was not difficult to obtain.

Carrying up the war-boats, properly so called, to twelve or thirteen hundred, the transport flotilla to nine hundred or a thousand, there were two thousand two hundred or two thousand three hundred vessels to unite together; a prodigious naval assemblage, without precedent in past times, and probably to have no example in those which are to come.

It is proper to understand now how it was possible to construct upon one or two points of the coast such an immense number of vessels. Small as their dimensions might be, it would have been impossible to procure at one place the materials, workmen, and building yards necessary for their construction. It had therefore been indispensable to make all the ports concur in that sole object as well as all the basins of the rivers. It was quite enough to reserve to the ports of the channel, in which they were to be united, the care of collecting and retaining these two thousand vessels.

But after having built them very far apart one from another, and it became necessary to assemble them, this assemblage must be at one point between Boulogne and Dunkirk, and they must elude the English cruisers, resolved upon their destruction before they should be united. It was needful, in consequence, to receive them in three or four ports, lying as much as possible open to the same point of the compass, at a small distance from each other, in order to hoist sail and depart together. It was needful to accommodate them, without confusion, sheltered from the danger of fire, to place the troops in such a manner that they should be able to pass in and out often; and to learn how to load and unload them rapidly with the men, cannon, and horses.

All these difficulties could only be resolved at the places themselves, before Napoleon, who should see things with his own eyes, while surrounded by officers the most special and able. He had sent to Boulogne M. Sganzin, the engineer of the navy, and one of the most able members of that distinguished body; M. Forfait, who had been the minister of marine for some months, and who, though not above mediocrity in the duty of administration, possessed very superior skill in the art of naval construction, full of invention, and devoted to an enterprize of which, under the directory, he had been one of the most ardent supporters; lastly, admiral Decrès, minister of the marine, and admiral Bruix, two individuals who have been already mentioned, and who merit to be made known more particularly.

The first consul would willingly have possessed a smaller number of good generals in his land forces, and a few more good admirals in his navy. But war and victory can alone form good generals. A naval war had not been wanting for twelve years preceding that time; but unhappily the French navy, disorganized by emigration, having felt itself greatly inferior to that of the English, had been obliged almost continually to remain shut up in port, and the French admirals, though they had not lost their bravery, had lost their confidence in themselves. Some were grown old, others wanted experience. Four at that moment attracted the attention of Napoleon, Decrès, Latouche-Tréville, Ganteaume, and Bruix. Admiral Decrès was a man of a rare understanding, but a censurer, only seeing the ill side of things, an excellent critic of the operations of others, and under this head a good minister; in administration displaying little activity, but very useful by the side of Napoleon, who in activity supplied the remissness of everybody, and who had need of councillors less confident than he was himself. For these reasons admiral Decrès was the one of all the four worth most at the head of the navy, and least worth at the head of a squadron. Ganteaume was a brave, intelligent, well experienced officer, able to conduct a naval division under fire, but out of action hesitating, uncertain, suffering fortune to pass without seizing it; he was therefore only adapted for the least difficult of enterprizes. Latouche-Tréville and Bruix were the two most distinguished seamen of the time, and certainly intended, had they lived, to dispute with the English the empire of the seas. Latouche-Tréville was all ardour, all audacity; he added to this a good understanding, experience as well as courage, inspiring the seamen with the sentiments which he felt himself, and in this respect the most valuable of the whole, because he

had that of which the French navy possessed too little, a proper confidence in himself. Lastly, there was admiral Bruix, poor in health and bodily appearance, wasted by pleasure, endowed with astonishing intelligence, a rare organization of genius, finding resources for every thing, profoundly experienced, the only officer who could have commanded forty ships of the line at once, and as capable of conceiving as of executing; he had made the best minister had he not been so well adapted to command. These were not all the chiefs of the French navy; there was Villeneuve, subsequently so unfortunate; Linois, the conqueror at Algesiras, then in India, and others, who will be known in their proper places, but the four now mentioned were at that time the principal.

The first consul wished to confide to admiral Bruix the command of the flotilla, because there all was to be created; to Ganteaume the Brest squadron, which had no more to do than to transport troops; lastly, to Latouche-Tréville the Toulon fleet, which was commanded to execute a difficult, bold, and decisive manœuvre, that will be hereafter stated.

Admiral Bruix having to organize the flotilla, was continually in contact with admiral Decrès. Both one and the other had too much spirit not to be rivals, and from that they became enemies; besides, their natures were incompatible. To point out invincible difficulties, and criticise the attempts made to overcome them, was the part of admiral Decrès; to perceive, study, and endeavour to conquer them, was the part of admiral Bruix. It must be added, that they were mistrustful of each other; they never ceased to fear, admiral Decrès that the inconveniences arising out of his inactivity would be denounced to the first consul, admiral Bruix those arising from his irregular life. They would, under a feeble master, have caused trouble in the navy by their divisions; but under such an one as Napoleon, they were useful by their very differences. Bruix proposed his combinations, Decrès criticised them, and the first consul pronounced judgment with almost infallible correctness.

It was amidst these men, and on the spot, that Napoleon decided all questions left in suspense. His arrival at Boulogne was urgent, because in spite of the energy and frequency of his orders, a great many things remained in arrear. They did not build at Boulogne, Calais, or Dunkirk, but they repaired there the old flotilla, and they got forward the preparations for executing what was necessary to put on board the two thousand vessels, bought or built, as soon as they should be assembled together. Workmen, timber, iron, and hemp, were wanted, as well as artillery of a long range, in order to keep off the English, who employed themselves very often in firing upon the vessels with incendiary projectiles.

The presence of the first consul, surrounded by M. Sganzin, M. Forfait, and admirals Bruix, Decrès, and a number of other officers, soon imparted fresh activity to the enterprize. A measure had been taken at Paris which he wished to apply at Boulogne, and every where that he came. He took, under the conscription, five or six thousand men, that belonged to all the trades attached to working in wood and iron, such as joiners, carpenters, sawyers, wheelwrights, lock and blacksmiths. Masters, chosen from among the workmen belonging to the navy, superintended and directed them. A high rate of pay was given to those who exhibited intelligence and good-will. In a short time, the ship-yards were covered with a population of working ship-builders, whose original trade it would have been hard to divine.

Forests were found in abundance in the vicinity of Boulogne. An order had been issued to deliver for the service of the navy all that was in the environs. Timber employed at the moment it was felled being green, was good to serve for piles, of which thousands were required in the ports of the channel. They were thus able to procure planks and floor timber. The timber for the bends and ribs was brought from the north. The naval stores and materials, such as hemp, masts, pitch, and tar, brought from Sweden and Russia into Holland, were imported, by the interior navigation, from Holland and Flanders to Boulogne. These had been stopped, at the moment, by different obstacles, on the canals of Belgium. Officers were immediately sent with orders and funds in order to accelerate the arrival of the materials on the way. The founderies of Douai, Liege, and Strasburg, in spite of their activity, were found behindhand. The learned Monge, who followed the first consul nearly wherever he went, was sent on a mission to accelerate their labours, and to see cast at Liege some heavy mortars and pieces of large calibre. General Marmont had the charge of the artillery. Aids-de-camp were every day sent off to stimulate his zeal, and to state to him the particular expeditions of cannon or of carriages which were delayed. There were demanded, independently of the artillery for the vessels, not less than five or six hundred guns for battery, in order to keep the enemy at a distance from the building-yards.

These primary orders given, it next became necessary to consider the great question of the ports of assemblage, and of the means of proportioning their capacity to the extent of the flotilla. It was necessary to enlarge some, create others, and defend all. After having conferred with M. Sganzin, M. Forfait, and admirals Decrès and Bruix, the first consul came to the following dispositions.

For a long while the port of Boulogne had been indicated as the best point of departure for an expedition directed against England. The coast of France, in advancing towards that of England, projects in a cape, called Cape Grisnez. To the right of this cape it turns to the east, towards the Schelde, having in front the vast expanse of the North Sea. To the left it encounters that of England, forming thus one of the two sides of the strait; then it descends suddenly from north to south towards the mouth of the Somme. The ports situated to the right of Cape Grisnez, such as Calais and Dunkirk, placed out of the strait, are less happily situated as points of departure; the ports to the left, on the contrary, such as Boulogne, Ambleteuse, and Etaples, placed in the strait itself, have always been judged preferable. In fact, it is necessary, on sailing from Dunkirk or Calais, to double Cape Grisnez, in order to enter the strait, to overcome the baffling winds of the

channel, which are felt in doubling the cape, and thus to get opposite Boulogne, and draw towards the land between Folkestone and Dover. On the contrary, in going from England to France, the passage is more naturally made towards Calais than towards Boulogne. In order to pass over into England, which was the case in the projected expedition, the ports to the left of Cape Grisnez were much better situated than those of Calais and Dunkirk. They were alone inconvenient from presenting less extent and depth than Calais and Dunkirk, which is explained by the accumulation of sands and shingle banks, always greater in a contracted space like a strait.

Still the port of Boulogne, consisting of the bed of a little marshy river, the Liane, was susceptible of receiving a considerable enlargement. The basin of the Liane, formed by two level surfaces, which separate in the environs of Boulogne, and leave between them a space of a semicircular figure, was capable, by great labour, of being converted into a dry port of very large extent. The channel of the Liane presented a depth of water of six or seven feet at high water in moderate tides. It was very possible, by excavation, to procure a depth of nine or ten feet. It was, therefore, a practicable thing to create in the marshy bed of the Liane, a little above Boulogne, a basin of a figure similar to the shape of the land, that is to say, semicircular, and capable of containing some hundreds of boats, more or less, according to the space determined. This basin, with the bed of the Liane, would be able to hold twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, and, in consequence, the larger part of the flotilla. But it was not enough to have a sufficient surface; there must be quays of very great extent, in order that numerous barks should be able, if not at once, at least in a very large number, to lie alongside the shore of the basin, and take on board their lading. The space devoted to the quays, therefore, was as important as the extent of the port itself. None of these things had been thought about under the directory, because its designs had never gone so far as to unite together one hundred and fifty thousand men and two thousand vessels. The first consul, in spite of the vastness of the labour, did not hesitate to order the deepening of the bed of the Liane to commence immediately. The same one hundred and fifty thousand men, that constituted by their number the difficulty of the enterprize, were to be employed themselves in vanquishing that difficulty, by deepening the basin in which they were to embark. It was arranged that the camps, placed originally at some distance from the coast, should immediately be brought near the sea, and that the soldiers should themselves excavate the enormous mass of earth which it would be necessary to remove.

A sluice was ordered for the purpose of deepening the channel, and procuring the necessary depth of water. Such ports as are not formed like that of Brest, by the sinuosities of a deep coast, and are called dry ports, in general exist at the mouths of small rivers, which become swollen at high tide, forming at that time a basin in which the vessels find themselves afloat. They then diminish in depth until low water, when nothing more presents itself than large rivulets running amid beds of slime, leaving the vessels dry ashore for some hours. The sands which these rivers bring down with them, gathered up by the sea, and driven back towards the mouths of the rivers, form banks or bars, which are a great trouble to navigation. In order to overcome these obstacles, sluice-gates are placed in the beds of the rivers. These open of themselves before the rising tide, and receiving an abundance of water, retain it by shutting of themselves when the tide begins to fall, and do not permit the water to escape until the moment when the sluice is opened. The moment chosen for this purpose is that of low tide, when the water rushing out with great force, drives the sand before its artificial torrent, and thus deepens the channel or passage. These gates are called by engineers (*ecluses de chasse*) "chasing" or "hunting sluices;" and it was a sluice of a similar kind, the construction of which was hastened at this time in the upper basin of the Liane.

Twenty thousand trunks of the trees felled in the forest of Boulogne, served to line with piles the two sides of the Liane, and the circumference of the semicircular basin; a part of such trunks sawn into large beams, and then laid as a flooring upon the piles, were used to form large quays the whole length of the Liane and the semicircular basin. The numerous vessels of the flotilla were thus enabled to come close and range along the quays to embark or disembark the men, horses, and stores.

The town of Boulogne was placed to the right of the Liane, the basin to the left, and nearly opposite. The Liane extended itself longitudinally between the two. Bridges were constructed to afford an easy communication from one side to the other, placed above the point where the anchorage or mooring ground commenced.

These vast works were far from sufficing. A great maritime establishment is supposed to include workshops, building-yards, magazines, barracks, slaughter-houses, hospitals, in short, all that is necessary to afford accommodation to a vast mass of different materials, to serve the seamen in health or sickness, to receive, nourish, clothe, and arm them. From this it may be readily imagined the cost in time and labour to form such establishments as those of Brest and Toulon! It was here an object to create more extensive establishments, because there were wanted workshops, building-yards, magazines, and hospitals, to meet the wants of two thousand three hundred vessels, thirty thousand seamen, ten thousand workmen, and one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers. If these creations had not been temporary, they would have been absolutely impossible. Still although temporary, the difficulty of their execution, considering the quantity of things to be united at one spot, was immense.

In the town of Boulogne all the houses were hired that could be converted into offices, magazines, or hospitals. The country and the farm-houses in the same neighbourhood were also taken for a similar purpose, when they were found adapted to the object. Wooden houses were erected for the naval workmen, and places of shelter were built up of plank to serve as stables for the horses. As to the troops, they were encamped in the open country in barracks constructed with the wrecks

and waste wood of the surrounding forests. The first consul selected the right and left of the Liane, on the two level spaces, the opening between which formed the basin of Boulogne, for the ground which the troops were to occupy. Thirty-six thousand men were here distributed in two camps; the one called that of the left, the other of the right. The troops that had been assembled at St. Omer, placed under the command of general Soult, were the occupants of these two positions. The other corps of the army were to be successively brought near the coast as their establishments should be prepared for them. The troops thus quartered found themselves in pure air, exposed, it was true, to violent and cold winds, but provided with a great abundance of wood to shelter and warm them.

Immense stores of provisions were ordered from all parts of the country, and brought into the magazines. There came by the interior navigation, which was very perfect, in the north of France, as is well known, flour to convert into biscuits, rice, oats, salt meat, wine, and brandy. A great quantity of cheese, of a round form, was brought from Holland. These different aliments were to serve for the daily consumption of the camps, and for the provision stores of the double flotilla of war and transport. It is possible to judge of the vast quantity to be collected, upon imagining that it was required to feed the army, the navy, the numerous population of workmen who had been drawn thither, at first during all the time of the encampment, then during two months when the expedition should be in activity, supposing the provisions to be for nearly two hundred thousand persons, and the forage for twenty thousand horses. If it be added, that all that was necessary was supplied with an abundance that left nothing to be desired, it will be comprehended that a more extraordinary creation had never been executed among any people by the head of an empire.

But one port alone would not suffice for the entire expedition. Boulogne would not contain more than twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, and it was required to receive two thousand three hundred. Had the port been able to contain all the number necessary, it would have taken too long a time for them to get out to sea by the same channel. Under certain circumstances, of the sea it was a great inconvenience to have only one place of refuge. If, for example, a considerable number of the vessels had gone out, and bad weather or the enemy had obliged them to enter the port again suddenly, they would have got foul of each other at the entrance, a want of water would have come on, and they would have been lost. There was, on descending the shore about four leagues to the south, a little river, called the Canche, the mouth of which formed a tortuous bay, very sandy, unhappily open to every wind, and offering a far less secure anchorage than that of Boulogne. It formed a little fishing port, that of Etaples. Upon this river Canche, at about a league in the interior, was situated the fortified town of Montreuil. It was difficult to excavate a basin there, but it was very possible to drive a succession of piles, within which the vessels might be moored, and to construct quays of wood upon these piles proper for the embarkation and disembarkation of troops. It was a safe and secure shelter for three or four hundred vessels. It was possible to get out with the wind in the same points as from the harbour of Boulogne. The distance from Boulogne, which was four or five leagues, offered some difficulty as regarded the simultaneous conduct of the operations; but that was a secondary difficulty, and an asylum for four hundred vessels was too important to be neglected. There the first consul formed a camp, which was destined for the troops united between Compiegne and Amiens, of which the command was reserved for general Ney, on return from his Swiss mission. This camp was called the Camp of Montreuil. The troops received orders to place themselves there as they were in the camps around Boulogne. Establishments were prepared accordingly for the preservation of the necessary provisions, for the hospitals, and, in fine, for all that could be required by an army of twenty-four thousand men. The centre of the army being supposed at Boulogne, the camp at Etaples would be the left.

A little to the north of Boulogne, before arriving at Cape Grisnez, there are two other bays discoverable, formed by two small rivers, the beds of which are much encumbered by sand and mud, but in which, at high water, the sea rises six or seven feet. The one is about a league, the other two leagues from Boulogne; they are, besides, placed in the same point with respect to the wind as Boulogne. Upon digging out the earth, and placing sluice-gates, it was possible to find shelter there for several hundred vessels, which would complete the means of accommodating the entire flotilla. The nearest of these two small rivers was the Wimereux, opening to the sea near a village of the same name. The other was the Selacque, the opening of which was near a fishing village, called Ambleteuse. During the reign of Louis XVI., it had been in contemplation to deepen these basins, but the works executed at that time had now disappeared under the sand and mud. The first consul ordered the engineers to inspect both these places, and in case of a report favourable to his object, the troops were to be employed there, and encamped in huts, as at Etaples and at Boulogne. These two harbours might be made to contain, the one two hundred, the other three hundred vessels; thus there were five hundred more still would have found the shelter of an harbour. The guard, with the grenadiers united, the reserves of cavalry and artillery, and the different corps which were forming between Lille, Douai, and Arras, would here find the means of embarkation.

There yet remained the Batavian flotilla, which was designed to embark the corps of general Davout, and which, according to the treaty concluded with Holland, was independent of the squadron of the line assembled in the Texel. Unfortunately, the Dutch was far less effectively armed than the French flotilla. It was a question whether it should go out of the Schelde direct for the coast of England, under the escort of several frigates, or whether it should proceed to Dunkirk and Calais, in order to set out for England from the ports placed to the right of Cape Grisnez. Admiral Bruix had the order to settle this ques-

tion. The corps of general Davout, which formed the right of the army, would be thus found approaching to the centre. They did not even despair, by dint of enlarging the basins, and compressing the encampment, to make the whole double Cape Grisnez, and to establish all at Ambleteuse and Wimereux. There the French and Dutch flotillas, united to the number of two thousand three hundred vessels, carrying the corps of generals Davout, Soult, and Ney, with the reserve besides, that is to say, one hundred and twenty thousand men, would be able to go to sea simultaneously, with the wind at the same point, from four ports, placed in the interior of the strait, with the certainty of being able to act together. The two great fleets ready to sail, the one from Brest, the other from the Texel, would be able to carry the remaining forty thousand men, of which the object and employment were the exclusive secret of the first consul.

In order to effect the completion of all the various parts of this vast organization, it was needful to place the coast out of the reach of attack by the English. Besides the zeal which they would infallibly show to hinder the concentration of the Boulogne flotilla, by guarding the shore from Bordeaux to Flushing, it was to be presumed, that in imitation of what they did in 1801, they would attempt to destroy the flotilla, either by fire in the basins, or by attacking them at their moorings when they came out to manœuvre. It was necessary, therefore, to render the approach of the English impossible, as much for the security of the ports themselves as to ensure a free outlet and entrance, because if the flotilla was condemned to remain immovable within the harbour, it would be incapable of manœuvring or of executing any great operation.

This approach of the English it was not easy to prevent, in consequence of the form of the coast being a right line, which presented neither hollow nor salient point, and for this reason had no means to carry out projectiles to any considerable distance. This defect was provided for in a very ingenious manner. In advance of the shore at Boulogne, two points of rock projected into the sea, one to the right, called the point of the Crèche, the other on the left, denominated that of the Heurt. Between these two points there was an open space of three thousand five hundred fathoms (nearly three miles), perfectly safe and very commodious for mooring. Two or three hundred vessels would be able to moor there in several lines. These points of rock, covered by the sea at high water, were uncovered at low tide. The first consul ordered the erection of two forts, in heavy masonry, of a semicircular form, solidly casemated, and presenting two tier of guns, which would be able to cover, by their fire, the mooring-ground which extended from one to the other. He had the work immediately commenced. The engineers of the navy and army, seconded by the masons taken out of the conscription, at once commenced the work. The first consul had the desire to see the work completed before the commencement of winter. But he set himself so much to multiply precautions, that he wished to secure the centre of the line of anchorage as well by a third point of support. This point was chosen in the middle of the line, and in face of the entrance of the port; and as it was upon a base of moving sand, the first consul devised the construction of this new fort in heavy carpentry. Numerous workmen were set, at low water, to drive hundreds of piles, which might serve as a base for a battery of eighteen twenty-four pounders. Oftentimes they continued the work under the fire of the English.

Independently of these three points, advanced into the sea, and placed parallel with the coast of Boulogne, the first consul placed cannon and mortars on all parts of the coast that projected in the smallest degree, and did not leave a point capable of carrying artillery, without arming it with guns of the heaviest calibre. Precautions less extensive, but yet amply sufficient, were taken at Etaples, and at the new ports which they had begun to deepen.

Such were the vast projects definitively arranged by the first consul, in the view of the localities and with the concurrence of the engineers and officers of the navy. The construction of the flotilla rapidly advanced, from the coasts of Britany to those of Holland; but before being able to effect the union at Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples, it was necessary to complete the excavation of the basins, the erection of the forts, the carriage of the artillery *matériel* to the coast, the concentration of the troops near the sea, and the creation of the different establishments necessary to supply their wants. The achievement of all these objects, it was calculated, would be completed by the winter.

The first consul, after visiting Boulogne, went to Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Antwerp. He desired to see this last port himself, and to be certain, by his own observation, of the truth of what he had heard in the very different accounts which had been transmitted to him. After having examined the situation of this city with that promptitude and accuracy of glance which only belonged to himself, he had no doubt upon his mind about the possibility of making a great maritime arsenal of Antwerp. This city had, in his view, very particular properties attaching to it. It was situated on the Schelde, opposite the Thames; it was in immediate communication with Holland by the finest of internal navigations, and, in consequence, was adapted for a rich deposit of naval stores. It was able to receive, without difficulty, by the Rhine and Meuse, the timber of the Alps, the Vosges, the Black Forest, the Wetteravia, and the Ardennes. Lastly, the workmen of Flanders, naturally drawn to that vicinity, would supply thousands of hands for the construction of vessels. The first consul resolved, therefore, to create at Antwerp a fleet, the flag of which should be continually flying between the Schelde and the Thames. This would be one of the most sensible annoyances which he was able to cause to his irreconcilable enemies, the English. He had the ground occupied immediately required for the construction of the vast basins, which still exist, and are the pride of the city of Antwerp. These basins communicate, by a sluice of the largest dimensions, with the river Schelde, and are capable of containing an entire fleet of line-of-battle ships, remaining always provided with thirty feet in depth of water, whatever be that of the river level. The first consul wished to have constructed

twenty-five sail of the line in this new port of the republic, and while waiting the new experiments relative to the possibility of the navigation of the Schelde, he ordered several vessels of seventy-four guns to be laid down on the stocks. He did not renounce the project of constructing them at a later period of a superior burden; and he hoped to make of Antwerp an establishment equal to those of Brest and Toulon, infinitely better placed to trouble the repose of England.

The first consul went from Antwerp to Ghent, and from Ghent to Brussels. The Belgic population, always discontented with the government which ruled, showed itself little docile under the administration of the French. The fervour of their religious sentiments, rendered more difficult than that of other nations the administration of public worship. The first consul at first encountered here a degree of coldness, or to speak more correctly, a less expanded vivacity than in the old French provinces. But this coldness soon disappeared when the young general was seen surrounded by the clergy, present and respectful at their religious ceremonies, accompanied by his wife, who, in spite of her fondness for dissipation, had in her heart the piety of a woman, and of a woman of the old time. M. de Roquelaure was archbishop of Malines, an old man, possessing great amenity of manners. The first consul received him with infinite regard, gave back to his family a considerable property that remained sequestrated by the state, exhibited himself often to the people, accompanied by the metropolitan of Belgium, and succeeded by his manners and bearing in calming the religious mistrust of the country. He was attended at Brussels, too, by cardinal Caprara. Their meeting produced the best effect. The presence of the first consul in the city was prolonged; and the ministers, with the consul Cambacérès, came there to hold councils. A part of the diplomatic body also arrived to obtain audiences of the head of the French government. Thus surrounded by ministers, generals, and numerous and brilliant troops, general Bonaparte held, in this capital of the Low Countries, a court which bore all the appearance of sovereignty. It might be said that an emperor of Germany had arrived to visit the patrimony of Charles V.

Time passed away much faster than the first consul had believed. Numerous public affairs demanded his presence in Paris; there were the orders still to give for the execution of what he had determined upon at Boulogne; and there were also negotiations with the European powers, which the present crisis rendered more active than ever. He therefore renounced, for the moment, a view of the provinces of the Rhine, leaving to a second and approaching journey that which he had originally intended to include in the present. But before he quitted Brussels, he received a visit, which was much noticed, and which merited to be so, on account of the personage who had come to see him.

This personage was M. Lombard, secretary to the king of Prussia. The young Frederick William, in his diffidence of himself and of others, had adopted the custom of detaining the work of his ministers, and of submitting it to a new examination, which he undertook with his secretary, M. Lombard, a man of mind and acquirement. M. Lombard, owing to this royal intimacy, had acquired in Prussia very great importance. M. Haugwitz, able at catching every kind of influence, had been artful enough to secure M. Lombard to his interest in such a manner, that the king, passing from the minister to his private secretary, only found in his ideas the same views as those of his minister, Haugwitz. M. Lombard, on coming to Brussels, represented, at the same time, therefore, before the first consul, both the king and the prime minister in one, in other words, the entire of the Prussian government, except the court, which arranged itself around the queen exclusively, and was animated by a different feeling from that of the ruling power.

The visit of M. Lombard to Brussels was the consequence of the agitation of the cabinets since the renewal of the war between France and England. The court of Prussia was in a state of great anxiety, which accrued from the recent communications of the Russian cabinet. This last cabinet, as has been already seen, returned in spite of inclination for its own internal affairs, to those of Europe, wishing to indemnify itself by playing in them a character of some consideration. All it endeavoured at first was to get the two belligerent powers to accept its mediation, and recommend the estates it protected to French forbearance. The result of these its first efforts had not been of a very satisfactory nature. England had received the overture with great coldness, refusing at once to confide Malta to Russian keeping, or to suspend hostilities during the time the work of mediation was proceeding. She had solely declared she would not decline the interference of the Russian cabinet, if the new negotiation embraced the whole of the affairs of Europe, and, consequently, included in the question all that the treaties of Lunéville and of Amiens had stipulated.

To accept these conditions was to repel the mediation. While England replied in this mode, France, on her side, receiving with entire deference the intervention of the young emperor, had, nevertheless, occupied without hesitation the territories under the recommendation and protection of Russia, namely, Hanover and Naples. The court of St. Petersburg was singularly hurt to find itself so little regarded, when it pressed England to accept the Russian mediation, and France to limit the extent of her hostility. Russia had then cast her eyes upon Prussia, in order to engage her to form a third party, which should give the law to the French and English; above all, to the French, who were much more alarming than the English, although more polite. The emperor Alexander, who had met the king of Prussia at Memel, and had sworn to him at that meeting an eternal friendship, who himself discovered every kind of analogy with the young monarch, analogies of age, mind, and virtue, endeavoured to persuade him, in a frequent correspondence, that they were made for each other, that they were the only honest people in Europe; that at Vienna there was nothing but falsehood, at Paris, ambition, and in London, avarice; in short, that they owed it to themselves to unite closely, in order to constrain and govern Europe.

The young emperor, exhibiting precocious

cunning, had endeavoured, before all things, to persuade the king of Prussia, that he was the dupe of the first consul's wheedling, and that for interests of a mediocre character, he had made to him dangerous political sacrifices; that owing to his condescension, Hanover had been invaded; that the French would not limit their occupations there; that the reason they urged to exclude England from the continent would carry them beyond Hanover, and conduct them as far as Denmark in order to seize the Sound; that then the English would blockade the Baltic as they had blockaded the Elbe and Weser, and thus shut up the last outlet remaining for the commerce of the continent. The fear thus expressed by Russia, could not be real; because the first consul did not think of pushing forward his system of occupation as far as Denmark, it was not possible that he dreamed of such a measure. He had occupied Hanover under its title of an English property; and he had occupied Tarentum, in virtue of the uncontested domination of France over Italy. But to invade Denmark, by passing over the body of Germany, was impossible, unless it was to begin by the conquest of Prussia herself; and then most fortunately the policy of France had not required so great an extension of power.

The suggestions of Russia, therefore, were falsehoods; but they became sources of uneasiness to the king of Prussia, already much troubled at the occupation of Hanover. This occupation had caused him, besides the continual complaints of the German states, very cruel commercial suffering. The Elbe and the Weser were closed by the English; the exportation of Prussian produce had ceased all at once. The cloths of Silesia, bought commonly at Hamburg and Bremen, the great trade of which they fed, had been refused on the same day that the blockade had commenced. The great merchants of Hamburg in particular had shown a species of malice in declining every kind of commercial business, in order yet more to stimulate the court of Prussia, and to make it feel more sensibly the inconvenience of the occupation of Hanover, the sole cause of the blockade of the Elbe and Weser. From that date the great Prussian nobles had sustained immense losses. M. Haugwitz himself had lost one-half of his income; a circumstance which did not alter in any degree the calmness of mind that made one of the merits of his political character. The king, besieged by the complaints of Silesia, had been obliged to lend a million of crowns to that province [1], a sacrifice great enough for an economical prince, who was so anxious to re-establish the treasury of the great Frederick. They requested at the present moment double that sum.

Agitated by the suggestions of Russia, and by the complaints regarding Prussian commerce, the king, Frederick-William, feared, besides, that if he suffered himself, led by these suggestions and complaints, to become engaged in hostile relations with France, it would overturn all his policy, which for several years had rested upon a French alliance. It was to extricate himself from this painful state of things, that M. Lombard came to be sent to Brussels. He had orders to observe the young general very narrowly, to endeavour to penetrate into his objects, to assure himself, if he intended, as they said at St. Petersburg, to push his occupations as far as Denmark; if, finally, as they still said too at St. Petersburg, it was so very dangerous to trust this extraordinary man. M. Lombard was at the same time to lay himself out for obtaining some concessions relative to Hanover. The king, Frederick-William, would have wished that the corps occupying the country should be reduced by some thousand men, which would have calmed the fears, sincere or affected, of which the presence of the French in Germany had been the cause. She wished, further, the evacuation of some small port at the mouth of the Elbe, such as that of Cuxhaven. This little port, situated at the entrance of the Elbe itself, was the nominal property of the Hamburghers, but in reality it served the English for the continuation of their trade. If that had been left unoccupied, from its claim to be Hamburg territory, the English trade would be carried on just as in a time of profound peace. With such a proceeding, the object that France proposed to herself would have been defeated; and so correct is this view of the matter, that in 1800, when Prussia herself had taken Hanover, she occupied Cuxhaven.

As the price of these two concessions, the king of Prussia offered a northern system of neutrality, drawn up after the system of the old Prussian neutrality, which would comprehend, besides Prussia and the north of Germany, the new German states, perhaps even Russia; at least so king Frederick William flattered himself. This was according to that monarch guaranteeing to France the immobility of the continent, leaving her free to employ all her means against England, and consequently worthy of some sacrifices. Such were the different objects confided to the prudence of M. Lombard.

The secretary of the king of Prussia left Berlin for Brussels, warmly recommended by M. Haugwitz to M. de Talleyrand. He felt in a sensible manner the honour of approaching and of conversing with the first consul. The last, made aware of the object with which M. Lombard had arrived, received him in the most brilliant way, and took the best means to open an access to his heart, which was to flatter him by a confidence without limit, by the development of all his ideas, and even of his secret thoughts. Besides, the first consul was able at that moment to unfold himself wholly without losing any thing by it; and he did so accordingly with much frankness, and a good deal of attractive language. He did not wish, he told M. Lombard, to acquire a single territory more upon the continent; he desired no more than other powers had recognised in French possession by open or secret treaties; the Rhine, the Alps, Piedmont, Parma, and the maintenance of existing relations with the Italian republic and with Etruria. He was ready to acknowledge the independence of Switzerland and Holland. He was resolved no more to mix himself up in the affairs of Germany from the date of the *recez* of 1803. He intended only the performance of one single thing, which was to repress the maritime despotism of England, insupportable to others certainly as well as to him, when Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, had united twice in twenty

[1] 5,000,000 f. or about £150,000.

years, in 1780 and 1800, in order to put a stop to it. It was for Prussia to aid in such a task; for Prussia, the natural ally of France, that for several years had received numberless services from her, and on whom yet greater ones awaited. If, in fact, he were victorious, grandly victorious, what would it not be in his power to do for Prussia! Had he not Hanover then under his hand, a complement so natural and so necessary for the Prussian territory! Was not that the price, immense and certain, of the friendship that the king Frederick-William testified for him under the existing circumstances! But in order that he should be victorious and grateful, it was necessary that he should be seconded in an efficacious manner. An ambiguous good will, a neutrality more or less extended, constituted a very middling aid. He must give assistance to close completely the shores of Germany, bear some momentary suffering, and ally himself to France by a positive union. That called, since 1795, the system of Prussian neutrality, did not suffice to secure the peace of the continent. It was necessary, in order to render this peace certain, to have a formal alliance, public, offensive and defensive, of Prussia with France. Then none of the continental powers would dare to enter into any design; England would be manifestly alone, reduced to a conflict, man to man, with the army of Boulogne; if to the perspective of such a conflict were joined the close of the European markets, she would be either brought to terms, or crushed by the formidable expedition which was preparing upon the shores of the channel. But the first consul repeated unceasingly, that in order to this the effective alliance of Prussia was necessary, and a concurrence, entire and earnest on her part, in the objects of France. Then all would succeed; then France would be able to heap benefits upon her ally, and make him the present which he had never demanded, but which at the bottom of his heart he ardently desired—namely, Hanover.

The first consul, by his sincerity, the warmth of his explanations, and the dazzling brilliancy of his intellect, did not dupe M. Lombard, as the inimical faction soon afterwards said at Berlin, but convinced and enchained him. He finished by persuading him that he contemplated nothing hostile to Germany; that he only desired to procure means of action against England, and that the price of a frank and sincere concurrence would be for Prussia a magnificent aggrandizement. In regard to the concessions of which M. Lombard had made the demand, the first consul exhibited to him their serious inconveniences; to leave the commerce of England the power of free exercise, while making a war which, up to the uncertain day of the descent, would be without bad consequences to that country—would be to abandon to her all the advantages of the contest. The first consul went even so far as to declare that he was ready to indemnify, at the expense of the French treasury, the suffering commerce of Silesia. That in case Prussia would consent to the stipulations of an offensive and defensive alliance, he was disposed, for such an interest, to make every one of the concessions which the king Frederick-William desired.

M. Lombard, convinced, dazzled, enchanted at the familiarities of the great man, of whom princes appreciated with pride the smallest attention, set out on his return to Berlin, disposed to communicate to his master and to M. Haugwitz the entire of the feelings with which his heart was full.

The first consul, after having held a brilliant court at Brussels, nothing more occurring to detain him in Flanders, and the works undertaken upon the coast not being more advanced, departed for Paris, where he had every thing to do in the double labour of government and diplomacy. He went by Liege, Namur, and Sedan, being every where received with enthusiasm, arriving on the commencement of August at St. Cloud.

He was pressed, while continuing to order from Paris the preparations for the grand expedition, to clear up and fix definitively his relations with the great powers of the continent. In the uneasiness of Prussia he had clearly discovered the influence of Russia; he found this influence besides in the ill-will which was exhibited towards him in Madrid. The Spanish cabinet, in effect, refused any explanation about the execution of the treaty of St. Ildefonzo, and said, that as the Russian mediation gave hope yet of a pacific termination, it must await the result of the mediation before taking a definitive part. Another circumstance had disagreeably affected the first consul; this was the evident partiality of Russia in the attempt at mediation which she had made. While the first consul had accepted the mediation with entire deference, and England, on the contrary, had opposed difficulties of every nature, refusing to confide Malta in the hands of the mediating power, while arguing to infinity upon the extent of the negotiation, the Russian diplomacy inclined more towards England than towards France, and seemed to take no account of the deference of the one, nor of the bad faith of the other. The propositions recently received from St. Petersburg revealed this disposition in the clearest manner. Russia declared her opinion, that England should render Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem; but that in return it would be proper to grant to her the island of Lampedosa; that France ought to give an indemnity to the king of Sardinia, acknowledge and respect the independence of the states placed in her vicinity, evacuate, no more to enter them, not only Tarentum and Hanover, but the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian republic, Switzerland, and Holland.

These conditions, acceptable under some points of view, were completely unacceptable under others. To concede Lampedosa in compensation for Malta, was to give the English the means of making with money, which they never wanted, a second Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. The first consul had been ready to consent to this, in order to preserve the peace from being broken. Now launched into war, full of the hope of succeeding, he would no longer consent to such a sacrifice. To indemnify the king of Sardinia was a matter of no difficulty with him, and he was disposed to devote Parma as an equivalent to this object. To evacuate Hanover and Tarentum, if a peace were established, was but the natural consequence of peace. But to evacuate the Italian republic, which had no army, Switzerland and Holland, which were menaced with an immediate counter-revolution if the French troops were withdrawn, this was to demand the deliverance to the enemies of France

of the states of which she had acquired the right to dispose by ten years of war and victory. The first consul was unable to abide by such conditions. That which decided him more completely still in not suffering such a mediation to proceed, was the form under which it was offered. The first consul had consented to the supreme arbitration, absolute and without appeal, of the young emperor himself, because it interested the honour of this monarch to be just, and gave the greater certainty of terminating the question. But submitting the case to the partiality of the Russian agents, all of them devoted to England, was to assent to a negotiation disadvantageous, and without limit in duration.

He therefore declared, after having discussed the Russian propositions, after having shown the danger and injustice of them all, that he was ever ready to accept the personal arbitration of the czar himself, but not a negotiation conducted by his cabinet in a manner by no means amicable towards France, and of such a complicated character, that no end to it could be hoped for; that he thanked the cabinet of St. Petersburg for its good offices, yet he renounced its aid to serve him further, leaving to the war the care of bringing back peace. The declaration of the first consul ended in these words, so deeply marked with his peculiar character:—

"The first consul has done all to preserve peace; his efforts having been vain, he should have seen that war was in the order of destiny. He will make war, and he will not bend before a proud nation, habituated for twenty years to make all the other powers give way[1]."

M. Markoff was drily treated, and merited to be so by his attitude and language in Paris. The constant approver of England, her pretensions and conduct, he was the avowed detractor of France and her government. When he was told that he did not conform himself in this way, at least in appearance, to the intentions of his master, who professed a rigorous impartiality between France and England, he replied that "the emperor had his own opinion, and that the Russians had theirs." It was to be feared that he would draw upon himself a storm like that which lord Whitworth had experienced, and even more disagreeable still, because the first consul had none of the consideration for M. Markoff which he professed for lord Whitworth.

The thread of this false mediation being cut, still not breaking with Russia, the first consul determined to force Spain to an explanation, and to make her say how she intended to execute the treaty of St. Ildefonzo. He acted thus to discover if she would take a part in the war, or if she would remain neuter, furnishing a subsidy to France in place of succour in men and vessels. The first consul was not yet able to give his entire attention to the grand expedition, inasmuch as this question was not resolved.

Spain showed, in deciding this point, an extreme repugnance, which had raised the most vexatious feelings respecting her in France. It was no doubt an onerous thing to be obliged to follow a neighbouring power through all the vicissitudes of its policy; but in engaging herself by the treaty of St. Ildefonzo, in the bonds of an offensive and defensive alliance with France, Spain had contracted a positive obligation, of which it was impossible to contest the results. Independently of this obligation, it was evident that this power must have most unworthily degenerated, to desire to keep herself at a distance, when the question of a maritime supremacy was about to be agitated for the last time. If England succeeded, it was evident that there would no longer be for Spain commerce, colonies, nor galleons, nothing, in fact, of that which for three centuries had composed her greatness and her riches. When the first consul pressed her to act, he pressed her not only to fulfil a formal engagement, but the most sacred of duties towards herself. Taking into account her present incapacity, he had left her neuter, and in thus managing for her to retain the power of receiving the dollars of Mexico, he demanded that she should contribute her part to a war made for the common advantage; to pay, in other words, that debt in money, when she was not able to pay it in blood, which was due to the cause of the liberty of the seas.

The relations of France with Spain altered, as has been seen, on the question of Portugal, a little ameliorated since, thanks to the vacancy of the duchy of Parma, were now spoiled anew, and on the point of becoming altogether hostile. They complained daily at Madrid of having ceded Louisiana for the kingdom of Etruria, which they denominated a nominal possession, because French troops guarded Etruria, which was incapable of guarding itself. They complained yet more of the cession of Louisiana to the United States. They said that if France wished to alienate that precious colony, it was to the king of Spain that he should have addressed himself, not to the Americans, who would become dangerous neighbours for the Mexicans; that if France had rendered back that colony to Charles IV., he would be well reconciled to the charge of preserving it from the Americans or the English. It was ridiculous, in truth, for these people, who were about to lose Mexico, Peru, and all South America, to pretend that they had the power of keeping Louisiana, which was neither Spanish in its manners, spirit, nor language. At Madrid, they made this alienation of Louisiana a great grievance against France, and with so grave a character did they clothe it, that they made it a ground to cancel every obligation towards her. The real motive of this humour was to be found in the refusal of the first consul to add the duchy of Parma to the kingdom of Etruria; a refusal at that moment forced upon him from being compelled to keep some territory in hand to indemnify the king of Piedmont, since there had been so strong a request made to grant that king an indemnity; and, besides, the Floridas, after the abandonment of Louisiana, were not an object of exchange that was acceptable. The cabinet of Madrid still kept towards France the attitude of bad humour, and proceeded to more injurious aggravations. The commerce of France was most unworthily treated. Under the pretext of smuggling, vessels had been seized, and the crews sent to Africa. All the remonstrances of the French government were disregarded; and no reply was made to the ambassador upon any subject. To crown these

[1] 29th August, 1803.

outrages, Spain suffered French ships to be boarded and carried off at the anchorages of Algesiras and Cadiz, within reach of the fire of the Spanish guns, which constituted, all alliance apart, a violation of territory it was unworthy of Spain to permit. The fleet which had sought for refuge in Corunna, upon a false allegation of quarantine, was kept beyond the anchorage-ground, where it would have found itself in security. The crews were suffered to perish on board, for want of the most indispensable resources, and more particularly, that most essential of all, the beneficial air on land. This squadron, blockaded by an English fleet, was unable to sail without some rest, a considerable refit, and a supply of provisions and ammunition. These were all refused, even at a money price. Lastly, by a bravado, which put a finish to the proceedings, while the Spanish navy was left in a state of dilapidation that attracted pity, the government employed itself in singular haste about the army, and organized the militia as if it would have wished to prepare for a national war against France.

What could have thus driven into an abyss the foolish favourite, whose government disgraced the noble blood of Louis XIV., and reduced a brave nation to the most disgraceful imbecility? The want of connexion in his ideas, wounded vanity, idleness, and incapacity, were the miserable springs that moved this usurper of Spanish royalty. He formerly leaned towards France, this was sufficient to make his inconstancy now incline towards England. The first consul had not been able to dissimulate his contempt for him, while the English and Russian agents, on the other hand, overloaded him with flattery; this more particularly, when France required courage, activity, and a good administration of Spanish affairs at his hands; no more than this was necessary to bring him to detest an ally who exacted so much from him. "All that will finish," said the first consul, "by a thunderbolt." Thus was announced, by unlucky flashes, the thunder concealed in the thick cloud, which began to gather in ominous gloom over the old throne of Spain.

The sixth of the camps formed near the seashore of France had been assembled at Boulogne. The preparations were accelerated and increased so far as to form a perfect army. Another formation of troops took place on the side of the Pyrenees Orientales. Augereau received the title of general-in-chief of these different bodies of troops. The French ambassador had orders to demand of the Spanish court the redress of all the grievances of which it had to complain. The enlargement of the French subjects that had been detained, with an indemnification for the losses they had sustained; the punishment of the commandants of the forts of Algesiras and Cadiz, who had suffered the French vessels to be taken within range of their guns; the restitution of the captured ships; the admission into the basins of Ferrol of the squadron which had sought refuge in Corunna; its refitting and revictualling at once, under an immediate settlement of expense with France; the disbanding of all the militia; and, lastly, on the choice of Spain, either a stipulated subsidy or an armament of fifteen ships and twenty-four thousand men, promised by the treaty of St. Ildefonzo. General Beurnonville was also to declare to the prince of the peace these expressed determinations, to tell him that if the court of Madrid persisted in its foolish and culpable conduct, it was upon him would be directed the just indignation of the French government; that in passing the frontier, the French would denounce to the king and people of Spain the shameful yoke under which they were bowed down, and from which they had come to deliver them. The declaration thus made to the prince of the peace had no effect.

General Beurnonville, impatient to put an end to these intolerable outrages, hastened to seek an interview with the prince of the peace, to tell him the hard truths which he had orders to deliver to his own ears, and not to leave him any doubt upon the serious nature of his menaces, to place before his eyes several passages in the despatches of the first consul. The prince of the peace grew pale, let fall some tears, was by turns abject and arrogant, and finished by declaring that M. Azara was charged at Paris to come to an understanding with M. de Talleyrand; that, moreover, it did not regard him, the prince of the peace; that in listening to the ambassador, he departed from his proper character, because he was generalissimo of the Spanish armies, and had no other function in the state; and that if he had any declaration to make, it was to the minister for foreign affairs that he ought to address himself, and not to him, the prince. He even refused a note, that general Beurnonville wished to give him at the conclusion of the conference. The general, thus repulsed, said,—"Prince, there are fifty persons in your ante-chamber, I shall go and make them witnesses of the refusal you have given to receive a note which relates to the service of your king, and I shall state that if I have not been able to acquit myself of my duty, the fault is solely with you, and not with myself." The prince, intimidated, then took the note, and general Beurnonville retired.

Continuing to fulfil his instructions to their full extent, the general and ambassador wished to see the king and queen; he found them surprised and astounded, seeming to comprehend nothing that had passed, repeating that the chevalier Azara had received instructions to arrange every thing with the first consul. The French ambassador quitted the court, broke off all communication with the Spanish ministers, and hastened to acquaint his government with what he had done, and with the slender result which he had obtained.

M. Azara, in fact, had received the most singular and most inconsistent communications, very disagreeable to himself. This lively and clever Spaniard was a sincere partizan for the alliance of Spain with France, and the personal friend of the first consul, since the campaigns in Italy, where he had played a conciliatory character between the French army and the pope. Unhappily, he had not sufficiently concealed the distaste and sorrow which the existing state of the court of Spain caused to himself, and this discontented court withdrew its consideration from the ambassador that thus deplored its situation. He was, it asserted, in the despatches that they had written to him from Madrid,—he was the humble servant

of the first consul; he had not informed his court of any thing, and he did not know how to serve it under an exigency. They went so far as to declare to him, that if the first consul had not a desire to detain him in Paris, they would choose another representative. They thus provoked him to give in his resignation without daring to demand it. He was ordered, as a conclusion of the affair, to offer France a subsidy of 2,500,000 f. per month, declaring that this was all Spain was able to do, as above that sum she was too much reduced to pay by her utter want of means. M. Azara transmitted these propositions to the first consul, and then sent off his resignation by a courier to Madrid.

The first consul sent for M. Hermann, secretary of embassy, who had had personal relations with the prince of the peace, and gave him his orders to carry to Madrid. M. Hermann was to signify to the prince that he must either submit, or resign himself to an immediate downfall, by the means that M. Hermann had in his portfolio. These means were as follow:—The first consul had written a letter to the king, in which he denounced to that weak monarch the misfortunes and reproaches of his crown, in such a manner, at the same time as to awaken the feeling of dignity without wounding him; and he placed him in a position between the dismission of the favourite, or the immediate entrance of a French army. If the prince of the peace, after having seen M. Hermann, did not immediately, without evasion, and without sending any new message to Paris, give full and entire satisfaction to France, general Beurnonville was to demand a solemn audience of Charles IV., and to deliver into his own hands the terrible letter of the first consul. Twenty-four hours after, if the prince of the peace was not dismissed or sent away, general Beurnonville was to quit Madrid, and forward to general Augereau the injunction to pass the frontier.

M. Hermann went in all haste to Madrid. He saw the prince of the peace, and signified to him the will of the first consul; this time he found him no more base and arrogant, but solely base. A Spanish minister who had the proper conviction of his duty and upheld the interests of his country, representing his king with honour, and not covering him with ignominy, would have braved disgrace, and even death, sooner than permit such a display of foreign authority. But the indignity attaching to his position left the prince of the peace no energetical resource. He submitted, and affirmed upon his word of honour that instructions should be sent to M. Azara, with power to consent to all which the first consul required. This answer was carried to general Beurnonville. He declared that he had orders to exact an immediate fulfilment, and not to pay another messenger to Paris; and further, that he had express instructions not to take the prince's word, but to have a signed document in Madrid itself, or to remit the fatal letter into the king's hand.

The prince of the peace repeated his old story, all had terminated at Paris at that moment, and conformably to the will of the first consul. This miserable court believed it had saved its honour in leaving to M. Azara the melancholy task of submitting himself to the will of France, and in sending to four hundred leagues' distance the spectacle of its own abasement. General Beurnonville then believed it was his duty to carry to the king the letter of the first consul. The directors of the king, in other words, the queen and prince of the peace, would have declined an audience, but a courier would have ordered Augereau to enter Spain. Still they found a means to arrange every thing. They advised Charles IV. to receive the letter, but persuaded him not to open it, because it contained expressions with which he would be much offended. They set themselves to prove to him, that by receiving the letter he spared Spain the entrance of the French army, and that by not opening it he saved his dignity from being hurt. Things being thus disposed, general Beurnonville was admitted to the Escurial in presence of the king and queen, out of the presence of the prince of the peace, which he had orders not to suffer, and he handed to the Spanish monarch the crushing denunciation of which he was the bearer. Charles IV., with an easiness which proved his ignorance of affairs, said to the ambassador: "I have received the letter of the first consul, seeing that it must be so; but I shall give it back to you soon without opening it. You will know in a few days that the step was useless, because M. Azara has been charged to settle every thing in Paris. I esteem the first consul; I am willing to be his faithful ally, and to furnish him with all the aid that my crown has at its disposal."

After this official reply, the king took up that familiar manner so little worthy of the throne and of his present situation; he spoke in terms of an embarrassing vulgarity of the vivacity of his friend general Bonaparte, and of his resolution to pardon every thing, in order not to break up the union between the two courts. The French ambassador retired confounded, having suffered painfully during such a spectacle, and now believed he was bound to await the arrival of a new courier from Paris, before giving general Augereau the notice to march.

This time the prince of the peace spoke the truth; M. Azara had received the authorization necessary to sign the conditions imposed by the first consul. It was agreed that Spain should remain neuter; that in place of the succours stipulated in the treaty of St. Ildefonso, she should pay to France a subsidy of 6,000,000 f. per month, of which a third should be retained for the adjustment of the balances existing between the two governments; that Spain should acquit at a single payment the four months which had become due since the commencement of the war, in a sum of 16,000,000 f. An agent named Hervas, who transacted in Paris the financial business of the court of Madrid, was to go into Holland to negotiate a loan with the house of Hope, and to deliver in payment dollars drawn from Mexico. It was understood that if England declared war against Spain, the subsidy should cease. For the consideration of this aid, it was stipulated that if the projects of the first consul against England succeeded, France should restore to her ally Trinidad in the first place, and in case of a complete triumph, the celebrated fortress of Gibraltar.

This treaty being signed, M. Azara insisted no less strenuously on giving in his resignation, although he was destitute of fortune, and deprived of

every kind of resource to solace a precocious old age. He died at Paris some months afterwards. The prince of the peace had so little dignity as to write to his agent Hervas, and to desire him, as he said, to arrange his personal concerns with the first consul. All that had passed was, according to him, only a misunderstanding; one of those ordinary differences between persons who love each other, and who are afterwards greater friends than they were before! Such was this personage, and such was the force and elevation of his character.

Autumn had arrived; the bad season approached, and one of the three opportunities reported to be the best for the passage of the straits was about to present itself in the fogs and long nights of the winter season. Then the first consul occupied himself without respite with his great enterprise. The end of the quarrel with Spain had come at the exact moment, not only to procure him pecuniary resources, but to render a part of his troops disposable. The assemblage of troops drawn towards the side of the Pyrenees was dispersed, and the corps which composed it marched towards the ocean. Several of these corps were quartered at Saintes, to be all carried by the squadron from Rochefort, others were ordered to Britany to be embarked in the grand squadron at Brest. Augereau commanded the camp formed in that province. The design of the first consul ripened in his head by little and little: it now seemed to him, that in order to trouble yet more the government of England, he must attack on several points at once, and that a part of the one hundred and fifty thousand men destined for the invasion should be thrown upon Ireland. This was the object of the preparations ordered at Brest. The minister Decrès had conferred with the Irish fugitives, who had already made an attempt to detach their country from England. They promised a general insurrection in case of the disembarkation there of eighteen thousand men, with a complete *matériel* and a good quantity of arms. They required as the price of their efforts, that France should not make peace without exacting the independence of Ireland. The first consul consented, upon the condition that a body of twenty thousand men at least should have joined the French army and fought with it during the time of the expedition. The Irish were confident, and full of promises, as all emigrants are sure to be; yet there were among them those who did not give such great hopes, and who did not promise any effective aid on the part of the population. Still, according to these last, it would be found well wishers, and that was enough to ensure support to the French army, to cause serious embarrassment to England, and to paralyze perhaps forty or fifty thousand of its soldiers. The expedition to Ireland had again the advantage of keeping the enemy uncertain about the true point of attack. Without this expedition England would have believed in only one object on the part of her enemy, that of traversing the straits to direct an army upon London. On the contrary, with the preparations at Brest, many believed that those made at Boulogne were only a feint, and that the true design consisted in a great expedition to Ireland. The doubts thus inspired were productive of a primary result exceedingly useful.

The fleet that had put into Ferrol was at length introduced into the docks, in due course of reparation, provided with the refreshments of which the crews stood in pressing need. That at Toulon was in course of preparation. In Holland they began to equip a squadron of the line, and to unite a mass of boats necessary for the formation of the Batavian flotilla. But it was at Boulogne principally that every thing proceeded with marvellous order and rapidity.

The first consul, full of the persuasion that it was necessary to see every thing himself, that the surest agents are often incorrect in their reports, through default in attention, or want of sufficient intelligence where they do not willingly report untruly, created for himself a dwelling at Boulogne, where he had the intention of frequently sojourning. He had ordered to be hired a small château in a village called Pont de Briques, and he had ordered the necessaries required to inhabit it with his military household. He left St. Cloud in the evening, passing over the sixty leagues which separate Paris from Boulogne with the rapidity that ordinary princes set out to pursue their vulgar pleasures; he arrived the following day by noon on the theatre of his immense labours, and would then examine every thing before going to sleep for a moment. He had exacted of admiral Bruix, worn down with fatigue, sometimes in a state of agitation from his quarrels with the minister Decrès, that he should not lodge at Boulogne, but on the shore, upon an eminence from whence he could command the port, the road, and the camps. There had been constructed for him a barrack of wood, well caulked and secured, in which this officer, so much regretted, terminated his earthly career, having continually before him every part of the immense creative labour over which he presided. He resigned himself to this perilous dwelling during his declining existence, in order to satisfy the uneasy vigilance of the chief of the government [1].

[1] Here is an extract from the correspondence of the minister Decrès, which proves the devotion of admiral Bruix to the enterprize, and well depicts the nature of his character, only that his sufferings were less imaginary than the minister Decrès says, because he died in the following year.

"The minister of the navy and colonies to the first consul.

"Boulogne, 7th January, 1804.

"Citizen Consul,—Admiral Bruix has not dissimulated your discontent; he appears very much relieved at finding in me a disposition to speak to him with confidence. He always sees general Latouche at the gates of Boulogne, and this idea is any thing but agreeable to him.

"'The business here is so great and so important,' he said to me, very nobly, 'that it cannot be confided except to such a man as the first consul shall judge most worthy of it. I conceive that no partial considerations should be admitted; and if the first consul believes Latouche more capable, he will nominate him, and he will do well. For myself, at the point which things have reached, I shall not be able to abandon the duty, and will serve under the orders of Latouche. But will my health permit me? Yes, it must permit me; and I am nearly sure it will do so. The first consul demands so much activity! he gives an example so extraordinary! Very well, this example I have seen well enough is a lesson given to myself, and the lesson shall not be lost.' 'What, then, will you enter into all the details, will you inspect every vessel?' 'Yes, I will do it when he wishes it, although it is my principle that this method is not equal to

The first consul had a similar barrack constructed for his own personal use, very near that of the admiral, and he sometimes passed whole days and nights there. He insisted that the generals Davout, Ney, and Soult, should reside, without interruption, in the midst of the camps, assisting personally at the works, and at the manœuvres, and giving him every day an account of the minutest circumstances. General Soult, who distinguished himself by the valuable quality of vigilance, was of great and constant utility to him. When the first consul had received from his lieutenants his daily correspondence, which he always answered at the moment, he set out to verify himself the exactness of the reports which they had addressed to him, never trusting for any thing but to his own eyes.

The English had set themselves to annoy the labourers in the execution of the works designed to protect the anchorage at Boulogne. Their cruisers, composed generally of about twenty vessels, of which three or four were ships of seventy-four guns, five or six frigates, and ten or a dozen brigs and sloops, with a certain number of gun-boats, made a continual fire upon the workmen. Their balls, passing over the shore, had fallen in the port and in the camp. Although their projectiles had caused but little damage, the fire was very disagreeable, and might, when a number of vessels were assembled, cause the most unfortunate ravages, and perhaps a destructive incendiarism. One night, the English advanced with great audacity in their boats, surprised the working place where the labour for the construction of the wooden fort was going forwards, cut away the monkeys that served to drive the piles, and knocked up the work for several days. The first consul shewed great discontent at this attack, and gave new orders, so as effectually to prevent a similar attack in future. Armed gun-boats were placed as sentinels, having to pass the night around the works. The labourers encouraged, their honour piqued, like that of soldiers led in presence of an enemy, were brought to labour before the English vessels, and under the fire of their artillery. It was at low tide only that they could get at their work, when the heads of the piles were sufficiently uncovered by the sea to be able to drive them; the workmen began their labours even before the complete retirement of the tide, resting after it had risen, one-half of their bodies in the waves, working and singing under the bullets of the English. Nevertheless, the first consul, with his never-failing fecundity of mind, devised new precautions to keep the enemy at a distance. He made experiments on the shore, in trying the effect of the fire of heavy cannon under an angle of forty-five degrees of elevation, in the same way in which shells are discharged from a mortar. The experiment succeeded, and the balls of a twenty-four pounder were sent to the distance of two thousand three hundred toises [1], which obliged the English to keep further off. It did better still than this; thinking continually of the same thing, he was the first to devise the means which, in the present day, causes frightful havoc, and seems about to exercise a great influence in maritime warfare, that of hollow projectiles employed against vessels. He ordered them to fire on the vessels with large shells, which, bursting in the timber or among the sails and yards, would produce breaches fatal to the hull of the vessel, or great destruction in the rigging. "It is with projectiles that explode," he wrote, "that timber must be assailed." Nothing is done easily, above all, when there are old prejudices to conquer. He had continually to reiterate the same instructions. When the English, in place of the solid balls which traversed like a thunder-bolt all which was in their passage, but left no more extended mischief behind than was caused by their own diameter, saw a projectile, which had less impulsion, it is true, but that exploded like a mine, either in the sides of the vessels, or over the heads of the defenders, they were surprised, and kept at a distance. Lastly, to obtain greater security, the first consul devised a means not less ingenious. He had an idea of establishing submarine batteries, in other words, he had placed, at the level of low water, heavy cannon and mortars, which were covered at high tide by the sea, and uncovered at the ebb. It cost much trouble to secure the platforms upon which the guns rested, so as to prevent their being covered with sand and an accumulation of matter brought up by the sea. Nevertheless, the plan succeeded, and at the time of low water, which was that of work, when the English advanced to disturb the labourers, they were received by discharges of artillery on a sudden from low water mark, in such a way, that the fire advanced, in a certain sense, and retired with the sea itself. These batteries were only employed during the time of the construction of the forts; they became useless when the forts were completed [2].

The wooden fort was the first finished, owing to the nature of the construction. Solid platforms were established upon the heads of the piles, some feet above the highest water mark. This work was mounted with ten pieces of large calibre, and with several mortars of a long range. When they began to fire, the English no more made their appearance at the entrance of the port. All the heights along the shore were mounted with

my own in value—to order things to be done, and to show myself seldom.' 'But the first consul!' 'Oh! he is always able to make himself visible, because he always makes others submit; but we who are not he, not even Hephestions to his Alexander, I believe must act with a greater reserve. But he wills; he understands matters in his own way, and I am willing that he should see that I know how to do what he wishes.'

"Here, then, citizen consul, is a summary of a part of my dialogue with him. He behaved marvellously well; and some generals having come in at the end of our conference, and having inquired respecting his health, he passed suddenly to his moribund manner, and began to complain in a lamenting tone of voice—a sacrifice involuntarily paid to his old habit.

"From all he said to me, it results that he trembles lest you should take the command from him; that he did not conceal from me he had such a dread; and that he promised me to do, in the fullest detail, all that of which you have given him the example, to commence from to-day.

"DECRÈS."

[1] About 14,700 feet English measure, or 2¾ miles.—*Trans.*

[2] All the details that are given here are extracted from the original correspondence of Admiral Bruix and of Napoleon, which has been already quoted.

twenty-four pounders, thirty-six pounders, and mortars. About five hundred guns were placed in battery, and the coast, rendered unapproachable, received, both from the French and English, the name of the "iron coast." In this interval the forts in masonry were completed without any other obstacle than that arising from the sea. At the commencement of the winter, more particularly, the waves sometimes became so furious, under the influence of the winds from the channel, that they shook and inundated the loftiest and most solid constructions. Twice they lifted entire courses of the masonry, and precipitated into the bottom of the sea the largest blocks of stone, from the summit of the walls in course of erection. These two important constructions were continued, notwithstanding, as being indispensable to the security of the anchorage.

During the construction of these works, the troops drawn near to the coast had constructed their barracks and traced their camps, making of them perfect military cities, divided into quarters, and traversed by long streets. This necessary labour first completed, they were divided about the basin of Boulogne. The task was apportioned among them, and each regiment excavated a determined part of the enormous mass of sand and slime which filled up the bed of the Liane. Some dug out the bed of the Liane itself, or the semicircular basin; others drove the piles required to form the quays. The works at Wimereux and at Ambleteuse, of which the practicability of the execution had been acknowledged possible, were already undertaken. They laboured in extracting the mud and sand; they constructed sluices, in order to deepen the channel by repeated discharges of water; while other detachments were occupied in making roads to unite together the ports of Wimereux, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples, and these ports themselves with the neighbouring forests.

The troops devoted to these rough labours were relieved after the accomplishment of their task, and those who had ceased to remove the earth became occupied with manœuvres of all kinds proper to perfect their military instruction. Dressed in the coarse clothes of workmen, secured by sabots from the humidity of the soil, well lodged, well fed, owing to the price of their labour added to their pay; living in the open air, they enjoyed in the midst of the rudest climate and the worst season the most perfect health. Content, occupied, full of confidence in the enterprise which was preparing, they acquired every day that redoubled physical and moral strength which might well serve them to conquer the world.

The moment at length arrived to concentrate the flotilla. The construction of the boats of all kinds was nearly achieved every where. They had been brought down to the mouths of the different rivers; and they had been rigged and armed in the ports. The workmen in timber who had become idle in the interior, had been formed into companies, and marched as well to Boulogne as to the surrounding ports. It was proposed they should be employed in furnishing and keeping the flotilla in order until the moment it was wanted.

It was then necessary to proceed to the work of concentration, which was waited for impatiently by the English, with the confidence of destroying to the last the light French gun flotilla. Here a judgment may be formed of the mental resources of the first consul. The divisions of the flotilla which had to reach Boulogne, were to depart from all the points on the coast of the sea from Bayonne to the Texel, in order to rally in the straits of Calais. They were to coast the shore, and to keep themselves always at a very slight distance from the land, and to run ashore when they were too closely pressed by the English cruisers. One or two accidents which occurred to the vessels of the flotilla, furnished the first consul with the idea of a system of succour as sure as it was ingenious. He had seen some boats run upon the shore to avoid the enemy, and happily and effectually succoured by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. Struck by this circumstance, he distributed along the sea-shore numerous corps of cavalry from Nantes to Brest; from Brest as far as Cherburg; and from Cherburg to Havre and Boulogne. These corps of cavalry, divided by the arrondissements, had with them batteries of artillery ready horsed, and trained to move with extreme rapidity, and to gallop along the hard sands which the sea left uncovered upon retiring. These sands, that are called the *estran*, are in general so solid as to bear horses and carriages. The cavalry, having the artillery following them, were to scour the shore, continually advancing and retiring with the sea, protecting by fire the boats moving along in-shore. Commonly only guns of small calibre were harnessed; the first consul had pushed forward the employment of adequate means so as to harness sixteen-pounders, to proceed as fast as seven or eight-pounder field-pieces. He ordered each horseman to be trained for every part of the duty; to dismount and serve the guns, or run, carbine in hand, to the aid of the seamen ashore upon the beach. "It is necessary to make the hussars remember," he writes to the minister at war, "that a French soldier ought to be a horseman, artilleryman, and foot-soldier, that he ought to cope with all [1]." Two generals, Lemarrois and Sebastiani, were charged with the command of this cavalry. They had orders to be on horseback continually, to make the squadrons manœuvre daily with the guns, and to keep themselves constantly aware of the movement of the convoys, in order to escort them on their way [2].

[1] Dated the 29th of September, 1803.

[2] The following letter, written at the moment some negligence had been shown, proves in what a state he had placed the coast:—

"To general Davout.

"30th October, 1803.

"Citizen General Davout,—I have not seen without pain, by the report of the brigadier Seras, that the English have had time to pillage and unrig a boat that was on shore between Gravelines and Calais. In the existing situation of the coast, never will a like event happen from Bordeaux. Detachments of cavalry and flying artillery should have arrived to prevent the English from pillaging the vessel. Here is the second time that the vessels on shore upon the coast have received no succour. The fault rests with whomsoever you charged with the care of that part of the coast. Order two generals of brigade to inspect the coast, the one from Calais to Dunkirk, the other from Dunkirk to the Scheldt. Let picquets of cavalry be disposed in such a man-

This system produced, as will be seen, very excellent results. The vessels were divided into convoys of thirty, fifty, and even sixty sail. They began to arrive towards the end of September from St. Malo, Granville, Cherburg, the river of Caen, Havre, and St. Vallery. There were not many between the last and Brest; but the English watched that part of the coast with too much care for the passage to be hazarded, after having made numerous experiments [1]. It was not the same commandant who conducted the convoys all the way from their point of departure to that of their arrival. It was thought that the naval officer who, for example, was well acquainted with the coasts of Britany, was not equally so with those of Normandy and Picardy. The commanders were therefore distributed according to their local knowledge, and as pilot coasters they did not go out of the arrondissement which was fixed upon for their station. They received the convoys at the limit of their arrondissement, and conducted them as far as the limit of the neighbouring arrondissement, thus transmitting them from hand to hand until they reached Boulogne. They embarked troops in these vessels, even horses in those designed to receive them; they were, in fact, laden as they were intended to be during the passage from France to England. The first consul had ordered an examination to be made with the greatest care how they carried themselves at sea under the cargo which they were to transport.

Towards the end of September, or first days of Vendémiaire, year XII., a first division, composed of gun-vessels, gun-boats, and pinnaces, left Dunkirk to double cape Grisnez and enter Boulogne. Captain St. Haouen, an excellent officer, who commanded this division, although a bold man, proceeded with the utmost precaution. When he was off Calais he suffered himself to be alarmed by an unimportant circumstance. He saw the English cruisers disappear, as if going in search of other vessels. He feared he should be assailed by a numerous squadron, and in place of carrying all sail to reach Boulogne, he took refuge in the harbour of Calais. Admiral Bruix having received notice of this error, went in person to the place, in order, if possible, to repair the fault. In fact, the English soon appeared in great strength; and it became evident that they were going to fall upon the port of Calais to prevent the passage out of the division which had taken refuge there. The admiral proceeded to Dunkirk in order to hurry forward the organization of the second division, which was nearly ready in that port, and to make it come to the aid of the first.

The English came before Calais with a considerable force, and more particularly with several bomb-vessels. During the 27th of September, or 4th Vendémiaire, they threw a great number of shells into the town and port. They killed two or three persons, but did not destroy any vessel. The batteries harnessed went to the shore at a gallop, and returned a well-sustained fire, obliging them to retire. They went off much mortified at having produced so slight an effect. The next day admiral Bruix ordered the division of St. Haouen to put to sea to insult the enemy's cruisers, and to prevent a second bombardment of the town, according to circumstances to double cape Grisnez, and in fact enter Boulogne. The second division from Dunkirk was to set sail at the same time, under the command of captain Pevrieux, to support the first. Rear-admiral Magon, who commanded at Boulogne, had orders on his side to come out of the port with all his disposable force, and to keep under sail in order to give assistance to the divisions of St. Haouen and Pevrieux if they proceeded to double cape Grisnez.

On the 28th of September, in the morning, or 5th of Vendémiaire, year XII., captain St. Haouen boldly came out of Calais, and advanced about a cannon-shot distance. The English made a movement in order to bear off to the wind. Captain St. Haouen profited ably by the movement, which took them in a contrary direction, and crowded all sail towards cape Grisnez; but he was soon afterwards approached by the English a little beyond the cape, and attacked by a violent fire of artillery. It seemed as if about twenty of the enemy's vessels,

ner as to watch without ceasing, and let guns be placed ready harnessed, in such a manner that at the first signal they will be able to arrive in the least possible time at the places where the boats may have run aground. In fine, these general inspectors ought to be always on horseback, making the land-artillery manœuvre, inspecting the artillerymen, guarding the coast, escorting the flotillas on the strand when they are in movement. Let me know the names of all the posts which you may place, and the spot where you have established the flying artillery."

[1] This arose from the nature of the coast and the deeper water than on the flat shores found more to the northward, which enabled the ships of war to approach pretty near the land. Sir Sidney Smith, after making an attack on one of these convoys of boats off the northern part of the coast, corroborated this system of protection as very effectual, owing principally to the shoal water. In one case he wrote, speaking of one of these convoys, "Having found a passage for the Antelope, she was enabled to bring her broadside to bear upon the headmost vessels before they got the length of Ostend. The leader struck immediately, and her crew deserted her. She was, however, recovered by the followers; the artillery from the town and camp and the rowing gun-boats kept a constant fire from the pier; our shot, however, which went over their vessels, going on shore among the horse-artillery, interrupted it in some degree; still, however, *it was from the shore we received the greatest annoyance;* for the vessels crowding along, they could not bring their guns to bear without altering their course towards us, which they would not venture to do; and their side guns, though numerous and well served, were very light. . . . Several of the vessels were driven on shore, and recovered by the army. . . . I have anchored in such a position as to keep an eye upon them; and I shall endeavour to close with them again if they move into deeper water. I have to regret, *that from the depth of water in which these vessels move, gun-boats alone can act against them with effect.*" The consequence was, that sir Sidney, out of several that struck, could bring off but one. To take possession of the others, he must have gone in with open boats, when the fire of the artillery on shore would have covered effectually those that ran aground, under the protection of the troops, for they could not be approached without great loss of men. Sir Sidney thus corroborates the effective nature of Napoleon's plan for their protection, while uniting at Boulogne. That in deep water their own means of defence would have availed them little, was abundantly proved, and when filled with the troops they were intended to embark, they would have offered a less formidable resistance, from their crowded state. The only wish of the English was, to get them out into deep water, when their numbers would rather have accelerated than impeded their inevitable fate, had their squadrons met them.—*Translator.*

every one of large size, must have sunk the light vessels of the French, but no mischief was done. Captain St. Haouen continued his course under the balls of the English without suffering much. A battalion of the 46th and a detachment of the 22d, embarked on board these vessels, managed their oars with admirable coolness under a warm, but, happily, not a very murderous fire. At the same time the moveable batteries on shore hastened down to the sea, and answered with effect to the English artillery. Finally, in the afternoon, captain St. Haouen moored in the road of Boulogne, and was joined by the detachment that had come out of port under the orders of rear-admiral Magon. The second division of Dunkirk, which had put to sea, had advanced on its course so far as to come within sight of cape Grisnez. But stopped by tide and calm it was obliged to anchor on that side along an uncovered coast. It remained in this position until the moment, when, the current changing, they were enabled to proceed to Boulogne. They had no wind, and they were obliged to use their oars. Fifteen English vessels, frigates, corvettes, and brigs, awaited them at cape Grisnez. At this place the water was deeper, and the English cruisers could approach near the shore without the French having the resource left them of running aground, and in consequence great fears were entertained in their behalf. But they passed, as those of the preceding evening had done; the French soldiers managed the oars with great boldness, and the English received from the land batteries more mischief than they were able to cause to the French gun-vessels. The flotilla of Boulogne and the division of St. Haouen, which had reached the port the evening before, went out again in order to join the division of Pevrieux. They came up with it at the heights called the Tour de Croy, before Wimereux. There the three divisions united, stopped, and formed a line, presenting to the English their prows armed with cannon; they went right towards them and fired upon them warmly. The fire lasted for two hours. The light French vessels sometimes struck the larger ones of the English, and were themselves rarely hit. In the end the English retired, every one so ill treated as to be obliged to go and repair their injuries in the Downs. One of the French vessels, the only one to which the accident occurred, pierced through and through by a ball, had time to reach the shore before sinking [1].

This conflict, followed at a later period by many others, more important and more murderous, produced a decisive effect upon the opinion of the navy and army. They saw that their small vessels could not be so easily sent to the bottom by the large ships, and that they struck much oftener their gigantic adversaries than they were themselves struck; they saw what aid could be obtained from the co-operation of the soldiery, who, without being yet exercised, had managed the oars, served the marine-artillery with rare address, and had, more particularly, shown no fear of the sea, and a great deal of zeal in seconding the seamen [2].

Scarcely had the first experiments been made, when the greatest ardour was shown to renew them; numerous convoys successively departed from all the ports of the channel for the general rendezvous at Boulogne. Several naval officers, as the captains St. Haouen and Pevrieux, whose names have been quoted, and the captains Hamelin and Daugier, distinguished themselves in this kind of pilotage by their courage and ability. The vessels, moved now by the oar, now by the sail, passed along the coast at a very little distance from the detachments of cavalry and artillery, ready to protect them. They were rarely obliged to seek refuge by running ashore, because they nearly always navigated in sight of the English, sustaining their fire, and sometimes stopping, when they had the weather in their favour, to face the enemy, and exhibit to him their prows armed with cannon of heavy metal. Often they made the brigs recoil, the corvettes, and even the frigates. If they ran ashore upon some occasions, it was oftener from the effect of the bad weather than from the power of their adversaries. When this happened, the English entered their boats to seize the vessels or pinnaces on shore. But the French artillery galloped with their guns to the spot, or their horsemen, changed at once into infantry, nearly into sailors, ran into the middle of the breakers to the aid of the seamen, drove off the English by the fire of their carbines, and obliged them to put to sea, without carrying off their prize, often after having been deprived of all their boldest sailors.

In the months of October, November, and December, nearly a thousand vessels, gun-vessels, gun-boats, and pinnaces, that had departed from other ports, entered Boulogne. Of this number the English did not take more than three or four, nor the sea destroy more than ten or a dozen.

These short and frequent passages were the causes of many useful observations. They revealed the superiority of the gun-vessels over the gun-boats. The last were more difficult to move, deflected more, and above all, wanted weight of fire. The defect of the gun-boats was in their construction, and their construction was owing to the necessity of placing field artillery in them, which it would have been well to resign. The pinnaces left nothing to be wished for in relation to speed and management. In other respects, all

[1] This shows how close the French were to the land, and proves that they never came beyond the protection of their land batteries. That they were not beyond shell range of the shore, and that the English were within it, is proved by the fact, that a shell from the shore burst on board the Leda, one of the squadron. The mischief done to the squadron by these boats, as thus stated, is wholly untrue. Captain Honeymoon, of the Leda, who commanded, wrote to lord Keith as follows, under date of September 29, 1833:—"At daylight this morning, another squadron of the enemy's gun-boats, twenty-five in number, was discovered coming from the eastward. I immediately proceeded to attack them, and after a severe cannonade for nearly three hours, they anchored in the situation with the vessels last night, with the loss of two of them, they having been driven on shore, and bilged upon the rocks. There are at present fifty-five gun-vessels at anchor outside the port of Boulogne. I am happy to add that I have no reports of any material injury done to the squadron under my command; a shell fell on board the Leda, which burst in her hold, doing little injury to the ship, and not hurting a man." Repairs in the Downs were therefore out of the question.—*Translator.*

[2] These sentiments are found expressed in all the correspondence written at Boulogne the day after these two actions.—*Author's note.*

the vessels made tolerable way, even without the aid of a sail. There were divisions that came from Havre to Boulogne, nearly always under oars, with a middling speed of about two leagues an hour. Some changes in stowage, that is to say, in loading them, would have mended their navigating qualities.

The experience of these voyages led to a change in the disposition of the artillery, which was immediately executed throughout all the flotilla. The heavy cannon, placed in the bow and stern, ran in grooves, in which they could only move or recoil in a right line. From this it resulted that the vessels were obliged to come round in order to fire and to present either the head or stern to the enemy. It was impossible then, when they were making way, to reply to the fire of the English, because at that time they only presented their sides. When coasting, the currents made them keep a position parallel with the shore, or, in other words, offer their disarmed flanks. This arrangement was changed when the stability of the vessels had been proved, and it had been further secured by a better calculated system of stowage. Carriages were constructed resembling those used in military service, which permitted of their being fired *en belle*, that is to say, in every direction. In this way the vessels, on their passage or in the roads, were able to fire, whatever was their position, without being obliged to come round. The gun-vessels could thus make four discharges in all directions. With a little habit, the landsmen and sailors came to practise this kind of firing with exactness, and without risk.

It was thought more particularly useful to cement a perfect intimacy between the seamen and soldiers, by means of appropriating the same vessels to the same troops. The capacity of the gun-vessels and the gun-boats had been calculated on the supposition of their being able to carry a company of infantry, besides artillerymen. That was the foundation which served for the arrangement of the general organization of the flotilla. The battalions were then composed of nine companies, and the demi-brigades of two war battalions, the third remaining at the depôt. The gun-vessels and boats were distributed according to this composition of the troops. Nine gun-vessels or nine gun-boats formed a section, and carried nine companies, or one battalion. Two sections formed a division, and carried a demi-brigade. Thus the vessel or boat answered to the company, the section to the battalion, and the division to the demi-brigade. Naval officers of a corresponding grade of rank commanded the vessel, the section, and the division. To arrive at a perfect uniformity of the troops with the flotilla, each division was assigned to a demi-brigade, each section to a battalion, and each vessel to a company; and this assignment, once made, remained unalterable. The troops were thus always enabled to preserve the same vessels, attached to it as a cavalry soldier to his horse. The naval and military officers, soldiers and seamen, came by this means to a knowledge of each other, acquired mutual confidence, and were more inclined to give help among themselves. Each company was to furnish the vessel to which it belonged with a garrison of twenty-five men always embarked. These twenty-five men, forming one-quarter of a company, remained about a month on board. During all this time they lodged in the vessel with the crew, whether it were at sea manœuvring, or remaining in port. They did every thing that was done by the sailors themselves, joining in all the petty manœuvres, and, above all, exercising themselves in managing the oars and firing the cannon. When they had been for a month inured to this kind of life, they were replaced by twenty-five other soldiers of the same company, who came, for the same space of time, to commence the same naval exercises. Thus successively the entire company played its part on board the gun-vessels or gun-boats. Each man was thus a soldier on land and on sea; alternately an artilleryman, infantry man, sailor, and even a workman of engineers, in consequence of the labours he executed in the basins. The seamen also took a part in this reciprocal instruction. They had, when on board, the arms of the infantry, and when in port went through, upon the quay, during the day-time, the exercise of the foot soldier. This was, in consequence, a reinforcement of fifteen thousand infantry, that after a disembarkation in England, would be able to defend the flotilla along the shores where it had run aground. In leaving with them, as reinforcements, a dozen thousand men, they would be able to await with impunity on the shore the victories of the army of invasion.

The pinnaces at first were left out of this system of organization, because they could not carry an entire company, and were better able to land troops rapidly than they were to meet the enemy face to face at sea. Still at a later period they were arranged in divisions, and the advanced guard was especially confided to them, composed of the grenadiers of the army united. In the mean time, they were ranged in thirds of companies in port, and every day the troops to whom boats were not yet assigned, went to exercise either at the movement of the oars, or at firing a light howitzer, with which the pinnaces were armed.

This being arranged, it was necessary to attend to another duty not less important, that of stowing the vessels. The first consul, in one of his journeys, had made gun-vessels, gun-boats, and pinnaces, be laden and unladen several times before his own eyes, and arranged their stowage himself [1]. As ballast, he assigned ball, shells, and munitions of war, in quantity sufficient for a long campaign. He stowed in the hold, biscuit, wine, brandy, salted meat, and Dutch cheese, sufficient for twenty days' provision for all the mass of men composing the expedition. Thus the war flotilla would carry, besides the army and its four hundred pieces of artillery, harnessed with a couple of horses each, the munitions for a campaign, and provisions for twenty days. The transport flotilla would carry, as already said, the surplus of the

[1] "To citizen Fleurieu.

"Boulogne, 16 November, 1803.

"I have passed the day here to observe the installation of a gun-vessel and gun-boat. The stowage is one of the most important manœuvres of the plan of the campaign, in order that nothing may be forgotten, and that all may be equally divided.

"Every thing begins to take a satisfactory turn."

artillery train, the horses required for one half of the cavalry, two or three months' provisions, and, finally, all the baggage. To each division of the war flotilla, there was an answering division of the flotilla of transport, the one to navigate after the other. In each vessel, a sub-officer of artillery had the care of the munitions, and a sub-officer of infantry of the provisions. All ought to be constantly embarked in the two flotillas, and there ought to remain nothing to put on board at the signal of departure, but the men and horses. The men, frequently exercised to take their arms and to go on board the flotilla, by demi-brigades, battalions, and companies, did not require more time than was necessary to go from the camps to the port. As to the horses, they had arrived at a mode of simplifying and accelerating their embarkation in a surprising manner. However great was the extent of the quays, it was still impossible to arrange all the boats alongside them. They were obliged to dispose them to the number of nine, one by the side of the other, the first alone touching the quay. A horse, with a harness that passed round its belly, was lifted from the ground by means of a yard, was transmitted nine times from yard to yard, and disposed in two or three minutes in the ninth vessel. In such a mode, the men and horses were all able to be placed on board the flotilla of war in a couple of hours. It would require three or four hours to embark the nine or ten thousand horses in the flotilla of transport. Thus all the heavy baggage being constantly on board, they would always be ready in a few hours to weigh the anchor; and as it was not possible for such a vast number of boats to leave the port in the space of a single tide, the embarkation of the men and horses would never be the cause of any loss of time.

After exercises continually repeated, all the manœuvres required were soon successfully executed, with as much promptitude as decision. Every day, in all weather short of a storm, there went out from a hundred to a hundred and fifty boats to manœuvre or moor in the roads before the enemy. They then practised upon the beach the operations of a disembarkation. They exercised themselves on board in sweeping the beach by a continual fire of artillery, then approaching the shore, landing there the men, horses, and guns. Often, when they were unable to reach the land, the men were flung into the water where it was five or six feet deep, but none of them were ever drowned, so much address and ardour did they display. Sometimes even the horses were differently disembarked. They were let down into the sea, and men in boats led them by means of a halter towards the shore. In this way of exercising there could not any accident occur in disembarking upon an enemy's coast, that was not foreseen, and several times braved, and to these were added all the difficulties that it might be supposed possible to vanquish, even that of night [1], excepting under a hostile fire. But this would rather be an excitement than an obstacle, for the bravest soldiers in the universe by nature and warlike habit.

This variety of exercise, by land and sea, these manœuvres intermingled with rough labours, interested these adventurous soldiers, full of imagination, and ambitious as their illustrious chief. A nourishing food, considerably augmented, owing to the price of their labour, added to their pay, continual activity, air the most inspiriting and healthy, all these could not but impart to them extraordinary physical energy. The hope to execute a prodigy, added a moral power proportionally great. It was thus that the unparalleled army was prepared by degrees, which was to make the conquest of Europe in two years.

The first consul passed a great part of his time in the midst of the men. He felt himself full of confidence at seeing them so well disposed, so alert, and animated with his own ideas. In their turn they received from his presence a continued excitement. They saw him on horseback, now on the heights of the shore, now at their head, galloping over the hard sands that the sea had deserted, and thus passing over the strand from one port to another [1]; sometimes embarked in the light pinnaces, going to assist at the petty actions between the gun-vessels and the English cruisers, pushing them upon the enemy so far as to make the frigates and corvettes fall back before the fire of his frail vessels. He was often obstinate in braving the sea; and once having a wish to visit the line of anchorage, in spite of bad weather, he was overset not far from the shore, in re-entering his boat. Fortunately, the men with him found bottom with their feet. The sailors threw themselves into the sea, and forming a close group, to

[1] "To the consul Cambacérès.

"Boulogne, 9 November, 1803.

"I passed a part of last night in making the troops perform night evolutions, a species of manœuvre that a corps well taught and well disciplined, will sometimes be able to do very advantageously against levies *en masse*."

[1] He wrote from Etaples to the consul Cambacérès, on the 1st of January, 1804:—

"I arrived yesterday morning at Etaples, where I write to you from my barrack. There blows a frightful south-west wind. This country resembles quite enough the territory of Eolus. I mount my horse in an instant to proceed to Boulogne by the strand."

He had written before, on the 12th of November:—

"I received, citizen consul, your letter of the 18th (Brumaire). The sea continues to be stormy, and the rain continues to fall in torrents. I was yesterday on horseback and in boats all the day; this is to tell you that I have been constantly wet. In the present season, there is nothing to be done if one does not encounter the water. Happily, as far as I am concerned, it suits me perfectly; I have never been so well.

"Boulogne, November 12."

On the 1st of January, 1804, he wrote again to the minister of the navy:—

"To-morrow, at eight in the morning, I shall make an inspection of all the flotilla; I shall see it by divisions. A commissary of the navy will call over all the officers and soldiers that compose the crews. Every one will hold his post of battle in the most perfect order. At the moment when I set foot in each vessel, they will salute thrice with 'Long live the republic!' and three times 'Long live the first consul!' I shall be accompanied in this visit by the chief engineer, the commissary of the armament, and the colonel-commandant of the artillery.

"During all the time of the inspection, the crews and the garrisons of the flotilla will remain at their posts, and sentinels will be placed to prevent any body from passing on the quay that overlooks the flotilla."

resist the waves, bore him on their shoulders in the midst of them as they broke over their heads.

One day, when thus passing along the shore, he became animated at the sight of England, and wrote to the consul Cambacérès :—

"I have passed the last three days in the midst of the camp and the port: I have seen the coasts of England from the heights of Ambleteuse, as one sees Calvary from the Tuileries. One could distinguish the houses and the movement. It is a ditch, which will be passed when one shall have the boldness to attempt it [1]."

His impatience to execute this grand undertaking was extreme [2]. He had at first thought of attempting it at the end of autumn; now he proposed the commencement or at the latest the middle of winter. But the labour of the task extended itself at each fresh glance; and every day some new design to make the plan more perfect presented itself to him or to admiral Bruix, which demanded a sacrifice of time to introduce. The instruction of the soldiers and sailors gained by these inevitable delays, which bore with themselves their own indemnity. In strictness, the projected expedition might have been attempted after this eight months' apprenticeship. Still it required six months more, if it was desired that all should be ready, that the equipment and the armament should be complete, and that the education of the sea and landsmen should be deficient in nothing.

But decisive considerations demanded a new delay; these regarded the Batavian flotilla, which was to carry the right wing, commanded by general Davout. On a wish expressed by the first consul, that there should be despatched to him a distinguished officer of the Dutch navy, there had been sent to him the rear-admiral Verhuel. Struck with the intelligence and coolness of this man of the sea, the first consul demanded that he should have the management of all which concerned the organization of the Dutch flotilla. This was conceded agreeably to his request, and there was soon impressed upon its organization all the desired rapidity. This flotilla, prepared in the Scheld, was to be conducted to Ostend,

[1] Depôt of secretary of state's office, November 16th, 1803.

[2] The following letters will exhibit this impatience, and his desire to execute his plan of the expedition in Nivôse or Pluviôse, that is, in January or February. One of these letters is addressed to admiral Ganteaume, who was at that moment commander of the Toulon fleet, before he commanded that of Brest. The cyphers contained in these letters are not exactly the same as those which have been already given in the present recital, because the first consul did not himself fix, until a little later, on the definitive number of men and vessels. The cyphers here adopted are those that were definitively arranged.

"Paris, 23rd November, 1803.

"You will please to go to Toulon. You will remit the accompanying letter to general Ganteaume; you will there take cognizance of the situation of the navy, of the organization of the crews, and of the number of vessels in the road, or that will be ready to go there. You will remain at Toulon for a new order. Forty-eight hours after your arrival, you will send me an extraordinary courier, with the reply of the general Ganteaume to my letter. The extraordinary courier despatched, you will write me daily all that you have done, and you will enter into the greatest detail on all parts of the administration. You will go every day, for one or two hours, to the arsenal. You will inform me of the day when the 3rd battalion of the 8th light, which left Antibes, will pass, it having orders to march to St. Omer, to form part of the expedition; you will proceed yourself to the place nearest to Toulon that it will pass, in order to inspect it, and you will let me know its condition.

"You will visit the Hieres Isles, to see in what manner they are guarded and armed. You will make me a detailed report on all the objects which you see."

"To general Ganteaume, councillor of state, and maritime prefect at Toulon.

"Paris, 23 November, 1803.

"Citizen General,—I have sent to you general Rapp, one of my aides-de-camp; he will sojourn some days in your port, and will learn in detail all which concerns your department. I have acquainted you, two months ago, that in the course of Primaire, I counted upon having ten ships of the line, five frigates, and four corvettes, ready to set sail from Toulon, and that I desired this squadron should be provisioned for four months, to support 25,000 men of good infantry soldiers, who will embark on board. I request that forty-eight hours after the reception of this letter, by the extraordinary courier of general Rapp, you will let me know the precise day when a like squadron will be able to set sail from Toulon, and what you may have in the road, and ready to sail at the moment of receiving my letter, and what you will have on the 15th Primaire and 1st Nivôse. My wish will be that your expedition shall be able to put to sea, at the latest, in the first days of Nivôse.

"I have come from Boulogne, where at this moment there reigns the greatest activity, and I hope to have, towards the middle of Nivôse, 200 gun-vessels, 500 gun-boats, and 500 pinnaces united, each pinnace carrying an howitzer of 36 pounds; each gun-vessel three 24-pounders, and each gun-boat one of 24. Let me know your ideas about this flotilla. Do you believe that we shall attain the shores of Albion? We shall be able to carry over 100,000 men. Eight hours of a night favourable to us will decide the fate of the universe.

"The minister of the navy has continued his tour towards Flushing, visiting the Batavian flotilla, composed of a hundred gun-vessels, three hundred gun-boats, capable of carrying 30,000 men, and the fleet of the Texel, capable of carrying 30,000 men.

"I have no need to stimulate your zeal, I know that you will do all that is possible. Count upon my esteem."

"Paris, 12 January, 1804.

"To citizen Daugier, capitaine de Vaisseau, commanding the battalion of seamen of the guard.

"Citizen Daugier,—I desire that you start in a day's time from Paris, in order to proceed in a right line to Cherbourg. You will give orders for the departure of the vessels of the flotilla, which are to be found in that port, and you will remain there the time necessary to remove all obstacles, and to accelerate the expedition.

"You will visit all the ports out of your way, where you know that there are vessels belonging to the flotilla; you will press their departure, and you will give instructions that the vessels do not remain for entire months in those ports, particularly at Dielette.

"You will fulfil the same mission at Cherbourg, at Granville, and St. Malo. You will write me from these two ports.

"You will fulfil the same mission at Lorient, Nantes, Rochefort, Bordeaux, and Bayonne.

"The season advances; all that shall not have reached Boulogne in the course of Pluviôse, will not be of any service to us. It is necessary, therefore, that you push the works to activity in consequence.

"You will assure yourself that the dispositions which have been made to furnish the complements for the vessels are sufficient in each port."

because they had recognised the danger of setting out from points so far apart as the Scheld and Boulogne. Lastly, from Ostend there was the hope of getting them to Ambleteuse and Wimereux, when these two ports should be completed. There would then be the advantage of having an immense expedition all at one point, and thus making set out together one hundred and twenty thousand men, ten thousand horses, with fifteen thousand sailors, placed under the same direction of the compass, at four ports contiguous to each other. But in order to do that, several months more were required, for the perfect equipment of the Batavian flotilla, and the completion of the ports of Wimereux and Ambleteuse.

Two other portions of the army of invasion were not yet ready; the squadron at Brest, destined to throw the corps of Augereau into Ireland, and the Dutch squadron in the Texel, which was to embark the twenty thousand men encamped between Utrecht and Amsterdam. It was these two corps which were designed, when joined to the one hundred and twenty thousand men at Boulogne, to carry the total force to one hundred and sixty thousand men, which, without the sailors, was the total of the army of invasion. It yet wanted several months before the fleet at the Texel and that at Brest would be completely ready for service.

There remained a last condition to ensure success, and this condition the first consul regarded as bringing for his enterprise the certainty itself. The vessels were now proved perfectly able to pass the six leagues across the straits, when the greater part of them had navigated a hundred and two hundred leagues in order to reach Boulogne, and often by their fire, divided and grazing, had answered with advantage to the dominant and concentrated fire of the shipping. They had the chance of passing without being touched or seen, whether in the calms of spring or in the fogs of winter; and on the most unfavourable supposition, if they were exposed to encounter the twenty-five or thirty corvettes, brigs, or frigates of the English, they would be able to pass, if it must be by the sacrifice of a hundred gun-vessels or gun-boats, out of the two thousand three hundred of which the flotilla was composed[1]. But there was one case in which every bad hazard disappeared, and that was the chance of a great French squadron appearing upon a sudden in the straits, driving away the English cruisers, domineering in the channel for two or three days, and thus covering the passage of the flotilla. In this case there could be no doubt; all the objections raised against the enterprise fall before it at once, unless indeed that of a sudden tempest be admitted, an improbable chance if the seasons were well chosen, and besides, always left out of the calculation. But it was necessary the third squadron of three being line of battle ships, that of Toulon, should be entirely equipped, and it was not ready. The first consul destined it to execute a grand combination, of which no one had the secret, not even the minister of the navy. He ripened this combination in his own mind by degrees, not saying a word to any individual, and leaving the English fully persuaded that the flotilla was to suffice of itself, when it was so completely armed, and every day presented itself in such order to their frigates and vessels.

This man so audacious in his conceptions, was in their execution the most prudent of soldiers. Although he had one hundred and twenty thousand men, united, and in hand, he would not proceed without the concurrence of the Texel fleet, carrying twenty thousand men; the fleet of Brest, carrying eighteen thousand; without the fleets of Rochelle, Ferrol, and Toulon, destined to clear the straits by a profound manœuvre. He made every effort to have all these means ready by February, 1804, and flattered himself they would be ready, when serious and unexpected events in the interior of the republic at once seized all his attention, and snatched him away for a moment from the grand enterprise which had attracted the eyes of the whole world.

[1] The following is an extract of a letter from the minister Decrès, who was of all the men employed near Napoleon, the one who had the fewest illusions, and who shows that with the sacrifice of a hundred vessels, he believed it possible to cross:—

"Boulogne, 7 January, 1804.

"The minister of the navy to the first consul.

"They begin to believe firmly in the flotilla, that the departure is nearer than most people suppose, and they promise me to think seriously about it. They begin to shake off all fears of the danger; each of them only sees Cæsar and his fortunes.

"The ideas of the subalterns do not go beyond the limits of the road and its current. They reason respecting the wind, the moorings, and the line of anchorage, like angels. As to the passage, that is your affair. You know better than they, and your eyes are worth more than their spying-glasses. They are for all you are ready to do.

"The admiral himself is so. He has never presented you with a plan, because in point of fact he has none. It will be the moment of the execution that will decide him. It is very possible, being obliged to sacrifice a hundred vessels by drawing the enemy upon them, that the rest, passing at the moment of their rout, would proceed without an obstacle.

"For the rest, a volume in folio would not contain the development of his ideas, already prepared upon the subject. What will be that which he will adopt? It is for circumstances to decide."

BOOK XVIII.

THE CONSPIRACY OF GEORGES.

FEARS OF ENGLAND AT THE SIGHT OF THE PREPARATIONS AT BOULOGNE.—WAR A THING OF ORDINARY OCCURRENCE WITH HER.—THE OPINION AT FIRST HELD IN LONDON REGARDING THE OBJECTS OF THE FIRST CONSUL; TERROR WITH WHICH THE VIEW OF THEM CONCLUDES.—IMAGINARY MEANS TO RESIST THE FRENCH.—DISCUS-

SION OF THOSE MEANS IN PARLIAMENT.—PITT AGAIN COMES TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.—HIS ATTITUDE AND THAT OF HIS FRIENDS.—MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE ENGLISH.—WINDHAM DEMANDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGULAR ARMY, IN IMITATION OF THE FRENCH.—THEY LIMIT THEMSELVES TO THE CREATION OF AN ARMY OF RESERVE, AND TO A LEVY OF VOLUNTEERS.—PRECAUTIONS TAKEN TO GUARD THE COAST.—THE BRITISH CABINET RESORTS TO THE MEANS FORMERLY PRACTISED BY PITT, AND SECONDS THE PLOTS OF THE EMIGRANTS.—INTRIGUES OF THE ENGLISH DIPLOMATIC AGENTS, DRAKE, SMITH, AND TAYLOR.—THE PRINCES WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN LONDON UNITE THEMSELVES WITH GEORGES AND PICHEGRU, AND ENTER INTO A PLOT, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO ATTACK THE FIRST CONSUL WITH A TROOP OF CHOUANS, ON THE ROAD TO MALMAISON.—IN ORDER TO INSURE THE ADHESION OF THE ARMY, UNDER THE SUPPOSITION OF SUCCESS, THEY ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO GENERAL MOREAU, THE CHIEF OF THE DISCONTENTED.—INTRIGUES OF LAJOLAIS.—FOOLISH HOPES CONCEIVED UPON CERTAIN PROPOSALS OF GENERAL MOREAU.—FIRST DEPARTURE OF A TROOP OF CHOUANS, CONDUCTED BY GEORGES.—THEIR DISEMBARKATION ON THE STRAND AT BIVILLE; THEIR ROUTE ACROSS NORMANDY.—GEORGES, HID IN PARIS, PREPARES THE MEANS OF EXECUTION.—SECOND DISEMBARKATION, COMPOSED OF PICHEGRU AND SEVERAL EMIGRANTS OF HIGH RANK.—PICHEGRU HAS A CONFERENCE WITH MOREAU.—HE FINDS HIM IRRITATED AGAINST THE FIRST CONSUL, WISHING FOR HIS FALL AND DEATH; BUT IS IN NO WAY DISPOSED TO SECOND THE RETURN OF THE BOURBONS.—DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE CONSPIRATORS.—THEIR DISCOURAGEMENT, AND THE LOSS OF TIME THAT DISCOURAGEMENT ENTAILS.—THE FIRST CONSUL, WHO IS ILL-SERVED BY THE POLICE SINCE THE RETIREMENT OF FOUCHÉ, DISCOVERS THE DANGER WITH WHICH HE IS MENACED.—HE ORDERS SOME CHOUANS, RECENTLY ARRESTED, TO BE DELIVERED OVER TO A MILITARY COMMISSION, IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY BE CONSTRAINED TO STATE ALL THEY KNOW.—HE THUS PROCURES AN EVIDENCE.—THE WHOLE PLOT DENOUNCED.—SURPRISE AT LEARNING THAT GEORGES AND PICHEGRU ARE IN PARIS, AND THAT MOREAU IS THEIR ACCOMPLICE.—AN EXTRAORDINARY COUNCIL, AND THE RESOLUTION TAKEN TO ARREST MOREAU.—DISPOSITIONS OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—HE IS FULL OF INDULGENCE TO THE REPUBLICANS, AND OF ANGER AGAINST THE ROYALISTS.—HIS DETERMINATION TO STRIKE THEM IN THE MOST UNSPARING MANNER.—HE ORDERS THE GRAND JUDGE TO BRING MOREAU TO HIM, THAT HE MAY TERMINATE ALL, AS REGARDS HIM, IN A PERSONAL AND AMICABLE EXPLANATION.—THE ATTITUDE OF MOREAU BEFORE THE GRAND JUDGE RENDERS ABORTIVE THIS KIND RESOLUTION.—THE CONSPIRATORS ARRESTED ALL DECLARE THAT A FRENCH PRINCE IS TO BE AT THEIR HEAD, AND THAT HE HAD A DESIGN TO ENTER FRANCE BY THE BEACH AT BIVELLE.—RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST CONSUL TO SEIZE HIM, AND DELIVER HIM OVER TO A MILITARY COMMISSION.—COLONEL SAVARY SENT TO THE SEA-SHORE AT BIVELLE, TO AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF THE PRINCE AND ARREST HIM.—A TERRIBLE LAW, PUNISHING WITH DEATH WHOSOEVER SHOULD AFFORD AN ASYLUM TO THE CONSPIRATORS.—PARIS CLOSED AT THE GATES FOR SEVERAL DAYS.—SUCCESSIVE ARRESTS OF PICHEGRU, M. DE POLIGNAC, M. DE RIVIÈRE, AND OF GEORGES HIMSELF.—DECLARATION OF GEORGES: HE HAD COME TO ATTACK THE FIRST CONSUL BY FORCE OF ARMS.—NEW DECLARATION THAT A PRINCE WAS TO BE AT THE HEAD OF THE CONSPIRATORS.—INCREASING IRRITATION OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—USELESS ATTEMPT OF COLONEL SAVARY ON THE SHORE AT BIVELLE.—THEY ARE INDUCED TO EXAMINE WHERE ALL THE PRINCES OF THE HOUSE OF BOURBON ARE TO BE FOUND AT THE MOMENT.—THE DUKE D'ENGHEIN IS THOUGHT OF, WHO WAS AT ETTENHEIM, ON THE BANKS OF THE RHINE.—A SUB-OFFICER OF GENDARMERIE IS SENT TO MAKE OBSERVATIONS.—ERRONEOUS REPORT MADE BY THAT SUB-OFFICER, AND FATAL COINCIDENCE OF HIS REPORT WITH A NEW DEPOSITION OF A DOMESTIC OF GEORGES.—ERROR AND BLINDFOLD ANGER OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—EXTRAORDINARY COUNCIL, AT THE TERMINATION OF WHICH THE SEIZURE OF THE PRINCE IS RESOLVED UPON.—HIS SEIZURE AND REMOVAL TO PARIS.—A PORTION OF THE ERROR COMMITTED IS DISCOVERED TOO LATE,—THE PRINCE, SENT BEFORE A MILITARY COMMISSION, IS SHOT IN THE FOSSE OF THE CHATEAU OF VINCENNES.—CHARACTER OF THAT UNFORTUNATE EVENT.

England began to be moved at the aspect of the preparations which were making in face of her own shores; she had at first attached to them but little importance.

War in general for an insular country, which takes no part in the great contests carried on by other nations, except with vessels that are generally victorious, and more or less with armies that act in the character of auxiliaries, to such war is a state of little uneasiness, and does not alter the public repose more than the night itself disturbs the daily progress of business. The stability of credit in London, amidst the most lavish effusions of human blood, is a striking proof of this fact. If it be added to these considerations, that the army is recruited with mercenaries, that the fleet is manned with seamen to whom it matters little whether they live on board the vessels of war or on board those of commerce, but for whom, on the other hand, the prizes have an infinite attraction, it may be better again conceived, that for such a country war is a change which resolves itself simply into a matter of taxation, a sort of speculation, in which millions are expended in order to obtain more extended commercial outlets. For the aristocratic classes[1] alone commanding the fleets and armies, who spilled their blood in commanding them, aspired, in fact, to extend the glory of their country as well as to acquire new territory, war resumed all its seriousness, its perils, but never at any time its greatest anxiety, because the danger of invasion did not appear to exist.

It was a war of this kind, and waged in this manner, that Windham, Grenville, and the feeble-minded minister, whom they dragged in their train, believed they had drawn upon their country. They had heard flat-bottomed boats spoken about under the directory, but so often and with so little effect, that they came to the conclusion of believing nothing about them. Sir Sidney Smith, more experienced in the matter than his fellow-countrymen, because he had seen by turns the French, Turks, and English disembark in Egypt, now in spite of formidable cruisers, now despite vigorous and good soldiers posted upon the shore; Sir Sidney Smith

[1] Nothing can be more unfounded as respects the naval service of England; the large majority of the distinguished commanders of which have not arisen from the aristocracy, though they have been rewarded by its distinctions for their services.—*Translator.*

had said in his seat in parliament, that it was possible at the utmost to unite sixty or eighty gun-vessels in the channel, or a hundred, if it was desirable to exaggerate, but that they could never unite more; and that twenty-five or thirty thousand men were the extreme limit of the forces that it was possible to transport into England. According to this officer, the greatest danger that could be apprehended after that was, the descent of a French army in Ireland, double or triple in force to that which had been formerly thrown upon the island; an army, which having more or less ravaged and agitated the country, would finish as the former had done, by succumbing and laying down its arms. There remained, besides, the animosities always silently existing on the continent against France,—animosities, that soon awakened again, would recall towards the continent the forces of the first consul. There was, therefore, more or less reason to fear the war of the first times of the revolution, signalised anew by victories of general Bonaparte over Austria, but with all the ordinary hazards of a complete overturn in a country so fickle as France, which during fifteen years had not supported for three successively the same government, and with the permanent advantage for England of new maritime conquests. These anticipations were realized, owing to many misfortunes and faults; but it will be seen that during several years dangers of the most serious kind menaced the existence of Great Britain.

The confidence of the English soon gave way at the aspect of the preparations which were made on the coast of Boulogne. They heard of a thousand or twelve hundred flat-bottomed boats (they were ignorant that they numbered two thousand), and were surprised; nevertheless they encouraged themselves by doubting their union, and, above all, doubting the possibility of their finding shelter in the ports of the channel. But the concentration of these flat-bottomed boats in the straits of Dover was made in spite of the numerous English cruisers; their good bearing at sea, and under fire, the construction of vast basins to receive them, the establishment of formidable batteries to protect them at anchor, the union of one hundred and fifty thousand men, ready to embark in them, made the English lose, one by one, the illusions of a presumptuous security. They well saw that such preparations could not be a mere feint, and that they had too lightly provoked the boldest and most able of men. There were, it is true, old Englishmen, confident in the inviolability of their island, who had no faith in the peril with which they were threatened; but the government and the leaders of the different parties did not think doubtful the hazard that threatened the soil of England. Twenty or thirty thousand French, however brave, however well commanded they might be, would not have alarmed them; but one hundred and fifty thousand men, having general Bonaparte at their head, caused a sensation of fear in all classes throughout every part of the nation. This was no proof of want of courage, because the bravest people in the world would have been rendered uneasy in presence of an army which had accomplished such great things, and was going to accomplish greater things yet.

One circumstance added much to the seriousness of this situation, the immoveable position of the continental powers. Austria would not agree for a hundred or two hundred millions to draw upon herself the blow intended for England. Prussia was in a community of interests, not of sympathies, with France. Russia censured both belligerent parties, and erected itself into a judge of their conduct, but did not pronounce formally for any. If the French went not north beyond Hanover, there was no chance, at least at the moment, of drawing the Russian empire into a war; and it was evident that there was no idea of giving Russia this motive to take up arms.

The preparations of England should therefore be proportioned to the extent of the danger. There was little to do under the head of the navy to preserve the superiority over France. At first sixty vessels of the line were placed in commission, and eighty thousand seamen raised at the eve of the rupture. The number of vessels of the line was carried up to seventy-five, and that of seamen to one hundred thousand, when the war was openly declared. A hundred frigates and an infinite quantity of brigs and of corvettes completed this armament. Nelson, at the head of a chosen fleet, occupied the Mediterranean, blocked up Toulon, and hindered any new attempt upon Egypt. *Lord* Cornwallis [1], at the head of a second fleet, was charged with the blockade of Brest himself; Rochefort and Ferrol were placed under his inferior officers. Lastly, lord Keith, commanding all the naval forces in the channel and the north sea, had to guard the coasts of England and to watch those of France. He had for his lieutenant Sir Sidney Smith, who cruised with vessels of sixty-four guns, frigates, brigs, and corvettes, from the mouth of the Thames to Portsmouth, and from the mouth of the Scheld to the Somme, covering a part of the English shore, and blocking up the other ports of France. A chain of light vessels, corresponding by signals over the whole expanse of this sea, gave the alarm at the least movement perceived in the French ports [2].

[1] Our author here confounds lord Cornwallis with admiral Cornwallis, so well known in the navy for keeping the sea off Brest with his large fleet during the entire winter season, in a way no admiral ever did before. M. Thiers has committed the error of making the plenipotentiary of Amiens an admiral, when he had before spoken of him as a military officer.—*Translator.*

[2] In the last chapter our author alluded to the English light squadron that cruised off the coast of France, as if its 25 or 30 corvettes, brigs, and frigates, were all the expedition, had it come out, would have had to cope with in the channel, and before which it could afford to lose a hundred. How the French gun-vessels would have acted in deep water, beyond the cover of their shore-batteries, disadvantageously filled with men, was never ventured to the proof on the smallest scale. But this light squadron was not all: at the first alarm, the whole coast, from the Thames to Portsmouth, would have put its vessels to sea. There were in activity at that moment, besides what belonged to the royal navy in the channel, 90 Trinity-House vessels; 173 king's yards' lighters; 19 East Indiamen; and a body of vessels, in all amounting to 624, especially directed to the defence of the coast, and all watching the signal to move; the smallest a match for two or three of the French. In February and March, 1804, besides this home force, the royal navy numbered 500 vessels more—in all 1596.—*Translator.*

By these measures the English believed they had condemned to inaction the French squadrons at Brest, Rochefort, Ferrol, and Toulon, and had constituted a sufficiently encouraging force of observation in the channel.

But it was necessary to do more in presence of a danger altogether new in kind, that of an invasion of the British soil. The sailors consulted had nearly all declared, particularly at the sight of the preparations of the first consul, that it was impossible to be assured that by favour of a fog, a calm, or a long night, the French might not be able to disembark upon the English coast. Without doubt, the new Pharaoh might be precipitated into the waves before reaching the shore; still, if once disembarked, not with one hundred and fifty thousand men, but only with one hundred thousand, or even with eighty thousand, who could resist him? That proud nation, which was itself so little regardful of the nations of the continent, that had not feared to renew the war which she had been habituated to wage with the blood of others, of which she was ever unsparing, was now reduced to her own forces, obliged to arm herself, and no longer confide in mercenaries, while her own forces were not numerous enough for the defence of her territory. She, so proud of her navy, regretted now not to have an efficient army to oppose to the formidable troops of general Bonaparte.

The composition of an army, then, was at that moment the subject of all the discussions in the house of commons; and as it is in the midst of the greatest perils that the spirit of party always most strongly exhibits itself, it was to the subject of this part of the question of the war, and the mode of sustaining it, that party spirit encountered and conflicted among the principal members of the parliament.

The feeble ministry of Addington had survived his faults; he was still at the head of the direction, though but for a short time only, of the war which he had so lightly and so criminally suffered to be rekindled. The majority in parliament well knew that he was inferior to the task which he had undertaken; but not willing to provoke or overturn the cabinet, supported it against its enemies, even against Pitt, that it still desired to see at the head of affairs. This powerful party chief had returned to the house of commons, to which he was incited by his secret impatience, the greatness of the public danger, and his own hatred to France. Always more moderate than his auxiliaries, Windham, Grenville, and Dundas, he had been made aware, by the result of a recent vote, that he might be again in power. In fact, upon a question of attaching blame to this minister, only fifty-three votes were given in the affirmative. The majority, through a disposition common enough in political assemblies, would have wished, without overturning the ministry, to place the helm of the state in the hands of a man of more character and ability. In expectation of his approaching entrance upon the management of public affairs, Pitt took a part in all the debates nearly as if he were minister, but rather with a view to support and perfect the measures of the government than to contravene them.

The principal of these measures was the organization of an army. England had one dispersed in India, America, and in all parts of the Mediterranean, composed of Irish, Scotch, Hanoverians, Hessians, Swiss, and even Maltese, formed by means of the recruiting system, so common in Europe before the institution of the conscription. It had conducted itself well in Egypt, as already seen. It amounted to about one hundred and thirty thousand men; but it is well known, that of one hundred and thirty thousand men the administration must be good in order to have eighty thousand capable of active service. To this force, of which the third at least was absorbed in Ireland, was to be joined fifty thousand of the militia, recently increased to seventy thousand, a kind of national troops that never go out of the province, and have never seen fire. They were led by half-pay officers, by English lords, full of patriotism no doubt, but little accustomed to war, and perfect novices, when opposed to those old bands that had vanquished the European coalitions.

How was this deficiency to be supplied? The minister, surrounded by the most experienced military men, devised the creation of an army, to be called the army of reserve, and to consist of fifty thousand men, formed of Englishmen, drawn for by lot, and not to be employed beyond the limits of the United Kingdom. The army of the line was supplied from this force, and a reinforcement of fifty thousand men obtained. The replacement of those who left to join the line was permitted; but it was only obtained, under the circumstances, at a very high rate. It was but a small matter in strength, but it was all that was able to be done at that moment. Windham, supporting the war party, attacked the proposition for the army of reserve as insufficient. He required the creation of a large army of the line, which, composed after the same principles as the French army, that is to say, by conscription, would be at the absolute disposal of the government, and could be sent any where. He said that which the minister had devised was only an extension of the militia, and would be no better in the face of the experienced troops they had to combat; it would prejudice the recruiting of the army by the power of replacing introduced under the new law, because the individuals disposed to serve would find it more advantageous to enter themselves in the army of reserve than to enrol themselves in the army of the line; that a regular army, formed from the national population, transportable every where that war was carried on, having, in consequence, the means to become efficient fighting men, was the only institution to oppose to the troops of general Bonaparte—"there must be the diamond to cut the diamond," said Windham.

England, that already had a navy, would also have a land army, an ambition very natural, because it is rare that a nation which has one of these two great arms does not wish to have the other. But Pitt made a cold and decided negative to these propositions of Windham. All the ideas of Windham, according to him, were very good; but how was an army to be created in a few days? how made accustomed to fight? How were the regimental skeletons to be obtained? Where could the officers be found? Such an institution could not be the work of a moment. That which had been done was the thing alone actually practicable. It will be difficult enough already to organize the

fifty thousand men now demanded, to instruct them, and to provide them with officers of every rank. Pitt entreated his friend Windham to renounce his notions, at least for the present, and to adhere with him to the government plan.

Windham did not make much of the advice of Pitt, and persisted in his own system, which he supported with new and stronger considerations. He even demanded a levy *en masse*, like that of France in 1792, and reproached the feeble minister, Addington, for not having thought of this grand resource for all the people whose independence should be threatened. This enemy of France and of Napoleon, by the effect of a very common result in hatred, found eulogies for what he most detested; almost exaggerated the French greatness and power, the danger with which the first consul threatened England, only to reproach the English minister for not taking sufficient precautions.

The army of reserve was voted, notwithstanding the scorn of the Windham party, that called it an augmentation of the militia. This combination was reckoned upon for the extension of the army of the line. It was hoped that the men designated by lot, and condemned to serve, would like better to enrol themselves in this species of force than in any other. There would in this way be twenty or thirty thousand recruits more added to the skeleton regiments.

Nevertheless, the danger increasing every hour, and above all, the co-operation of the continent being every day less probable, recourse was had to the proposition of the more extreme party, and all tended to the idea of a levy *en masse*. The minister demanded and obtained the power to call out to arms all the English, from seventeen years old to fifty-five. They were to take volunteers, and in default of them, the men designated by law, to form them into battalions, and to instruct them during a certain number of hours every week. They were to be allowed pay to indemnify them for loss of time; but this arrangement only applied to those volunteers who belonged to the working classes.

Windham, obliged to recognize that they borrowed his ideas, complained that they took them too late or unworthily, and criticised several of the details of the measure. But the measure was voted; and in a little time there were seen in the towns and counties of England, the population called to arms, and exercised every morning in the uniform of volunteers. This uniform was worn by all classes. The respectable Addington came to parliament in this costume, which he so little suited, and caused himself no small degree of ridicule by a manifestation of such a character. The old king and his son, the prince of Wales, passed the volunteers of London in review, at which the French princes were guilty of the unpardonable fault of attending. There were seen in London as many as twenty thousand of these volunteers, which was not a very considerable number, it is true, when the vast population of the city is taken into account. The number was sufficiently great in the whole extent of England to furnish an imposing force, if it had been well-organized. But soldiers are not to be made on a sudden, and much less officers. If in France there were doubts of the worth of the flat-bottomed boats, in England there were great doubts of the worth of these volunteers, if not of their courage, at least of their warlike ability. To these measures were joined the design of fortifications in the country around London, upon the roads that conduct to the capital, and on all the points of the coast that were most threatened. A part of the active force was disposed along the shore, from the Isle of Wight as far as the mouth of the Thames. A system of signals was established for giving the alarm, by means of fires lighted along the coast at the first appearance of the French. Chariots of a particular form were constructed, in order to convey troops by post to the threatened points. In a word, on this side of the strait, as well as on the other, they made efforts to complete extraordinary inventions, to devise new means of defence and attack, to overcome the elements, and associate them in their cause. The two nations, as if drawn to this double shore, presented there a grand spectacle to the rest of the world: one, troubled when she thought of her inexperience in arms, was encouraged when she considered the ocean, which girded her round as with a belt; the other full of confidence in her bravery, in her habits of war, in the genius of her chief, measured with her eyes the arm of the sea that arrested her ardour, accustomed herself every day to contemn it, and regarded as certain that she should soon pass over in the train of the conqueror of Marengo and of the Pyramids.

Neither of the two belligerents had an idea of any other means than those which they saw preparing under their own eyes. The English believing Brest and Toulon carefully blockaded, had no notion of any squadron appearing in the channel. The French, every day exercised in navigating their gun-vessels, did not dream of any other mode of passing over the strait. No one suspected the principal combination of the first consul. Still the one feared, the other hoped, some sudden invention of his genius, and this was the cause of the uneasiness which reigned on one side of the channel, and of the confidence that prevailed upon the other.

It must be said that the means prepared to resist the French were of little account if the strait were once passed. In admitting that they were able to assemble, between London and the channel, fifty thousand men of the army of the line, and thirty or forty thousand of the army of reserve, and that they were able to unite to those regular troops the greatest possible mass of the volunteers, they would not reach the numerical force of the French army destined to pass the straits; and what would they have been able to do altogether, even two or three times superior in number, against the hundred and fifty thousand men that in eighteen months, under the conduct of Napoleon, beat at Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, all the European armies, apparently as brave, certainly longer trained to war, and four or five times more considerable in number than the British forces? The preparations of the English were therefore of little real value, and the ocean was always their most certain and effective defence. In any case, whatever might be the definitive result, it was already a severe punishment of the conduct of the British government, this general agitation of all classes,

this displacement of workmen from their workshops, the men of business from their affairs, the English lords from the enjoyment of their opulence; even such an agitation, prolonged for some time, would become an immense evil, perhaps a serious injury to the public peace.

The British government, in its anxiety, had recourse to every means, even to those which morality is least capable of defending, in order to turn aside the blow which menaced it. During the last war it had fomented insurrections against the governments of every kind and form that had succeeded one another in France. Since then, although these insurrections were little to be expected under the powerful administration of the first consul, it had kept in London and paid, even during the peace, all the staff of La Vendée and of the emigration. This persisting in the retention and preservation in its own hands of all the culpable instruments of an ungenerous war, had contributed much, as has been seen, to renew the quarrel between the two countries. Diversions are, beyond a doubt, one of the ordinary resources of war, and the insurrection of a province is one of the diversions regarded as most useful, and which there is commonly the least scruple made about employing. The English attempt to raise an insurrection in La Vendée, the first consul returned in his attempts to make a revolt in Ireland. The means were reciprocal, and were powerfully employed. But at that moment an insurrection in La Vendée was out of the question of probability. The employment of the Chouans, and of their chief, Georges Cadoudal, could have no other effect than that of tempting to some abominable outrage, such as the infernal machine, or some similar attempt. To push the means of insurrection so far as to overturn the government, was to return to the practices of a legitimacy strongly contested; but to follow up the overturn of a government by an attack upon the individuals composing that government, was to pass all the limit of the rights of nations admitted among civilized people.

The question may be further judged by the facts themselves, as far as relates to the complicity of the British ministry in the criminal projects meditated anew by the French emigration that had taken refuge in London. It will be remembered that the formidable chief of the Chouans of the Morbihan, Georges Cadoudal, who alone among the Vendéans presented to the first consul, had resisted his ascendancy, had withdrawn himself into Britany, and from thence into England. He lived in London in the bosom of opulence, distributing to the French refugees the sums which were granted to them by the British government, and passing his time in the society of the emigrant princes, particularly of the two more active ones, the count d'Artois and the duke de Berry. That these princes should wish to re-enter France was nothing more than natural; that they should wish to kindle a civil war for that purpose, was nothing more than might be expected in a common, if not a legitimate course of things; but unfortunately for their principles or honour, they could no longer calculate upon a civil war, and were only able to reckon upon plots and conspiracies to compass their ends.

Peace had filled the minds of all the exiles with despair, princes as well as others; war restored to them their hopes, not only because it assured them of the concurrence of a part of Europe, but because it became, according to them, a means of ruining the popularity of the first consul. They corresponded with La Vendée through Georges, and with Paris through the returned emigrants. That which they dreamed about in England their partisans dreamed of in France, and the least circumstance which accorded with their illusions, in their eyes, changed their illusions into a reality. They said the one to the other, in their deplorable correspondence, that the war would strike a fatal blow against the first consul. That his power, illegitimate to the French who rested faithful to the blood of the Bourbons, and tyrannical for the French who remained faithful to the revolution, had only two claims to rest upon for support, the re-establishment of peace and the re-establishment of order; that one of these titles had disappeared completely since the rupture with England, and the other was compromised deeply, because it was doubtful whether order could be maintained in the midst of the anxieties of warfare. The government of the first consul would, therefore, become unpopular, as all the preceding governments had become. The tranquil mass of the people would owe to him this resumption of hostilities with Europe; it would become less credulous in his lucky star, since difficulties no longer seemed to be smoothed under his feet. He had, besides, enemies of a different species, of whom it would be possible to make good use; first the revolutionary party, and then those who were jealous of his glory, who swarmed in the army. They said that the Jacobins were exasperated; and that the generals were very little satisfied in having contributed to make their master out of an equal. It was necessary to create, out of these malcontents, in themselves so diverse, a single party capable of overturning the first consul. All that they called for in France, and all that they received for answer from London, tended always to this plan,—to unite the Jacobins, the royalists, and the malcontents of the army into a single party, for the purpose of overturning the usurper Bonaparte.

Such were the ideas cherished in London by the French princes, and in consequence, the same with which they entertained the English cabinet, when demanding the sums of money which they lavished, knowing as it did, at least in a general sense, the object which was sought to be carried into effect.

A vast conspiracy was, therefore, interwoven upon this plan, and carried on with the ordinary impatience of the emigrant party. It was communicated to Louis XVIII., then retired to Warsaw. This prince, always in disagreement with his brother, the count d'Artois, whose sterile and imprudent activity he disapproved, repelled the proposition. What a singular contrast was presented in the two princes. Count d'Artois had goodness without wisdom; Louis XVIII., wisdom without goodness. Count d'Artois entered into the unworthy projects dear to his heart, which Louis XVIII. repulsed because they were unworthy of his understanding. Louis XVIII. resolved from this time to remain a stranger to all the new plots and practices, of which the war was

about to become the unfortunate cause. The count d'Artois, placed at a great distance from his elder brother, excited by his natural ardour, by that of the emigrants, and by that which was more grievous, of the English themselves, took a part in all the designs to which the circumstances of the moment gave rise, in the troubled heads of those who were in a continual state of excitement.

The communications of the French emigrants with the English cabinet took place through the medium of Mr. Hammon [1], who had figured in several negotiations. It was to him that the communications of the French emigrants with the English cabinets were addressed for all that might concern England in any way. Out of England they were addressed to British diplomatic agents: Mr. Taylor, at Hesse; Mr. Spencer Smith, minister at Stuttgard; and Mr. Drake, minister in Bavaria. These three agents, placed near the French frontiers, endeavoured to cultivate every species of intrigue in France, and to second on their side of that country those which were planned in London. They corresponded with Mr. Hammon, and had considerable sums of money at their disposition. It is difficult to believe that these were for the obscure dealings of the police, that governments sometimes permit to be expended for simple means of observation, and to which they devote small sums. They were for real political projects, passing through the hands of their more elevated agents, connected with a most important minister, the minister for foreign affairs, and costing even millions in amount.

The French princes more immediately mingled in these affairs were the count d'Artois, and his second son, the duke de Berry. The duke d'Angoulême resided in Warsaw at the time with Louis XVIII. The princes Condé lived in London, but not in habits of intimacy with the princes of the elder branch, and even strangers to their plots and designs. They were treated as soldiers constantly ready to take up arms, and only fit for that character. While the grandfather and the father of the Condés were in London, the grandson, the duke d'Enghien, was in the territory of Baden, given up to the enjoyment of hunting, and to a warm affection which he had for a princess de Rohan. All three being in the service of England, had received orders to prepare themselves to commence the war, and they had obeyed like soldiers who must pay attention to the government of the country that pays them; melancholy, indeed, the spectacle of the Condés in such a character, but less dishonourable than that of the leaders of conspiracies.

The following is the plan of the new conspiracy. To raise an insurrection in La Vendée did not at that moment present the smallest chance of success; on the contrary, to attack the government of the first consul directly in the middle of Paris appeared the most prompt and certain means of obtaining the object sought. The consular government overturned, there was nothing more possible, according to the authors of the plan, than the return of the Bourbons. But as the consular government consisted entirely in the person of general Bonaparte, it would be necessary to make away with him. The conclusion was obvious, but it was required to destroy him surely and certainly. The blow of a poignard, an infernal machine, all such attempts would be of dubious success, because all would depend upon the sure stroke of the assassin's hand, or upon the hazard of an explosion. There remained a mode, so far never attempted, and therefore not discredited by a trial; this was to unite a hundred determined men, the intrepid Georges at their head; to waylay on the road from St. Cloud or Malmaison, the carriage of the first consul; to attack the guard, generally about ten or a dozen horse in all, to disperse them, and thus to kill him in a species of combat. In this mode, then, it was certain that nothing would be wanting. Georges, who was brave, who had pretensions to the military character, and who would not pass for an assassin, exacted of the two princes that he should have at his side one of them at least, and that they should thus regain with the sword in hand the crown of their ancestors. Can it be credited? These individuals, their minds perverted by emigration, really imagined that in thus attacking the first consul, surrounded by his guards, they gave him a species of battle, and that they should not be assassins! They were to be equals apparently to the noble archduke Charles combatting general Bonaparte at the Tagliamento, or at Wagram, and were only his inferiors in the number of their soldiers. Lamentable sophistry, to which only one-half of those who promulgated it gave credit, showing, on the part of the unhappy Bourbon princes, not a natural perversity, but one acquired amid civil war and exile. Only one of all these concerned was in his natural character, and that was Georges. He was a master in the art of wary ambushes; he had been educated in the heart of the forests of Britany; and now in exercising his skill at the gates of Paris, he did not fear to be reduced to the rank of the instruments, by which he would serve himself, to repudiate them afterwards, because he hoped to have princes for accomplices. He thus secured to himself all the dignity compatible with the character which he was going to perform, and by his audacious attitude in the presence of justice, he proved soon enough that he was not of his party the most depressed at such an unhappy conjuncture for himself.

This was not all; after the combat it was necessary to gather the fruits of the victory. It was necessary to prepare matters so that France should fling herself into the arms of the Bourbons. The parties themselves had destroyed one another, and there did not remain with any of them the shadow of real power. The violent revolutionists were odious. The moderate revolutionists, who had taken refuge with general Bonaparte, were without strength. There remained nothing in an erect attitude but the army. It was that which it would be necessary to subdue; but that was devoted to the revolution; for that it had spilled its blood, and it felt a sort of horror at the emigrants, that it had so often seen under English and Austrian uniforms. It was here that jealousy, that eternal and perverse passion of the human heart, offered to the royalist conspirators the most useful and precious succour.

There was nothing made more noise than the

[1] *Quere*, Hammond?—*Translator.*

difference between general Moreau and general Bonaparte. It has been already said elsewhere, that the general of the army of the Rhine, discreet, reflective, firm in war, was in his private life careless and feeble, governed by those around him; that under this unhappy influence, he had not been free from envy, a vice of the second order of men; that covered with favours by the first consul, he had left off visiting him, without any reason, except that general Moreau was the second in the state, and that general Bonaparte was the first; that feeling this, Moreau had shown a want of seemly conduct in refusing to follow the first consul to a review, and that the last, always apt to resent an affront, had himself abstained from inviting Moreau to the festival annually given to celebrate the foundation of the republic; that Moreau had committed the fault of going on the same day to dine, out of uniform, with several discontented officers in one of the most public places, where he was seen by all the world, to the great displeasure of thinking people, and to the great joy of the enemies of the republic. There have been recounted before the miserable effects of that vanity, which commenced between the females from vulgar differences, and terminated among the men in scenes of tragedy. If a difference between elevated personages be difficult to prevent, it is more difficult still to arrest when it is once declared. From that day Moreau had not ceased to show himself more and more hostile to the consular government. When the concordat was concluded, he had cried out aloud at the domination of the priesthood; when the legion of honour had been instituted, he had censured the re-establishment of an aristocracy; and, lastly, he had exclaimed against the re-establishment of royalty when the consulate for life had been instituted. He had finished by no more appearing before the head of the government, nor even at the houses of the consuls. The renewal of the war would have been an honourable occasion for his reappearance at the Tuileries to offer his services, not to general Bonaparte, but to France. Moreau, by little and little led into evil ways, in which the steps become so fleet, had considered in this rupture of the peace, less the misfortunes of his country, than a check upon a detested rival, and only set himself to observe how this detested enemy, whom he had himself made, would get clear of the embarrassment. Moreau lived then at Grosbois, in the midst of ease and comfort, the just rewards of his services, as a great citizen would do who was the victim of his prince's ingratitude.

The first consul attracted jealousy by his glory; he also attracted it through his family. Murat, whom he had refused for a long time to elevate to the rank of his brother-in-law, who had an excellent heart, an unaffected mind, and chivalrous bravery, acted very ill under all these qualities. Murat, out of a feeling of vanity, which he dissimulated before the first consul, but which he exhibited freely when he was out of the sight of his severe master, dazzled those who, being too little in mind to envy general Bonaparte, were at least able to envy his brother-in-law. The first consul, therefore, had the great and little who were jealous of him. Both the one and the other grouped around Moreau. At Paris during the winter, at Grosbois during the summer, there was kept up a crowd of malcontents, who talked with unlimited indiscretion. The first consul knew this, and revenged himself not solely by the constant advance of his power, but also by his open disdain. After imposing upon himself an extreme reserve for a long time, he finished by no longer keeping silence, and he returned the compliments of mediocrity by his sarcasms, but his were those of a man of genius. They were repeated at least as frequently as those that escaped from the social circle of Moreau.

Parties invented differences that were groundless, in order to serve themselves, and for a more powerful reason, they served quickly and perfidiously those differences which already existed. All had surrounded Moreau without delay. Listening to the malcontents of every side, he was the accomplished general, the modest and virtuous citizen. General Bonaparte was the imprudent, but fortunate soldier; the usurper without genius, the insolent Corsican, who had dared to overturn the republic, and mount the steps of the throne already re-erected. He must be left, said they, to lose himself in his foolish and ridiculous enterprise against England, and to take heed he does not offer her his sword. Thus, after having treated the conqueror of Egypt and Italy as an adventurer, they treated the patriotic expedition, which he had so much at heart, as the most extravagant of rash enterprises.

The conspirators of London had in those unhappy divisions great facilities towards the completion of the second half of their design. It was Moreau that it was necessary to gain, and through Moreau the army; and then the first consul killed on the road from Malmaison, Moreau gained over, would come at the head of the army to reconcile this formidable part of the nation with the Bourbons, who had had the courage to reconquer their throne sword in hand. But how was it possible to get near Moreau, who was at Paris, surrounded by a society altogether republican, whilst in London the conspirators were in the midst of a chosen body of Chouans? There must be some intermediate agent. At that moment, from the fastnesses of the American deserts, there had arrived a man once illustrious, much fallen by his faults from his first eminence, but endued with qualities truly great, and holding in his hand at the same time both the royalists and republicans. This was Pichegru, the vanquisher of Holland, transported by the directory to Sinnamari. He had escaped from his place of banishment, and had reached London, where he lived with the desire not to remain, but to re-enter France, profiting by the policy which recalled, without distinction, the culpable as well as the victims of all parties. But the war, for a moment suspended, had soon recommenced, and with it the follies and illusions of the emigrants, to whom Pichegru had alienated his liberty by alienating his honour. He had been comprised, almost in spite of himself, in the present conspiracy, and he had been charged with that intermediate agency near Moreau, of which the party had need to bring over the last to the cause of the Bourbons, and thus fuse together in one mass the republicans and royalists of every shade of colour.

The plan thus adopted agreed well enough with

certain momentary appearances to be deemed at least specious, though not with enough of reality about it to succeed; but it had still more of the reality than of inefficiency with these impatient people, to whom every thing was good provided they were in action, and that the onerous idleness of exile was relieved by agitation. The plan being arranged, they next occupied themselves with the execution.

It was needful to enter France. If Georges wished to be followed there by one or two of the princes, still he did not desire to have them immediately with him. He admitted that he must prepare every thing before he got them to come over, with the object of not exposing them uselessly to a prolonged residence in Paris under the eyes of a vigilant police. He therefore decided upon setting off the first, and to proceed to Paris, in order to compose the band of Chouans with which he should attack the guard of the first consul. During this time Pichegru was to undertake a conference with Moreau, at first through an intermediate party, then directly, upon proceeding himself to Paris. Lastly, when all should be prepared on both sides of the channel, when they should have ready the Chouans to make the attack, and Moreau to secure the adhesion of the army, the princes should come last, the eve before, or on the day of execution.

All this being arranged, Georges, with a troop of Chouans, on whose resolution and fidelity he could depend, quitted London to enter France. They were all provided with arms as offenders who were going to take to the woods. Georges carried in a belt a million of money in bills of exchange. It was not the French princes, it was well understood, who were able to furnish the sums which circulated between those concerned in the plots, they had been reduced to their last shifts in order to live. These sums came from the common source, in other words, from the British treasury.

An officer of the royal navy of England, captain Wright, an intrepid seaman, who commanded a small vessel of war, received off Deal or Hastings the emigrant emissaries, and was to land them, at their own choice, upon any point of the coast that they might designate for the purpose. Since the first consul, well aware of the frequent descent of the Chouans, had caused the coasts of Britany to be guarded with more care than ever, they had changed their direction and come in by Normandy. Between Dieppe and Treport, in the length of a steep perpendicular shore or cliff, called that of Biville, there existed a mysterious outlet, made in a cleft of the rock, and solely frequented by smugglers. A cable, strongly attached to the summit of the cliff, descended in this cleft of the rock and hung down until it touched the sea. At a call which served as a signal, the secret guardians of the passage flung over the rope, that the smuggler seized, and by its aid clambered up the precipice of two or three hundred feet in height, carrying a heavy load on his shoulders. The confidants of Georges had discovered this inlet, and thought of appropriating it to their own use, which it was very easy to do with the money which they possessed. In order to complete the communication with Paris, they had established a succession of lodging-places either in isolated farms, or in chateaux inhabited by noble Normans, faithful and discreet royalists, seldom moving from their estates. It was thus easy to arrive from the shore of the channel at Paris without passing over a high road, and without entering an inn. Lastly, in order not to compromise this way by passing over it too often, it was reserved for the more important personages of the party. Money distributed abundantly at some of the houses of those royalists of whom a lodging was borrowed, the fidelity of others, but above all, keeping at a distance from places much frequented, rendered acts of indiscretion difficult, and the secret certain to be kept at least for some time.

It was in this way that Georges penetrated into France. Embarked in the vessel of captain Wright, he and his friends landed at the foot of the cliff of Biville, on the 21st of August, 1803, at the same moment that the first consul was making an inspection of the coasts. He followed the step of the smugglers, and from resting-place to resting-place, arrived, with all his most faithful lieutenants, as far as Chaillot in one of the faubourgs of Paris. There had been prepared for him in that place a small lodging, from whence he was able to come at night into Paris, to see his associates there, and prepare to strike the blow, for the performance of which he had brought himself to France.

Courageous and sensible, Georges possessed the passions without the illusions of his party, and judged much better than the others of what was practicable. He attempted that through his courage, which the emigrants, his accomplices, attempted by their ignorance. Having arrived in Paris, he soon discovered that the first consul was not as unpopular as he had been represented in communications received in London; that the royalists and republicans were not so much disposed to fling themselves into adventures, and that here, as is always the case, the reality was very far from bearing out the promise. But he was not a man to be discouraged, nor above all to discourage his associates in making them acquainted with his observations. In consequence, he set himself at work. After all, for a sudden blow such as he contemplated striking, he had no need of any aid from the public feeling; and the first consul no more, France would be forced, in default of something better, to return to the Bourbons. From the depth of his impenetrable obscurity he sent emissaries into La Vendée, to discover whether, upon the ground of the pressure of the conscription, the people were not disposed to rise anew, and if the conscripts of that country did not say now as formerly, that to serve for service sake it was more worthy to carry arms against the revolutionary government than in its behalf. But in La Vendée all was found in a state of inertness. His name alone, among all the names of Vendean leaders, had preserved its power, because he was regarded as an incorruptible royalist, who had preferred exile to the favours of the first consul. They had a sympathy for the representative of a cause which responded to the more secret affections and attachments of the population; but to scour the heaths and high roads again, was not agreeable to the taste of any of the inhabitants. Besides, the priests, the real inspirers

of the Vendeans, were now inclined towards the first consul. Some insignificant assemblages of the people were all of which any hope could be indulged; and, a thing dispiriting for the conspirators, they found already fewer determined Chouans than formerly, who were prepared for any thing sooner than a return to laborious and peaceable occupations. It was still necessary to find some who were at the same time brave and discreet. Georges had been two months in Paris before he had with much trouble united more than thirty. The object of their union was never stated; they did not make it known the one to the other. They only knew that they were destined to take a part in an approaching enterprise in favour of the Bourbons, which was agreeable to them, and besides that they would be well paid, which was news not less agreeable. Georges secretly prepared uniforms and arms for them against the day of combat.

Amid the mystery in which he lived with numerous precautions, although that part of the project which regarded the republicans was not in his jurisdiction, he was desirous of knowing if affairs went on better on that side than on the side of the royalists. He got the secretary of Moreau, called Fresnières, to be sounded by a faithful Breton, that secretary being a Breton also, connected with all the parties and even with M. Fouché. This was running a great degree of peril, because Fouché at that time had his eyes wide open upon all around him, being desirous of an occasion to render a service to the first consul. Fresnières said nothing of an encouraging nature relative to Moreau, at least his replies were very insignificant. Georges made no account of them, but resolute to attempt every thing, pressed his employers in London to act, because compromised in the middle of Paris for several months, he ran there uselessly the greatest dangers.

While Georges was thus occupied, the agents of Pichegru had acted on their side, and had conferred with Moreau. An old commissary of stores, a species of men who at times become familiar with generals, was employed to carry a message in a few words from Pichegru to Moreau. He was asked if he remembered this old companion in arms, and if he still cherished against him any old resentments. It was not for Moreau to have been pleased with Pichegru, whom he had denounced to the directory by delivering up the papers of the waggon of Klingin. But while strong in momentary resentment, he was not capable of recalling to mind past grievances. He therefore expressed nothing but kindness towards Pichegru, and even sympathy for the misfortunes of an old friend. It was then demanded of him if he would not interest himself for Pichegru, and use his influence to obtain his return into France. The effect of the amnesty granted to all the Vendeans, to all the soldiers of Condé, was it not also made to cover the conqueror of Holland?

Moreau replied, that he ardently wished for the return of his old companion in arms; that he regarded such a return as an act of justice due to his services; that he would willingly contribute to it, if his own actual relations with the government were of a nature to permit him; but that having had differences with those who governed, he never placed his feet in the Tuileries. Then came naturally confidential remarks on his own grievances, on his aversion for the first consul, and his desire to see France soon delivered.

The disposition of Moreau, thus foreseen, there was employed about him one of his old officers, general Lajolais, a familiar acquaintance, the most dangerous that can be admitted into the intimacy of a feeble man, who does not know how to govern himself. This general was little, lame, remarkably endowed with a spirit of intrigue, pressed by pecuniary necessities, indeed, nearly reduced to a state of indigence. There was sent to gain him over a deserter from the armies of the republic, disguised as a lace-merchant, with letters from Pichegru, and a good sum of money; and he had not much trouble in acquiring the good offices of Lajolais. Being gained to the conspiracy, he attached himself to Moreau, obtained from him, in confidence, his ill-will to the ruling powers, and his wishes, which tended to nothing less than to the destruction of the consular government, by every possible means. Lajolais did not go so far as to make open propositions; but credulous as all go-betweens are in similar cases, he imagined that there remained only one more word to be said to decide Moreau to take an active part in the conspiracy; and if he believed beyond that which was really correct, he told his employers beyond what he himself believed. It is thus that this species of plots are woven by agents who in one-half cheat themselves, and cheat those who employ them the other moiety. Lajolais gave the greatest hopes to the agents of Pichegru, and, pressed by them, consented to go to London, to make his verbal report to the great personages of whom he had become the instrument.

Lajolais and his conductor were obliged to go through Hamburg to reach London safely; they thus lost a good deal of time. Disembarked in England, they there found orders given by the British authorities that they should be immediately received. They set off for London, and were then introduced to Pichegru, and the managers of the whole intrigue. The arrival of Lajolais filled with foolish pleasure all the impatient spirits there. The count d'Artois had the imprudence to assist at the councils of the conspirators, and thus to compromise his rank, dignity, and family. He was then only personally known to the leaders, it is true; but the vivacity of his sentiments and language exciting attention, he soon became known to them all. On hearing Lajolais describe, with ridiculous exaggeration, what he had collected from the lips of Moreau himself, and say that Pichegru had only to make his appearance to secure the adhesion of the republican general, the count d'Artois, no longer able to restrain his joy, cried out, "If our two generals are in a perfect understanding, I shall soon be on my return to France." These words drew upon the prince the attention of the conspirators, who enquired the identity of the personage who thus expressed himself. They learned that it was a prince of the blood, the son of kings, called to be a king himself, whom the corrupt influence of his exile thus conducted to acts so little worthy of his rank or his heart. The satisfaction expressed upon this event was so great, said one of the agents, who at a later period revealed the details, "that the king of England, had he been present himself,

would have wished to be among those that undertook the voyage[1]."

It was then agreed upon, without further delay, that they should enter France, in order to apply the last hand to the execution of the enterprise. It was become time to hasten, because the unfortunate Georges, left alone in the vanguard of the business, and in the midst of the consular agents of the police, ran the most serious hazards. There had been sent to him, about the end of December, a second detachment of emigrants, in order that he might not suppose himself abandoned. It was now decided that Pichegru himself, accompanied by the greatest personages, such as M. de Rivière, and one of the Polignacs, should embark for France, and should join Georges by the way already marked out. The moment the party thus newly setting out had prepared every thing, M. de Rivière, who had most coolness of them all, affirmed that the moment was so far come, that there was sufficient maturity in the projected enterprise to risk even the princes themselves, that the count d'Artois, or the duke de Berry, or both, should proceed to France, in order to take a part in this pretended combat against the person of the first consul.

Pichegru left London, with the principal French emigrants, upon the expedition in which he entombed for ever his glory, already sullied, and his life, which might have been otherwise employed. He set out during the first days of the year 1804, embarking in the vessel of captain Wright; he landed at the cliff of Biville, on the 16th of January. The conqueror of Holland, accompanied by the most illustrious members of the French nobility, followed the route of the smugglers, found Georges, who had come to meet them, near the sea, and from resting-place to resting-place, traversing the forests of Normandy, reached Chaillot on the 20th of January.

Georges had not collected all his party; but bold as he was, with those of his band already united, he was fully prepared to throw himself upon the carriage of the first consul, and to strike the infallible blow. But it was necessary first to have a definitive understanding with Moreau, in order to be secure about the morrow. The intermediate parties went to see him anew, and told him that Pichegru had arrived secretly, and wished to have a conference with him. Moreau consented, but unwilling to receive Pichegru in his own dwelling, gave him a meeting at night, in the Boulevard of the Madeleine. Pichegru came to the appointment. He would have desired to be alone, because he was cool, prudent, and disliked the company of vulgar and excited persons, who annoyed him by their impatience, and whose society was the first punishment inflicted for his conduct. He came with too many persons to the place of rendezvous, and he came there more particularly with Georges, who wished to examine every thing with his own eyes, apparently to judge upon what foundations he was going to risk his life in a desperate undertaking.

During a cold and dark night, in the month of January, at a given signal, Moreau and Pichegru drew near each other. It was the first time they had met since they had fought together on the Rhine, where their lives were without reproach, and their glory unobscured. Scarcely were they recovered from the emotion which was naturally the effect of so many recollections, when Georges came up and made himself known. Moreau was struck, exhibited at once coldness, discontent, and appeared not much pleased with Pichegru at such an encounter. It was necessary to separate without any thing of moment or of utility being said. Moreau will presently be reverted to again in another part of the affair.

This first meeting produced in the mind of Georges a very ill impression. "This will do mischief," were his first words. Pichegru himself feared he had been too adventurous. Still the intriguers, who served as the goers-between, seeing Moreau, no longer dissimulated any thing, but told him they were acting in a conspiracy to overturn the government of the first consul. Moreau had no objection to the overturn of the government, by means that without being declared, might at the same time be imagined; he only exhibited an invincible repugnance to operate in the cause of the Bourbons, and more particularly to be personally mixed up in such an enterprise. To bring benefit to the republic and to himself, by the fall of the first consul, was clearly his ambition; but it was only between Pichegru and himself that such a matter could be entered upon. This time he received him in his own house, and after several accidents, that barely missed the disclosure of all, he had at last a long and serious interview with his old companion in arms. All was stated. Moreau would not go out of a certain circle of ideas. He had, he pretended, a considerable party of friends in the senate and in the army. If it came to pass that France could be delivered from the three consuls, the power would certainly be placed in his hands. He should use it to save the lives of those who would have disembarrassed the republic of its oppressor, but he would not deliver to the Bourbons the republic thus enfranchised. As to Pichegru himself, the old conqueror of Holland, one of the most illustrious generals of France, they would do better than save his life, he would be reinstated in his honours and in his greatness; he would be elevated to the first ranks in the state. Moreau, warm with these ideas, expressed his astonishment at seeing Pichegru mingled with his present party. Pichegru had no want of the opinion of Moreau, to find insupportable the society of the Chouans, among whom he lived; but Moreau was himself a proof, when people lay themselves out for conspiracies, of the difficulty there is not to become soon the prey of the worst who are around. Pichegru was too sensible and too intelligent to partake in the illusions of Moreau, and he attempted to persuade him that after the death of the first consul, no other government than that of the Bourbons was possible. All this was above the understanding of Moreau, an understanding of a very moderate kind beyond the field

[1] These words, as well as the whole recital of this deplorable affair, are extracted with scrupulous fidelity from the voluminous instruction which took place, and of which one part has been published, and another remains in the archives of the government. There is not admitted as worthy of credit any but the details which are placed beyond all doubt as to their fidelity, by the concurrent testimony of revelations that bear the evident character of truth.

of battle. He was obstinate in the belief, that general Bonaparte ceasing to live, he, general Moreau, would become the first consul of the republic. Although the death of the first consul was never spoken about, it was always understood, as being the means of disembarrassing the stage of the person who occupied it. It may be said, without searching for excuses for these fatal negotiations, to appreciate them exactly, that the personages of that time had seen so many die upon the scaffold and on fields of battle, had given so many or submitted themselves to such terrible orders, that the death of a man had not for them that signification and that horror which the end of the civil wars and the ameliorations of peace have so happily rendered it in the present day.

Pichegru went away from his friend this time in utter despair, and said to the confidential party who had conducted him to Moreau, and who was then leading him to an obscure hiding-place: "He too has ambition; he would, in his turn, govern. Poor man! he knows not how to govern France for twenty-four hours!"

Georges, informed of all that had passed, cried, with the ordinary energy of his language, "Usurper for usurper; I love him that now governs better than Moreau, who has neither head nor heart!"

It is thus, as will presently be seen, that they treated the man whom their writers and talkers represented as the model of the public and warlike virtues.

The knowledge, soon acquired, of the dispositions of Moreau, threw into despair the unhappy and culpable emigrants. They had yet another interview with him at Chaillot in the dwelling of Georges, probably without his knowing whose house he had entered. Georges joining at the commencement of the conversation, withdrew, saying bluntly to Pichegru and Moreau: "I withdraw myself; perhaps while you are alone, you may finish by a mutual understanding."

The two republican generals understood one another no further: it was now become evident to all the conspirators, that they were foolishly engaged in a design which could only terminate in a catastrophe. M. de Rivière was disconsolate. He and his friends said that which they always said, when they found none to take part with their own passions and feelings: "France is apathetic; she desires only repose; she is unfaithful to her old sentiments." France, in fact, was not as they had been assured she was, indignant against the consular government; all the parties were not in an understanding to overturn it. There were none but those who were envious, and destitute of genius, who dreamed of its destruction; yet they were not willing to commit themselves in a plot, however well characterised. And as to France, without doubt regretting the loss of the peace so promptly broken, mistrustful too, perhaps, of the taste for war and power which so distinguished general Bonaparte, she did not the less regard him as her saviour. She was struck with his genius, and she would not, at any price, see herself cast again into the hazards of a new revolution.

Already the unhappy conspirators were tempted to withdraw, some into Britany, others into England. Disabused by the knowledge of facts, the most elevated among them felt besides a deep disgust at the society in the midst of which they were reduced to live. M. de Rivière and Pichegru, the wisest of all the party, confided to each other their repugnance and chagrin. One day Pichegru, wishing to put in their proper position the Chouans who were too importunate, replied with bitterness and disdain to one of them, who said: "But, general, you are *with* us!" "No, I am *amongst* you[1]!" By which he signified that his life itself was in their hands, but that his will and reason were so no more.

All the conspirators now found themselves plunged into the most cruel uncertainty. Still Georges was always ready to attack the first consul, except that he wished to know what would be done afterwards; the others asked, to what good a useless attempt would tend. They were in this state when these plottings, carried on for six months without interruption, were completed by giving a glimpse of their existence to the police, too late for the credit of its vigilance. The sagacity of the first consul saved it altogether, and ruined the imprudent enemies who conspired against his life. It is the ordinary punishment of those who engage in such enterprises to stop when it is too late; oftentimes they are discovered, seized, and punished, when already conscience, reason, and fear, beginning to open their eyes, they began to retrograde in the path of evil.

These comings and goings continued from August to January; passing more particularly so near to such a man as the former minister Fouché, who had a great desire to make discoveries, it was scarcely possible they should not one day be perceived. It has been elsewhere related that M. Fouché had been deprived of the portfolio of the police, at the period when the first consul had wished to distinguish the inauguration of the consulship for life by the suppression of such a rigorous administration. The police had been hidden, it may be said, in the administration of justice. The grand judge, Regnier, entirely a stranger to the duties of the police, had abandoned them to the counsellor of state, Real, a man of spirit, but sanguine, credulous, and having nothing near the sagacity, certain and penetrating, of M. Fouché. Thus the police was directed with little skill, and it had affirmed to the first consul, that never even then had there appeared less symptoms of a conspiracy. The first consul was far from partaking in this feeling of security. Besides, M. Fouché did not leave him the choice of doing so. Become a senator, weary of his idleness, he had still kept up his connexion with his old agents, was perfectly well informed on matters and things, and came to communicate his observations to the first consul. The first consul listened to all that Fouché and Real chose to tell him, but reading with care the reports of the gendarmerie, always most useful, because they are the most exact and most honest, came to the conviction that plots were forming against his person. At first a fact, or a general deduction drawn from circumstances, led him to think that the renewal of the war might become an occasion for the emigrants and republicans to make some new attempts. Different indications,

[1] "Mais, général, vous êtes *avec* nous!" "Non, je suis *chez* vous."

such as that of Chouans being arrested in several directions; notices from Vendean chiefs attached to his person, all proved to him that his inferences were just. Upon an announcement from La Vendée itself, which gave the information that refractory conscripts were observed to be forming themselves into bands, he sent colonel Savary into the western departments, an officer whose devotion he knew was without limit, and whose intelligence and courage were equally tried. There were sent with him some of the select gendarmerie, to follow the movements and to direct several moveable columns detached into La Vendée. Colonel Savary set out, observed every thing personally, and clearly perceived signs of a concealed action from some quarter. This action was effected by Georges, who, from Paris, endeavoured to excite an insurrection in La Vendée. Still nothing was discovered of the terrible secret, which Georges reserved to himself and his principal associates. The bands in La Vendée dispersed, and colonel Savary returned to Paris without having learned any thing very important.

Another intrigue, the thread of which had fallen into the hands of the first consul, and which he took a sort of pleasure in tracing out himself, promised some light on the matter, without having yet afforded any. The three English ministers at Hesse, Wurtemburg, and Bavaria, who were charged to weave plots in France, applied themselves to the task with zeal and assiduity, but in a clumsy manner. Strangers show little ability in conducting similar plots. Of these Mr. Drake, the Bavarian minister, was the most active. He lodged out of the city of Munich, in order that he might receive with greater facility the agents which came to him from France; and in order the better to ensure the security of his correspondence, he had seduced a director of the Bavarian post-office. A Frenchman given to intrigue, formerly a republican, with whom Mr. Drake had undertaken these practices, and to whom he avowed continually the object of the British intriguers, had made known all to the Parisian police. Mr. Drake wished at first to procure the secrets of the first consul relative to the descent on England, then to gain over, if possible, some important general, to seize, if it could be done, upon some fortified place like Strasburgh or Besançon, and there to commence an insurrection. To disembarrass himself of general Bonaparte, was always, in terms more or less explicit, the essential part of the design. The first consul delighted to catch an English diplomatist in such a flagrant offence, gave money to the intermediate agent who thus deceived Mr. Drake, upon the condition of his continuing the intrigue. He himself furnished the copies of the letters which were to be written to Drake. He gave in these letters numerous and true details of his personal habits, of the manner in which he drew up his plans, dictated his orders, and added, that the grand secret of his operations was contained in a great black portfolio, always entrusted to M. de Meneval, or a huissier in his confidence; that M. de Meneval was incorruptible, but that the huissier was not, and demanded a million of francs for the delivery of the portfolio. The first consul insinuated, that there must certainly be in France other plots besides that under the direction of Mr. Drake, and that it was important to know them, in order that they might not reciprocally obscure each other, but, on the contrary, be of mutual service. Finally, he added as a very important piece of revelation, that the real object of the descent was Ireland; that what had taken place at Boulogne was purely a feint, that it was endeavoured, by the extent of the preparations, to render it of importance, but that there was nothing serious except in the expedition ordered at Brest and the Texel[1].

[1] Here are curious extracts from these letters, dictated by the first consul himself:—

"To the grand judge.

"9th Brumaire, year XII. (1st Nov. 1803.)

"It will be of importance to have near Drake, at Munich, a secret agent, who will take an account of all the French who visit that city.

"I have read all the reports which you have sent to me. They appear sufficiently interesting. He must not press for the arrests. When the authorities shall have given all the reinstructions, a plan will be arranged with him, and that which he will have to do will be seen.

"I desire that he write to Drake, and, to give him confidence, inform him, that while waiting until the grand blow can be struck, he believes he has it in his power to promise that there shall be taken from the table of the first consul, in his secret cabinet, written in his own hand, notes relative to his great expedition, and every other important paper; that this hope is founded upon a huissier of the cabinet, who having been a member of the society of Jacobins, having now the care of the cabinet of the first consul, honoured with his confidence, finds himself in the meanwhile in the secret committee; but that he has a need of two things, the first that he shall have the promise of 100,000*l.* sterling, if he really remits those papers of an importance so great, written in the first consul's hand; the second condition is, that there shall be designated a French agent of the royalist party, that shall furnish the means of concealing himself to the huissier, who will be certainly arrested in the course of the affair if ever documents of such importance are found missing. . . .

"Bonaparte writes himself scarcely ever. He dictates every thing, walking up and down his cabinet, to a young man aged about twenty, named Meneval, who is the sole individual, not only who enters his cabinet, but who approaches within the three rooms that lead to that cabinet. This young man succeeded Bourienne, whom the first consul had known from his infancy, but whom he has sent away. . . .

"Meneval is not of the character that one can be able to hope for any thing from him.

"But the notes which contain the grandest and most important calculations the first consul never dictates, but writes himself. He has upon his table a great portfolio, divided into as many compartments as there are ministers. This portfolio, made with care, is closed by the first consul; and every time that the first consul leaves his cabinet, Meneval is ordered to place the portfolio in a cupboard in a recess under his desk, screwed to the floor.

"Perhaps this portfolio might be carried off. Meneval or the huissier of the cabinet, who lights the fire and sets the apartment in order, would alone be suspected. It will be necessary that the huissier should disappear afterwards. In this portfolio there must be all that the first consul has written for several years past, because it is the only one which has constantly travelled about with him, and which goes incessantly with him from Paris to Malmaison and to St. Cloud. All the secret notes of the military operations would be found there; and seeing that, it will be possible to attain the destruction of his authority by confounding his

This clumsy and culpable diplomatist, who had committed the double wrong of compromising the most sacred functions, and of playing so stupidly with the police, received all these details with extreme avidity; he demanded more, above all, relative to what was passing at Boulogne; stated that he would refer to his government for what related to the "black portfolio," for which so great a price was demanded; and as to the other plots of which his correspondent desired information, in order that they might not run counter to one another, he said he was not instructed, which was true enough; but it would be needful, if he encountered any, to lay himself out, in order to make all tend to the same object; because, added

designs. There can be no doubt that the subtraction of this portfolio would confound them all."

"To the grand judge.

"Paris, 3rd Pluviôse, year XII. (12 Jan. 1804.)

"The letters of Drake appear very important. I desire that Méhée, in his approaching bulletin, should say that the committee had been in great glee, as they thought that Bonaparte would embark at Boulogne, but that there is to-day the certainty that the demonstrations at Boulogne are false demonstrations; that although costly, they are much less so than appears at the first glance; that all the vessels of the flotilla are able to be used for ordinary purposes; that there be care taken to observe all that would show that those preparations are only menaces, and that it is not a fixed establishment which it might be wished to preserve.

"That he will not dissimulate; that the first consul was too wary, and believed himself too well established to-day, to attempt a doubtful operation, where a mass of force will be committed. His real project, as much as can be judged by his external relations, is the expedition to Ireland, which will be made at the same time by the squadrons from Brest and the Texel.

"Nothing is said of the expedition from the Texel, although it is well known to be ready; and much noise is made about the camps of St. Omer, Ostend, and Flushing. The great quantity of troops united in encampments has a political object. Bonaparte is very pleased to have them at hand, to keep them in war-trim, and to make a diversion of a fourth of them to fall upon Germany, if he sees it necessary to his objects to make the war continental.

"Another expedition is that of the Morea, which is decidedly arranged. Bonaparte has forty thousand men at Tarentum. The Toulon squadron will proceed thither. He hopes to find a considerable auxiliary force among the Greeks.

"The affair of the portfolio must always be continued. Say that (in order to get belief) the huissier came to show several pieces of letters written in the very hand of Bonaparte. That you should be able to extract the greater part through this man, but that he wants a great deal of money. The project is really to deliver the portfolio, in which the first consul puts all the instructions that they can desire or believe, but for which it is necessary they should advance money, at least to the extent of 50,000*l.* sterling."

"To citizen Real.

"Malmaison, 28th Ventôse, year XII. (March 19, 1804.)

"I pray you to send to citizen Maret the last letter written by Drake, in order that he may print it after the collection of pieces relative to this affair.

"I also pray you to add two notes, one to make known that the aid-de-camp of the supposed general is no more than an officer sent by the prefect of Strasburg; and the other which makes known that the huissier was a pure invention of the agent, that there is not any huissier employed about the government who would not be above the corrupting gold of England."

Mr. Drake, it matters very little by whom the animal is "laid low, it suffices that you are all ready to join in the chase [1]."

It was to this unworthy character, then, that an agent, clothed with an official character, ventured to descend; it was this odious language which he dared to use.

But all this threw no light upon what was sought. Mr. Drake was ignorant of the great conspiracy of Georges, of which the secret had not been spread abroad; and he had not been able, in his ridiculous confidence, to make a single useful revelation. The first consul was always persuaded that the men who invented the infernal machine, would have much stronger reasons for preparing something similar, under existing circumstances. Struck with the numerous arrests executed in Paris, La Vendée, and Normandy, he said to Murat, governor of Paris, and to M. Real, who directed the police, "The emigrants are certainly at work. Numerous arrests are taking place; some of the individuals taken must be sent before a military commission, that will condemn them, and then they will confess before they suffer themselves to be shot."

This which is here stated actually took place between the 25th and 30th of January, during the interview between Pichegru and Moreau, and when the conspirators began to give themselves up to discouragement. The first consul had the lists brought to him of those individuals who had been arrested. Among them were found all the agents of Georges, arrived either before or after himself, and in that number was an old physician of the Vendean armies, who had disembarked in August with Georges himself. After examining the particular circumstances attached to each of them, the first consul, in designating five of their number, said, "I am very strongly deceived, or there are here some men who will not be wanting in making revelations."

For a long while the laws formerly made had not been carried into effect, which permitted the institution of military tribunals. The first consul, during the peace, had wished to let them fall into desuetude; but on the return of the war, he believed that he was bound to use them, above all, in case of the spies, who came to observe his preparations against England. He had caused them to be arrested, tried, and every one shot. The five individuals whom he had designated were now put upon trial. Two were acquitted; two others, convicted by the court of crimes that the law punished with death, were shot, without avowing any thing, but that they declared they had come to serve the cause of their legitimate king, who would soon be triumphant over the ruins of the republic. They preferred, besides, frightful menaces against the person at the head of the government.

The fifth, whom the first consul had particularly designated as the man who would be likely to confess every thing, declared, at the moment they were leading him to punishment, that he had great secrets to disclose. There was immediately sent

[1] These are the expressions employed by Mr. Drake himself. The letters, written in his own hand, were deposited with the senate, and shown to all the agents of the diplomatic body who had any inclination to peruse them.

to him one of the most able agents in the service of the police. He avowed every thing, declared that he had disembarked in the month of August at Biville with Georges himself; that they had arrived, by traversing the woods, from station to station, as far as Paris, with the object of killing the first consul, through an attack upon his escort by main force. He indicated some of the places where the Chouans lodged who were under the orders of Georges, and particularly several wine-merchants.

This declaration threw in a ray of light. The presence of Georges in Paris was in the highest point significative. It was not for an attempt of slight importance that such a personage had been sojourning six months in the capital itself with a band of his accomplices and dependants. The point of disembarkation at the cliff of Biville, the existence of a route to Paris, the sojourning places in traversing the woods, and every one of the obscure lodgings where the conspirators were hidden, were now known. A most singular chance had revealed a name, which being traced, disclosed the gravest circumstances. At an anterior epoch, some Chouans disembarked on the same shore of Biville, had exchanged musket-shots with the gendarmes, and the name of Troche was found upon a fragment of paper which had served for wadding. This Troche was a clockmaker at Eu. He had a son very young, and employed in the correspondence. He was secretly arrested and taken to Paris. On being interrogated he avowed all he knew. He declared that it was he who went to receive the conspirators at the cliff of Biville, and conducted them to their first stations. He related the three disembarkations, of which the history has been related, that of Georges in August, and those of December and January, in which were found Pichegru, M. de Rivière, and M. de Polignac. He did not know the names or the quality of the personages to whom he had served as a guide. He only knew that in the first days of February a fourth disembarkation was to take place at the cliff of Biville. He was equally ordered to be the guide to receive them when they arrived.

Suddenly, during the first days of February, a search was commenced, and the places indicated from Paris as far as the coast were examined, in order to discover the stations which were used by the emigrant travellers. A good guard was placed at the wine-merchants denounced by the agents of Georges, and in a few days different important arrests were made, two in particular, which threw a great light upon the whole affair. They seized at first a young man, named Picot, a domestic of Georges, and an intrepid Chouan, who being armed with pistols and poignards, fired upon the agents of the police, and did not yield until the last extremity, declaring he would die in the service of his king. At the same time was seized the principal officer of Georges, named Bouvet de Lozier, who suffered himself to be taken without provoking the same tumult, exhibiting himself perfectly calm.

These men were armed like offenders ready for the committal of the greatest crimes, and besides the arms which they carried about them, they had considerable sums in gold and silver. At the first moment they appeared to be highly excited, then they became more calm, and finished by making confessions. It was thus with the party named Picot, arrested on the 8th of February, or 18th Pluviôse; he would say nothing at first, but afterwards, by little and little, he was induced to speak. He avowed that he had come from England with Georges; that he had been with him in Paris during the last six months, and did not much disguise the motive of their voyage to France. Thus the presence of Georges in Paris for a grand object, could no longer be a matter of doubt. But they knew nothing more. Bouvet de Lozier said nothing. He was a personage much above Picot in education and manners. In the night of the 13th or 14th of February, Bouvet de Lozier suddenly called his jailer. He had attempted to hang himself, and not having succeeded, had fallen into a sort of delirium; he then demanded that the declaration he made should be received. The unhappy man now stated, that before dying for the cause of his legitimate king, he wished to unmask the perfidious person who had drawn these brave men into an abyss, by compromising them uselessly. He made to M. Real, surprised and confounded, the strangest and most surprising recital. They were, he said, in London, around the princes, when Moreau had sent over to Pichegru one of his officers, to offer to set him at the head of a movement in favour of the Bourbons, promising to draw in the army to follow his example. On this intelligence, they had set off altogether, with Georges and Pichegru himself, to co-operate in the revolution. Arrived in Paris, Georges and Pichegru had gone to Moreau, to have an understanding, and Moreau had then changed his language, and had demanded that they should overturn the first consul, for his own advantage, in order to make himself the dictator. Georges, Pichegru, and their friends, had refused such a proposition, and it was owing to the unfortunate delays, arising from the pretensions of Moreau, that they had become objects of search to the police. This tragical deponent added, that "he had escaped the shadows of death to avenge himself and his friends upon the man who had lost them every thing[1]."

[1] The declaration of Bouvet de Lozier himself is here cited. This document, as are all those relative to the conspiracy of Georges, and which will be cited hereafter, is taken from a collection in eight volumes, 8vo, having for the title:—

"The process instituted by the court of criminal and special justice of the department of the Seine, sitting at Paris, against Georges, Pichegru, and others, charged with a conspiracy against the person of the first consul. Paris, C. F. Patras, printer to the court of criminal justice, 1804." (The copy in the royal library.)

Declaration of Athanase Hyacinthe Bouvet de Lozier, made in presence of the grand judge, minister of justice. Book ii. page 168.

"It is a man who comes out of the gates of the tomb, still covered with the shadows of death, who asks vengeance upon those that by their perfidiousness have thrown him and his party into the abyss in which he finds himself.

"Sent to sustain the cause of the Bourbons, he found himself obliged to combat for Moreau, or to renounce an enterprize which was the sole object of his mission.

"*Monsieur* was to pass into France in order to place him

Thus, in the midst of an interrupted suicide, there came out against Moreau a terrible denunciation; a denunciation exaggerated by despair, but presenting, nevertheless, the outline of the plot. M. Real, almost stupified, ran to the Tuileries. He found the first consul gone, according to his custom, to take his rest at an early hour, in order to give himself up to his labours. The first consul was yet in the hands of his valet de chambre, Constant, when at the first accents of M. Real, he placed his hand on his mouth, silenced him, and shut himself up alone with him, to listen to his recital. He did not seem astonished. He refused to credit entirely and wholly the declaration about Moreau. He comprehended well enough the project of uniting all parties against himself, and employing Pichegru as an intermediate agent between the royalists and republicans; but to credit the culpability of Moreau, he wished that the presence of Pichegru in Paris should be well established. If new revelations removed all doubts in this respect, the connexion between the royalists and Moreau would be found established, and they would be able to deal with him. In other respects, there escaped from the first consul not a single accent of anger nor of vengeance; he appeared more curious and more thoughtful than he was irritated.

They thought of interrogating Picot, the domestic of Georges, anew, to discover if he had cognizance of the presence of Pichegru in Paris. He was questioned upon the same day, when, on treating him with mildness, they terminated the matter, by bringing him to open what he knew to them entirely. He declared himself all that related to Pichegru and Moreau. He had known less than Bouvet de Lozier; but that which he did know was perhaps more significant, because the inference from it was, that the despair produced by the conduct of Moreau had descended so as to be shared by the lowest ranks of the conspirators. In regard to Pichegru, he had declared positively that he had seen him in Paris but a few days before; and he affirmed even that he was still there. As to Moreau, he stated that he had heard the officers of Georges express the greatest regret that they had addressed themselves to that general, who was ready to ruin all by his ambitious pretensions[1].

These facts having been made known during the 14th of February, the first consul immediately convoked a secret council at the Tuileries, composed of the two consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, the principal ministers, and M. Fouché, who, although no longer a minister, had borne a leading part in the existing information. The council was held in the night of the 14th and 15th. The question merited a serious examination. There was incontestable evidence of a conspiracy. The design to attack the first consul with a troop of Chouans, having Georges at their head, was beyond a doubt. The concurrence of all the parties, republicans or royalists, thus become certain from the presence of Pichegru, who had served as the intermediate agent between one and the other. As to the culpability of Moreau, it was difficult to discover its precise extent; but neither Bouvet de Lozier in his despair, nor Picot in his subaltern simplicity, could possibly have invented the extraordinary circumstance of the wrong done to the royalist party by the personal views of Moreau. It was clear, then, that if this general were not arrested, the process would follow him up, and he

self at the head of the royalists; Moreau promised to unite his cause with that of the Bourbons. The royalists came into France and Moreau retracted.

"He proposed that we should labour for him and get him nominated dictator.

"The accusation which I make against him is not supported perhaps but on half proof.

"Here are the facts; it is you who are to appreciate them.

"A general who has served under Moreau's orders, Lajolais, was sent by him to the prince in London; Pichegru acted intermediately; Lajolais adhered in the name and on the part of Moreau to the principal points of the proposed plan.

"The prince proposed to depart; the number of royalists in France was augmented, and in the conferences which have taken place in Paris between Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges, the first manifested his intentions, and declared he would not act except for a dictator, not for a king.

"From thence arose the hesitation, the dissension, and the nearly total loss of the royalist party.

"Lajolais was with the prince at the commencement of January in the present year, as I have been apprised by Georges.

"I myself saw on the 17th of January his arrival at La Poterie on the day following his disembarkment with Pichegru, by the route of our common correspondence, which you only know too well.

"I have seen the same Lajolais, on the 25th or 26th of January, when he came to take Georges and Pichegru to the carriage where I was with them in the Boulevard de la Madeleine to conduct them to Moreau, who waited for them at some paces distance. He then had with them in the Champs Elysées one conference, that led to our presage of that which Moreau openly proposed at a succeeding meeting that he had with Pichegru alone; to wit, that it was not possible to re-establish the king; and he proposed that he himself should be placed at the head of the government under the title of dictator, not leaving to the royalists any chance but to be his supporters and soldiers.

"I know not what weight the assertion of a man will have with you, snatched but an hour before from the death that he had given himself, and that sees before him the death reserved by an offended government.

"But I am not able to restrain the cry of despair, nor an attack upon the men who have reduced me to it.

"As to what remains, you will discover facts conformable to those which I advance in the course of the grand process in which I am implicated.

"(Signed) BOUVET,

"Adjutant-general of the royal army."

[1] *Extract from the second declaration of Louis Picot, the 24th Pluviôse, year XII.* (*14 February*), *at one in the morning, before the prefect of police*, book ii. p. 392.

Declares—"That the chiefs had drawn lots who should attack the first consul.

"That they would attack him if they encountered him on the road to Boulogne, or assassinate him while presenting a petition to him on the parade, or as he went to the theatre.

"That he firmly believes that Pichegru is not only in France, but still in Paris."

Extract from the third declaration of Louis Picot, the 24th Pluviôse (*14th February*).

Declares—"That Pichegru constantly bore the name of Charles, that he had heard him several times so called.

"That he had heard general Moreau spoken of several times, and that the chiefs had frequently repeated it before him; that they were vexed that the princes had let Moreau into the affair, but that he was ignorant whether Georges had seen Moreau."

would be found denounced every moment; that those denunciations would be noised abroad, and that then the charge would have the appearance of being either wholly a perfidious calumny, or that the government was afraid, and did not dare to prosecute a criminal, because in that criminal's identity would be found the second personage in the republic.

The decision of this question remained for the first consul. To suffer the strength of his government to be called in question, was the thing ever most opposed to his pride and policy. "They will say," he observed, "that I am afraid of Moreau. It will not be found so. I have been the most merciful of men, but I will be the most terrible, when it shall become necessary. I will strike Moreau as I would strike any other man when he enters into conspiracies, odious in their object, and disgraceful by the party reconciliations which they imply."

He did not, therefore, hesitate a moment in deciding upon the arrest of Moreau. He had, besides, another reason, and that was one of weight. Neither Georges nor Pichegru were arrested. Three or four of their accomplices were taken; but the main body of those who were to carry the scheme into execution was yet entirely beyond the grasp of the police, and it was possible that the fear of being discovered might cause them to carry out at once the attempt which they had entered France to make. It was on this account needful to hasten the process, and seize all the principal parties whom they had the means of securing. This would lead inevitably to other discoveries. The arrest of Moreau was resolved upon accordingly, and with Moreau that of Lajolais and the other intermediate agents, whose names had been discovered.

The first consul was irritated, but not in a particular manner, against Moreau. He wore the appearance more of a man who endeavoured to strengthen himself beforehand rather than to seek vengeance. He wished to have Moreau in his power to convince him, and to obtain the information of which he had need, and then to pardon him. He imagined that it would be the full measure of address and goodness, to terminate the matter in this way.

It was necessary to fix upon the jurisdiction. The consul Cambacérès, who had a professed knowledge of the laws, stated the danger of the ordinary jurisdiction in an affair of this nature, and proposed, as Moreau was a military man, to send him before a council of war, composed of the most distinguished individuals in the army. The existing laws furnished the means of taking this step. The first consul opposed it[1]. "They will say," he remarked, "that wishing to disembarrass myself of Moreau, I have had him assassinated, judicially, by my own creatures." A middle term was then sought, and it was in consequence devised to send Moreau before the criminal tribunal of the Seine. The constitution permitted the suspension of the jury in certain cases, and over the entire extent of particular departments, and it was decided that this suspension should be immediately pronounced for the department of the Seine. This was a fault, the principle of which was honourable. The public considered the suspension of the jury an act as rigorous as if the case had been sent before a military commission, and without giving it the merit of respecting the forms of justice, thus imparted to it all the inconveniences, as will soon be seen. It was resolved, besides, that the grand judge, Regnier, should draw up a report upon the conspiracy which had been discovered, declaring the motives for the arrest of Moreau, and that the report should be communicated to the senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate.

The council lasted the whole night. In the morning of the 15th of February, a chosen detachment of gendarmerie, with the officers of justice, was sent to the house inhabited by Moreau. He was not to be found there, and they set out for Grosbois, but met him on the bridge of Charenton, returning to Paris. He was arrested without noise, treated with much respect, and conducted to the Temple. At the same time as Moreau, they arrested Lajolais, with the clerks of the provision-sellers, who had served as intermediate agents.

The message containing the report of Regnier was taken the same day to the senate, to the legislative body, and to the tribunate. It produced there a painful astonishment among the friends of the government, and a sort of malicious delight among its enemies—enemies more or less active, of whom a certain number yet remained in the great bodies of the state. It was, according to these, an invention of the police, a machination of the first consul, who wished to get rid of a rival of whom he was jealous, and repair his compromised popularity, by inspiring uneasiness about his life. Every tongue was let loose, as is certain to happen under similar circumstances. In place of saying, "the conspiracy of Moreau," the wits said, "the conspiracy against Moreau." The brother of the general, who was a member of the tribunate, suddenly rose in the tribune of that assembly, declared that his brother had been calumniated, and that he demanded only one thing to demonstrate his innocence, and that was to be sent before an ordinary, and not a special court of justice. He only demanded for his brother the means to make the truth be heard. These words were heard coldly, but with evident chagrin. The majority of the three bodies was at the same time devoted to the government, and deeply afflicted. It seemed as if, since the rupture of the peace, the fortune of the first consul, so far fortunate as it was great, had a little fallen off. They did not believe that he could have invented this conspiracy; but they were grieved to see that his life was yet in peril, and that it was necessary to defend it by striking at the highest characters in the republic. They replied, therefore, to the message of the government, by one which contained the expression, common under those circumstances, of the interest and attachment they felt towards the chief of the state, and their ardent wishes that justice should be promptly and faithfully rendered.

The noise caused by these arrests was very great, and it could not be otherwise. The bulk of the public were strongly disposed to indignation against every attempt which placed the valuable life of the first consul in peril; still the reality of

[1] The author here repeats the testimony of M. Cambacérès himself.

the plot was doubted. It was certain that the infamous infernal machine had rendered it all credible; but there the crime had preceded the process, which last was, besides, produced under the form of the most atrocious of wicked attempts. Now, on the contrary, a simple intention of assassination was announced, and on that simple announcement they began by arresting one of the most illustrious men in the republic, who passed for being the object of the first consul's jealousy. Malcontent persons asked where then was Georges? Where was Pichegru? Those two personages, they apprehended, were certainly not in Paris; they had not found them there, because all was no more than a clumsy fable—an odious invention.

If the first consul had been at first tranquil at the aspect of the new danger with which his person was menaced, he felt deeply angry on finding of what black calumnies that danger was the cause. He demanded if it was not enough to be the object of the most frightful conspiracies; if he must still be passed off himself for a maker of plots, for envious, when he was pursued by the meanest envy, for the author of perfidious designs against the life of another, when his own life ran the greatest risk. He was seized with a fit of anger, which every step in the instructions against the criminals did not cease to augment. He set himself about the discovery of the authors of the plot with a sort of exasperation; not that he did so for the security of his own life; he did not think so much of that, which he confided to his good fortune, but he held himself bound to confound the infamy of his detractors, who represented him as the inventor of plots which had failed, and of which it was yet possible he might become the victim.

It was not against the republicans that he was most irritated on this occasion, but against the royalists. At the time of the infernal machine, although the royalists were the authors, he ascribed all to the republicans, because he saw in them the obstacle to the good which he designed to effect. But at this moment his indignation had a different object. Since his access to power he had done every thing for the royalists; he had relieved them from oppression and from exile; he had restored them to the rank of Frenchmen and citizens; he had, as far as he was able, given back to them their property; and he had done all in spite of the advice and against the will of his most faithful supporters. To recall the priests he had braved prejudices the most deeply rooted of the country and the age; to recall the emigrants he had braved the alarms of the most suspicious class, the acquirers of national property. Finally, he had invested several of the royalists with most important functions; he had even commenced to place them about his person. When, in fact, the state in which he found them on the cessation of the reign of the convention and the directory was compared with that in which he had placed them, it is impossible to hinder oneself from acknowledging, that no one ever did more for a party, that never had a party a more generous protector, in the sight of impartial justice, and that never had such black ingratitude repaid a conduct so noble. The first consul had gone so far for the royalists as to risk his popularity, and what was worse, the confidence of all the men sincerely and honestly attached to the revolution; because he had left it to be said and credited, that he thought of re-establishing the Bourbons. In payment of these efforts and these benefits, the royalists had wished to blow him up by means of gunpowder in 1800; they wished now to cut his throat upon the high road; and these were the parties who accused him, in their drawing-rooms, of being the inventor of conspiracies, which they had themselves formed.

This was the feeling which promptly filled his ardent soul, and produced in his mind a sudden reaction against a party so culpable and so full of ingratitude. Thus his anger did not direct itself against the republicans on the present occasion: without doubt he felt no great vexation to see Moreau reduced to receive the humiliating benefit of his clemency; but it was upon the royalists that he determined to cast the whole weight of his anger, and he was resolved, as he said himself, to give them no quarter. The revelations which ensued added yet more strength to this feeling, and converted it into a species of passion.

Whilst Georges and Pichegru were sought with the greatest care, new arrests were made, and there were obtained of Picot and of Bouvet de Lozier the most complete details, and the gravest of all which had been hitherto acquired. These men would not have it given out that they were assassins, they therefore hastened to make known that they had come to Paris in company of the highest rank, that they had with them the greatest nobles of the Bourbon court, more especially M. de Polignac and M. de Rivière; and they positively declared that they were to have a prince at their head. They had expected him, they said, every moment; they even believed that this prince, so much looked for, would be one of the last disembarkation, or in that announced for February. It was reported among the party that it would be the duke de Berry [1].

[1] *Extract from the fourth declaration of Louis Picot before the prefect of police, 25th Pluviôse (13th February)*, book ii. page 398:—

Declares—"I disembarked with Georges between Dunkirk and the town of Eu. I am ignorant whether there had been any anterior disembarkations; there had been two subsequently. There was a mention made of a fourth disembarkation, much more considerable, which was to be composed of twenty-five persons; of this number was to be the duke de Berry. I am ignorant whether such a disembarkation has taken place. I knew that Bouvet and one named Armand were to go in search of the prince."

Extract from the second interrogatory of Bouvet, the 30th Pluviôse (20th February), book ii. page 172.

Question.—"At what period and in what manner do you believe that Moreau and Pichegru had concerted the plan that Georges was to execute in France, and which tended to the re-establishment of the Bourbons?

Answer.—"I believe that for a long time Pichegru and Moreau had been in correspondence; and it was only on the certainty that Pichegru had given the prince, that Moreau would aid by all the means in his power a movement in France in their favour, that the plan was indeterminately arranged for the re-establishment of the Bourbons, by the councils held with Pichegru; a movement in Paris, sustained by the presence of the prince; an attack by main force directed against the first consul; the presentation of a prince to the armies by Moreau, who beforehand was to have prepared all minds for the event."

The depositions became upon this point the most precise, concordant, and complete possible. The plot now acquired, in the sight of the first consul, a fatal clearness. He saw the count d'Artois and the duke de Berry, surrounded by emigrants, adopted by Pichegru on the part of the republicans, having at their service a troop of assassins, promising even to set himself at their head, to kill him in an ambuscade, which they styled a loyal combat on an equal footing. A prey to a species of rage, he had now only one desire, and that was to seize upon the prince that they were sending to Paris by way of the cliff of Biville. That warmth of language to which he gave himself up at the time of the infernal machine, against the Jacobins, was now entirely turned against the princes and nobles who could descend to play such characters. "The Bourbons believe," said he, "that they shall be able to spill my blood as they would that of the vilest animal. My blood is still of more worth than theirs. I will return to them the terror with which they would fain inspire me. I pardon Moreau his weakness, and the allurements of a stupid jealousy; but I will unpityingly shoot the first of these princes that shall fall into my hands. I will teach them with what kind of a man they have to deal."

Such was the language which he did not cease to hold during this terrible process. He was sombre, agitated, menacing, and what was a singular thing with him, he worked much less. He even seemed to have forgotten for a moment Boulogne, Brest, and the Texel.

Without losing a moment he sent for colonel Savary, upon whose devotion to himself he could firmly rely. Colonel Savary was not a wicked man, although it has been so said by the common detractors of the fallen regime. He possessed a remarkable mind; but he had lived among soldiers, had no fixed principles upon any thing, and knew no other rule than fidelity to a master from whom he had received the greatest benefits. He had passed several weeks disguised in the woods exposed to great dangers. The first consul ordered him to disguise himself anew, and to go with a detachment of the select gendarmerie (*gendarmes d'élite*) and post himself at the cliff of Biville. These gendarmes were to the rest of the gendarmerie what the consular guard was to the rest of the army, in other words, a union of the bravest and most orderly soldiers of their class. They might safely be charged with the most difficult commissions, without the fear of the least infidelity. Sometimes under the unforeseen pressure of the service two of them have been despatched in a post-carriage, and have carried with them several millions in gold, to the bottom of the Calabrias, or the extreme of Britany, without one of them ever having been known to betray his trust. They were not therefore mere tools as some have pretended, but soldiers who obeyed their officers with rigorous exactness, a formidable exactness it is true, when under an arbitrary government and with the laws of that day. Colonel Savary was to take with him fifty men, to clothe them in disguise, arm them well, and conduct them to the cliff of Biville. None of the deponents doubted the presence of a prince in the party which was about to be disembarked. They only varied upon one point, their ignorance as to whether it was to be the duke de Berry or the count d'Artois. Colonel Savary had orders to pass day and night on the summit of the cliff, to await the disembarkation, seize all that composed the party, and transport them to Paris. The resolution of the first consul was taken; he was decided to send before a military commission, and to have immediately shot the prince who might fall into his hands. A lamentable and terrible resolution, of which the fearful consequences will soon be seen.

Whilst he gave these orders the first consul showed very different sentiments towards Moreau. He was at his feet, compromised, ruined in consideration; he was willing to treat him with unlimited generosity. He said to the grand judge on the day of his arrest, it is necessary that all which concerns the republicans should terminate between Moreau and myself. Go, interrogate him in prison; bring him in your carriage to the Tuileries; that he may make up all matters with me, and I will forget all the estrangements produced by a jealousy that was more the work of those who surrounded him than his own. Unhappily it was much easier for the first consul to forgive, than for Moreau to accept his forgiveness. To avow all, that is, as much as to say, he must fling himself on his knees before the first consul, this was an act of abasement, which it was not very possible to expect of a man, whose tranquil spirit little elevated was, on the other hand, little able to humble itself. M. Fouché, if he had been then minister of police, would have had the charge of seeing Moreau. He was the most capable man, by his familiar insinuating manner, of introducing himself to the avenues of a mind closed by pride and misfortune, to set that pride at ease, in saying to him with an indulgent feeling for which he alone knew how to find the language:—"You have desired to overthrow the first consul, but you have succumbed. You are his prisoner. He knows all; he pardons you, and will give you back your situation. Accept his good will; be not the dupe of a false dignity, in refusing a grace unlooked for, which will replace you where you stood before, and as if you had not played with your existence in a conspiracy." In place of such a man as M. Fouché, an intermediate agent, little scrupulous but able, there was sent to Moreau an honest, good kind of man, who attacked the illustrious accused with all the formality of his office, and thus defeated the intention of the first consul. The grand judge Regnier went to the prison in his robe, accompanied by Locre, the secretary of the council of state. He made Moreau appear before him, and interrogated him at length with a cold aspect. During the day, Lajolais arrested had told nearly every thing which concerned the relations between Pichegru and Moreau. He avowed his having served as the intermediate agent to bring Pichegru and Moreau together; that he had gone to London to bring over Pichegru; had placed them in contact; all with the intention, he said, to obtain the recall of the one through the solicitations of the other. Lajolais concealed only his connexion with Georges, which once avowed, would have rendered his story inadmissible. But this unhappy man was ignorant that the relations between Pichegru and Moreau, and that with the emigrant princes, was stated in

a manner not to be doubted by other depositions; thus to give only the secret of the interviews of Moreau with Pichegru was to establish a fatal connexion between Moreau, Georges, and the emigrant princes. The depositions of Lajolais were therefore sufficient to place in evidence the guilt of Moreau.

The first thing to be done was to enlighten Moreau in a friendly way in the progress of the instructions in order to prevent his exposing himself by speaking useless untruths. It must bring him to state every thing correctly when it was proved to him that all was known. If then they had added the tone and language which invited confidence, perhaps a moment of renunciation of his proud feeling might have occurred, and the unfortunate general have been saved. In place of thus acting, the grand judge interrogated Moreau on his relations with Lajolais, Georges, and Pichegru, and on each of these points suffered him always to say that he knew nothing, that he had not seen any one, that he was ignorant why they addressed all these questions to him, and never hinted to him that he had thus engaged himself in a labyrinth of useless and injurious denials which tended to compromise him. This interview with the grand judge had not therefore the result which the first consul expected from it, and which had rendered possible an act of clemency as noble as it would have been useful.

M. Regnier returned to the Tuileries to report the result of the interrogation of Moreau. "Very well," said the first consul; "when he will not open himself to me, he must explain himself in a court of justice."

The first consul then followed up the business with the utmost rigour, and displayed extreme activity in trying to arrest the guilty parties. He thought it, above all, necessary to save the honour of his government, very seriously compromised if it could not furnish a proof of the reality of the plot by the double arrest of Georges and Pichegru. Without these arrests, he should pass for a low envious person, who had wished to commit and to ruin the second general in the republic. Every day new accomplices of the conspiracy were taken, which left no doubt about the entire existence and the details of the plan, particularly the resolution to attack the carriage of the first consul between St. Cloud and Paris, in the presence of a young prince, at the head of the conspirators; the arrival of Pichegru to concert with Moreau; the difference of views, the delay which had followed these differences, and which had brought about the destruction of them all. All these facts then were known, but as yet not one of the chiefs had been taken, whose presence thus proved, might have convinced the most incredulous; they had not taken the prince, so much expected, of whom the first consul, in his anger, would make such a sanguinary sacrifice. Colonel Savary, placed at the cliff of Biville, wrote that he had seen every thing, verified all upon the spot, and stated the perfect exactness of the revelations obtained as far as the mode of disembarkation was concerned, in regard to the mysterious road beaten between Biville and Paris, and as to the existence of the small vessel which every night ran its broadside along the coast, and seemed always desiring to approach without ever doing so. There was reason to believe that the signals agreed upon between the conspirators were not made from the summit of the cliff, because they had never observed them; or perhaps notice had been sent from Paris to London, and the new disembarkation had been countermanded, or at least suspended. Colonel Savary had orders to remain and wait with unrelaxing patience.

They traced every day in Paris the track of Pichegru or of Georges. They had failed to arrest them, but each time they had only wanted a moment for so doing. The first consul, who never troubled himself about the means, resolved to present a law, the character of which will prove what idea people had, on coming out of the revolution, of the security of the citizen so respected in the present time. There was proposed to the legislative body a law, by which every individual who concealed Georges, Pichegru, or any of their sixty accomplices, of whom descriptions were given, should be punished, not with the prison, nor with irons, but with death! Whoever, having seen them, or having known their retreat, and did not denounce them, was to be punished with six years in irons. This formidable law, that ordained a barbarous act, under the pain of death, was adopted the same day it was presented without any remonstrance.

Scarcely was this law passed, but it was followed by the most rigorous precautions. It might be feared that the conspirators, followed up in such a way, would only dream of taking flight. Paris was, therefore, closed. Any body might enter, but no one had permission to go out for a certain number of days. In order to secure the execution of this measure, the foot guard was placed in detachments at all the gates of the capital; the horse guard made constant patrols all along the wall of the Octroï, with an order to arrest whosoever might pass over the wall, and to fire upon whomsoever attempted to fly. Lastly, the sailors of the guard were distributed in the boats stationed upon the Seine, day and night. The government couriers had alone the right to go out, after having been searched and recognised in such a manner that they could in no way deceive.

For the moment they seemed to have returned again to the worst times of the revolution. A species of terror reigned all over Paris. The enemies of the first consul cruelly abused him, and said of him all that had been formerly said of the old committee of public safety. Directing the police himself, he was informed of all these discourses, and his exasperation increasing without cessation, rendered him capable of the most violent acts. He was sombre, harsh, and spared nobody. Since the recent occurrences he did not dissimulate any more his ill humour against M. Markoff, and present circumstances made this humour break forth in a very vexatious manner. Among the persons arrested was a Swiss, attached under some title to the embassy of Russia, a true intriguer, that it was little seemly for a foreign legation to take into its service. To this impropriety, M. de Markoff added the unsuitableness, still greater, of reclaiming him. The first consul gave an order not to restore him, but to keep him more strictly than before, and to let M. Markoff

feel all the unseemliness of his conduct. On this occasion he was struck with two circumstances, of which until then he had taken no note, it was that M. d'Entraigues, formerly agent of the emigrant princes, was at Dresden with a diplomatic commission from the emperor of Russia; that an individual named Vernègues, another emigrant attached to the Bourbons, sent by them to the court of Naples, was at Rome, and took there the character of a Russian subject. The first consul demanded from the court of Saxony that M. d'Entraigues should be sent away, and of the court of Rome the immediate arrest and interdiction of the emigrant Vernègues, and he demanded these rigorous acts in a peremptory manner, so as to leave scarcely the possibility of answering by a refusal. At the first diplomatic reception, he put to a rough proof the surliness of M. de Markoff, as he had a little while before the stateliness of lord Whitworth. He told him that he found it very strange, that ambassadors had in their service men who conspired against the government, and yet dared to reclaim them. "Is it that Russia," added he, "believes that she has such a superiority over us that she may permit herself similar proceedings? Is it that she believes we have taken to the distaff to such an extent as to support these things? She is deceived; I shall not suffer any thing unbecoming from any prince upon earth."

Ten years before, the benevolent revolution of 1789 had become the sanguinary revolution of 1793, by the continual provocation of angry enemies. An effect of the same kind was produced at this moment in the boiling soul of Napoleon. These same enemies comported themselves with Napoleon as they comported themselves with the revolution, making turn from good to evil, moderation to violence, the man who until that day had been a sage at the head of the state. The royalists that he had delivered from oppression, Europe that he had attempted to vanquish by his moderation, after he had conquered it with his sword, all which he had, in a word, the most thoughtfully treated, he was now disposed to ill-treat in words and acts. It was a tempest excited in a great soul by the ingratitude of parties, and the imprudent malevolence of Europe.

Profound anxiety reigned in Paris. The terrible law against those who concealed Georges, Pichegru, and their accomplices, had not stimulated a single person to the base resolution of delivering them up; but, on the other hand, no one would afford them an asylum. These miserable persons, who were left disunited and disconcerted by their differences, wandered in the night from house to house, paying sometimes six or eight thousand francs for a refuge which could only be granted to them for a few hours; Pichegru, M. de Rivière, and Georges, living in the most fearful anxiety. The last supported his situation with courage, habituated as he had been to the adventures of a civil war. Besides that, he did not feel himself abased; he had around him equally compromised all that he held as most worthy and noble, and he only thought of getting himself fortunately out of that bad position, as he had out of so many former ones, by his own intelligence and courage. But the members of the French nobility, who had believed that France, or all at least of their party, would open their arms to them, but had met them with nothing but coldness, embarrassment, or censure, were disconsolate at their enterprise. They now felt keenly the odious character of a project which no longer presented itself under the deceiving colours that the hope of success lends to every thing. They felt the indignity of the relations to which they had condemned themselves, by being introduced into France with a troop of Chouans. Pichegru, who to his deplorable vices joined the qualities of coolness, prudence, and deep penetration—Pichegru well saw that in place of lifting himself up after his first fall, he had now dropped into the bottom of an abyss. A first fault committed some years before, that of being in culpable relations with the Condés, had made him become a traitor, then be proscribed. Now he was to be found among the accomplices of an ambush assassination. This time no further glory remained for the conqueror of Holland! In learning the arrest of Moreau, he guessed the lot that awaited himself, and felt that he was lost. The familiarity of the Chouans was odious to him. He comforted himself in the society of M. de Rivière, whom he found more sensible, more wise, than the other friends of count d'Artois sent to Paris. One evening, reduced to the brink of despair, he seized a pistol, and was going to blow out his brains, when he was hindered by M. de Rivière himself. Another time, deprived of a night's lodging, an impulse which did him honour came upon him, and honoured more particularly the man to whom he had recourse at such a moment. Among the ministers of the first consul who was proscribed on the 18th Fructidor, was M. de Marbois. Pichegru did not hesitate one night to knock at his door and exhibit a proscribed one of Sinnamari, who asked at the door of another of the proscribed, a minister of the first consul, to violate the law of his master. M. de Marbois received him with deep sorrow, but without uneasiness for himself. The honour done him in calculating upon his generosity, he in turn did to the first consul, not doubting his approbation. It is a consoling spectacle, amid these sad scenes, to see these three men, so diverse, count one upon the other in this way; Pichegru upon M. de Marbois, M. de Marbois on the first consul. Afterwards, when M. de Marbois avowed what he had done to the first consul, the last answered him in a letter which contained a noble approbation of his generous conduct.

But such a situation must have an approaching end. An officer who had been attached to Pichegru betrayed his secret and delivered it to the police. During the night, while the general slept, surrounded with arms, from which he was never separated, and with books in which he constantly read, the lamp being extinguished, a detachment of *gendarmerie d'élite* entered his retreat to take him. Wakened by the noise, he would have seized his arms, but he had not time; he defended himself for some moments with great vigour. Soon vanquished, he yielded, and was carried to the Temple, where he finished in an unhappy manner a life formerly so brilliant.

Scarcely was he arrested, than M. Armand de Polignac, after him M. Jules de Polignac, and, lastly, M. de Rivière, pursued without ceasing, but

not denounced, for they were seen when changing their asylum, were taken in their turn. These arrests produced a deep and general effect upon the public mind. The mass of honest men who did not indulge in party spirit, were convinced about the reality of the plot. The presence of Pichegru, and of the personal friends of count d'Artois, no longer left any doubt of the matter. They had not apparently been brought into France by the police, in order to enscaffold[1] a plot. The gravity of the dangers which the first consul had run, and still ran, was entirely revealed, and more strongly than ever did the interest appear that was inspired by a life so precious. It was no longer the envious rival of Moreau that had desired to ruin that general, it was the saviour of France exposed to the incessant machinations of parties. Still the malevolent spirits, although a little disconcerted, were not silent. To listen to them, the Polignacs and M. de Rivière, were imprudent persons, incapable of remaining in repose, continually agitating with the count d'Artois, and only come to see if circumstances were favourable to their party. But there had not been any serious plot, nor menacing danger, of a nature to justify the interest which it was attempted to inspire for the person of the first consul.

It was necessary, in order to close the mouths of these prattlers, and to confound them, that there should be another arrest, that of Georges. Then it would not be very possible to say, in finding the Polignacs, de Rivière, Pichegru, and Georges in Paris, that they were there only as simple observers. This last proof was to be soon obtained, owing to the terrible means employed by the government.

Georges, tracked by a multitude of agents of the police, obliged to change his lodgings every day, unable to leave Paris, which was guarded by land and water, could not finish but by succumbing. They were upon his track; but it is just to acknowledge for the honour of that day, that no one would bring themselves to give him up, although there was a general wish for his arrest. Those who hazarded themselves by receiving him, would only conceal him for a single day. It was necessary that every evening he should change his refuge. On the 9th of March, just at the coming on of night, several officers of the peace surrounded a house, become suspected by the comings and goings of individuals of a bad appearance. Georges, who had occupied it, attempted to go out, in order to seek an asylum elsewhere. He left about seven o'clock in the evening, and mounted, near the Pantheon, a cabriolet, conducted by a confidential servant, a determined young Chouan. The peace officers followed the cabriolet, which went at a breathless rate as far as the crossway of Bussy. Georges entreated his companion to mend their pace, when one of the agents of police, who arrived first, sprang at the bridle of the horse. Georges, with a pistol-shot, laid him dead at his feet. He then sprang from the cabriolet to take to his heels, and fired a second pistol at another agent of the police, whom he grievously wounded. But, surrounded by the people, he was stopped in spite of his efforts, and handed over to the officers that came up in all haste. He was immediately recognized as the redoubtable Georges, who had been sought for so long a time, and was at last secured. The news produced a general joy throughout Paris. People had lived in a sort of apprehension, from which they were now relieved. With Georges was arrested the servant that accompanied him, who had scarcely found time to get away more than a few paces from the spot.

Georges was conducted to the prefecture of police. The first emotion having subsided, the chief of the conspirators became perfectly calm. He was young and vigorous; his shoulders were large, his countenance full, more open and serene than sombre and vicious in expression, or than his previous character would have led the spectator to believe. He carried about pistols, a poignard, and sixty thousand francs, in gold and bank notes. Being immediately interrogated, he avowed his name without hesitation, as well as his motive for being in Paris. He had come, he said, to attack the first consul, not by introducing himself with four assassins into his palace, but in an open attack in the plain country, in the midst of his consular guard. He was to act in company with a French prince, who proposed to come into France, but who had not yet arrived. Georges was proud of the nature, entirely new, of the plot, which he took great care to distinguish from an assassination. "Nevertheless," it was remarked to him, "you sent St. Réjant to Paris to prepare the infernal machine." "I did send him," replied Georges, "but I did not prescribe to him the means by which he was to serve his purpose." A bad justification, which proves too clearly that Georges was not a stranger to that horrible attempt. In other respects, and about what concerned any body else this bold conspirator kept an obstinate silence, repeating that there were enough victims, and that he did not desire to augment the number[1].

[1] Echafauder.

[1] *Extract from the first interrogatory of Georges by the prefect of police*, 18*th Ventôse* (9*th March*), book ii. page 79.

"We, councillor of state, prefect of police, have made Georges Cadoudal appear before us, and have interrogated him as follows:—

"*Q.* What did you come to do in France?

"*A.* I came to attack the first consul.

"*Q.* What were your means for attacking the first consul?

"*A.* I had as yet but few; I reckoned upon uniting them.

"*Q.* Of what nature were your means of attack against the first consul?

"*A.* By means of an active force.

"*Q.* Had you many persons with you?

"*A.* No; because I should not attack the first consul until there would be a French prince of the blood in Paris, and he had not yet arrived.

"*Q.* At the time of the 3rd Nivôse you wrote to St. Réjant, and you reproached him with the slowness he exhibited in executing your orders against the first consul?

"*A.* I did write to St. Réjant to unite means at Paris, but I never told him to commit the affair of the 3rd Nivôse."

Extract from the second interrogatory of Georges Cadoudal, 18*th Ventôse* (9*th March*), book ii. page 83.

"*Q.* How long have you been in Paris?

"*A.* About five months; I have not remained there fifteen days together.

"*Q.* Where have you lodged?

"*A.* I had rather not tell. ["*Q.* What

After the arrest of Georges, and his declarations, the plot was proved, and the first consul justified; it could now be said no more that, as had been repeated for a month, the police invented the conspiracies they pretended to discover; they had nothing else left them to do, but to cast down their eyes, if they were of the royalist party, at seeing a French prince promise to enter France with a band of Chouans, to give a nick-named battle upon a highway. There remained, it is true, the excuse of saying that he did not intend to come. It is possible, and even probable, he did not, but it would have been better worth to have kept his word, than vainly promise it to the unhappy persons who staked their heads upon his assurances. It was not only Georges, on the other hand, that announced the speedy arrival of a prince, but the friends of count d'Artois. M. de Rivière and the Polignacs held the same language. They confessed the most important part of the plan. They repelled utterly the idea of participating in a deed of assassination; but they avowed they had come into France for something which was never defined; for a species of movement, at the head of which a French prince would figure. They had done nothing but advance, in the first instance, to assure themselves with their own eyes, whether what was about to be done was really useful and convenient to the purpose [1].

"*Q.* What is the motive which brought you to Paris?

"*A.* I came with the intention of attacking the first consul.

"*Q.* What were your means of attack?

"*A.* The attack would be made with open force.

"*Q.* Where did you expect to find that force?

"*A.* Throughout all France.

"*Q.* Is there, then, throughout all France an organized force at your disposition and that of your accomplices?

"*A.* It is not of such a force as that of which I would be understood to have spoken.

"*Q.* What, then, must be understood of the force of which you spoke?

"*A.* A force united in Paris. This united force is not yet organized; it might have been as soon as the attack had been definitively resolved upon.

"*Q.* What was your object and that of your accomplices?

"*A.* To place a Bourbon in the situation of the first consul.

"*Q.* Who was the Bourbon designated?

"*A.* Charles Xavier Stanislaus, formerly Monsieur, acknowledged by us as Louis XVIII.

"*Q.* What character should you have borne in the attack?

"*A.* That which one of the former French princes, who should come to Paris, should assign to me.

"*Q.* The plan has then been devised and was to be executed in accord with the former French princes?

"*A.* Yes, citizen judge.

"*Q.* You have conferred, then, with the former princes in England?

"*A.* Yes, citizen.

"*Q* Who was to furnish the funds and arms?

"*A.* I have for a long time past had the funds at my disposition; I have not yet had the arms."

[1] *Extract from the first interrogatory of M. de Rivière, by the councillor of state, Réal, on the 16th Ventôse (7th of March)*, book ii. page 259.

"*Q.* How long have you been in Paris?

"*A.* About a month.

"*Q.* By what way did you come from London to France?

"*A.* By the coast of Normandy, in an English vessel, under captain Wright, as I believe.

As Georges did, these individuals endeavoured to excuse themselves for being found in such

"*Q.* How many passengers were there, and who were the passengers?

"*A.* I do not know.

"*Q.* You know that the ex-generals Pichegru and Lajolais made a part of the passengers, as well as M. Jules de Polignac?

"*A.* That does not relate to myself, I am ignorant of it.

"*Q.* Arrived on the coast where you disembarked, by what way did you reach Paris?

"*A.* Sometimes on foot, sometimes on horseback, by the road of Rouen, which I had reached.

"*Q.* What were your motives for the journey, and your visit to this city?

"*A.* To assure myself of the real situation of things, and of the political and interior state of the country, in order to communicate it to the princes, who would be able to judge after my observations, if it was for their interest to come into France or to remain in England. I must still say that I had no particular mission from them at the moment; but the having often served them with zeal.

"*Q.* What has been the result of the observations that you have made on the political situation of the country, the government, and general opinion? What would you have noted to the princes on the subject, if you had been able to write to them, or you had gone to them?

"*A.* In general I believe I see in France much self-esteem, much apathy, and a great desire to preserve tranquillity."

Extract from the second interrogatory of M. Armand de Polignac, 22 Ventôse (13th March), book ii. page 289.

"I disembarked on the coast of Normandy; after several sojourns, I lodged near the Isle Adam, in a place where Georges was found, known also under the name of Loriére.

"We came to Paris together, with some officers at his disposition.

"When I parted this last time from London, I knew what the designs of the count d'Artois were; I was too much attached to him not to accompany him.

"His plan was to arrive in France, to make a proposal to the first consul to give up the reins of government, in order that he might be able to give them to his brother.

"If the first consul had rejected this proposition, the count was determined to engage in an attack by main force, to endeavour to reconquer the rights which he regarded as belonging to his family.

"I was aware that he was not yet ready to attempt the descent at my departure; if I preceded him, it was from a desire to see, as I have said, my relations, wife, and friends.

"When the second disembarkation became a question, count d'Artois made me understand, that by reason of the confidence which he had in me, and on account of the zeal which I had always testified, he desired me to make ready to depart; it was this that determined me to go in the next vessel.

"I am bound to observe, that to the moment of my departure, I loudly declared, that if all the means had not the stamp of perfect good faith, I would withdraw myself, and would return again into Russia.

"*Q.* Is it in your knowledge that general Moreau saw Pichegru and Georges Cadoudal?

"*A.* I know that there had been a very serious conference at Chaillot, in the house, No. 6, where Georges Cadoudal lodged, between Georges, general Moreau, and the ex-general Pichegru.

"I am assured that Georges Cadoudal, after different overtures and explanations, had said to general Moreau: 'If you wish, I will leave you with Pichegru, and then you may perhaps finish by comprehending each other.'

"That, in fact, the result left nothing but a disagreeable uncertainty, seeing that Georges and Pichegru appeared very faithful to the cause of the prince; but Moreau re-

bad company, by repeating that a French prince would be with them. This prince not being come, evidently did not now intend to come; they might be assured he would not put himself in danger, when he was secured where he was by the whole width of the channel. These imprudent persons could not doubt that there were some parties less well secured, who would perhaps pay with their blood for the projects thus conceived and prepared in London.

Would to Heaven that the first consul had contented himself with the criminals he had under his hands as instruments to confound his enemies. He had the means to make them tremble, and the power to inflict upon them the legal penalties contained in the French codes; he was able to do more than cover them with confusion, because the proofs obtained were overwhelming. There was more than he needed for his security and his honour. But as already observed, indulgent then towards the revolutionists, he was indignant against the royalists; he felt a revulsion against their base ingratitude, and resolved they should feel the whole weight of his power. He had at heart another sentiment, a species of pride. He said aloud to all who came, that a Bourbon to him was no more than a Moreau or a Pichegru, and even less; that these princes believing themselves inviolable, compromised at their will a crowd of unfortunate people of all ranks, and kept themselves in safety beyond the sea; that they did wrong to count upon such an asylum; that he should finish well by taking one of them, and that he would shoot him, as he would any ordinary criminal; that it was necessary they should know with whom they had to do in attacking him; that he had no more fear to take the blood of a Bourbon than that of the meanest of the Chouans; that he would soon show the world that the parties were all equal in his eyes; that those who drew down upon their heads his formidable hand should feel the weight, whoever they might be, and that after having been the most merciful of men, they should see he could become the most terrible.

Nobody dared to contradict him. The consul Lebrun held his tongue. The consul Cambacérès was silent also; but letting him see, however, his silent disapprobation, his usual mode of resistance to certain acts of the first consul. M. Fouché, who desired to bring himself into favour, and who leaned towards indulgence in general, desired, nevertheless, to embroil the government with the royalists, and strongly urged the necessity of an example. Talleyrand, who was never cruel, but who never knew how to contradict power, at least to such an extent as to become its enemy, and who had to a fatal degree the taste to please it when he loved it; M. Talleyrand said also with Fouché, that too much had been done for the royalists; that in consequence of treating them well, they had gone so far as to give to the men of the revolution vexatious doubts, and that it was necessary to punish, and to punish severely, without exception of persons. Except the consul Cambacérès, all the world flattered this angry feeling, which at that moment had no need to become formidable, perhaps cruel.

This idea, bearing all the feeling of chastisement upon the royalists alone, in order to show clemency only to the revolutionists, was so rooted in the mind of the first consul, that he attempted for Pichegru that which he had endeavoured to do for Moreau. A deep feeling of pity came upon him in thinking upon the frightful situation of that illustrious general, associated with Chouans, exposed to lose not only his life before a public tribunal, but the last remnant of his honour.

"A fine end," said the first consul to M. Réal, —"a fine end for the conqueror of Holland! But it must not be permitted that the men of the revolution should devour each other. It is a long time since I thought about Cayenne; it is the best spot upon earth to found a colony. Pichegru was one of the proscribed, he knows it well; he is of all our generals the most capable of creating a great establishment. Go, find him in his prison, tell him that I pardon him, that it is not either to him or to Moreau, or those like them, that I would push the rigour of justice. Ask him how many men and millions it will take to found a colony at Cayenne; I will give them to him, and he will repair his glory in rendering services to France."

M. Réal carried to the prison of Pichegru these generous words. When Pichegru first heard them, he refused to credit them; he imagined that they wished to seduce him to betray his companions in misfortune. Soon convinced by the earnestness of M. Réal, who asked no revelation from him, while he knew every thing, he was deeply moved, his firm mind yielded, he shed tears, and spoke a long time of Cayenne. He avowed, that by a singular foresight he had often in his exile meditated on what he should be able to do, and even prepared his designs. It will soon be seen by what a fatal rencontre the generous intentions of the first consul had no other effect than a deplorable catastrophe.

The first consul always waited with the greatest impatience for news from colonel Savary, placed as sentinel with his fifty men at the cliff of Biville. The colonel remained in observation twenty days and upwards, and no disembarkation had taken place. The brig of captain Wright appeared every evening, ran along the coast, but did not touch the shore; whether, as has been said, the passengers that captain Wright carried awaited a signal that was never made to them, or whether news from Paris prevented them from disembarking. Colonel Savary at length declared that his mission was uselessly prolonged, being without an object.

The first consul, despite his not being able to

mained undecided, which caused a suspicion that he had ideas of particular interests. I have known since that there have been other conferences between general Moreau and the ex-general Pichegru."

Extract from the interrogatory submitted to by M. Jules Polignac before the councillor of state, Réal, on the 16th of Ventôse (7th March), and cited in the act of accusation, book I. page 61.

Required to answer:

"That it appeared to him as well as to his brother, that what they would wish to do, was not as honourable as they had been naturally led to hope, and they had spoken of retiring into Holland."

Invited to express the motive of his fears:

"He answered, because he suspected that in place of fulfilling any mission whatever relative to a change of government, it was a question to act against a single individual, and that it was the first consul whom the party of Georges proposed to attack."

seize one of these princes, of whom he would have had the life, glanced his eyes over all the places where they resided. One morning, being in his cabinet with Talleyrand and Fouché, he made them enumerate the members of this unlucky family, as well to complain of their faults as to note their misfortunes. Ney told him that Louis XVIII. with the duke d'Angoulême were living in Warsaw; that the count d'Artois and duke de Berry were in London; that the princes de Condé were also in London; that one only, the third, the youngest, the most venturous, the duke d'Enghien, lived at Ettenheim, very near Strasburg. It was in that direction that Taylor, Smith, and Drake, the English agents, also had endeavoured to foment intrigues. The idea that this young prince would be able to serve his objects by the bridge of Strasburg, as the count d'Artois had been willing to make use of the cliff of Biville, struck the mind of the first consul at once, and he resolved to send to the spot an intelligent sub-officer of gendarmerie to get information. There was one who had formerly served, when in his youth, with the princes de Condé. He was ordered to disguise himself and to proceed to Ettenheim, there to procure some intelligence regarding the prince's mode of life and his different relations.

The sub-officer departed with this commission, and arrived at Ettenheim. The prince had lived there for some time, being near a princess de Rohan, to whom he was much attached, dividing his time between his taste for the chase, which he gratified in the Black Forest, and this affection of the heart. He had received an order from the British cabinet to proceed to the banks of the Rhine, without doubt under contemplation of the movement of which Drake, Smith, and Taylor, had given false hopes to their government. This prince expected shortly to be called upon to make war upon his own country, a lamentable act, of which for many years he had been already guilty. But there was nothing to prove that he knew any thing of the plot of Georges, every thing, on the contrary, went to prove his ignorance of it. He was often absent following the chase, and some persons said he had attended the theatre at Strasburg. It is very certain that this report had received a considerable degree of credit, since his father wrote to him from London, and advised him to be more prudent, in terms somewhat strong [1].

[1] The prince de Condé to the duke d'Enghien.

"Wanstead, the 16th June, 1803.

"My dear Child,—I have been assured here that within six months you have made a journey to Paris; others say that you have only been to Strasburg. It must be confessed it is utterly useless thus to risk your life and liberty. In respect to your principles, I am perfectly easy about them; they are too deeply engraven in your heart as they are in ours. Methinks at present you will feel disposed to confide to us what has passed; and if the thing be true, what you saw in the course of your journeys.

"As to your well-being, which is dear to us under so many points, I give you notice, that the position in which you are now may be very useful in many respects. But you are very near; take care of yourself, and do not neglect any precaution to get notice of danger in time, and to make your retreat in safety, in case it should come into the head of the first consul to order you to be seized. Do not believe but that he has the resolution to brave every thing in such a matter.

(Signed) "Louis Joseph de Bourbon."

The prince had about his person certain emigrants, and particularly a marquis de Thumery.

The sub-officer, sent to obtain intelligence, arrived in disguise, and obtained, even in the prince's own house, a number of details, of which it was very easy for minds so predisposed to draw the most mischievous deductions. It was said that the young duke was often absent; that he was even absent for many days together, sometimes, it was added, he proceeded to Strasburg. He had with him a personage who was represented as of much greater importance than he really was, and who was called by a name which the Germans, who made the communication, pronounced badly, and in such a manner as to make it be believed that this person was general Dumouriez. This individual was the marquis de Thumery, whose name is mentioned above, whom the sub-officer, deceived by the German pronunciation, believed in reality to be general Dumouriez. He entered these details in his report, written, as has been seen, under the influence of the most unfortunate illusions, and sent it immediately to Paris.

The fatal report arrived on the 10th of March, in the morning. The evening of the day before, in the night, and again in the morning of the same day, a deposition had been made not less fatal, and several times renewed. This deposition had been obtained from a party named Léridant, who was the servant of Georges, and arrested with him. He had at first resisted the pressing interrogations of justice; afterwards he finished by speaking with a sincerity which seemed to be honest, and he declared that, in fact, there was a plot, that a prince was to arrive, and even had arrived; that as to this person, he had reason to believe it was so, because he had sometimes seen with Georges a young man, well-bred, well-dressed, and the object of general respect. This deposition, often repeated, and every time with fresh details, was stated to the first consul. The report of the sub-officer of gendarmerie having arrived at the same moment, it produced in his head the most fatal concurrence of ideas. The absence of the duke d'Enghien tallied with the pretended presence of a prince in Paris. This young man, for whom the conspirators exhibited so much respect, could be no prince arrived from London, because the cliff of Biville was carefully guarded. It could be no other than the duke d'Enghien, coming in forty-eight hours from Ettenheim to Paris, and returning from Paris to Ettenheim in the same space of time, after passing a short period in the midst of his accomplices. But that which completed, in the sight of the first consul, this unhappy demonstration, was the supposed presence of Dumouriez. The plan thus connected itself in a most striking manner. The count d'Artois was to arrive by Normandy with Pichegru, the duke d'Enghien by Alsace with Dumouriez. The Bourbons, in order to enter France, had got themselves thus accompanied by the two celebrated generals of the republic. The mind of the first consul, commonly so sound and so strong, no longer contained itself amid such deceptive appearances. He was con-

vinced. It is necessary to have seen minds warped by a research of this nature, above all, if any passion whatever dispose them to credit that which they suspect to be true, to comprehend to what a point such inductions are apt to prompt them, and to bless a hundred times the slower proceedings of justice, which preserve men from the fatal conclusions drawn so rapidly from fortuitous coincidences.

The first consul, on reading the report of the sub-officer, sent from Ettenheim, which came to him, having been sent by general Moncey, the commandant of the gendarmerie, was seized with an extreme agitation. He received M. Réal very ill, who happened to come in at that moment, reproached him with having so long kept him in ignorance of details of so much importance, which he held in reality to be the second and most formidable part of the plot. This time the sea did not stop him; the Rhine, the duke of Baden, the Germanic body, were no obstacles in his way. He immediately assembled an extraordinary council, composed of the three consuls, the ministers, and M. Fouché, become again a minister in fact, though not in name. He ordered at the same time the attendance of the generals Ordener and Caulaincourt. But while awaiting the arrival of the ministers, he had taken the map of the Rhine, that he might arrange the plan of the seizure, when not finding that which he sought, he threw down confusedly upon the floor all the maps in his library. M. de Meneval, a mild, sage, incorruptible man, without whom he was not able to do any thing, because he dictated to him his most secret letters, happened to be absent on that day for a few moments. He called him back to the Tuileries, with reproaches for his absence, reproaches little merited, and continued his work on the map of the Rhine in a state of extraordinary excitement.

The council took place: an ocular witness has given the recital in his memoirs.

The idea of seizing the prince and general Dumouriez, without disturbing himself about the violation of the Germanic soil, but addressing an excuse, for form's sake, to the grand duke of Baden, was immediately proposed. The first consul demanded the opinion of those present, but with all the appearance of a foregone resolution. Still he heard with patience the objections urged. His colleague, Lebrun, appeared alarmed at the effect such an event must produce in Europe. The consul Cambacérès had the courage openly to resist the measure which was proposed. He set himself to exhibit all the dangerous effects of a resolution of this nature, whether as regarded the empire within or its relations without, and the character of outrageous violence it would not fail to impress upon the government of the first consul. He, above all, gave the greatest weight to the consideration, that it would be a sufficiently grave thing to arrest, try, and shoot a prince of the blood royal, even surprised in a flagrant offence upon the French soil, but that to send and search for him in a foreign territory, would be, independently of a violation of territory, to seize him when he had on his side all the appearance, at least, of perfect innocence, and to stamp upon himself the colouring of an odious abuse of his power; he conjured the first consul, for the sake of his personal glory, and for the honour of his policy, not to permit himself a course of action which would reduce his own government to the level of the revolutionary governments, from which he had taken so much care that it should be distinguished. He insisted several times upon this, with a warmth which was not at all a part of his nature, and proposed, as a mean term, to wait until this prince or some other was found upon the French territory, and then to apply to such an one the laws of the day in all their rigour.

This proposition was not admitted. It was answered by saying, they could not hope that the prince, who was to be introduced into France through Normandy or by the Rhine, would come and expose himself to certain and inevitable danger, when Georges and all the agents of the conspiracy were already arrested; that, besides, in taking him whom they found at Ettenheim, they should take with him his papers and accomplices, and thus acquire the proofs which would attest his criminality, and that thus they should be able to use them in a rough way in supporting the evidence already acquired; that to suffer patiently, under the security of a foreign territory, strangers to conspire against France at its very doors, was to sanction the most dangerous of impunities; that the Bourbons and their partisans would recommence it continually; that it would be necessary to punish ten for one, while by striking one great blow, they might re-enter afterwards upon a system of clemency more natural to the first consul's feelings; that the royalists had need of a warning; that relatively to the question of territory, they must give to those petty German princes a lesson, as well as to the rest of the world; that in other respects it was to render a service to the grand duke of Baden, in taking the prince without making a demand for his person, because it would be impossible for him to refuse the request of such a power as France, and he would be set at the ban of all Europe for having granted it. It was added, finally, that the act was done, after all, only to secure the person of the prince, of his accomplices, and of his papers; that it would be afterwards seen what must be done when he was got hold of, and when an examination had taken place of his papers, and the extent of his culpability had been ascertained.

The first consul hardly attended to what was said on one side and the other; he listened like a man firmly resolved. No person was able to boast of having in the least influenced his determination. Still he did not appear to feel the least ill-will towards Cambacérès for his resistance to him. "I know," he said, "the motive which makes you speak thus; it is your sincere attachment for me. I thank you for it; but I will not suffer myself to be killed without standing on my defence. I will go and make those gentry tremble; I will teach them to keep themselves a little more tranquil."

The idea of terrifying the royalists, to teach them that they should not attack with impunity such a man as he was, to let them know that the sacred blood of the Bourbons had, in his eyes, no more value than that of any noted personage in the republic; this idea, and others in which calculation, vengeance, and the pride of power, had an equal share, predominated with violence.

He gave immediate orders, in presence of general Berthier; and he prescribed to the colonels[1] Ordener and Caulaincourt the conduct which they were to pursue. Colonel Ordener was to go to the banks of the Rhine, to take with him three hundred dragoons, some ponton men, and several brigades of gendarmerie, to provide those troops with provisions for four days, to take a sum of money, in order not to be at any charge to the inhabitants, to pass the river at Rheinau, hasten to Ettenheim, surround the town, and seize the prince with all the emigrants who were about him. During this time, another detachment, supported by four pieces of artillery, was to go by Kehl to Offenburg, and remain there in observation until the operation should be achieved. Directly afterwards, colonel Caulaincourt was to proceed to the grand duke of Baden, in order to present him with a note, containing an explanation respecting the act which had been committed. This explanation consisted in saying, that in suffering such assemblages of emigrants, he had obliged the French government itself to break them up; that besides, the necessity of acting promptly and secretly, had not permitted a previous conference with the government of Baden.

It is needless to add, that in giving these orders to the officers charged with their execution, the first consul took no pains to explain what his intentions were in seizing the prince, nor what he intended to do with him. He commanded his men, who obeyed as soldiers. Nevertheless, colonel Caulaincourt, who in the connexions of his birth was attached to the ancient royal family, and particularly to the Condés, was deeply wounded, although he had only to perform the part of carrying a letter, and was far from foreseeing the terrible catastrophe which he was preparing. The first consul did not appear to notice this, but enjoined it on all to set out immediately upon leaving the Tuileries.

The orders which he thus gave were punctually executed. Five days afterwards, that is to say, on the 15th of March, the detachment of dragoons, with all the precautions commanded, left Schelestadt, passed the Rhine, and surprized and surrounded the little town of Ettenheim, before any news of their movement could be carried there. The prince, who had before received prudent advice, but who at the same time had no positive notice of the expedition directed against his person, was at the moment in the house at Ettenheim which he had been accustomed to inhabit. On seeing himself attacked by an armed troop, he was at first about to defend himself, but of this he soon discovered the impossibility. He surrendered, declaring himself who he was to those who endeavoured to recognize him, and with deep mortification at thus being deprived of his liberty, because the extent of his danger was at the time wholly unknown to him, he suffered himself to be conducted to Strasburgh, where he was placed in the citadel.

There was no discovery made either of the important papers which there had been hopes of procuring nor of general Dumouriez, who was supposed to be near the prince, nor any proofs of the plot so strongly alleged as the motive of the expedition. In place of general Dumouriez they had found the marquis de Thumery, and some other emigrants of no importance. The report containing the sterile details of the arrest was immediately sent forward to Paris.

The result of the expedition should have enlightened the first consul and his counsellors upon the rashness of the conjectures they had formed. The error in particular committed about general Dumouriez was very significant. Here are the ideas which unhappily led away the first consul and those who thought with him upon this matter. They had one of the princes of the house of Bourbon, to whom it cost so little to get up conspiracies, and to find imprudent persons and fools enough always ready to compromise themselves in their train. It was necessary to make a terrible example, or be exposed to the provoking ridicule, the laugh of contempt on the part of the royalists, in releasing the prince after he had been seized. They would not be wanting to say, that after all the government had been guilty of a blunder in sending and taking the prince at Ettenheim, and it had had a dread of the public opinion and a fear of Europe; that, in a word, it had possessed the will to commit a crime but had not the courage. In place of giving them ground to laugh, it was better to make them tremble. The prince after all was at Ettenheim, so near to the frontier, under similar circumstances, for some apparent motive. Was it possible, that cautioned as he had been, and letters found in his house proved it, was it possible that he remained so close to danger without any object? That he was no sort of an accomplice in the project of assassination? In any case he was certainly at Ettenheim, to second a movement of the emigrants in the interior, to excite a civil war, to carry arms again against France. These acts, both the one and the other, were punished with severe penalties by the laws at all times; they must be applied to him.

Such were the motives which the first consul himself had at the time, and that he repeated more than once. There was no more of the counsel which has been already related; but there were frequent conferences between him and those who flattered his passion. He never quitted the fatal idea; the royalists are incorrigible, they must be terrified. The removal of the prince was ordered to be transferred to Paris, there to be brought before a military commission for having endeavoured to excite a civil war, and for having borne arms against France. The question thus stated, it was resolved to carry out in a sanguinary manner. On the 18th of March the prince was taken from the citadel of Strasburg to Paris under a strong escort.

As the moment of this terrible sacrifice approached, the first consul wished to remain alone.

He left Paris on the 18th of March, Palm-Sunday, for Malmaison, a retreat where he was better assured of isolation and repose. Except the consuls, the ministers, and his brothers, he received nobody. He walked about alone for entire hours, affecting a tranquillity of countenance that did not reign in his heart. The best proof of these agitations of soul was found in his extreme idleness, as

[1] So entitled in the original, though before styled "generals"—*Translator*.

he dictated scarcely a single letter during the eight days of his remaining at Malmaison, an example of idleness that was unique in his existence; nevertheless, Brest, Boulogne, and the Texel, had occupied but a few days before all the activity of his mind. His wife, who had been informed, as had all his family, of the prince's arrest—his wife, who with that sympathy of which she was not able to divest herself for the Bourbons, had a horror of the effusion of the royal blood; she, who with that foresight of heart belonging to woman, perceived possible, perhaps, in the cruel deed a reaction in vengeance against her husband and children, even against herself; madam Bonaparte, steeped in tears, spoke several times of the prince, not yet believing, but fearing that his fate was determined. The first consul, who had a species of gratification in compressing the emotions of his heart, generous and good, although they have said otherwise who have not known it—the first consul repelled the tears of which he feared the effect upon himself. He replied to madam Bonaparte with a familiarity which he endeavoured to render harsh: "Thou art a woman; thou dost not understand my policy; thy part is to hold thy tongue!"

The unfortunate prince left Strasburg on the 18th of March, and arrived in Paris on the 20th, about noon. He was detained until five o'clock at the barrier of Charenton, guarded in a carriage by the escort that accompanied him [1]. There had in this fatal affair been some confusion in the orders issued, because there had been agitation among those who issued them.

According to the military law the commandant of the division should form the commission, assemble it, and order the execution of the sentence. Murat was commandant of Paris and also of the division. When the decree of the consuls came to him he was seized with the deepest grief. Murat, as already observed, was brave, often unreflecting, but perfectly good. He had applauded some days before the vigour of the government, when it ordered the expedition to Ettenheim; but charged now to follow up its cruel consequences, his excellent heart failed him. He said, in despair, to one of his friends, shewing him the skirts of his uniform, that the first consul would impress upon them the stain of blood. He went to St. Cloud to express to his formidable brother-in-law the sentiments which he felt. The first consul, who was himself more inclined to partake in them than he was willing to discover, concealed under an iron countenance the agitation with which he was secretly smitten himself. He feared lest his government should appear weak before the young shoot of an inimical dynasty. He addressed harsh words to Murat, reproached him with his feebleness in contemptuous terms, and ended by telling him with hauteur, that he would cover that, which he styled his faint-heartedness, by signing himself with his own consular hand the orders of the day. The first consul had recalled colonel Savary from the cliff of Biville, where he had vainly waited for the princes mingled in the plot, and he confided to him the care of watching over that sacrifice of the prince, in which he bore no part. Colonel Savary was ready to give to the first consul his life and his honour. He gave no advice, he executed as a soldier that which his master had commanded, to whom he bore an attachment without limit. The first consul drew up all the orders, signed them himself, then enjoined Savary to deliver them to Murat, and to proceed to Vincennes and preside at their fulfilment. The orders were complete and positive. They contained the composition of the commission, the designation of the colonels of the garrison who should become members, the indication of general Hullin as president, the injunction to meet immediately, in order to finish all on that night; and if, as cannot be doubted it would be, the condemnation was one of death, to execute judgment upon the prisoner immediately. A detachment of *gendarmerie d'élite*, and of the garrison, were to proceed to Vincennes, to guard the tribunal, and proceed to the execution of the sentence. Such were the fatal orders, signed with the hand of the first consul. Legally speaking, they were to be executed in the name of Murat; but, in reality, he took hardly any part at all in the affair. Colonel Savary, as he had received the command to do, went to Vincennes to watch over the accomplishment of these orders.

Nevertheless, what was contained in these orders was by no means irrevocable; there was yet a mode of saving the unfortunate prince. M. Real was to go to Vincennes, to interrogate the prisoner at length, and to gather from him whether he knew of the plot, of which all still believed him an accomplice, without the power of offering a single proof of the fact. M. Maret had himself, in the evening, deposited with the counsellor of state, Real, the written injunction to proceed to Vincennes in order to make the interrogatory. If M. Real had seen the prisoner, understood from his own mouth a true explanation of the facts, felt himself touched by his frankness, and by his instant demand to be conducted before the first consul, M. Real would have been enabled to communicate his own impressions to him who held the prince's life in his powerful hands, and who had, therefore, yet, even after the condemnation, a means to avoid pursuing the frightful path which he was on, by granting to the duke d'Enghein a pardon, nobly demanded, and as nobly granted.

It was the last chance which remained to save the life of the young prince, and to spare the first consul the committal of a great fault. The last thought so at that moment, even after the orders which he had given. In fact, during that melancholy evening of the 20th of March, he remained shut up at Malmaison with his wife, his secretary, a few ladies and officers. Solitary, absent, affecting calmness, he had terminated by sitting down before a table, where he began to play at chess with one of the most distinguished ladies [1] of the

[1] There has appeared an excellent piece of writing on the catastrophe of the duke d'Enghien, by M. Nongarède de Fayet. The conscientious researches, full of sagacity, that distinguish this morsel of special history, deserve the greatest confidence. M. Nongarède de Fayet says that the prince was conducted to the door of the minister of foreign affairs. It is possible that this may have been the exact fact; but not having been able to state it as a certain thing, the more general tradition has been admitted.

[1] This lady was madam de Rémusat. She has described this incident in her memoirs, which to this day remain in manuscript, as interestingly as spiritedly written.

consular court, who, knowing that the prince had arrived, trembled with fear, in thinking of the possible consequences of that fatal day. She dared not lift her eyes on the first consul, who, in his mental absence, murmured several times over the verses on clemency, well known in French poetry; at first those that Corneille has put into the mouth of Augustus, and next those that Voltaire makes Alzire repeat.

This could not be sanguinary irony; it would have been too useless and too base. But that man, commonly so firm, was agitated and shaken, and reverted now and then to the consideration of the grandeur, the nobleness of pardon, granted to an enemy vanquished and disarmed. This lady believed the prince was saved; she was full of delight. Unhappily, it came to nothing.

The commission assembled in haste, the members, for the most part, ignorant who the accused was against whom they acted. They were told that it was an emigrant prosecuted for having broken the laws of the republic. They were told his name. Every one of these soldiers of the republic, children when the monarchy had fallen, scarcely knew that the name Enghien was borne by the heir presumptive of the Condés. Their hearts still suffered at sitting on such a commission, because for several years no more emigrants had been condemned. The prisoner was brought before them. He was calm, even proud, and yet doubted of the lot which awaited him. Interrogated as to his name, and his conduct, he replied with firmness, repelled every idea of participation in the plot then actually under the pursuit of justice, but avowed, perhaps in too ostentatious a manner, that he had served against France, and that he was on the banks of the Rhine, to serve again in the same manner. The president, pressing upon this point with the intention of revealing to him the danger of such a declaration made in such language, he repeated what he had said with an assurance that his danger ennobled, but which hurt the minds of old soldiers, who had been habituated to spill their blood in defending the soil of their country. The impression thus produced was painful. The prince demanded several times, and with energy, to see the first consul. He was remanded to his prison, and the court deliberated. Although his repeated declarations had revealed in him an implacable enemy to the revolution, the hearts of the soldiers were affected by the youth and the courage of the prince. The question, stated as it was, could have no other than a fatal solution. The laws of the republic and of all times, punished with capital penalties the fact of service against France. Nevertheless, laws had been violated against the prince, in his seizure upon a foreign soil, and his being deprived of a defender, and these were considerations which ought to have had weight in the determinations of the judges. In the confusion into which they were thrown, these unhappy judges, afflicted at their character more than they were able to say, pronounced sentence of death. Still the greater part among them expressed a desire to submit the sentence to the clemency of the first consul, and, above all, to present the prince to him, who demanded so vehemently to see him. But the orders of the morning, that all should be finished in the night, were precise. M. Real alone was able, on arriving, and interrogating the prince, to get a respite. M. Real did not appear. The night passed away, and day approached. The prince was conducted to the fosse of the château, and there he received with a firmness worthy of his name, the fire of the soldiers of the republic, against whom he had so often fought in the midst of the ranks of the Austrians. He was buried on the same spot where he fell. Melancholy reprisal of civil warfare!

Colonel Savary set off immediately to render an account to the first consul of the execution of his orders.

On his way he met M. Real, who was going to interrogate the prisoner. The councillor of state, worn out by the fatigue of several days and nights of labour, had forbidden his domestics to awaken him. The orders of the first consul had not been delivered to him until five o'clock in the morning. He arrived too late. It was not, as some have said, a planned machination to place a crime on the first consul's shoulders; nothing of the kind occurred. It was an accident, a pure accident, which took from this unfortunate prince the only chance of saving his life, and from the first consul a happy opportunity to preserve his glory from a stain. Unhappy violation of the ordinary forms of justice! When these sacred forms are violated, invented by the experience of successive ages, to protect the lives of men from the errors of judges, they are at the mercy of a hazard or of any triviality. The lives of accused persons and the honour of governments depend sometimes on the most fortuitous contingencies. Doubtless the resolution of the first consul had been taken, but he was agitated, and if the appeal of the unhappy Condé, demanding his life, had reached him, he would not have been found insensible to it; he would have yielded to the emotions of his heart, and it would have been glorious to yield to them.

Colonel Savary arrived, much affected, at Malmaison. His presence caused a scene of deep sorrow. Madam Bonaparte, upon seeing him, divined that all was over, and began to shed tears. M. de Caulaincourt uttered cries of despair, saying that they wished to dishonour him. Colonel Savary penetrated to the cabinet of the first consul, who was alone except M. Meneval. He gave him an account of what had been done at Vincennes. The first consul instantly said to him: "Has Real seen the prisoner?" Savary had scarcely replied in the negative when M. Real appeared, and tremblingly excused himself for the non-execution of the orders which he had received. Without expressing approbation or blame, the first consul took leave of the instruments of his orders, and shut himself up in a room of his library, where he remained during several hours alone.

In the evening some members of the family dined at Malmaison. Their faces were serious and melancholy. No one ventured to speak—none did speak. The first consul was as silent as the rest. The silence at last became embarrassing. On leaving the table, he broke it himself. M. de Fontanes having arrived at the same moment, became the only interlocutor with the first consul. He was astounded at the act, of which the rumour now filled Paris, but he did

not permit himself the avowal of his sentiments in the spot where he then was. He listened a good deal, but rarely replied. The first consul spoke continually, endeavouring to fill up the void left by the silence of the company; he talked of the princes of every age; of the Roman emperors; of the kings of France; of Tacitus, and the opinions of that historian; of the cruelties to which the heads of the empire often lent themselves, when they were forced to give way to an inevitable necessity; finally, arriving by a long circuit at the tragic subject of the day, he spake these words: "They wish to destroy the revolution in attacking my person; I will defend it, because I am the revolution, me, myself! They will respect it from this day, because they will know of what we are capable."

It is afflicting for the honour of humanity to be obliged to confess, that the terror inspired by the first consul acted efficaciously upon the princes of the house of Bourbon and upon the emigrants. They no longer believed themselves in security, on seeing the German territory had not preserved even the unhappy duke d'Enghein; and from that day all plots of the same kind ceased. But this sad utility gives no justification of such acts. It was better worth for the person of the first consul to encounter a danger, so often exposed as it was upon fields of battle, than purchase the security acquired at such a price.

The rumour soon circulated through Paris, that a prince had been seized, transferred to Vincennes and shot. The effect was great and lamentable. Since the arrest of Pichegru and of Georges, the first consul had become the object of universal solicitude. All were indignant against those who had associated themselves with the Chouans to threaten his life; it went very hard upon Moreau, of whom the culpability, less demonstrated, began, notwithstanding, to wear the aspect of truth. Ardent wishes were expressed for the man who did not cease to be, in all eyes, the tutelary genius of France. The sanguinary execution at Vincennes operated a sudden reaction. The royalists were prodigiously irritated, and yet more alarmed; but the honest men were disconsolate to see a government, so far admirable, sprinkle its hands with blood, and in one day reduce itself to the level of those who had put Louis XVI. to death, and, it must be acknowledged, without the revolutionary passions and excuses that, in 1793, troubled the heads of the strongest, and the hearts of the best men.

None felt satisfaction except the ardent revolutionists, those very men of whom the first consul had terminated the senseless power. They now found themselves, in a single day, become pretty nearly upon an equality. None among them any more dreaded that general Bonaparte would labour thenceforth for the Bourbons.

What a singular failing of the mind! This extraordinary man, of a spirit so elevated, so just, with a heart so generous, was lately full of severity towards the revolutionists and their excesses. He judged of those errors without indulgence, sometimes even without justice. He reproached them bitterly for having shed the blood of Louis XVI., dishonoured the revolution, and rendered France irreconcileable with Europe. All of a sudden, when his own passions were excited, he had rivalled, in a moment, the act committed against the person of Louis XVI. that he had made so bitter a reproach against those who preceded him, and he had placed himself in the sight of Europe in a state of moral opposition, which soon rendered a general war inevitable, and obliged him to go and seek for peace—a magnificent peace, it is true—at the extremity of Europe, at Tilsit.

How much such spectacles are calculated to confound the pride of human reason, and to teach us that the most transcendent genius does not save the possessor from the commonest faults, when he abandons to the passions, even for a single instant, the government of himself.

But to be wholly just, after having deplored this fatal excess of passion, ascending to those who had provoked it—who were they! Always the same emigrants, who after having exacerbated that revolution, then innocent, quitted their country to search out, in all quarters, the enemies of France. This revolution moderated from its excesses, and headed by a great man, showed itself sage, humane, and pacific. The emigrants it had recalled, embosomed them in their country, in their property, and prepared to restore them to all the eclat of their old position. How did they return this clemency! Were they grateful—peaceable at least! Not at all. They were allies of a neighbouring nation, jealous of the greatness of their country, and they made use of the liberty of that nation to turn it against France. By the force of the vilest publications they irritated the pride of two nations that were too easily excited; and after having endeavoured to recover themselves with arms in their hands, they did not limit themselves to being the soldiers of the British government, they lent it the aid of their plots. They planned a base conspiracy; they coloured with miserable sophisms a design of assassination, and they employed Georges and Pichegru in France. If there was a heart that the glory of the first consul had wounded, it was to that they had recourse. They had misled and perverted the feeble Moreau; they had deceived him, and they were deceived by him; and then when by the force of imprudence they had been discovered by the vigilant sight of the man whom they wished to destroy, they were denounced the one by the other, and then thought to justify or to excuse themselves, by saying aloud that a French prince would be at the head of their horrible doings! The great man against whom these odious plots were directed, revolted at being made the object of the murderous attacks of those whom he had snatched from persecution, and gave way to fatal anger. He had waited at the foot of a rock for the prince, of whom they announced the arrival; he had waited in vain; and his mind troubled by the very declarations of the conspirators themselves, had, in fact, perceived a prince on the banks of the Rhine, who was waiting there for the renewal of the civil war. At this sight his reason had gone astray; he had taken that prince for the chief of the conspirators who threatened his life; he had felt a sort of pride in seizing him upon the German territory, in order to strike a Bourbon like any vulgar individual; and he had struck him to show to the emigrants and to Europe how dangerous and insensate it was to attack his person.

Grievous spectacle, where every one was in fault, even the victims themselves; where the French were seen to make themselves instruments of British greatness against that of France; Bourbons, sons, brothers of kings, destined in their turn to be kings, seen mingling themselves with the scouts and pests of the highways; the last of the Condés paying with his blood for the plots of which he was not the author, and that Condé whom people would have to be irreproachable because he was a victim, culpable in placing himself again under the British to fight against the French flag; finally, a great man seen led away by his anger, by the instinct of self-preservation, by pride, losing in a moment that sagacity which every body so much admired, and descending to the character of those sanguinary revolutionists, whom he had himself compressed with his triumphant hands, and had made it his glory not to imitate! Fatal bondage of human passion! He who is struck will strike in turn; the blow received is given back in a moment; blood calls for blood, and revolutions thus become a succession of sanguinary reprisals, that would be eternal, if there did not arrive a day at last when they must cease,—a day when men must renounce rendering blow for blow; when they must for this linked vengeance, substitute a calm, impartial, and humane justice; when they must place above even this justice, if there can be any thing superior to it, a clear-sighted and elevated policy, leaving among the sentenced of the tribunals, none for execution but the most pressing cases, and granting pardon to others who have gone astray, but are still susceptible of restoration and a return to reason. To defend social order, by conforming to the strict regulations of justice, without giving way in the smallest degree to vengeance: such is the lesson which must be drawn from these tragic events. There is yet another remaining, and that is, to judge with indulgence the men of all the parties, who, placed before us in the career of revolutions, brought up in the middle of the corrupting troubles of civil war, excited, without cessation, by the sight of blood, had not for the lives of each other that respect with which the time, reflection, and a long peace have happily inspired us.

BOOK XIX.

THE EMPIRE.

THE EFFECT PRODUCED ON EUROPE BY THE DEATH OF THE DUKE D'ENGHIEN.—PRUSSIA, READY TO FORM AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE, TURNS TO RUSSIA, AND ALLIES HERSELF BY A SECRET CONVENTION TO THE LATTER POWER.—THE TRUE STATE OF THE FRENCH ALLIANCE IN 1803 DESCRIBED, AND HOW THIS ALLIANCE FAILED.—THE CONDUCT OF DRAKE, SMITH, AND TAYLOR, DENOUNCED BY ALL THE CABINETS.—THE FEELING IT INSPIRED DIMINISHED THE EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE DEATH OF THE DUKE D'ENGHIEN.—THE SENSATION EXPERIENCED AT ST. PETERSBURG.—COURT MOURNING SPONTANEOUSLY WORN.—LIGHT AND THOUGHTLESS CONDUCT OF THE YOUNG EMPEROR.—HE REMONSTRATES AT THE DIET OF RATISBON AGAINST THE VIOLATION OF THE GERMANIC TERRITORY, AND ADDRESSES IMPRUDENT NOTES TO THE DIET AS WELL AS TO FRANCE.—CIRCUMSPECTION OF AUSTRIA.—THIS STATE MAKES NO COMPLAINT OF WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AT RATISBON, BUT AVAILS ITSELF OF THE SUPPOSED EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE FIRST CONSUL, TO COMMIT WITHIN THE GERMAN EMPIRE THE MOST ARBITRARY ACTS OF POWER.—SPOLIATIONS AND VIOLENCES THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF GERMANY.—ENERGY OF THE FIRST CONSUL.—CRUEL REPLY TO THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER, AND RECAL OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR.—CONTEMPTUOUS TREATMENT OF THE RUSSIAN REMONSTRANCE TO THE DIET.—EXPEDIENT DEVISED BY TALLEYRAND TO CONFINE THE REMONSTRANCE TO AN INSIGNIFICANT RESULT.—EQUIVOCAL CONDUCT OF THE AUSTRIAN MINISTERS AT THE DIET.—ADJOURNMENT OF THE QUESTION.—NOTICE TO AUSTRIA TO CEASE HER VIOLENT CONDUCT IN REGARD TO THE EMPIRE.—DEFERENCE OF THAT COURT.—SEQUEL OF THE PROSECUTION OF GEORGES AND MOREAU.—SUICIDE OF PICHEGRU.—AGITATION OF THE PUBLIC MIND.—THERE RESULTS FROM THIS AGITATION A GENERAL RETURN TOWARDS MONARCHICAL IDEAS.—HEREDITARY SOVEREIGNTY BEGINS TO BE CONSIDERED A MEANS OF CONSOLIDATING THE NATIONAL ORDER, AND TO SHELTER IT FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ASSASSINATION.—NUMEROUS ADDRESSES.—DISCOURSE OF M. FONTANES UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE CIVIL CODE.—CHARACTER OF M. FOUCHÉ UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES.—HE BECOMES THE INSTRUMENT OF THE CHANGES ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE.—CAMBACÉRÈS SHOWS SYMPTOMS OF RESISTANCE TO A CHANGE.—THE FIRST CONSUL COMES TO AN EXPLANATION WITH HIM.—PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE MANAGED BY FOUCHÉ.—THE FIRST CONSUL DEFERS ANSWERING THE SENATE, AND APPLIES HIMSELF TO THE FOREIGN COURTS, TO DISCOVER IF HE SHALL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THEM THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE NEW TITLE WHICH HE IS ABOUT TO TAKE.—THE FAVOURABLE REPLIES OF PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.—CONDITIONS WHICH THE LAST-NAMED COURT ATTACHES TO THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT.—STRONG DISPOSITION OF THE ARMY TO PROCLAIM AN EMPEROR.—THE FIRST CONSUL, AFTER A SILENCE SUFFICIENTLY LONG, RETURNS AN ANSWER TO THE SENATE, REQUIRING THAT BODY TO MAKE KNOWN ALL ITS IDEAS ON THE SUBJECT.—DELIBERATION OF THE SENATE.—MOTION OF THE TRIBUNE CURÉE, HAVING FOR ITS VIEW THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONARCHY.—DISCUSSION UPON THE SUBJECT IN THE TRIBUNATE, AND SPEECH OF THE TRIBUNE CARNOT.—THE MOTION IS CARRIED UP TO THE SENATE, WHICH RECEIVES IT FAVOURABLY, AND ADDRESSES A MESSAGE TO THE FIRST CONSUL, PROPOSING TO HIM THE RETURN TO A MONARCHY.—A COMMITTEE IS CHARGED TO DRAW UP THE CHANGES NECESSARY IN THE CONSULAR CONSTITUTION.—CHANGES ADOPTED.—THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION.—THE GRAND DIGNITARIES.—THE CIVIL AND MILI-

TARY CHANGES.—PROJECT TO RE-ESTABLISH ONE DAY AN EMPIRE OF THE WEST.—THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DISPOSITIONS CONVERTED INTO A SENATUS-CONSULTUM.—THE SENATE IN A BODY PROCEEDS TO ST. CLOUD, AND PROCLAIMS NAPOLEON EMPEROR.—SINGULARITY AND GRANDEUR OF THE SPECTACLE.—SEQUEL OF THE PROCESS AGAINST GEORGES AND MOREAU.—GEORGES CONDEMNED TO DEATH AND EXECUTED.—M. ARMAND DE POLIGNAC AND M. RIVIÈRE CONDEMNED TO DEATH, BUT PARDONED.—MOREAU EXILED.—HIS DESTINY AND THAT OF NAPOLEON.—NEW PHASE IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—THE REPUBLIC CONVERTED INTO A MILITARY MONARCHY.

THE effect produced by the sanguinary catastrophe of Vincennes was, no doubt, very considerable throughout France, but it was much more so in Europe. It is not departing from the rigour of facts to state that this catastrophe became the principal cause of the third general war. The conspiracy of the French princes, and the death of the duke d'Enghien, which followed that event, were but reciprocal acts through which the revolution and counter-revolution were excited to commence a new and violent conflict, that soon extended from the Alps and the Rhine as far as the remoter banks of the Niemen.

The respective situations of France and the different courts have been already explained, setting out from the period of the renewal of hostilities with Great Britain; the pretensions of Russia to be the supreme arbitrator, coolly received by England, but courteously by the first consul, yet afterwards repelled by him as soon as he had recognised the partial tendencies of the Russian cabinet; the apprehensions of Austria, fearful of seeing the war become general, and endeavouring to dispossess itself of its uneasiness by the exercise of an excess of power in the empire; the perplexities of Prussia, by turns agitated through the suggestions of Russia, or attracted by the flatteries of the first consul, nearly seduced by his conversations with M. Lombard, and ready at last to abandon its long state of hesitation, and throw itself into the arms of France.

Such, then, was the situation of affairs a little before the deplorable conspiracy of which the tragical changes have been related. M. Lombard had returned to Berlin full of all he had listened to and observed at Brussels; and in communicating his impressions to the young king, Frederick-William, he had at last decided to unite himself definitively with France. Another circumstance contributed much towards the production of so fortunate a result. Russia had shown herself but little favourable to the ideas and views of Prussia, which were marked by a species of continental neutrality, founded upon the old Prussian system; she had endeavoured to substitute for those ideas the project of a third European party, which, on the pretext of restraining the belligerent powers, would have concluded in a new coalition, directed against France, and paid by England. Frederick-William, mortified at the reception which had been given to his propositions by Russia, knowing that results very visible might enchain the Russian project, and feeling that the strength lay on the side of the first consul, made the offer to him, not as before of a mere sterile friendship, such as had been given since 1800 by the unfixable M. Haugwitz, but a real and sincere alliance. At first he had offered to France as well as to Russia only an extension of the Prussian neutrality, that was to comprehend all the German states, and was to be paid for by the evacuation of Hanover, which would have for France the effect of re-opening the continent to the commerce of England, and of closing upon her the road to Vienna.

The first consul, when he conferred at Brussels with M. Lombard, would not listen to such a measure. After the return of M. Lombard to Berlin, and under a view of the later conduct of Russia, the king of Prussia therefore proposed to France measures altogether different. Under the new system, the two powers, France and Prussia, guarantied the *status presens*, comprehending for Prussia all that she had acquired in Germany and in Poland since 1789; on the part of France, the Rhine, the Alps, the junction of Piedmont, the presidency of the Italian republic, the possession of Parma and Placentia, the maintenance of the kingdom of Etruria, and the temporary occupation of Tarentum. If for any one of those interests the peace were endangered, that of the two powers which should not be immediately menaced should interfere as an intermediate party in order to prevent war. If the good offices thus tendered remained destitute of efficacy, the two powers then engaged to re-unite their forces, and sustain the conflict mutually and in common. As the price of this serious engagement, Prussia demanded the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and Weser, that the army in Hanover should be reduced to the number of men necessary to collect the revenue of the country, in other words, to about six thousand, and that finally, if at the peace the success of France should have been sufficiently great to enable her to dictate conditions to the enemy, Prussia exacted that the fate of Hanover should be regulated in agreement with her. This was, in an indirect fashion, neither more nor less than stipulating the possession of Hanover for herself.

Frederick-William had been influenced to enter in this forward manner into the political system of the first consul by the certainty of the continental peace, which depended, in his opinion, upon a solid alliance between France and himself. He had seen with a glance of the eye, honourable to himself, but above all to M. Haugwitz, his true inspirer, that Prussia and France being firmly united, no one upon the continent would dare to trouble the general peace. He had discovered, at the same time, that in thus binding the continent he equally bound the first consul, because the guarantee given to the present situation of the two powers was in a certain mode to fix them in that situation, and to interdict new enterprizes to France. If Prussia had persisted in such views, and had been encouraged to persevere, the destinies of the world would have been changed.

The same reasons which had decided Prussia to make the proposition which is here stated, would have decided the first consul to accept it. That which he wished, definitively at least at the period thus spoken of, was, France as far as to the Rhine and the Alps; an absolute domination in Italy; a preponderating influence in Spain, and, in a

word, the supreme power in the west. All this he would obtain through the guarantee of Prussia, and that to a degree of certainty well nigh infallible. Without doubt the continent would be re-opened to the English by the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and Weser; but these facilities given to their commerce would not effect so much benefit in their behalf as the immobility of the continent would inflict evil, ensured as it was henceforth by the union of Prussia with France. The continent at rest, the first consul was certain, by applying his genius to the task for several years, to strike sooner or later some great blow against England.

It is true that the name of an alliance was missing in the proposition of Prussia, but the alliance was certainly there, though the word was wanting, in accordance with the wish, deeply meditated upon, of the young king.

This prince in reality had not wished to use the term: he had even imagined to diminish the importance of the treaty by calling it a convention. But what could the form matter, when the whole substance remained; when the engagement to join his forces to those of the French was formally stipulated; when this engagement, entered into by a king, honourable and faithful to his word, could deserve to be reckoned upon? Herein may be remarked one of those weaknesses of mind visible, not only in the court of Prussia, but in all the courts of Europe at that period. They admired the new government of France, since it was under the direction of so great a man; they loved its principles as well as they respected his glory; and still they would not willingly take any part with him. Even when a pressing interest obliged them to approximate towards him, they were unwilling to have more to do with him than was necessary in relation to the business before them; not that they felt or that they ventured to manifest towards him that aristocratical disdain which old dynasties exhibit towards new; the first consul was not as yet exposed to comparisons of such a nature in constituting himself the head of a dynasty; and the military glory which was now his principal title to respect, was one of those meritorious qualifications before which such a disdain always vanishes. But it was feared by Prussia, that in formally declaring herself his ally, she should pass, in the eyes of Europe, for a deserter from the common cause of kings. Frederick-William would find himself embarrassed before his young friend Alexander, and even before his enemy the emperor Francis. The pretty and young queen, who kept around her a circle deeply imbued with the passions and prejudices of the old order of things—a circle the members of which rallied M. Lombard because he had returned from Brussels full of enthusiasm for the first consul, and hated M. Haugwitz because he was the advocate of the French alliance—this pretty and young queen and those around her made a great outcry, and overwhelmed the king with their censures. This was no more, it is true, than a mere domestic difference, similar to those which Frederick-William was often obliged to encounter. But he would not have been able to conciliate this formal treaty of alliance with that equivocal language and destitution of frankness which he had ordinarily held to the other courts. He was desirous of representing the engagements he had entered into with the first consul as a sacrifice he had been obliged to make in spite of his own inclinations to the pressing necessities of his people. In fact, his people had an urgent need that Hanover should be evacuated, in order that the blockade of the Elbe and the Weser might be raised. To obtain from France the evacuation of Hanover, it was needful, he would have said to the other powers, to concede something to her, and he had seen himself compelled to guarantee to her that which all the other powers, more particularly Austria, had guarantied to her either by treaties or by secret conventions. At this price, which was not a new concession, he had delivered Germany from foreign soldiers, and re-established his commerce. Add but the word alliance to the proceeding, and this interpretation became impossible. It is true that the stipulation respecting Hanover was as compromising to Prussia as the word alliance would have been, but this stipulation was confined to an article which it was agreed under the word of honour should be kept secret.

The court of Prussia was, as may be easily perceived, as feeble as it was ambitious; but its promise could be safely relied upon when it was once committed to writing. It was necessary to take Prussia just as she was, to give way to her weaknesses, and to seize upon the sole opportunity to bind her in a common cause with France.

In the present time, since the old Germanic empire has been broken up, there subsist few points of rivalry between Prussia and Austria, and there exists a very formidable one between Prussia and France, in the Rhenish provinces. But in 1804, Prussia, placed some distance from the Rhine, had with France very similar interests, and with Austria those of a very opposite character. The hatred which the great Frederick felt towards Austria, and inspired on her part, still survived in its full extent. The reform of the Germanic constitution, the secularization of the ecclesiastical territories, the suppression of the immediate nobility, the partition of the votes between the catholics and protestants, being so many questions either resolved or to be resolved, filled the two courts with bitter resentment for the past and the future. Prussia, enriched with the spoils of the church, representing the revolution in Germany, and having the interests and very nearly the same bad character with the older monarchies, was the natural ally of France; the last, not willing to be without a friend in Europe, must therefore evidently attach herself to that power.

Spain, as an ally, was not worthy of consideration; and in order to regenerate her, France was condemned, at a later period, to plunge into great difficulties. Italy, torn into strips, of which France possessed nearly the whole, was unable yet to contribute any real strength to France; she furnished, with some trouble, a few soldiers, that to become efficient, because they were capable of being made so, had need to be intermingled with the French. Austria, more able and more subtle than all the other courts together, cherished the resolution, which she dissimulated to all the world besides, and almost to herself, of precipitating herself upon France on the first opportunity, in order to recover what she had lost; and there was nothing in this

astonishing, nor, indeed, to be condemned. Every vanquished party endeavours to recover itself again, and has a right to make the attempt. Just as much as Prussia represented in Germany something analogous to France, so much did Austria represent all that can be imagined of the contrary, because she was the accomplished image of the old order of things. There was another reason rendered her irreconcileable with France—this was Italy, the object of her eager desire, and of a passion for its possession equal to that indulged by the first consul. While France kept the dominion in Italy, there could be nothing more expected than mere truces between the two countries, longer or shorter, according to circumstances. Between the two German courts, always divided, to choose the alliance of that of Vienna was therefore impossible. As to Russia, in pretending to domineer over the continent, it was necessary for France to resign herself to be her enemy. The ten years last passed away, sufficiently proved that such must be the case. Even with no interest in the war that France sustained against Germany, with an interest more conformable to that of France in a war sustained by this last power against England, she had taken an hostile attitude under Catherine, and under Paul I. sent Suwarrow into the field; under Alexander she had finished by wishing to protect the smaller powers, and by confining the continent to a protectorate, incompatible with the power that France desired to exercise there. Continental jealousy made her an enemy to France, as maritime jealousy made her one to England.

It was thus Spain, then fallen, having no force to aid France; Austria being irreconcileable on account of Italy; Russia being jealous on account of the continent, as England was of the ocean; that Prussia, on the contrary, having alone similar interests to those of France, playing among the old governments the character of an upstart, found herself the forced as well as natural ally of France. To neglect to be so was to remain isolated. To be isolated and alone was ever, in all cases, to consent to perish on the very first reverse of circumstances.

M. de Talleyrand, when alliances were the matter in hand, advised the first consul badly. That minister, with whom partialities exercised more influence than calculation, bore towards Austria a preference arising from habit. Full of revived remembrances of the old cabinet of Versailles, in which the great Frederick was detested on account of his sarcasms, but in which the court of Vienna was beloved on account of its flatteries, he believed himself again at Versailles, when in amicable relations with Austria. For these ill reasons, he was cold, a railer, even disdainful in all that concerned Prussia, and prevented the first consul from confiding in her. His counsels in other respects had little effect. The first consul, from the beginning, had judged with his ordinary sagacity on what side the alliance was most to be desired, and he had inclined towards Prussia. Still, confident in his own strength, he was not pressed to make a choice of friends. He acknowledged the utility of having them; he appreciated the real value of one or the other, but he believed that there was always time to secure them for himself, and was inclined to be leisurable in the selection.

When M. Lucchesini, in consequence of the conferences at Brussels, brought a letter from the king himself, and the project of an alliance, or at least the title, the first consul was much piqued. He regarded, and with reason, that relations with France were honourable enough, above all, sufficiently profitable, to be openly avowed. "I accept," he said, "the proposed basis; but I desire that the word 'alliance' should be in the treaty. It is only a public profession of our friendship with Prussia that will intimidate Europe, and permit me to direct all our resources against England. With such a treaty I shall diminish our land forces, and increase those of the sea, and devote myself entirely to a maritime war. With less than a public and formal alliance, I shall not be able to operate without danger in the revision and training of the troops, and make the sacrifice of re-opening the rivers without a sufficient advantage in return."

There was much truth in this kind of reasoning. The full and complete avowal of the French alliance would have imparted a moral influence, which it was impossible a half avowal would be able to ensure. But even the single fact of a union of the strength of the two countries was of immense value: the substance ought here to have prevailed over the form. Prussia, allied with France, so far as the obligation was to take arms in certain cases, would have been soon compromised in the sight of Europe; pursued by the ill language of the cabinets, and irritated by this language, be driven, in spite of herself, into the arms of France. The first step would have made the second inevitable. It was, therefore, a fault not to have acceded. The first consul, besides the word alliance, for which he stipulated absolutely, contested certain of the conditions which Prussia demanded. In regard to Hanover he was very ready to yield, and made no difficulty in ceding it to Prussia, the contingency happening, because it would embroil her fundamentally with England. But he was always very difficult to negotiate with relatively to the opening of the rivers. He was indignant at the idea of re-opening a part of the continent to the English, who shut up every sea. He went so far as to say to the minister of Prussia, "How, for a question of mere money, would you oblige me to renounce one of the most efficacious means of striking at Great Britain? You have given the aid of three or four millions of crowns to the cloth merchants of Silesia; it will be necessary to give them as much more. Make your calculation, how much it will cost you—six or eight millions of crowns? I am ready to furnish you with the amount secretly, in order that you may give up the condition of the re-opening of the rivers."

This expedient was not to the Prussian taste. Prussia wished to be able to say to the courts of Europe, that she had only engaged herself so deeply with the first consul in order to send the French away from the banks of the Elbe and Weser.

When the proposition, thus modified, was returned to Berlin, the king was alarmed at the very idea of an explicit alliance. The emperor Alexander and the German courts were present in his

mind continually, making him a thousand reproaches for his rebellion. He feared also the enterprising character of the first consul, and dreaded, lest by enchaining himself too strongly with him, he might be drawn into a war, which was that of all things in the world he most desired to avoid. The court was divided and agitated by the question. Although the cabinet was very secret, there was something gathered beyond its precincts of the matter which thus preoccupied it so seriously; and the court inveighed against M. Haugwitz, whom it accused of being the author of this piece of policy. This eminent statesman, that a certain appearance of duplicity, belonging more to his situation than to his character, caused to be calumniated in Europe, but who then comprehended better than any Prussian, it may be truly said, better than any Frenchman, the combined interest of the two powers, made every effort to strengthen the heart of the affrighted monarch, and to persuade the first consul not to be too exacting. But his efforts were vain; and in his disgust he formed the design of retiring, a design that he soon afterwards executed. The minister of Russia at Berlin, M. Alopeus, a Russian, fiery and arrogant as M. Markoff, troubled Potsdam with his exclamations. The Austrian diplomatic body became filled with intrigues. All the passions were enlisted against the idea of an alliance with France. Nevertheless, this internal agitation did not extend itself beyond the more intimate circle of the court, and had not acquired at Berlin the notoriety connected with a public event.

Such was the situation of things when intelligence of the seizure and carrying away of the duke d'Enghien from the Germanic soil was suddenly received. It produced an immense impression. The rage of the party opposed to France passed all bounds. The embarrassment of the opposite side was extreme. The argument of the consul Lebrun, that the act would produce a great noise in Europe, was fully realized. Still, in order to lessen in some degree the effect thus produced, it was added, that the measure was one of pure precaution; that the first consul had only seized him as an hostage, but that it never could have entered into his thoughts to strike down a young prince of an illustrious name, a stranger, besides, to the practices that were carrying on in Paris. They were scarcely got to listen to these excuses, when the news of the terrible execution at Vincennes was learned with consternation. The French party was from that time obliged to hold its tongue, and no longer offer even excuses for the act. The minister of France, Laforest, enjoying great personal consideration at Berlin, found himself suddenly abandoned by the Prussian society, and he related himself in his despatches, that they no longer exchanged a word with him. He repeated, in one of his daily reports, the real expressions of a person held in much esteem by the French legation:

"To judge of the exasperation of the public mind by the excited state of the language spoken, I do not doubt that all who supported the French government would have been insulted, not to say worse, had there not been in Prussia protective laws, and a monarch whose principles are known."

M. de Laforest said again, under the same date, that the brawlers, after having shown, in appearance at least, a deep sensibility at the event, "were not able to restrain a sort of insulting delight, and that they congratulated themselves as if they had obtained an important success."

This cruel event was, in fact, an important success for the enemies of France, because it every where lowered the friends of France, and occasioned the formation of alliances that it was only possible to disunite by the thunder of cannon.

The faults of an adversary are a poor compensation for the faults which we commit ourselves. Still, England managed to make this sort of compensation. She had committed an act difficult to qualify, in furnishing the money necessary to carry on a plot, and in ordering or in suffering three of her agents, her ministers at Stutgardt, Cassel, and Munich, to intermingle in the most criminal intrigues. The first consul had sent a confidential officer, who, being disguised, and giving himself out as an agent of the conspiracy, introduced himself into the confidence of Mr. Drake and Mr. Spencer Smith. He had received from them, to be transmitted to the conspirators, with a right to open an account, seeing the difficulty of uniting, at that moment, a sufficient sum in money, more than a hundred thousand francs in gold, which he delivered over immediately to the French police. The report of this officer, the autograph letters of Drake and Spencer Smith having been immediately collected and deposited in the senate, were communicated to the diplomatic body, to authenticate the handwriting[1]. The fact could not be

[1] It is singular that our author has refrained from giving an extract from this correspondence, any thing, in short, that can tend to prove the exact nature of the conduct for which these ministers are so much censured. They do not appear to have been concerned in any such reprehensible practices as M. Thiers would fain have the reader infer. At page 264, in a note, the reader will find a specimen of the false colouring and evasion of the truth put forth by the French authorities in those times, which, from the author's own statements, may also be plainly inferred in the present case. In reply to the present charge, lord Hawkesbury, afterwards lord Liverpool, a statesman of admitted integrity, deserves every credit. The following is an extract from the document he put forth on the occasion. That large sums of money were paid by this country to the insurgents of La Vendée, and to the weak-minded French princes and emigrants, is likely enough, too frequently, perhaps, under pretences baseless enough, of raising insurrections in France, during war considered legitimate. That the British government was conscious of doing more than this, no reasonable man will for one moment credit. The first consul complained to Mr. Fox in Paris, of the connexion of the English ministry with the parties who planned the infernal machine. Fox indignantly denied that any English minister would be a party to an assassination. That British ships were ordered to land the agents of the French princes and those concerned in the affair of Georges, is no doubt true; but the British ministers were never privy to their designs beyond the representations they made, in which the intended assassinations were never disclosed. In regard to the state of affairs in the interior of France, the British ministry, it must be admitted, credited the emigrants, ignorant and demented as they were, upon that and too many other occasions. This is not to be wondered at, when that ministry was continually surrounded by them, their own views in every thing being strongly linked to the old Bourbon system, and, in their sight, the French revolution a crime against the majesty of kings, before whose claims the sufferings of the people that

denied. The report and these documents inserted in the *Moniteur*, and addressed to all the courts, caused a severe censure upon England to succeed the passionate censure of which France was for some days before the exclusive object. Impartial men saw that the first consul had been provoked by odious actions, and they regretted, for the sake of his glory, that he was not content with the legal repression which would strike Georges and his accomplices, and the reprobation that would be incurred by Drake and Smith, for their conduct as English diplomatists, who were sent away with indignation from Munich and Stutgardt, traversing Germany precipitately, and not daring to show themselves any where. Mr. Drake, in particular, passing by Berlin, received an injunction from the Prussian police not to remain there a single day [1]. He only passed through that capital, and went to embark in all haste for England, bearing with him the shame which attached to the profanation of the most sacred functions.

The conduct of Mr. Drake and his colleagues operated as a diversion to the death of the duke d'Enghien *. Nevertheless, the Prussian cabinet, observing besides in its language perfect propriety, became all at once silent, cold, and impenetrable to M. Laforest. Not another word of an alliance, not a word more of business, not even a syllable upon the cruel event which was every where so deplored. M. Haugwitz and M. Lombard were inconsolable at an accident which had ruined all their political views; it was known that M. Haugwitz, in particular, had taken a resolution to quit the helm of affairs, and retire to his Silesian estates, much impoverished by the war. But these two personages now said not a word more. M. Laforest wished to provoke an explanation. M. Haugwitz heard his observations with much attention, and replied to him in these serious words: "Amid all this, monsieur, be persuaded that the king has been particularly sensitive to all which may affect the glory of the first consul. As to the alliance, it must no more be thought about. It was wished to exact too much of the king; and, besides, he has suddenly turned towards other ideas, in consequence of an unforeseen event, of which neither you nor I will be able to avert the consequences."

In fact, the dispositions of the king of Prussia were completely changed. He thought now of approaching more towards Russia, and to obtain through her the advantage of that support which he had at first sought to secure from France. He had desired to gain from the first consul the reduction of the army in Hanover, and the

produced it was not to be weighed. Such were the feelings of that day, under which feelings it is fair to consider their conduct. The following is an extract from lord Hawkesbury's answer in the affair of Drake:—

"It is the acknowledged right of belligerent powers to avail themselves of any discontents existing in the countries with which they may happen to be at war. The expediency of acting upon this right (even if the right were in any degree doubtful) would, in the present case, be most fully sanctioned, not only by the actual state of the French nation, but by the conduct of the government of that country, which, ever since the commencement of the present war, has maintained a communication with the disaffected in his majesty's dominions, particularly in Ireland; and has actually assembled on the coast of France a body of Irish rebels, for the purpose of aiding their designs against that part of the United Kingdom.

"Under these circumstances his majesty's government would not indeed be warranted in foregoing this right to support, as far as is consistent with those principles of the law of nations which all civilized governments have hitherto acknowledged, the efforts of such of the inhabitants of France as may profess hostility to its present government. They feel, in common with all Europe, an anxious desire to see established in that country an order of things more consistent with its own happiness, and with the security of surrounding nations. But if this cannot be accomplished, they are justified, on the strictest principles of self-defence, in endeavouring to cripple the exertions, to distract the operations, and to confound the projects of a government whose avowed system is not merely to distress the commerce, to reduce the power, or to abridge the dominions of its enemy, but to carry devastation and ruin into the heart of the British empire.

"In the application of these principles his majesty has directed me further to declare, that his government has never authorized any one act which will not stand the test of the strictest principles of justice, and the known and avowed practice of all ages. If any minister accredited by his majesty to a foreign court has held correspondence with persons in France, with a view of obtaining information of the projects of the French government, or for any other legitimate purpose, he has done no more than ministers, under similar circumstances, have been uniformly considered as having a right to do, with respect to the countries with which their sovereign was at war, and much less than the ministers and commercial agents of France, in neutral countries, can be proved to have done with regard to the disaffected in parts of his majesty's dominions. In conducting, therefore such a correspondence, he would not in any degree have violated his public duty. A minister in a foreign country is bound by the nature of his office, and the duties of his situation, to abstain from all communication with the disaffected in the country to which he is accredited, as well as from any act injurious to the interests of that country; but he is not subject to the same restraints with respect to those countries with which his sovereign is at war. His acts respecting them may be praiseworthy or blameable, according to the nature of the acts themselves; but they would not constitute any violation of his public character, unless they militated against the peace or security of the country to which he was accredited."

The charge of aiding assassination, lord Hawkesbury thus answers:—

"It cannot be necessary for him" (his majesty) "to repel with the scorn and indignation which it deserves, the most unfounded and atrocious calumny, that his government were parties to any project of assassination; an accusation most falsely and calumniously advanced under the same authority against the members of his majesty's former government in the last war; an accusation inconsistent with his majesty's honour, and with the known character of the British nation; and so completely unsupported by even any shadow of proof, that it may be justly presumed to have been brought forward at the present moment*, *for the sole purpose of diverting the attention of Europe* from the contemplation of that sanguinary deed which, in violation of the law of nations, and of the plainest dictates of honour and humanity, has been recently perpetrated by the direct order of the first consul of France."—*British State Paper, April* 30, 1804.—TRANSLATOR.

[1] Bavaria was at this time no better than a French province, Napoleon's will being law there. Baden was terrified after the violation of her territory; and Prussia was a fawning, insincere sycophant. The fear of the first consul, not the public indignation, caused the unmerited treatment of these envoys.—*Translator.*

evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and Weser, by engaging to partake in all the chances that might menace France. Decided at last to have nothing in common with her, he resigned himself to suffer the occupation of Hanover, the closing of the rivers of which that was the consequence, and sought in an intimate agreement with Russia, the means to prevent or limit the inconveniences which must result from the presence of the French in Germany. He entered immediately into conferences with the ambassador of Russia. It was easy to conduct a similar negotiation to the desired end, because it responded to all the wishes of that court.

While the effect of the tragical event with which Europe was occupied grew weaker at Berlin, it began to appear at St. Petersburg. It was greater there than elsewhere. In a young court, sensitive, seldom drawing just inferences, dispensing with prudence, through the distance which separated it from France, the manifestations of feeling were by no means controlled. It was on a Saturday that the courier reached St. Petersburg. The next day being Sunday, was the day for the diplomatic receptions. The emperor, hurt at the haughtiness of the first consul, and little disposed to restrain himself to humour him, listened to nothing in these circumstances but his resentful feelings and the exclamations of a passionate mother. He made all his household put on mourning, without even consulting his cabinet. When the moment for the reception arrived, the emperor and his court were all found in mourning, to the great astonishment of the ministers themselves, who had not been forewarned of it. The representatives of all the European courts saw with pleasure this testimony of sorrow, which was a real insult offered to France. The ambassador, general Hedouville, attending with other diplomatic personages, found himself for some moments in a very painful situation, yet he showed a calmness and dignity which struck all the witnesses of this strange scene. The emperor passed before him without exchanging a single word. The general neither appeared troubled nor embarrassed, threw around him a tranquil look, and made respect be felt for himself by the countenance he bore upon the occasion, as well as for the French nation, compromised by a great misfortune.

After this imprudent scene, the emperor began to deliberate with his ministers upon the conduct to be pursued. This young monarch, sensible, but as vain as he was sensible, was impatient to act a character. He had already played a part in the affairs of Germany, but he very soon perceived that the policy of the first consul did not accord with his own, or rather that he had not overcome him by conviction. He had recommended to him Naples and Hanover without being listened to; he had been mortified by the haughtiness with which the first consul was pleased to heighten the errors of M. Markoff, although he himself censured the conduct of that ambassador. In this disposition, the smallest occasion sufficed him to speak openly, and in yielding to his wounded vanity, he believed he only obeyed the sentiments of an honourable humanity. If there be added to this a character open to the slightest impression, and an utter want of experience, his sudden resolutions find an easy explanation.

To the disaster which has been already related, he wished to subjoin some stroke of policy, which should be much more serious than any demonstration of the court could be. After resisting what he proposed, his councillors imagined to give him satisfaction by very hazardous means, that of remonstrating against the invasion of the territory of Baden, in calling himself the guarantee of the Germanic empire. This was, as will be seen, a step of the most inconsiderate nature.

The quality of guarantee to the Germanic empire that the Russian court thus attributed to itself, was very liable to be contested, because the last mediation, exercised in partnership with France, had not been followed up by a formal act of guaranteeship. This act was so necessary to prove the guarantee existed, that the ministers of France and Russia had often deliberated with the German ministers upon the necessity which there was to complete it, and about the form in which it was most convenient to draw it up. Still the act had never taken place. In default of this, the title to the guaranteeship could only be drawn from the treaty of Teschen, by which France and Russia had guarantied in 1779, the intervening arrangements between Prussia and Austria relative to the Bavarian succession. This engagement, limited to a special object, admitted of the question, whether it conferred the right to intermeddle in the interior police of the empire. The thing was at least doubtful. In any case, the empire having to complain of a violation of territory, it was the duty of the state in which the outrage had been committed to complain at most to a German power of the violation of its territory, in other words, for the grand duke of Baden to remonstrate against the oppression, but most assuredly not a foreign power. In raising this question, there was evidently no ground to go upon. It was to embarrass Germany, even to offend that empire, because although outraged, she had no desire to commence a quarrel, the issue of which it was easy to foresee. In making this bustle, therefore, the greatest of levities was committed. Four years had scarcely passed away since a crime which calumniators denominated a parricide, had disgraced St. Petersburg, and procured the crown for the young monarch. The assassins of the father still surrounded the son, and not one of them had been punished. This was to expose himself on the part of an audacious adversary to a terrible rejoinder. M. Woronzoff being sick, had been replaced by the young prince Czartorisky, and it must be said to his praise, that young as he then was, he made strong objections to the measure. But the older members of the council showed no more wisdom upon this occasion than the young monarch himself, because in the passions prudence is pretty nearly upon an equality in every stage of life. In consequence, the cabinet of St. Petersburg decided on addressing to the German diet a note, to exhibit its solicitude, and provoke its deliberation upon the violation of the territory recently committed in the grand duchy of Baden. A copy of the same note upon the same subject was to be addressed to the French government.

They set no limit to the manifestations inspired by this unfortunate circumstance. They wished to testify to the court of Rome a marked degree of disapprobation, in return for the condescension which this state had shown to France, in delivering to her the emigrant Vernégues. The minister of Russia at Rome had been recalled at that moment. The pope's nuncio had been sent away from St. Petersburg. It was impossible to exhibit a censure more out of place, more offensive, in the acts of a foreign court, if these acts were censurable. Saxony, uneasy at the displeasure which the presence of M. d'Entraigues caused at Dresden, had requested Russia to recall him. The cabinet of St. Petersburg replied, that M. d'Entraigues should remain at Dresden, because they did not consult the conveniences of other courts in the choice of Russian agents.

After these imprudent steps, the Russian cabinet occupied itself in guarding against the future by seeking to form alliances. It had naturally lent a complacent and eager ear to the new language of Prussia, that after having quitted Russia for France, now quitted France for Russia, inclining to unite itself with the north. Russia much desired to draw in Frederick-William, so far as to form a sort of continental coalition independent of England, but leaning towards her side. Still they were obliged to be content with what the king of Prussia offered. That prince, constrained to abandon Hanover to the French, since he had renounced all negotiations with her, sought to compensate for the inconveniences attached to their presence in that territory, by means of an understanding with Russia. He wished that alone, and it was impossible to bring him to desire any thing more.

In consequence, after forcing themselves, each on his own side, to bring to the result the object most preferred, a species of engagement was entered into, consisting in the double declarations of Prussia to Russia, and of Russia to Prussia, drawn up in different terms, and impressed with the spirit of each of these two courts; the sense of the engagement being this: that as far as the French limited themselves to the occupation of Hanover, and did not exceed the number of thirty thousand men in that part of Germany, the two courts would remain inactive, and keep themselves to the *statu quo*. But if the French troops were augmented, and if the other German states were invaded, they would then concert measures to resist such a fresh invasion, and if this resistance to the progress of the French towards the north produced a new war, that then they should unite their forces and sustain in common the conflict actually begun. The emperor in that case placed, without any reserve, all the resources of his empire at the disposition of Prussia. This lamentable contract, signed on the 24th of May, 1804, by Prussia, was at the same time accompanied by a host of restrictions. The king, in his declaration, said, that he did not intend to suffer himself to be drawn into war upon any frivolous ground; that thus it would not happen from an augmentation of a few hundred of men to the army occupying Hanover, sent there by the annual and regular recruiting of that army; that it would not happen from an accidental collision with one of the smaller German powers, that so carried itself as to brave a rupture with France, but only with the formal intention of France to extend herself in Germany manifested by a real and considerable augmentation of the French forces in Hanover. As to the young emperor, he carried into his engagement no restrictions of such a nature. He obliged himself simply and purely to join his arms to Prussia in case of war [1].

[1] This treaty, under the form of a double declaration, must not be confounded with the secret treaty of Potsdam, concluded on the 3rd of November, 1805, while Napoleon was marching from Ulm to Austerlitz, and which was wrung from Prussia in consequence of the violation of the territories of Anspach and Bareuth. That which is now alluded to has never been published in any diplomatic collection, and it remains unknown even in France. In order that it may be known it is published here, to clear up an important fact, in the abandonment of the alliance of France by Prussia.

Declaration of the Court of Prussia.

"We, Frederick-William III. &c. &c.

"The war which is rekindled between France and England having exposed the north of Germany to a foreign invasion, the consequences which are the result of the present moment, both as regards our own government and that of our neighbours, have excited all our solicitude; but those more particularly which it is possible may yet happen, have required us to weigh and to prepare in time such means as may operate in remedying them.

"However painful may be the occupation of Hanover, and its indirect consequence,—the closing of the rivers; after having exhausted, in order to put an end to such a state of things, every means short of war, we have resolved to make, for peace, the sacrifice of not returning to the past, and of not proceeding to active measures, until new usurpations shall have compelled us.

"But if in spite of the solemn promises given by the French government, it extends beyond the *statu quo* of the present moment, its enterprises against the security of any of the states of the north, we are decided to oppose it with the powers that Providence has placed in our hands.

"We have made to France this solemn declaration, and France has accepted it; but it is, above all, towards his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, that confidence and friendship make it our duty to express ourselves; and we have had the satisfaction to be convinced that our resolutions were in absolute accordance with the principles of our august ally, and that he himself was determined to support them with ourselves. In consequence, we have come to an agreement with his imperial majesty under the following heads:—

"1. We will oppose ourselves in concert to every new entrenchment of the French government upon the states of the north, strangers to its quarrel with England.

"2. For this end we will begin to bestow a continual and severe attention upon the preparations of the republic. We will fix a vigilant eye on the different bodies of troops that she may bring into Germany; and if the numbers be augmented, we will put ourselves, without loss of time, in a posture to make that protection respected which it is intended to accord to the weaker states.

"3. In case of a new usurpation of power happening, we think that, with an adversary so dangerous, half measures would be unfortunate; it will be with forces proportionable to the immense power of the republic that we shall march against her. Thus, in accepting with acknowledgments the offer of our august ally, to join our troops immediately with an army of forty or fifty thousand men, we may not reckon less upon the anterior stipulations of the treaty of alliance between Russia and Prussia—stipulations which so bind the destinies of the two empires, that, should the existence

This treaty, so singular in form, was to remain secret, and, in fact, it continued completely unknown to France. Scarcely was it concluded, when the king of Prussia, perpetually running from

of one be in question, the efforts of the other will know no limit.

"4. To determine the moment when the *casus fœderis* shall exist, it is needful to take an extended view of affairs in their true spirit. The small states of the empire situated beyond the Weser, may possibly offer passing scenes which are repugnant to these principles, whether because they are a territory offering a continual passage to the French troops, or because their sovereigns are either sold to French interests, —as with the count de Bentheim,—or are dependants upon France on other accounts, as the count d'Aremberg. The minute deviations that a proper representation would redress,—as at Meppen, where the safety of nobody was put to hazard,—are strangers to an agreement, the only motive of which is security. It is on the banks of the Weser that the interest becomes of essential consequence, because from that point it deals with Denmark, Mecklenburg, and the Hanseatic towns; and the *casus fœderis*, consequently, will have operation on the first enterprise of France against any state of the empire situated on the right of the Weser, and particularly against the Danish provinces and Mecklenburg, in the just expectation which we have, that his majesty the king of Denmark will then make, conjointly with us, a common cause against the enemy.

"5. The enormous marches that the Russian troops will have to make before joining ours, and the difficulty of their arriving in time to take a part in decisive conflicts, make us judge that it will be most convenient to adopt, for the different descriptions of troops, a different mode of transport. Thus, while the Russian cavalry and artillery march through our provinces, it seems preferable that the infantry and cannon should pass by sea, and be disembarked in some port of Pomerania, of Mecklenburg, or of Holstein, according to the operations of the enemy.

"6. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or sooner, if the convenience of so doing is acknowledged by the two contracting courts, Denmark and Saxony will be invited to adhere to this agreement, and to co-operate by means proportioned to the power of each state; and in the same way will be invited all the princes and states of the north of Germany that, by the proximity of their territories, would feel bound to participate in the advantages of the present arrangement.

"7. From this time we bind ourselves not to lay down our arms, or to enter into an accommodation with the enemy, but with the consent of his imperial majesty, and after a previous agreement with him, full of confidence in our august ally, who has entered into similar engagements towards us.

"8. After having attained the end which has been proposed, we reserve ourselves to come to an understanding with his imperial majesty upon the ulterior measures to be taken, for the object of purging the north of Germany entirely of the presence of foreign troops; and to assure ourselves of this happy result in a stable and secure manner; and in advising an order of things which will no more expose Germany to the inconveniences from which it has suffered since the commencement of the existing war.

"This declaration is to be exchanged against another signed by his imperial majesty of Russia, and conceived in the same sense; we promise on our faith and royal word, to fulfil to the letter the engagements into which we have here entered.

"In the faith of which we have signed these presents with our hand, and have affixed our royal seal.

"Done at Berlin, on the 24th of May, in the year of grace 1804, and in the eighth of our reign.

(Signed) "FREDERICK-WILLIAM.
(Counter-signed) "HARDENBERG."

Counter-declaration of Russia.

"The critical situation of the north of Germany, and the burthen imposed upon its commerce, the same as on that of all the north, by the presence of the French troops in the electorate of Hanover; and, further, the imminent danger that exists in providing for the tranquillity of the states which, in this part of the continent, are not yet subjugated under the yoke of France, having excited all our solicitude, we are compelled to apply ourselves in search of the proper means to calm our apprehensions in this regard.

"The invasion of the electorate of Hanover, it not having been possible to prevent, and circumstances having unhappily hindered in time its deliverance from the presence of the French troops, we have judged it convenient not to adopt, at the present moment, any active measure, while the French government shall limit itself to the occupation of the German dominions of his Britannic majesty, and also not permit the French armies to pass, in Germany, the line behind which they now confine themselves.

"His majesty, the king of Prussia, whom we have acquainted, in all confidence, with our fears, and the measures which appear to us indispensable to ward off the danger that we anticipate, having expressed his assent to our views, as well as his desire to concur in objects so salutary, and to oppose himself to new aggressions of the French government upon the other states of the empire, strangers to its quarrel with England, we have fallen into accord with his aforesaid majesty on the following points:—

"1. The acknowledged audacity and activity of the French government, making it undertake and execute its designs spontaneously, it is absolutely necessary to watch over the preparations which it will employ for the completion of its designs on the north of Germany. We shall, therefore, keep a vigilant eye on the bodies of troops which occupy these countries, and in case their number should be augmented, we shall feel urged, without loss of time, to place ourselves in a posture proper to make respected the protection which it is our intention to grant to those states that, by their weakness, know not how to sustain themselves against the dangers with which they are threatened.

"2. To prevent all uncertainty about the period of placing in activity the means destined both on one part and the other, and hereafter announced, to preserve Germany from every invasion by foreigners, it is agreed upon before any thing besides, between ourselves and his Prussian majesty, to determine the *casus fœderis* of the present arrangement. To this effect it is agreed to consider it as having ceased at the first trespass the French troops, stationed in the electoral states of his Britannic majesty, shall commit upon the adjacent territories.

"3. The *casus fœderis* ceasing, his majesty, the king of Prussia, finding himself nearer the theatre of events, will not wait the union of the respective bodies of troops hereafter specified in order to act, but will commence operations as soon as he shall have received intelligence that the French forces have passed the line which they at present occupy in the north of Germany.

"4. All the means of which we propose to ourselves the employment for this same object, will be found ready to be placed in activity, we engage ourselves in the most formal manner to march to the succour of his Prussian majesty at the first signal that will be given, and with all the celerity possible.

"5. The forces which will be employed on one part for the defence of the rest of the north of Germany, will amount to forty thousand regular troops, and will be augmented to fifty thousand, if required. His majesty, the king of Prussia, obliges himself, on his side, to employ for the same purpose an equal number of troops of the line. When once military operations are commenced, we bind ourselves not to lay down our arms, nor enter into any accommodation with the common enemy, without the consent of his Prussian majesty, after a previous agreement with him; it being understood that his majesty, the king of Prussia, imposes the obligation equally upon himself,

one side to the other, to avoid all danger of war, dreaded, after fixing himself to the side of Russia, that it should be too openly visible on the part of France. The hasty way in which he had ceased to speak of an alliance with France, and the deep silence kept about the affair of the duke d'Enghien, appeared to him dangerous to peace. He therefore charged M. Haugwitz to make towards France a solemn declaration of neutrality, absolute on the part of Prussia, while the French troops occupying Hanover should not be augmented. In consequence, M. Haugwitz broke forth suddenly from his constrained silence with M. Laforest, declared to him that the king engaged his word of honour to remain neuter, whatever would happen, if the number of French in Hanover did not surpass thirty thousand. He added, that this was worth nearly as much as the unconcluded alliance, because the immobility of Prussia, certain under the conditions that he stated, insured that of the continent. The significancy of this declaration, for which at the moment it was made there was little motive, surprised M. Laforest, but revealed nothing to him. Still it appeared to him very singular. Frederick-William believed by this means that he had put himself in the position he wished with all the world. There is no prospect more melancholy to behold than incapable weakness embarrassed in a political labyrinth, and committing itself on the strength of a wish to ward off blows from every side, as a feeble bird caught in a net is obliged to flutter in order to get free.

Thus were laid, through the ambiguous policy of the king of Prussia, and under the strong impression produced by the event at Vincennes, the foundations of the third coalition. Russia, delighted to have secured Prussia, began at the same time to turn her eyes towards Austria, and forced herself to humour this power a little more than she had ever done before. She had easy means in her hands: it was to say no longer the same thing as France, in speaking of the questions yet pending in the empire, but, on the contrary, exactly that which the court of Vienna said itself.

It is needful to make known now in what manner that event had been taken at Vienna which so profoundly troubled the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. If there had been a court in Germany that the violation of the Germanic territory, by the carrying off the duke d'Enghien, should have affected more deeply than another, it was that of Austria. Nevertheless, the only ministers who on this occasion conducted themselves with moderation were those of the emperor. There did not escape from them a single word offensive to the French government, no step of which it had any reason to complain. However, the chief of the empire, the natural guardian of the safety and dignity of the German territory, was responsible; there was nobody to be found there to lift a voice against the act committed in the grand duchy of Baden. It may even be said, being exactly correct, that all would have been in place, if the tranquillity shown in the court of Austria in this matter had been visible at St. Petersburg, and if the like promptitude in remonstrance had manifested itself at Vienna. No one would have been surprised if the emperor had demanded, with moderation, but with firmness, some explanations of the first consul upon the violation of territory, which must fill Germany with uneasiness. It was not this, but even the direct contrary which occurred. They were young and inexperienced at Petersburg, and above all, a long way from France; they were sage and full of dissimulation at Vienna, and above all, very near the conqueror of Marengo. They were silent. M. Cobentzel, more prompted by M. de Champagny than provoking the subject himself, said that he comprehended the hard necessities of politics, and that he regretted in good truth an event adapted to nourish in Europe fresh complications; but that the cabinet of Vienna would watch, as far as that was concerned, with more zeal than ever the maintenance of continental peace.

In order to comprehend the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna under these circumstances, it is necessary to be aware that in waiting the favourable opportunity to regain that which it had lost—an opportunity which it would not willingly obtain through any imprudence of its own—it regarded with ardent curiosity all that was going on at Boulogne, forming very natural wishes that the French armies might be engulphed in the ocean, but would not on any account draw them towards the Danube, because it knew that their superiority henceforward was irresistible. In the interval it profited by the occupation that the maritime war created in France, to resolve at its own will the questions which had not been settled in the *recez* of 1803. These questions, left in suspense for want of time, were, as may be remembered, the following: the proportions to be established between the catholic and protestant voices in the college of princes; the maintenance or suppression of the immediate nobility; the new direction of the circles for the police, and the maintenance of order in Germany; the reorganization of the German church; the sequestration of the movable and immovable property attached to the ecclesiastical

neither to lay down his arms, nor to enter into an accommodation with the common enemy, without our consent, after a previous agreement with us.

"6. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or sooner, if the convenience of the measure is recognised between the two contracting courts, the king of Denmark and the elector of Saxony will be invited to adhere to this agreement, and to co-operate in it by the means proportioned to their respective resources, and as well all the other princes and states of the north of Germany, that by the proximity of their territories would participate in the benefits of the present arrangement.

"7. After the end thus proposed shall have been obtained, we reserve to ourselves the coming to an understanding with his Prussian majesty upon the ulterior measures to be taken, for the purpose of purging entirely the German territory of the presence of foreign troops, and to insure for the future that happy result in the most stable manner, and in advising an order of things which shall no more expose Germany to the inconveniences from which it has suffered since the commencement of the existing war.

"This declaration is to be exchanged against an act signed by his majesty the king of Prussia, and conceived in the same sense; we promise on our faith and imperial word to fulfil to the letter the engagements into which we have thus entered.

"In faith of which we have signed it with our own hand, and have caused the seal of our empire to be affixed.

"Given at St. Petersburg, the • • • of the year 1804, and the fourth year of our reign."

principalities which were secularized; and five other matters of less moment.

The most serious of these questions, from its consequences, was the delay caused in the reorganization of the circles, because from this delay there resulted a defect of police, which left every thing in the hands of the strongest. France being at the moment entirely occupied with the maritime war, and separated besides from Russia, had not any external influence capable of carrying succour to the oppressed states, and the empire began to fall on all sides into anarchy.

At the close of the negociation of 1803, Austria had sequestrated the dependencies of the secularized principalities, which found themselves under her hands. It will be remembered, that these old ecclesiastical principalities had some of their funds deposited in the bank of Vienna, others had lands in the midst of different German states. These funds and lands naturally belonged to the princes who had been indemnified. Austria, alleging nobody could tell what feudal law maxim in her defence, had sequestrated more than 30,000,000f. of capital placed in the bank of Vienna or in the funds. The houses of Orange and of Bavaria sustained the greatest losses. Austria placed no limit to her attempts. She treated with a crowd of petty princes to get from them certain possessions which they had in Swabia, and thus managed to obtain for herself a position on the shores of the lake of Constance. She purchased the town of Lindau of the prince of Bretzeheim, and ceded to him estates in Bohemia, with the promise of a virile vote in the diet. She treated with the house of Kœnigseck, in order to obtain, upon the like conditions, territories situated in the same country. Lastly, she laboured in the diet for the creation of new catholic votes, in order to raise to an equality the protestant and catholic voices. The majority of the diet not seeming disposed to meet her wishes, she menaced it with the interruption of all deliberations, until this question of the proportion of the suffrages was resolved conformably to her wishes.

The German princes, aggrieved by the violence of Austria, avenged themselves by committing similar violences upon states more feeble than their own. Hesse and Wirtemberg invaded the lands of the immediate nobility, avowing loudly their designs of incorporation. The immediate nobility of Franconia addressed themselves to the imperial chamber of Wetzlar, in order to obtain a decree against the usurpations with which they were threatened; the Hessian government had the notices defaced everywhere, containing the judgment given by the imperial chamber; thus affording an example of the most extraordinary contempt for the tribunals of the empire. They did not restrain themselves to these excesses, they refused to pay the pensions of the clergy, despoiled of their goods by the secularizations. The duke of Wirtemberg would pay none. In the midst of this reciprocal violence, each indulged in the hope to secure impunity for himself. They made no complaint of the sequestrations of Austria, because she had suffered them to execute all they chose to undertake against the immediate nobility, or against the unhappy pensioners thus deprived of their bread. Bavaria, the worst treated of all by Austria, avenged herself upon the prince archchancellor, whose electorate had been transferred from Mayence to Ratisbon. Seeing him with pain upon the territory of Ratisbon, which she had for a long time desired for herself, she followed him with threats, and took from him a number of estates, filling him with a thousand uneasinesses for his very existence. Prussia imitated these things in dealing with Westphalia, and did not remain in arrear of Austria or Bavaria in her usurpations.

Two states only conducted themselves with justice: first, the archchancellor prince, who, owing his existence to the arrangements of 1803, applied himself to make them respected by the members of the confederation. Secondly, the elector of Saxony, who, disinterested in the midst of pretensions of all kinds, remained immovable in his old principality, without having lost or acquired any thing, voting in a dry manner, that the rights of all should be respected by moderation and honesty.

All the culpable concessions made to Austria, in permitting the oppression of some that she might permit oppression to others, had not disarmed her, particularly in regard to Bavaria. Believing herself strong enough to be no more under the necessity of humouring any thing, she began to take up, cause and fact, the support of the immediate nobility, of which she was the natural and interested protector, by reason of their aid in recruiting her armies.

It has been already seen, that the immediate nobility, sustained by the emperor, and not the territorial princes, whose states surrounded their lands, did not owe these last any military contingents. Those of the inhabitants who had a taste for arms, enrolled themselves in the Austrian troops, and there were procured in Franconia alone, more than two thousand recruits annually, appreciable much more by their quality than by their number. They were, in effect, true Germans, very superior to the other soldiers of Austria, for their intelligence, bravery, and warlike qualities. They furnished all the sub-officers of the imperial armies, and formed, in some sort, a German skeleton corps for the imperial army, in which Austria placed her recruits of all kinds, from subjects comprehended within the limits of her vast territories. Thus she was resolved, on this point, to brave every thing, except a war with France, sooner than yield. Without making herself uneasy about the reproaches she might merit for her abuse of power, she referred to the aulic council, as acts of violence belonging exclusively to the imperial police, the infringements committed against the immediate nobility; and, with a promptitude seldom noticed in any Germanic proceeding, a provisional decision was given, qualified *de conservatorium*, in the constitutional language of the empire, confiding the execution to four confederated states: Saxony, Baden, Bohemia, and Ratisbon. Austria marched eighteen battalions by Bohemia on one side, and by the Tyrol on the other, and threatened Bavaria with an immediate invasion, if she did not instantly withdraw her troops from the different lordships which she had entered. It is easy to comprehend that in such a situation, Austria had much to do to manage the first consul, because, although occupied on the seashore, he was not a man to draw back upon any point. Besides, the irritation to which he had

been excited, rendered him more susceptible and formidable than usual. It is that which explains the reserve of the Austrian diplomatists in the affair of the duke d'Enghien, and the real or apparent indifference that they exhibited under this serious circumstance.

We have already noted the dispositions which had arisen in the mind of the first consul out of the attacks directed against his person. The benefits which he had been gratified in heaping upon the emigrants had not disarmed their hatred. The respect which he had testified for Europe had not calmed its jealousies. Irritated in the highest degree to have obtained so small a return, it had effected a sudden mental revolution, and he was disposed to ill-treat all whom he had most spared until then. The answer to the manifestations about to be related was hardly to be expected; but after having to deplore this wild wandering of his passions, there will be fresh occasion to admire the grandeur of his character.

The court of Prussia had neutralized itself, and had ceased to speak of an alliance. The French were silent towards it; but the first consul severely reprimanded M. Laforest for having too faithfully reported in his despatches the impressions on the public mind at Berlin. As to the court of Russia, the reply was instantaneous and cruel. General Hedouville had orders to quit St. Petersburg in forty-eight hours, without alleging any other reason for his departure than that of health, a reason in customary use with diplomatists, in order to lead others to guess that which they do not choose to tell. He was to leave all in ignorance whether he went away for a certain time only or for ever. M. de Rayneval alone continued to reside at the Russian court, taking upon him the character of *chargé d'affaires*. There had only remained at Paris, after the departure of M. Markoff, an agent of the same grade, in M. Oubril. The first consul sent, in reply to the Russian despatch, one which was exceedingly grievous to the emperor. This reply recalled to recollection, that France, having observed, until the present time, the best conduct towards Russia, and having made her an equal partaker in all the more important affairs of the continent, did not meet a return on her part; that she found the Russian agents, without exception, malevolent and hostile; that, contrary to the last treaty of peace, which obliged the two courts to refrain from creating embarrassments towards each other, the cabinet of St. Petersburgh accredited French emigrants to foreign nations, and covered conspirators, under the pretext of Russian nationality, from the police of France; that this was to violate at the same time the letter and spirit of treaties; that if Russia desired war, she had only to state her wish frankly; that the first consul, who had no desire of the kind, on the other hand, had no fear of it, because the recollection of the last campaign bore not any thing very alarming in its consequences (this allusion was to the disaster of Suwarrow); that relatively to what had passed at Baden, Russia constituted herself, upon very slight grounds, the guarantee of the Germanic territory, but her title to interfere there was very good ground for contesting; that in any case, France had used the legitimate right of defence against the plots concocted on her frontier, in the sight and with the knowledge of certain German governments, upon which she had heaped favours, and been repaid by the blackest ingratitude; that as to the rest, she had explained to them, and she would explain with them alone, and that, in her place, Russia would herself have done as much; because, if she had been informed that the assassins of Paul I. were united only a march distant from her frontier, and within her grasp, would she have abstained from going to arrest them [1]?

The irony was cruel towards a prince who had been reproached with not having punished any of his father's murderers, and who from this circumstance had been accused, besides, though very unjustly, of being an accomplice in the horrible deed. It must have proved to the emperor Alexander how imprudent it was in him to intermeddle in the affair of the duke d'Enghien, when the death of Paul I. rendered a rejoinder so easy and terrible.

In relation to Germany, Russia having recently approved the conduct of Austria, and her ground of pretension, for fixing on a reference to the aulic council to decide constitutional questions, the first consul declared plainly, that France thenceforward separated herself from the Russian diplomacy for all that should follow in relation to German affairs; that she did not admit that the questions remaining in suspense should be settled by the aulic council, the tribunal of the emperor

[1] It is very singular that our author should quote from this document so briefly. It is dated Paris, May 16, 1804, and signed by Talleyrand. It contains a charge against England as futile as that which alleged her participation in the wicked design of the count d'Artois, his brother, and Georges, to assassinate the first consul; it was perhaps deemed by M. Thiers so much the effect of the angry feeling of those times, that the atrocious falsehood might be passed over to lessen the obloquy of the document. The above passage runs as follows in the state paper alluded to. It is too curious not to place on record here. After treating on other matters at some length it proceeds thus:—

"France requires of her (Saxony) to remove emigrants who were in the employment of Russia, at a time when the two countries were at war, from countries that rendered themselves conspicuous only by their intrigues; and Russia insists upon maintaining them there; and the remonstrance she now makes leads to this question; *If, when England planned the murder of Paul I.*, supposing intelligence to have been received, that the authors of the plot were at a league from the frontier, would not pains have been taken to arrest them?"

The reply of Russia to this part of the document is also curious. It states that the allusion outraged decorum, and that it can hardly be credited that France should so violate truth as to allege examples, which were altogether improper to be mentioned, and that it should, "in any official document, recall even a father's death to the recollection of his illustrious son, in order to wound his tender feelings; and that it should (contrary to all truth and probability) raise an accusation against another government, that France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it."

The document concludes by the averment that the indecent French note is calculated to incense the emperor's just indignation, yet that he is superior to emotions of merely a personal nature. Surely such a diplomatic note as the present must tend to cast merited discredit upon all other averments about England from the same dishonest source.—*Translator.*

simply, rather than of the empire. That these questions ought, as well as all the others, to be treated of in the diet, the supreme body, and the sole depository of the German sovereignty. Thus the difference of sentiment was complete upon all these points, the resolutions being as cutting as the language.

As to Austria, the first consul had been satisfied with the indifference that she had shown towards the victim of Ettenheim. But he saw clearly that they abused at Vienna the impediments which the maritime war seemed to create. He wished that Austria should be well edified in this respect. He had two modes of combating England, the one was to meet her, man to man, in the straits of Dover, the other was to crush her allies on the continent. At bottom, the second mode was easier and surer than the first, and although less direct, could not but be efficacious. If, therefore, Austria provoked him, he determined, without losing a moment, to strike his camp at Boulogne, and to enter Germany, because he would not pass the sea unless he had disarmed all the open or secret allies of England. He communicated to the two Cobentzels, as well to him who was ambassador at Paris, as to him who directed public affairs at Vienna, that Bavaria had been the ally of France for several centuries, and that he would not abandon her to the ill-feeling of Austria; that if Bavaria did wrong by attacking too hastily the property of the immediate nobility, Austria, by her unjust sequestrations, had forced all the German princes to indemnify themselves by violence for the violence to which they had been subjected; that Bavaria had possibly done amiss, but that he would not suffer her to be crushed with impunity, and that if Austria did not recall the battalions which she had drawn together in Bohemia and the Tyrol, he was resolved to direct a body of forty thousand men upon Munich, which should be kept there as a garrison until Austria withdrew her troops.

This declaration, precise and positive as it was, threw the Cobentzels into unspeakable embarrassment. They extricated themselves by fresh expressions of sorrow upon the unceasing enmity of which Austria was the object on the part of France, and the state of deep despair into which they found themselves reduced. Nevertheless, Talleyrand and M. de Champagny insisted, and it was agreed on both sides, that Bavaria should evacuate the estates of the immediate nobility, but that the Austrian troops should first halt where they were, and should afterwards finally retrograde, in order not to commit the dignity of the emperor, by being too precipitate in their retreat. The Austrian cabinet gave it to be understood anew, that if France lent herself to its wishes relative to the proportion of catholic and protestant voices in the diet, it might be reckoned upon in all the other circumstances, and particularly in that which arose upon the occasion of the note addressed by Russia to the Germanic diet.

This note was received at Ratisbon by the same courier that had taken to Paris the despatches from St. Petersburg. It grievously embarrassed the German princes, both as regarded their dignity and security, because it was a foreign court that had thus invited them to show themselves alive to a violation of the Germanic territory, and yet if they had shown themselves sensible to the violation, they would incur to the extreme the resentment of France. In point of fact, they had not time to send instructions to their ministers at the diet; but these, presuming upon the dispositions of their respective courts, had appeared much more disposed to neglect the note, than to give it any great notoriety. The Prussian minister, M. Goertz, the same who has already made a figure in the Germanic negotiations, would have been willing to leave the whole matter lie in obscurity. But the Austrian ministers had received their instructions, (thanks to the proximity of Vienna,) and played, according to custom, a double game: finding the note particularly ill-timed when they were face to face with the French agents, and promising to get it received when they were with the agents of Russia, they imagined a middle term. They took the note into consideration, but each minister was to refer to his court, to state at an ulterior time what related to its contents. "You see," said M. Hugel to the Russian minister, "that we have got your note admitted." "You see," he said to the French minister, "that in adjourning the discussion for two months, we have extinguished it, because in a couple of months nobody will think any thing more about this proceeding of the emperor Alexander."

Such was to be finally the fate of this inconsiderate proceeding. But to come at the result, there was still more than one embarrassment to subdue. The German governments were unwilling to affront France, of which they were in fear, or to disoblige Russia, of which power they might ultimately find they had need. Their ministers bestirred themselves in Paris, therefore, to find a mode of getting out of the difficulty: "Settle it as you find most convenient, gentlemen," the first consul observed to them; "if the discussion occupies the space of two months, in such a manner as to arrive officially in France, I will frame a reply so high, so merciless, that the dignity of the Germanic body will be cruelly humiliated. It will remain for you either to suffer this reply, or to take arms, because I am resolved, in case of necessity, to begin upon the continent the war which I wage against England."

M. de Talleyrand, faithful to his common preference for peace, endeavoured to find expedients for preventing a rupture. The foreign ministers, fearing the first consul, finding, on the contrary, in Talleyrand perfect favour, and a facility, which besides did not exclude a haughty carriage, sought him with assiduity again and again. Among the most diligent and intelligent was the duke de Dalberg, nephew of the prince arch-chancellor, and then the minister of Baden in Paris. It was this personage that Talleyrand made use of to act upon the court of Baden. After having recalled to the recollection of this court all it owed to France, that had so much aggrandized its territories in the arrangements of 1803, he was made to comprehend also all that it might have to dread if war should break out anew. He engaged, therefore, to declare at Ratisbon that he had received from the French government satisfactory explanations, and that Baden desired, in consequence, that

no result should follow the Russian note. Whilst M. Talleyrand executed such a declaration underhand, the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, relying upon the relationship of the house of Baden with the imperial family of Russia, strove to modify this declaration to such a degree as to render it inefficient. But France being nearer and stronger prevailed. As to the rest of the affair, two months passed over before the opening of the discussions; drafts of the documents were sent from Carlsruhe to Paris, and from Paris to Carlsruhe, incessantly modified, and there was no loss in soon finding a convenient solution.

The first consul did not much trouble himself with these comings and goings, leaving all that was to be done to his minister for foreign affairs. He had offended Russia, and obliged Austria to keep herself quiet. He had made Prussia uneasy by his coldness; as to the diet of Ratisbon, he treated it as the representative of a body fallen into senility, in spite of all which he had done to renew its youth; and he was prepared either not to reply, or to give a very humiliating answer. All these questions, raised out of France by the catastrophe of Vincennes, had scarcely turned his attention from those at home that the existing moment had seen reach a real crisis.

Although, in a few days, the impression produced by the death of the duke d'Enghien had received through time the attenuation of impression that even the greatest incident soon experiences, still there remained a permanent source of agitation in the process of Pichegru, Georges, and Moreau. It was, in effect, a vexatious, but inevitable necessity, to compel the appearance in a court of justice of so many personages of different political classes. Some, as M. de Rivière and M. de Polignac, were dear to the old French aristocracy; others, as Moreau, cherished by all who loved the glory of France; and these were to make their appearance in a court of justice, in the midst of the public curiosity strongly excited, in the midst of the abuse and railing of the malevolent, always prompt to draw from the smallest circumstances, interpretations the most subtle and absurd. But it was imperiously necessary that justice should be rendered, and this process trouble, for one or two months more, the ordinary calm of the first consul's government. An incident, altogether unforeseen, added to the sombre and sinister aspect of the existing circumstances. Pichegru, the prisoner of the first consul, at first diffident of his generosity, and with difficulty believing in the offers of his clemency, which M. Real had carried to him, had soon been reassured of their sincerity, and had given himself up with confidence to the idea of preserving his life, and of recovering his honour by founding a grand colony in Cayenne. The offers of the first consul were sincere, because, in his determination to strike only at the royalists, he had wished to show favour to Moreau and Pichegru. M. Real, incapable of an ill-feeling, had, in following up this important business, another misfortune. He had arrived too late at Vincennes; he now appeared too seldom in the prison of Pichegru, where the business of the process scarcely required him, seeing that he could hope to obtain nothing in the way of information from a man so firm and concentrated as this old general of the republic. Absorbed in a thousand cares, M. Real neglected Pichegru, who hearing nothing more said of the propositions of the first consul, and learning the sanguinary execution at Vincennes, believed that he had to reckon for nothing the clemency which had been offered and promised. Death was not that which cost this soldier the more painful feeling; it was the winding up, nearly forced upon him, of the culpable intrigues in which he had been engaged when deviating from the right path in 1797; and then, too, he must appear between Moreau and Georges; one he had compromised, the other, to whom he had entrusted his honour, was about to figure at his side in a royalist conspiracy. All the denunciations which he had borne at the epoch of the 18th of Fructidor, and that he had repelled with feigned indignation, were now found to be justified. He lost with his life the melancholy remains of the honour already so compromised. This unfortunate man preferred immediate death, but death without the shame that must be the result of a public display. This feeling proves that he was worth a little more than his former conduct might lead to be supposed. He had borrowed from M. Real the works of Seneca. One night, after having read for several hours, and having left the volume open at a passage where it treated of a voluntary death, he strangled himself by means of a silk cravat, which he had twisted into a cord, and a billet of wood, of which he had made a lever; towards the morning, the jailor, hearing some noise in his chamber, entered, and found him suffocated, his face red, as if he had been struck by apoplexy. The medical men and magistrates called in, had not the smallest doubt as to the cause of his death, and they placed it on evidence perfectly satisfactory to all persons of good faith.

But there is no proof clear enough for the spirit of party, resolved to credit a calumny or to propagate it, without giving it credit at all. It was suddenly spread abroad among the royalists, who were naturally pleased in imputing all sorts of crimes to the government, and by the idle, who, without malice, love to see in the progress of events more complications than they really possess, that Pichegru had been strangled by the myrmidons of the first consul. This catastrophe, styled that of the Temple, was the complement of that styled the catastrophe of Vincennes; one was the successor of the other. The character of the new Nero thus rapidly developed itself. After the example of the Roman prince, he passed from good to evil, from virtue to crime, almost without the transition. As it was needful for those who gave themselves the trouble to state a motive for their falsehoods, to lay down the explanation of such a crime, they said, that not hoping to convict Pichegru, he had been assassinated, because his presence at the trial was required for the justification of the others who were accused.

This was the most absurd as well as most odious of invented calumnies. If there had been one of the accused whose presence at the trial was necessary for the interest of the first consul, it was Pichegru. Personally, Pichegru could not pass for a rival to be dreaded, since his well-known junction with the royalist party had lost him

utterly in the opinion of the public; besides, the actual depositions of all the accused of every party, equally bore him down. The man to be feared, if either of them was, through his yet untarnished glory and the difficulty of convicting him, was Moreau; and if there had been a useful accuser against Moreau, it was Pichegru, who had served as the link between the royalists and republicans. In fact, if Pichegru had been brought to trial, he would have been unable to deny his connexion with Georges or with Moreau; unable either to explain or deny these, he would have inevitably connected Moreau with the royalists, and thus covered him with merited confusion. Pichegru was, therefore, an immense loss to the prosecution. Lastly, to commit a crime to deliver himself from a dreaded rival, it was Moreau, not Pichegru, whom it would be necessary thus to place beyond the reach of the prosecution. The accusation, therefore, was as stupid as it was atrocious, yet it was not the less admitted as a fact by the chatterers in the royalist saloons, that the first consul, in order to disembarrass himself of Pichegru, had caused him to be strangled. This unworthy accusation promptly fell to the ground, but in the meanwhile it troubled the public mind; and the hawkers of false news, in repeating it, administered to the perfidiousness of the inventors. This new misfortune awoke again for some days the painful impressions already produced by the conspiracy of the emigrant princes. Still such impressions could not be durable. If enlightened persons, friends of the first consul, jealous of his glory, nurtured in their hearts irreconcileable discontents, the mass of the people felt that they were able to repose without fear under the shelter of a firm and just power. No one seriously believed that executions, banishments, and spoliations, were about to recommence. It must even be avowed that the men individually engaged in the revolution, whether they had acquired either national property, public offices, or an embarrassing celebrity, were secretly satisfied to see general Bonaparte separated from the Bourbons by a foss filled with the blood royal.

The sensations produced by these political events were confined then to a number of persons every day more limited. The extraordinary participation that the nation had taken in public affairs during the revolution, had given place to a species of disregard arising at the same time from lassitude and confidence. In the first times of the consulate, all eyes were fixed upon the government with a certain anxiety, but soon, seeing it so able and fortunate, each giving himself up to security and repose, returned to the care of his private affairs, long neglected during a stormy revolution, that had overturned at the same time property, commerce, and industry. Of the masses, there remained attentive to the public events of the day only those classes which had sufficient leisure and intelligence for occupying themselves with state affairs, and the interested of every party, emigrants, priests, acquirers of national property, the military, and persons holding places.

But in this part of the public the impressions were divided. If some declared the act committed in regard to the duke d'Enghien to be abominable, others found not less abominable the plots so unceasingly renewed against the person of the first consul. These said, that the royalists, in order to recover the government, of which they were incapable and unworthy, rendered liable to destruction government of every kind in France; that the first consul dead, nobody would be able to retain the reins of power in a manner sufficiently strong, that all would fall again into anarchy and bloodshed; that it was all well done to show severity in order to discourage the wicked and imprudent; that the royalists were incorrigible; that, covered with benefits by the first consul, they neither knew how to be grateful nor even resigned; that he had not missed, in order to finish with them, to make them tremble for once. It was thus that they reiterated their opinions in the circles around the government, or that the heads of the army expressed themselves, the administration, the magistracy, the members of the senate, tribunate, and legislative body. Even the impression produced by the death of the duke d'Enghien beginning to be effaced, things nearly similar were said by peaceable disinterested persons, who desired that they should be finally left to repose under shelter of the powerful arms which at that time governed France.

From this conflict of opinions there sprung instantaneously a new idea, soon propagated with the rapidity of lightning. The royalists, considering the first consul as the sole obstacle to their designs, had wished to strike him down, hoping that the government would wholly perish with him. "Very well," it was said, "we must defeat their criminal hopes. This man whom they desired to destroy must be made king or emperor, in order that the hereditary succession may add to his power, ensure him natural and immediate successors, and thus, from the crime committed against his person becoming useless, people will be less tempted to commit it." Thus it may be seen that the return towards monarchical opinions had for some years been rapid. From five directors nominated for five years, they had passed to the idea of three consuls nominated for ten years; then from the idea of three consuls, to that of one consul, having the power during life. In such a course they were unable to stop until after having passed the last step, in other words, returned to hereditary power. It sufficed for such an end that the least impress should be given to the public mind. This impress the royalists were chargeable with making themselves, by desiring to assassinate the first consul; and they thus gave no more than a very common exhibition, because most frequently they are the real enemies of a government, who, by their imprudent attacks, make it proceed in too rapid a manner.

In a comparative moment, whether in the senate, the legislative body, or the tribunate, not only in Paris, but in the chief places in the departments, where the electoral colleges were assembled, or in the camps spread along the coasts, there was heard almost spontaneously cried up, this notion of an hereditary monarchy. This movement of opinion was natural; it was also somewhat excited by the manifestations of all who were desirous of pleasing; by the prefects, who sought to testify their zeal; by the generals, who wished to draw upon themselves the notice of a powerful master; all well knowing that in proposing monarchy, they divined

the secret idea of their master, and that they certainly did not affront him if they should by chance hurry forward the moment fixed upon for that object by his ambition.

Without being dictated, the language was every where uniform. It was necessary, they said, to affix a term to hesitation and to false scruples, in coming to the only institution that was stable, in other words, to hereditary monarchy. While the royalists hoped to destroy the government and the revolution at one blow, they would renew their crimes, and might finish by succeeding. They would not begin any more, or at least they would have a much less interest in beginning again, when they saw by the side of the first consul children or brethren ready to succeed him, and the new government, like the old, having the property of survivorship in itself. To place a crown on the sacred and precious head upon which reposed the destinies of France, was to place there a buckler which should protect it against the blows of the assassin. In protecting that head, all the interests arising out of the revolution were protected; the men committed by their past faults would be saved from a sanguinary reaction; there would be preserved to the acquirers of national domains all their property, to the military their ranks, to all the members of the government their places, to France the reign of equality, justice, and the greatness which she had conquered. Besides, all the world, it was added, had returned to sound ideas. Every body had trouble to comprehend how they had suffered themselves to be led away, by insensate theoreticians, to make the vast and aged France a republic like that of Sparta or Athens. All recognized that in destroying the monarchy for the republic, they had passed the first and legitimate objects of the revolution of 1789, which only went to obtain a reform of abuses, the abolition of the feudal system, with the modification of the royal authority, and not its overturn. That in 1802, on the institution of the consulate for life, a false shame had constrained the legislators of France; to-day this false shame had passed away; to-day the crimes of the royalists had served to open the eyes of all; it was necessary to take its side, and constitute the government by a complete and definitive act; that after all they need only connect the law to the fact, because in reality general Bonaparte was king, absolute king; and whilst they decreed royalty to him under its real form, they would treat with him, would limit that royalty, and would by the same stroke add duration to the government and guarantees to liberty. Such was the language generally held some days before the unfortunate scenes which have been just recounted.

What a spectacle was that of this nation, which, after having attempted the sanguinary republic under the convention, the moderate but inert republic under the directory, suddenly disgusted with a collective and civil government, demanded aloud the hand of a soldier to govern it, showing itself so much pressed to have one, that it had taken the unfortunate Joubert in the absence of Bonaparte; then had run before the last on his return from Egypt, supplicated him to accept a power which he was but too impatient to seize, made him consul for ten years, then consul for life, and finally an hereditary monarch, provided he would guarantee it by the vigorous exercise of his power as a soldier against this anarchy, of which the frightful spectre followed it incessantly. What a lesson for the sectaries that had believed, in their pride of delirium, they should make France a republic, because the era had constituted it democratical! What time had it required for this change of ideas! Only four years, and a miscarried conspiracy against an extraordinary man, to some an object of love, to others of hatred, to all one of passionate attention. Then let the depth of this lesson be admired. This man had become the object of a criminal attempt; he had in his turn committed a sanguinary act; and in this same moment it did not fear to raise him as much as it felt was necessary. It took him not less glorious, but less pure. It had taken him with his genius, it would take him as he was, provided he was powerful; so much it wished for energy on the morrow of great disorders. Have there not been seen around us in our time affrighted nations, flinging themselves into the arms of soldiers of middling abilities, because they presented at least the appearance of strength!

At Rome, an old republic, the necessity had been long felt of a single chief; the inconvenience, often repeated, of the elective transmission of the sovereign power, had required several generations, Cæsar at first, then Augustus after Cæsar, and even Tiberius after Augustus, in order to habituate the Romans to the idea of monarchical and hereditary power. There were not wanted so many precautions in France, among a people accustomed for twelve centuries to a monarchy, and for ten years only to a republic. A simple accident alone was necessary to recall from their dream a few generous spirits who had wandered astray from the living and indestructible recollections of an entire nation.

In every country torn by factions and menaced by external enemies, the necessity to be governed and defended will bring sooner or later the triumph of a powerful personage, a warrior, like Cæsar at Rome, or a wealthy individual, like the Medicis at Florence. If the country has for a long time been a republic, many generations will be needed to fashion it into a monarchy; but if the country has always been a monarchy, and if the folly of factions have for an instant snatched it out of its natural position, in order to make an ephemeral republic, there will be required several years of trouble to inspire a horror of anarchy, fewer years still to find the soldier capable of putting a termination to it, and the wish of this soldier, or the blow of a poignard from his enemies, to make him king or emperor, and thus restore the country to its habits, and dissipate the dreams of those who had believed they could change human nature by vain decrees, or oaths vainer still. Rome and Florence, for a long time republics, ended one in the Cæsars, the other in the Medici, and it required more than half a century to place them in their hands. England and France, republics for ten years, ended in three or four years, the one in Cromwell, the other in Napoleon.

Thus the revolution, in its rapid re-action upon itself, came forth in the face of heaven to confess its errors, one after another, and to give itself the most palpable contradictions. Distinguishing

still, that when it willed the abolition of the feudal regime, equality in the sight of the law, uniformity in justice, the administration and taxation, the regular intervention of the nation in the government of the state, it had not deceived itself, it had not falsified itself, it had not belied itself to any one. When it had, on the contrary, desired a barbarous and chimerical equality, the absence of every social hierarchy, the continual and tumultuous presence of the multitude in the government, a republic after a monarchy of twelve centuries, the abolition of all religious worship, it had been foolish and culpable, and it came to make, in presence of the universe, the confession of its erratic deeds. But what imports some passing errors by the side of the immortal truths, which, at the price of its blood, it left as a legacy to mankind! Even its errors themselves contain useful and serious lessons, given out to the world with incomparable grandeur. Yet, if in this return to the monarchy, France obeyed the immutable laws of human society, she had gone fast, perhaps too fast, according to the usage of revolutions. A dictatorship, under the title of Protector, had sufficed for Cromwell. The dictatorship, under the form of a perpetual consulate, with a power as extended as his genius, to endure with his life, ought to have sufficed for general Bonaparte to accomplish all the good which he meditated; to reconstruct the old demolished state of society; to transmit, after having re-organized it, either to his heirs, if he had had any, or to those more fortunate, one day destined to profit by his labours. It was, in fact, decreed by the wisdom of Providence, that the revolution, following up its reaction upon itself, should go further than the re-establishment of the monarchical form of government, and as far even as the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty itself. To accomplish this noble task, the dictatorship, under the form of the consulate for life, sufficed, therefore, for general Bonaparte; and in creating an hereditary monarchy, he attempted that which was neither the best for his moral grandeur, nor the safest for the grandeur of France. Not that the right was wanting to those who would have made of a soldier a king or an emperor: the nation could, incontestably, turn him into what it saw fit to choose, and to a great soldier rather than to any other could bestow the sceptre of Charlemagne and of Louis XIV. But that soldier, in his natural and simple situation of prime magistrate of the French republic, had not his equal upon earth, even upon the most elevated thrones. In becoming an hereditary monarch, he placed himself in comparison with kings great and small, and was their inferior in one point, that of blood. But this might be only in the sight of the prejudiced; he might be below them in something else. Welcomed in their society, and flattered, because he was feared, he would be secretly scorned by the meaner of them, and what is yet more serious, would he not attempt to become king and emperor! to become king of kings, and head of a dynasty of monarchs, raised by his new throne! What gigantic enterprises to be undertaken, to which would perhaps succumb the fortune of France! What stimulants for an ambition, already too excited, and which could only be destroyed by its own excesses!

If, then, in our opinion at least, the institution of the consulate for life had been a sage and politic act, the indispensable complement of a dictatorship became necessary; the re-establishment of the monarchy in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte, was not a usurpation, a word borrowed from the slang of the emigration, but an act of vanity on the part of him who lent himself to it with too much ardour, and of the imprudent avidity of some of the new converts to monarchy, in haste to *devour* this reign of a *moment*. Still, if he only acted thus to afford a lesson to man, we must agree the lesson was more instructive and more profound, more worthy of those that Providence gives to nations, when it was given by this heroic soldier, and by those republicans recently converted to monarchical principles, pressed, the one and the other, to clothe themselves in purple over the ruins of a republic of ten years' duration, to support which, they had taken a thousand oaths. Unhappily, France, which had paid with its blood for their republican delirium, was now exposed to pay with its greatness for their new monarchical zeal; because it was in behalf of that there were French kings planted in Westphalia, Naples, and Spain, and that France lost the Rhine and the Alps for her boundary. Thus in every thing France was doomed to serve for the instruction of the universe; a heavy misfortune, and great glory for any nation!

It was necessary to have men under each successive change, who would charge themselves with the realization of the ideas impressed upon the general mind; in other words, to have proper instruments. One was found for the revolution which was now preparing, singularly adapted to the circumstances of the moment. M. Fouché had thus far, influenced by a remnant of sincerity, censured the rapidity of action which drew France towards the past; he had even obtained the favour of madam Bonaparte, by appearing to partake in her confused fears; and he had, on that very account, incurred the disgrace of her ambitious spouse. Owing to his playing the ungrateful character of a secret approver, M. Fouché had lost a minister's place[1]; and he did not desire to play it any longer: he now, therefore, embraced the opposite side. Directing the police spontaneously in the pursuit of the late conspirators, he was again appointed to his post. Seeing the first consul deeply irritated against the royalists, he flattered his anger, and pushed him forward in the immolation of the duke d'Enghien. If the idea that had been often attributed to the first consul of concluding a sanguinary treaty with the revolutionists, and obtaining the crown at the price of a frightful pledge—if this idea ever entered into the head of any man of that time, it was most assuredly into that of M. Fouché. An applauder of the death of the duke d'Enghien, he was also the most ardent of the new partisans of the hereditary succession. He now surpassed Talleyrand, Rœderer, and Fontanes, in his monarchical zeal.

The first consul had certainly no need to be

[1] Our author has given a different reason for the dismissal of M. Fouché, see page 374. One or the other must be wrong: it is important to know which is really correct.—*Translator.*

encouraged in his aspirations to the throne. He wished for the supreme monarchical rank, not that such had been his constant wish since his Italian campaigns, nor even since the 18th Brumaire, as some vulgar narrators suppose; no, he did not indulge all his aspiring wishes at once. His ambition became larger by degrees as his fortunes extended. Arrived at the command of armies, he perceived from that elevated point a higher point of elevation still in the government of the republic, and to that he first aspired. Arrived at that height, he had seen the perpetual consulship yet above him, and he had aspired to that in the same way. Arrived at this last elevation, from whence he distinctly saw the throne, he wished to sit upon it. Such is the march of human ambition, and this was not so far a crime. But to clear-sighted minds, there was danger in an ambition unceasingly excited, and still insatiate, because it would only be excited yet further the more it was gratified.

But at the moment of taking upon itself a power which did not naturally belong to it, every genius, however audacious it might be, would at least hesitate, if it did not tremble. In such situations an involuntary bashfulness seizes upon the most ardent ambition, and it dares not avow all which it most desires. The first consul, who discoursed very little respecting state affairs with his brothers, had confidants in them, when he contemplated objects of personal aggrandisement, to whom he was fond of confiding every thing, and confidants, too, who were more ardent than he was himself, because they longed to become princes. It may be remembered, that they had regarded the consulate for life with disdain, as an abortive attempt. At the time to which allusion is now making, Lucien was absent, and Joseph had quitted Paris. Lucien, by a new inconsequence, after his own character, had married a handsome widow, very little calculated to match with the position of the Bonaparte family. At variance with the first consul on account of his marriage, he had retired to Rome, playing the part of one proscribed, and appearing to seek in the pursuits and enjoyments of the arts an indemnification for fraternal ingratitude. Madame Letitia Bonaparte, who, under the modest bearing of a female born in humble circumstances, and still affecting this recollection, hid all the passions of an empress mother, complained constantly and wrongfully of Napoleon, and exhibited for her son Lucien a very marked preference; she followed him to Rome. The first consul, who was always full of affection for the members of his family, even when he had not reason to applaud their conduct, had taken care that his all-powerful protection should accompany his mother and brother, and had recommended them to the benevolent regard of pope Pius VII., saying that his brother had gone to seek in Rome the enjoyment of the fine arts, and his mother the benefit of a mild climate. Pius VII. exhibited to his illustrious hosts the most marked and the most delicate attention.

Joseph was also discontented; it could scarcely be imagined on what account, if history had not stated the reason. He felt hurt that the first consul had wished to nominate him president of the senate, and refused the high office with the tone of offended dignity, when Cambacérès had gone to offer it to him on the part of his brother. This last, who did not love to see him idle, had then made him go in search of greatness by the same path in which he had obtained his own, and Joseph was nominated to the colonelcy of the 4th regiment of the line. He set off, in consequence, for Boulogne, at the same moment when the grand question of the re-establishment of the monarchy was in agitation. The first consul was thus deprived of two confidential individuals, to whom he would willingly have opened his mind upon such matters as related to his personal elevation.

M. Cambacérès, to whom the first consul commonly spoke his mind upon every subject, general or personal, at the epoch of the consulate for life, had spared him the embarrassment of avowing his wishes, and had taken the lead in making himself the instrument of a change universally approved. But now M. Cambacérès was silent, for two reasons, the one good, the other bad. The first was, that with his rare foresight he feared the excesses of an ambition without limit. He had heard the empire of the Gauls spoken of, and the empire of Charlemagne, and dreaded to see the solid greatness of the treaty of Luneville sacrificed to gigantic enterprizes, in consequence of the elevation of Bonaparte to an imperial throne. The second reason was, that he should find himself separated from the first consul by the entire height of the throne, and should thus become, from a copartnership in the sovereignty, however small that partnership might be, the simple subject of the future monarch. He therefore held his tongue, and did not this time, as he had done on the preceding occasion, place his influence at the service of the first consul. The third consul, Lebrun, perfectly devoted in his services, but never meddling with any thing save the duties of the administration, had it not in his power to be of utility.

Fouché, in the ardour of his zeal, made himself the spontaneous agent of the change which was preparing. He accosted the first consul, whose secret wishes he had already divined, represented to him the need of taking a prompt and decided part, and the urgent necessity for terminating the anxieties of France, and putting the crown upon his head, thus consolidating definitively the results of the revolution. He showed him how all classes in the nation were animated by the same sentiment, and impatient to proclaim him emperor of the Gauls or of the French, as was most agreeable to his policy and taste. He returned often to the charge in the same way, directing himself to make the advantages of the proposal felt at an instant when France, alarmed for the life of the first consul, was disposed to concede to him any thing he might demand. He nearly passed from exhortations to reproaches, and reproved in strong terms the indecision of general Bonaparte. The latter had not quitted his retreat at Malmaison since the event at Vincennes. M. Fouché went thither continually, and when the first consul had gone out to take his walk or ride, and he could not meet with him, he sought for his intimate secretary, M. de Meneval, and demonstrated to him at full length the advantages of an hereditary monarchy, and not only of a monarchy, but of an aristocracy, as a support and ornament to the throne; adding, that

if the first consul wished to re-establish it, he was quite ready to defend the rectitude of such a new creation, and, if it were necessary, even to become a noble himself.

Such was the zeal of this old republican, so completely repentant of his errors. His uneasy activity, excited more upon this occasion than was customary, began to arouse itself further than was needful. He acted, in short, as a man would do who wished to have the merit of pushing forward the business in hand through his own agency alone.

There was scarcely a person who was not disposed to second the wishes of the first consul. France having seen for a long time past she was now provided with a master, who besides covered her with glory and benefits, was not willing to refuse him the title which was most grateful to his ambition. The bodies of the state, and the heads of the army, who knew how much all resistance was thenceforth impossible, and who had seen in the ruin of Moreau the danger of intemperate opposition, flung themselves before the new Cæsar, in order to distinguish themselves by their zeal at least, and to profit by an elevation which there was not time to prevent. It is the common disposition of mankind to make the best of the ambition which they are unable to combat successfully, and to console their envy by their greediness. There was now an embarrassment for every body, in being obliged to adopt the usage of words which had been proscribed, and to repudiate others which they had adopted with enthusiasm. By a slight precaution in the choice of the title to be conferred on the future monarch, it was possible to facilitate this change. Thus in calling the sovereign emperor in place of king, the difficulty was much diminished. Besides, to draw the existing generation out of this embarrassment, no one was better for the purpose than an old Jacobin like M. Fouché, taking upon himself to give an example to all, both masters and subjects, and impressing upon himself to be the foremost to offer the words which no one yet dared to have upon his lips.

Fouché arranged every thing with some of the gentlemen ushers in the senate, the first consul seeing what he did and approving, but feigning that it was for no end. He feared to be the first to commence the subject in the French journals, because their absolute dependance upon the police would have given their opinion too much the colouring of a command. He had secret agents in England, and these managed to get it stated in some of the English journals, that since the last conspiracy general Bonaparte was uneasy, sombre, and menacing; that every one in Paris lived in great anxiety; that this was the natural consequence of a form of government where all rested upon his head alone, and that thus, in consequence, the peaceably-disposed people in France wished for an hereditary sovereignty, established in the family of Bonaparte, in order to procure, in the existing state of things, the stability that was so needful. Thus the English press, ordinarily employed in the defamation of the first consul, was now employed in serving his ambitious views. These articles, reproduced and commented upon in the French papers, caused a very lively sensation, and gave the expected signal. There were at this period several electoral colleges assembled in the departments of the Yonne, the Var, the Hautes Pyrennées, the Nord, and the Roër. It was very easy to obtain addresses. These were in an equal manner prompted on the part of the municipal councils of the great cities, such as Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris. Finally, the camps assembled along the coasts of the ocean were put into fermentation in their turn. The military were of all classes the most devoted to the first consul. A certain number of officers and of generals excepted, some sincere republicans, others animated by the old rivalry which divided the soldiers of the Rhine from those of Italy, the greater part of the chiefs of the army saw their own elevation in that of a soldier upon the throne of France. They were therefore perfectly ready to lead off, and to do that which they had often seen done in the history of the Roman empire, to proclaim an emperor themselves. General Soult wrote to the first consul that he had heard the generals and colonels all demand the establishment of the new form of government; that they were ready to give to the first consul the title of emperor of the Gauls: he demanded his orders upon the matter. Petitions were circulated in the divisions of dragoons encamped at Compiegne; these petitions were covered with signatures, and had been received in Paris.

On Sunday the 4th Germinal, or 25th of March, some days after the death of the duke d'Enghien, several addresses of electoral colleges were presented to the first consul. Admiral Ganteaume, one of his devoted friends, himself presented the address of the college of the Var, of which he was the president. It said in formal terms, that it did not merely suffice to seize, try, and punish the conspirators, but that it was needful by a large system of institutions which consolidated and perpetuated the power in the hands of the first consul and his family, to insure the repose of France, and put an end to its long anxieties. Other addresses were read at the same audience, and immediately afterwards there came one of a more elevated character. M. de Fontanes had received the presidency of the legislative body, and had thus obtained, through the favour of the Bonaparte family, a place which he merited to obtain solely by his talents. He had received the commission to felicitate the first consul on the achievement of his immortal work, the civil code. This code, the result of so much learned labour, a monument of the strong will and universal mind of the chief of the republic, had been terminated during the present session, and the legislative body in acknowledging it, had resolved to commemorate the remembrance of the event by placing in the hall where they sat a marble statue of the first consul. It was that circumstance which M. Fontanes had announced in this audience; and certainly of all the claims of the man whom they wished to honour, there was not one that it was more becoming to recall, at the moment when they were going to make him the hereditary sovereign of the country which his genius had organised. M. Fontanes expressed himself as follows:—

"CITIZEN FIRST CONSUL,

"An immense empire has rested four years under the shelter of your powerful administration. The wise uniformity of your laws tends to unite

more and more all its inhabitants. The legislative body wishes to commemorate this remarkable epoch; it has decreed that your statue, placed in the middle of the hall of its deliberations, should perpetually recall to it your favours, and the duties and hopes of the French people. The double right of conqueror and legislator has ever silenced all others. You have seen this confirmed in your own person by the national suffrage. Who would now nourish the criminal hope of opposing France to France? Will she divide herself for a few past recollections when every present interest unites her? She has but one chief—that chief is yourself; she has but one enemy—that enemy is England.

"Political tempests had thrown some of the wisest men upon unforeseen paths. But as soon as your hand had raised up again the signals of their country, all good Frenchmen recognised and followed them; all marched by the side of your glory. Those who conspire in the bosom of an enemy's territory, renouncing irrevocably their natal soil, what are they able to oppose to your ascendency? You possess invincible armies—they have only libellers and assassins; and whilst the voice of religion is elevated in your favour at the foot of those altars which you have reconstructed, they would fain outrage you in a few obscure organs of superstition and revolt. The impotence of their plots is proved. They every day render destiny more rigorous in fighting against its decrees. May they yield at last to that irresistible movement which carries the universe with it; and may they meditate in silence upon the causes of the ruin and elevation of empires!"

This abjuration of the Bourbons, made in the face of the newly-designated monarch, with its solemnity of language, although indirect in allusion, was the most significant of manifestations. Still they did not wish to make any thing public, before the senate, the highest body in the state, charged by the constitution to lead the way, had taken the first step.

In order to obtain this proceeding, it was necessary to come to an understanding with M. Cambacérès, who directed the senate. It was necessary to enter into an explanation with him for that object, and to be assured of his good wishes, not that any resistance upon his part was to be feared, but his simple disapprobation, although silent, would have been a real defeat, under a circumstance in which it was important that all the world should seem to be of one mind.

The first consul sent for M. Cambacérès and M. Lebrun to Malmaison. M. Lebrun, as most easy of persuasion, was sent for first. With him there was no effort to be made, because he was a decided partisan of monarchy, and more willingly so under the sovereignty of general Bonaparte than that of any other person. Cambacérès, discontented with what was going on, arrived when the conference with his colleague Lebrun was already far advanced. The first consul, after speaking of the movement which was taking place in the public mind, as if he had been a stranger to the cause, requested the opinion of the second consul upon the question, so much agitated at that moment, of the re-establishment of the monarchy.

"I doubted much," replied Cambacérès, "how they came to make a question of it. I see that all tends to that end, and I am sorry for it." Then dissimulating badly the personal displeasure which he intermingled with the wisdom of his views, Cambacérès laid open to the first consul the grounds of his opinion. He painted the discontent of the republicans with that which left them not even the name of the chimera they had pursued; the royalists revolted, that they should dare to raise up the throne without seating a Bourbon upon it; he showed the danger of pushing the return of the old regime so far, that very soon it only remained to put one person in place of another for the old monarchy to be established. He stated the discourses of the royalists themselves, who loudly boasted that they had in general Bonaparte a precursor charged to herald the return of the Bourbons. He set at its true value the inconvenience of a new change, without any other utility beyond an empty title, because the first consul had actually at that moment unlimited power, and he remarked, that it often happened there was more danger in changing the names of things than the things themselves. He alleged the difficulty of obtaining in Europe the acknowledgment of a monarchy such as he might wish to found, and the difficulty still greater to obtain in France the efforts necessary for a third war, if it should be required to have recourse to that means of forcing the acknowledgment from the old European courts; in fine, he stated many reasons more, some excellent, and others only of middling character, in which a species of humour was thrown, very uncommon with so grave a personage. But he did not dare to give the best reason, of which he was well aware; that if this new concession was accorded to an enormously ambitious man, it would not be possible to stop any where, because in decreeing to general Bonaparte the title of emperor of the French, it prepared him to desire that of emperor of the west, to which he had afterwards a secret aspiration, which was not the least among the causes that pushed him almost to pass the limits of the possible, and to fall in returning. As with every man constrained and cramped, Cambacérès did not say that which he had better have said, and was beaten by his interlocutor.

The first consul, who so dissimulated his wishes at the time of the institution of the consulate for life, this time made the step forward which was not made towards him. He frankly avowed to Cambacérès, his colleague, that he thought of taking the crown, and he declared why he thought of it. He asserted to him that France wished for a king; this was evident to whoever knew how to observe; that it turned back more and more every day from the follies that had for a moment got into its head, and that of all follies, a republic was the most egregious; that France was so completely disabused, it would take a Bourbon, if it did not get a Bonaparte given to it; that the return of the Bourbons would be a calamity, because it would be a pure counter-revolution; and that for himself, without desiring more power than he had, he yielded upon this occasion to a necessity of the public mind, and to the interest of the revolution itself; that, besides, it was important to take a part, because the movement was such in the army, they would perhaps proclaim him emperor in

the camps, and then his elevation to the throne would resemble a scene of the pretorians, that above all things it was necessary to avoid.

These reasons operated little in persuading M. Cambacérès, who had no desire to let himself be persuaded, and each retained his opinion, sorry to have been too forward in the argument. This unforeseen resistance of M. Cambacérès embarrassed the first consul, who feigning less impatience than he really felt, said to his two colleagues, that he would meddle with nothing, but leave the movement of the public mind to itself. They parted discontented one with the other; and Cambacérès, on returning with M. Lebrun to Paris, about the middle of the night, addressed the following words to his colleague: "The thing is done; the monarchy is re-established; but I have a presentiment that the edifice will not be durable. We have made war in Europe to give to it republics, children of the French republic; we shall make it now in order to give it monarchs, sons or brothers of our own, and France, exhausted, will finish by succumbing to such foolish enterprises."

But this disapprobation of Cambacérès was the most silent and the most inactive of resistances. He suffered Fouché and his auxiliaries to act according to their inclinations. An excellent opportunity offered itself for their objects. Following the customary usage of addressing to the senate communications upon the occurrence of important events, there had been presented to him a report of the grand judge, relative to the intrigues of the English agents, Drake, Spencer Smith, and Taylor. It was needful he should reply to this communication of the government. The senate had named a commission in order to prepare the draft of a reply. The gentlemen ushers already mentioned, finding the circumstances favourable, set themselves to persuade the senators that the time was come for them to commence on the subject of the restoration of the monarchy; that the first consul hesitated, but that it was necessary to overcome his hesitations, by denouncing to him the vacancies existing in the actual institutions, and indicating to him the manner of filling them up. They recalled gently to memory the disagreement to which the senate had been exposed two years before, when remaining behind the wishes of general Bonaparte. They produced aloud a specious reason to prevent his advancing alone. The army, they said, exalted to the highest pitch in favour of its chief, was ready to proclaim him emperor, and then the empire would be as at Rome, given away by the pretorians. It was necessary, by hastening, to spare France so great a disgrace. They could not but follow the example of the Roman senate, that more than once was forced to proclaim certain emperors, in order to avoid receiving them from the dictation of the legions. Then came a reason which need not be told too loudly or too softly, it was, that there remained for distribution a great part of the senatorial places instituted at the time of the consulate for life, which would procure a territorial dotation, a surplus above the pecuniary income granted to each senator. There would be also, besides, a profusion of new places to distribute. It was therefore necessary, when they were not able to resist the elevation of their new master, not to expose themselves to displease him. It is still but just to add, that to these base motives there were also some of a better kind to be added. Except an opposition very few in number, of which M. Sieyès was the leader, but with which he himself got disgusted, as he did with every thing, and that he had abandoned it to leaders much more insignificant than himself; except this opposition, the mass saw in the monarchy the door through which the revolution was bound to go and seek its own safety.

These reasons, of a nature so diverse, secured the majority of the senate, and that body resolved to give a significant reply to the message of the first consul. The following was the sense of this reply:—

The institutions of France are incomplete under two heads. First, there is no tribunal for great offences against the state, and it is required to leave them to a jurisdiction insufficient and feeble (what passed in the tribunal of the Seine on the occasion of the process against Pichegru and Moreau, filled the public with the same sentiment). Secondly, the government of France rested upon one head, and it was a perpetual temptation for the conspirators, who believed that in striking down that head, all would be destroyed with it. It was thus a double want that it was necessary they should denounce to the first consul, in order to provoke his solicitude, and, in case of necessity, his commencement of the affair.

On the 6th Germinal, or 27th March, two days after the audiences above reported, the senate was called to deliberate upon the draft of a reply. Fouché and his friends had prepared every thing, without making it known to the consul Cambacérès, who ordinarily presided in the senate. It appears that they did not even acquaint the first consul, with the view of causing him an agreeable surprise. This surprise was not any thing like equally agreeable to M. Cambacérès, who was astounded on hearing the reading of the report of the commission. Still he showed himself impassive, and left nothing of it to be perceived by the numerous eyes fixed upon him, desirous of knowing how far all that had been done was agreeable to the first consul, of whom he was imagined to be the confidant and accomplice. At this reading might be perceived a light but very sensible murmur in a part of the senate; nevertheless, the project was adopted by an immense majority, and it was to be communicated on the morrow to the first consul.

Scarcely had he quitted the sitting before M. Cambacérès, piqued at not having been made acquainted with the proceeding, wrote to the first consul at Malmaison, and told him all that had occurred, in a letter sufficiently cool. The first consul came to Paris on the following day to receive the senate, but first wished to have an explanation with his two colleagues. He himself appeared astonished at the precipitation of the measure, and in some sort taken by surprise: "I have not reflected enough," he said to Cambacérès; "I have need to consult you again, and many others, before taking a decided part. I will go and reply to the senate that I am deliberating. But I will neither receive it officially, nor publish its message. I will not let any thing transpire without doors, so long as my resolution shall not

be definitively fixed." The proceeding thus agreed upon, was carried into effect the same day.

The first consul received the senate as he had announced he would do, and replied verbally to its members, that he thanked them for such testimonies of their devotion to him; but that he had need to deliberate carefully upon the subject they had submitted to his attention, before making a public and definitive reply.

Although a witness and silent accomplice of all that had been done, the first consul was nearly anticipated in his desires. The impatience of his partisans had surpassed his own, and he was very clearly not yet ready for the measure. The act of the senate was not, therefore, made public, although absolute secrecy was impossible; but while he had not taken the official and avowed step forward, he could always retire in case of encountering an unforeseen obstacle.

Before advancing to that point from whence he could never again retrograde, the first consul wished to be certain of the army and of Europe. In reality he did not doubt either the one or the other, because he was beloved by the first, and feared by the second. But it was a cruel sacrifice to impose upon his companions in arms, who had shed their blood for France, and not for one man, to desire that they should accept him for a sovereign. After the effect produced in Europe by the death of the duke d'Enghien, it was a singular act of condescension to demand of all the legitimate princes, that they should recognise for an equal a soldier who had but a few days before dipped his hands in the blood of the Bourbons. Although he expected to receive the reply which the power of the soldier commanded, he was wise to assure himself of that reply beforehand.

The first consul wrote to general Soult and to those generals in whom he had the most confidence, to ask their opinion upon the proposed change. He had not, he said, taken any part, nor sought in that step aught but what was best for France; and wished, before his decision, to gather the opinion of the heads of the army. The answer was, assuredly, not a doubtful one; but it provoked at least protestations of devotion, which would serve by way of example, and secure the lukewarm or retiring.

In regard to Europe, the condescension, although very probable, presented still more of doubt. He was at war with England, and with that country he need not concern himself. The new relations of France with Russia made it a point of dignity not to address her. Spain, Austria, Prussia, and the smaller powers, remained to be consulted. Spain was too feeble to refuse; but the blood of a Bourbon, recently shed, required that some weeks should pass before applying to that power. Austria had appeared the least sensible of all the powers to the violation of the Germanic territories; and in her profound indifference for all which was not her interest, there was nothing which might not be expected of her. But in a matter of etiquette she was difficult to manage, trifling, and jealous, as were all the old and qualified courts. An emperor, because the title had been decided upon, as at the same time more grand, novel, and military than that of king—an emperor to be joined to the list of sovereigns, was a thing to which the chief of the holy Roman empire would be little inclined to accord his consent.

Prussia was yet, in spite of her recent coolness, the power which was the most facile to dispose favourably. A courier was immediately sent to Berlin with an order to M. Laforest to see M. Haugwitz, in order to learn from him if the first consul might be enabled to hope for recognition by the king of Prussia in quality of hereditary emperor of the French. This was demanded in such a manner as to place the young king between a lively gratitude or a bitter resentment on the part of France. M. Laforest had an order to leave no trace of such a step in the archives of the legation. As to Austria, without writing to M. de Champagny at Vienna, and without hazarding any direct overtures, a means close at hand was employed, by sounding M. Cobentzel, who, always near M. Talleyrand, expressed an immoderate desire to please the first consul. M. Talleyrand was just the minister to manage such a negotiation. He obtained from M. Cobentzel the most satisfactory words, but nothing positive. It was needful he should write to Vienna for power to give a decisive reply.

The first consul was obliged, therefore, to wait fifteen days before he could answer the senate, and permit the labourers at his new grandeur to pursue their work. Still the addresses of the great cities and principal authorities continued to be received. They were satisfied by not inserting them in the *Moniteur*.

The king of Prussia was found to be in the best disposition for the acknowledgment. This prince, after turning towards Russia, and secretly allying himself with her, feared he had done too much in that direction, and made his censures too visible for the catastrophe that had happened at Ettenheim. He required, therefore, nothing better than to have an instance of the personal testimony of his good will to give to the first consul. M. Laforest had scarcely spoken the first words on the subject to M. Haugwitz, than he stopped the completion of what M. Laforest had begun, by hastening to declare that the king of Prussia would not hesitate to acknowledge the new emperor of the French. Frederick-William expected fresh censures on the part of the factious coterie that was in action around the queen; but he well knew how to brave its censures for the benefit of his kingdom, and he regarded the continuance of good intelligence with the first consul, as the first of his interests. It is needful to add, that he experienced a feeling of satisfaction, that all the other courts equally experienced, at seeing the republic abolished in France. Monarchy alone could satisfy those courts, and the return of the Bourbons seemed actually impossible. General Bonaparte was the new monarch whom all the powers expected to see mount the throne of France. This is one proof, among a thousand others, of the slight duration that certain impressions make upon men, above all when they feel interested in erasing them from their hearts. All the courts were about to acknowledge that man for an emperor who, amid their angry feelings, just fifteen days before, they had called a regicide and an assassin.

The king of Prussia himself wrote a letter to M.

Lucchesini, which was communicated to the first consul, and contained the most amicable expressions. "I shall not hesitate," said the king, "to authorize you to seize, as soon as possible, an occasion to testify to M. Talleyrand, that after having seen with pleasure the supreme power conferred for life upon the first consul, I shall see with more interest still the order of things established by his wisdom and great actions, consolidated by the hereditary authority in his family, and that I shall not find any difficulty in acknowledging it. You will add, that I flatter myself that this unequivocal proof of my sentiments will be of equal value in his eyes to all the securities and guarantees that it was possible to offer him in a formal treaty, of which the basis in fact exists; and that I hope to be able to reckon in my turn on the effects of this friendship and reciprocal confidence, which I desire to see constantly subsist between the two governments." Dated April 23, 1804.

These words, although sincere in the main, were nevertheless not altogether conformable to the spirit of the treaty signed with Russia; but an immoderate desire for peace led this prince into falsifications the most unworthy of his character.

Things passed differently at Vienna. No engagement had been there entered upon with Russia; they would not there redeem a concession made to one by a concession to others; they only considered in that court their interest, calculated in the best mode possible. The death of the duke d'Enghien, the violation of the Germanic territory, all that was regarded of very middling importance. The indemnification to be exacted for the sacrifice they might make in acknowledging the new emperor, was the sole consideration of which they kept a reckoning. At first, in spite of the inconvenience of disobliging Russia in conceding a point highly agreeable to the French government, it was necessary to resign themselves to acknowledge Napoleon; because to refuse to do so had been to place themselves in a state of war in regard to France, or very nearly so, which they wished before all things to avoid doing, at least for the moment. But it was necessary, to obtain a part of the acknowledgment, which it made the question of its consent to wait a little at that point, to obtain payment by certain advantages, and to represent to Russia, as an awkward delay, the time employed to negotiate the advantages which it was so desirable to obtain. Such was the Austrian policy; and it must be agreed, that this was but the natural course between nations that lived one towards the other in a state of perpetual distrust.

Since the extreme weakening of the Austrian party in the empire, it was very possible to occur, that at the approaching election Austria might lose the imperial crown. There was a means to ward off this inconvenience, and that was to insure to the house of Austria for her hereditary states, not a royal but an imperial crown, in such a mode that the head of that house remained emperor of Austria, in case he should cease, by the changes of any future election, to be emperor of Germany. It was this with which they had charged M. de Champagny at Vienna, and M. Cobentzel at Paris, as the request to be made of the first consul, being a price demanded in exchange for that which he had requested on his own account. In other respects, it was declared to him, that, except a discussion upon the conditions, the principle of the acknowledgment was admitted without delay by the emperor Francis.

Although the first consul had little doubt of the disposition of the powers, their replies filled him with satisfaction. He lavished testimonies of gratitude and friendship upon the court of Prussia. He thanked in a manner not less warm the court of Vienna, and replied, that he consented without making any difficulty to acknowledge the title of emperor in the head of the house of Austria. He only stipulated that he was not willing to publish such a declaration immediately, in order not to appear to purchase the acknowledgment of his title at any price whatever. He should prefer, by a secret treaty, to bind himself to acknowledge at a later time the successor of Francis II. as emperor of Austria, if that successor should lose the rank of emperor of Germany. Still, if the court of Vienna insisted, he was ready to give up this difficulty which was not a difficulty after all, because, in reality, these different titles had no more real importance. From Charlemagne down to the eighteenth century, there had not been in Europe but a single sovereign holding the title of emperor, at least in the west. Since the eighteenth century, there had been two, the czar having taken upon himself this qualification. There would be three after what now took place in France, and there would be one day four if a future German election should give an emperor not taken out of the house of Austria. It was even thought that the king of England, having denominated the united parliament of Great Britain and Ireland the "imperial parliament," might be tempted to entitle himself emperor. In that case there would be five. All this did not require that it should stop there. They were all empty titles without the value that was formerly annexed to them when Francis I. and Charles V. disputed between them the suffrages of the Germanic electors.

Independently of these tranquillising assurances on the part of the principal courts, the first consul had received from the army the most impressive testimonies of its adhesion to him. General Soult particularly had written him a letter full of the most satisfactory declarations, and in the fifteen or twenty days that had passed in correspondence with Vienna and Berlin, the great cities of Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris, had sent up energetic addresses in favour of the re-establishment of the monarchy. The movement was general, the eclat of the object as forcible as it was well able to be; it was necessary therefore to proceed to official measures, and finally to explain in regard to the senate.

The first consul, as already seen, had not publicly received the senate, nor had he replied in any other than a verbal manner to the message of the 6th Germinal. It had been nearly a month that he had made it wait for the official answer. This answer was given on the 3rd Floréal, or 25th of April, 1804, and it brought the winding up of the plot that was expected:—

"Your address of the 6th Germinal," said the first consul, "has never ceased being present to my mind. You have deemed hereditary succession necessary to place the French people in security

from the conspiracies of our enemies and the agitations which are engendered by ambitious rivals; many of our institutions it has in the mean time appeared to you necessary to render perfect, to ensure, in return, the triumph of equality and of public liberty, and to offer to the nation and government the double guarantee required. In proportion as I have directed my attention to these serious subjects, I have more and more been sensible, that under a situation as new as it is important, the advice resulting from your wisdom and experience was necessary to me. I therefore invite you to make known to me all your ideas upon the subject."

This message was not immediately published, any more than that to which it seemed to be the reply. The senate immediately assembled for the purpose of deliberation. The deliberation was not difficult, the result being known beforehand; the proposition being to convert the consular republic into an hereditary empire.

Still it was necessary that all should not pass over in silence, and it was therefore agreed to discuss a portion of the grand resolution thus preparing, in some one of the bodies of the state where the proceeding could be public. The senate did not debate; the legislative body heard the official orators, and voted in silence. The tribunate, although diminished and converted into a section of the council of state, still preserved its discussions. It was resolved to make use of it, in order that there might be heard, in the only place which had reserved to itself the possibility of contradiction, a few words having the semblance of freedom.

The tribunate had at that time for its president M. Fabre de l'Aude, a personage devoted to the Bonaparte family. The choice of the tribune, whose former opinions had been avowedly republican, was arranged upon with him in order to take the lead upon the occasion. The tribune Curée, the fellow-countryman[1] and personal enemy of Cambacérès, was selected to play that character. It was believed by the public that this personage, the supposed creature of the second consul, had been chosen and put forward by him. This was not correct. It was unknown to Cambacérès, and even in opposition to his wish, that M. Curée was fixed upon. This last personage, formerly an ardent republican, and, like many others, come back again to monarchical ideas, drew up a motion in which he laid down the hereditary succession in favour of the Bonaparte family. M. Fabre de l'Aude took this to St. Cloud, in order to submit it for the approbation of the first consul. The latter seemed very little satisfied, and thought that the language of the individual, thus disabused of his republican notions, showed little ability or elevation. Still there was the inconvenience of choosing another member of the tribunate in rejecting it. He therefore suffered the text to remain that had been submitted to him, and sent it immediately to M. Fabre de l'Aude. This text had undergone at St. Cloud a singular change. In lieu of the words, "hereditary in the family of Bonaparte," the words were changed to "hereditary in the descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte." M. Fabre de l'Aude was the particular friend of Joseph Bonaparte, and one of the members of his social circle. Evidently, the first consul, discontented with his brothers, would not have any constitutional engagement on their behalf. Those who wished to please Joseph, went to work about M. Fabre de l'Aude, and they carried back the projected motion to St. Cloud, in order to replace the words "Bonaparte family," in lieu of the "descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte." The document was sent back, having the word "descendants" still remaining without any explanation.

M. Fabre resolved not to make any noise about this circumstance, and to give to M. Curée the copy of the motion just as it had come out of the hands of the first consul, but inserting the version preferred by the partizans of Joseph. He believed that the motion once presented and reproduced in the *Moniteur*, they would not venture to change it; and he resigned himself, if it became necessary, to a painful explanation upon the subject with the first consul. This was a proof that the party surrounding the brothers of Bonaparte were sufficiently powerful, allied together, to brave for their interest the displeasure of the head of the family. All these proceedings were sent daily to Joseph, who had already reached the camp at Boulogne.

On Saturday, the 8th Floréal, or 28th of April, 1804, the motion of M. Curée was deposited in the tribunate, and the discussion of which it was to be the subject, was fixed upon for Monday, the 10th of Floréal. A crowd of speakers pressed forward to the tribune in support of the measure, demanding, in emulation of each other, the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by a dissertation on the advantages of the monarchy. The main point being, in truth, to become its adherents.

The revolution of 1789 had been directed to the abolition of feudal rights, a reform of the social state, the suppression of abuses introduced under arbitrary rule, and the reduction of the absolute power of the sovereign, by the intervention of the nation in the government. These were just and legitimate wishes. All that exceeded these limits had passed by the object, and had done nothing but bring misfortunes upon the country. The most painful experience had taught this lesson to France. It was necessary to profit by its past experience, and to revert to that which had been thus overdone. The monarchy was, therefore, to be re-established on new bases, upon constitutional liberty and civil equality. With a monarchy there could be only one particular monarch possible, and that was Napoleon Bonaparte, and the remaining members of his family.

The more zealous of the orators in the tribunate added to their harangues invectives against the Bourbons, and the solemn declaration that these princes were rendered for ever incapable of governing France; that every Frenchman ought at the price of his blood to oppose their return. It seemed that the lie they gave at this moment to themselves in proclaiming the monarchy, after having taken so many oaths to the republic, indivisible and imperishable, would have been a lesson to these orators, and have at least taught them to speak less affirmatively of the future.

[1] Cambacérès was a native of Montpellier, where he was born in 1753, and died in 1824. Curée was a native of the same city.—*Translator.*

But there is no lesson capable of preventing a troop of men, not above mediocrity of mind, from throwing themselves into the torrent which runs before them; all suffer themselves to be borne along, particularly when they believe they shall find honours and fortune in their course.

In the number of those eager people were found more immediately the men formerly signalised by their republican spirit, or those who, at a later period, were remarked for their zeal towards the Bourbons. One only personage, in the midst of the base adulations thus let loose, exhibited a real dignity of character. This personage was the tribune Carnot. Most assuredly he deceived himself in his general theory, because after what had been seen in France for ten years, it was difficult to admit that, for such a country, a republic was preferable to a monarchy; but this apostle of error was far worthier in his own attitude than the apostles of the truth, because he had over them all the advantage of a courageous and disinterested conviction. What rendered his courage the more honourable was, that so far from expressing himself like a demagogue, he expressed himself, on the contrary, as a wise and moderate citizen, the friend of order. He protested that he would submit himself, the next day, with perfect docility, to the sovereign whom the law might appoint, but that while the law was in progress, and when it became a subject of discussion, he would speak out his opinion.

He spoke at first with nobleness of the first consul, and of the great services which he had rendered to the republic. If, in order to secure tranquillity in France, and a reasonable degree of liberty, it was necessary to have an hereditary chief, he should be senseless, he said, to choose any other than Napoleon Bonaparte. No one had struck such terrible blows at the enemies of his country; no one had done so much for its civil organization. Had he given to France the civil code alone, his name would well deserve to pass down to posterity. He was not, therefore, doubtful, that if it were necessary to elevate the throne again, it was the first consul who should be placed upon it, and not the blind and vindictive race, that never re-entered France but to spill the blood of its best citizens, and re-establish the dominion of the narrowest prejudices. But if Napoleon Bonaparte had rendered France so many services, was there no other recompense to offer him than the sacrifice of the liberties of the country?

Carnot, without causing himself to lose sight in his remarks of the inconveniences or the advantages which attached to different forms of government, endeavoured to prove that at Rome, in the time of the empire, they had as much agitation as in that of the republic, and that they had not possessed less of the masculine and heroic virtues; that the ten centuries of the French monarchy had not been less tempestuous than those of all known republics; that under monarchy, the people attached themselves to families, identified themselves by their passions, rivalries, and hatred, making these causes as much questions of dispute as any others; that if the French republic had had its sanguinary times, these were troubles inseparable from its origin; that it proved more or less the necessity of a temporary dictatorship, as at Rome; that this dictatorship had been conferred upon Napoleon Bonaparte; that no one contested his possession of it; that it depended on him to make of it the most noble, the most glorious usage, in preserving it during the time necessary to prepare France for liberty; but that if he wished to convert it into an hereditary and perpetual power, he at once renounced a singular and immortal glory; that the new state founded twenty years since on the other side of the Atlantic, was a proof that it was possible to find peace and happiness under republican institutions; and that as regarded himself, he should for ever regret that the first consul did not wish to employ his power in procuring so great a felicity for his country. Examining the arguments often used, that there would be a better chance of a durable peace by approximating to those forms of government most generally received in Europe, he inquired if the acknowledgment of the new emperor would be as easy as people imagined; if they were prepared to take up arms in case such an acknowledgment were refused; if France, converted into an empire, would not as much tend to mortify Europe, to excite jealousy, and to provoke war, as if it were maintained in its existing situation of a republic!

Casting a final look back, and addressing to the past a noble adieu, the tribune Carnot said:

"Was liberty then exhibited to man that he might never possess its enjoyment? Was it to be offered to his desires incessantly, like the fruit to which he had no sooner stretched out his hand than he became death-stricken? No, I am unable to agree that I am to regard this great good, so universally preferred before all others, and without which all others are nothing, as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, that its reign is easy, and far more stable than that of any arbitrary or oligarchical government."

He finished by these words, attaching to the character of a good citizen:—

"Always ready to sacrifice my dearest affections to the interests of our common country, I shall content myself with having caused to be once more heard the accents of a free spirit; my respect for the law will be so much more assured from its being the result of long misfortunes, and from the reason that commands us at this moment imperiously to unite ourselves in front of the common enemy, an enemy always ready to foment discord, and with whom all means are legitimate, provided they arrive at the object of universal oppression, and the dominion of the seas."

Carnot evidently confounded liberty and the republic, the common error of all who reason as he did. A republic is not necessarily liberty, as monarchy is not of necessity social order. Oppression is encountered under a republic, as disorder is met with under a monarchy. Without good laws both one and the other will be found under either of those forms of government. But it is a main point to know whether, with wise laws, monarchy does not give in a higher degree than any other form of government the sum of possible liberty, and more than that the force of action necessary for great military states; above all, if the habits of twelve centuries have not rendered this form of government inevitable, or since that time desirable, in a country like France. If it has been thus,

would it not be better to admit it at once, and organize wisely, than to debate in a false position, which neither agrees with the ancient manners of France, nor with the necessity there is for a stable and satisfactory state of things? The illustrious tribune had only reason upon his side on one point; perhaps there was only the necessity for Napoleon, and a simple dictatorship, to terminate at a later period, according to Carnot, in a republic, according to the present view of things, in a representative monarchy. Napoleon was wonderfully selected by Providence to prepare France for a new regime, and to deliver over the care of aggrandizing and regenerating to those, whoever they might be, that should govern after him.

The tribune Carion de Nisas took upon himself the duty of replying to Carnot, and acquitted himself of his task to the great satisfaction of the new monarchy men, but with a mediocrity of eloquence that was only equal to the mediocrity of his ideas. With the last it was no more than a got up discussion. Tediousness, and a feeling of its perfect inutility, set a tolerably speedy termination to the sitting. A commission of thirteen members was formed to examine the motion of the tribune Curée, and convert it into a definitive resolution.

In the sitting of the 13th of Floréal, or 3rd of May, that is to say on the Thursday following, M. Jard Panvillier, the reporter of the commission, proposed to the tribunate to move a request that, according to the constitutional regulations in force, should be addressed to the senate, and carried up to that body by a deputation.

This request was as follows:

Firstly, that Napoleon Bonaparte, actually consul for life, should be named emperor, and in that character be charged with the government of the French republic.

Secondly, that the title of emperor and the imperial power should be hereditary in his family, male and male, according to the order of primogeniture.

Thirdly, that in carrying out, in the organization of the constituted authorities, the modifications which the establishment of the hereditary power may demand, equality, liberty, and the rights of the people should be preserved in their integrity.

This request, or prayer, adopted by an immense majority, was carried to the senate on the following day, the 14th Floreal, or 4th of May, 1804. M. François de Neufchâteau occupied the vice-president's chair at this sitting. After having heard the deputation from the tribunate, and having given effect to the request which they brought, he said to the tribunes, "I am not able to tear off the veil which for the moment covers the proceedings of the senate. I must nevertheless inform you, that since the 6th Germinal, we have fixed upon the same subject of which you have thought, mindful of the chief magistrate. But know for your advantage, that during two months past we have contemplated in silence, what your institution has permitted you to give out for discussion in presence of the public. The happy development which you have given to a great idea, will procure for the senate that has opened the tribune to you, the satisfaction of delight in the selection, and applause for the labour.

"In your public discourses you have penetrated to the bottom of our thoughts. As you do not, citizen tribunes, we do not desire to have the Bourbons; because we will not have a counter-revolution, the sole present that those unhappy deserters are able to make us, who have carried away with them despotism, nobility, feudality, servitude, and ignorance.

"Like you, citizen tribunes, we wish to raise up a new dynasty, because we wish to guarantee to the French people all the rights which they have reconquered. Like you, we wish that liberty, equality, and intelligence, should not again retrograde. I speak not of the great man called forward by his glory to give his name to the age. It is not for himself, it is for us, that he devotes himself. That which you propose with enthusiasm, the senate will consider with calmness."

It may be seen by these words of the vice-president, that the senate wished to keep to its time, and not expose itself again to be outstripped or surpassed in devotion to its new master. The secret directors of the change which they prepared, had well foreseen the influence which the discussion in the tribunate exercised over that body. They made it serve for hastening the resolution, saying it was needful that this resolution should be arranged the same day that the prayer of the tribunate would be communicated, in order that the two assemblages should appear to meet each other, and that the most considerable should not seem to come after the others. Thus they hastened to finish all as rapidly as possible. They devised the plan of addressing a memorial to the first consul, in which the senate should express its ideas, and propose the basis of a new organic senatus consultum. This memorial was, in fact, quite ready at the moment when the deputation of the tribunate was introduced. The draft was approved, and the presentation to the first consul immediately determined upon. It was arranged that this presentation should take place the same day, or on the 14th Floréal. In consequence, a deputation, composed of the officials and members of the commission who had prepared the memorial, waited upon the first consul, and handed to him the message of the senate and the memorial which contained its ideas on the new monarchical organization of France.

It was necessary, in fine, to give to these ideas the form of constitutional articles, a commission was named, composed of several senators, also of the ministers and the three consuls, which was charged to draw up the new senatus consultum. Not having any further precautions to take in respect to publicity, there were inserted in the *Moniteur* on the morrow, all the acts of the senate, the communications which it had had with the first consul, those which it had received, and all the addresses which for some time before had been sent to the government, praying the re-establishment of the monarchy.

The commission nominated set about its labours. It met at St. Cloud, in presence of the first consul and his two colleagues. It examined and successively resolved all the questions which were designed for the establishment of the hereditary succession. The first which presented itself, was relative to the title of the new monarch. Should

he be styled king or emperor? The same reason that in ancient Rome had caused the Cæsars to resuscitate no more the title of king, and to take the all military one of emperor (*imperator*), decided the authors of the new constitution to prefer the same qualification. It presented at once more of novelty and of grandeur; it discarded, in a certain degree, the recollections of the past time, that it was wished only to restore in part, and not by any means entirely. Besides, there was in this designation something of the vastness, the illimitability, which suited best the ambition of Napoleon. His numerous enemies in Europe, in attributing to him, daily, projects which he had not conceived at all, or had not yet imagined, by repeating in a multitude of publications, that he dreamed about reconstituting the empire of the West, or at least that of the Gauls, had thus prepared every mind, even his own, for the title of emperor. This title was in every mouth, whether of friends or enemies alike, before it was really adopted. It was settled upon without any dispute, in consequence, that the first consul should be proclaimed emperor of the French.

The hereditary succession, the end of this new revolution, was very naturally established upon the principles of the Salic law, that is to say, male succeeded male in the order of primogeniture. Napoleon not having children, and appearing as if destined to have none, it was thought of giving him the power of adoption, such as was once a part of the Roman institutions, with the same conditions and solemn forms. In default of adopted descent, the transmission of the crown was permitted in the collateral line, not to all the brothers of the emperor, but to Joseph and Louis exclusively. These were the only two of the family who had acquired for themselves real respect. Lucien, by the kind of life he led, and by his recent marriage, had disqualified himself for a successor. Jerome, scarcely out of his adolescence, had married an American lady, without the consent of his relations. Only Joseph and Louis, therefore, were admitted to the succession. In order to prevent the inconveniences of misconduct in a numerous family, so recently elevated to the throne, an absolute power was given to the emperor over all the members of the imperial family. It was settled that the marriage of a French prince, contracted without the consent of the chief of the empire, should bar all right to the hereditary succession for such prince and his children. A dissolution of the marriage so contracted could alone enable him to recover the lost right.

The brothers and sisters of the emperor received the rank of princes and princesses, as well as the honours attached to these titles. It was resolved that the civil list should be established upon the same principles as that of 1791; in other words, that it should be voted for the whole reign, that it should be composed of the royal palaces still existing, of the product of the domains of the crown, and a revenue of 25,000,000 f. The endowment of the French princes was settled at a million of francs per annum for each of them. The emperor had the right of fixing, by the imperial decree, (corresponding to what are since called ordinances,) the interior regulations of the palace, and the arrangement of that kind of show and splendour which should be most agreeable to the imperial majesty.

On entering so completely into monarchical ideas, it was needful to place near the new throne a circle of grand dignitaries, that should serve it both for ornament and support. It was necessary, further, to consider these secondary ambitions, arrayed voluntarily beneath the great superior, that had been raised to the pinnacle of greatness, and were to receive, in their turn, the price of their private and public services. Each had now before his eyes the two consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, who, very far from their colleague in all respects, had, nevertheless, partaken in the supreme power, and had rendered incontestable services to the public by the wisdom of their counsels. They assisted, both the one and the other, in the conferences of the senatorial commission, that drew up at St. Cloud the new monarchical constitution. The consul Cambacérès, for the first time in his life perhaps, knew not how to dissimulate his displeasure, and showed himself cold and uncommunicative. He was as reserved as Fouché exhibited himself the other way in this respect, and he did not know how to dissimulate his vexation, except in the disdain which he exhibited towards the zeal which was shown by the constructers of the new monarchy. This situation of things brought about more than one conflict, which was speedily repressed, indeed, by the authority of Napoleon. The necessity of satisfying the two consuls going out of place by this new change was generally felt, above all, towards Cambacérès, who, in spite of some ridiculous jokes, enjoyed immense political consideration. They had, at first, thought to imitate in every thing the Roman empire, and to suffer the two consuls to remain by the emperor's side. No one is ignorant that after the elevation of the Cæsars to the empire, they preserved the institution of the consuls; that one of the senseless members of that family gave the title to his horse, that others gave them to their slaves or to their eunuchs, and that in the empire of the East, very near the period of its fall, they had still two consuls, chosen annually, charged with the vulgar guardianship of the calendar. It was this recollection, little flattering, that had inspired their friends, in other respects full of kind wishes, with the idea of preserving the two consuls in the new French empire. Fouché repelled such a proposition, and said, that it was necessary to have little care about those who lost place under the new organization; that what was, before all, most important, was not to suffer the existence of any trace of a deceased régime, such as that of the republic. "Those who lose any thing by the new régime," replied Cambacérès, "will have one consoling reflection; they will carry with them that which all those who go out of place cannot take with them, the esteem of the public." This allusion to Fouché and to the last time he quitted office, made the first consul smile, perfectly approving the reply; but it impressed him with the necessity of putting an end to such discussions, carried at last to a painful extent. The second and third consuls were, therefore, no longer summoned to the sittings of the commission.

Talleyrand, with the most ingenious inventions at command, when it was a point with him to

satisfy the ambitious, had conceived a scheme of borrowing from the Germanic empire some of its great dignities. Each of the seven electors was, in the old empire, one a field-marshal, another a cup-bearer, this a treasurer, that a chancellor of the Gauls or of Italy, and so on. In the idea, yet vague, of re-establishing perhaps at some future day, the empire of the West for the advantage of France, it was but to prepare the elements, by surrounding the emperor with grand dignitaries, chosen at the moment among the French princes, or the great personages of the republic, destined at a later time to become kings themselves, and to form a retinue of vassal monarchs around the throne of this modern Charlemagne.

Talleyrand and the first consul, between them, devised six grand officers, corresponding not to the various offices of the imperial domicile, but to the different attributes of the government. In this constitution, where there still remained many elective functions, where the members of the senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate, were to be elected, in which the emperor himself would become, in case of the extinction of direct descendants, a grand elector, charged with certain honorary cares relative to the elections, such an office may easily be imagined. The first great dignitary that was proposed, therefore, was a grand elector. For the second, an arch-chancellor of the empire, charged with a character purely representative, and with a general inspection over all, through the statements of the judicial department; for the third, an arch-chancellor of state, having a similar character to the last, connected with the diplomatic relations of the country; for the fourth, an arch-treasurer; for the fifth, a constable, and for the sixth, a grand admiral. The titles of these last sufficiently indicate to what department of the government their dignity answered.

The titularies of these great offices were, as will presently be seen, dignitaries and not functionaries, because they were to be irresponsible and immovable. They were to have attributes purely honorary, and only the general inspection of that portion of the government with which their titles connected them. Thus the grand elector convoked the legislative body, the senate, and the electoral colleges, presenting the oath to the members of the different assemblies, and taking a part in all the formalities that were attached to the convocation or dissolution of the electoral colleges.

The arch-chancellor of the empire received the oaths of the magistrates, or else presented them to the emperor for that purpose; he watched over the promulgation of the laws and the senatus consultum, presided in the council of state, the high imperial court, (of which mention will shortly be made,) urged forward the reforms desirable in the laws, in fine, exercised the functions of a state civil officer, as respected the births, marriages, and deaths of the imperial family. The arch-chancellor of state received the ambassadors, introduced them to the emperor, signed treaties and promulgated them. The arch-treasurer watched over the great book of the public debt, gave the guarantee of his signature to all the writings delivered to the state creditors, verified the summary of the general state accounts before they were submitted to the emperor, and delivered his own views upon the management of the finances. The constable, by reports to the war department, the grand admiral, by reports to that of the navy, both had duties perfectly similar. Thus the principle deposed by Napoleon was, that no grand dignitary could ever be a minister, in order to keep separate the preparatory attribute from the real function. These were in each division of the government, dignities modelled upon royalty itself, inactive, irresponsible, honorary, like that, but charged, as that is, with a general and superior superintendence.

The titularies of these dignities would be able to replace the emperor in his absence, whether in the senate, the council, or the army. They formed with the emperor the great council of the empire. Finally, in case of the extinction of natural and legitimate descendants, they elected the emperor, and in case of a minority, they watched over the heirship to the crown, and formed the council of the regency.

The idea of these grand dignitaries was agreeable to all the framers of the new constitution. Each titulary, at least when he was not at the same time a grand dignitary and an imperial prince, was to receive an income amounting to the third of the endowment of the princes, or one-third of a million. These were to be provided for the two brothers of the emperor, his late colleagues, and the most considerable personages who had rendered important military or civil services. Every one thought by these, after the emperor's two brothers Joseph and Louis, of the two consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, Eugene de Beauharnais, the adopted son of the first consul, Murat, his brother-in-law, Berthier, his faithful and useful companion in arms, and Talleyrand, his intermediate agent with the powers of Europe. The partition of such great favours awaited the will of the sovereign.

It was natural, also, to create in the army certain elevated posts, and to re-establish in that branch of service the dignity of marshal, which existed under the old monarchy, and is adopted throughout Europe as the most distinguished mark of military command. It was settled that there should be sixteen marshals of the empire, and four honorary marshals, the last chosen from among those old generals who were become senators, and were, in that quality, deprived of active functions. There were also re-established the posts of inspectors-general of engineers and artillery, and of colonels-general of cavalry. To these great military officers were added certain great civil officers of state, such as chamberlains, masters of the ceremonies, and others; and there were composed of both a second class of dignitaries, under the title of grand officers of the empire, as immovable as the six great dignitaries themselves. In order to give to them all a sort of hold upon the soil, they were charged with the presidentships of the electoral colleges. The presidentship of each electoral college was affixed in a permanent manner to one of these great dignities, and to the care of a civil or military officer. Thus the grand elector would preside over the electoral college of Brussels; the arch-chancellor over that of Bordeaux; the arch-chancellor of state over that of Nantes; the arch-treasurer over that of Lyons; the constable over that of Turin; the grand admiral over that of Marseilles;

the other great civil and military officers presided over the electoral colleges of less importance. This was as much as human artifice of the most able kind could imagine, in order to imitate an aristocracy with a democracy, because this hierarchy of six grand dignitaries and of forty or fifty great officers placed on the steps of the throne, was at once aristocratic and democratic; aristocratic by the position, the powers, and revenues which it would soon possess, thanks to the conquests made by France; democratic in its origin, because it was composed of lawyers, officers of fortune, and sometimes of peasants become marshals, all places remaining constantly open to every new candidate of genius or of talent. The creations have disappeared with the creator and the vast empire that served for their base; but it is possible that they would have terminated in success, if time had strengthened them, and added the age which engenders respect.

In upraising the throne and adorning the steps of its social pomp, it was impossible to dispense with the assurance of some guarantees to the citizens, to indemnify them by a little real liberty for that apparent liberty of which they were deprived by the abolition of the republic. They had repeated for some time, that under a monarchy well regulated, the government would be stronger, and the citizens more free. It was necessary to keep to a part of these professions, if it was possible to keep any single one of such a nature, at a time when all the world, desiring to have an energetic power, had suffered to perish, for lack of use, even the strongest liberty secured by the laws. It was therefore thought right to give to the senate and to the legislative body some prerogatives which they did not possess, and which, it was possible, might become useful guarantees to the citizens.

The senate, at first composed of eighty members elected by the senate itself, then of citizens whom the emperor judged worthy of that elevated position, in fine, of six grand dignitaries and of French princes of the age of eighteen years, was always the first body of the state. It composed the others by the faculty of election which it had preserved; it was able to extinguish any law or decree in consequence of its being unconstitutional, and to reform the constitution by means of an organic senatus consultum. It had remained, in the midst of the successive transformations to which it had submitted, as all-powerful as M. Sieyès had wished it should be. The restorers of the monarchy deliberating at St. Cloud, conceived the idea of giving it two new attributes of the highest importance—they confided to it the care of individual liberty and the liberty of the press. By the forty-sixth article of the first consular constitution, the government was not able to retain any individual in prison without referring him, within the space of ten days, to his natural judges. By the second consular constitution, that which had established the consulate for life, the senate, in case of a plot against the security of the state, had the power of deciding if the government should exceed the delay of ten days, and for how long a time it should be able to do so. It was desirable to regulate, in the most secure manner, this arbitrary authority, granted to the government at the expense of the liberty of the citizens. A senatorial commission was created, composed of seven members, selected by ballot, to be renewed successively by one member going out every four months. This commission was to receive the demands and remonstrances of the detained parties or their families, and to declare if their detentions were just, and required for the interests of the state. In the contrary case, if after having addressed a first, second, and third invitation to the minister who had ordered the arrest, that minister not setting free the individual who had demanded his freedom, the commission had the power itself to place him before the high imperial court, for the violation of individual liberty.

A similar commission, organized in the same manner, was charged to watch over the freedom of the press. It was the first time that this liberty had been named in the different consular constitutions, so lightly did they treat on its morrow the saturnalia of the press during the directory. As to the periodical press, that was left under the authority of the police. It was not for that they made any profession of interesting themselves. They only occupied themselves with books which were alone judged worthy of the liberty refused to the journals. They were unwilling, as was the case prior to 1789, to leave books to the arbitrary rule of the police. Every printer or bookseller, when a publication was found to be aggrieved by a public authority, had the power of addressing the senatorial commission charged with the duty of attending to the matter; and if, after having made an acquaintance with the interdicted or mutilated work, the senatorial commission disapproved of the rigorous conduct of the public authority, it made a first, second, and third notice to the minister, and after the third it was able, in case of a refusal to obey these repeated notices, to hand the minister over to the high imperial court.

Thus, besides the powers already enumerated, the senate had the care of watching over individual liberty and the liberty of the press. These two last securities were not without value. Doubtless nothing would be of previous efficacy under a despotism universally accepted. But under the successors of the depository of that despotism, if any there should be, such guarantees would not fail to acquire real strength.

They did something in the same sense for the organisation of the legislative body. The tribunate, as has been said several times, discussed alone the projected laws, and after having formed an opinion regarding them, sent three orators to sustain them against three counsellors of state before the legislative body, that remained silent. This silence, corrected in the idea of M. Sieyès by the loquacity of the tribunate, had soon become ridiculous in the sight of a nation given to raillery, that all the while fearing oratory and its excesses, still, nevertheless, laughed at the forced silence of its legislators. The dumb state of the legislative body had become yet more obvious since the tribunate, deprived of all energy, remained silent also. It was decided that the legislative body, after having heard the counsellors of state and the members of the tribunate, should retire to discuss in secret committee the projects which had been submitted to them, that every one of the members might speak, and that

subsequently it might enter upon a public sitting to vote in the ordinary way of the ballot.

The right of speech in secret committee was then given to the legislative body.

The tribunate become, since the institution of the consulate for life, a sort of council of state, reduced at this period to fifty members, and having from custom only to examine the projects of laws in private conferences with the counsellors of state, the authors of these projects, received in the new constitution an organization conformable to the usages which it was about to adopt. It was divided into three sections; the first that of legislation, the second of the interior, and the third of the finances. It could not deliberate on the laws save in an assembly of the sections, and never in a general assembly. Three orators were to go in the name of the section to support its opinion before the legislative body. This was to consecrate definitively, by a constitutional disposition, the new form imposed upon itself out of deference.

The power of the members was prorogued from five to ten years, a favour for the individuals, which diminished yet further the vitality of the body itself, and more rarely still renewed its spirit.

To all this was finally joined an institution which was wanted for the security of the citizens, it was that of a high court, which then in England and now in France is found in the bosom of the chamber of peers. The want of such a court appeared in the process for the conspiracy of Georges, and in the unfortunate execution at Vincennes. The disadvantage of this want was the more felt under a dictatorial government, of which the agents only offered a nominal responsibility, and it was not possible to bring them before any of the bodies of the state. They had not then, in effect, as they have to-day, the means to summon them before one of the chambers. It was of as much importance to procure a guarantee to the government against the authors of conspiracies, as it was to the citizens against the agents of the public authority.

They affected to give to the institution of the high court the apparent advantage that they endeavoured to bestow on the monarchical institution, that of adding as much to the liberty of the citizen as of strength to the ruling power. In consequence its seat was placed in the senate, still without composing it of the senate wholly and entirely. It was to be formed of sixty senators out of one hundred and twenty, of six presidents of the council of state, of fourteen counsellors of state, of twenty members of the court of cassation, of the grand officers of the empire, of six grand dignitaries, and of princes having acquired a deliberative voice. It was to be presided over by the archchancellor. The court was charged to take notice of all conspiracies entered into against the security of the state; against the person of the emperor; the arbitrary acts imputed to the ministers, and to their agents; acts of forfeiture and extortion; faults charged upon generals or admirals in the exercise of their commands; offences committed by the members of the imperial family, by the great dignitaries, the great officers, the senators, counsellors of state, and similar personages. It was besides a court of justice charged with the repression of great encroachments; a political jurisdiction for the ministers and agents of the public authority; a tribunal of the marshals for soldiers; and a court of peers for the grand personages of the state. A public prosecutor, attached permanently to this extraordinary jurisdiction, had the commission to prosecute from his office, in case complainants did not take the lead in prosecutions themselves.

The sole modification introduced into the ordinary régime of justice, was the appellation of "court," which was substituted for that of tribunal in those tribunals that were of the higher rank. The tribunal of cassation was to take the title of court of cassation, and the tribunals of appeal that of imperial courts.

It was arranged that there should again be made an act of reference to the national sovereignty, and that open registers, in the form commonly used, should receive the wishes of the citizens relative to the establishment of the hereditary imperial succession in the descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte, and his two brothers Joseph and Louis.

The emperor was within two years to take a solemn oath to preserve the constitution of the empire, in presence of the grand dignitaries, the great officers, the ministers, the council of state, the senate, the legislative body, the tribunate, the court of cassation, the archbishops, the bishops, the presidents of the courts of justice, the presidents of the electoral colleges, and the mayors of thirty-six of the principal cities and towns of the republic. This was to be taken upon the evangelists, while repeating the text of the new constitutional act to the French people. It was conceived in the following terms:

"I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the republic; to respect and make to be respected the laws of the concordat and the liberty of worship; to respect and make to be respected the equality of the laws, and liberty political and civil, the irrevocability of the sales of the national property; not to levy any tax, but in virtue of the law; to maintain the institution of the legion of honour; and to govern in the sole view of the interest, happiness, and glory of the French people."

Such were the conditions adopted for the new monarchy, in a project of the senatus consultum, written in a simple manner, precise and clear, as were all the laws of those days.

This was the third and last transformation of the celebrated constitution of M. Sieyès. We have elsewhere said that it had been the work of this legislator of the French revolution. The aristocratic régime is the haven where those republics pass into repose that do not finish in despotism. Sieyès, perhaps, without a doubt on the matter, had sought to conduct the French republic to the same port, as much disgusted with the agitations of ten years, as the republics of antiquity and of the middle ages after those of centuries; and he had composed his aristocracy with the notable and experienced men of the revolution. In order to do this, he had imagined an inactive senate, but armed with immense influence, electing its own members, and those of all the bodies of the state, in the lists of notability rarely renewed, nominating the chiefs of the government, revoking them, striking them with the ostracism at pleasure, not taking any part in making the laws, but able to abrogate them when of an unconstitutional character; not exercising, in a word, the power, but conferring it,

and having always the means of arresting it. He had added a legislative body, equally inactive, which admitted or rejected in silence the laws that the council of state had been charged to make, and the tribunate to discuss; then, lastly, a supreme representative of the executive power, called a grand elector, elective, and for life, like a doge, inactive as a king of England, nominated by the senate, nominating the ministers in his turn, alone acting, and alone responsible. In this fashion Sieyès separated every where the influence from the action; the influence that delegated the power, the control, and the decree, the action that it received and exercised; he had given the first to an idle aristocracy, highly placed; the second to agents elective and responsible. He had thus arrived at a sort of aristocratic monarchy, without hereditary succession, recalling Venice to mind more than Great Britain, adapted to a country tired of change rather than to one which was free.

Unhappily for the work of Sieyès, at the side of this aristocracy without root, composed of disabused and unpopular revolutionists, there was discovered a man of genius that France and Europe denominated a saviour. There were few chances in favour of this kind of an aristocracy defending itself like that of Venice, against usurpation, and more particularly that in these times of rapid revolutions, the contest would be very long. Before accepting this constitution of M. Sieyès, general Bonaparte had arranged his own place by making himself first consul in room of grand elector. Scarcely had he begun to govern, than the intemperate resistance of the tribunate restrained him in the good which he wished to accomplish. He had broken that down, to the great gratification of a public tired of revolutions, and he got the consulate for life given to him by the senate. On the same occasion he had added to the powers of the senate the constituent power, not fearing to render all-powerful a body which he himself governed; he had annulled the tribunate, by reducing that body to fifty members, and dividing it into sections, that discussed the proposed laws, hand to hand with the sections of the council of state. Such was the second transformation of the constitution of Sieyès, or that which had existed in 1802 at the period of the consulate for life. A vigorous hand had thus contrived to alter, in the course of two years, this aristocratic republic into a species of aristocratic monarchy, to which nothing but the hereditary succession was wanting.

Thus it was that in 1802, many persons demanded why the thing was not finished off at once; why the hereditary succession was not given to the palpable monarch? A conspiracy directed against his life awakened, with greater force than ever, the desire for more stable institutions, and, in fact, brought about the last transformation, and the definitive conversion of the constitution of the year VIII. into a monarchy, in form representative, but absolute in fact. There were found many republican remnants at the side of despotic authority, a little like those in the empire founded by the Cæsars at Rome. This was not representative monarchy, such as it is now understood. The senate, with the power to elect all the bodies of the state from the electoral lists, with its constituent power, with its faculty to abrogate laws, that senate, with so much of power, subjected to one master, bore no resemblance to an upper chamber. The silent legislative body, although it had the right of speaking in a secret committee, bore no resemblance to a chamber of deputies. Yet, for all this, that senate, that legislative body, all might become one day a representative monarchy. Thus the constitution of Sieyès, as modified by Napoleon, must not be judged by the dumb obedience that reigned under the empire.

The constitution of 1830, with the press and the tribune, would not have sensibly perhaps given different results, because the spirit of the time did more than the written laws. It would have done to judge the imperial constitution under a succeeding reign. Then the opposition, the inevitable consequence of a previous submission, would have had birth even in the senate, so long a time docile, but armed with enormous powers. It would have been found most probably in accord with the electoral colleges, making a choice conformable to the new spirit of the time; it would have broken the chains of the press; it would have opened the doors and windows of the palace of the legislative body, so that its orators might be heard afar. It had been then the representative monarchy existing at this day, with the difference, that the resistance would come from on high in place of below. This is no reason why it should be less enlightened, less constant, or less courageous. But here is a secret that time has carried away without explaining the event to us, as it has carried away many besides. Still these institutions were far from meriting the contempt which has been attached to them. They composed an aristocratical republic, turned aside from its object by a powerful head, converted temporally into an absolute monarchy, at a later period becoming again a constitutional monarchy, strongly aristocratic, it is true, but founded on the basis of equality; because every fortunate soldier would, under it, be able to arrive at the rank of constable; every able lawyer might become arch-chancellor; and after the example of the founder, any one might become, from a simple officer of artillery, an hereditary emperor, and master of the world.

Such was the work of the constituent committee that met at St. Cloud. During the last days of the meeting Cambacérès and Lebrun did not attend. The alterations that the monarchical zeal of Fouché, on one side, and the bad humour of Cambacérès, on the other, had provoked, were the motives for which they had ceased to summon the first and second consuls. The wisest of the senators, among those which composed the commission, had felt, and had made Napoleon feel how necessary it was to satisfy his two colleagues in the government by treating them with due consideration. It was not necessary to notice the subject to him, because he well knew the worth of Cambacérès, the second consul, appreciated his unostentatious devotion, and designed to attach him to the new monarchy. He made him come to St. Cloud, entered anew into an explanation with him on the last change, gave him his reasons, heard those of the second consul, and terminated the conversation by the expression of his will, henceforth become irrevocable. He desired a crown, and he was not to be contradicted. He

had, besides, a good indemnification to offer to Cambacérès and Lebrun. He designed for the first the dignity of the arch-chancellorship of the empire, for the second that of arch-treasurer. He thus treated them as he treated his own brothers, who were to be comprised in the number of the six grand dignitaries. He announced this resolution to Cambacérès; he added those seducing flatteries, which at that time no one was able to resist, and he succeeded in wholly regaining him.

"I am now," he said to Cambacérès, "and I shall be more than ever, surrounded with intrigues and falsely interested counsels; you alone will have judgment and sincerity enough to speak the truth to me. I wish, therefore, that you should approach yet nearer to my person and ear. You will continue to have all my confidence, and to justify it." These testimonies were merited. Cambacérès, not having any thing more to desire, and nothing more to fear for his elevated position, came to be, and was in effect the more sincere, the more true, the sole influential counsellor of all belonging to the new emperor.

Joseph Bonaparte was named grand elector, Louis Bonaparte constable. The two dignities of arch-chancellor of state and of grand admiral were reserved. Napoleon hesitated again about the different members of his family. He had thought of Lucien, who was absent, disgraced, but whose recent marriage he was in hopes of breaking; of Eugene Beauharnais, who had solicited nothing, but who with perfect submission awaited all the kindness of his adopted father; and of Murat, too, who solicited not by himself, but through his wife, young, handsome, and ambitious, but dear to Napoleon, and making use with cleverness of the tender regard which she inspired.

Talleyrand, the principal inventor of the new dignities, sustained on this occasion a disappointment, that influenced his disposition in a vexatious way, and at a later time threw him into an opposition, unhappy for himself, and unfortunate for Napoleon. The place of arch-chancellor of the empire, that corresponded with his judicial functions, having devolved upon the second consul, Cambacérès, he hoped that the arch-chancellorship of state, which corresponded with his diplomatic functions, would naturally devolve upon him. But the new emperor had positively explained himself upon the subject. He would not admit that the grand dignitaries should be ministers; he would only have in ministers agents removable and responsible, whom he could displace and punish at will. General Berthier was as precious an instrument to him as Talleyrand. He, nevertheless, wished him to remain a minister, as well as Talleyrand, indemnifying them by valuable gifts. The pride of Talleyrand was singularly wounded; and although ever a courtier, he commenced, notwithstanding, to suffer his attitude of a discontented man to become visible, though at that time it was tolerably restrained, but at a later period became less so, and gained for him at length severe disgrace.

Over and above these there remained, whether in the army or in the court, places fit to content every grade of ambition. There were four marshals' places, honorary ones, to be given to the generals who had gone to repose in the senate, and sixteen to those who, full of youth, were to figure for a long time yet at the head of the army in activity. Napoleon reserved the four honorary marshalships, the first for Kellermann and the recollections of Valmy; for Lefebvre, for his tried bravery and devotion on the 18th Brumaire; for Perignon and Serrurier, for the respect they so justly bore in the army. Of sixteen marshals' places vacant, destined for generals in active service, he wished to confer fourteen immediately, and to keep two for the recompense of future merit. These fourteen *bâtons* were given to general Jourdan, for the noble remembrance of Fleurus; to general Berthier, for his eminent services and continuance at the head of the staff; to general Massena, for Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa; to the generals Lannes and Ney, for a long succession of heroic actions; to general Augereau, for Castiglione; to general Brune, for the defence of the Helder; to Murat, for his chivalrous conduct at the head of the French cavalry; to general Bessières, as commander of the guard, which he had held since the day of Marengo, and of which he was worthy; to generals Moncey and Mortier, for their military merit; to general Soult for his services in Switzerland, at Genoa, and at the camp of Boulogne; and to general Davout, for his conduct in Egypt, and the firmness of character of which he had given such brilliant proofs; lastly, to general Bernadotte, for a certain degree of renown acquired in the armies of the Sombre and Meuse, as well as on the Rhine, for his consanguinity, more particularly, in spite of an envious hatred that Napoleon discovered in the heart of this officer, which had already given him the presentiment, several times loudly expressed, of future treason.

A general who had not yet commanded in chief, but who had, like generals Lannes, Ney, and Soult, directed considerable bodies of troops, and who merited the bâton of marshal as much as the officers already quoted, was not upon the list of new marshals. This was Gouvion St. Cyr, who, if he did not equal Massena in his warlike character under fire, surpassed him in intelligence and in military combinations. Since Moreau had been lost to France by his political errors, and since Kléber and Desaix were no more, he was with Massena the man most capable of commanding an army; Napoleon, it being well understood, could not be put in comparison with any one. But St. Cyr's jealous and unsocial character began to receive in return the coolness of the supreme distributor of favours. With the sovereign power came its weaknesses; and Napoleon, who pardoned Bernadotte for his petty treasons, the presage of a greater one, knew not how to pardon in St. Cyr his aspiring spirit. Still general St. Cyr had ranked among the colonels-generals, and became colonel-general of cuirassiers. Junot and Marmont, faithful aides-de-camp of general Bonaparte, were nominated colonels-generals of hussars and chasseurs, and Baraguay-d'Hilliers of dragoons. General Marescot received the rank of colonel-general of engineers, and general Songis that of inspector-general of artillery. In the navy, vice-admiral Bruix, the commander and organizer of the flotilla, obtained the bâton of admiral, and was made inspector-general of the coasts upon the

ocean; vice-admiral Decrès was named inspector-general of the coasts on the Mediterranean.

The court offered great situations for distribution. It was organized with all the pomp of the old French monarchy, and more brilliancy than the imperial court of Germany. It was to have a grand almoner, a grand chamberlain, a grand huntsman, a grand equerry, a grand master of the ceremonies, and a grand marshal of the palace. The office of grand almoner was conferred upon cardinal Fesch, uncle of Napoleon; that of grand chamberlain on Talleyrand; that of grand huntsman on general Berthier. To the two last these offices of the court were an indemnification destined to compensate them for not having obtained two of the grand dignities of the empire. The office of grand equerry was conferred upon M. de Caulaincourt, in order to make up to him for the calumnies of the royalists, pressing upon him since the death of the duke d'Enghien. M. de Segur, the former ambassador of Louis XVI. to Catherine of Russia, one of the men best adapted to teach the new court the usages of the old, was nominated grand master of the ceremonies. Duroc, who governed the consular now become the imperial household, was to remain the governor under the title of grand master of the palace.

Neither lesser appointments, nor the subaltern candidates who disputed for them, is it needful to cite here. History has only to recount the more prominent facts. It only descends to such details, when they are of importance for painting the manners of the time with fidelity. It need only be said that the emigrants, who before the death of the duke d'Enghien tended to approximate somewhat towards the government, and who after that event had for a moment gone off again, but who, forgetful of all the world, thought already less of a catastrophe grown two months old, began to figure in the number of candidates for honours, anxious to have places in the imperial court. Some were admitted. It was contemplated above all to organize for the empress a sumptuous household. A personage of high birth, Madame de la Rochefoucauld, destitute of beauty but not of mind, distinguished by her education and her manners, formerly very much of a royalist, and now laughing gracefully at its blind passions, was destined to be the principal lady of honour to Josephine.

These selections were known before they were published in the *Moniteur*, and published from mouth to mouth in the midst of the unfailing speeches of approvers and disapprovers; they had a great deal to do in order to communicate all that inspired them at so singular a spectacle, each censuring or applauding according to their friendships or their dislikes, the pretensions satisfied or crossed, scarcely any person following his political opinions, because then no one had any political opinions, except the hot-headed royalists or the implacable republicans.

To these nominations there was added one much more serious, that of M. Fouché, who was called to the ministry of the police, re-established for him, as a recompense of the services which he had rendered during the late events.

It was required to give to these selections, and to the greatest of all, that which created out of a general of the republic an hereditary monarch, the character of official acts. The senatus consultum was settled upon and drawn up. It was agreed that it should be presented to the senate on the 26th of Floréal, or 16th of May, 1804, in order that it might be decreed in the usual form. This presentation having taken place, a commission was immediately appointed to make its report. M. de Lacépède was charged with the report, a man of learning, and a senator devoted to Napoleon. It was completed in forty-eight hours, and carried to the senate on the morrow or 28th of Floréal, the 18th of May. This day was destined for the solemn proclamation of Napoleon as emperor. It had been decided that the consul Cambacérès should preside in the sitting of the senate, in order that his adhesion to the new monarchical establishment should be more striking. M. de Lacépède had scarcely finished reading his report, when the senators, without the appearance of a single dissentient, and with a sort of unanimous acclamation, adopted the entire senatus consultum. They even awaited with the utmost visible impatience the indispensable formalities with which such an act must be accompanied, so eager were they to proceed to St. Cloud. It was agreed that the senate should go in a body to that place, to present its decree to the first consul, and to salute him with the title of emperor. Scarcely was the adoption of the senatus consultum terminated, than the senators raised the sitting tumultuously, in order to reach their carriages and be the first to arrive at St. Cloud.

The necessary dispositions had been made at the palace of the senate, on the route, and even at St. Cloud, for this unequalled scene. A long file of carriages, escorted by the cavalry of the guard, carried the senators as far as the residence of the first consul on a superb day in spring. Napoleon and Josephine, having received notice, attended this solemn visit. Napoleon standing in military uniform, calm, as he knew how to bear himself when men regarded him, his wife at times satisfied and troubled, received the senate, which was conducted by the arch-chancellor Cambacérès. This his respectable colleague, and yet more respectable subject, addressed, bowing low, the following words to the soldier whom he was about to proclaim emperor:—

"SIRE,

"The love and gratitude of the French people have during four years confided to your majesty the reins of government, and the constitutions of the state already make in you their choice of a successor. The denomination more imposing which is decreed you to-day is nothing but the tribute which the nation pays to its own dignity, and to the necessity which it feels of giving you every day fresh testimonies of an esteem and attachment which every day sees augmenting. How can the French people think without enthusiasm of the happiness it has received since Providence inspired it with the thought of throwing itself into your arms!

"The armies had been vanquished; the finances were in disorder; public credit was annihilated; factions disputed among them the remnants of our former splendour; the sense of religion and even of morals was obscured; the habit of giving and of taking away authority left the magistrates without respect.

"Your majesty appeared. You recalled victory to our standard; you established order and economy in the public expenditure; the nation, encouraged by the acts which you knew how to perform, regained confidence in its own resources; your wisdom calmed the fury of parties; religion saw you raise up her altars; finally, and this is without doubt the greatest of the miracles operated by your genius, the people that civil effervescence had rendered incapable of all restraint, the enemy of every authority, you have known how to make cherish and respect a power that was never exercised except for its glory and repose.

"The French people does not pretend to make itself a judge of the constitutions of other states; it has no critical remarks to make, no examples to follow; experience henceforward will become its teacher.

"It had for ages tasted the advantages attached to hereditary power; it had made a short experiment, but a painful one, of the contrary system; it re-enters, through the effect of a free deliberation, upon a régime conformable to its own nature. It freely uses its right to delegate to your imperial majesty a power that its interest forbids it to exercise of itself. It stipulates on behalf of the generations to come, by a solemn compact confiding the happiness of its posterity to the offspring of your race.

"Happy the nation that after so many troubles finds in its bosom a man capable of appeasing the tempest of angry passions, of conciliating all interests, and of uniting all suffrages!

"If it is in the principles of our constitution to submit to the sanction of the people the part of the decree which concerns the establishment of the hereditary government, the senate has thought it is bound to supplicate your imperial majesty to agree that the organic dispositions should receive their execution immediately; and for the glory, as for the honour and happiness of the republic, it proclaims at this moment, *Napoleon, emperor of the French!*"

Scarcely had the arch-chancellor terminated these words, when the cry of "Long live the emperor," resounded beneath the ceilings of the palace of St. Cloud. Heard in the courts and in the gardens, the same cry was repeated there with joy and tumultuous applauses. Confidence and hope were in all countenances, and all who attended, enchained by the interest of the scene, believed that for a long time they had insured their happiness and that of France. The arch-chancellor, Cambacérès himself, led away, seemed to have always desired that which at this moment he accomplished.

Silence being re-established, the emperor addressed the following words to the senate:—

"All that can contribute to the good of the country is essentially allied to my happiness.

"I accept the title that you believe is of utility to the glory of the nation.

"I submit to the sanction of the people the law of hereditary succession. I hope France will never have to repent the honours with which she has surrounded my family.

"In all cases, my spirit will cease to animate my posterity the day when it will cease to merit the love and confidence of the great nation."

Reiterated acclamations followed these noble words; then the senate, through the organ of its president Cambacérès, addressed some phrases of congratulation to the new empress, which she heard, according to custom, with perfect good grace, and to which she did not reply except by her deep emotion.

The senate afterwards retired, having attached to this man, born so far from a throne, the title of emperor, which he never more lost, even after his fall and in his exile. He will henceforward be so styled here; it was his own title, dating from the day just described. The wish of the nation was so certain, that there was something puerile in the care that was taken to state it; the wish of the nation was to decide the hereditary succession; but in the meanwhile he was emperor of the French, by the power of the senate acting within the limit of its privileges.

When the senators retired, Napoleon retained the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and desired him to remain and dine with the imperial family. The emperor and empress loaded him with their kindnesses, and endeavoured to make him forget the distance that henceforward separated him from his old colleague. Besides this the arch-chancellor might well console himself; in reality he had not descended; his master had only risen, and had raised every body with himself.

The emperor and the arch-chancellor Cambacérès had to confer upon several important subjects which were allied to the events of that day. These were the ceremony of the coronation and the new régime to be given to the Italian republic, which it was not possible to keep so near France, thus converted into a monarchy. Napoleon, who was fond of the marvellous, had conceived a bold idea, the accomplishment of which might seize upon the public mind, and render still more extraordinary his accession to the throne. This was to have himself crowned by the pope in person, transported for the purpose of such a solemnity from Rome to Paris. The thing had no example in the eighteen centuries that the church had existed. All the emperors of Germany, without exception, had gone to be crowned at Rome. Charlemagne proclaimed emperor of the West in the church of St. Peter, in some sort by surprise, on Christmas-day, 800, had not seen the pope displaced even for him. Pepin, it is true, had been crowned in France by pope Stephen, but this pope had gone there to solicit succour against the Lombards. It was the first time that a pope would have quitted Rome to consecrate the rights of a new monarch in the new monarch's own capital. The instance in past time, to which it had a resemblance, was the effect of the church recompensing, by the title of emperor, the fortunate soldier who had lent it succour; a wonderful resemblance with Charlemagne, by replacing in a way fully sufficient, that legitimacy of which the Bourbons so vainly boasted, but rendered of small esteem by their defeat, their misconduct, and their co-operation in unworthy plots.

This idea scarcely conceived, Napoleon at once converted it into an irrevocable resolution, and promised himself to bring Pius VII. to Paris by some means, either by seduction or fear. It was the most difficult of negotiations, one in which no other

than himself would have been able to succeed. He proposed to help his object through cardinal Caprara, who did not cease to write to Rome, that without Napoleon, religion would have been lost in France, and perhaps even in Europe. He communicated his design to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and arranged with him the best steps to be taken, to make the first attack upon the prejudices, the scruples, and the inaction of the Roman court.

As to the Italian republic, it would have been for two years before a theatre of confusion without the presidency of general Bonaparte. At first M. Melzi, an honest man, sensible enough, but morose, eaten up with the gout, always ready to give in his resignation as vice-president, not having the character necessary for supporting the heavy weight of the government, was a very insufficient representative of the public authority. Murat, commandant of the French army in Italy, caused broils in the Italian government, which added to the vexatious position of M. Melzi. Napoleon interfered unceasingly to keep the two authorities in agreement. To these present difficulties were joined those which necessarily arise from the very foundation of things. The Italians, as yet little fashioned to a constituent régime, that admitted them to a participation in their own affairs, were always either in a state of perfect indifference or of extreme vehemence. For governing purposes there were only a moderate few to be found, very much troubled in supporting the character they had to sustain, placed as they were between the nobles devoted to the Austrians, the liberals to Jacobinism, and the mass of the people sensible to nothing but the weight of taxation. These last complained of the expenses of the French occupation. "We are governed by strangers, and our money goes beyond the mountains:" this kind of discourse, so common in Italy, was again heard under the new republic as it had been under the sway of the house of Austria. There were but a small number of enlightened men, who felt that, thanks to general Bonaparte, the greater part of Lombardy, united in a single state, governed in reality by those of the same nation, placed only under an exterior and distant inspection, was thus called into an existence of its own, the commencement of an Italian unity; that is, they must pay twenty millions per annum for a French army, a very moderate indemnity for the support of an army of thirty or forty thousand men, indispensable, if they would not again fall under the yoke of the Austrians. Nevertheless, in spite of the sombre hue with which the sickly mind of M. Melzi coloured the picture of Italian affairs, those affairs, after all, went on peaceably, under the dominant hand of Napoleon.

To convert this republic into a vassal monarchy of the empire, and bestow it upon Joseph Bonaparte, for example, was to commence the empire of the West, that Napoleon already dreamed about, in an ambition, henceforward without limits; it was to assure a régime more stable in Italy; it was probably to content it, because the Italians loved much to have a prince among them; and being a change, it would have satisfied, if only by the title, their uneasy and restless imaginations. It was agreed that the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, very intimate with M. Melzi, should write to him, in order to make upon the subject such overtures as seemed most advisable.

Napoleon, after having placed in due accord with his old colleague all he had to do at that time, commanded the cardinal legate to attend at St. Cloud, spoke to him in an affectionate tone, but in one so positive, that it did not come into the cardinal's mind to dare a single objection. Napoleon told him that he charged him expressly to request the pope to come to Paris to officiate at the ceremonial of the coronation; that he would make the formal demand at a later period, when he was certain of not being refused: that he did not doubt the success of his wishes; that the church was bound to adhere to him, and owed it to herself to do so, because nothing would more serve religion than the presence of the sovereign pontiff in Paris, and the union of religious to the civil pomp on such a solemn occasion. Cardinal Caprara sent off a courier to Rome, and Talleyrand, on his side, wrote to cardinal Fesch, to inform him of the new design, and request him to support the negotiation.

It was spring, Napoleon wished the journey of the pope to take place in the autumn. He proposed to himself the addition of another wonder to that of the pope crowning at Paris the representative of the French revolution; this was the expedition to England, that he had adjourned in consequence of the royalists' conspiracy and of the institution of the empire, but of which he had so far completed the preparations, that the success did not seem in his own view to be doubtful. A month, more or less, was only necessary for his purpose, because he desired to strike a blow like a thunder-bolt. He designed July or August for this grand operation. He hoped, then, towards October to return victorious, possessed of the definitive peace, and of all the power of Europe, and to be able to get himself crowned by the commencement of the winter on the anniversary day of the 18th Brumaire, or 9th of November, 1804. In his ardent mind, he turned over all these projects, and it will be soon seen, by the last combination he devised, that they were not an utter chimera.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès wrote, on his side, to M. Melzi, regarding the affairs of the new kingdom of Italy. M. Marescalchi, the minister of the Italian republic in Paris, was to support the overtures of Cambacérès to M. Melzi.

The subsequent days were employed in taking the oath to the new sovereign of France. All the members of the senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate, were successively introduced. The arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, standing at the side of the emperor, who was seated, read the form of the oath; the personage admitted swore directly afterwards; the emperor, half raising himself from his imperial chair, returned a light salute to him from whom he had just received homage. This sudden difference introduced into the relations between the subject and the sovereign, who, the day before, was their equal, produced some sensation among the members of the bodies of the state. After having given him the crown under a sort of hurried train of events, they were surprised on seeing the first consequences of what they had done. Carnot, the tribune, true to his promise of

submitting to the law when once passed, took the oath with the other members of the tribunate. He there exhibited the dignity of obedience to the law, appearing even to perceive less than others the changes operated in the external forms of power. But the senators, above all, perceived this, and held upon the subject more than one malicious conversation. One circumstance contributed more particularly to inspire them with this kind of discourse. Of the thirty and some odd senators instituted at the epoch of the consulate for life, their remained fifteen to fill up; those of Agen, Ajaccio, Angers, Besançon, Bourges, Colmar, Dijon, Limoges, Lyons, Montpellier, Nancy, Nimes, Paris, Pau, and Riom. They were given away on the 2nd Prairial, or 22nd of May. Lacépède, Kellermann, Françoise de Neufchâteau, and Berthollet, were of the number of the parties thus favoured. But in a hundred senators, of whom more than eighty were yet to be satisfied, fifteen contents did not form a sufficient majority. Nevertheless, those who had missed senator's places, had others in view, and had no reason to be in despair. But while thus waiting, somewhat of ill-humour was discoverable in their language. The *Moniteur* was every day filled with nominations of chamberlains, equerries, ladies of honour, and tire-women. What the personal grandeur of the new emperor did might be pardoned him, but it was not the same with those whom he elevated in his train. The uneasy activity of the republicans, impatient to become courtiers, and of royalists pressing forward to serve him whom they denominated a usurper, was a strange and singular spectacle; and if to the natural effect of this spectacle be added the hopes, deceived or delayed, that were avenged in spiteful speeches, it may be comprehended, that at the moment they criticised, railed, contemned, in a word, talked a great deal. But the masses, charmed to have a government as glorious as it was benevolent, struck with the unequalled scene, of which they only perceived the entire, and not the details, felt not at all envious of those happy creatures of a day, who had succeeded in making their children pages, their wives ladies of honour, and themselves prefects of the palace or chamberlains; the masses had been attentive to what was going forward, and were seized with a surprise which soon changed into admiration. Napoleon, the sub-lieutenant of artillery, acknowledged and accepted by Europe, and lifted on high in the midst of a profound calm, covered with the brilliancy of his fortunes the littleness mingled up in this prodigious event. They no more experienced, it is true, that eager sentiment, which in 1799 had carried the astonished nation into a race in advance of its saviour; they no more experienced the sentiment of gratitude that in 1802 had carried the delighted nation on to decreeing to its benefactor a perpetuity of his power; they were, in fact, less pressed to pay in gratitude a man who had so well taken care to pay himself. But they judged him worthy of the sovereign hereditary government; they admired him who had dared to take it; they approved of its re-establishment, because it was a more complete return to order; they were, in fine, dazzled at the wonders in which they aided. Thus, although with sentiments a little different from those which they had at heart in 1799 and in 1802, the citizens went with eagerness to all the places where the registers were opened, to enrol their votes. The affirmative suffrages were entered by millions, and scarcely any negative suffrages, or very rarely a single one, as if to show the liberty which they enjoyed, made their appearance in the immense mass of favourable votes.

Napoleon had only one last disagreeable affair to encounter before coming into possession of his new title. It was necessary to finish the process against Georges and Moreau, in which they had, at first, engaged with full confidence. In relation to Georges and his accomplices, or as respected Pichegru himself, if he had lived, the difficulty was not so great; the process would have covered them with confusion, and proved the participation of the emigrant princes in their plots. But Moreau was connected with their cause. It was believed at the commencement that more proofs would be found than there really existed against him; and although his crime was evident to persons of sound understanding, still the malevolent had the means left of denying it. Besides, there was the involuntary sentiment of pity felt at the aspect of the contrast afforded by the two first generals of the republic, the one mounted upon a throne, the other in fetters, and destined, not for the scaffold, but for exile. Every consideration, even that of justice itself, was placed aside in a similar case, and the wrong would be given more willingly to the fortunate if there had been ground.

Those who were accused with Moreau, advised by their defenders, contrived so as completely to escape involving him. They had been much irritated against him at the opening of the proceedings; but interest predominated over passion; they promised to save him if possible. It was first, the greatest moral check against Napoleon, to make Moreau, his rival, shake off his fetters, and come out victorious over the accusation laid against him, covered with the robe of innocence, aggrandized by persecution, and rendered an implacable enemy. Further, if Moreau had not conspired, they would have been able to assert that there had been no conspiracy, that is to say, not a criminal one, and from thence deduce that none were guilty. Their own safety, therefore, as far as the royalists were concerned, bordered on calculations as to party connexion, and bound them to keep to the line of conduct proposed.

The bar, always disposed in favour of the accused, the people of Paris, independent in their judgments, and in willing opposition, when serious events do not attach them to power, were passionately in favour of Moreau, and expressed their wishes in his behalf. Those even, who without malevolence towards Napoleon, saw only in Moreau an illustrious and unfortunate soldier, whose services might yet become useful, wished that he should be pronounced innocent of the charge, that he might be restored once more to the army and to France.

The trial began on the 28th of May, or 8th Prairial, year XII., in the midst of an immense attendance of people. The accused were numerous, arranged on four rows of seats. The attitude of all was not the same; Georges and his own party

exhibited an affected assurance: they felt themselves at their ease, because after all, they were able to call themselves the devoted victims of their cause. Still the arrogance of some did not dispose the spectators to judge favourably of them. Georges, although elevated in the sight of the crowd by the acknowledged energy of his character, caused some marks of indignation among the people. But the unfortunate Moreau, burdened with his glory, deploring at this moment an illustration which made him of so much value in the eager regards of the multitude, was deprived of that tranquil self-possession, which constituted his principal merit in war. He evidently asked himself what he did there among the royalists—he, who was one of the heroes of the revolution, and who, if he did himself justice, could only have been able to repeat, in his own mind, the one thing, that he had merited his doom from having yielded to the deplorable vice of jealousy. Among the numerous accused the public searched for him alone. There were even some applauses heard from old soldiers among the crowd, and from disconsolate revolutionists, believing they saw the republic itself sitting on that prisoner's stool, on which was now seated the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine. This curiosity, and these homages to himself, embarrassed Moreau; for whilst the others declared with loud emphasis their names, obscure or too sadly celebrated, he pronounced his own glorious name so low, that it was heard with difficulty. A just self-censure for a noble reputation compromised.

The proceedings were long. The system which it had been agreed upon to adopt was exactly followed. Georges, M. de Polignac, and M. de Rivière, had only come to Paris, they said, because it had been represented to them that the new government was wholly unpopular, and the public mind universally returned to the Bourbons. They did not conceal their attachment to the cause of the legitimate princes, and their disposition to co-operate in a movement, if a movement had been possible; but they added that Moreau, whom intriguers represented as quite ready to welcome the Bourbons, had not thought of it, and would not hear any of their propositions. Ever since then they had not even thought of conspiring. Georges, interrogated on the foundation of the design, and in presence of his first declarations, in which he had avowed that he came to assail the first consul on the road to Malmaison, with a French prince at his side—Georges, confounded, replied that without doubt they should have thought of it at a later period, if an insurrectional movement had seemed opportune, but that nothing being possible at the moment, they had not even occupied their minds with the plan of attack. Upon showing him the poignards, the uniforms designed for the Chouans, and the Chouans themselves seated near him, on the benches of the accused, he did not exhibit himself exactly disconcerted, but he became silent, appearing to avow by his silence that the system invented for his co-accused partisans and for Moreau, was neither true nor praiseworthy. There was but one point on which they all rested in conformity with their past declarations, and this was the presence of a French prince in the midst of them. They felt, in effect, that in order not to be ranked in the class of assassins, it was necessary to be able to say that they had a prince at their head. It was of little importance to them to compromise the royal dignity; a Bourbon gave them the character of soldiers combating for the legitimate dynasty. Besides, when the imprudent Bourbons had saved their own lives in London, without disturbing themselves about their unhappy victims, those victims might well be justified in attempting the salvation in Paris, if not of their own lives, at least of their honour.

As to Moreau, his system of defence was more specious, because he had never varied. That system he had already laid open in a letter to the first consul, unhappily for him written too late, a long time after the useless interrogatories of the grand judge, and when the government, engaged in the proceedings, was unable to draw back without appearing to fear a public trial. He avowed that he had seen Pichegru, but only with the object of being reconciled to him, and to manage some means for him to return to France. After the settlement of the civil troubles, he had thought that the conqueror of Holland was worth the trouble of restoring to the republic. He had not been willing to see him openly, or to solicit his appeal directly, having lost all influence by his coolness with the first consul. The mystery with which he surrounded himself had had no other motive. It was true that on this occasion Pichegru had made use of the opportunity to speak of designs against the government, but he had repulsed them as ridiculous. He had not denounced them, because he believed them to be devoid of any danger, and because such a man as himself ought not to put on the character of an informer.

This defence sustainable, if positive circumstances and irrefutable witnesses had not rendered it inadmissible, gave place to very close examinations, in which Moreau recovered his true presence of mind, a little in the way it happened to him in war upon any pressing occasion. He even made noble replies, singularly applauded by the auditory. "Pichegru was a traitor," the president said to him, "and even denounced by yourself to the directory. How could you dream of being reconciled to him, and of bringing him back to France?"

"At the time," replied Moreau, "when the army of Condé filled the saloons of Paris and those of the first consul, I might well be justified in occupying myself with bringing the conqueror of Holland back to France."

Upon the same subject they asked him why, under the directory, he had been so late to denounce Pichegru, and thus seemed to throw suspicion upon his past life.

"I had cut short the interviews of Pichegru," he replied, "and of the prince of Condé on the frontier, by placing, through the victories of my army, eighty leagues of space between that prince and the Rhine. The danger over, I left to a council of war the care of examining the papers thus found, and of sending to the government such as it might judge useful."

Moreau, interrogated upon the nature of the plot in which they had proposed to him to become an associate, persisted in asserting that he had repulsed it. "Yes," they said to him, "you repulsed the proposition to place the Bourbons upon

the throne, but you consented to serve Pichegru and Georges for the purpose of overturning the consular government, in the hope to receive the dictatorship at their hands."

"They attribute to me, then," replied Moreau, "a ridiculous project, that of making me serve the royalists to become dictator, believing that if they were victorious, they would remit the power into my hands. I have conducted war for ten years, and during that ten years I have never, that I am aware, done very ridiculous things."

This noble allusion to his past life was covered with applause. But all the witnesses were not in the secrets of the royalists; all were not prepared for a desertion of their first depositions. There was one witness, named Roland, formerly employed in the army, who repeated with sorrow, but with an obstinacy that nothing could shake, that which he had stated on his first examination. He said, that the go-between of Pichegru and Moreau charged the last with declaring, that he would not have the Bourbons; but that if they delivered themselves from the consuls, he would use the power, which would be inevitably conferred upon him, to save the conspirators, and restore Pichegru to all his honours. Others confirmed again this assertion of Roland. Bouvet de Lozier, the officer of Georges who escaped from suicide in order to fling a terrible accusation against Moreau, could not retract, but repeated it, at the same time endeavouring to lessen its force. In the accusation, given in writing, he had only announced those things which he had heard from Georges himself. Georges answered, that Bouvet must have ill heard and ill understood him, and, in consequence, made a very incorrect report. But there remained the interview during the night at the Madeline, in which Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges were found together, a circumstance wholly irreconcilable with the simple design of bringing back Pichegru to France. Wherefore be found at night at a rendezvous with the chief of the conspirators, with one whom it was impossible to meet innocently, when a man was not himself a royalist? Here the depositions were so precise, so concordant, so numerous, that with the best will in the world, the royalists were not able to recall that which they had declared, and which, when they attempted to do, they at the same moment confounded themselves utterly.

Moreau, at this time, was overwhelmed, and the interest of the auditory finished by diminishing sensibly. At times the unbecoming reproaches of the president on his fortunes, awoke a little of the interest which had nearly died away: "You are at least culpable of non-revelation," the president said to him; "and although you pretend that such a man as yourself knew not how to take upon you the character of an informer, you were bound to obey the law, which ordains that every citizen, whoever he may be, is to denounce all plots of which he may acquire a knowledge. You owed it to a government that had loaded you with benefits. Have you not rich appointments, an hotel, estates?"

Such a reproach was little worthy of being made, addressed, as it was, to one of the most disinterested generals of the time.

"Monsieur the president," Moreau replied, "do not put into the balance my services and my fortune; there is no comparison possible between similar things. I have forty thousand francs of appointments, a house, an estate which is worth three or four hundred thousand francs; I know this, but I should have had fifty millions, if I had used victory as many others have done."

Rastadt, Biberach, Engen, Mœsskirch, Hohenlinden, these noble recollections placed by the side of a little miserable money, carried away the auditory, and provoked applauses that the inconsistency of the defence had begun to render very rare.

The trial lasted twelve days, and the agitation of the public mind was considerable. It has been seen in later times that a process may entirely engross the public attention. The same thing happened here, but with circumstances productive of any other emotion than that of mere curiosity. The presence of a general triumphant and crowned, a general in misfortune and in fetters, opposing, by his defence, the last resistance possible to a power every day more absolute; in the middle of the silence of the national tribune, the voice of the advocates making themselves heard as in countries the purest in character; illustrious heads in danger, the one belonging to the emigration, the other to the republic; here was certainly enough to raise emotion in all hearts. They yielded to a just pity, perhaps also to the secret sentiment that created a wish for a check upon fortunate power; and that too without being inimical to the government, or having wishes for Moreau. Napoleon, who felt himself exempt from that base jealousy of which he was accused, who knew well that Moreau, without wishing for the Bourbons, had desired his death in order to replace him, believed and said aloud, that they owed him justice in condemning a general culpable of a state crime. He wished the condemnation for the sake of his own justification; he desired it not to see the head of the conqueror of Hohenlinden fall upon the scaffold, but that he might have the honour of pardoning him. The judges knew this, and also the public.

But justice which does not enter into political considerations, and which has good reason for not entering into them, because if policy is sometimes humane and wise, it is at others imprudent and cruel; justice, in the midst of this conflict of the passions, the last which was to trouble the profound repose of the empire, remained impassible, and rendered equitable judgments.

The 21st of Prairial, or 10th of June, after fourteen days of open court, while the tribunal had retired to deliberate finally, certain of the accused royalists, perceiving that they had been deceived, and that all their efforts to clear Moreau had served no end, demanded of the judge of instruction, to be allowed to verify their declarations more exactly. They spoke no more of three interviews with Moreau, but of five. M. Real having notice of this, had gone off to the emperor, and the emperor had written immediately to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, in order to find out some means of getting to the judges. But this was a difficult point, and, further, it was useless, as without lending themselves to the new communications, they gave the same day, the 10th of June, a judgment not dic-

tated by any influence. They pronounced the penalty of death against Georges and nineteen of his accomplices. As to Moreau, they found his material complicity not sufficiently established, but his moral conduct reprehensible; and, in consequence of this consideration, they inflicted upon him the penalty of two years' imprisonment. M. Armand de Polignac and M. de Rivière were condemned to death; M. Jules de Polignac and five others of the accused were sentenced to two years' imprisonment; twenty-two were acquitted.

This judgment, approved by all impartial persons, caused mortal displeasure to the new emperor, who was very angry at the weakness of that justice, which others at the same moment accused of barbarity. He wanted the self-control that the supreme authority ordinarily imposes upon itself, above all, in such serious matters. In the state of exasperation into which he had been thrown by the unjust charges of his enemies, it was difficult to obtain from him any acts of clemency. But he was so prompt in calming his anger, so generous, and clear-sighted, that the access was soon opened again which led to his reason and his heart. In the few days employed for the purpose of addressing the court of cassation, he took suitable resolutions, remitted to Moreau his two years' imprisonment, as he would have remitted the capital penalty, if it had been pronounced, and also consented to his departure for America.

This unfortunate general desiring to sell his property, Napoleon gave orders that it should be purchased immediately at the highest price. As to the condemned royalists, always rigorous in their regard since the last conspiracy, he would not, at first, grant a pardon to any of them. Georges alone, owing to his energy and his courage, seemed to inspire him with some interest; but he regarded him as an implacable enemy, whom it was necessary to destroy to ensure the public tranquillity. Besides, it was not for Georges that the emigrants were interested. They were much more so for M. de Polignac and M. de Rivière; they censured the imprudence which had placed these persons of elevated rank and good education, in company so unworthy of them; but they were not reconciled to see their heads fall on the scaffold; it is true that the attachments of party, soundly appreciated, might excuse this fault, and merit the indulgence even of the head of the empire himself.

They knew the kind heart of Josephine; they knew that she had a bosom in the midst of her unparalleled greatness of elevation, that preserved its unaffected goodness. They knew also that she lived in continual fears, imagining that daggers were constantly raised to strike her husband. A remarkable act of clemency might arrest the poignard, and tranquillize their exasperated spirits. It was contrived to introduce madam de Polignac through the means of madam Rémusat, who was attached to the person of the empress, and to bring her to St. Cloud, whither she came, and bathed in her tears the imperial mantle. Josephine was deeply touched, as with her kind and sensitive heart she was certain to be, at the aspect of a distracted wife imploring in so noble a manner a pardon for her husband. She ran to make a first attempt on Napoleon, who, according to his custom, concealed his own emotion beneath a harsh and severe countenance, and bluntly repulsed her. Madam de Rémusat was present. "You interest yourselves continually for my enemies," he said to them both. "They are all, one and the other, as imprudent as they are culpable. If I do not give them a lesson, they will recommence, and will be the cause of making fresh victims."

Josephine, thus repelled, knew not to what other means she could have recourse. Napoleon was to leave the apartment of the council in a short time, and to pass through one of the galleries of the château. She thought of placing madam de Polignac in his way, that she might be able to fling herself at his feet when he passed. At the moment when he did pass madam de Polignac, bathed in tears, presented herself before him, and besought of him the life of her husband. Napoleon, surprised, threw towards Josephine, whom he guessed to be an accomplice in the matter, a severe glance. Then suddenly giving way, he said to madam de Polignac, that he was astonished to find M. Armand de Polignac engaged in a conspiracy against his person, the companion, as he had been, of his youth at the military school; that, nevertheless, he granted his pardon to the tears of his wife; and that he trusted so much weakness on his own part would not have any evil result by encouraging more of such imprudent attempts. "They are very guilty, madam," he added, "those princes, who thus commit the lives of their most faithful adherents without partaking in the dangers."

Madam de Polignac, overcome with joy and gratitude, went to recount to all the astonished emigrants this scene of mercy, and purchased for an instant something of justice towards Josephine and Napoleon. M. de Rivière still remained in danger. Murat and his wife went to the emperor, to overcome and snatch from him a second pardon. That of M. de Polignac brought that of M. de Rivière, for it was immediately granted to them. The generous Murat, eleven years afterwards, did not meet with a similar generosity in return.

Such was the end of this odious and sad conspiracy, which had for its object to annihilate Napoleon; that instead placed him upon the throne, unhappily less pure than he was previously; that brought a tragical end upon one of the French princes who had not conspired, and impunity to those who had framed the plots, but it is true with great public indignation for the chastisement of their faults; lastly, exile upon Moreau, the only one of the generals of that time of whom it was possible, in exaggerating the glory and lowering greatly that of Napoleon, to make a rival for the last. Striking circumstances from which the spirit of party should take a lesson! They always aggrandize the government, the party, or the man, who attempt their destruction by criminal means.

Every resistance was henceforth overcome. In 1802, Napoleon had surmounted all civil resistance by annulling the tribunate, and in 1804, he surmounted all military, by discomfiting the conspiracy of the emigrants with the republican generals. While he mounted the steps of the throne, Moreau had gone into exile. They were to meet again at cannon-shot distance from each other, under the walls of Dresden, both unhappy, both culpable; the one in returning from a foreign land to make war upon

his country; the other in abusing his power so far as to provoke a universal reaction against the greatness of France; the one died of a shot from a French gun, while the other, carrying away a last victory, already saw the abyss before him in which his prodigious destiny was to be engulphed.

Nevertheless, those grand events were yet very far off. Napoleon now seemed to be all-powerful, and to be so for ever. Doubtless he had experienced recently some vexations, because, independently of great misfortunes, Providence always conceals some anticipated bitterness even in happiness itself, as if to give notice to the human mind, and prepare it for greater misfortunes still. The last fifteen days had been painful, but they soon passed away. The clemency which he had shown threw a soft brightness over his nascent reign. The death of Georges affected nobody deeply, although his courage, worthy of a better fate, inspired some regret. Very soon every body was attracted by that feeling of marvellous curiosity which is experienced in presence of an extraordinary spectacle.

Thus terminated, after twelve years' duration, not the French revolution, for that was always living and indestructible, but the republic, qualified as imperishable. It fell under the hand of a victorious soldier, as all republics fall that do not go to sleep in the embraces of an oligarchy.

BOOK XX.

THE CORONATION.

DELAY CAUSED TO THE ENGLISH EXPEDITION.—MOTIVES AND ADVANTAGES OF THAT DELAY.—THE CARE OF THE PREPARATIONS REDOUBLED.—FINANCIAL MEANS.—BUDGET OF THE YEARS XI., XII, AND XIII.—CREATION OF INDIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS.—THE ANCIENT THEORY OF TAXATION SOLELY UPON LAND.—NAPOLEON REFUTES THIS DOCTRINE, AND LAYS A TAX UPON CONSUMPTION.—FIRST ORGANIZATION OF THE REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED DUTIES.—SPAIN PAYS ITS SUBSIDY IN LIMITED OBLIGATIONS.—AN ASSOCIATION OF MONIED MEN PRESENTS ITSELF TO DISCOUNT THEM.—FIRST OPERATIONS OF THE COMPANY CALLED THE UNITED TRADERS.—ALL THE DISPOSABLE RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE SQUADRONS OF BREST, ROCHFORT, AND TOULON.—NAPOLEON PREPARES FOR THE ARRIVAL OF A FRENCH FLEET IN THE CHANNEL, IN ORDER TO RENDER CERTAIN THE PASSAGE OF THE FLOTILLA.—FIRST COMBINATION WHICH HE ORDERED.—ADMIRAL LATOUCHE TRÉVILLE ORDERED TO EXECUTE THIS COMBINATION.—THIS ADMIRAL WAS TO QUIT TOULON, DECEIVE THE ENGLISH BY TAKING A FALSE ROUTE, AND TO APPEAR IN THE CHANNEL, JOINING ON HIS WAY THE ROCHFORT SQUADRON.—THE DESCENT FIXED FOR JULY AND AUGUST, BEFORE THE CEREMONY OF THE CORONATION.—THE MINISTERS OF THE COURTS AT PEACE WITH FRANCE DELIVER TO NAPOLEON THEIR LETTERS OF CREDENCE.—THE AMBASSADOR OF AUSTRIA ALONE BEHINDHAND.—DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON FOR BOULOGNE.—GENERAL INSPECTION OF THE FLOTILLA, VESSEL BY VESSEL.—THE BATAVIAN FLOTILLA.—GRAND FÊTE ON BOARD THE "OCEAN," AND DISTRIBUTION TO THE ARMY OF THE DECORATIONS OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR.—SUCCESSION OF EVENTS IN ENGLAND.—EXTREME AGITATION OF THE PUBLIC MIND.—OVERTURN OF THE ADDINGTON ADMINISTRATION BY THE OPPOSITION OF BOTH FOX AND PITT.—ENTRANCE OF PITT AGAIN INTO THE MINISTRY, AND HIS FIRST STEPS TO RENEW A CONTINENTAL COALITION.—SUSPICIONS OF NAPOLEON.—HE FORCES AUSTRIA TO AN EXPLANATION, AND EXACTS THAT THE LETTERS OF CREDENCE OF M. COBENTZEL SHALL BE SENT TO HIM AT AIX-LA CHAPELLE.—HE BREAKS OFF HIS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, AND PERMITS THE DEPARTURE OF M. OUBRIL.—DEATH OF ADMIRAL LATOUCHE TRÉVILLE, AND ADJOURNMENT OF THE DESCENT UNTIL THE WINTER.—ADMIRAL LATOUCHE TRÉVILLE REPLACED BY ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE.—CHARACTER OF THE LAST ADMIRAL.—JOURNEY OF NAPOLEON TO THE BANKS OF THE RHINE.—GREAT CONCOURSE OF PERSONS AT AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.—M. COBENTZEL SENDS HIS LETTERS OF CREDENCE TO NAPOLEON THERE.—THE IMPERIAL COURT PROCEEDS TO MAYENCE.—RETURN OF THE COURT TO PARIS.—PREPARATIONS FOR THE CORONATION.—DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION TO BRING PIUS VII. TO PARIS TO CROWN NAPOLEON.—CARDINAL FESCH AMBASSADOR TO THE POPE.—CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF THAT PERSONAGE.—TERROR WHICH CAME UPON POPE PIUS AT THE IDEA OF ENTERING FRANCE.—HE CONSULTS A CONGREGATION OF CARDINALS.—FIVE DECLARE AGAINST THE JOURNEY, AND FIFTEEN IN FAVOUR OF IT, BUT WITH CONDITIONS.—LONG DEBATE UPON THOSE CONDITIONS.—DEFINITIVE CONSENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE CEREMONIAL LEFT IN SUSPENSE.—BISHOP BERNIER AND THE ARCHCHANCELLOR CAMBACÉRÈS CHOOSE AMONG THE ROMAN AND FRENCH PONTIFICALS, THE CEREMONIES CORRESPONDENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE.—NAPOLEON REFUSES TO SUFFER THE POPE TO PLACE THE CROWN UPON HIS HEAD.—PRETENSIONS OF THE FAMILY.—DEPARTURE OF THE POPE FOR FRANCE.—HIS JOURNEY.—HIS ARRIVAL AT FONTAINEBLEAU.—HIS PLEASURE AND CONFIDENCE ON SEEING THE WELCOME HE RECEIVES.—RELIGIOUS MARRIAGE OF JOSEPHINE AND NAPOLEON.—CEREMONY OF THE CORONATION.

The conspiracy of Georges, the proceedings which followed it, and the change which it brought about in the form of government, had occupied all the winter of 1803 and 1804, and had suspended the great enterprise of Napoleon against England. But he had not ceased to think of it, and at this moment he prepared for the execution in the middle of the summer of 1804, with redoubled care and activity. Besides, the delay was not to be regretted, because in his impatience to execute so vast a design, Napoleon himself had much exaggerated the possibility of being ready at the end of 1803. The continual experiments made at Boulogne, every day revealed the necessity of taking new precautions, or there were improvements to introduce, and it was of little importance

to strike the blow six months later, if in the interim the means of striking with more certainty were ensured. It was not the army, well appointed, that caused this loss of time, because at this epoch the army was always disposable; the flotilla and the squadrons were the cause. The construction of flat-bottomed boats, and their union in the four ports of the straits, all this was achieved. But the Batavian flotilla made them wait; the squadrons of Brest and of Toulon, the concurrence of which in the enterprise was judged indispensable, were not ready, eight months not having sufficed for completing their armament. The winter of 1804 had been devoted to their completion. This time, lost only in appearance, had therefore been very usefully employed. It had been above all busy in creating financial means, which are always allied to military ones, and at this time were more so than ever. If, in effect, it is possible with much industry and exposure to great inconvenience to make war on land with little money, by living on the enemy, a naval war cannot be made without money, because none is to be found on the immense solitudes of the ocean, except what has been taken out with the vessels on leaving their ports. The financial were not therefore the least important of the immense preparations of Napoleon, and their details therefore merit notice here for a short time.

We have already said with what resources the contest had been commenced after the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The budget of the year XI., or 1803, voted in the contemplation of unforeseen events, had been fixed at 589,000,000 f. exclusive of the expenses of collection, that is to say, 89,000,000 f. more than the budget of the preceding year, which had been acquitted with 500,000,000 f. But the expenses had naturally exceeded the first estimates as laid before the legislative body, and had surpassed them by 30,000,000 f. The sum total thus reached 619,000,000 f. This was little in amount, it is most assuredly true, when the expenses of such an expedition as that of Boulogne are duly considered. The moderate character of the augmentation of the budget is explained by the period, which divided its expenditure. That of the year XI. finished on the 21st of September, 1803, and on the same day that of the year XII. commenced. The principal expenses of the flotilla were not, therefore, comprised in the budget of the year XI. It was thus that it became circumscribed within the sum of 619,000,000 f., which, adding the expenses of collection, made the total amount about 710,000,000 f. or 720,000,000 f. The budget of the year XII. would naturally, therefore, be more elevated in amount, because within that year it would be necessary to pay all which had not been paid in the year XI. This last had been provided with the ordinary contributions, of which the produce, in spite of the war, had continued to increase considerably, so great was the security under the wise and vigorous government which then reigned in France. The stamp and registry had shown an increase of 10,000,000 f.; the customs 6,000,000 f. or 7,000,000 f.; and in spite of a diminution of 10,000,000 f. in the land-tax, the ordinary taxes had risen to 573,000,000 f. They had now as a surplus 22,000,000 f. of the Italian subsidy, with 24,000,000 f. borrowed from extraordinary sources, which last were composed, as has been already said, of the Spanish subsidy, fixed at 4,000,000 f. per month, and the price of Louisiana, ceded to the Americans. These resources, scarcely entered upon, remained nearly untouched for the year XII.; which was very fortunate, because all the expenses of the war were to be paid at once upon this revenue, or upon the receipts from September, 1803, to September, 1804.

The expenditure in the year XII. could not be estimated at less than 700,000,000 f. in place of 619,000,000 f., which made, with the expenses of collection, and some additional centimes omitted, a total of 800,000,000 f. Still, in this total the new civil list was not included. It will be seen that hereafter the budgets approached rapidly towards the amount which they have since attained.

It was perceived, that there would be a certain diminution in the revenue of the domains, in consequence of the alienation of the national property and the taxed endowments granted to the senate, the legion of honour, and the sinking fund. The ordinary contributions did not amount to much less than 560,000,000 f., excepting the augmentation of the products, which was probable, but that, by an excess of exactness, they were unwilling to carry into the account. It was necessary then to issue not less than 140,000,000 f. of extraordinary means to reach the sum of 700,000,000 f., the supposed amount of the expenditure, the expenses of collection, and some additional centimes besides. Italy gave 22,000,000 f. for the three states to which a French force served as the protection. The 48,000,000 f. of Spanish subsidies, the 60,000,000 f. from America, reduced to 52,000,000 f. by the charges of negotiating, made in all 122,000,000 f. of extraordinary receipts. There remained, in consequence, about the sum of 28,000,000 f. to be found. The resource of the securities, the nature of which has been already described, remained to meet this deficiency. Security in money had been already exacted from the receivers-general, the payers and receivers of the registry, and of the customs. These securities had been placed to the account of the sinking fund, which was made debtor for them to those who had lodged the different amounts. The sinking fund, in its turn, had advanced those securities to the government, which had promised to replace them at a later time, by the payment of 5,000,000 f. per annum. This was a species of loan from those accountable to the state, perfectly legitimate, when these last were to the state a guarantee for good administration. This kind of loan, too, was capable of being extended, because there yet remained other accountable parties to be submitted to the general regulations. There existed, in fact, a new category of receivers of the public money, whose duties had need of regulation; these were the collectors of the direct contributions. Until now, in place of collectors nominated by the state in the country and in the towns to receive the direct taxes, small farmers were employed in the collection, at a low rate. This system was changed in the large towns, where collectors were placed for the sole purpose, appointed from the treasury, by means of a simple remittance. This new mode was found to succeed, and it was proposed, for the year 1804, to establish in all the communes, urban

or rural, collectors, nominated by the government, upon whom were to be imposed securities, the total value of which altogether, would amount to about 20,000,000 f. This sum turned into the treasury, was to be restored in consecutive sums to the sinking fund, as had been stipulated for the anterior securities.

By these means, added to the sale of some national property, taken from a quantity which remained disposable since the endowments of the senate, the legion of honour, of public instruction, and the sinking fund, there was a new resource, to the extent of 15,000,000 f., for the year XII., above the sum judged to be wanting. The property to be sold was delivered over to the sinking fund, which sold it little by little, selling every day at a better price. It was arranged that the product of the sales should be left to the fund, in order to acquit the debt of 5,000,000 f., which was annually due to it for the reimbursement of the securities.

Such were the financial means created for the year XII., 560,000,000 f. of ordinary contributions; 22,000,000f. of Italian subsidy; 48,000,000f. of Spanish subsidy; 52,000,000f. the price of Louisiana; 20,000,000f. from securities, and several millions more in national property. There were more than 700,000,000f. estimated as necessary for the expenditure of the year, from September 1803, to September 1804.

But it was near the conclusion of the expenditure of the year XII., because it was now the summer of 1804. It was necessary to consider the year XIII., from September 1804 to September 1805, for which considerable funds would be required. The American subsidy belonged entirely to the year XII. They were not able to dispense with its immediate realization.

Napoleon was a long time since convinced that the revolution, although it had created great resources by the equalization of the taxes, had notwithstanding treated the landed proprietary too hardly, by throwing upon that alone the burthen of the taxes, by the suppression of the indirect contributions. That which the revolution had thus done was but an ordinary course of proceeding in troublous times. At the first disorder, the people, above all those of the towns, profited by the occasion to refuse payment of the taxes placed upon consumption, and more particularly upon liquors, which constitute their principal enjoyment. This was seen in 1830, when this species of impost was refused payment for more than six months. In 1815, their suppression was a deceptive promise, by the aid of which the Bourbons obtained a momentary applause; and lastly, in 1789, when the first popular movements were directed against the barriers. But these imposts, the most hated by the population of the towns, are still those which characterise the countries truly prosperous, as they press more in reality upon the rich than upon the poor, and prejudice agriculture less than any other kind of tax; while the contributions levied upon land deprive agriculture of its capital or stock, in other words, of live stock and fattened beasts, impoverish the soil, and thus attack the most extended source of riches. In the eighteenth century, a prejudice became established which then rested, it must be acknowledged, upon an incontestable foundation. The landed proprietary, concentrated in the hands of the aristocracy and clergy, unequally taxed according to the rank of the possessors, was an object of hatred on the part of those generous persons who wished to relieve the poorer classes. It was at this epoch that the theory of a single impost was devised, to bear exclusively upon land, and meet all the expenses of the government. By this means they were enabled to suppress the excise, and the *gabelle* taxes, which in appearance bore only upon the people. But this theory, though generous by intention, and false in fact, gave way before experience. After 1789, land divided among thousands of persons, burthened equally with taxation, no longer merited the animadversions which it had previously attracted, and it became necessary, above all things, to consider the essential interest of agriculture. It is but just to say, that in burthening them beyond reasonable measure, the agriculturists are injured, and deprived of the means of cultivation, to the profit of the dealers and consumers of spirituous liquors. It should be said too, it was absolutely necessary to bring the revenue to an equality with the expenses, unless France was willing to fall back again upon paper money and bankruptcy, and that to make the revenue equal to the expenses, it was as absolutely required to vary the sources of taxation, in order that they might not be dried up. It belonged to the man who had restored order in France, and extricated the finances from chaos, by the re-establishment of the regular collection of the indirect contributions to complete his work, and re-open the sources of the indirect contributions which were at present closed up. But it was necessary to have for that purpose great power as well as energy. Faithful to his character, Napoleon had no fears, on the very same day that he stood for the throne, of re-establishing under the name of the united duties, the most unpopular, but the most useful of the taxes.

He made the first proposition to the council of state, which he supported with wonderful sagacity, as if the study of the finances had been that of his whole life, showing the true principle of the question. To the theory of the single impost laid solely upon land, exacting from the proprietor and farmer the total sum necessary for the state necessities, obliging them to make the advance at least under the supposition the most favourable for them, that in which an increase in the price of agricultural produce indemnifies them for the advance; to a theory so foolishly exaggerated, he urged the simple and sound one of a taxation ably diversified, resting at the same time upon all kinds of property and industry, not requiring of them individually too considerable a portion of the public resources, and consequently carrying with it no forced movement in prices, drawing out the wealth in all the channels where it was abundant, and drawing it from each channel in such a manner as not to cause too sensible a diminution. This system, the fruit of time and experience, is only susceptible of one objection; it is this, that the diversity of the tax brings with it a diversity in the collection, and with that an augmentation of the expense; but it presents so many advantages, and the contrary mode is so violent, that this light augmentation of expense could not be a serious consideration. When he had got his own views adopted by the council of

state, Napoleon sent his plan to the legislative body, where it was not an object of any serious difficulty, owing to the previous conferences between the corresponding sections of the tribunal, and the council of state. The following were these dispositions.

A body of collectors was formed under the title of the Administration of the United Duties. This administration was to collect the new imposts by means of the excise, which was alone acknowledged to be efficacious, and consisted in searching for objects liable to the tax, at the places where they were grown or made. These objects were wines, brandies, beer, cider, and similar substances. A single and moderate duty was laid upon the first sales, according to an inventory established at the epoch of the growth or making. The amount of the tax was to be paid at the moment when the substance taxed was first displaced. Besides liquors, the principal thing taxed was tobacco. There already existed a customs' duty upon foreign tobacco, and one of fabrication upon that produced in France, the monopoly of that article not having been then devised, but the product of the last species escaped from the treasury in consequence of a defect in the superintendence. The creation of an administration of united duties admitted the possibility of collecting those duties in full, which then returned so little, but promised to become considerable. Salt was not comprised in the matters on which a duty was imposed. They feared to recall the recollection of the old *gabelles*. Nevertheless there was an administration for salt duties established in Piedmont, being at the same time a measure of police and finance. Piedmont obtained salt either from Genoa, or the mouths of the Po, and was sometimes exposed to pay a grievous price for the article, through the interested speculations of commerce, and had never been able to keep it from the intervention of the government. In creating an administration of the salt duties, to which was committed the care of providing, and selling it at a moderate price, the danger of dearness and scarcity was avoided, and there was thus procured sure, as well as facile means to collect a duty sufficiently productive, although moderate in the aggregate amount of the rate.

These different combinations could produce nothing in the year XII., the year of their creation; but they gave a prospect of 15,000,000 f., or 18,000,000 f. in the year XIII., and of 30,000,000 f., or 40,000,000 f. in the year XIV. As to the following years, the product, difficult to estimate, still sufficed for all the demands of the war, even should it be prolonged.

Resources had therefore been ensured for the outlay of the current year XII., or 1803 and 1804, by procuring 700,000,000 f. of ordinary and extraordinary receipts, while they had also got ready certain products for the future expenditure. They had to encounter, however, great difficulties in realization for the first time. The two principal and actual resources consisted in the purchase money of Louisiana, and in the monthly subsidy furnished by Spain. The inevitable delays, which accompanied the voting of the American funds, had prevented the payment of this money into the treasury. Still the house of Hope was disposed to pay in a part towards the end of 1804. As to Spain, of the 44,000,000 f. due in Floréal for eleven months gone over, she had only furnished in different modes about 22,000,000 f., or one half. The finances of that unhappy country were more than ever embarrassed, and although the sea was open to her galleons, thanks to the neutrality in which she had been left by France, the metals arriving from Mexico were wasted in the most futile dissipation.

In order to supply the want of these coming in sums, an account was maintained in credit bills with the treasury. The English possessed exchequer bills. France at present issues royal bills, reimbursable every three, six, or twelve months, which, negotiated on the spot, constitute a temporary loan, by the aid of which they are able to wait, for a longer or shorter time, the realization of the revenue of the state. Although Napoleon had laboured hard to re-establish the finances, and had succeeded, the treasury did not then enjoy sufficient credit in the commercial world to issue with success any paper whatever under its own name. The obligations of the receivers-general, bearing the personal engagement of an accountable person, and payable into the sinking fund in case of protest, alone obtained credit. These were, as already seen, subscribed at the commencement of their usage, for the full value of the direct contributions, to be successively acquitted month by month. The last had fifteen or eighteen months to run. For the purpose of realizing an advance to the revenues of the state, they were discounted in sums of 20,000,000 f. at the rate of a half per cent. per month, or six per cent. per annum, during the short peace of Amiens, and, after the war, at three-quarters per cent. per month, or nine per cent. per annum. In spite of the confidence inspired by the government, the treasury inspired so little, that the banking-houses of the best class refused this kind of operation. They were the hazardous speculators, and the old contractors of the directory, who gave these discounts. M. de Marbois, wishing to be independent of their concurrence, addressed the receivers-general themselves, who formed a committee in Paris, and discounted their own paper with their own funds, or with such funds as they had procured at a high interest from the hands of capitalists. But these accountants, limited in their speculations, had neither enough of capital nor of boldness to furnish any great resources to the treasury.

There happened to be in Paris, about this time, a banker, M. Desprez, deeply versed in this species of negotiation; a very active contractor, exceedingly able in the art of supplying armies, named M. Vanderberghe; lastly, a most fertile speculator, the most ingenious possible at every kind of business, M. Ouvrard, celebrated at the moment for his immense fortune. All these had entered individually into relations with the government. M. Desprez in the discount of the treasury obligations; M. Vanderberghe in supplying provisions; M. Ouvrard in every kind of great operations for furnishing supplies, or banking. M. Ouvrard formed an association with M. Desprez and M. Vanderberghe, placed himself at the head of the partnership, and became, by little and little, as under the directory, the principal financial agent of the government. He knew how to inspire confidence in M. de Marbois, minister of the treasury, who, feeling his

own insufficiency, was happy to have near him an inventive mind, capable of devising expedients that he was unable to devise himself. M. Ouvrard offered to take upon himself, on his own part, and that of his associates, the negotiation of the treasury obligations. He concluded a first agreement in Germinal, in the year XII., April, 1804, by which he obliged himself to discount not only a considerable sum in the obligations of the receivers-general, but the engagements of Spain herself, that, not being able to pay her subsidy in specie, paid it in paper at a long date. M. Ouvrard made no difficulty in taking as money the Spanish paper, and handing over the amount. He soon found a particular advantage in this combination. M. Vanderberghe and himself were creditors of the state in heavy sums, in consequence of anterior contracts. They were authorized, in discounting the bills of the receivers-general and the obligations of Spain, to deliver as money on account a part of these credits. Thus, while they were discounting, they paid themselves with their own hands. Under the title, "united dealers," this company began, therefore, to enter upon the business of the state. Its origin is worthy of attention, because it soon partook in immense operations, and bore a considerable influence on the French finances. No wonder that the operations it undertook with the treasury should turn out well, and even surpassingly good; it only sufficed that Spain should honour her engagements, because the obligations of the receivers-general, composing a part of the pledge, presented the greatest security. These obligations had only the inconvenience of being a paper of a long date, seeing that the treasury employed in its payments those which had only one or two months to run, and discounted, on the contrary, those which had to run for six, twelve, or fifteen months; but the length of the term out of the question, they offered an infallible solidity. In regard to the paper subscribed by Spain, its value depended upon the conduct of a senseless court, and the arrival of the galleons from Mexico. M. Ouvrard constructed upon this basis the most extended schemes, succeeded in dazzling the credulous understanding of M. de Marbois, and set off for Madrid, in order to realize his bold conceptions.

Napoleon mistrusted this man, so very fertile and bold in his expedients, and he warned M. de Marbois also to mistrust him. But M. Ouvrard discounted through M. Desprez the obligations of the treasury, and those of Spain himself; while he supported his engagements for the army through M. Vanderberghe. Thanks to his efforts, all these services proceeded together, and the evil, if there were any, did not seem to possess the power of extending itself far; because, after all, M. Ouvrard appeared always in advance with the treasury, and not the treasury with him.

Such were the means employed to meet immediately all the charges of the war, without recourse to loans. It was required of these speculators to advance by discount the realization of the state revenues, and that of the 122,000,000 f. furnished by the paying allies, Italy, America, and Spain. In regard to the future, the creation of indirect taxes, a long time announced, and finally decreed this year, would provide completely.

Napoleon had resolved to execute his grand enterprize after a brief delay. He wished to pass the strait in the month of July or August, 1804. If the incredulous persons, who have thrown doubts upon his design, were but able to read his intimate correspondence with the minister of the navy, the infinite number of his orders, and the confiding of his secret hopes to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, they would no longer feel any uncertainty about the reality on his part of this extraordinary resolution.

All the vessels composing the flotilla were united in the ports Etaples, Boulogne, Wimereux, and Ambleteuse, except those which had been constructed between Brest and Bayonne, because by the plan of coasting devised for the union of the vessels, these had never been able to double Ushant. But nearly the whole of the naval constructions had been executed between Brest and the mouth of the Scheldt; and the part wanting was not considerable. There were enough to transport one hundred and twenty thousand men, designed to pass over in the gun vessels. The rest, as it will be recollected, had always been designed for embarkation in the fleets of Brest and of the Texel.

The Dutch flotilla constructed and united in the Scheldt was behindhand. Napoleon had given the command to admiral Verhuell, who possessed his esteem, and well merited it. The Dutch, not ardent, but, above all, being slightly confident in the singular design, which was much too hardy for their cold and methodical minds, gave to it very little of their zeal. Nevertheless, the zeal of the admiral, and the pressing remonstrance of the French minister at the Hague, M. de Sémonville, had accelerated the armaments that Holland engaged to furnish. A fleet of seven sail of the line, added to numerous merchant vessels, was ready to transport twenty-four thousand men of the camp at Utrecht, commanded by general Marmont. At the same time, a flotilla, composed of several hundreds of gun and large fishing vessels, finished their organization in the Scheldt. It remained for them to leave their moorings, and to pass from the shores of the Scheldt, more accessible to the enemy than the coasts of France. Admiral Verhuell himself directing their detachments, had fought several brilliant combats between the Scheldt and Ostend. In spite of the loss of a few vessels, five or six at most, he had disconcerted the efforts of the English, and changed the incredulity of the Dutch sailors into confidence. The Dutch flotilla completed its union in the spring of 1804, at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais, and was ready to embark the corps of marshal Davout encamped at Bruges. Napoleon desired more; he would have the flotilla of France and that of Holland united wholly in the ports situated to the left of Cape Grisnez, at Ambleteuse, Wimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, that they might all be placed at the same point of the compass. They were compelled to satisfy him by drawing closer the encampment of the troops, and the station of the flotilla.

The works of the armaments along the coast of Boulogne were terminated, the forts constructed and the basins excavated. The troops having completed their task, had returned to their military duties. They had acquired a discipline

and a precision in movement truly admirable; and thus presented in themselves an army, not only inured to war by numerous campaigns, and hardened by rude labours, but capable of manœuvring as if it had passed years upon a parade ground. This army, the finest perhaps that a prince or general ever commanded, awaited with impatience the arrival of its recently crowned prince. It burned for the opportunity of congratulating him, and of following him to a scene of new and astounding glory.

Napoleon was not less impatient to rejoin it. But he had raised a great question among scientific persons, which was, to be informed if the gun vessels, composing the flotilla, or "nutshells," as they were called, could brave the English fleet. Admiral Bruix and admiral Verhuell had the greatest confidence in the worth of the gun vessels; both kinds had exchanged shot with the English frigates, and had gone out of port in all weathers, and they had acquired a conviction that these vessels were fully equal to pass the strait. Admiral Decrès, given to contradict every body, and admiral Bruix more willing to go forward than any other person, seemed to think differently. Those of the French naval officers, who were not employed in the flotilla, whether prejudiced, or led to criticise that with which they had nothing to do, inclined to the opinion of admiral Decrès. Admiral Ganteaume, transferred from Toulon to Brest, had been eye witness to an accident that has been already related some way back, which had much troubled him for the fate of the army, and the emperor, to whom he was deeply attached. The view of a gun vessel turning over in the road of Brest, so as to show its keel above water, had filled him with uneasiness, and he had written immediately to the minister of the marine. This accident, as already observed, signified nothing. The vessel had been laden without care; the artillery had been badly placed, and the men were not enough exercised. The tonnage badly divided, joined to the confusion of those on board, had caused the misfortune.

It was not on the ground of want of stability that admiral Decrès had his doubts. The flotilla of Boulogne manœuvring for two years in the strongest squalls had quieted in this respect every uncertainty. But the objections which the admiral addressed to the emperor, and to admiral Bruix, were as follows[1]:—"Certainly," he observed, "the bullet of a twenty-four pounder, whether fired from a gun vessel or a ship of the line will have the same force. It will cause the same ravage, often more, fired from a small vessel which is difficult to hit, and which aims between wind and water. Added to this, the musketry, formidable at a short distance, and the danger of boarding, and the worth of those gun vessels is not to be undervalued. They carry more than three thousand cannon of large calibre, in other words, as many as a fleet of thirty or thirty-five sail of the line, such a fleet as is rarely to be seen united. But where have these gun vessels been seen to measure their strength against the large vessels of the English? In a single place, that is to say, close to the shore, in flats and shallow water, into the midst of which these large vessels dare not venture to follow an enemy, feeble but numerous, and ready to riddle it with his cannon. It is like an army engaged in a defile, and assaulted from the heights of an inaccessible position by a cloud of bold and clear sharp-shooters. But," continued admiral Decrès, "suppose these gun vessels in the middle of the channel, out of shallow water, and in presence of vessels that have no longer any fear of advancing upon them; suppose, besides, a wind tolerably fresh, which renders manœuvring easy for those vessels but difficult for the gun vessels, will they not be in danger of being run down in great numbers by the giants with which they will have to contend." "They will lose," says admiral Bruix, "a hundred vessels out of two thousand; but nineteen hundred will pass, and that will suffice for the ruin of England." "Yes," replies admiral Decrès, "if the loss of a hundred does not strike terror among the nineteen hundred; if even the number of nineteen hundred be not itself the cause of inevitable confusion, and if the naval officers, preserving their coolness, do not fall into that disordered state of mind, which must involve all in a general catastrophe."

"Let there be, in the supposed hypothesis of a summer calm, or a winter's fog, two occasions equally propitious, because in a calm the English vessels will not be able to bear down upon our vessels, and in a fog they will be deprived of the means of seeing them, and in these two cases their formidable encounter will be avoided. But such circumstances, although presenting themselves two or three times in every season, would not ensure sufficient security. Two tides would be necessary, or twenty-four hours, in order that the flotilla may come entirely out of port, it would require ten or twelve hours to cross, and with the loss of time always inevitable, full forty-eight hours would be required. Is it not to be feared, that during such an interval, not less than two days, a sudden change of the atmosphere might intervene, and surprise the flotilla when in full movement?"

The objections of admiral Decrès were therefore very serious. Napoleon drew up his replies in his characteristic manner, trusting to his confidence in his good fortune, in the recollections of Egypt and of the St. Bernard. He said that the finest operations had been accomplished in the front of obsta-

[1] The close correspondence of M. Decrès with the emperor, so secret that it was all written in his own hand, exists in the particular archives of the Louvre. It is one of the finest monuments of this period after the correspondence of the emperor. It does equal honour to the patriotism of the minister, to his reason, and the striking originality of his mind. It includes views upon the organization of the French marine of very great value, and it ought to be read incessantly by naval men, and those connected with the administration of such affairs. It is there that I have been enabled to study this profound conception of the emperor's, to acquire new proofs of his extraordinary foresight, and of the certainty and reality of his designs. It is in one of these letters that I found the opinion of admiral Decrès upon the flotilla, an opinion at that time rather suspected than known, because Napoleon required silence on the part of all the world in relation to the strength or weakness of his plans. Operations were not then as they have been since, decried in advance by the indiscretion of the agents who were charged to give them their concurrence.—*Note of the Author.*

cles equally great, that it was right to leave as little as possible to hazard, but that something must be so left. Still in combating these objections, he knew how to appreciate them, and this man, who, by force of tempting fortune, perished in repulsing her, this man, when he was able to avoid a danger, and thereby add a single chance more in favour of the success of his plans, never missed the opportunity. Bold in his conceptions, he exhibited in their execution the most consummate prudence. It was to meet these objections that he meditated incessantly on the project of bringing, by a sudden manœuvre, a large fleet into the channel. If this fleet, superior for only three days to the English fleet in the Downs, covered the passage of the flotilla, all obstacles would fall to the ground. Admiral Decrès admitted that in such a case he had no longer a single objection to offer, and that masters of the ocean, England would be delivered over to the invaders. If, which it was nearly certain to be, the superiority acquired was kept for more than two days, because a notice of the presence of the French fleet could not be conveyed with sufficient rapidity to the English fleet blockading Brest, so that it could rejoin instantly that which was in observation before Boulogne, there would be time enough for the flotilla, passing and re-passing several times, to fetch across fresh troops left in the camps, and ten or fifteen thousand horses waiting upon the French coast the means of transportation, with a considerable supplementary materiel. The mass of force would then be so great that all resistance on the side of England would become impossible.

Such prodigious results hung therefore upon the sudden arrival of a fleet in the channel. In order to meet that end, an unforeseen combination was necessary, that the English should not be able to baffle. Happily, the old British admiralty, strongest before all things in its traditions, and the spirit of the service, was not able to contend in invention with a wonderful genius, constantly occupied on the same subject, and able to dispense with concerting plans amid a collective administration.

Napoleon had at Brest a fleet of eighteen vessels, which was soon to be raised to twenty-one; a second of five at Rochefort, another of five at Ferrol, one in harbour at Cadiz; finally, one of eight vessels at Toulon, which was to be increased to ten. The English admiral Cornwallis blocked up Brest with fifteen or eighteen, and Rochefort with four or five ships. A weak English division blockaded Ferrol. Lastly, Nelson with his squadron cruised off the Hyères Isles to watch Toulon. Such was the state of their respective forces, and the field which offered itself to the combinations of Napoleon. His idea was to make one of these squadrons steal away, and arrive by a sudden march in the channel, to be for some days superior to the English. When he had intended to act in winter, that is, in the preceding month of February, he had thought of directing the Brest fleet towards the coast of Ireland, to land there the fifteen thousand or eighteen thousand men which it had on board, and to make its appearance suddenly in the channel. This bold plan had only a chance of success in the winter season, because in that season the continued blockade of Brest being impracticable, it would be able to profit by the bad weather to set sail. But in summer, the presence of the English was so continued that it would be impossible to put to sea without an action; and vessels encumbered with troops, going to sea for the first time in presence of ships experienced by a long cruise, and lightly manned, ran great danger, unless with an immense superiority of force. In this season the facilities of proceeding to sea were much greater on the coast of Toulon. In June and July the strong mistral gales blowing very frequently, obliged the English to run for shelter behind the Isles of Corsica or Sardinia. A squadron availing itself of such a movement, would be able to unbend its sails at nightfall, gain twenty leagues the same night, deceive Nelson by taking a false course, and by inspiring him with alarm about the East, draw him perhaps towards the mouths of the Nile; because since Napoleon had escaped from him in 1798, Nelson's mind was constantly pre-occupied with the possibility of the French throwing an army upon Egypt, and was determined not to be a second time surprised. Napoleon therefore conceived the idea of confiding the flotilla of Toulon to the boldest of his admirals, Latouche Tréville; to compose it of ten sail of the line, and several frigates; to form a camp in the environs, in order to give the idea of a new expedition to Egypt, to embark in reality very few troops, and to send this fleet to sea during a breeze of the mistral, assigning to it the following route. It was at first to navigate towards Sicily, then sailing westwards to direct itself towards the Strait of Gibraltar, to pass through, pick up in its course the Aigle, ship of war in Cadiz, avoid Ferrol, to which Nelson would be tempted to sail, when he knew that the French had passed the Strait, push forward into the gulf of Gascony, to rally there the division of the French at Rochefort, and finally, keeping himself to the south of Sorlingues on the north of Brest, avail himself of the first favourable wind to sail into the channel. This fleet of ten vessels at its departure, reinforced by six others on its voyage, would number sixteen on its arrival, and would be sufficiently numerous to domineer for some days in the straits of Dover. To deceive Nelson was easily practicable, because this great seaman, full of ability for fighting, had not always a judgment perfectly correct; and besides, his mind was continually troubled by the recollection of Egypt. To avoid Ferrol, in order to come before Rochefort, and to rally the squadron there, was very practicable. The most difficult thing to do was to penetrate into the channel, and pass between the English force which guarded the avenues to Ireland, and the fleet of admiral Cornwallis blockading Brest. But the squadron of Ganteaume, always ready to hoist sail, with his people on board, could not fail to attract the close attention of admiral Cornwallis, and oblige him to press close into the gullet of Brest. If Cornwallis should abandon the blockade of Brest, and give chase to Latouche Tréville, Ganteaume would have set sail at the same moment, and one of the two French fleets would have most assuredly arrived before Boulogne. It was nearly impossible for the English admiralty to discover such combination, and to provide against it. A point of departure so far removed as that of Toulon, would less than any other cause the channel to be thought its object. Besides, in arming the flotilla in such a manner as that it would

suffice for its own defence, the idea of so distant an aid was discarded, and the vigilance of the enemy lulled asleep. Thus all was combined to ensure the success of a skilful manœuvre, that could only have come into the mind of a man conceiving and acting alone, keeping his own secret close, and continually pondering upon the same thing [1].

"If you wish to confide," said admiral Decrès to the emperor, "a great design to a man, it is first necessary that you see him, that you speak to him, that you animate him with your genius. This is the more necessary still with our naval officers, demoralized by our maritime reverses, always ready to die like heroes, but ever thinking more of succumbing nobly, than of conquering." Napoleon therefore sent for Latouche Tréville, who had been in Paris since his return from St. Domingo. This officer had neither the same bearing of mind, nor the same genius for organization as admiral Bruix; but in execution he exhibited a hardihood, a glance, that in all probability had he lived, would have made him the rival of Nelson. He was never discouraged like his companions in arms, and was ready to attempt every thing. Unfortunately he had contracted at St. Domingo the germs of the malady through which so many brave men had already fallen, and many more were yet to die. Napoleon disclosed to him his design, made him be convinced to the letter of its possibility, laid before him the grandeur, the momentous consequences, and imparted to his spirit the same ardour which filled his own. Latouche Tréville quitted Paris with enthusiasm before his health was re-established, and went to watch himself over the equipment of his squadron. All was so calculated that this operation might be put in execution, in July, or at the latest in August.

Admiral Ganteaume, who had commanded at Toulon before Latouche, had been transferred to Brest. The emperor relied upon the devotion of Ganteaume, and was much attached to him. Still he did not find him bold enough to confide to him the execution of his important manœuvre. But after admiral Bruix under the head of capacity, and admiral Latouche under that of audacity, he preferred Ganteaume for his experience and courage to all the others. Napoleon, therefore, confided to his care the Brest squadron, probably destined to carry troops to Ireland, and charged him to complete the equipment, so that he should be ready to co-operate with the fleet from Toulon.

Still the fleet was much behind on account of the unheard of efforts they had made to complete the flotilla. Since the last was ready, all the naval means of equipment had been directed to the squadrons. Constructions in full force were now pushing forward in the ports of Antwerp, Cherburg, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon. Napoleon had said that he would have a hundred ships of the line in two years, and of this number twenty-five at Antwerp, because at this port it was that he placed his hopes for the restoration of the French marine. He found, besides, in this system of vast naval constructions, an occasion for the employment of the idle hands in the French ports. But the consumption of materials, the encumbrance of the yards, and even the insufficiency of the working population, slackened the execution of these great designs. They had with trouble placed a few vessels on the stocks at Antwerp, the men and materials having been sent away to Flushing, Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, in consequence of the necessity of labouring unceasingly upon the flotilla. At Brest they had only just armed the eighteenth vessel; at Rochefort the fifth. At Ferrol the want of resources among the Spaniards had stopped the refitting of the division which had taken refuge there. At Toulon there were only eight vessels ready to sail immediately, and still the winter had been passed in the utmost activity. Napoleon stimulated his minister of marine, Decrès, and left him no rest [1].

[1] This was the first idea of Napoleon. It will be seen hereafter that it was several times modified, according to the circumstances under which he was to act.

[1] Here are two letters from the emperor to admiral Decrès, which prove with what energy of determination he employed himself in the restoration of the French navy.

"To the Minister of the Marine.

"St. Cloud, 21st April 1804, or 1st Floréal, year XII.

"It appears to me perfectly proper that an imposing ceremony should take place on laying the first stone of the arsenal at Antwerp; but it also appears to me not proper to demolish the building under the pretext of want of regularity. It suffices to build nothing against the general regular plan. The rest will establish itself insensibly. When one has to demolish, we must demolish that which is not regular; but I must repeat what I said last to you, I am not satisfied with the works at Antwerp, because there is only one vessel upon the stocks and five hundred workmen. I must desire that before the 1st Messidor there may be at least three vessels of seventy-four guns upon the stocks, that before the 1st Vendémiaire, year XIII., there be six; and before the 1st of Nivôse, nine; and all this cannot be done with the small number of workmen that you have at command. There are a good many workmen in Provence unoccupied; there are many to be had on the coast of Bayonne and Bordeaux; in consequence, therefore, bring together three thousand at Antwerp. Naval stores of the north, wood, iron, all are easily conveyed thither. The war is no obstacle to naval construction there. If we had been three years at war, twenty-five vessels must have been built there. Any where besides such a thing is impossible. We must have a navy, and we shall not be regarded as having one until we shall possess a hundred sail of the line. It is necessary to have them in five years. If, as I think, they are able to construct vessels at Havre, there must be two immediately begun. It is necessary also to occupy themselves with commencing two new ones at Rochefort, and two others at Toulon. I believe that these last should be all of from four to three decks.

"I would wish also to settle my ideas about the port of Dunkirk. I beg that you will make for me a little memorandum that I may know how high the sea reaches at low water.

"The flotilla will soon be constructed every where. There must then be occupation given to a great number of workmen, as at Nantes, Bordeaux, Honfleur, Dieppe, St. Malo, and other places. A number of frigates, lighters, and brigs must be laid down. It is necessary, even under the feeling of public spirit, that the workmen on the coast should not perish of hunger, and that the departments bordering upon the sea, which have been the least favourable to the revolution, should perceive, that the time will come when the sea also will be our domain. St. Domingo cost us two millions a month, the English have taken it; these two millions per month must now be carried only to naval construction. My intention is to apply to the navy the same activity as to the flotilla, except that not being pressed, more of order may be introduced. I am not press-

He had even ordered that they should work by torchlight at Toulon, that the ten ships destined for Latouche Tréville might be equipped in proper time. There was not less a deficiency of materials and of workmen, than of seamen. The admirals Ganteaume at Brest, Villeneuve at Rochefort, Gourdon at Ferrol, and Latouche at Toulon, complained that they had not sufficient. Napoleon, after many experiments, became confirmed in the idea of supplying the insufficiency of the crews by young soldiers chosen from the regiments; these exercised in the artillery and common manœuvres, would be able to complete in an advantageous manner the equipment of the vessels. Admiral Ganteaume had already tried this step at Brest, and he had found it answer well. He praised a good deal the sailors borrowed from the land service, above all, for their artillery practice. He only requested they would not send him any soldiers who were perfect in their profession, as they would acquire with repugnance a second education, but the young conscripts, who had learned nothing, were much more apt at learning what he desired to teach them, and showed themselves more docile. They tried them besides, and only kept those who showed a taste for the sea service. They had thus succeeded in augmenting a fourth or fifth the total number of seamen.

France had at this time about forty-five thousand disposable seamen: fifteen thousand in the flotilla, twelve thousand at Brest, four thousand or five thousand between Lorient and Rochefort, four thousand between Ferrol and Cadiz, and about eight thousand at Toulon, without reckoning several thousand in India. They were able to add twelve thousand, perhaps fifteen thousand, to their force, which would carry it to sixty thousand, the number of men embarked. The fleet of Brest alone had received an addition of four thousand conscripts. These conscripts were much praised. If the squadrons thus manned had been able to navigate the ocean for a certain time under good officers, they would have soon been equal to the English squadrons. But blockaded in their ports they had no experience at sea; and the admirals, besides, wanted the confidence that is only to be acquired by victory. Nevertheless, all went forward under the influence of a will all-powerful, which bent itself to give confidence to those who had lost it. Admiral Latouche neglected nothing at Toulon, to be ready by July or August. Admiral Ganteaume came out of Brest and went in again in order to form his crews a little, and keep the English in continual doubt about his designs. By the strength of his threats to come out, he thus disposed them to an incredulity, through which some day he might be able to profit.

Napoleon devised a new supplementary force for the French navy, and for this purpose wished to appropriate the Genoese navy. He thought that with a squadron of seven or eight vessels and seven frigates in that port, he should divide the attention of the English between Toulon and Genoa, oblige them to keep a double fleet of observation in that sea, or answering the same end to himself, leave one of the two ports free, while the other was blockaded. He enjoined upon M. Salicetti, the French minister at Genoa, to conclude a treaty with that republic, by which she should deliver her building-yards to France for the construction of ten vessels of the line and the like number of frigates. France in return engaged to receive into her navy a number of Genoese officers, proportioned to the number of vessels, with a rate of pay equal to that of the French officers. Further, France bound herself to enrol six thousand Genoese seamen, that the Ligurian republic obliged itself on its own side always to retain at her disposition. When peace arrived, France bound herself to grant her imperial flag to the Genoese, which would procure them a protection, exceedingly useful against the Corsairs of Barbary.

All the dispositions of Napoleon were terminated, and he was on the point of setting out. He wished first to receive the ambassadors, who were charged to deliver to him their new letters of credence, in which he was gratified with the title of emperor. The pope's nuncio, the ambassadors of Spain and Naples, the ministers of Prussia, Holland, Denmark, Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Wurtemburg, Hesse, and Switzerland, presented themselves to him on Sunday, the 8th of July, or 19th of Messidor, with the forms adopted in all the courts, and remitted to him their letters, treating him, for the first time, as a crowned prince. There was no one wanting at this audience but the ambassador of the court of Vienna, with whom there was still a negotiation for the imperial title to be given to the

ing about the time, but I urgently demand that they commence.

"I pray you to present to me in the course of the coming week a report which will enable me to become acquainted with the actual situation of our navy, of our constructions, what is to be constructed, in what ports, and the sum that it will cost per month, not departing from the principle, I better love, that if you should give eighteen months to building a vessel you should make it to me a third part more time.

"As to the vessels, I would construct them on the same plan. The frigates on the model of the Hortensia and Cornelia, which appear to be very good; for the ships of the line, take the best vessels, and every where build vessels of eighty guns upon three decks, except at Antwerp, where it appears to me more prudent to commence at first with ships of seventy-four guns."

"*To the Minister of the Marine.*

"St. Cloud, 28th April 1804, or 8th Floréal, year XII.

"I signed to-day a decree relative to naval constructions. I shall admit no kind of excuse. Have an account rendered twice a week of your orders, and watch over their execution; if extraordinary measures are necessary, let me be acquainted with them. I shall not admit any reason valid, because with a good administration I would build thirty vessels of the line in France in a year, if it was needful. In a country like France, one ought to be able to do what one chooses. It will not escape you that my intention is to begin a good many vessels, except at Brest, where I desire not to build again. My desire is to have afloat before Vendémiaire, year XIV., twenty-six vessels of war, it being well understood that their being afloat will depend more particularly on the circumstance whether by that time we shall have peace. But henceforth all the vessels of seventy-four guns must be built at Antwerp. It is at Antwerp that our great building-yard must be. It is only there that the restoration of the French navy in a few years can be possible.

"Before the year XV. we ought to have a hundred men-of-war."

house of Austria; the ambassador of Russia, with whom there was a coolness, on account of the note addressed to the diet of Ratisbon; and, finally, him of the English court, with whom France was at war. It might be said, therefore, that Great Britain excepted, Napoleon was acknowledged by all Europe; because Austria was going to forward the formal act of acknowledgment; Russia regretted what she had done, and only demanded an explanation which should save her dignity, to acknowledge the imperial title in the Bonaparte family.

Some days after this, the grand distribution of the decorations of the legion of honour took place. Although this institution had been decreed for two years, the organization had demanded much time, and was scarcely now completed. Napoleon himself distributed these grand decorations to the first civil and military personages of the empire, in the church of the invalids—a building for which he had a peculiar regard. He did the honours with great pomp on the anniversary day of the 14th of July. He had not yet exchanged the order of the legion of honour with the foreign orders; but in awaiting such exchanges as he proposed to make, in order to place, under every relation, his new monarchy on an equal footing with the others, he called cardinal Caprara to him in the midst of the ceremony, and detaching from his own neck the cordon of the legion of honour, he gave it to this old and most respected cardinal, who was deeply touched at a distinction so marked. Napoleon commenced thus, through the pope's representative, the affiliation of the order, which, all recent in date as it was, soon became an object of ambition throughout Europe.

Attached to conferring a serious character upon things in appearance the most vain, he sent the cross of a grand officer of the legion of honour to admiral Latouche Tréville:—"I have named you," he wrote to the admiral, "a grand officer of the empire, inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean: but I much desire that the operations which you are about to undertake, may enable me even to raise you to such a degree of consideration and of honour, that you can have nothing more to wish * * * * * * Let us be masters of the strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world." Dated 3rd July, 1804 [1].

Entirely occupied with his vast projects, the emperor set out for Boulogne, after having delegated to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, besides the ordinary duty of presiding in the council of state and the senate, the power of exercising the supreme authority, if it should become necessary. The arch-chancellor was the sole personage of the empire in whom he had enough confidence to delegate such extensive powers. He arrived at Pont de Briques on the 20th of July, and immediately descended to the port of Boulogne to see the flotilla, the forts, and the different works which he had ordered to be performed. The two armies

[1] The following is the entire letter:—

"By the return of my courier, let me know the day when it will be possible for you, a due subtraction being made for the weather, to weigh anchor; inform me what the enemy is doing, and where Nelson keeps himself.

"Meditate on the great enterprize with which you are charged, and before I sign definitively your last orders, make me acquainted with the manner in which you think it most advantageous to fulfil them.

"I have named you a grand officer of the empire, inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean: but I much desire that the operations which you are about to undertake, may enable me even to raise you to such a degree of consideration and of honour, that you can have nothing more to wish.

"The Rochefort squadron, composed of five vessels, of which one is of three decks, and five frigates, is ready to weigh anchor; it has only five of the enemy's vessels before it.

"The Brest squadron consists of twenty-one vessels. These vessels weigh anchor to harass admiral Cornwallis, and they oblige the English to have a great number of vessels there. The enemy also keep six vessels before the Texel to blockade the Dutch squadron, composed of five vessels, five frigates, and a convoy of eight ships.

"General Marmont has his army on board.

"Between Etaples, Boulogne, Wimereux, and Ambleteuse, two new ports which I have had constructed, we have 270 gun vessels, 534 gun boats, 396 pinnaces, in all 1200 vessels, carrying 120,000 men and 10,000 horses. Let us be masters of the strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world.

"The enemy have in the Downs, or before Boulogne and before Ostend, two ships of 74 guns; three of 60 or 64; and two or three of 50. Up to this time, Cornwallis had not more than 15 sail; but all the reserves of Plymouth and Portsmouth have come to reinforce him. The enemy also keep at Cork, in Ireland, four or five vessels of war; I do not speak of frigates and small vessels, of which they have a great number.

"If you deceive Nelson, he will go to Sicily, to Egypt, or to Ferrol. I do not think that he will miss appearing before Ferrol. Of five vessels which are in that latitude, four are ready; the fifth will be so in Fructidor. But I think Ferrol is so marked, and it is so natural for one to suppose, if your army in the Mediterranean enter the ocean, its force is destined to raise the blockade of Ferrol. It appears better, therefore, to sail by there very large, and to arrive before Rochefort, which would complete you a squadron of sixteen sail of the line and eleven frigates, and then without anchoring or losing a moment, whether by doubling Ireland very large, or whether by executing the first design, to arrive before Boulogne. Our Brest squadron of twenty-three ships will have an army on board, and will be every day under sail in such a manner, that Cornwallis will be obliged to keep in close to the shore of Britany under the endeavour to oppose their passage out.

"For the rest, I wait to fix my ideas upon this operation, which has its chances, but of which the success offers results so immense, for the design which you have announced to me by the return of the courier.

"The largest stock of provisions possible must be embarked, in order that, under any circumstances, you be not straitened for any thing.

"At the end of this month they will launch a new vessel at Rochefort and at Lorient. That of Rochefort will not give place to any question, but if it should happen that the one at Lorient be in the road, and it should not have the power to join before your appearance at the Isle of Aix, I wish to know if you think you could shape your course so as to join it. However, I think that sailing out before a good mistral, it is preferable every way to perform the operation before the winter; because in the bad season, it will be possible that you will have a better chance of arriving, but it is possible there will be many days together in which there will be no profiting by your arrival. In supposing that you will be able to depart before the 10th Thermidor or 29th of July, it is not probable that you can arrive before Boulogne until some time in September, at the moment when the nights are already reasonably long, and when the weather is not bad for any time together."

of the land and sea welcomed him with transports of joy, and hailed his presence with a thousand unanimous exclamations. Nine hundred cannon, fired from the forts and line of moorings, and re-echoed from Calais to Dover, apprized the English of the presence of the man who, for eighteen months, had so deeply troubled the accustomed security of their island.

Napoleon embarked at the same moment, in spite of a stormy sea, wishing to visit the forts and masonry of the Creche and the Heurt, as well as the wooden fort placed between the other two; all these destined, as already observed, to cover the mooring line. He ordered to be executed, under his own eyes, some experiments in firing, with the object of assuring himself that the instructions he had given to obtain the most distant effect of the fire possible had been followed. He then sailed at large, and went to see manœuvres at the distance of a cannon shot from the English squadron, by several divisions of the flotilla, of which admiral Bruix boasted, without ceasing, of the progress. He returned full of satisfaction, after having lavished the testimonies of this satisfaction upon the chiefs of the two armies that, under his supreme directions, had contributed to the creation of that prodigious armament.

The day following and subsequent days, he visited all the camps, from Etaples to Calais; then he returned to the interior to inspect the cavalry corps, encamped at a distance from the coasts, and, more particularly, the five divisions of grenadiers, organized by general Junot, in the neighbourhood of Arras. This division was composed of companies of grenadiers taken from the regiments which were not designed to make a part of the expedition. There could not be a finer body of men seen, either as regarded the selection, or the handsome make of the men. They much surpassed the consular guard itself, now become the imperial guard. This body consisted of ten battalions of eight hundred men each. With the grenadiers began the reform of the military head-dress. These soldiers wore schakos in place of hats; the hair cut, and without powder, in place of the old mode of dressing it, so troublesome and ill adapted. Inured to war by numerous campaigns, manœuvring with unparalleled precision, and animated with all that pride which constitutes the strength of a select corps, it presented a division of about eight thousand men, which no European troops would have been able to resist, if they were double or triple its number. This was the body of grenadiers which he was to throw the first upon the shores of England, after they had crossed in the light pinnaces, which have been already described. On beholding their bearing, discipline, and enthusiasm, Napoleon felt his confidence redouble, and doubted no more of conquering at London the sceptre of the land and sea.

Returned to the coast, he inspected the flotilla, vessel by vessel, in order to be assured if the arrangements were such as he had ordered, and to try if it were possible at the first signal to embark, with the necessary rapidity, every thing that had been collected in the magazines of Boulogne. He found all things in the state which he desired. It required several days to embark the heavier stores, but those being placed on board, which might be done several weeks before the expedition moved, they would be able in only three or four hours to place the men in the flotilla, with the horses and field artillery. Still all was not yet ready. There were some divisions behindhand to come from Havre to Boulogne. The vessels for the guard particularly, confided to captain Daugier, were not arrived. The Batavian flotilla on that side occasioned to Napoleon more than one disappointment. He was greatly satisfied with admiral Verhuell; but the equipment of a part of this flotilla was not completed, whether through a want of zeal on the part of the Dutch government, or whether, as is most probable, it arose from the difficulties in the way of the thing itself. The two first divisions had united at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais; the third had not left the Scheldt. There remained another condition towards success, about which Napoleon deemed it needful to be assured; this was the union of the entire Batavian flotilla in the ports situated to the left of Cape Grisnez, by thus drawing them more closely together in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Wimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples. The whole flotilla would thus be enabled to depart together under the same wind at points only three or four leagues distant from each other. But two things, money and time, are always consumed in such great operations with a rapidity and to an extent which continually surpasses the conjectures of minds most positive in their estimates. The commencement of August having arrived, Napoleon perceived that all could not be absolutely ready before the month of September; and he made known to admiral Latouche that he had delayed the expedition for a month. He consoled himself for the delay, by thinking that this month would be employed in getting things better prepared than they were already, and that, besides the season being still sufficiently fine in the month of September, there also would be the advantage of longer nights [1].

In the mean time, he wished to give a grand fête to the army, adapted to elevate the moral courage of the troops, if it were possible it could be more elevated than it was. He had distributed grand decorations of the legion of honour to the principal personages of the empire in the church of the invalids, on the anniversary of the 14th of July. He now conceived the distribution himself of the crosses to the army, which were to be given in exchange for the arms of honour that had been suppressed, and to celebrate this ceremony of the anniversary of his birth on the borders of the ocean,

[1] The text of this new order was as follows:—

"*To the Minister of the Marine.*

"2nd August, 1804, (14th Thermidor, year XII.)

"My intention is, that you should send an extraordinary courier to Toulon, in order to make known to general Latouche, that the different divisions of the flotilla not having been able to join, I have thought a delay of a month cannot but be advantageous, inasmuch as the nights will become longer; but that my intention is, he should avail himself of this delay to add the ship Berwick to the squadron; that all and every kind of means should be used to produce this result; that a vessel more or less is not a thing to be disregarded. In fact, they will induce me, if able, to carry up the united squadron to eighteen sail.

"I desire that orders be renewed as well, to press the armament of the Algesiras at Lorient. It must be in the road by the 10th Fructidor."

in presence of the English squadron. The result met his wishes; it was a magnificent spectacle, of which cotemporaries for a long time retained a recollection.

He made choice of a spot situated on the right of Boulogne, along by the sea, not far from the column that was afterwards erected at that place. This ground having the form of an amphitheatre, or half circle, as if constructed designedly on the shore side, seemed to have been prepared by nature for some grand national spectacle. The space was shaped in such a manner, it was possible to place the whole army there. In the centre of this amphitheatre, a throne was raised for the emperor, with the back to the sea, and the front towards the land. To the right and left steps were constructed to receive the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and marshals. In the prolongation of the two wings were displayed detachments of the imperial guard. In front, on the inclining ground of this natural amphitheatre, were arranged, as anciently were the Roman people in their vast arenas, the different corps of the army, formed in close columns, radiating from a common centre towards the throne of the emperor. At the head of each of these columns was placed the infantry, the cavalry in the rear rising above the infantry by the height of their horses.

On the 16th of August, the morrow of the day of St. Napoleon, the troops marched to the place where the fête was to be given, across a flood of population, that had poured in immense numbers from all the provinces round to attend at the spectacle. A hundred thousand men, nearly all veterans of the republic, their eyes fixed on Napoleon, awaited the reward of their exploits. The soldiers and officers who were to receive the crosses had left the ranks, and advanced to the foot of the imperial throne. Napoleon, standing up, read to them the fine formula of the oath of the legion of honour, when all together, at the sound of trumpets and the roar of artillery, shouted, "We swear it!" They then came forward successively for several hours, to receive one after another this cross which was to supplant nobility of blood. Former gentlemen mounted along with simple peasants the steps of the throne, equally delighted to obtain the distinction awarded to their courage, and all promising to spill their blood on the shore of England, in order to assure to their country, and the man who governed it, the uncontested empire of the world.

This magnificent spectacle moved every heart, and an unforeseen circumstance happened to render it deeply serious. A division of the flotilla, which had recently left Havre, entered Boulogne at the same moment, for a long time exchanging a lively cannonade with the English. From time to time, Napoleon quitted the throne, to take his spy glass, and see with his own eyes how the soldiers of the land and sea comported themselves in presence of the enemy.

Such scenes as these tended much to agitate England. The British press, arrogant and calumniating, as the press always is in a free country, railed much at Napoleon and his preparations, but railed as one who trembles at that which he would make appear the object of his laughter. In reality, the uneasiness there was deep and general. The immense preparations which had been made for the defence of England disturbed the country, without making completely easy in mind the men who were acquainted with the art of war. They were seen regretting that they had not a great army, as France regretted that she had not a powerful navy; England had wished by means of a corps of reserve to augment its military strength. A part of the men designed to serve in the reserve by the drawing, had volunteered into the line, which carried up this force to nearly one hundred and seventy thousand men. To that was joined the local militia, an undetermined number, designed to serve exclusively in the provinces; and lastly, one hundred and fifty thousand volunteers, who had offered their services in the three kingdoms, showed much zeal, and submitted themselves to military exercise. There were three hundred thousand volunteers spoken of, but they had not more than half that number effective, and really prepared to serve; the highest persons in England, in order to give the impulse, had clothed themselves in volunteer uniforms. It has been already seen, that Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt both wore the dress. The levy *en masse*, decreed upon paper, had not been seriously undertaken.

In making allowance for customary defalcations, England had to oppose to the French one hundred thousand or one hundred and twenty thousand regular soldiers of excellent quality, a militia without organization[1], and one hundred and fifty thousand volunteers without experience, having in general officers below mediocrity, the whole shared between England and Ireland, and dispersed on those parts of the coasts where the danger was most to be apprehended. There were counted in regular troops and volunteers, seventy thousand men in Ireland; their remained for England and Scotland one hundred and eighty, or two hundred thousand men, volunteers or troops of the line. It was the utmost, even with the art to move masses which Napoleon at that time possessed almost alone, it was the utmost if they had been able to unite eighty thousand or ninety thousand men at the place of danger. What would they have done had they been twice as numerous, before the one hundred and fifty thousand French, all accomplished soldiers, which Napoleon would have thrown on the other side of the straits! The real defence of England therefore was on the ocean. The English had one hundred thousand seamen; eighty-nine vessels of the line, spread over all the seas; twenty vessels of fifty guns; one hundred and thirty-two frigates, and more, a proportional number in her dockyards and basins. As Napoleon did, rendering themselves more perfect as time ran on, they had created sea fencibles, in imitation of land fencibles. They had under that name united all the fishermen and seamen not liable to the ordinary press, that were spread, to the number of twenty thousand, in boats along the coast, keeping a continual guard, independently of the advanced guard of frigates, brigs, and corvettes, that were in a connected chain from the Scheldt to the

[1] The regular militia are omitted above, in almost all respects equal to the line, as the two or three regiments who turned the tide of battle at Albuera never before in fire, and almost all militiamen, clearly proved. These were seventy-two thousand, of whom our author takes no notice, He evidently confuses the local militia with them, whereas these last were little other than the volunteers whom he faithfully enough designates.—*Trans.*

Somme. Night signals and chariots for transporting troops by post, completed their system of precautions, exhibited fully, and brought to greater perfection in the fifteen months which had already passed. They had besides entrenched the ground, and placed in the Thames a line of frigates connected by iron chains, capable of opposing a continued and solid barrier to all vessels. From Dover to the Isle of Wight, every flat part of the shore was crowned with artillery.

The expense of these preparations, and the disturbance they occasioned, was immense. Those given to agitation in public life, as was very natural when they were in danger of invasion, could find nothing good that was done, nothing sufficiently secure, and with a feeble minister, of whom all the world believed they had ground to contest the capacity, there was no moral power capable of restraining the rage for fiction and censure. On his proposing any measure, they said it was petty, or bad, or not sufficiently good for the object, and they proposed something else. Pitt, who had been for some time reserved, had ceased to be so any longer, encouraged as he was by the general outcry. He severely blamed the measures taken by the ministers, whether he thought the moment was come to overturn them, or whether he really found their precautionary measures insufficient and badly calculated. It is at least certain that his censures were much better founded than those of the other members of the opposition. He reproached the ministers with not having foreseen and prevented the concentration of the flat-bottomed boats at Boulogne, which, according to his statement, were above a thousand at least. Although he endeavoured to exaggerate rather than to dissimulate the danger, it will be seen that he stopped very short of the truth, because with the Batavian flotilla the number amounted to two thousand three hundred. He attributed the fault to the ignorance of the admiralty, that had not foreseen the use that might be made of gun-boats, and that had employed vessels of the line, and frigates in shallow water, where large vessels could not possibly follow the small French boats. He pretended that with some hundreds of gun-boats, supported by frigates at sea, it would have been possible to combat on equal terms the French preparations, and destroy their immense armament before it could have united in the channel. The reproach was at least specious, if not well founded.

The ministers replied, that during the last war, gun-boats would willingly have been employed, but that they would not stand the weather. This shows that the English seamen had applied themselves much less than the French to this species of vessel; because the French gun-boats had navigated in all weathers. Sometimes they had got aground in the shallows, but except in the accident at Brest, none had been lost through defect of construction. In fact, Mr. Pitt neither agreed in opinion with Mr. Windham, his old colleague, nor with Mr. Fox, his new ally, on the insufficiency of the regular army, acknowledging that it is not easy to extend on a sudden, at will, the proportions of a regular military force, above all, in a country where recourse is not allowed to a conscription, complaining, too, that more had not been done with the volunteer system. He pretended that he could, by availing himself of the effective services of the one hundred and fifty thousand English volunteers, make them acquire the degree of discipline and instruction of which they were capable, and bring them to be much less inferior than they appeared to the regular troops. This reproach, well or ill-founded, was as specious as the preceding.

Pitt sustained his opinions with great warmth. In proportion as he engaged further in opposition, he found himself approach, if not by his sentiments and opinions, at least by his conduct, the old Whig opposition, and Fox. These two adversaries, who had been in opposition for twenty-five years, seemed to become reconciled, and it was even reported that they were going to form a joint ministry. The old majority was broken up. It has been already seen that a small part of this majority had followed Windham and Grenville into opposition. A larger part still had joined them since Pitt had raised the standard. This opposition was composed of all those who thought that the actual ministers were incapable of meeting the situation of affairs; and that it was absolutely necessary to have recourse to the old head of the war party. The other part, or the old Whig opposition, led by Mr. Fox, although it had sustained some defections, as in the cases of Sheridan and Tierney, that rallied round Mr. Addington, was singularly strengthened by a circumstance that happened at the court. The king's mind appeared to be troubled anew, and every thing announced the approaching regency of the prince of Wales. But the prince, formerly at variance with Pitt, and more recently with Addington, was strongly attached to Fox, and would, as it was believed, take him for his principal minister. From that time a certain number of members of the House of Commons, acting under his influence, come forward to support the party of Fox. The two united and augmented oppositions, one by hoisting the flag of Pitt, the other by the prospect of the approaching fortune of Fox, counterbalanced nearly the whole majority of the minister Addington.

Several successive divisions soon revealed the serious position of affairs as they affected the cabinet. Mr. Pitt had moved, in the month of March, for a comparative state of the English navy in 1797, 1801, and 1803. Aided by the friends of Mr. Fox, he succeeded in obtaining one hundred and thirty voices for his motion, to two hundred and one against it. The ministers only obtained a majority of seventy votes, and on comparing the votes upon this motion with anterior votes, it was impossible not to be struck with the progress made by the opposition. This success encouraged the newly-allied parties, and they multiplied motions. In April, Mr. Fox moved that there should be laid before a committee all the measures adopted for the defence of the country since the renewal of the war. This was in a manner to submit to the judgment of parliament the conduct and capacity of the minister Addington. The former majority was now found to be yet further diminished. The opposition numbered two hundred and four votes, and the ministers two hundred and fifty-six, which reduced the former majority of seventy voices to fifty-two. Every day this majority lessened; and in the month of May, a third motion was announced, which would have placed the ministers definitively in the minority, when lord Hawkesbury declared,

in terms sufficiently clear to be understood, that this last motion was useless, because the cabinet was going to resign.

The old king, by whom Addington and Hawkesbury were much esteemed, and Pitt very little, finished the affair nevertheless by appealing to the last to take office. This celebrated and all-powerful personage, for so long a time the enemy of France, then retook the reins of the state, with the commission to upraise, if he were able, the threatened fortunes of England. On entering into the cabinet, he left out his old friends, Windham and Grenville, and his recent ally, Fox. He was reproached for this double infidelity, explained in very different ways. That which was most probable is, that he would not have Windham and Grenville because their Toryism was too violent, and that the king on his side would have nothing to do with Fox, who was too decided a Whig. This statesman has been reproached with not having done enough under the circumstances to overcome George III. It would seem to have been desirable, seeing the danger menacing the nation, that the two men of the greatest talent in England should have united to afford the government the utmost power and authority.

Still Pitt exercised an influence upon the general mind, and there was such a confidence reposed in a person so long tried, it sufficed alone to bring him into power. On entering upon his administration, he at once required 60,000,000 f. of secret service money. It was pretended that this money was designed for the renewal of the relations of England with the continent; because Mr. Pitt was regarded with good reason as the most fitting of all the ministers to renew coalitions, by the great consideration which he enjoyed in those courts which were inimical to France.

Such had been the events occurring in England during the time that Napoleon had taken the imperial crown, and when, proceeding to Boulogne, he felt disposed to force the barrier of the ocean. It seemed as if Providence had recalled these two men upon the scene of action, to make them contest with each other, for the last time, with more obstinacy and violence than ever; Pitt in sustaining those coalitions which he so well knew how to form; Napoleon in destroying them with the sword, which he understood still better how to do.

Napoleon was very indifferent to all that passed on the other side of the strait. The military preparations of the English made him smile with much more sincerity than his gun-boats made the English journalists laugh. He only required of Heaven one thing, and that was to have a fleet in the channel for forty-eight hours, and he would soon give a good reason for re-uniting all their armies between Dover and London. The ministerial changes in England would not have affected him, unless they had called Fox to the head of affairs. Believing in the sincerity of that statesman, and in his good dispositions towards France, he would have been induced to pass by all ideas of an exasperated war for those of peace, and even of alliance. But the arrival of Pitt in power, on the contrary, proved further still, that it was necessary to finish by some audacious and desperate blow, in which the two nations should risk their existence. Meanwhile, the demand of 60,000,000 f. of secret service money by Pitt, was only to be explained by some matter of an occult nature connected with the continent, and could not but occupy his attention. He found Austria very slow in forwarding the new letters of credence, and but little candid at Ratisbon in the affair of the Russian note. Lastly, he had received through M. Oubril, the reply from the cabinet of St. Petersburg, to the despatch in which he had made allusion to the death of Paul I[1]. This reply of Russia seemed to indicate some ulterior project. Napoleon, with his usual sagacity, already perceived the commencement of a new European coalition; and complained to Talleyrand of his incredulity out of complaisance to the two Cobentzels, adding, that on the least doubt in the dispositions of the continent, he would throw himself not upon England, but upon those of the other powers that might excite his alarm; "besides," he said, "he was not fool enough to pass the channel, if he were not quite certain all was safe on the side of the Rhine." It is thus he wrote from Boulogne to Talleyrand, telling him that he must provoke Austria and Russia to explain themselves, when a sudden accident, and ever to be regretted, intervened to terminate these uncertainties, and oblige him to defer for some months yet his project of a descent upon England.

The brave and unfortunate Latouche Tréville, preyed upon by a disease incompletely cured, and by a degree of ardour which he could not control, died on the 20th of August, in the port of Toulon, the evening before he was to set sail. Napoleon was apprized of the melancholy event at Boulogne about the close of August, 1804, at the moment when ready to embark. He had also been seized with some presentiments of a European coalition, and was sometimes tempted to deal his blows elsewhere than in London. The Toulon fleet having lost its chief, he was forced to defer his expedition to England, because the choice of a new admiral, the nomination, the journey, the giving him time to become known to his squadron, would require above a month. The end of August had arrived; it would require until the end of October for the departure from Toulon, and until November for the arrival of the fleet in the channel. There would thus be a winter campaign to make, and in consequence, new combinations to be formed.

Napoleon immediately set about finding an officer to take the place of admiral Latouche: "There is not a moment to be lost," he wrote to the minister Decrès, "to send an admiral who is able to take the command of the Toulon squadron. It cannot be worse off than it is now in the hands of Dumanoir, who is not capable of maintaining discipline in so large a squadron, nor of making it act. * * * It appears to me, that for the Toulon squadron, there are only three proper men, Bruix, Villeneuve, or Rosily. You will be able to sound Bruix. I believe that Rosily has a good will, but he has done nothing for fifteen years. * * * * However, it is an urgent

[1] See a note at page 547, with an extract from this Russian despatch.—*Translator.*

matter to be decided." Dated 28th August, 1804.

Dating from that day he re-organized the naval and military establishment which he had created at Boulogne, it being of a less temporary character than he at first supposed, employing himself on the spot in simplifying the organization, in order to render it less expensive, and at the same time add as much as possible of perfection to its manœuvres. "The flotilla," he wrote to admiral Decrès, "has been hitherto considered as an expedition; it must henceforth be regarded as a fixed establishment, from this moment attaching the greatest attention to all that is of a fixed nature, governing it by different regulations from a squadron." Dated 23rd Fructidor, year XII., or September 18th, 1804.

He simplified, in fact, the wheels of the administration; suppressed many of the double employments, provided for the approximation of the sea and land armies, revised all the appointments, and employed himself, in a word, in making the flotilla of Boulogne a separate organization, that costing as little as possible, might last as long as the war, and continue to exist, in case the army should be obliged to quit for a moment the shores of the channel.

He also separated the division into squadrons, to infuse a better order into the movements of the two thousand three hundred vessels. The definitive distribution adopted was as follows: nine gun-vessels or gun-boats formed a section and carried a battalion; two of these sections formed a division and carried a regiment. The pinnaces, that were only able to hold half the amount of the other boats, were doubled in number. The division of pinnaces was composed of four sections, or thirty-six pinnaces in place of eighteen, in order to suffice for a regiment of two battalions. Several divisions of gun-vessels, boats, and pinnaces formed a squadron, which would transport several regiments, in other words, a *corps d'armée*. To each squadron was added a certain number of fishing or pilot boats, that were devoted to the embarkation of the cavalry horses and naval baggage. The entire flotilla was divided into eight squadrons, two at Etaples for the corps of marshal Ney, four at Boulogne for the corps of marshal Soult, two at Wimereux for the advanced guard and for the reserve. The port of Ambleteuse, in the new design, that time had been required to perfect, was destined for the Batavian flotilla, and this was to take on board the corps of marshal Davout. Each squadron was directed by a superior officer, and manœuvred at sea in an independent manner, although in combination with the whole operation together. In such a mode, the distributions of the flotilla were found to be completely adapted to those of the army.

In the mean time admiral Decrès had sent for the admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy, in order to offer to them the vacant commands. Considering Bruix as indispensably necessary at Boulogne, and Rosily as too long absent from active sea service, he had regarded Villeneuve as the most proper person to command the Toulon squadron, and Missiessy that of Rochefort, which Villeneuve would in that case vacate for Toulon. Admiral Villeneuve, whose name is encircled with an unfortunate celebrity, had spirit, courage, and a perfect knowledge of his duty, but he had no firmness of character. Lying open to the slightest impression, he was capable of exaggerating to himself without measure the difficulties of his situation, and apt to fall into a state of discouragement, in which he was no longer master of his heart or his head. Admiral Missiessy, less able, but colder in temperament, was little susceptible of elevated feelings, but he was also as little susceptible of depression. Admiral Decrès sent for both, endeavoured to overcome that demoralization which had affected not the seamen and officers, who were filled with the noblest ardour, but the commanders of the fleets, who had lost in battle that renown which they esteemed above life. He made admiral Missiessy accept the command of the Rochefort squadron, and admiral Villeneuve that of Toulon. He had for this last admiral a friendship which had continued from early infancy. He made him acquainted with the secret of the emperor and the great operation, to the performance of which he destined the Toulon squadron. He excited his imagination by showing him the grand task to be executed, and the high honour to be obtained. A deplorable temptation, arising out of an old friendship. This momentary excitement was to give place in Villeneuve to an unhappy depression, and bring to the navy of France the most sanguinary reverses.

The minister of the navy wrote in haste to the emperor the result of his conferences with Villeneuve, and the effect produced upon that officer by the prospect of the danger and glory which lay open before him [1].

[1] The letter of admiral Decrès is here cited, because it is important to know how the man was nominated to this command, who afterwards lost the battle of Trafalgar.

"Sire," he wrote, "vice-admiral Villeneuve and rear-admiral Missiessy are here.

"I informed the first of the grand project.

"He heard it coldly, and keeping silence for a few moments, then said with a calm smile to me: 'I awaited something of a similar nature; but to be approved, it is necessary that such projects should be completed.'

"I allow myself to transcribe to you literally his reply to a particular conversation, because it will better depict to you than I can do, the effect which this overture produced upon him. He added: 'I shall not lose four hours in rallying the first; with the five others, and my own (vessels) I shall be sufficiently strong. It is necessary to be fortunate, and to know how far I am so, the task must be undertaken.'

"We spoke of the route. He judged of it in the same way as your majesty. He made no obstacle of unfavourable chances, any more than was needful for one to discover that he was not heedless of them. In fact, nothing of that kind had any effect upon his resolution.

"The place of a great officer, that of a vice-admiral, has made him a new man. The idea of danger was effaced by the hope of glory, and he finished by saying to me: 'I give myself wholly up to it,' and that in a tone and with an action indicative of cool and positive decision.

"He will set off for Toulon as soon as your majesty shall have been pleased to make known to me if you have any other commands to give him.

"The rear-admiral Missiessy is more reserved with me: he requests to remain here eight days; he is very cold, which makes him less definite. He told me that he was much mortified that your majesty had not given him the Mediterranean squadron, or that he is not made a vice-admiral in other words. His ground of reasoning among his familiar friends is, that having done nothing during the war, he has at least the honour not to have encountered any defeats! I have given him the order to go and take the com-

Napoleon, who had a deep knowledge of mankind, reckoned but little upon the adequate substitution of any one for admiral Latouche. Meditating continually upon his project, he modified it and increased it according to the unlooked for circumstances that occurred. The winter gave the Brest fleet freedom of action, and caused the cessation of the blockade. Although Ganteaume had exhibited a want of character in 1801, still he had shown on more than one occasion both courage and devotion. Napoleon wished therefore to confide to him the brilliant and difficult part of the plan. He put off the expedition until after the 18th Brumaire, or 9th of November, the time assigned for the ceremony of the coronation, and he resolved to make Ganteaume go to sea in that rough season, with fifteen or eighteen thousand men destined for Ireland; then when the admiral had thrown them upon one of the accessible points of that island, he was to return rapidly into the channel, in order to protect the passage of the flotilla.

In the modified plan the admirals Missiessy and Villeneuve were charged with a different business from that designated for the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons, when Latouche Tréville had the command. Admiral Villeneuve, sailing from Toulon, was to go to America, reconquer Surinam and the Dutch colonies of Guiana[1]. One division detached from the squadron of Villeneuve in passing, was to capture the island of St. Helena. Admiral Missiessy was ordered to reinforce the French West India islands or Antilles, with three or four thousand men. Then to ravage the English islands, by surprising them nearly in their defenceless state. The two admirals were then to unite and return together to Europe, having as their last instruction to raise the blockade of Ferrol, and to enter Rochefort to the number of twenty ships of the line. They were enjoined to sail before Ganteaume, in order that the English, aware of their departure, might be drawn into following them. Napoleon desired that Villeneuve should sail from Toulon on the 12th of October; Missiessy, from Rochefort, on the 1st of November; and Ganteaume, from Brest, on the 22nd of December, 1804. He regarded it as certain that the twenty vessels of Villeneuve and Missiessy would draw after them at least thirty sail of the English out of the European seas; because the English, attacked on a sudden upon all points, would not omit to send succours every where. It was in that case probable that admiral Ganteaume would have sufficient freedom of movement to execute the operation which had been confided to him, and which consisted, after having touched on Ireland, in bringing himself before Boulogne, whether by going round Scotland, or by coming from Ireland directly into the channel.

All these orders were given from Boulogne itself, where he then was, while Napoleon wished, in the time remaining to him before the winter, to clear the aspect of affairs upon the continent. Directing the conduct of Talleyrand by a daily correspondence, he prescribed to him the course of diplomacy which would lead to this object.

The unreflecting note on the subject of the violation of the Germanic territory sent by the Russian cabinet, and the bitter reply of that of France, will no doubt at once recur to the recollection. The young Alexander had deeply felt that reply, and had acknowledged, but too late, that his mode of coming to the throne had taken away from him the right to give such haughty moral lessons to other governments. He was even humbled and frightened. The mind of Alexander was more lively than strong. He placed himself willingly in advance, and then retired willingly as soon as he observed his danger. It was without consulting his ministers that he had put on mourning for the death of the duke d'Enghien; and it was in opposition to one portion of them that he had sent to Ratisbon the note which has been already mentioned. Still he had the greatest trouble to support himself in his first resolutions. The better informed persons in St. Petersburg, after the first excitement had passed away, discovered that he had conducted himself with too much levity in the affair of the duke d'Enghien; they charged it upon the young ministers who governed the empire, and, among others, upon the prince Czartoryski sooner than on the rest, because he was a Pole, and minister for foreign affairs since the retirement of the chancellor Woronzoff into the country. Nothing could be more unjust than this judgment in regard to the prince Czartoryski, because he had resisted the conduct of the court as much as he was able, but he still wished that it should now leave with dignity the wrong path which it had followed. He had in consequence prescribed to M. Oubril, the Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Paris, to make a complaint in a note at once firm and moderate, of the affectation which the French cabinet had used in recalling certain recollections; to testify pacific dispositions, but to exact an answer upon three or four ordinary subjects to the reclamations of the Russian government; such as the occupation of

mand of the squadron, and I calculate that in eight days he will be on the road. It will cost him five or six to arrive at his destination."

[1] While our author details the smallest advantages gained over her enemies by France, he omits the losses of France and her dependents. Thus Surinam was conquered by the English with inconsiderable loss on the 4th of the preceding May (1804), two thousand men were made prisoners. It seemed necessary to mention this conquest after the breach of the peace of Amiens, to comprehend the above passage; for how else could Villeneuve be sent by Napoleon to take Surinam from the British, since it had been restored to the Dutch. History, with such omissions, must be imperfect. Again, Demerara and Essequibo were taken by the English, September 27, 1803. Gorée was taken from the French, March 15, 1804, but no mention is made of that circumstance. St. Lucia was captured by assault on the 23rd of June, 1803; the island of Tobago in like manner on the 1st of July, 1803. All these our author suffers to go unnoticed. A landing in Dominica by a French squadron, and the burning of the little town of Roseau, is to be found subsequently set out at length. It is the duty of the faithful historian, even when making a merit of passing over trivial events, to record important territorial losses in belligerent conflicts. The meaning of Napoleon in a letter to the minister of marine, occurring at page 582 in the note, cannot be understood except by reference to a note of the translator, at page 472. The words of the emperor are these: "St. Domingo cost us two millions a month; *The English have taken it.*" Our author no where states that the remnants of the French expedition to St. Domingo had surrendered, and become prisoners to the English at all; the omission becomes the more obvious from the allusion of the emperor to the fact.—*Translator.*

Naples, the indemnity, continually deferred, of the king of Piedmont, and the invasion of Hanover. M. Oubril had orders, that if he obtained upon these subjects an explanation only specious, so as to content himself, to remain at Paris, but to ask for his passports if they enveloped themselves in an obstinate and disdainful silence.

Prussia, thus following an expression of Napoleon, "continually agitated between the two giants," informed of the exact position of things in the Russian cabinet, had made Talleyrand acquainted with it through the minister, Lucchesini; and had said to him, "Defer your reply as long as possible; then make an answer which shall furnish the dignity of Russia with an apparent satisfaction, and this tempest in the north, with which it is endeavoured to alarm Europe, will be calmed."

These different communications were received at Paris while Napoleon was at Boulogne. Talleyrand had had recourse to a dilatory policy, in which it has been seen that he excelled. Napoleon willingly lent himself to the system, not seeking to enter upon a war with the continent, nor fearing it, but preferring to finish with Europe by an expedition directed against England. He, therefore, continued his operations at Boulogne, during which M. Oubril was left waiting in Paris. Still Talleyrand did not attach sufficient importance to the Russian note, and, taking too much to the letter the advice of Prussia, he too readily believed that the matter might be got off by delay. M. Oubril, after having waited out the month of August, had at last demanded a reply. Napoleon, importuned with questions by M. Oubril, and disposed besides to explain himself categorically with the powers of the continent since the entrance of Pitt upon the ministry, had willed that an answer should be given. He had sent himself the model of a note to be transmitted to M. Oubril; and Talleyrand, following his usual custom, had done the utmost in his power to soften both the ground and the form of the original. But what he had sent was very insufficient to save the dignity of the Russian cabinet, unhappily committed.

This note placed in strong contrast the wrongs charged upon France, and those for which Russia was to be reproached on the other side. Russia, it said, had no right to keep troops in Corfu, and she every day increased their number. She was bound to refuse all favours to the enemies of France, and she did not limit herself to affording an asylum to the emigrants, she accorded to them besides public functions at foreign courts. This was a positive violation of the last treaty. More than this, the Russian agents every where exhibited their hostility to France. Such a state of things excluded all idea of an intimate connexion, and made that concert impossible which had been agreed upon between the two cabinets, for the management of the affairs of Italy and Germany. As to the occupation of Hanover and Naples, these had been measures forced by the war. If Russia would engage to make the English evacuate Malta, the cause of the war would vanish; and the countries occupied by France would be evacuated at the same moment. But to endeavour to bear upon France, without seeking to bear equally upon England, was neither just nor reconcilable. If she pretended to constitute herself arbitrator between the two belligerent powers, to judge not only the ground of the quarrel, but the means employed to determine it, she must be a firm and impartial arbitrator. France was decided to accept no other. If Russia desired war, France was perfectly ready; since, after all, the last campaign of Russia in the west did not authorize her to allow herself towards France the indulgence of so high a tone as that which she seemed to take at the moment. It was needful to be well understood, that the emperor of the French was not the emperor of the Turks or Persians. If it was wished on the contrary to be in the best relations with him, he was perfectly disposed to meet that desire; and then, most certainly, he should not refuse to do that which he had promised, more particularly on the subject of the king of Sardinia; but in the state of existing relations, nothing would be obtained from him, because threats were in his view the most inefficacious means for such a purpose.

This haughty note left not the smallest pretext for M. Oubril to say he was satisfied. It was the consequence of the rashness of his cabinet, which sometimes almost proposed, as it affected Naples and Hanover, to constitute itself the judge of the means which the belligerent powers should employ in the war, sometimes wished to mingle itself up with an act beyond its own territory, as in the case of the duke d'Enghien's death, and continually exposed itself to receive in all those points, so injudiciously touched upon, the most provoking replies. M. Oubril, consulting his instructions, believed it his duty to demand his passports; still in order to be wholly faithful, he added that his departure was but a simple interruption of diplomatic relations between the two courts, and not a declaration of hostilities; that when such relations had nothing more left useful or agreeable, there was not any reason for their continuance; that for the rest, Russia did not dream of having recourse to arms, but that the French cabinet would decide by its posterior conduct, if or not war should follow this interruption of the relations between the two countries.

M. Oubril, after this cold but still pacific declaration, quitted Paris. An order was sent to M. de Rayneval, who had remained as *chargé d'affaires* at St. Petersburg, to return to France. M. Oubril left at the end of August, but stopped some days at Mayence, to await the intelligence of the free passage accorded to M. de Rayneval out of Russia.

It was evident that Russia, in endeavouring to testify her displeasure by the interruption of her relations with France, still did not make war, as in a case in which a new European coalition had furnished her with the advantageous occasion. All depended consequently upon Austria in the judgment of Napoleon. He therefore put it to a strong test to discover what he had to hold by, before delivering himself up entirely to his maritime projects. The acknowledgment of the imperial title that he had taken he still awaited; and he peremptorily demanded it. His design to visit the banks of the Rhine would shortly conduct him to Aix-la-Chapelle; he exacted of M. Cobentzel that he should come there to render him homage, and to hand him his letters of credence, in the same city where the German emperors had been accustomed to take the crown of Charlemagne. He declared that if he got no satisfaction on this point, M. de Champagny,

nominated minister of the interior, in place of M. Chaptel, called up to the senate, should have no successor at Vienna, and that the withdrawal of an ambassador between powers so closely in vicinity as France and Austria, would not pass as pacifically as between France and Russia. Lastly, he willed that the Russian note already postponed at Ratisbon by an adjournment, but on the fate of which it would be necessary to decide in a few days, should be definitively rejected, or he declared anew that he would address an answer to the diet, from whence war would inevitably arise.

This being done, Napoleon quitted Boulogne, where he had passed six weeks, and journeyed towards the departments of the Rhine. Before parting, he had occasion to be present at a combat of the flotilla against an English division of vessels. On the 25th of August, or 8th of Fructidor, year XII., at two o'clock, he was in the road, inspecting in his boat the line of anchorage composed, according to usage, of a hundred and fifty, or two hundred gun vessels and pinnaces. The English squadron moored seawards consisted of two ships, two frigates, seven corvettes, six brigs, two cutters, and a lugger, in all twenty sail. A corvette, detaching itself from the enemy's division, came and placed itself at the extremity of the French line of anchorage, to observe, and it fired several broadsides. The admiral then gave the order to the first division of cannoneers, commanded by captain Leray, to weigh anchor, and to direct his whole force on the corvette; which obliged it to retire immediately. Seeing this, the English formed a detachment, composed of a frigate, several brigs and corvettes, with a cutter, to force the French cannoneers to retire in their turn, and hinder them from regaining their accustomed position. The emperor, who was in the same boat with admiral Bruix, the minister of war and of the marine, and several marshals, went into the midst of the gun-boats which were engaged, and to set them the example, placed the boat's head towards the frigate, which advanced at full sail. He knew that the soldiers and seamen, admirers of his boldness on land, sometimes enquired if he would be equally bold on the sea. He wished to satisfy them in this respect, and accustom them to brave with temerity the large vessels of the enemy. He made them steer his boat far in advance of the French line, and as near as possible to the frigate. This last vessel, seeing the imperial boat all in trim, and conjecturing perhaps the precious freight which it contained, had reserved its fire. The minister of the navy trembling for the emperor from the consequences of such a bravado, wished to seize the tiller of the helm to change the direction of the boat; but an imperious gesture of Napoleon arrested the minister's attempt, and the course was continued towards the frigate. Napoleon, his spying-glass in his hand, continued to look through it, when on a sudden the frigate fired her reserved broadside, and covered with its projectiles the boat which bore "Cæsar and his fortunes." No one was hurt; and the account was acquitted by the splash of the projectiles in the water. All the French gun-vessels that witnessed the scene advanced as rapidly as possible, in order to attract the fire, and to cover by passing forward the boat of the emperor. The English division assailed in its turn by a shower of balls and grape-shot, retrograded by little and little. It was followed, but it retired afresh, keeping its broadside towards the land. During this interval, a second division of gun-vessels, commanded by captain Pevrieu, had weighed anchor, and borne down towards the enemy. Very soon the frigate, badly handled, and steered with difficulty, was obliged to sail away. The corvettes followed this retreating movement, each of them much damaged, and the cutter so crippled that she was seen to go down.

Napoleon quitted Boulogne, delighted with the combat in which he had thus taken a part, and still more that the secret accounts which came to him from the English coast gave the most satisfactory details of the moral and physical effect which the combat had produced. The French had no more than one man killed and seven wounded, one of them mortally. The English, according to the report addressed to Napoleon, had twelve or fifteen killed and sixty wounded. Their vessels suffered much. The English officers were struck with the bearing of the small vessels of the French, with their vivacity, and the precision of their fire. It was evident, that if these gun-vessels had to dread the vessels of the enemy on account of their size, they had to oppose to them a power and a multiplicity of force very formidable [1].

Napoleon then traversed Belgium, visited Mons, Valenciennes, and arrived on the 3rd of September at Aix-la-Chapelle. The empress who had gone to take the waters of Plombières, during the residence of Napoleon on the sea-shore, had come to rejoin him, and attend the fêtes that were preparing in the Rhenish provinces.

M. de Talleyrand and many of the great dignitaries and ministers were also in attendance there. M. Cobentzel had been faithful to the rendezvous which had been assigned for him. The emperor Francis, feeling the inconvenience attending a longer delay, had taken on the 10th of August, at a solemn ceremonial, the imperial title decreed to his house, and had qualified himself the elected emperor of Germany and hereditary emperor of Austria, king of Bohemia and of Hungary, archduke of Austria, duke of Styria, &c. He immediately afterwards gave M. Cobentzel an order to go to Aix-la-Chapelle, to remit to the emperor Napoleon his letter of credence. To this step, which the place where it was made rendered yet more significant, there was joined the formal, and for the moment the sincere assurance of the desire to live in peace with France, and the promise not to make any account of the Russian note sent to the Ratisbon diet, as Napoleon wished. That note had in effect been rendered nugatory by an indefinite adjournment.

[1] Napoleon wrote to marshal Soult.

"Aix-la-Chapelle, 8th September, 1804.

"The little skirmish at which I assisted on the evening before my departure from Boulogne has had an immense effect in England. It has produced there a real alarm. You will see on this subject, details translated from the gazetteers, extremely curious. The howitzers on board the gun-vessels produced a very grand effect. The particulars that I have learned state that the enemy have had sixty wounded and twelve or fifteen killed. The frigate was very ill treated."—(*Depôt of the secretaryship of state.*)

The emperor of the French gave M. Cobentzel the best reception, and lavished upon him, in return for his own, the most tranquillizing declarations. With M. Cobentzel, M. Souza presented himself, bringing the acknowledgment by Portugal of the new emperor; the bailli de Ferrette, that of the order of Malta, and a crowd of foreign ministers, who knowing for what object their presence at Aix-la-Chapelle would be agreeable, had thought of the flattery that would be implied in a request to present themselves there. They were received with great readiness, and with that favour which sovereigns well satisfied always know how to exhibit. This assemblage was singularly brilliant through the concourse of foreigners and of Frenchmen, the luxury displayed, and the military pomp attending it. The recollections of Charlemagne were revealed there with intentions very little disguised. Napoleon descended into the vault where the great man of the middle age had been buried, visited his relics with much curiosity, and gave to the attendant clergy brilliant tokens of his munificence. Scarcely had he left these fêtes when he entered upon more serious occupations; he went over all the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, Juliers, Wenloo, Cologne, and Coblentz, inspecting at the same time the roads and fortifications, rectifying at every fortress the plans of the engineers with that certainty of glance, that deep experience, that belonged to himself alone, and ordering new works which would render invincible this part of the Rhenish frontiers.

At Mayence, where he arrived about the end of September, or commencement of the year XIII., fresh pomps attended upon him. All the princes of Germany, whose states were in the vicinity, and who had an interest in humouring their powerful neighbour, hastened to offer him their felicitations and homage, not through intermediate agents, but in their own persons. The prince arch-chancellor, owing to France the preservation of his title and his opulence, wished to render homage to Napoleon at Mayence, his former capital. With him presented themselves the princes of the house of Hesse, the duke and duchess of Bavaria, the respectable elector of Baden, the oldest of the European princes came with his son and grandson. These personages, and others that succeeded them at Mayence, were received with a magnificence, much superior to that which they would have found even at Vienna. They were struck with the promptitude with which the crowned soldier had taken the attitude of a sovereign; that is, he had early commanded men, not through the virtue of a vain title, but through that of his character, genius, and sword; and he had in the fact of such a command an apprenticeship very superior to any which it is possible to gain in courts.

The rejoicings which had taken place at Aix-la-Chapelle, were renewed at Mayence under the eyes of the French and Germans who had hastened to see as closely as possible the spectacle which at that moment excited the curiosity of all Europe. Napoleon invited to his coronation festivals most of the princes who had come to visit him. In the midst of this tumult, stripping himself every morning of the vanities of the throne, he scoured the banks of the Rhine, examined every part of the fortress of Mayence, that he regarded as one of the most important of the continent, less on account of the works, than of the position on the bank of a great river, along which Europe had for ten centuries conflicted with France. He ordered those works to be performed which might give it all the strength of which it was susceptible. The sight of this place inspired him with a very useful precaution, and of which no one would have thought if he were not taken to the spot himself. The last treaties had ordered the demolition of the forts of Cassel and Kehl. The first formed the opening of Mayence, and the second that of Strasburg on the right bank of the Rhine. These two fortresses would lose their value without the two redoubts covering the bridge heads, serving at the same time for the means of defence and for the passage to the other bank. He ordered that timber and materials of every kind necessary for forming works on a sudden should be amassed, together with fifteen thousand pickaxes and shovels, in order to carry within twenty-four hours eight or ten thousand workmen to the other side of the river, for reconstructing the defences which had been destroyed. For want of tools alone, he wrote to the engineer, you would lose eight days. He even arranged all the plans, so that under a telegraphic order the works might be immediately commenced.

Napoleon after having remained at Mayence, and in the new departments, the entire time necessary for his objects, departed for Paris, visiting Luxembourg in his way. He arrived at St. Cloud on the 12th of October, 1804, or 20th Vendémiaire, year XIII.

He had flattered himself for a moment to offer France and Europe an extraordinary spectacle, by traversing the straits of Dover with one hundred and fifty thousand men, and returning to Paris master of the world. Providence, which had reserved for him so much glory, did not furnish him so much to impart to his coronation. There remained another means for him to dazzle all eyes. These were to make the pope descend a moment from the pontifical throne, in order to come to Paris and bless his sceptre and crown. He had in this to gain a great moral victory over the enemies of France, and he did not doubt of success. Every thing was prepared for his coronation, to which he had invited the principal authorities of the empire, numerous deputations of the army and navy, and a crowd of foreign princes. Thousands of workmen laboured on the preparations for the ceremony in the church of Notre Dame. The rumours of the coming of the pope having transpired, public opinion took up the subject and marvelled; the public devoted to the government was enchanted, the emigrants deeply chagrined, Europe surprised and jealous. The question had been weighed where all public affairs were treated upon, in the council of state. In that body, where the most perfect freedom was left to opinion, the objections sustained on the concordat were reproduced much more strongly still on the idea of submitting, in a certain sense, the coronation of the new monarch to the head of the church. The repugnance, so ancient in France, even among religious men, against ultramontane domination, had all at once awakened itself. It was said that such a step was to raise

up again all the pretensions of the clergy, to proclaim a dominant religion, to make it be supposed that the emperor recently elected, held his crown, not through the wishes of the nation and through the exploits of the army, but of the sovereign pontiff, a dangerous supposition, because he who gave the crown could also withhold it.

Napoleon, impatient of so many objections against a ceremony, which would be a real triumph obtained over European malevolence, took up the matter himself, and showed all the advantages that would result from the presence of the pope at such a solemnity, the effect that it would produce upon the religious part of the population as well as upon the entire body, the strength it would impart to the new order of things, and to that conservation in which all the men of the revolution were equally interested; he showed the smallness of the danger attached to this signification of the pontiff giving the crown; he asserted that the pretensions of a Gregory VII. were not those of our time, that the ceremony in which he would act was no other than an invocation for the celestial protection in favour of a new dynasty, an invocation made in the ordinary forms of the most ancient worship general and popular in France; that in other respects, without religious pomp, there would not be any real pomp, above all in catholic countries, and that to make the priests figure in the coronation, it would be best to call in the greatest and most qualified, and if it was possible, the superior of all in the pope himself. Pressing, in fine, upon these opponents as he pressed upon his enemies in war, in other words to the outrance, he finished by this trait, which at once terminated the discussion. "Gentlemen," cried he, "you deliberate at Paris, in the Tuileries; suppose that you were deliberating in London, in the British cabinet, that you were, in a word, the ministers of the king of England, and you were apprised that the pope was at the moment passing the Alps to crown the emperor of the French; would you regard that as a triumph for England or for France?"

This interrogatory, so sharp, and carrying justice with it, made all silent, and the journey of the pope to Paris encountered no more any objection.

But it was not all to obtain a general consent to this journey, it was necessary to obtain that of the court of Rome, and this was a thing exceedingly difficult. In order to succeed it was needful to use great art, and to mingle much firmness with a great deal of mildness; and the ambassador of France, cardinal Fesch, with the natural irascibility of his character, and the obduracy of his pride, was much less adapted for the purpose than his predecessor, M. de Cacault. It is proper here to describe this personage, who played such a part, both in the church and the empire. Cardinal Fesch, large in person, middling in height, moderate in intellect, vain, ambitious, passionate, but resolute, was destined to be a great obstacle in the way of Napoleon. During the reign of terror, he had, like many other priests, flung afar the insignia, and with them the obligations of the priesthood. Become a war commissary in the army of Italy, no one could have said, seeing him act, that he was an old minister of religious worship. But when restoring all old things to their places, Napoleon recalled the priests to their altars, cardinal Fesch thought of entering again upon the duties of his former profession, and so managed as to obtain the rank for which his powerful relation permitted him to hope. Napoleon was not willing to restore him, but upon the condition of his supporting a becoming conduct; and the abbé Fesch had soon, with a strength of will extremely rare, changed his manners, concealed his existence, and given in a religious seminary the picture of an exemplary penitent. The archbishopric of Lyons was secured in reserve for him, and when invested with the cardinal's hat, he immediately exhibited himself, not the supporter of Napoleon in the church, but much more his antagonist, and it was possible to foresee already, that he indulged in the pretension on some future day of obliging his nephew, to whom he owed every thing, to balance account with an uncle, supported by the secret malevolence of the clergy.

Napoleon himself had spoken bitterly of this new ingratitude of his family with the wise Portalis, who had given him the advice to free himself from his uncle by sending him to be ambassador at Rome. "He will have there," said M. Portalis, "a good deal to do with the pride and the prejudices of the Roman court; and he will employ the defective parts of his character in serving you, in place of using them to your injury." It was for this reason, and not with the idea of one day making him pope, as the inventors of falsehoods would have it appear, that Napoleon accredited cardinal Fesch to the Roman court. No pope could have been more disagreeable, opposite, or dangerous than he would have shown himself to Napoleon in that character.

Such was the personage who was to negotiate the journey of Pius VII. to Paris.

As soon as Pius VII. was apprised by an extraordinary courier of cardinal Caprara of the wish which Napoleon had expressed, he was seized with feelings of the most contrary character, which for a long while continued to agitate him. He comprehended well enough that it furnished an opportunity of rendering new services to religion, to obtain in its behalf more than one concession, so far constantly refused, perhaps even to obtain the restitution of the rich provinces torn from the patrimony of St. Peter. But then what chances also were to be braved! How much of vexatious language to be endured throughout Europe! How many disagreeable things might be encountered in the midst of a revolutionary capital, infected with the spirit of philosophers, yet filled with their adherents, and inhabited by the people of all the earth most given to raillery! All these things appeared in perspective at once before the mind of the pontiff, sensitive and irritable, agitating him so much that his health was apparently altered. His minister and favourite counsellor, the cardinal secretary of state Gonsalvi, became instantly the confidant of the causes of his agitation[1]. He communicated to him his uneasiness, received the

[1] I do not suppose there was any purpose in this, I imagine there was none. All which follows is faithfully extracted from the secret correspondence of cardinal Gonsalvi with cardinal Caprara, a correspondence of which France remained in possession.—*Author's note.*

communications of his own, and both found themselves pretty nearly in agreement. Both feared what the world would say about the consecration of an illegitimate prince, of a usurper, for so they denominated Napoleon in a certain party; they feared the discontent of the other courts, above all, that of Vienna, that saw with a mortal displeasure the elevation of a new emperor of the West; they dreaded, among the party of the old order of things, a degree of abuse much greater than that which had burst forth at the epoch of the concordat, and with a much better ground, because here the interest of religion was less evident than the interest of the individual man; they feared that once in France there would be demanded of the pope, something at present unforeseen, inadmissible, that he had already much trouble in refusing at Rome, that he would be much less able to refuse in Paris, and which might cause some vexatious embroilment, perhaps make a great noise in the world. They went so far as to fear some act of violence; such as the detention of Pius VI. at Valence; and they figured to themselves in a confused way the strangest and most frightful scenes. It is true that cardinal Gonsalvi, who had gone to Paris on the business of the concordat, and cardinal Caprara who passed his life in that capital, had for Napoleon, his courtesy and the delicacy of his proceedings, different ideas from those which reigned in this court of old priests, who never represented Paris in any other terms than as a dark abyss, in which a formidable giant governed. Cardinal Caprara in particular never ceased to repeat, that if the emperor was the most passionate, most imperious of men, he was also the most generous, and the most amiable, when he was not hurt; that the pope would be delighted to see him; that he might obtain what he wished for the interest of religion and of the church; that it was the moment to come, because the war tended to some decisive crisis; that there would be the conquered and the conqueror, and more new distributions of territory, and that perhaps the pope would obtain the Legations; that there was nothing promised it was true, but that at bottom something was the intention of Napoleon, and that his presence alone would be necessary for its realization. These prospects calmed a little the troubled imagination of the unhappy pontiff; but Paris, the capital of that frightful French revolution, which had swallowed up kings, queens, and thousands of priests, could not but be for the pope an indefinable object of terror.

Then there were considerations on the other side to perplex. Without doubt Europe would censure his conduct if he went to Paris; it was possible he might be exposed to unknown and unforeseen events; but if he were not to go there, how would it turn out for religion and the holy see? All the Italian states were under the arm of Napoleon. Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, even Naples, in spite of Russian protection, were full of French troops. Out of regard for the holy see, the Roman states had been alone spared. What would Napoleon not do, irritated and mortified by a refusal which would be infallibly no secret throughout Europe, and which would pass for a condemnation of his rights emanating from the holy see. All these contradictory ideas formed, in the mind of the pope, and his secretary Gonsalvi, an action and re-action of a kind very much to be pitied. Cardinal Gonsalvi, who had already faced the danger, and who when at Paris had been far from finding grounds of displeasure, was the least agitated of the two. He thought only of Europe, and of the opinions and displeasure of all the old cabinets.

Nevertheless the pope and the cardinal, while awaiting the reception from Paris of solicitations which it was probable would not admit of a refusal, wished to have the sacred college on their own side. They dared not consult it in the entire body, because it had amongst its number cardinals tied to foreign courts, who would perhaps betray the secret. They chose ten of the most influential members of the congregation of cardinals, and submitted to them in the secrecy of confession the communications made by cardinals Caprara and Fesch. These two cardinals were unfortunately divided, and there was reason to fear that it would be the same with the sacred college. Then the pope and his minister thought it was necessary to have recourse to ten other cardinals, making in the whole twenty. This consultation, remaining still secret, gave the following results:—Five cardinals were wholly opposed to the demand of Napoleon, and fifteen were favourable, but at the same time raising objections, and demanding conditions. Of the five who gave a refusal, two only had stated their motive to be a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the sovereign whom it was the question to crown. These five said that it would be to consecrate and ratify all that the new monarch had suffered to be done, or had done himself to the injury of religion; because, if he had made the concordat, he had also formed the organic articles, and taken away, when he was general, the Legations from the holy see, that recently again, in concurring in the secularizations, he had contributed to despoil the German church of its property; that if he wished to be treated like Charlemagne, he must conduct himself like that emperor, and show his regard to the holy see with the same munificence.

The fifteen cardinals disposed to agree under restrictive conditions had made objections in regard to the opinion and discontent of the European courts; the slight to the pope's dignity, that he should go and consecrate the new emperor at Paris, while the chiefs of the holy empire had all come to Rome to be crowned at the foot of the altar of St. Peter; the inconvenience of meeting the constitutional bishops, who had but incompletely retracted, or who, after their reconciliation with the church, had caused new controversies; the false position of the holy father in presence of certain high functionaries, as M. Talleyrand, for example, who had broken his ties to the priesthood in order to unite those of marriage; the danger of receiving in the heart of an enemy's capital inadmissible demands, which it would be difficult to refuse without a noisy rupture; lastly, the danger of the journey for one whose health was as delicate as that of Pius VII.; recalling to recollection the censure which pope Pius VI. had incurred in the last century, when he had made a journey to Vienna, on a visit to Joseph II., and had returned without having obtained any thing favourable to religion. The fifteen cardinals were of opinion, that there would not be any excuse in the eyes of the Christian world for the act of condescension thus de-

manded of Pius VII., unless it was to request and obtain certain notorious advantages; such as the revocation of a part of the organic articles; the abolition of the measures taken by the Italian republic in regard to the clergy; the revocation of what the French commissary had done at Parma and Placentia relative to the church in that country; and, finally, territorial indemnities for the losses that the holy see had suffered, and, above all, the adoption of the ancient ceremonial for the coronation of the Germanic emperors. Each of these fifteen cardinals even added an express claim that the coronation should take place, not in Paris, but in Italy, when Napoleon should visit his states beyond the Alps; and exacted this condition as indispensable to the dignity of the holy see.

Somewhat assured by these opinions, the pope felt disposed to yield to the wishes of Napoleon, insisting at the same time, in a peremptory manner, upon the conditions demanded by the fifteen consenting cardinals; and he had made known a part of this resolution to cardinal Fesch. But in the interval, there had reached Rome the text of the senatus consultum of the 28th Floréal, and the formula of the oath of the emperor, containing these words—"I swear to respect and to make respected the *laws of the concordat*, and *the liberty of worship*." The laws of the concordat appeared to include the organic articles; the liberty of worship appeared to sanction heresies, and the court of Rome had never admitted such a liberty into its reckoning. The oath became on a sudden the ground for an absolute refusal. Nevertheless, the pope and Gonsalvi consulted again the twenty cardinals, and this time only five thought that the oath was not an insurmountable obstacle; fifteen replied that it rendered the coronation of the new monarch by the pope an impossible thing.

Although the secret had been well kept by the cardinals, intelligence from Paris, and some indiscretions inevitable among the agents of the holy see, brought about the discovery of the negotiation, and the public, composed of prelates and diplomatists that encircled the Roman court, spread it abroad in speeches and sarcasms. They called Pius VII. the "chaplain of the emperor of the French," because this emperor, having need of the pope's ministry, did not come to Rome as the Charlemagnes, Othos, Barbarossas, and Charles V. had deigned to do; but sent for the pope to his own palace.

This raillery added to the difficulties of the oath, shook Pius VII. and cardinal Gonsalvi; both therefore adopted the resolution to make a reply favourable in appearance, but negative in reality, because it consisted in an acquiescence burthened with conditions which it was not possible for the emperor to admit.

Cardinal Fesch eagerly replied to the principal difficulty raised against the oath, drawn from the engagement that the sovereign had taken to respect freedom of religious worship. He said that such an engagement was not the canonical approbation of differing creeds, but the promise to suffer the free exercise of every kind of worship, and not to persecute any, which was still conformable to the spirit of the faith in the church, and the principles adopted in the present age by all the sovereigns. These explanations, full of good sense as they were, had, according to the cardinal Gonsalvi, merely a private character, and not a public one, and they would not excuse the court of Rome in the eyes of the faithful, or in the sight of God, if they were wanting to the catholic faith.

Although of a mind not insinuating, cardinal Fesch had known how to penetrate by fear and presents into the secret of more than one personage of the Roman court, and he knew perfectly well the objections made as well as their authors. He sent word of every thing to Paris, that the emperor might be well acquainted with all; and still not knowing to what point the pope wished to hold back through unacceptable conditions, and how much might be gained from him, he gave more hope of success than he had a right to expect at the moment, adding, in the mean while, that in order to success, it was necessary to give the holy see promises and explanations perfectly satisfactory.

These communications transmitted to Paris became a cause of cruel embarrassment to cardinal Caprara, because they took them for a consent merely dependent upon some explanations that still remained to be given, and looked for the appearance of the pope in France as a certain thing. Cardinal Caprara, who knew the real disposition of his court, but who dared not speak out, was in a state of tremor and confusion. The empress Josephine held more than Napoleon did to the coronation, which seemed to her the pardon of Heaven for an act of usurpation. Thus she received cardinal Caprara at St. Cloud, and lavished upon him the kindest attention. On his own side, Napoleon showed great satisfaction, and both told him that they considered the affair as arranged; that the pope would be received at Paris with the honours due to a chief of the universal church, and that religion would obtain infinite benefit from his journey. Napoleon, without knowing all, still suspected a part of the secret wishes of the Roman court; he avoided suffering himself to be accosted by cardinal Caprara, out of fear that the cardinal would demand of him things either altogether impossible to grant, such as the revocation of the organic articles, or actually very difficult, such as the restitution of the Legations. The cardinal was, therefore, doubly embarrassed, between the hopes too readily indulged in Paris, and the difficulty of accosting Napoleon, to obtain the words in reply capable of leading the Roman court to a decision.

The abbé Bernier become bishop of Orleans, the man whose wise and profound mind had been employed in vanquishing all the difficulties of the concordat, was also very useful in the present conjuncture. He was charged with the task of making replies to the court of Rome. He conferred for this end with cardinal Caprara, and made him comprehend that after the hopes indulged by the imperial family, after the expectation produced in the mind of the French public, it would be impossible to draw back without outraging Napoleon, and exposing himself to the most serious consequences. The bishop of Orleans drew up a despatch, which would do honour to the most able and learned diplomatist. He recalled to memory the services of Napoleon to the church, and the claims which he had to its acknowledgment, the good which religion might yet expect from him, and the effect, before all, which would be produced upon the

French people by the presence of Pius VII., with the impulse it would impart to religious ideas. He explained the oath and the expressions relative to liberty of worship as they ought to be understood; he offered besides an expedient, which was to make two ceremonies, the one civil, in which the emperor took the oath and the crown; the other religious, in which the crown should be consecrated by the pontiff. Finally, he declared positively, that it was for the interest of religion, and what was intimately attached to it, that the presence of the pope was required in Paris. There were hopes enough concealed in these words to gain over the personal consent of the holy see, and give a pretext to Christianity that should justify its condescension towards Napoleon.

Cardinal Caprara joined to this official despatch of the French government, particular letters in which he drew a picture of what passed in France, the good which was to be accomplished there, and the evils to be repaired, and affirmed positively, that the request could not be refused without great dangers; that at Rome things were very ill-judged of, and that the pope would gather from the journey only subjects of satisfaction to himself.

A second time carried to Rome, the negotiation could not but succeed. The pope and cardinal Gonsalvi, enlightened by the letters of the legate, and of the bishop of Orleans, comprehended the impossibility of a refusal, and pressed by cardinal Fesch, finished the affair by consenting to go. But they were under the necessity of consulting the cardinals once more; above all, they were alarmed at one of the explanations of the bishop of Orleans, consisting in the idea of a double ceremony. The pope would only admit one, because he wished not only to sprinkle the holy water over the new emperor, but to crown him. The cardinals were then consulted anew upon the explanations sent from Paris. Cardinal Fesch got access among them, and contrived to put fear into their hearts, in which he was much more able, than in seducing them by persuasion. The answer was favourable; but an official note was demanded in explanation of the oath, that should promise only one ceremony, and that should contain an express mention of the conditions under which the pope went to Paris.

Pius VII. then declared that he consented to the journey upon condition that the oath should be explained as not attaching any approbation of heretical dogmas, but only the simple toleration material to dissenting modes of worship; that they promised to listen when he remonstrated against certain organic articles, when he remonstrated for the interests of the church, and of the holy see (the Legations were not named); that they would not suffer near him those bishops who disputed their submission to the see of Rome, unless under a new and most complete submission on their part; that he should not be exposed to encounter those persons who were in a situation contrary to the laws of the church (this positively designated the wife of the minister for foreign affairs); that the ceremonial observed should be either that of the court of Rome crowning the emperor, or that of the archbishop of Rheims crowning the kings of France; that there should be only one ceremony, exclusively through the ministry of the pope; that a deputation of two French bishops should carry to Pius VII. a letter of invitation, in which the emperor said that, retained for powerful reasons in the heart of his empire, and having to discuss with the holy father the interests of religion, he begged him to come to France to bless his crown, and treat on the interests of the church; that no species of demand should be addressed to the pope, that should restrain in any manner his return to Italy. The pontifical cabinet expressed finally its desire that the coronation should be postponed until the 25th of December, the day when Charlemagne had been proclaimed emperor, because the pope, deeply agitated, had need to pass some time at Castel Gandolfo, in order to obtain a little repose, and could not besides quit Rome without setting in order a good deal of business relative to the Roman government.

These conditions had nothing in them but what was acceptable, for if it was promised to listen to the remonstrances of the pope upon certain organic articles, there was no promise to grant the claim exacted, in case they should be contrary to the principles of the French church. Cardinal Fesch had even declared faithfully that they could never modify those organic articles which most offended the Roman church, and which exacted the consent of the civil authority for the introduction into France of the pontifical bulls. They were able, without scruple, to promise that one single ceremony alone should be retained, the observation of the Roman or French service; the hope of an amelioration in respect to the territory of the holy see, because Napoleon often thought of it; the sending a deputation to invite the pope in a formal manner to come to Paris; the allegation of the interests of the church as the motive of the voyage; the repression of the five bishops who had returned upon their reconciliation, and troubled the church in a vexatious manner. They were able, in fine, to engage that nothing disagreeable should be required of pope Pius VII., and that he should be perfectly free, for nothing to the contrary had even in thought entered into the mind of Napoleon or his government. It required the imagination of those feeble and trembling old men, to suppose that the liberty of the pope had any thing to fear in France.

Cardinal Fesch, the consent of the pope once obtained, declared that the emperor took upon himself all the expenses of the journey, which was for a ruined government a difficulty of moment less in the way. He made known besides the details of the magnificent reception reserved for the holy father. Unhappily he troubled him by accessary exactions, wholly out of place. He wished that twelve cardinals, and more than that, the secretary of state, Gonsalvi, should accompany the pope; he wished contrary to established usage, that classed the cardinals by the oldest standing, that the first place in the pontifical carriage should be for the ambassador, grand almoner and uncle of the emperor. All this was useless, and occasioned to men who were fearful formalists, as much pain as more serious difficulties would have done.

Pius VII. yielded on some points, but he was inflexible about the number of cardinals, and the omission of the secretary of state, Gonsalvi. In their vague terror, Pius VII. and Gonsalvi had imagined a provision against all the dangers of the church by a singular precaution. The holy

father, who believed himself worse in health than he was in reality, and who mistook the nervous agitations with which he saw himself attacked for some dangerous malady, thought he should die on his journey. He thought, too, that perhaps they would misuse him. To guard against this second apprehension, he had drawn up and signed his abdication, and had deposited it in the hands of cardinal Gonsalvi, that he might be prepared to declare the papacy vacant. Further, if he died or abdicated, it would be necessary to convoke the sacred college, in order to fill the chair of St. Peter. It was, therefore, requisite to leave at Rome as many cardinals as possible, and among them the man who, by his ability, was the most capable of directing the church under these grave circumstances, in other words, cardinal Gonsalvi himself. A last consideration decided the pope to act in this way. He had not been able to avoid an explanation with the Austrian court, to make it agree to his journey to Paris. Austria, appreciating his situation, had acknowledged the necessity he was under of undertaking the journey; but she had demanded a guarantee, that he should promise not to treat at Paris about the arrangements of the German church, which were the consequence of the *recez* of 1803. It was, above all, on account of this motive that Austria dreaded the sojourn of the pope in France. Pius VII. had solemnly promised not to treat with Napoleon on any question foreign to the French church. But to add confidence to his promise, it was necessary that he should not take with him cardinal Gonsalvi, the man through whom all the great business of the Roman court was transacted.

From these motives, Pius VII. refused to take with him more than six cardinals, and persisted in his resolve of leaving at Rome the secretary of state, Gonsalvi. He consented to an arrangement as far as the personal pretensions of cardinal Fesch were concerned. This cardinal was to occupy the first place when they should arrive in France.

These matters arranged, the pope went to Castel Gandolfo, where the pure air, the tranquillity that followed his fixed resolution, the news, every day more satisfactory, of the welcome prepared for him at Paris, re-established his health, which was so much shattered.

Napoleon regarded the object he had attained as a great victory, because it put the final seal to his rights, and left him nothing to desire on the score of legitimacy. Meanwhile, he would not lose his own character in the midst of these external pomps; he would do nothing or promise nothing contrary to the principles of his government. Cardinal Fesch having said to him that it would be sufficient to send to the pope some general enjoying high public consideration, he sent general Caffarelli to carry his invitation, and he drew it up in the most respectful and even kind terms, but without giving it to be too much understood that he had requested the pope's presence near him, for any other object than his coronation. This letter, written with perfect dignity, was thus conceived:—

"Most Holy Father.—The happy effect produced on the morals and character of my people, by the re-establishment of the Christian religion, induces me to pray your holiness to afford me a new proof of the interest that you take in my destiny, and that of this great nation, under one of the most important circumstances that the annals of the world can offer. I pray you to come and impart in the most eminent degree possible, a religious character to the ceremony of the oath and coronation of the first emperor of the French. The ceremony will acquire a new lustre when it shall be performed by your holiness in person. It will attach upon us and our people the blessing of God, whose decree regulates according to the dictates of his will the fate of families and empires.

"Your holiness knows the affectionate sentiments which I have for a long time borne towards you, and will thus judge of the pleasure this event will confer upon me, by enabling me to give new proofs of them.

"We pray God to preserve you, most holy father, many years to come for the regulation and government of our mother the holy church.

"Your devoted son,

"Napoleon."

To this letter were joined strong solicitations that the pope, in place of arriving on the 25th of December, should arrive on the last day of November. Napoleon did not tell the real motive that made him wish for the ceremony to take place sooner; this motive was no other than his project of a descent upon England, prepared for December. He alleged a reason, which was also true, but less serious, this was the inconvenience of leaving too long a time at Paris all the civil and military authorities already convoked.

General Caffarelli set off in the utmost haste, and reached Rome in the night on the 28th or 29th of September. Cardinal Fesch presented him to the holy father, who gave him a paternal reception. Pius VII. received the letter from the hands of the general, but deferred reading it until after the audience. But when he had acquired a knowledge of it, and did not find in it any allegation of religious business as the motive for his proceeding to France, he was seized with deep sorrow, and fell into a state of nervous agitation which excited the greatest uneasiness. In reality, that which most touched this venerable pontiff, as with all princes of an elevated spirit, was his honour, the dignity of his crown. He believed these to be compromised if for an instant religious affairs were not alleged to explain his thus displacing himself. The name of "Chaplain of Napoleon," which his enemies gave him, deeply hurt him. He sent for cardinal Fesch:—"It is poison," said he, "that you have brought to me." He added that he would make no reply to such a letter; that he would not go to Paris, because they had broken their word with him. Cardinal Fesch attempted to calm the irritated pontiff, and thought that a new consultation of cardinals might arrange this last difficulty. All began to feel the impossibility of drawing back, and by means of a last explanatory note, signed by the cardinal ambassador, the difficulty was removed. It was decided that the pope, on account of All Saints' day, should set out on the 2nd of November, and arrive at Fontainebleau on the 27th.

While this passed at Rome, the emperor Napoleon had disposed every thing in Paris to give a prodigious eclat to the ceremony of his coronation. He had invited the princes of Baden, the prince arch-chancellor of the German empire, and numerous deputations chosen in the administration, in the magistracy, and the army. He had left the care to bishop Bernier and the arch-chancellor Cambacérès to examine the ceremonial used for the coronations of emperors and kings, and to propose to him modifications, that the manners of the age, the spirit of the time, and the prejudices of France against the Roman authority, made necessary to be introduced. He prescribed to them the greatest secrecy, that these questions should not become the subject of vexatious discourses, and reserved to himself the decision upon those which might be doubtful. The two rites, both Roman and French, contained certain modes of proceeding equally difficult to be rendered supportable to the public mind. According to both ceremonies, the monarch arrived without the insignia of supreme power, such as the sceptre, sword, and crown, and only received them from the hands of the pontiff, and further, he placed the crown on the head; according to the French rite the peers, by the Roman rite the bishops, held the crown suspended over the head of the monarch on his knees, and the pontiff, taking it, made it descend upon his brow. Bernier and Cambacérès, after having suppressed certain details, too much in opposition to the feelings of the present time, were of opinion that the last part of the ceremony should be preserved, substituting for the peers of the French rite, and the bishops of the Roman rite, the six grand dignitaries of the empire, and letting the pope deposit the crown on the head, as was anciently customary. Napoleon grounding it upon the feeling of the nation and the army, asserted that he would not be able then to receive the crown from the pontiff; that the nation and the army, from whom he held it, would be annoyed to see a ceremonial not in conformity with the real state of things, and the independence of the throne. He was inflexible in this respect, saying that he knew better than any body the true sentiments of France, yielding, no doubt, to religious ideas, but even under that relation, always ready to censure those who passed certain limits. He wished, therefore, to arrive at the church with his imperial insignia, that is to say, as emperor, and only give them to be consecrated by the pope. He consented to receive the benediction and to be consecrated, but not to be crowned. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès avowed that there was truth in the opinion of Napoleon, but signified the danger there was not less great of hurting the feelings of the pontiff, already very much chagrined, and of depriving the ceremony of a conformity, precious from the old usages customary from the time of Pepin and Charlemagne. Cambacérès and Bernier, both intimately connected with the legate, were charged with the task of making him agree in the views of the emperor. Cardinal Caprara, knowing how much forms were deemed an affair of grave import with his court, thought that he could not decide any thing without the opinion of the pope, but that it was necessary not to communicate any more with the holy see for fear of raising new difficulties, convinced that the pope, once arrived in Paris, would be at the same time reassured and charmed by the welcome which he was destined to receive in France; the cardinal believed that all would be arranged with more facility in Paris under the influence of an unexpected satisfaction, than at Rome under the influence of vague terrors.

These difficulties overcome, there still remained others which had birth in the midst of the imperial family. It was the question to fix the place of the wife, and of the brothers and sisters of the emperor, in the ceremony of the coronation. It was necessary to know, first, whether Josephine should be crowned, and take the oath in the same manner as Napoleon himself. She ardently desired it, because this would be a new tie to her husband, a new guarantee against a future repudiation, which was the constant care of her life. Napoleon hesitated between his affection for his wife, and the secret presentiments of his policy, when a family scene failed then to bring about the loss of the unfortunate Josephine. All the world was busy around the new monarch, brothers, sisters, and relations. Each wished in the solemnity which it seemed ought to consecrate them all, some character conformable to their actual pretensions and their future hopes. At the sight of this agitation, and witness of the entreaties of which Napoleon was the object, above all, on the part of one of his sisters, Josephine troubled in mind, and swallowed up by jealousy, suffered outrageous suspicions towards that sister to be discovered, and towards Napoleon himself—suspicions in unison with certain atrocious calumnies of the emigrants. Napoleon was suddenly seized with a most vehement fit of anger, and finding in this anger a resistance to his affections, he told Josephine that he would separate himself from her[1]; that besides he must do so at a later period, and that it was better to be resigned to it at once, than to contract stricter ties. He called his two adopted children, made them acquainted with his resolution, and plunged them, by the announcement, into the deepest sorrow. Hortensia and Eugene Beauharnois declared with a tranquil and saddened resolution, that they would follow their mother into any retreat to which she might be condemned. Josephine, well advised, showed herself full of submission and melancholy resignation. The contrast of her chagrin, with the satisfaction that appeared in the rest of the imperial family, rent the heart of Napoleon, and he was unable to make up his mind to the sight of the exile and unhappiness of the woman who had been the companion of his youth, and with her, exiled and unhappy, the children as well, who had become the objects of his paternal tenderness. He took Josephine in his arms, and told her, in the overflow of his heart, that nothing but force should separate him from her; although, perhaps, his policy might command it to be otherwise. Thus he promised that she should be crowned with him, and receive the divine consecration at his side from the hand of the pope.

[1] I state here the faithful recital of a respectable individual, an ocular witness, attached to the imperial family, who has preserved the recollection of this incident in his manuscript memoirs.—*Author's note.*

Josephine ever mutable, passed at once from terror to the most perfect contentedness, and gave herself to the preparations for the ceremony with puerile delight.

Napoleon, with the secret idea of some day raising up an empire of the West, felt desirous of having vassal kings around his throne. At the moment he made his two brothers, Joseph and Louis, grand dignitaries of the empire; but he soon afterwards thought of making them kings, and he had even already prepared a throne for Joseph in Lombardy. His intention was, that in their becoming kings they should remain still grand dignitaries of his empire. They were thus to be in the French empire of the west, the same that the princes of Saxony, Brandenburgh, Bohemia, Bavaria, Hanover, and others were in the Germanic empire. It was needful that the ceremony of the coronation should answer to this view of the scheme, and be the emblematic image of the reality which he contemplated. He would not admit that the bishops or peers should hold the crown suspended over his head, nor even that the first bishop, him of Rome, should place it there. For the same reasons he wished that his two brothers, destined to be vassal kings of the great empire, should take at his side a position which clearly indicated their future vassalage. He exacted that his brothers, when he was clothed with the imperial mantle, and should proceed himself into the body of the church, from the throne to the altar, and from the altar to the throne, should support the skirt of his mantle. He exacted this, not only for himself, but for the empress. The princesses, his sisters, were the parties to fulfil for Josephine the duty which his brothers performed near himself. An energetic expression of his will was necessary to obtain this performance of the office. Although his kindness made painful to him some family scenes, he became absolute when his requirements touched upon any of his political designs.

It was November: all was ready at Notre Dame. The deputations had arrived; the tribunals ceased to sit; sixty bishops and archbishops followed by their clergy had abandoned the care of their altars. The generals, admirals, officers the most distinguished in the land or sea service, the marshals Davout, Ney, Soult, the admirals Bruix, Ganteaume, in place of being at Boulogne or Brest, were all found in Paris. Napoleon was at variance with this state of things, because pomp, much as he loved it, only passed away rightly with him after business was over. A multitude of curious persons, from all parts of Europe as well as of France, filled the capital, and awaited impatiently the extraordinary spectacle which had drawn them thither. Napoleon, whom the assemblage of which he was the continual object did not displease, was still anxious to put an end to a state of things which broke in upon the regular order which he preferred to see prevail in his empire. He sent off officer after officer in order to deliver to the pope letters filled with filial tenderness, and warm entreaties that he would hasten his journey. Delays upon delays caused the ceremony to be fixed for the 2nd of December.

The pope had ultimately decided upon quitting Rome. After having confided full powers to cardinal Gonsalvi, and having loaded him with his troubles and embarrassments, he had gone, on the 2nd of November, in the morning, to the altar of St. Peter, and had there passed much time upon his knees, surrounded by the cardinals, the grandees of Rome, and the people. He offered at the altar a fervent prayer, as if he were going to encounter great dangers; then he entered his carriage, and took the road to Viterbo. The people of Transtevere, so faithful to their pontiffs, accompanied his carriage a long way in tears. The time had passed away when the court of Rome was the most enlightened in Europe. The old men of the sacred college scarcely knew in what age they lived, blaming, from want of comprehending it, the wise condescension of Pius VII. They were ready to swallow the most absurd stories. There were some who regarded as correct the story of a stratagem, said to be prepared in France, to make the holy father a prisoner, and seize upon his states; as if Napoleon had required such means to be master of Rome, or as if he desired any thing besides, at that moment, than the pontifical benediction, which rendered the character of his authority respectable in the eyes of mankind.

Pius VII., on leaving Rome, wished, in spite of his poverty, to take with him some presents worthy of the host with whom he was going to take up his residence. With that delicacy of tact to which he was accustomed, he selected, for a present to Napoleon, two antique cameos, as remarkable for their beauty as their signification. One represented Achilles, the other the continence of Scipio. For Josephine, he destined some antique vases, of admirable workmanship. By the advice of Talleyrand, he brought a profusion of chaplets for the ladies of the court.

He set out therefore; traversed the Roman and Tuscan states, in the midst of the Italian people, kneeling as he passed. At Florence, he was received by the queen of Etruria, become a widow, and then actually regent for her son of the new kingdom created by Napoleon. This princess, pious as all Spanish princesses are, received the pope with demonstrations of respect and devotedness, which much delighted him. He began from that moment to lose some of his deep inquietude. He wished to avoid the Legations, in order not to sanction by his presence the attachment of them to any other state than that of Rome. He proceeded to Piacenza, Parma, and Turin. He was not yet in France, but the authorities and the troops of France surrounded him. He saw the old Menou, the officers of the army of Italy, bend before him with respect, and was touched by the respectful expression of their manly countenances. Cardinal Cambacérès, and a chamberlain of the palace, M. de Salmatoris, sent in advance, presented themselves to him on the frontiers of Piedmont, which were those of the French empire, and handed him a letter of Napoleon full of expressions of acknowledgment, and of his wishes for a speedy and happy journey to the pontiff. Hour after hour gave him more confidence; and Pius VII. had no longer reason to feel doubt as to the consequences of his resolution. He passed the Alps. Extraordinary precautions had been taken to render the passage safe and easy for himself and the old cardinals who accompanied him. Officers of the imperial palace provided every thing on the

way with infinite eagerness and magnificence. At length he arrived at Lyons. There his fears were changed into real pleasure. Crowds of the population had come thither from Provence, Dauphine, Franche-Comté, and Burgundy, to see the representative of God upon the earth. The people always have in their hearts a confused but deep sentiment of a divinity. The form in which the idea is presented to their imagination matters little, provided such a form should have been anciently sanctioned, and that those above them give an example of respect towards it. If there be added to the natural force of this sentiment the extraordinary power of popular reaction, the earnestness with which the multitude returns to the things that it had momentarily abandoned, the eagerness may be conceived that the people of the cities and country parts of France exhibited in seeking the presence of the holy father. In seeing upon its knees that nation which had been depicted to him as always in revolt against the authorities of earth and heaven—that nation which had overturned thrones, and held a pontiff in captivity—Pius VII. was startled and encouraged; he acknowledged that his old counsellor Caprara had spoken truth, when he affirmed that this journey would be of great advantage to religion, and procure to himself infinite satisfaction. A letter from the emperor had found him at Lyons, bringing fresh thanks and wishes for his prompt arrival. The feeble pontiff, possessing sensibility to infirmity, no longer felt fatigue since he saw himself received in such a welcome manner, and offered of his own accord to accelerate his journey a couple of days, which offer was accepted. He quitted Lyons in the midst of the same homage; traversing Moulins and Nevers, encountering every where upon his road the affected multitude, demanding his benediction from the head of the church.

At Fontainebleau Pius VII. was to stop. Napoleon had so regulated matters, in order to have the opportunity of encountering the holy father, and arranging two or three days' rest for him in that fine retirement. He had ordered for the 25th of November a day of hunting, when the company should take their course towards the road by which the holy father was expected to come. At the hour when he knew that the pontifical party would arrive at the cross of St. Herem, he turned his horse's head that way, in order to meet the pope, who soon after arrived. He presented himself to him immediately, and embraced him. Pius VII., affected at this eagerness of manner, regarded with emotion and curiosity this other Charlemagne, whom he had thought for some years to be the instrument of God upon the earth. It was the middle of the day. The two sovereigns mounted the same carriage, to proceed to the chateau of Fontainebleau, Napoleon giving the right hand to the head of the church. On the threshold of the palace, the empress, the great men of the empire, and the chiefs of the army were arranged in a circle for the purpose of receiving Pius VII., and of doing him homage. The pope, although habituated to Roman pomp, had never seen any thing so magnificent. He was conducted, surrounded by the splendid party, to the apartment destined for his use. After some hours' rest, according to the rules of etiquette established between sovereigns, he paid a visit to the emperor and empress, which visit they immediately returned. Every time more encouraged, and more won over by the seducing language of his host, which promised rather than to intimidate to afford him great pleasure, he conceived a regard which to the end of his life, after numerous and terrible vicissitudes, he still felt for the unfortunate hero. The great men of the empire were successively presented to the pope. He received them with perfect cordiality, and that grace attaching to the old, that carries so powerful a charm. The countenance, mild and dignified, the penetrating glance of Pius VII. affected every heart, and he was himself touched at the effect which his own presence produced. They had not yet conferred upon any of the difficulties which remained to be regulated. They solely indulged the pope's feelings, and relieved his fatigues. He was himself all emotion, all pleasure at his reception, which seemed to him to be the triumph even of religion itself.

The moment came to depart for Paris, and to enter finally into that formidable city, where for a century the human mind had been in a ferment, and where for some years the destiny of the world had been regulated. On the 28th of November, after three days' rest, the emperor and the pope entered the same carriage in order to reach Paris, the pope being always placed on the right side. The pope was lodged in the pavilion of Flora, which had been arranged for his reception. The whole of the 29th was allowed him for rest. Upon the 30th, the senate, legislative body, tribunate, and council of state were presented to him. The presidents of these four bodies addressed him in speeches which depicted in terms the most glowing and just, his virtues, wisdom, and great condescension towards France; still in the midst of these addresses, fugitive as were the sensations they inspired, that of M. Fontanes must be remarked, serious and enduring as the truths with which it was filled.

"Most Holy Father,—When the conqueror of Marengo conceived in the midst of the field of battle the design of re-establishing religious unity, and of rendering back to the French their ancient worship, he preserved from utter ruin the principles of civilization. This great conception coming upon a day of victory, gave birth to the concordat; and the legislative body of which I have the honour to be the organ before your holiness converted the concordat into a national law.

"A memorable day, equally estimated by the wisdom of the statesman, and dear to the Christian faith! It was then that France, abjuring her too serious errors, gave the most useful lessons to the human race. She seemed to acknowledge before mankind, that all irreligious thoughts are impolitic, and that every attack upon Christianity is an attack upon society.

"The return of the ancient worship soon prepared the way for that of a government more natural to great states, and more conformable to the old habits of France. The entire social system shaken by the inconstant opinions of man, supports itself anew upon a doctrine immutable as God himself. It was religion that formerly polished savage societies; but it is more difficult at this day to repair social ruins than to lay their foundation.

"We owe this advantage to a double prodigy.

France has seen the birth of one of those extraordinary men, sent at long distant intervals to the succour of empires that are ready to perish; while Rome at the same time has seen shining from the throne of St. Peter, all the apostolical virtues of the first ages. Their mild authority makes itself felt in every heart. Universal homage cannot fail to attach to a pontiff as wise as he is pious, who at the same time discriminates all that is necessary to be left to the course of human affairs, and all that is required for the interests of religion.

"This august religion has come to consecrate through him the new destinies of the French empire, and take the same apparel as in the age of the Clovis and the Pepins.

"Every thing has changed around her; she alone has known no change.

"She sees the termination of the families of kings as well as of subjects; but on the ruins of crumbling thrones, and on the steps of those newly elevated, she continually observes the successive manifestation of the designs of the Eternal, and obeys them with confidence.

"Never has the world had a more imposing spectacle presented to it; never have the people received more important instructions.

"The time no longer exists when the empire and the priesthood are rivals. Both now give each other assistance in repelling the false doctrines which have menaced Europe with total subversion. May they for ever yield before the double influence of religion and policy in union. This wish will not be baffled; never in France was there so much of political genius, and never did the pontifical throne offer to the Christian world a model more affecting and respectable."

The pope showed considerable emotion at this noble address; the finest which had been delivered at all from the time of Louis XIV. The people of Paris ran under his windows, demanding that he should show himself. Already the fame of his mildness and his noble countenance had spread over the capital. Pius VII. appeared several times at the balcony of the Tuileries, always accompanied by Napoleon, and was saluted with loud acclamations; he saw the people of Paris, that people who had attended the 10th of August, and adored the goddess of Reason, on their knees awaiting the pontifical benediction. What a singular inconstancy in men and nations, proving that man must attach himself after all to the great truths on which human society reposes, and fix there finally; because there is neither dignity nor repose in the caprices of a day that are embraced and quitted with dishonourable precipitation.

The sombre apprehensions which had so embittered the resolution of the pope were entirely dissipated. Pius VII. saw near him a prince full of regard and care, joining grace to genius, in the midst of a great nation, restored to the old traditions of Christianity by the example of a glorious chief. He was delighted to have come, and added by his presence to the force of the impulse. He had yet some trouble to encounter, either touching the ceremonial, or on the subject of the constitutional bishops, that after their reconciliation with the church, had set themselves to dogmatise upon the meaning of that reconciliation. There were four of these, Lecoz, archbishop of Briançon, Lacombe, bishop of Angoulême, Saurine, bishop of Strasburg, and Remond, bishop of Dijon. M. Portalis had sent for them, and by order of the emperor, had enjoined it upon them, if they had any desire to be presented to the pope, to write a letter of reconciliation, minuted in accord with bishop Bernier, and the cardinals composing the pontifical train. At the latest moment, they wished to change a word in the letter, which the pope perceived, remarked upon, and then left to the emperor the task of terminating these sad disputes. In other respects he showed a countenance equally mild and paternal to all the members of the French clergy.

The questions relating to the ceremonial still remained open. The pope had admitted the principal modifications, founded upon the state of manners; but the question of the coronation singularly affected him. He kept to the preservation of the right of his predecessors to place the crown on the emperor's brow. Napoleon ordered that it should not be insisted upon, and said that he would take upon him to arrange every thing on this point at the place itself.

The eve of the grand solemnity now approached, the 1st of December. Josephine, who had pleased the holy father by a species of devotion like that of the Italian females, had got access to the pope for the purpose of making an avowal, from which she hoped to derive a great advantage. She had declared to him that she was only civilly married to Napoleon, because at the epoch of this marriage the religious ceremonies had been interdicted. This was even on the throne strange evidence of the manners of the time. Napoleon had put an end to a similar state with his sister the princess Murat, by praying cardinal Caprara to give them the nuptial benediction; but he had never required that the state in which he himself was should be terminated in a like manner. The pope, scandalized at a situation which in the sight of the church was a concubinage, demanded instantly a conference with Napoleon, and declared that he should be wholly unable to consecrate him, because the state of conscience of emperors had never been sought by the church when it was a question to crown them; but he should be unable in crowning Josephine to give the divine sanction to a state of concubinage. Napoleon, irritated against Josephine for this interested indiscretion, fearing to outrage the pope, who he knew was not to be moved in any matter that concerned the faith, and besides, not willing to alter a ceremony of which the programme was already published, consented to receive the nuptial benediction. Josephine, severely reprimanded by her husband, but charmed at attaining her object, received on the night that preceded the coronation the sacrament of marriage, in the chapel of the Tuileries. The cardinal Fesch married the emperor and empress, and there were present for witnesses M. de Talleyrand and marshal Berthier, who kept it a profound secret. The secret was kept until the time of the divorce. On the morning of the coronation there were discoverable in the red eyes of Josephine traces of the tears which had been caused by her secret agitation upon this occasion.

On Sunday the 2nd of December, a day of winter, cold, but calm and serene, the population of Paris, seen forty years afterwards to flock in a similar

state of the atmosphere, to attend the mortal remains of Napoleon, thronged to attend the progress of the imperial procession. The pope set out first at ten o'clock in the morning, some time in advance of the emperor, in order that the two processions might not interfere in the way of one another. He was accompanied by a numerous body of the clergy, clothed in the most sumptuous garments, and escorted by detachments of the imperial guard. A portico, richly decorated, had been constructed all around the place Notre Dame, to receive on descending from the carriages, the sovereigns and princes that might attend at that ancient cathedral. The archbishop's palace was adorned with a luxury worthy of the guests whom it was to contain, and was disposed so that the pope and the emperor might remain there for a few moments' repose. After a short rest the pope entered the church, where some hours before the deputies from the towns had taken their places, with the representatives of the magistracy and of the army, the sixty bishops with their clergy, the senate, legislative body, tribunate, council of state, princes of Nassau, Hesse, and Baden, the arch-chancellor of the Germanic empire, in fine the ministers of all the powers. The great door of Notre Dame had been closed, because they had placed against it the back of the imperial throne. The church was therefore entered by the side doors situated at the two extremities of the transversal nave. When the pope, preceded by the cross and insignia of the successor of St. Peter, appeared in this old church of St. Louis, all the auditory arose, and five hundred musicians astonished them with the solemn effect of the holy chant, "Tu es Petrus!" The effect was sudden and striking. The pope, walking at a slow pace, went first to kneel before the altar, and afterwards took his place on a throne prepared for him upon the right side. The sixty prelates of the French church came one after the other to salute him. He showed towards each of them, constitutional or not, the same benevolence of aspect. After this they waited for the arrival of the imperial family.

The church of Notre Dame was decorated with unequalled magnificence. The hangings of velvet, sprinkled with golden bees, descended from the roof to the floor. At the foot of the altar there were very simple chairs, which the emperor and empress occupied before their coronation. At the bottom of the church, in the extreme point opposite to the altar, arose an immense throne, elevated upon twenty-four steps, placed between columns that supported a pediment, while a species of monument in a monument was destined for the emperor and empress when crowned. This was according both to the French and Roman ritual. The monarch could not go to sit upon his throne until after having been crowned by the pontiff.

They awaited the emperor, and awaited him a good while. It was the only vexatious circumstance in the solemnity. The position of the pope during this long interval was a painful one. The manager of the fête had apprehended that the two processions might be exposed to encounter each other, and was the cause of the delay. The emperor had left the Tuileries in a carriage entirely surrounded with glasses, surmounted by genii of gold holding a crown; a carriage popular in France, always recognised by the people of Paris, when it has been since visible in other ceremonials. He was dressed in a coat designed by the greatest painter of the time, and pretty much like the costume of the sixteenth century; he wore a cap and feather, with a short cloak. He was to take the imperial costume from the archbishop himself at the moment of entering the church. Escorted by the marshals on horseback, preceded by the grand dignitaries in carriages, he passed slowly along the rue St. Honoré, the quay of the Seine, and the place Notre Dame, in the midst of the acclamations of an immense population, enchanted to see the general favourite become emperor, not as if he had operated the whole himself, with his fluctuating passions, and his warlike heroism, but that it was the enchantment of a magic ring that had done it for him.

Napoleon arrived at the portico already described, descended, and went into the archbishop's palace, where he took the crown, sceptre, and imperial mantle, and then proceeded towards the church. At his side was borne the great crown, in the form of a tiara, modelled upon that of Charlemagne. During the first few moments his brow was girt with the crown of the Cesars; in other words, with a simple wreath of golden laurel. They admired the head, as fine under the golden laurel as an antique medal. Having entered into the church at the notes of the resounding music, he knelt down, and went afterwards to the chair which he was to occupy before placing himself in possession of the throne. Then the ceremony commenced. The crown, sceptre, sword, and mantle were deposited upon the altar. The pope made upon the emperor's brow, on his arms and head, the customary anointings; then blessing the sword with which he girded him, and the sceptre which he placed in his hand, he approached to take the crown. Napoleon, observing his movement as he announced he would do, and thus determinate the difficulty at the place itself, took the crown from the hands of the pontiff without roughness, but in a decided manner, and placed it upon his own head. The act, understood by all the assistants, produced an indescribable effect. Napoleon then taking the crown of the empress, and approaching Josephine, who knelt before him, placed it with visible tenderness upon the head of this companion of his fortunes, who was at the same moment bathed in tears. This done, he moved towards the grand throne. He mounted it, followed by his brothers, who supported the skirts of the imperial mantle. Then the pope proceeded according to usage to the foot of the throne to bless the new sovereign, and chant the words which had resounded in the ears of Charlemagne in the church of St. Peter, when the Roman clergy suddenly proclaimed him emperor of the west: "Vivat æternum semper Augustus!" At this chant the cries of "Long live the emperor," a thousand times repeated, were heard resounding along the arches of Notre Dame; cannon added their thunder peals, and announced to all Paris the solemn moment when Napoleon was definitively consecrated, according to all the forms agreed upon among men.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès next bore to him the text of the oath; a bishop presented the evan-

gelist; and, his hand placed upon the Christian volume, he took the oath, which embodied the great principles of the French revolution. Then was sung a grand pontifical mass. The day was far advanced when the two processions regained the Tuileries, traversing the streets amid an immense concourse of people.

Such was the august ceremony by which the return of France to monarchial principles was consummated. It was not one of the least triumphs of the revolution to see the soldier coming forth from his own sphere, crowned by the pope, who had expressly quitted for that purpose the capital of the Christian world. It is, above all, to such a claim that similar pomps are worthy of drawing the attention of the historian. If moderation of desire had seated itself on the same throne with genius—had dealt out to France a sufficient degree of liberty, and had limited duly the course of heroic enterprise—this ceremony had consecrated for ever, or, in other words, for some centuries, the new dynasty. But we must pass by other ways to a political state of more freedom, and to a greatness unhappily too restrained.

There were fifteen years gone since the revolution commenced. Monarchy reigning during three years, republicanism during twelve, France had now become a military monarchy, founded at the same time upon civil equality, upon the concurrence of the nation in the law, and upon the free admission of every citizen to those social greatnesses re-established. This, for fifteen years, had been the progress of French society successively overthrown, and successively re-edified with the ordinary promptitude attaching to popular passions.

BOOK XXI.

THE THIRD COALITION.

STAY OF THE POPE IN PARIS.—CARE OF NAPOLEON TO RETAIN HIM THERE.—THE FLEETS UNABLE TO ACT IN DECEMBER; NAPOLEON EMPLOYS THE WINTER IN ORGANIZING ITALY.—TRANSFORMATION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC INTO A VASSAL KINGDOM OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE.—OFFER OF THE KINGDOM TO JOSEPH BONAPARTE, AND HIS REFUSAL OF IT.—NAPOLEON DETERMINES TO PLACE THE IRON CROWN UPON HIS OWN HEAD, DECLARING THAT THE TWO CROWNS OF FRANCE AND ITALY SHALL BE SEPARATED AT THE PEACE.—SOLEMN SITTING OF THE SENATE.—SECOND CORONATION AT MILAN FIXED FOR THE MONTH OF MAY, 1805.—NAPOLEON FINDS IN HIS PRESENCE BEYOND THE ALPS A MEANS FOR THE BETTER CONCEALMENT OF HIS NEW MARITIME PROJECTS.—HIS MARITIME RESOURCES INCREASED BY A SUDDEN DECLARATION OF WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SPAIN.—NAVAL FORCE OF HOLLAND, FRANCE, AND SPAIN.—DESIGN FOR A GRAND EXPEDITION TO INDIA.—HESITATES FOR A MOMENT BETWEEN THAT PROJECT AND THE OTHER OF A DIRECT EXPEDITION AGAINST ENGLAND.—DEFINITIVE PREFERENCE GIVEN TO THE LAST.—EVERY THING PREPARED TO CARRY THE DESCENT INTO EXECUTION IN THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST.—THE FLEETS OF TOULON, CADIZ, FERROL, ROCHEFORT, AND BREST, WERE TO UNITE AT MARTINIQUE, TO RETURN IN JULY INTO THE CHANNEL TO THE NUMBER OF SIXTY VESSELS.—THE POPE FINALLY PREPARES TO RETURN TO ROME.—HIS OVERTURES TO NAPOLEON BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.—ANSWERS TO THE DIFFERENT QUESTIONS TREATED OF BY THE POPE.—DISPLEASURE OF HIS HOLINESS TEMPERED AT THE SAME TIME BY THE SUCCESS OF HIS JOURNEY TO FRANCE.—DEPARTURE OF THE POPE FOR ROME, AND OF NAPOLEON FOR MILAN.—DISPOSITIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURTS.—THEIR TENDENCY TO A NEW COALITION.—STATE OF THE RUSSIAN CABINET.—THE YOUNG FRIENDS OF ALEXANDER FORM A GRAND PLAN FOR AN EUROPEAN MEDIATION.—IDEAS OF WHICH THIS PLAN WAS COMPOSED, THE TRUE ORIGIN OF THE TREATIES OF 1815.—M. NOWOSILTZOFF CHARGED WITH OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF THE COURT OF LONDON.—RECEPTION HE MET FROM PITT.—THE PLAN OF A MEDIATION IS CONVERTED BY THE ENGLISH MINISTER INTO THE PLAN OF A COALITION AGAINST FRANCE.—RETURN OF M. NOWOSILTZOFF TO PETERSBURGH.—THE RUSSIAN CABINET SIGNS WITH LORD GOWER THE TREATY THAT CONSTITUTES THE THIRD COALITION.—THE RATIFICATION OF THAT TREATY IS SUBMITTED TO ONE CONDITION, THE EVACUATION OF MALTA BY ENGLAND.—IN ORDER TO PRESERVE TO THIS COALITION THE PREVIOUS FORM OF A MEDIATION, M. NOWOSILTZOFF MUST GO TO PARIS TO TREAT WITH NAPOLEON.—USELESS EFFORTS OF RUSSIA TO BRING PRUSSIA INTO THE NEW COALITION.—HER EFFORTS MORE FORTUNATE WITH AUSTRIA.—ENTERS INTO EVENTUAL ENGAGEMENTS.—RUSSIA MAKES PRUSSIA SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIATE AGENT, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FROM NAPOLEON PASSPORTS FOR M. NOWOSILTZOFF.—THESE PASSPORTS WERE GRANTED.—NAPOLEON IN ITALY.—ENTHUSIASM OF THE ITALIANS TOWARDS HIS PERSON.—CORONATION AT MILAN.—EUGENE BEAUHARNOIS DECLARED VICEROY.—MILITARY FÊTES AND VISITS TO ALL THE CITIES.—NAPOLEON INEVITABLY DRAWN INTO CERTAIN DESIGNS BY THE SIGHT OF ITALY.—HE PROJECTS THE EXPULSION OF THE BOURBONS SOME DAY FROM NAPLES, AND IMMEDIATELY DECIDES UPON THE UNION OF GENOA WITH FRANCE.—MOTIVES FOR THIS UNION.—CONSTITUTION OF THE DUCHY OF LUCCA INTO AN IMPERIAL FIEF, FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PRINCESS ELIZA.—AFTER A SOJOURN OF THREE MONTHS IN ITALY, NAPOLEON IS DISPOSED TO GO TO BOULOGNE IN ORDER TO EXECUTE HIS DESCENT.—GANTEAUME AT BREST—UNABLE TO FIND A SINGLE DAY TO SET SAIL.—VILLENEUVE AND GRAVINA, HAVING LEFT TOULON AND CADIZ IN SECURITY, ARE ORDERED TO PROCEED AND RAISE THE BLOCKADE OF GANTEAUME, IN ORDER THAT THE WHOLE TOGETHER MAY ENTER THE CHANNEL.—SOJOURN OF NAPOLEON AT GENOA.—HIS SUDDEN DEPARTURE FOR FONTAINEBLEAU.—WHILE NAPOLEON PREPARES HIS DESCENT UPON ENGLAND, ALL THE POWERS OF THE CONTINENT GET READY FOR A FORMIDABLE WAR AGAINST FRANCE.—RUSSIA EMBARRASSED BY THE REFUSAL OF ENGLAND TO ABANDON MALTA, FINDS IN THE ANNEXATION OF GENOA A PRETEXT TO GET OUT, AND AUSTRIA A REASON FOR IMMEDIATE DECISION.—TREATY FOR A

SUBSIDY. HER IMMEDIATE ARMAMENTS, OBSTINATELY DENIED TO NAPOLEON.—HE PERCEIVES THEM AND DEMANDS EXPLANATIONS, BY COMMENCING SOME PREPARATIONS ON THE SIDE OF ITALY AND THE RHINE.—PERSUADED MORE THAN EVER THAT HE MUST GO AND CUT IN LONDON THE KNOT OF ALL THE COALITIONS, HE SETS OUT FOR BOULOGNE.—HIS RESOLUTION TO EMBARK, AND HIS IMPATIENCE WHILE AWAITING THE FRENCH FLEET.—MOVEMENTS OF THE SQUADRONS.—LONG AND FORTUNATE NAVIGATION OF VILLENEUVE AND GRAVINA AS FAR AS MARTINIQUE.—FIRST MARKS OF DISCOURAGEMENT WITH ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE.—SUDDEN RETURN TO EUROPE, AND VOYAGE TO FERROL TO RE-OPEN THAT PORT.—NAVAL BATTLE OFF FERROL AGAINST ADMIRAL CALDER.—THE FRENCH ADMIRAL MIGHT HAVE CLAIMED THE VICTORY IF HE HAD NOT LOST TWO SPANISH VESSELS.—HE FULFILS HIS OBJECT IN RAISING THE BLOCKADE OF TOULON, AND IN RALLYING TWO NEW FRENCH AND SPANISH DIVISIONS—IN PLACE OF ACQUIRING CONFIDENCE AND COMING TO SET GANTEAUME FREE AT BREST IN ORDER TO PROCEED WITH FIFTY SAIL INTO THE CHANNEL, VILLENEUVE DISCONCERTED DECIDES TO SET SAIL FOR CADIZ, LEAVING NAPOLEON TO SUPPOSE THAT HE HAD PROCEEDED TOWARDS BREST.—LONG WAITING OF NAPOLEON AT BOULOGNE—HIS HOPES UPON THE RECEPTION OF HIS FIRST DESPATCHES FROM FERROL.—HIS IRRITATION WHEN HE LEARNED THAT VILLENEUVE HAD PROCEEDED TOWARDS CADIZ.—VIOLENT AGITATION AND BEARING AGAINST ADMIRAL DECRÈS.—POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE OF THE DESIGNS OF AUSTRIA.—SUDDEN CHANGE OF RESOLUTION.—PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1805.—WHAT THE CHANCES OF THE DESCENT WERE, LOST BY THE FAULT OF VILLENEUVE.—NAPOLEON TURNS HIS FORCES DEFINITIVELY AGAINST THE CONTINENT.

THREE days after the ceremony of the coronation, Napoleon distributed to the army and the national guards the eagles, which were designed to surmount the colours of the empire. This ceremony, as grandly arranged as the preceding, had for its scene of exhibition the Champ de Mars. The representatives of every corps came to receive the eagles, which were designed for each, at the foot of a magnificent throne, elevated in front of the palace of the military school; and before receiving them, they took the oath, that they well kept afterwards, to defend them to the death. On the same day, there was a banquet at the Tuileries, at which the emperor and the pope were seen seated at the same table, one at the side of the other, clothed in imperial and pontifical ornaments, and served by the great officers of the crown.

The multitude, ever greedy after public spectacles, was delighted with these pomps. Many, without suffering their good sense to govern them, admitted these scenes as the natural effects of the re-establishment of the monarchy. Wiser persons expressed wishes that the new monarch might not suffer himself to become intoxicated with the fumes of his own omnipotence. In other respects, no sinister prognostic yet troubled the public satisfaction. They believed in the endurance of the new order of things. With great magnificence, too much perhaps, there was still seen the faithful consecration of the social principles proclaimed at the French revolution—a prosperity always on the increase, notwithstanding the war, and a continuation of that greatness, which had about it something flattering to the national pride.

The holy father had not wished to make a long stay in Paris; but he hoped that by sojourning there for a time, he might find a favourable occasion to express to Napoleon the secret wishes of the Roman court, and he was reconciled to prolong his stay for two or three months. The season besides did not permit him to repass the Alps immediately. Napoleon, who wished to detain him at his side in order to show France to him, to make him justly appreciate its feeling, and to bring him to a right comprehension of the conditions upon which the re-establishment of religion had been possible; to gain his confidence finally by frank and daily communications—Napoleon exhibited, in order to retain him, the most perfect kindness, and finished by completely winning over the holy pontiff. Pius VII. was lodged in the Tuileries, and left free to devote himself to his moderate and religious tastes, but was surrounded, when he went out, with all the attributes of supreme power, escorted by the imperial guard, and, in a word, overwhelmed with the highest honours. His interesting figure, his virtues almost visible in his person, had much struck the Parisian population, that followed him every where with a mixture of curiosity, sympathy, and respect. He had visited by turns all the parishes of Paris, where he officiated in the midst of an extraordinary number of people. His presence augmented the religious impulse that Napoleon had endeavoured to impress upon their minds. Hence the holy pontiff was happy. He visited the public monuments and the museums enriched by Napoleon, seeming to feel interested in the grandeurs of the new reign. In one visit to a public establishment, he conducted himself with a degree of tact and a conformity which secured to him general applause. Surrounded by a crowd that knelt before him, and demanded his benediction, he perceived a man whose severe and morose countenance still bore the stamp of the extinguished passions of the past times, and turned away to withdraw himself from the pontifical benediction. The holy father, approaching him, said, with great mildness: "Do not go away, sir; the benediction of an old man cannot do you any injury." This affecting and just expression was repeated and applauded throughout Paris.

The fêtes and hospitable cares lavished upon his venerable guest, did not divert Napoleon from his more important affairs. The fleets designed to aid in the descent upon England continued to attract his attention. That of Brest was at last ready to set sail; but that of Toulon, retarded in getting ready, because he would have it increased to eleven instead of eight sail, had required the labour of the entire month of December. Since it had been completed, a contrary wind had hindered it from getting out during the whole month of January. Admiral Missiessy with five vessels ready at Rochefort only awaited a storm to steal out clear of the enemy. Napoleon devoted the time thus passed to the internal administration of his new empire.

Although determined upon war to the utmost against England, he believed he ought to commence his reign by a proceeding, useless at the moment, and which, besides its inutility, had the inconvenience of being the repetition of another step perfectly fitting the occasion, which he had

on his coming to the consulate. He wrote a letter to the king of England to propose a peace, and he forwarded this letter by a brig to an English cruiser before Boulogne[1]. It was immediately communicated to the British cabinet, which stated that a reply should be sent at a later period.

[1] This letter of Napoleon was as follows:

"SIR AND BROTHER,—Called to the throne of France by the suffrages of the people and the army, my first sentiment is a wish for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity: they may contend for ages; but do their governments well fulfil the most sacred of their duties? and will not so much blood shed uselessly and without a view to any end, accuse them in their own consciences? I consider it as no disgrace to make the first step. I have I hope sufficiently proved to the world that I fear none of the chances of war; war besides presents nothing that I need to fear. Peace is the wish of my heart, but war has never been contrary to my glory. I conjure your majesty not to deny yourself the happiness of giving peace to the world, nor to leave that sweet satisfaction to your children; for in fine there never was a more fortunate opportunity, nor a moment more favourable to silence all the passions, and listen only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. This moment lost, what end can be assigned to a war which all my efforts will not be able to terminate? Your majesty has gained more within ten years both in territory and riches than the whole extent of Europe. Your nation is at the highest point of prosperity; what can it hope from war? to form a coalition of some powers on the continent? the continent will remain tranquil, a coalition can only increase the preponderance and continental greatness of France. To renew internal troubles? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances? Finances founded on a flourishing state of agriculture can never be destroyed. To take from France her colonies? The colonies are to France only a secondary object: and does not your majesty already possess more than you know how to preserve? If your majesty would but reflect, you must perceive that the war is without an object; without any presumable result to yourself. Alas! what a melancholy prospect to cause two nations to fight for the sake of fighting! The world is sufficiently large for our two nations to live in it; and reason is sufficiently powerful to discover means of reconciling every thing, when the wish for reconciliation exists on both sides. I have, however, fulfilled a sacred duty, and one which is precious to my heart.

"I trust that your majesty will believe in the sincerity of my sentiments, and my wish to give you every proof of it, &c. "NAPOLEON."

The reply to the above was as follows:—

"His majesty has received the letter which has been addressed to him by the head of the French government, dated the 2nd of the present month. There is no object which his majesty has more at heart than to avail himself of the first opportunity to procure again to his subjects the advantages of a peace, founded on a basis which may not be incompatible with the permanent security and essential interests of his states. His majesty is persuaded that this end can only be attained by arrangements which may, at the same time, provide for the future safety and tranquillity of Europe, and prevent the recurrence of the dangers and calamities in which it is involved. Conformably to this statement, his majesty feels that it is impossible for him to answer more particularly to the overture that has been made him, until he shall have had time to communicate with the powers of the continent, with whom he is engaged in confidential connexions and relations, and particularly with the emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of the sentiments with which he is animated, and the lively interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe.

(Signed) "MULGRAVE."

Peace was possible in 1800, even necessary for both powers. The step taken at that time was therefore very well timed, and the refusal of the propositions for peace, followed by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, covered Pitt with confusion, and was even one of the causes of the fall of that minister. But in 1805, the two nations were at the commencement of a new war, their pretensions were accumulated to such a point, that they could not be adjusted, except by force, a proposition for peace seemed visibly to put on the affectation of moderation, or as if to afford an occasion to speak to the king of England as monarch to monarch.

That which was much more pressing than these empty demonstrations was the definitive organization of the Italian republic. In 1802, in the consulta of Lyons, it was constituted in imitation of that of France, by adopting a government, republican in form, but absolute in fact. It was now natural that it should take the last step by following France, and that from a republic it should become a monarchy.

In the preceding book there have been recounted the overtures that Cambacérès and the minister of the Italian republic at Paris, M. Marescalchi, had been charged to make to the vice-president Melzi, and to the members of the state consulta. These overtures had been received favourably enough, although the vice-president Melzi, in an ill mood from the state of his health and a task above his strength, had mingled reflections sufficiently bitter in his reply. The Italians accepted, without regret, the offer of the transformation of the republic into a monarchy, because they hoped to obtain upon this occasion, in part at least, the accomplishment of their wishes. They wished much for a king, and for a brother of Napoleon, upon condition that such a brother should be either Joseph or Louis Bonaparte, and not Lucien, whom they formally excluded; that such a king should belong to them entirely; that he should always reside at Milan; that the two crowns of France and Italy should be immediately separated; that all the functionaries should be Italians; that they should no more pay the subsidy for the maintenance of a French army; and that, finally, Napoleon should take upon himself to make Austria approve of the new change.

Upon these conditions, said Melzi, the vice-president, the Italians would be satisfied, because they had not yet felt any advantage from their disfranchisement, except in an augmentation of taxes.

The idea that their money was carried beyond the mountains, commonly filled the minds of the Italians, who had been for so long a time subject to powers placed on the other side of the Alps. However, they have a better and nobler motive to desire their freedom, which is to live under a national government. These base reasons made Napoleon indignant, because though he estimated men lightly, he never laboured to degrade them. He had no thought of debasing them when he asked from them only great measures. He was, therefore, indignant at the reasons the vice-president presented. "What," he exclaimed, "the Italians will then not be sensible that their independence cost money! They must be supposed

very base or very dull: as for myself, I am far from believing them such. Were they able to free themselves? are they able to defend themselves without the French soldiers? If they are not able to do so, is it not just that they should contribute to the support of the soldiers who spill their blood for them? Who united in a single state, to make them a nation, five or six different provinces, formerly governed by five or six different princes? Who then, if not the French army, and I who commanded it? If I had wished it upper Italy would be to-day cut up, distributed in shares, a part given to the pope, another to the Austrians, a third to the Spaniards. I might at the peace have disarmed the other powers, and secured for France the peace of the continent. Do not the Italians see that the constitution of their nationality began by a state which already comprehends a third of all Italy? Is not this government composed of Italians, and founded upon the principles of justice, equality, and a wise liberty, in fact, upon the principles of the French revolution? What can they desire better? Am I able to accomplish all things in a day?"

Napoleon, under these circumstances, had plainly reason on his side against Italy. Without him Lombardy would, with its works, have satisfied the pope, the emperor of Germany, Spain, the house of Sardinia, and served as an equivalent for the union of Piedmont with France. True it is that it was in the interest of French policy, that Napoleon laboured to constitute an Italian nationality. But was not that a great benefit to the Italians, that the policy of France should thus comprehend them? Owed they not to this policy the concurrence of all their efforts? And, in fact, 22,000,000 f. per annum, to support thirty and some thousand men, was a trifling amount, because they had before been in the habit of supporting sixty thousand at least; was this then a very heavy burden, for a country which included some of the richest provinces in Europe?

Further, Napoleon gave himself little uneasiness about the ill-humoured remonstrances of the vice-president Melzi. He knew that he must not take them all in a very serious way. The moderate Italian party, with which he ruled, abandoned by the nobles and the priests, who in general were inclined to the Austrian side, and by the liberals who were filled with exaggerated ideas; the moderate party in its isolation, experienced a degree of sadness at the prospect of affairs, and painted them accordingly in sombre colours. Napoleon took little account of this, and always occupied with the idea of supporting Italy against the power of Austria, sought out the means to accommodate its institutions to the new institutions of France.

The coronation had been the cause of uniting at Paris the vice-president Melzi, and some delegates from the different Italian authorities. Cambacérès, Marescalchi, and Talleyrand, entered into conferences with them, and got into agreement upon all points, save one only, that of the subsidy paid to France, because the Italians demanded the French occupation for their security, but were unwilling to support the expense.

The arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, was subsequently charged to treat with Joseph Bonaparte, on the question of his elevation to the throne of Italy. To the astonishment of Napoleon, Joseph refused the throne from two motives, one was natural, the other singularly presumptuous. Joseph declared, that by virtue of the principle of the separation of the two crowns, the condition of the throne of Italy would be the renunciation of that of France, while he wished to remain a French prince with all the rights to the succession of that empire. Napoleon not having children, he preferred the distant possibility of reigning some day in France, to the certainty of reigning immediately in Italy. Such a feeling had nothing in it but what was natural and patriotic. The second motive of refusal given by Joseph, was that a kingdom had been offered him too near to France, and from that circumstance too dependent, that he could only govern under the authority of the head of the French empire, and that he did not feel inclined to reign at such a price. Thus, showing already the sentiments that directed the brothers of the emperor on all the thrones which he gave them. It was a proof of great folly and vanity, not to wish for the advice of such a man as Napoleon. It was a very impolitic piece of ingratitude to endeavour to be free from his power; because at the head of an Italian state newly created, to endeavour to be isolated, was to risk the loss of Italy as much as the weakening of France.

All the entreaties employed to overcome Joseph were in vain, although his future royalty had been announced at all the courts with which France held relations at that time, in Austria, Prussia, and the holy see; it was necessary to revert to other ideas, and conceive some new combination. Napoleon, aware by this last experiment, that he must not create in Lombardy a jealous royalty, disposed to run contrary to his great designs, resolved to take himself the iron crown, and to qualify himself "emperor of the French, king of Italy." He had but one objection to this design, which was, that it recalled too strongly the union of Piedmont with France. He exposed himself thus to wound Austria, deeply, and to bring her back from pacific ideas to the warlike desires of Pitt, who since his return to office, had endeavoured to profit by the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and Russia, in order to form a new coalition. In order to meet this objection, Napoleon proposed to declare formally that the crown of Italy would only remain upon this head until a peace; that at this epoch he would proceed to the separation of the two crowns, by choosing among the French princes one who should succeed him. At the moment he adopted Eugene Beauharnois, the son of Josephine, whom he loved as if he had been his own son, and to him he confided the vice-royalty of Italy.

This determination being once taken, it gave him little trouble to make M. Melzi agree to it, whose complaints, sufficiently unreasonable, began to be fatiguing, because he perceived in him a much greater desire to work for a species of popularity, than any intentions to labour in common at the future constitution of Italy. Cambacérès and Talleyrand were ordered to signify these resolutions to the Italians then in Paris, and combine with them the means of their execution. These Italians seemed to fear that the three great permanent colleges of the "possidenti," "dotti," and "commercienti," to whom was confided the care of electing

the authorities, and of modifying the constitution when it took place, would resist every project, save that of a Lombard monarchy, immediately separated from that of France, and in the way of resistance, that they would oppose an Italian indifference, and neither vote for or against. Napoleon, under these circumstances, renounced the employment of constitutional forms; he acted as the creator who had made Italy what she then was, and who had the right to do further still, in all that he believed useful to what he had made. Talleyrand addressed a report to him, in which he demonstrated that these dependent provinces, the one on the ancient Venetian republic, the other belonging to the house of Austria, that of the duke of Modena, and that of the holy see, depended as conquered provinces upon the will of the French emperor; that what he wished to give them was an equitable government, adapted to their interests, and founded upon the principles of the French revolution; but that for the rest, he should give to that government the form which was most agreeable to his vast designs. The decree constituting the new kingdom followed, a decree which was to be adopted by the consulta of the state, and the Italian deputies present in Paris, communicated afterwards to the French senate, as one of the great constitutional acts of the empire, and promulgated in an imperial sitting. Still it was necessary that it should appear as if Italy went for something in these new determinations. It was therefore conceived proper to prepare for her the sight of a coronation. It was resolved to draw from the treasury of Monza the famous crown of iron of the Lombard kings, that Napoleon might place it upon his head, after having been consecrated by the archbishop of Milan, conformably to the ancient usage of the Germanic emperors, who received at Rome the crown of the west; but at Milan that of Italy. This exhibition could not but raise emotion in the Italians, re-awaken their hopes, call back the party of the nobles and priests, who regretted above all in the Austrian domination the monarchical forms, and thus satisfy the people, always smitten with the luxury of their masters; because luxury, in pleasing the eyes of all, helped their industry. As to the enlightened liberals, they would finish by comprehending that the association of the destinies of Italy to those of France could alone give substantial assurance for the future.

It was agreed, that after the adoption of the new decree, the Italian deputies, the minister Marescalchi, and the grand master of the ceremonies, M. de Segur, should precede Napoleon to Milan, in order to organise an Italian court, and to prepare in that city the pomps of the regal coronation.

At this moment a thousand rumours were spread abroad among the European diplomatists. It was said sometimes that Napoleon had given the crown of Holland to his brother Louis, sometimes that he had given that of Naples to Joseph, and again, that he was going to unite Genoa and Switzerland to the French territory. There were even persons who maintained that Napoleon would make cardinal Fesch pope, and that they already spoke of the crown of Spain as reserved to a prince of the house of Bonaparte. The hatred of his enemies divined his designs on some points, they exaggerated them in others, they suggested to him some of which he had not yet dared to think, and certainly facilitated them, in preparing the opinion of Europe for their reception. The sitting of the senate for the promulgation of the constituted decree of the kingdom of Italy, would not fail to confer credit on all these surmises, true or false, and for the moment push them on too far.

The Italian deputies at Paris were first called together, and the decree submitted to them, to which they unanimously adhered; then the imperial sitting was declared for the 17th of March, 1805, or 26th Ventôse, year XIII. The emperor went to the senate at two o'clock, surrounded with all the show of constitutional sovereigns in England and France, when they hold a royal sitting. He was received at the gate of the palace of the Luxemburg by a grand deputation, and immediately seated himself on a throne, around which were ranged the princes and the six grand dignitaries, the marshals, and the great officers of the crown. He ordered the communication of the acts which were to be made the object of the sitting. Talleyrand read his report, and after the report the imperial decree. A copy of the same decree in the Italian language, clothed with the adhesion of the Lombard deputies, was afterwards read by the vice-president Melzi. Then the minister Marescalchi presented those deputies to Napoleon, at whose hands they took an oath of fidelity to him as king of Italy. This ceremony being finished, Napoleon seated and covered, delivered a strong and concise speech, as he well knew how to do, and of which the intention will be easily judged.

"Senators,—We have willed under the present circumstances to come into the midst of you, and make you acquainted with our entire thoughts, upon one of the most important subjects of our state policy.

"We have conquered Holland, three-fourths of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. We have been moderate in the midst of the greatest prosperity. Of so many provinces we have not kept but as much as was necessary to maintain us in the same position of power and consideration that France has always been. The partition of Poland, the provinces sequestrated from Turkey, the conquest of the Indies, and of nearly all the colonies have destroyed to our detriment the general equilibrium.

"All that we judged useless to re-establish we have returned.

"Germany has been evacuated; its provinces have been restored to the descendants of so many illustrious houses, that were lost for ever, if we had not accorded to them a general protection.

"Austria herself, after two unfortunate wars, has obtained the state of Venice. At all times she would have exchanged Venice by mutual consent for the provinces which she has lost.

"Scarcely conquered, Holland was declared independent. Its union to our empire had been the completion of our commercial system, while the largest rivers of half our empire open into Holland. Still Holland is independent, and its customs, its commerce, and administration are regulated at the will of its government.

"Switzerland was occupied by our armies; we have defended it against the combined forces of

Europe. Its union would have completed our military frontier. Meanwhile Switzerland governs itself under the act of mediation, at the will of the nineteen cantons, free and independent.

"The union of the territory of the Italian republic to the French empire had been useful to the development of our agriculture; still after the second conquest we, at Lyons, confirmed its independence. To-day we do more, we proclaim the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, assigning for the time of this separation the instant when it shall become possible and be free from danger for our Italian people.

"We have accepted, and we shall place upon our head the crown of iron of the ancient Lombards, to retemper and restrengthen it. But we do not hesitate to declare that we shall transmit this crown to one of our legitimate children, whether natural or adopted, the day when we shall be free from alarm for the independence that we have guaranteed to the other states of the Mediterranean.

"The genius of evil in vain searches for pretexts to place the continent in a state of war; that which has been united to our empire by the constitutional laws of the state shall remain united. No new province shall be incorporated, but the laws of the Batavian republic, the act of mediation of the nineteen Swiss cantons, and the first statute of the kingdom of Italy, shall be constantly under the protection of our crown, and we will never suffer that they be attacked."

After this lofty and peremptory speech, Napoleon received the oaths of several senators that he named, and then returned, surrounded with the same attendance, to the palace of the Tuileries. M. Melzi, M. Marescalchi, and the other Italians had an order to proceed to Milan, to prepare the public mind for the new solemnity which had been determined upon. Cardinal Caprara, the pope's legate with Napoleon, was archbishop of Milan. He had only accepted the dignity through obedience, being very aged, worn down with infirmities, and after a long life passed in courts, much more disposed to quit the world than to prolong there his existing character. At the entreaty of Napoleon, and with the agreement of the pope, he set out for Italy, in order to crown the new king, following the ancient usage of the Lombard church. M. de Segur went off immediately with an order to hasten his preparations. Napoleon had fixed his own departure for the month of April, and his coronation for that of May.

This excursion in Italy perfectly agreed with his military plans, and was even a great aid to them. Napoleon had been obliged to wait all the winter, that his squadrons might be ready to sail from Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. In January, 1805, there had about twenty months elapsed since the maritime war had been declared, because the rupture with England was dated from May, 1803; and still the fleets of the ships of the line had not been able to set sail. The warm impulse of Napoleon had not been wanting to the administration; but in naval affairs nothing is done quickly, and it is of this which nations that aspire to create a naval power are not enough aware. However, it must be said that the fleets of Brest and Toulon had been sooner ready, if they had not wished to increase their first effective strength. That of Brest had been carried up from eighteen sail to twenty-one, and was capable of embarking seventeen thousand men, and five hundred horses, together with a considerable *matériel*, without the aid of transports borrowed from commerce. In the design to set sail in winter during a stormy period, it had been seen necessary to renounce their accompaniment by vessels of a small tonnage, equally incapable of following ships of the line and of being towed. They had, therefore, taken old vessels of war, which they had armed *en flute*, and freighted with men and stores. By that means, the squadron would be able to go out altogether at once, and, in any weather, run over to Ireland, land there the 17,000 men, with stores, and then return directly into the channel. Of the rest, there had been ready in November, as was wished, at Rochefort, a squadron of five sail of the line, and four frigates, carrying 3000 men, 4000 muskets, and 10,000 weight of powder, all at the same time. At Toulon alone the fleet, raised from eight to eleven vessels, had occupied all the month of December. General Lauriston, aide-de-camp of Napoleon, had been ordered to prepare a corps of 6000 men, carefully selected, with fifty pieces of cannon, and materials for a siege, and to embark all on board that fleet. The same fleet, as already said, was, on making its voyage, to throw a division of troops upon St. Helena, to capture that island, to proceed to Surinam, and retake the Dutch colonies, and rally afterwards with the squadron of Missiessy, which, on its own part, was to succour the French West India islands, and ravage those of the English. Both these, after having thus drawn the attention of the English to America, and disengaged Ganteaume, had orders to return to Europe. Ganteaume, whose preparations were achieved, had waited all the winter, that Missiessy and Villeneuve, in sailing from Rochefort and Toulon, might draw off the English in their pursuit. Missiessy, who wanted impetus, but not courage, sailed from Rochefort on the 11th of January during a frightful storm, and, passing between the openings, got out into the open sea, without being either seen or rejoined by the English. He set sail towards the West Indies with five ships of the line and four frigates. His vessels received some injury, which they repaired at sea. As to Villeneuve, to whom the minister Decrès had communicated a factitious exaltation of mind of very short endurance, he had suddenly cooled on coming near and seeing the Toulon squadron. To make eleven equipments with eight, it had been necessary to divide, and consequently to weaken them. They had completed the crews with conscripts borrowed from the land service. The materials employed in the port of Toulon were badly chosen, and it was discovered that the iron, cordage, and masting, broke easily. Villeneuve pre-occupied himself a good deal, and perhaps too much, with the danger he had to brave in such vessels, and with such crews; the vessels of his enemies, being completely inured by a cruise of twenty months. His mind was troubled before he was at sea. Still pushed on by Napoleon, by the minister Decrès, and by general Lauriston, he set himself in readiness to weigh anchor towards the end of December. A contrary wind detained him from the end of December until the 18th of

January in the road of Toulon. On the 18th, the wind having changed, he set sail, and succeeded in taking a false course in order to deceive the enemy. But night brought with it a heavy trouble; the inexperience of the crews, and the bad quality of the materials, exposed many of the vessels to the most vexatious accidents. The squadron was dispersed. In the morning Villeneuve had but four ships of the line, and a frigate; the rest were separated from him. Some had their masts or topmasts broken; others leaked, and received injuries difficult to repair at sea. Besides these accidents, two English frigates had observed the movement, and the admiral found he should be rejoined by the enemy at a moment when he had only five vessels with which to oppose him. He, therefore, decided upon re-entering Toulon, although he had already run seventy leagues, in spite of the entreaties of general Lauriston, who, reckoning four thousand some hundred men in the vessels remaining together, demanded to be conducted to his destination. Villeneuve re-entered Toulon on the 27th, and happily succeeded in bringing back the whole of his squadron.

The time was not lost. They went about repairing the damage sustained, setting up the rigging, and rendering every thing ready to start anew. But admiral Villeneuve was strongly affected; he wrote to the minister the same day that he returned to Toulon:—"I declare to you, with vessels equipped like these, weak in seamen, encumbered with troops, having old rigging, or that of a bad quality; vessels which, on the least breeze, break their masts and tear their sails, and that, when the weather is fine, pass their time in repairing the injuries occasioned by the wind or the inexperience of the crews; we are not in a fit state to undertake any thing. I have had a presentiment before my departure; I go to make a grievous experiment[1]."

Napoleon exhibited a sensible displeasure on learning this useless sally. What is to be done, he said, with admirals who, on the first damage received, become demoralized, and think of returning! It is necessary to renounce navigation, and to undertake nothing even in the finest season, if an operation is thus to be thwarted by the separation of some of the vessels. They should, he continued, give a rendezvous to all the captains in the latitude of the Canaries by means of sealed despatches. The damage sustained should be repaired on the voyage. If any vessel leak in a dangerous manner, it might be left at Cadiz, turning over the crew to the Aigle ship of the line, which is in that port ready to set sail. A few broken topmasts, a few accidents in a storm, are very common things. Two days of fine weather would have made it up to the squadron, and set all in order. "But the grand evil of our navy is, that the men who command it are new to all the chances of commanding[2]."

Unfortunately, the propitious time was over for the expedition to Surinam, and it was necessary that Napoleon, with his ordinary fecundity of invention, should find another combination. The first, which consisted in the passage of admiral Latouche into the channel from Toulon, had failed by the death of that excellent seaman. The second, which consisted in drawing the English into the American seas, and in sending the squadron of Villeneuve to Surinam, and that of Missiessy to the West Indies, and to profit by this diversion to throw Ganteaume into the channel, had equally failed by the delays in the organization, by the contrary winds, and by a fruitless sally. It was needful, therefore, to have recourse to another plan. A new loss, that of admiral Bruix, different from that of admiral Latouche, but his equal in merit at least, added to the difficulties of the naval operations. The unfortunate Bruix, so remarkable for his character, experience, and bent of mind, had expired the victim of his zeal and devotion to the organization of the flotilla. If he had lived, Napoleon would, most assuredly, have placed him at the head of the squadron charged with effecting the great manœuvre which he contemplated. It might be said that destiny, in sworn animosity to the French navy, had taken from it in ten months its two best admirals, both assuredly capable of contending with the admirals of England. It was then necessary, until the events of the war had discovered new men of talent, to resolve on availing itself of the admirals Ganteaume, Villeneuve, and Missiessy.

A serious event had recently occurred at sea, which had modified the situation of the belligerent powers. England had in an unforeseen and very unjust manner declared war against Spain[1]. For

[1] Despatch of the 1st Pluviôse, year XIII. or 21st January, 1805, on board the Bucentaure in the road of Toulon.

[2] Letter to Lauriston, of the 1st of February, 1805.

[1] Nothing can be more erroneous than the colour given to the charge of unjust treatment of Spain on the part of England by our author. The treaty of St. Ildefonso bound Spain to furnish France with a contingent of vessels and troops in case of war between France and Great Britain. England had a right to declare war against Spain as well as France in 1803, unless Spain renounced such a treaty, this is clear. France made no demand of the execution of this treaty until July, 1803, when Spain actually agreed to pay a large sum of money to France monthly, in lieu of men and ships, the supply of which should or might have been taken at once for a declaration of war by England. The English ministry forbore pressing Spain as long as possible. At length her conduct induced remonstrances on the part of the English government, they knew this money was employed against itself, being effective in the hands of Napoleon with a contingent of any other kind. The Spanish government continued to urge the efforts it had made to extricate itself from such payments. The convention for these payments was protested against in the fullest manner, and declared to be a just ground for war. A perseverance in it was announced as a justifiable cause for war, and Spain was told that England would be at liberty to commence when she pleased. The entrance of French troops into Spain was declared a cause that would inevitably renew hostilities. That any naval assistance to France would be deemed a cause of war. That British ships must have the same treatment, whether ships of war or commerce, as those of France. On the entrance of any French troops into Spain, or on any Spanish naval armament being fitted out for French assistance, the British minister had orders to quit Madrid, announcing to the British naval commanders that they were instantly to proceed to hostilities, nor to wait orders from home. No other declaration was to be made. Evasive answers were always given by Spain. From a wish to spare Spain, and no Spanish naval armament being fitted out, things remained in this state until July, 1804, when Spain gave England assurances of a faithful and settled neutrality, disavowing any intention to arm. Yet in the following month reinforcements of French soldiers and sailors were marched through Spain; and at the end of September, 1804, Spanish armaments were preparing, and the packets ordered to arm. Representations were again made to Spain

some time, she had perceived that the neutrality of Spain, without being very favourable for France, was highly useful to it upon several accounts. The French squadron harboured in Ferrol was repaired there while it was blockaded. The Aigle ship of the line underwent the same process at Cadiz. The French privateers entered the ports of the peninsula to dispose of their prizes. England had a right to enjoy the same advantages under favour of the reciprocity; but she preferred to be deprived of the advantages rather than leave them to us. She had in consequence announced to the court of Madrid, that she regarded as a violation of neutrality what was thus passing in the ports of the peninsula, and threatened war if the French ships were suffered to continue their armaments there, and if French privateers continued to find a shelter and a market in Spain. She had demanded further, that Charles IV. should guarantee Portugal against any attempt on the part of France. This last demand was exorbitant, and passed out of the limits of neutrality in which it was desired that Spain should remain. However, France had permitted the court of Madrid to show itself pliant towards England, and even to agree to a part of her demands, in order to prolong a state of things which was convenient to France. In fact, the military co-operation of Spain would not be worth to France the amount of a subsidy of 48,000,000 f. per annum, and this subsidy could not be acquitted without a state of neutrality, that alone allowed the arrival of the precious metals from the new world. They were ready to consent to all; but England becoming more exacting as Spain ceded to her demands, had demanded that every armament should immediately cease in the ports of Spain; and she intended by that, it was necessary to send the French vessels out of Ferrol immediately, or, in other words, to deliver them up. Violating openly in fact the rights of nations, she had, without previous notice, ordered the stoppage of Spanish vessels encountered at sea. If it had been thought that such an order had no other object than that of seizing the ships coming from America, having cargoes of gold and silver, the thing might be qualified, without injustice, as a real piracy. At that moment, four Spanish frigates, carrying 12,000,000 of dollars, or about 30,000,000 of francs, had sailed from Mexico towards the coast of Spain, when they were stopped by English cruisers. The Spanish commander having refused to surrender his vessels, he was barbarously attacked by a force immensely superior[1], and made prisoner after an honourable defence. One of the four frigates blew up; the other three were sent into the English ports.

This odious act excited the indignation of Spain and the censure of Europe. Without any hesitation Charles IV. declared war against England. He ordered at the same time the arrest of all the English seized upon the soil of the peninsula, and the sequestration of all their property, to answer for the goods and persons of Spanish merchants.

Thus in spite of its supineness—in spite of the able management of France, the court of Spain found itself forcibly drawn into a war by the maritime outrages of England.

Napoleon could no longer demand the subsidy of 48,000,000 f., and therefore hastened to regulate the mode in which Spain should co-operate in hostilities, and endeavoured, above all, to inspire her with resolutions worthy of herself and of her former greatness.

The Spanish cabinet, in its desire to please Napoleon, as well as from a sentiment of justice towards merit, had chosen admiral Gravina for ambassador in France. He was the first officer of the Spanish navy, and hid under external simplicity, rare intelligence and intrepid courage. Napoleon was much attached to admiral Gravina, and Gravina to Napoleon. For the same motives which had made him to be nominated ambassador, he received the command of the Spanish navy, and before he quitted Paris, he was charged to confer with the French government upon a plan of naval operations. With this view the admiral signed on the 4th of January, 1805, a convention which specified the part which each of the two powers should take in case of war. France engaged to keep constantly at sea forty-seven vessels of the line, twenty-nine frigates, fourteen corvettes, twenty-five brigs, and to press forward as much as possible the completion of sixteen vessels of the line, and fourteen frigates, existing in the dockyards; to unite the troops which remained encamped near the ports of embarkation, in the proportion of five hundred men to each vessel, and two hundred to every frigate; lastly, to keep the French flotilla always in a state to transport ninety thousand men, without comprising the thirty thousand destined for embarkation in the Dutch flotilla. If the force of the flotilla were valued in vessels and frigates, and there were added to it the fleet of large vessels, it might be said that France had a total effective force of sixty ships of the line, and forty frigates actually at sea.

Spain on her side promised to equip immediately thirty-two sail of the line, provided with four

on the subject, while it was further announced that the British admiral off Ferrol would prevent any ships of war whatever from entering or sailing from that port. No satisfactory redress was afforded. Additional naval equipments took place in all the Spanish ports. Remonstrances and manifestos followed, and in the last of them Spain openly stated that she had contemplated war from the beginning. The orders given at first by England were only to detain Spanish ships of war if they had treasure on board, but not other ships. Here Napoleon was outwitted. He suffered an affected Spanish neutrality only that the treasures of Mexico might reach Spain, and a portion enter his own exchequer to which Spain contributed. Had Spain or Naples paid England a monthly subsidy under any previous treaty, a French army would at once have been quartered on those countries. England justly required too of Spain, that French troops should not violate her neutrality, in order to invade Portugal, a point which England had a right to insist upon from any power honestly neutral, and far from "exorbitant." The colouring given by our author is therefore altogether of a wrong hue. He does not perceive in the concession of Spanish neutrality which Napoleon, with so much good policy permitted, how he himself justifies the conduct of England, having laid the object of the French emperor so plainly open. (*See the British state papers.*)—*Translator.*

[1] Spanish ships Medea, 42 guns; Fama, 36 guns; Clara, 36; and Mercedas, 36; the last blown up. The English ships were the Indefatigable, 44; Medusa, Amphion, and Lively, of 36 guns each.—*Translator.*

months' water, and six months' provisions. Their division was thus indicated. At Cadiz, there were fifteen sail; at Carthagena eight; and at Ferrol nine. Spanish troops were to be united near the points of embarkation, at the rate of four hundred and fifty men for each ship of the line, and two hundred for each frigate. Besides these, they were to prepare means of transport in ships of war armed *en flute*, in the proportion of four thousand tons for Cadiz; two thousand for Carthagena, and two thousand for Ferrol. It was agreed that admiral Gravina should have the superior command of the Spanish fleet, and correspond directly with the French minister Decrès. This was to state that he should receive his instructions from Napoleon himself, and Spanish honour might without blushing accept such a direction. Some political conditions accompanied these warlike stipulations. The subsidy naturally ceased on the day when hostilities were commenced by England against Spain. Further, the two nations agreed not to conclude a separate peace. France promised that Trinidad should be restored to Spain, and even Gibraltar, if the war was followed by a complete triumph.

The engagement taken by the court of Madrid was much above its means. It was so much above them, that in place of equipping thirty-two vessels, it could only reach the equipment of twenty-four, although manned by brave crews. If then the total of the forces of France, Spain, and Holland be taken, it may be considered that the three nations could unite about ninety-two sail of the line, of which sixty belonged to France, twenty-four to Spain, and eight to Holland. Still the flotilla must be reckoned as fifteen, which reduces to seventy-seven the effective line of battle-ships of the three nations. The English had eighty-nine perfectly armed, equipped, and experienced, in every thing superior to those of the allies, and they were preparing to carry them up in a short time to the number of a hundred. The advantage then was on their side. They could not be beaten but by a superiority of combination, which has never had any thing near as much influence at sea as on land.

Unhappily Spain, formerly very powerful in her naval forces, and much interested in being so still, on account of her vast colonies, found herself, as has been many times repeated, in absolute destitution. Her arsenals were abandoned, and contained neither timber, cordage, iron, nor copper. The magnificent establishments of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, were empty and deserted. They had neither materials nor workmen. The seamen, not very numerous in Spain since her commerce had been nearly reduced to the transport of the metallic specie, were become yet more scarce in consequence of the yellow fever, which ravaged all the coast, and made them fly to foreign countries, or to the interior. To this, if a great dearth of grain be added, and a financial distress increased by the loss of the galleons recently captured, an exact idea can scarcely be had of all the miseries which afflicted this country, formerly so great, and now so sadly fallen.

Napoleon, who had very often but vainly advised this country during the last peace to devote a part of its resources to the reorganization of its navy; Napoleon, even without the hope of being listened to, wished to make a last attempt upon the court. This time, in place of employing menaces as in 1803, he employed kindness and encouragement. He had recalled marshal Lannes from Portugal, to place him at the head of the grenadiers, that were designed to be the first to disembark in England. He had ordered general Junot to replace marshal Lannes in Portugal. He loved Junot, who had a good understanding from nature, too ardent a character, but a devotion without limit. He desired him to stop at Madrid, to see the prince of the peace there, the queen, and the king. Junot was to stir up the honour of the prince of the peace, to make him sensible that he had in his hands the fate of the Spanish monarchy, and that he stood between the character of a favourite disdained and detested, and that of a minister who profited by the favour of his master to elevate the power of his country. Junot was authorised to promise him all the kind regards of Napoleon, and even a principality in Portugal, if he served with zeal the common cause, and applied himself to impress a sufficient activity upon the Spanish administration. The envoy of Napoleon was afterwards to see the queen, to declare to her that her influence on the government was well known in Europe, or in other words, over the king and prince of the peace; that her personal honour was interested as much as the honour of the monarchy, in making great efforts, and obtaining successes; that if the Spanish power did not raise itself on the present occasion, she who was the all-powerful queen would be held personally responsible in the eyes of the world, and of her children, for the disorders which would have enfeebled and ruined the monarchy. Junot was in fact to use every means for inspiring the queen with just sentiments. As to the king, there was no need of doing any thing to inspire him with them, because he had none that were not excellent; but this feeble monarch was destitute of will and of attention. He was brutalised by his fondness for hunting, and his attachment to mechanical labour.

Junot was ordered to remain some time in Madrid before he proceeded to Portugal, and to act the character there of an ambassador extraordinary, while attempting some little re-animation of this degenerate court.

It became a question now to employ in the best mode possible, the resources of the three maritime nations, France, Holland, and Spain. The project of bringing back on a sudden a part of the naval force, more or less important, into the channel, a project already twice modified, occupied Napoleon unceasingly. But a great and sudden thought arose to draw off his attention for a moment.

Napoleon frequently received reports from general Decaen, the commandant of the French factories in India, who, since the renewal of the war, had retired to the Isle of France, and in concert with admiral Linois, caused great injury to the commerce of England. General Decaen, who had an ardent mind, and was very capable of a distinct command in an independent and hazardous situation, had formed connexions with the Mahrattas, as yet in a state of ill submission. He had procured some curious information upon the disposition of the princes recently subdued by

the English, and had acquired a conviction that six thousand French, disembarked with a sufficiency of warlike stores, soon joined by a mass of insurgents impatient to be rid of the yoke, would be able to shake the empire of England in India. It was Napoleon, as it may be remembered, who, in 1803, had placed general Decaen in this situation, and he had accepted it with ardour. But it was not a rash enterprise that Napoleon wished to attempt; to attempt something worth while it must be a grand expedition, worthy that of Egypt, capable of snatching from the English the important conquest they had made in the present century, their greatness and their glory. The distance rendered such an expedition very different from the expedition to Egypt. To carry in time of war thirty thousand men from Toulon to Alexandria was already a considerable operation; but to carry them from Toulon to the coast of India, doubling the Cape of Good Hope, was a gigantic enterprize. Napoleon thought, resting the point upon his own experience, that the immense extent of the ocean rendered encounters with an enemy a very rare thing, that it was possible with a good invention to dare the boldest movement, and to succeed without finding on the way an enemy very superior in number. It was thus that in 1798 he had sailed across the English fleet with some hundred vessels and an entire army, taken Malta, and landed at Alexandria, without encountering Nelson. It was thus that he hoped to secure the arrival of a fleet in the channel. The success of such enterprises required profound secrecy and great skill to deceive the British admiralty; but he had a well-disposed means to throw that body into mental confusion. Having troops assembled and ready to embark, wherever he had naval forces, at Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, Brest, and the Texel, he was constantly in a position to send out an army, without the English becoming acquainted with his intention, and without their being able to guess either its strength or destination. The project for a descent had this much of utility, that the attention of the enemy being unceasingly directed to that object, he would always believe such an expedition directed against Ireland or the coasts of England. The moment was, therefore, favourable for attempting one of those extraordinary expeditions, that Napoleon was so prompt to conceive and resolve upon. He thought, for example, that to take away India from England was a result sufficiently great for consenting to defer all his other projects, even that of the descent; and he was disposed to employ in that object all his naval forces. His calculations upon this subject were as follows. He had in the ports of their equipment, besides the squadrons ready to set sail, a reserve of old vessels little proper for active service. He had also in the crews, besides good seamen, novices very young, or conscripts but recently put on board ship. It was upon this double consideration that he established his plan. He would add to a certain number of new vessels all those that were out of the service, but which were still capable of making a voyage; these he would arm *en flute*, that is to say, he would take out their artillery and replace it with a large body of troops, complete the crews with men of every class taken in the ports, expedite thus the Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest fleets, which, without taking a single transport vessel, would be able to throw into India a very considerable army. He proposed to send from Brest twenty-one sail, Toulon thirteen, in all thirty-four, of which half would be old vessels, to these thirty-four adding twenty frigates, of which ten would be nearly unfit for service. These two fleets, sailing nearly at the same time, and making the Isle of France the place of rendezvous, were capable of carrying forty thousand men, soldiers as well as sailors. Upon arriving in India, the old vessels would be sacrificed, and those only preserved which were fit to navigate, which number might amount to fifteen vessels out of thirty-four, and ten frigates out of twenty. The crews were then to be divided. All the good seamen were destined to man the vessels that were preserved; while the indifferent seamen, but men well adapted to make soldiers, by turning them over into the skeleton regiments, would serve to complete the army disembarked. Napoleon supposed that it would require fourteen thousand or fifteen thousand seamen to man well the fifteen ships of the line and the ten frigates, which were to return to Europe. There would then be in India twenty-five or twenty-six thousand troops out of the forty thousand soldiers and seamen embarked in Europe, and a fleet of fifteen ships of the line would be brought back, excellent under every point of view, by the quality of the vessels, the selection of the crews, and the experience acquired by a long navigation. Nothing would have been lost, as far as the navy was concerned, but mere hulls unfit for service and fag ends of the equipments, and there would be left in India an army perfectly sufficient to conquer the English, above all, if it was commanded by a man as enterprising as general Decaen [1].

Napoleon, besides, proposed that three thousand troops should be embarked on board the Dutch fleet in the Texel; two thousand in a new naval division organizing at Rochefort; and four thousand Spaniards in the Spanish flotilla at Cadiz, which made a reinforcement of nine thousand men, and would carry up to the number of thirty-five thousand or thirty-six thousand, the number of soldiers in the army of general Decaen. It is extremely probable that India, having scarcely submitted, a similar force would have destroyed the British power there. As to the voyage, there was nothing less probable than an encounter with the English. It would have been difficult to escape them, if the squadrons of ships of the line had to trail after them some hundreds of transport vessels. But the old vessels, and the old frigates armed *en flute*, rendered dispensable that means of conveyance. This project rested, therefore, upon the principle of sacrificing the more indifferent or bad part of the navy, as well in men as materials, and be resigned to bring back only the more excellent portion. At that cost the miracle might be operated of transporting to India an army of thirty-six

[1] There were in India at this time above twenty thousand British troops of the line, and above a hundred thousand sepoy regiments, officered by men of the greatest experience, together with a fine body of European artillery, and all these, a most important thing, inured to the climate, and well acquainted with the country and its resources.—*Translator.*

thousand men. The sacrifice, moreover, was not as great as it appeared to be, because there is not a seaman who does not know that on the sea as on the land, but still more upon the sea, the quality of the force is every thing, and that more can be done with ten good vessels, than with twenty which are indifferent.

This project caused the momentary adjournment of the descent; but it was possible that it would favour the execution in a very extraordinary manner, because, after some time, the English, informed of the departure of the French fleets, would follow them, and thus leave unguarded the European seas, while the squadron returning from India with fifteen sail of the line and ten frigates, would be able to appear in the straits, where Napoleon, always ready at whatever moment the occasion offered, would be in a state to profit by the shortest favour of fortune. It is true that this last part of the combination implied double good fortune, in reaching India, and in returning, and fortune rarely favours a man to such a high point, however great he may be. For five weeks, Napoleon remained in suspension between the idea of sending this expedition to India, and passing the straits of Dover. The overturn of the English empire in India seemed a result so considerable, that he hoped to dispense by that with the risk his person and army would incur in an attempt so hazardous as the descent. He passed therefore an entire month in hesitating between the two combinations, and his correspondence gives proof of the fluctuation of his mind between these two extraordinary enterprises.

Nevertheless the Boulogne expedition carried the day. Napoleon regarded the blow as the more prompt, more decisive, and even as little less than infallible, if a French fleet should arrive on a sudden in the channel. He set his mind at work anew, and conceived a third combination, greater, deeper, and more plausible yet than the two preceding, to unite unknown to the English all his naval forces between Dover and Boulogne.

His plan was arranged during the first days of March, and orders sent off in consequence. It consisted, like that for the capture of Surinam, in drawing the English towards India and the West Indies, to which last the squadron of admiral Missiessy, that sailed on the 11th of January, had already directed their attention, then to return immediately into the European seas, with a union of force superior to every English squadron, whichever it might be. It was in fact the project of the preceding December, but enlarged and completed by the union of the Spanish forces. Admiral Villeneuve was to part with the first favourable wind, pass the straits, touch at Cadiz, and there join admiral Gravina with six or seven Spanish ships, besides the French ship the Aigle, then proceed to Martinique; if Missiessy was yet there, to join him, and await a new junction more considerable than all the others, that of Ganteaume. The last admiral, profiting by the first equinoctial gale that should drive off the English, was to sail from Brest with twenty-one vessels, the best in that arsenal, proceed off Ferrol, release the French division in that port, and the Spanish division which was also ready to sail, and to go to Martinique, where Villeneuve was to await him. After this general junction, which presented few real difficulties, he would have in Martinique twelve vessels under Villeneuve, six or seven under Gravina, five under Missiessy, and twenty-one under Ganteaume, not reckoning the Franco-Spanish squadron in Ferrol, that is to say, altogether about fifty or sixty sail of the line; an enormous force, of which the concentration had never before been seen at any period upon any sea. This time the combination was so complete, so well calculated, that it must produce in the breast of Napoleon the most lofty hopes. The minister Decrès himself agreed that it offered the greatest possible chances of success. To sail from Toulon was always possible during the mistral, and the last attempt of Villeneuve proved the fact. The junction at Cadiz with Gravina, if they gave the slip to Nelson, was easy, because the English had not yet judged it of any service to blockade that port. The squadron of Toulon thus carried up to seventeen or eighteen sail, was very nearly certain of arriving at Martinique. Missiessy had arrived without encountering any but merchant vessels, which he captured.

The most difficult point was to get out, and set sail from the road of Brest. But in March there was every reason to count upon an equinoctial gale. Ganteaume arriving before Ferrol, which was only blockaded by five or six English vessels, having twenty-one sail himself, would take away every idea of an action, rally without a blow the French division commanded by admiral Gourdon, and such of the Spaniards as were ready, and set sail for Martinique immediately. It could not enter the minds of the English, that the French dreamed of uniting upon such a single point as Martinique fifty or sixty vessels at one time. It was probable that their conjectures would be directed towards India. In any case, Ganteaume, Gourdon, Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy once assembled, those of the English squadrons which they might encounter, not more than twelve or fifteen vessels strong, would not brave fifty, and the return into the channel was certain. Then all the French forces would be found assembled between the shores of France and England, at the moment when the naval forces of England were going to the east, America, or India. Events soon proved that this grand combination was to be realized, even under the circumstance of only a middling execution.

All was carefully managed so as to keep the plan a profound secret. It was not confided to the Spaniards, who had engaged to follow in a docile manner any directions whatever from Napoleon. Villeneuve and Ganteaume were alone to know the secret among the admirals; but not at their departure, and only at sea, when they were no longer able to communicate with the land. Then the despatches, that they had orders to open in a certain latitude, would make them acquainted with the course which they were to follow. None of the captains of vessels had been initiated into the secret of the enterprise. They had only the points of rendezvous fixed for them in case of separation. None of the ministers were acquainted with the plan, except admiral Decrès. He was expressly commanded to correspond directly with Napoleon, and to write his despatches himself. The rumour of an expedition to India had spread through all the ports. They feigned to embark a good many

troops, when in reality the Toulon squadron had orders to take scarcely three thousand men, and that of Brest only seven thousand or eight thousand. It was prescribed to the admirals to leave half of this force in the West Indies to strengthen the garrisons, and to bring back to Europe four thousand or five thousand of the best men, to join in the Boulogne expedition.

The fleets by this means would be but slightly encumbered, manageable, and at their ease. They had all provisions for six months, in such a way as to be able to remain a long while at sea, without being obliged to enter a harbour any where. Couriers left for Ferrol and Cadiz, carrying orders to prepare themselves without delay, and to be always in a position to weigh anchor, because it was possible their blockade might be raised by an allied fleet, without being able to say which fleet or at what moment.

To all these precautions for deceiving the English, there was joined another not less calculated for the purpose, and this was the journey of Napoleon into Italy. He supposed that his fleets, leaving about the end of March, employing the month of April in reaching Martinique, the month of May in forming a junction, and the month of June to return, would be in the channel about the commencement of July. He might remain all this time in Italy, review the troops, give fêtes, conceal his profound plans under the appearance of a vain and sumptuous mode of living, then at the moment indicated, leave Italy secretly by posting, and in five days transport himself from Milan to Boulogne, and while he was thought to be still in Italy, strike the blow at England which he had menaced for so long a time. That blow she had awaited for two years, and now began to have faith in it no longer. Europe saw no more in the threat than a feint planned to keep the British nation agitated, and oblige it to exhaust itself in useless efforts. While they abandoned themselves to this idea, Napoleon, on the contrary, had, without cessation, increased his maritime forces, taking from the different depôts all that was required to augment the effective strength of his war battalions, and filling by means of the annual conscription the void thus made in the depôts. The army of Boulogne was thus reinforced by nearly thirty thousand men, without any one knowing it. He had always kept this army in such a state of activity, and so disposable, that it was not very possible to discover whether it was more or less effective. The opinion that it was a simple demonstration, destined to the object of rendering England uneasy, became every day more and more the dominant opinion.

All being thus disposed, with the firm determination to attempt the enterprise, and with a profound conviction of success, Napoleon proposed to journey into Italy. The pope had remained all the winter in Paris. He had at first thought to set out on his way about the middle of February, in order to arrive at his dominions. An abundance of snow falling in the Alps, had served as the excuse for his longer detention. Napoleon mingled so much kindness in his entreaties, that the pope gave way, and consented to defer his departure until the middle of March. Napoleon was not displeased to let Europe perceive the length of this visit, to render his intimacy with Pius VII. greater every day, and finally to keep him on the Paris side of the Alps, while the French agents made the preparations at Milan for the second coronation. The courts of Naples, Rome, and even of Etruria, did not see without regret the creation of a vast French kingdom in Italy; and if the pope had found the Vatican besieged by suggestions of every kind, perhaps he had been induced to show himself little favourable to it.

Pius VII., after becoming entirely in confidence with Napoleon, finished by avowing his secret wishes. He was charmed with the honours paid to him personally; honours which benefited religion through the good which his presence seemed to produce, and even that which the new emperor had accomplished in France to aid in the restoration of worship. But all saint as Pius VII. was, he was still a man, he was a prince; and the triumph of spiritual interests, while filling him with satisfaction, did not permit him to forget the temporal interests of the holy see, that were greatly suffering since the loss of the Legations. He had brought to Paris with him six cardinals, of which number one, cardinal Borgia, had died at Lyons. The others, especially the cardinals Antonelli and Pietro, were of the ultramontane party, and greatly in opposition to cardinal Caprara, who had too much intelligence and knowledge to agree with them. Thus they had brought the pope to conceal his proceedings from this cardinal, who in quality of legate ought to have been duly informed of all the negotiations proceeding in Paris. He certainly could not have taught them a mode of succeeding in their designs, because all that it was possible to do for the church Napoleon did spontaneously, and without being pressed to do. But this personage, full of experience and knowledge, would have dissuaded them from useless attempts, always to be regretted, because they afterwards became the causes of disputes and differences.

They commenced by dogmatising with Napoleon upon the four propositions of Bossuet, of which Louis XIV., towards the end of his life, had, it was said, promised the annulling. Napoleon was mild in manner, but inflexible in principle, and suffered them to see that there was nothing to expect in the revocation of the former organic articles. The mode of executing them remained to be settled. He was disposed to listen to any observations which they wished to present to him upon the subject. At first they spoke to him of the jurisdiction of the bishops over the ecclesiastics, of which they had often conferred, and which did not appear sufficiently complete to Pius VII.; to that Napoleon, settling his answer with M. Portalis, replied, that every spiritual offence was and should be left to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that all civil offences against the civil law would continue to be brought before the ordinary tribunals, because the priests were citizens, and under this relation would appeal to the common law. Then they spoke of the seminaries, of the smallness of the number of ministers of worship, of the religious edifices at last, neglected for twenty years and falling into ruin. They supposed that at least 36,000,000 f. would be required per annum for the necessities of religion, while they had only entered 13,000,000 f. in the budget, and this left a deficiency of 25,000,000 f. Napoleon

answered by an enumeration of what he had done in this respect, and of what he would still do in proportion to the augmentation of the revenues of the state. They conferred afterwards upon various other subjects, foreign to the organic articles and to their execution, and particularly of divorce, permitted by the new French laws. Napoleon, always in concert with M. Portalis, said that divorce appeared indispensable to their legislation, to repair certain disorders in morals, but that the priest remained free to refuse the religious benediction to the divorced who wished to contract a new marriage; that the conscience of the priests was not, therefore, violated; but that besides, this was not a matter that invaded the dogma, seeing that divorce existed in the ancient church. After the discussion of this subject, they spoke of the observation of Sundays and festival days, which, in spite of the re-establishment of the Gregorian calendar, had not been adopted generally enough among the people. Napoleon answered, that even towards the end of the last century, the manners, more powerful than the laws, had caused a relaxation, and that there was sometimes seen, before the revolution, workmen labouring on the Sunday; that penalties employed in such cases were of less value than examples; that the government applied itself always to give those which were good, and that the workmen paid by the state never laboured on holidays; that the Sunday was strictly observed by the country people, that the inhabitants of the towns only were wanting in its observation; and that in the towns to oblige the workmen to be idle, besides the inconvenience of employing a penal law, would be to give drunkenness and vice the time taken from labour; that to the utmost they had attempted every thing a religious but prudent policy permitted to be done.

They then touched upon another subject, that of education, and demanded for the clergy the right of superintending the schools. Napoleon replied, that he had chaplains in the Lyceums, chosen from among the priests in doctrinal conformity with the church. That these were, in fact, the ecclesiastical inspectors of the places of education, that they were able to designate to their bishops those in which religious instruction left any thing to be desired, but that there was not over these establishments of education any other authority than that of the state. Some conversation took place in relation to the bishops who were not in agreement with the holy see, and it was agreed to bring them back to that state of peace, voluntary or forced, in which Napoleon was resolved to make the entire of the clergy live. The series of questions of a spiritual nature were terminated by the discussion of a project, which without cessation had pre-occupied the court of Rome, this was, that the catholic church should be declared the dominant religion in France. Here Napoleon was immoveable. According to him that religion was already dominant by the fact, because it was the religion of the majority of the French, because it was that of the sovereign, because the great acts of the government, as the taking the crown, for example, had been surrounded by catholic pomps. But a declaration of the kind was likely to alarm all dissenting worshippers; he intended to assure perfect peace to all, and he would not admit that the catholic religion, which he had desired, and sincerely desired to re-establish, should operate as a diminution of security for any of the existing religions.

Upon all these points Napoleon showed extreme mildness of manner, but determined firmness of principle. They from thence arrived at the essential thing, which affected Rome more than any points of ecclesiastical discipline, this was the affair of the Legations. They digested a memorial that Pius VII. had himself sent to Napoleon, which related to the losses the holy see had experienced during a century past, as well in revenues as in territories. There was an enumeration too in this memorial of the different dues of the holy see formerly collected in all the catholic states, and which, under the influence of French feeling, had been either suppressed or diminished in France, Austria, and even Spain itself. There was recalled to recollection the manner in which the holy see had been disappointed of its right of return to the possession of the duchy of Parma, by the extinction of the house of Farnese; the more early privation of the county of Venaissin, ceded to France, was then brought forward; the most serious of all the losses was cited, that of the Legations, transferred to the Italian republic. Thus reduced, the holy see was not able, it was said, to meet the obligatory expenses of the catholic religion in all parts of the world. It was unable either to place the cardinals in a position to sustain their dignity, to support the foreign missions, or to provide for the defence of its weak states. They reckoned upon the new Charlemagne to equal the munificence of the ancient. Napoleon was placed in complete embarrassment before a demand so directly made. He had promised nothing to bring the pope to Paris; but at every period of his success, he had given out the hope in a general manner that he would ameliorate materially the situation of the holy see. To give back the Legations to the pontifical court was impossible, or at least it was to betray the republic he had established in a very odious way, the founder of which he had been, and of which he was about to become the monarch. It had been to destroy all the hopes of the Italian patriots, who saw in this new state the commencement of an independent existence for their country. But he had at his disposal the duchy of Parma, that he would neither grant to the house of Sardinia as an indemnity for Piedmont, nor to Spain for the aggrandisement of the kingdom of Etruria, and which he reserved at the moment for a family portion. It would have been prudent, without doubt, to give it as an indemnity to the house of Sardinia, or as well to add it to Etruria, obliging this state to indemnify the house of Sardinia with the Siennese. It would thus have been possible at one stroke to secure peace with Russia, and give Spain the greatest possible pleasure. But if the management of Russia were given up, that had withdrawn its *chargé d'affaires*, and the satisfaction of Spain, whose inertness had not long been awakened by good conduct, it had been a destination worthy the proud designs of Napoleon to give the duchy of Parma to the pope. In granting it to the holy see, Napoleon would overturn most of the arguments used about his designs in Italy; he

would destroy the principal argument which served Austria in her object of uniting a third coalition in Europe; and what was not of less importance, he would attach the pope to him for ever, and have prevented the sad rupture with the holy see, that at a later period caused him a considerable moral injury, a rupture which had in reality no other origin than the discontent, ill dissimulated, of the court of Rome upon that occasion. All this it was of more value to arrange than to reserve Parma, as Napoleon determined to do, for a gift to his family. Suffering the alliance of Prussia to escape him in 1804 and in 1805, sending back the pope covered with honour, but finally aggrieved as regarded his interests, constituted, in our opinion, the first essential faults of that powerful policy, of which the error was, the reckoning only with itself, and never with others.

Napoleon took advantage of that of which they did not directly speak, namely, the Legations, to make the simple and easy reply arising out of the situation of the thing itself. He was unable to betray a state which had chosen him for its chief—a reason legitimate and well-founded, as it affected the Legations; while he announced that he intended to ameliorate at a later period the situation of the holy see. He commanded cardinal Fesch to enter into an explanation with the pope. He was willing at the moment to lend his holiness pecuniary aid; he afforded him a glimpse at a time which was not far off, of new accessions of territory, by the aid of which the pope might be indemnified. Besides this, he was sincere; because, as to such accessions, he discovered them at a future time rapidly approaching. He saw, in fact, coming war reawakened upon the continent, and Italy this time wholly conquered, Venice taken from Austria, Naples taken from the Bourbons; and said to himself that he should find easily among all these a means of satisfying the pope.

But these good intentions deferred left a present displeasure, that was soon to become a source of vexation.

Napoleon and the pope quitted each other without being as mutually discontented as the demands made and refused might have given ground to apprehend. The pope, in place of the ambuscade which insensate persons announced was laid for him upon quitting Rome, had found in Paris a magnificent welcome, augmented by the presence of a religious impulse, and in fact he occupied in France a place worthy of the grandest eras of the church. All things considered, if his interested counsellors were dissatisfied, he returned home contented himself. He exchanged with the emperor and empress the most affectionate farewell, and went away loaded with rich presents. He set out from Paris on the 4th of April, 1805, in the midst of a concourse of people still more considerable than at his first arrival. He was to remain some days at Lyons on his way, to celebrate the feast of Easter.

Napoleon had disposed every thing to depart on his journey to Italy at the same time. After having given his last orders to the fleet and army, and reiterated his entreaties to the court of Spain, that all might be got ready at Ferrol and Cadiz; after having left to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès the government of the empire, not ostensibly, but in fact, he proceeded to Fontainebleau on the 1st of April, where he was to stay for two or three days. He left this place enchanted with his designs, and full of confidence in their success. He had already a first pledge in the lucky departure of admiral Villeneuve. This officer had finally set sail on the 30th of March with a favourable wind, and they had lost sight of the heights of Toulon without the fear of encountering the English. A single contrary incident prevented this satisfaction from being complete. On the 1st of April, the equinox had not yet been felt at Brest; calm and clear weather prevailed, which was not of a nature to keep off the English, or hide from them the sailing of the fleet, rendering the departure of Ganteaume impossible. Had he been clear of Brest, the success of the junctions appeared to be no more doubtful; and it must be supposed a real phenomenon in the seasons, that the equinox did not bring a single gale of wind during the whole month of April.

Napoleon quitted Fontainebleau on the 3rd, proceeding by Troyes, Châlons, and Lyons, pushing on rapidly before the pope, in order that the two progresses should not be mutual obstacles on the road.

While he thus proceeded towards Italy, given up to his grand ideas, or suffering his time to be diverted by receiving the homage of the people, Europe, differently agitated, was at work upon the third coalition. England alarmed for her existence; Russia wounded in her pride; Austria strongly thwarted by what was preparing to be done in Italy; Prussia hesitating without cessation between contrary fears, knitting, or suffering to be knit, a new European league, that, far from being more fortunate than those which preceded, was to secure for Napoleon a colossal greatness, unhappily too disproportionate to be durable.

The Russian cabinet, regretting the errors of which the vivacity of its young sovereign had caused the committal, had hoped to find in the answers of France a pretext for retracing its former unreflecting conduct. The pride of Napoleon, that would not give even a specious explanation about the occupation of Naples, the refusal to indemnify the house of Savoy, or the invasion of the house of Hanover, considering these questions as matters in which he might have been able to indulge a friendly, but not a hostile court—this pride had disconcerted the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and had forced it, spite of itself, to recall M. Oubril. The emperor Alexander, who had not character enough to support the consequences of a first movement, was disconcerted, and nearly intimidated. M. Strogonoff, M. Nowosiltzoff, and M. Czartoryski, were firmer, but perhaps less penetrating, and surrounding him, had made him feel the necessity of defending the dignity of his crown in the eyes of Europe. They had returned to the ideas so little of a practical but seducing character, of a supreme arbitration, exercised in the name of justice and sound law. Two powers, France and England, troubled the repose of Europe, and oppressed it for the interests of their rival policy. It was necessary for Russia to place herself at the head of the nations thus ill treated, proposing to them a common plan of pacification, in which their rights should be guaranteed, and the litigated points between France and England regulated. It was required

to rally Europe around this plan, in order to make proposals in its name to England and France, to arrange itself afterwards with that one of the two powers which adopted it against the power refusing, in order to subdue the last by force, and the common law of the whole world. Men less young, less fed upon theories, would have seen in such a scheme simply a coalition with England and a part of Europe against France. The scheme, in effect, conceived in a manner wholly favourable to England, that flattered Russia, and unfavourable to France, that flattered her but little, could not but be tolerably acceptable to Pitt, and unacceptable to Napoleon, being followed sooner or later by war against him. It led to the third coalition. The propositions presented to the emperor Alexander were mingled with so much of the specious and brilliant in ideas, each being at the same time even generous and true, that the lively imagination of the young Czar, at first affrighted with that which they proposed to him, was finally attracted and seduced to such a point as made him set his hand to the work immediately.

Before recounting the negotiations which followed this plan, it is needful to lay open the scheme of European arbitration, and to indicate its author. It will be seen by the gravity of the consequences that they merit to be known.

One of those adventurers, sometimes endowed with distinguished qualities, who wished to carry into the north the spirit and knowledge of the south, had gone into Poland to find there employment for his talents. He was an abbé, called Piatoli, and had been at first attached to the last king of Poland. After the different partitions, he had passed into Courland, and from Courland into Russia. He was one of those active minds that, unable to elevate themselves to the government of states, placed too much above them, conceive plans that are ordinarily of a chimerical character, but not always to be disdained. The man now spoken of had meditated much upon the state of Europe, and he owed to chance, placed in relation with the young friends of Alexander, his opportunity of exercising there an occult influence, but sufficiently considerable to make prevalent a portion of his conceptions in the resolutions of the powers. Subaltern thinkers rarely have such an honour. The abbé Piatoli had the sad advantage of furnishing in 1805 some of the principal ideas, which terminated by their being admitted into the treaties of 1815. Under this claim he is worthy of attention, and the ideas which we give as his are not on supposition, because they are contained in the secret memoirs then remitted to the emperor Alexander [1]. This foreigner finding in the prince Czartoryski a more thoughtful mind, and one more grave than belonged to the other young personages who ruled over Russia, was more intimately associated with him, and their views had become altogether common, to such a point, that the plan proposed to the emperor appertained nearly as much to the one as to the other. The following was this plan.

The ambition of the northern powers, and the conquests of the French revolution, had for thirty years overturned Europe, and oppressed every nation of the second order. It was necessary to provide for this by a new organization, and by the establishment of a new law of nations, placed under the protection of the great European confederation. To this end there was need of a power perfectly disinterested, which made its own disinterestedness partaken by all the others, and which would labour for the accomplishment of the proposed work.

A single power had in itself all the requisites for this noble end, and that power was Russia. Its real ambition ought to be, if it comprehended its character, not to acquire territory, as England, Prussia, or Austria would, but moral influence. For a great state that influence was every thing. After a long influence, territorial acquisitions would come. This Italian had reason on his side. By appearing to protect in Europe, against that which they denominated revolution, the princes great or small, who had it in fear, Russia gained Poland. It will not be impossible that hence she may yet gain Constantinople. At first comes influence, next conquest follows. Russia was then to propose to all the courts, not a war against France, which would neither be just nor politic, but "an alliance of mediation for the pacification of Europe." They would not certainly have any trouble to make Austria and England adhere to this; but every thing was dangerous in the concurrence of Prussia. It was needful therefore to draw out of its interested hesitations this crafty court, or tread it well under the feet of the European armies, if it refused to concur in the common object. It implied no humouring either towards Prussia or any other state which should resist the proposed plan, "because they would have deserted the cause of the human race."

All the states of Europe, save France, once united, would form three great masses of force; one in the south composed of Russians and English, coming into Italy in their vessels, designed to mount with the Neapolitans the Italian peninsula, to join itself to a column of one hundred thousand Austrians operating in Lombardy; a mass towards the east, composed of two grand Austrian and Russian armies, marching by the valley of the Danube towards Suabia and Switzerland; finally, a mass in the north, composed of Russians, Prussians, Swedes, and Danes, descending perpendicularly from the north to the south on the Rhine. These three grand masses of force were to act independently the one of the other, in order to avoid the inconvenience of coalitions, which got themselves beat by attempting to act in a concert that is impossible. Each of the three was to direct itself as a separate army, having only to think of its own security, and its own separate action. It was from the desire of combining their movements, that the archduke Charles and Suwarrow had met with the disaster of Zurich.

These three masses of force thus formed, they were to speak in the name of a common congress, representing the "alliance of the mediation." They would offer to France conditions compatible with its natural greatness, conditions to which they would have previously brought England to agree, and they would not go to war except in case of a refusal. The conditions would be these; the treaties of Luneville and of Amiens, but be it well understood, as explained by Europe. One is able, in other

[1] There exists in France a copy of these memoirs.

respects, to conceive a grand idea of the French power at this period, if only from observing the designs which were formed by its jealous enemies.

France kept the Alps and the Rhine, that is to say, Savoy, Geneva, the Rhenish provinces, Mayence, Cologne, Luxemburg, and Belgium. Piedmont was to be restored. The new state created in Lombardy was not to be destroyed, to restore the shreds to Austria, but to be employed in constituting Italy independent. For this view they would even demand of Austria that she should abandon Venice. Switzerland foreseeing the organization given it by Napoleon, would be closed against the French troops, and declared in a perpetual neutrality. It would be the same with Holland. France in a word, maintained in its grand limits of the Alps and the Rhine, would be obliged to evacuate Italy entirely, Holland, and Switzerland, without counting Hanover, that the war ceasing, would not be longer kept in occupation.

In return for these concessions, exacted on the part of France, England was to be obliged to evacuate Malta, to restore such colonies as she had captured, and even to second the French in another enterprize against St. Domingo, because Europe had an interest in snatching this magnificent territory from the barbarities of the revolted negroes. They would, in fine, oblige all the nations to agree to an equitable maritime code. As a last condition, all the courts would acknowledge Napoleon emperor of the French.

Certainly, if Russia had been powerful enough to make Austria consent to the independence of Italy, and England to the independence of the seas, Napoleon had been highly culpable in refusing the proposed conditions. But far from abandoning Venice to the benevolent organizers of a new Europe, Austria was impatient to return to Milan, and to advance herself in Suabia. England intended to keep Malta, and not to acknowledge the rights of neutrals. If, therefore, Napoleon was obstinate in retaining, as there is no doubt he was, Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland, to use for his own advantage the countries which his enemies wished to constitute against him, his ambition may certainly stand excused in the face of that of the other European governments.

This design, conceived at first with sincerity, and from generous intentions, had been in all points equitable, if every body would have accepted it in its entirety. But it must be in the hands of a hypocritical coalition, a pretext to bring back France to a refusal, that would again place Europe in arms. Facts soon occurred to prove this true.

If France refused, which was possible, they must act against her in a military manner. It was necessary in that case sooner to hide than publish the intention to change the government, humour her pride, secure the purchasers of the national domains, promise to the army the preservation of its grades (all which was done in 1814), and if the fatigue of a warlike and agitated government recalled the public opinion in France to the ancient dynasty, then only to seek to re-establish it, because this dynasty, owing its restoration to Europe, would content itself with much more ease than the family of Bonaparte, with the little state which they wished to leave it.

War was capable of offering different chances. If it were only half fortunate, they would take from France Italy and Belgium; if it were completely so, they would take from France the Rhenish provinces, that is to say, the territory comprised between the Meuse and the Rhine. It would, however, be necessary not to forget the fault committed against Louis XIV., and keep clear of renewing the haughtinesses of the pensionary Heinsius, because France, when too ill-treated, will never be at rest. It would therefore preserve her something among her actual conquests in drawing the line from Luxemburg to Mayence, and in conceding besides the fortress of Mayence, that which is denominated Rhenish Bavaria. It will be seen that the combinations of this policy, not having been fingered by Pitt, did not carry the impress of a passionate hatred, like those which prevailed ten years afterwards.

In this double hypothesis of a war, more or less fortunate, Europe would be distributed in the following manner.

It was of the utmost importance to guard against that French nation, endowed with "such dangerous talents," and a character so enterprising. In order to do this, it was necessary to surround her with powerful states, capable of self-defence. It was necessary at first to reinforce Holland, and with that view to give it Belgium, to make the two countries that which was called "the kingdom of the two Belgiums," intended to be granted to the house of Orange, that had suffered so much in consequence of the French revolution. Prussia was maintained where she was upon the Rhine; perhaps there would be restored to her the small provinces that she had added to the French republic, such as the Duchy of Cleves and Gueldres, and as much as possible she was to be established in Westphalia around Holland, to separate her from all contact with France. Still in virtue of the principle of disinterestedness imposed upon great courts, a principle, without which it would be impossible to establish Europe on a durable basis, little would be given to Prussia, with the view of having the power of organizing Germany and Italy in a convenient fashion. After the kingdom of the two Belgiums, created on the north of France, the kingdom of Piedmont would be created on the south and east, under the name of the subalpine kingdom, and they would adjudge it to the house of Savoy, then dethroned, which had suffered yet more than the house of Orange in this common cause of kings. They would not restore him Savoy, but give him the whole of Piedmont, all Lombardy, even the Venetian states, taken with this intention from Austria, by means of the indemnification which would follow. Finally, to this vast territory they would add Genoa. The subalpine kingdom, forming thus the most considerable state of Italy, would be capable of holding the balance between France and Austria, and serve at a later period as the foundation of Italian independence.

Italy, that fine and interesting country, would be constituted separately, in such a mode as to enjoy that existence so proper for it, and so vainly desired by its people. To unite it in one entire body was at that time impossible.

They would therefore compose it of several states united in a federation bond, a bond sufficiently strong to render the common action as prompt as it would be facile. Besides the subalpine kingdom, comprehending the whole of Upper Italy from the maritime as far as the Julian Alps, and having two ports, such as Venice and Genoa, there would be the kingdom of the Two Sicilies preserved in its actual limits, which would be placed on the other extremity of the Peninsula; in the centre would be found the pope, to whom the Legations would be restored, enjoying a perpetual neutrality, and as the elector of Mayence in the Germanic body, having the functions of the chancellor of the confederation; in the centre there would still be the kingdom of Etruria left to Spain; then either in the interstices of these states, or at the extremities, would be the republic of Lucca, the order of Malta, the republic of Ragusa and of the Seven Islands. The Italian body in its federal organization would have a head or chief as the Germanic body had, but not elective. The king of Piedmont and of the Two Sicilies would alternately enjoy that dignity.

This was, without doubt, a generous and wise combination, for which France would have been bound to impose sacrifices upon herself, if the young heads that governed Russia had been capable of determining seriously and strongly upon a great measure.

Savoy taken from the crown of Sardinia, was not to be given to France, but with the Valteline and the Grisons to be converted into a Swiss canton. Switzerland divided into cantons would have been united to Germany as one of the confederated states.

The Germanic empire was to be submitted to a system of government entirely new. It was oppressed alternately by Austria and Prussia, that disputed their domination. These two powers would be placed out of the confederation, in which they played only the character of the heads of an ambitious party. The Germanic body thus delivered over to itself, diminished by these two great powers, but increased by the additions of the kingdom of the two Belgiums and Switzerland, freed from all vexatious influence, having in view only the interest of Germany, would be no more drawn, in spite of itself, into wars unjust, or foreign to its true interests. The crown would cease to be elective. The principal states of the confederation would have, by turns, the supreme direction, as it was proposed should be the case in Italy. Then would be reinforced, by means of new territorial limitations, the states of Baden, Wurtemburg, and Bavaria. The quarrel, always disturbing to the empire, that existed between Bavaria and Austria, would be terminated by giving the frontier of the Inn to the latter power.

The three great states of the continent, France, Prussia, and Austria, would be then separated the one from the other by three grand independent confederations; the Germanic, the Swiss, and the Italian, thus connecting themselves with each other from the Zuider Zee as far as the Adriatic.

In supposing these different combinations sound, and practicable in effect, we scarcely know how to avoid these observations; that to cut off Austria and Prussia from the Germanic body was not to set free that body, because these two ambitious powers remaining without, and unconnected, would have acted towards it as absolute states placed around one which is free, or as Frederic and Catharine around Poland; they would have divided and agitated it; in place of merely wishing to exercise a predominant influence, they would lean towards its conquest. The true independence of Germany, therefore, consisted in a strong organization of the diet, in an equitable partition of voting between Austria and Prussia, of such a nature that the confederation should be able to hold the balance between them. In addition to those European arrangements which would not render Prussia the natural enemy of France, (as was done in 1815, by giving that power the Rhenish provinces,) the two German powers remaining rivals, but held in equilibrium by the diet, Germany would be free, that is, would be capable of making its resolutions lean to the side of its true interests.

To suppress the power of election for the imperial crown, would not be a step of much value, at least so it would appear. Although for two centuries this crown has not passed away from the house of Austria, the election was, nevertheless, a bond of dependence, which laid that house under an obligation to the states of Germany. It is sometimes highly useful to make the great dependent upon the suffrage of the lesser powers, when anarchy cannot be expected to result from such a dependence. Germany, constituted as it had been in 1803 by Napoleon, with some votes given to the Catholics, in order by that to re-establish a balance, too much changed at the expense of Austria, presented an arrangement better and more natural than that which was devised by the authors of the new European organization.

Although disinterestedness was the essential principle of the proposed plan, this same disinterestedness might go so far as not to acquire, and content itself with a better arrangement of Europe as a unique indemnity for the expense of the war, but it was not to be expected that it should go so far as to make sacrifices at a loss. They would, therefore, owe an indemnity to Austria for the states of Venice, of which they wished to demand the renunciation on her part. In consequence they gave Austria Moldavia and Wallachia, in order that she might thus extend her territory as far as the Black Sea, and secure herself against the future danger of being blockaded by Russia.

The Ottoman empire was maintained unchanged, save in regard to certain restrictions, that they would afterwards make known.

The north remained to be considered. There was much to be done in its regard, according to the singular organizers of Europe, who worked with so much freedom upon the map of the world. The frontier which separated Prussia from Russia was bad. Poland was divided between these two powers. In the sight of the abbé Piatoli, and in that of the young personages whom he inspired with his policy, in that of prince Czartoryski above all, even with Alexander, the dismemberment of Poland was a great outrage. Alexander, in his youth idle, and oppressed in the time of Paul, had

often said in the midst of his heart's outpourings that the dismemberment of Poland was a crime of his forefathers, and that he should be happy to make reparation for it. But how was Poland to be renewed? How placed? a state cut off and isolated between the rival states which had destroyed it. There existed one mode, which was to reconstruct it entirely, to render back to it all the parts of which it was formerly composed, and to give it afterwards to the emperor of Russia, who would grant to it independent institutions, in such a fashion that Poland, destined in the ancient ideas of Europe to serve as a barrier to Germany against Russia, would be rather the advanced guard of Russia against Germany. Such was the dream of these young politicians, such was the ambition with which they nourished Alexander. This great indignation against the outrage of the last century, this noble disinterestedness imposed upon all the courts to repress the ambition of France, had therefore, for the definitive end, to reform Poland, that it might be given to Russia! This was not the first time that, under the vain-glorious virtues, offered with ostentation to the world's esteem, great vanity and great ambition have been concealed. This court of Russia, which at that time carried to the highest point the affectation of equity and disinterestedness, that pretended from the height of the Pole to give a lesson to England and to France, was thinking, therefore, in reality, of the complete possession of Poland! However, it concealed amid its designs a feeling that must be honoured, that of prince Czartoryski, who, not seeing at the moment any possibility of re-establishing Poland by the hands of Poles alone, wished in default of them, to serve the cause by the hands of the Russians. This at least was a legitimate object; and it is not possible to reproach him with but one thing, often perceived by the Russians, and more than once denounced to the emperor Alexander, that he thought less of the interests of Russia than those of his original country, and in this view would push his master into an ill-calculated war. The abbé Pistoli, a long while attached to Poland, partook in all these ideas. It was difficult, nevertheless, to propose to "this alliance of mediation," founded on the principle of disinterestedness; it was difficult to propose to such an alliance the abandonment of Poland to Russia; but there was a means of obtaining that object. Prussia loving peace and the profit of a neutrality would not, it was probable, consent to declare herself. Then to punish her refusal, they would march over her body, and take from her Varsovia and the Vistula; and with these large portions of ancient Poland, reunited to those already in the possession of Russia, they would constitute the new Poland of which Alexander should be the king and legislator.

To these ideas there were some others joined, as accessaries to the plan, sometimes singular in themselves, and sometimes just and generous.

They would oblige England to restore Malta to the order. Russia would abandon Corfu, which from that time would figure among the seven islands. England had taken India; that it would be necessary to abandon to her; but they would be able to draw from Egypt an immense aid towards civilization, general commerce, and the balance of the seas. They would take it from the Porte, and give it over to France in order that she might charge herself with its civilization. They would form an oriental kingdom, which should be placed under the paramount sovereignty of France. There they would place the Bourbons to reign, if at the peace Napoleon was maintained upon the throne of France, and Napoleon if the Bourbons were re-established on their former throne. They would restore to the Porte the Barbary states; they would even aid it to reconquer them, in order that piracy might be abolished, a barbarism dishonourable to Europe. Finally, there were certain possessions contrary to the nature of things, although sanctioned by time and conquest, that it would be humane and wise to alter. For example, Gibraltar served the English to keep up in Spain a contraband trade, shameful and corrupting for the nation; the islands of Jersey and Guernsey aided the English in fomenting civil war in France; Memel in the hands of Prussia was on the territory of Russia, a species of Gibraltar in fraud. They would, if it was possible, through the means of certain compensations, bring the possessors to renounce the posts and places of which such a censurable use was made.

Spain and Portugal were to be reconciled and united by a federal tie, which placed them under the shelter of French influence on one side, and of English influence on the other. It was necessary to oblige England to repair the wrongs that she had done towards Spain, to weigh upon her, so as to force her to restore the captured galleons, and in thus conducting the mediation, to snatch the court of Madrid, which desired nothing more ardently, from the overwhelming tyranny of France.

To complete this great work of European organization, the emperor of Russia was to address himself to all the learned men of Europe, and to request from them a code regulating the rights of nations, comprehending a new maritime law. It was, they said, inhuman and barbarous, that a nation should declare war without having first submitted to the arbitration of a neighbouring disinterested state, and above all, that one nation should commence hostilities against another without a previous declaration of war, as had come to pass in regard to England and Spain, and that innocent merchants should find themselves ruined or deprived of their liberty by such a species of ambuscade. It was intolerable yet more, that neutral nations should be the victims of the rage of rival powers, and be unable to pass over the seas without being exposed to the consequences of a contest to which they were perfect strangers. The honour of this grand reforming court exacted that all these evils should be provided against by international laws. Prizes would be granted to the learned who should propose on this subject the best system of the rights of nations.

It was by this medley of odd ideas, some of an elevated character, others purely ambitious in their objects, these wise, those chimerical, that they exalted the brain of the young emperor, fickle, lively, as vain of his honest but fugitive intentions, as he would be, if they were all of the most approved worth. He believed himself really called to regenerate Europe; and if he sometimes interrupted himself in his fine dreams, it was in thinking of a

great man who domineered in the west, and who was not of the humour to leave him to his work of regeneration, neither without him nor against him. Those who observed Alexander closely, observed, although his spirit was shaken at the idea, that he foresaw war with Napoleon, as the last and probable conclusion of all his plans.

This strange conception did not merit to be related at such a length, no more than the thousand propositions with which the framers of projects often overburden the courts which have the weakness to listen to them, if it had not entered into the head of Alexander and of his friends, and what is more serious, had it not become the text of all the negotiations which followed, to serve finally as the foundation of the treaties of 1814.

One thing is worthy of remark. It was a reproach at this epoch that the French revolution had promised liberty, independence, and happiness to every people without giving them, and thus had broken its word with mankind. But here we have absolute power at work. Young, spirited men, some honest and sincere, others purely ambitious, all educated in the school of philosophers, united by their birth, and uniformity of tastes, around the heir of the greatest despotic empire in the world, are taken with the idea of rivalling the French revolution, and of performing its generous and popular intentions. This revolution, which according to them had not even procured liberty for France, because it had given her a master, and that had been of no more worth to other nations, than causing them a humiliating dependence upon the French empire, this revolution they would confound by opposing to it a European regeneration, founded upon an equitable distribution of territories, and a new law of nations. It would have an independent Italy, a free Germany, a Poland reconstituted. Every great power would be restrained by useful counterpoises. France itself would be, not humiliated, but brought back to a respect for the rights of others. The abuses of war would disappear on land and sea; piracy would be abolished; the ancient highway of commerce would be re-established through Egypt; science finally would be called in to write down a public law of nations. All this was not only libellously written down by an editor of memoirs, but seriously proposed to all the courts, and discussed with Pitt, the least chimerical of mankind. We know to-day, we who are forty years old and more, what has become of all those philanthropic views of absolute power. The inventors of these schemes, beaten, disconcerted for ten years by that which they wished to destroy, once victors, in 1814, made neither a code of the law of nations, nor a code of maritime law; they did not free Italy, nor Germany, nor Poland. Malta and Gibraltar have not ceased to belong to the English; and the demarcations of Europe, traced according to the interests of the passing moment, without any calculation about the future, are the least wise that it is possible to imagine them.

However, not to anticipate on the sequel of this history—to say how all these ideas became common to the friends of Alexander and to himself, would be a useless detail. It appears certain, that they were deeply penetrated with them, both the one and the other, and that they promised to make them the basis of the Russian policy. The prince Czartoryski, seeing here a new chance for the re-constitution of Poland, very ardently desired to carry it into execution. He had become, since the retreat of M. de Woronzoff into the country, from the simple adjoint to the minister of foreign affairs, the directing minister of that department. M. Nowosiltzoff and Strogonoff, the adjoints, one of justice, the other of the interior, dedicated themselves to very different cares than those apparently under their charge; they occupied themselves with their young colleague and the emperor to set the world upon a new basis. It was resolved that the one of their number possessed of most dexterity, M. Nowosiltzoff, should be sent to London to confer with Pitt, and make him agree to the designs of the court of Russia. It was necessary to convert the ambitious British cabinet, to bring it to the disinterested views of the projected design, in order to be able to found that which they called "the alliance of mediation," and in the name of this alliance, to speak to France in such a manner as to be heard. A cousin of M. Strogonoff set out for Madrid, in the double object of pacifying England and Spain, and of binding together Spain and Portugal by indissoluble ties. It was decided that M. Strogonoff should visit London before going to Madrid, in order to commence in that capital his conciliatory mission. In the judgment of all Europe, the proceedings of the British government towards the commerce of Spain had been considered unjust and odious. He was to state, that if England did not become more rational in its conduct, it should be left to engage alone against France, and that Russia would enter herself, with all the continental powers, into a neutrality fatal to Great Britain.

The two young Russians charged to obtain the adoption from other powers of the policy of their cabinet, set themselves on the route for London towards the close of April, 1804. M. Nowosiltzoff, presented at the English court by the Russian ambassador, Woronzoff, brother of the chancellor in retirement, was received with a distinction and with attentions fitting to make an impression upon a young statesman admitted, for the first time, to the honour of treating upon the great affairs of Europe. It is much oftener harshness and pride than subtilty that characterize the diplomatists of England. Still lord Harrowby, and more particularly Pitt, with whom the Russian envoy entered at once into a conference, were both soon able to perceive with what sort of persons they had to transact business, and conducted themselves accordingly. Old Pitt, old by character much more than years, rendered supple by the danger, all haughty as he was, esteemed himself but too fortunate to find again an alliance upon the continent, to be very difficult in his negotiation. He was as complaisant as it was needful for him to be towards young personages destitute of experience, and feeding themselves upon chimerical notions. He listened to the singular propositions of the Russian cabinet, appeared to welcome them with great consideration, but modified them as he found it convenient to suit his own political views, took care not to repel any thing, but limited himself to postponing until the time of a general peace any thing that was incompatible with the interests of British policy. He returned the propositions of the Rus-

sian envoy, writing in relation to them his own observations[1]. At first Pitt consented to be browbeaten by the young Russian envoy; he suffered him to reproach English ambition, the harshness of its proceedings, and its usurping system, which served as a pretext for the usurping system of France. He suffered him to say, that in order to form a new alliance, it must be grounded upon a great disinterestedness on the part of all the contracting powers. The head of the British cabinet, thus become alive to the subject, approved strongly of all the ideas of the ambassador of Alexander, and declared that it was necessary to exhibit effectually the most perfect separation from any personal views, if they would tear off the mask with which the ambition of France was concealed; that it would be indispensably needful that the allies should not appear to think of themselves, but of the enfranchisement of Europe, oppressed by a barbarous and tyrannical power. The gravity of men, and the seriousness of the interests of which they treat, do not hinder them from giving very often a spectacle but too puerile. Is it not, in effect, something very puerile to see diplomatists representing the ambitions that have agitated the world for ages, reproaching France with her insatiable avidity! As if the English minister had wished in this any thing more than Malta, India, and the dominion of the sea! As if the Russian minister had desired any thing besides Poland and a dominant influence on the continent! How lamentable to hear the heads of states address each other seriously with similar reproaches! Doubtless, Napoleon was much too ambitious for his own interest, and more particularly for that of France; but Napoleon considered, if it may be so said, in his moral causes, was he any thing more than the reaction of the French power against the usurpations of the European courts in the last century, against the partitions of Poland and the conquest of the Indies! Ambition is the vice or virtue of all nations; the vice, when it torments the world without doing any good; the virtue, when it agitates and civilizes it. In this point of view, the ambition of which the nations have still the least to complain, whatever they have suffered, is that of France. There is not one of the countries traversed by her armies which France has not left better and more enlightened.

It was then agreed between Pitt and M. Nowosiltzoff that the new alliance should profess the greatest disinterestedness, in order to render more evident still the insatiable cupidity of the French emperor. In admitting that it would be very useful to disembarrass Europe of this formidable personage, it was still acknowledged that it would be imprudent to announce any intention of imposing a new government upon France. They would wait until the country itself should pronounce; secondly, if it should itself be disposed to shake off the yoke of the imperial government; above all, take great care to assure to the heads of the army the preservation of their rank, and to the proprietors of the national domains the preservation of their property. All the proclamations addressed to the French nation were to carry the most tranquillizing assurances upon this subject. Pitt even went as far as to regard this precaution so important, that he said he was ready to make, with English money, a provision (*une provision*, this was his own expression,) to indemnify the emigrants remaining around the Bourbons; and thus take away from them every motive for alarming the proprietors of the national property. Pitt dreamed therefore of the famous indemnity to the emigrants twenty years before it was voted by the parliament of France. In willing to indemnify such pretensions, he could not assuredly have known what he engaged himself to do; but in showing himself disposed to attempt it at the expense of the British treasury, he proved what an immense price England attached to the fall of Napoleon, who had become so menacing an object in her sight.

The idea of uniting an imposing mass of force, on the strength of which they could treat before fighting, was naturally admitted by Pitt with extreme eagerness. He had consented to the similitude of a previous negotiation, well knowing that it would not be of consequence, and that the conditions proposed would never agree with the pride of Napoleon. He would never suffer in any case that they should organize without, and against him, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, under the specious pretext of their independence. Pitt therefore left the young Russian governors to think that he would work for the "grand mediation," convinced as he was that they were marching purely and simply to a third coalition. As to the distribution of the forces, he contradicted a part of their project. He accepted well enough the three grand masses; one in the south composed of the Russians, Neapolitans, and English; another in the east, composed of the Russians and Austrians; one in the north composed of Prussians, Russians, Swedes, Hanoverians, and English. But he declared he could not at that moment furnish a single Englishman. He said that they should be kept on the coasts of England, always ready to embark, and they would produce a very useful result, by menacing the shores of the French empire in all points at once. This signified that, living in terror of the expeditions prepared at Boulogne, the English government would not leave its territory destitute, a thing very natural. Pitt promised subsidies, but not as much nearly as they asked. He offered 6,000,000*l.* sterling, or 150,000,000 f. He insisted most particularly upon a subject which the authors of the Russian project seemed to treat very lightly, that was the concurrence of Prussia. Without her, all appeared to him difficult, indeed nearly impossible. In his eyes the concurrence of entire Europe was required for the destruction of Napoleon. He strongly approved that they should pass over the body of Prussia, if it were not found practicable to draw that country into the alliance; because Russia would thus bind herself for ever to the policy of England; he even offered in that case, to make the part of the subsidy destined for Prussia pass on to St. Petersburg; but he felt it was a very serious thing, and gave his advice that propositions, the most advantageous possible, should be addressed to the cabinet of Berlin, in order to gain it over. "Do not believe," he said to M. Nowosiltzoff, "that I am the least in the world

[1] I have myself seen the duplicate of these conferences, of which one copy is to be found in France.—*Author.*

favourable to that false cabinet, crafty, and full of cupidity, that demands sometimes of Europe, sometimes of Napoleon, the price of its perfidiousness; no, but it is in this cabinet that the fate of the present, and even of the future reposes. Prussia, jealous of Austria, fearing Russia, will always carry herself on the side of France. It is necessary to detach her; unless this is done, she will never cease to be the accomplice of our irreconcilable enemy. It is necessary to be wanting as relates to her alone in your ideas of disinterestedness; it is necessary to give more than Napoleon knows how to offer, something before all things else, that shall embroil her with France."

Pitt had then by his hatred, which sometimes cleared his sight, if it often blinded him, imagined a modification of the Russian plan, fatal as well for Germany as for France. He thought the idea luminous and profound, of constructing around the French territory kingdoms capable of resisting France, a kingdom of the two Belgiums, and a subalpine kingdom; one for the house of Orange protected by England, the other for the house of Savoy protected by Russia. But he thought that it was an insufficient precaution. He wished that in place of separating Prussia and France by the Rhine, they should on the contrary be placed in immediate contact; and he proposed to grant to Prussia, if she pronounced in favour of the coalition, all the country comprised between the Meuse, Moselle, and Rhine, all that is called at this day the Rhenish provinces. It seemed indispensable to him if it was wished in future to drag Prussia from her interested neutrality, and from her partiality for Napoleon, near whom she always searched and found an unceasing support against Austria. They extended their design in 1815, by placing on the Rhine Bavaria, besides Prussia, in order to take away from France all her old allies in Germany. When she will one day have need of a support against the dangers which will come upon her from the side of the north, Germany will appreciate what services those might have rendered her, who have themselves studied to create subjects of division between her and France.

There came out of these conferences a new idea, destined to complete the kingdom of the two Belgiums; that was to construct a girdle of fortresses, the image of those which Vauban had constructed formerly to cover France, in that country without frontier, and to construct those fortresses at the expense of the alliance.

In regard to Germany and Italy, the English minister made them feel how far it was from being possible to execute their vast project at the moment, how much it would wound the two powers of whom they had the most need, Prussia and Austria. They would neither the one nor the other consent to leave the Germanic confederation; Prussia in particular had refused to agree that the crown of Germany should be hereditary; Austria would repulse a constitution for Italy which should exclude it from that country. Of the projects regarding Italy, Pitt admitted only the constitution of the kingdom of Piedmont. He wished that Savoy itself should be added to all that the Russian project already attributed to Piedmont.

Finally, they did not discourse much about Poland; all that point implied war with Prussia, which Pitt held it as above all things best to avoid. The Russian diplomatist, imbued with such generous ideas on quitting St. Petersburg, dared not make mention of Egypt, Gibraltar, or Memel; of all that he had there deemed the most excellent in his primitive project. Upon two subjects very important, Pitt was little satisfactory and almost negative; it may be said upon Malta and maritime law. Relative to Malta, Pitt peremptorily refused to entertain the question, and adjourned explanations upon that subject until the epoch when it would be known what sacrifices France was disposed to make. As to the new law of nations, he said that such a work, moral, but little practicable, should be left to a congress which should assemble after the war, to conclude a peace in which all the interests of the nations should be equitably balanced. The idea of a new law of nations seemed to him very fine, but difficult to realize, because nations would with difficulty adopt uniform dispositions, and would observe them with still more difficulty when adopted. However, he did not decline to treat of these matters in the congress, which should at a later time regulate the conditions of a peace.

These conferences terminated by a singular explanation. It had for its subject the east and Constantinople. Very recently, by her policy in Georgia, and by her relations with the insurgents on the Danube, Russia had given England some umbrage, which had provoked on her part a note, in which the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire were already professed as principles of European policy. "It is not thus that people proceed when they would establish confidence between allies," said M. Nowosiltzoff to Mr. Pitt; "of all men my master is he who has the most noble, most generous character; it suffices that he is proud of his integrity. But to seek to stop him by menaces, or only by insinuations, is to wound him uselessly. He would be excited rather than restrained by such means." At these words Pitt made many excuses at having suffered umbrages so ill founded to be noted, that they were but natural before they had arrived at the period in their intercourse, that inspired full confidence between each other; but that for the future, and with the intimacy that was established between the two courts, it would be impossible. "Besides," said M. Nowosiltzoff, "what inconvenience would it be if Constantinople appertained to a civilized people like the Russians, in place of belonging to barbarians like the Turks? Would not your commerce in the Black Sea gain considerably by such a change? Without doubt, if the east had submitted to that France which is so given to usurpation, the danger would be real; but as to Russia, the danger would be nothing. England could have no objection to make. Pitt[1] replied, that these considerations had assuredly much weight in his eyes; that as to himself he had no prejudice in that respect, that he did not see any very great danger in case Constantinople should fall into the hands of the Russians; but that it was a prejudice rooted in his country, that he was obliged to humour, and that he must take good care about actually touching on any similar subject.

[1] This detail is contained in a very curious letter from M. Nowosiltzoff to his cabinet.

M. Strogonoff obtained nothing satisfactory, or next to nothing, relative to Spain. She had handed over, according to the English cabinet, all her resources to France; it was a delusion to care about her. However, if she would declare against France, her galleons should be restored to her.

M. Strogonoff set out for Madrid, M. Nowosiltzoff for St. Petersburg. It was agreed that lord Gower, subsequently viscount Granville, then ambassador from England at the court of St. Petersburg, should be charged with detailed powers to conclude a treaty on the basis agreed upon between the two courts.

The Russian plan had not been submitted but a few days to elaboration in London, when it thus returned home, despoiled of all which it had that was generous, and also of a little that was practical. It was reduced to a project of intended destruction against France. No more of Italy, Germany, or Poland, independent! The kingdom of Piedmont; the kingdom of the two Belgiums; out of a sense of profound hatred to France, Prussia upon the Rhine; the restitution of Malta evaded; the new law of nations remitted to a future congress; in fine, before the commencement of hostilities, a simulation of negotiation, a simulation very vain, because a general and immediate war was at the foundation of things: here is what remained of this vain-glorious project for a European re-constitution, grown out of a sort of mental fermentation in the young heads that governed Russia. They then set themselves to negotiate at Petersburg with lord Gower upon the points that were admitted in London between Pitt and Nowosiltzoff.

Whilst they thus leagued with England, it was necessary to undertake an analogous work with Austria and Prussia, in order to bring them to join the new coalition. Prussia, that had engaged herself with Russia to make war if the French passed the limit of Hanover, but that in the meanwhile had promised France to remain inviolably neuter if the number of French in Germany were not augmented, was not willing to abandon this perilous equilibrium. She feigned not to comprehend that which Russia stated to her, and sheltered herself under her old system, become proverbial, "the neutrality of the north of Germany." This manner of eluding the question was so much the more facile, as that in fear of seeing the secrets of the new coalition delivered over to Napoleon, the Russian diplomatists dared not openly explain themselves. The cabinet of Berlin, by its hesitations, had given itself such a reputation for duplicity, that they believed it was impossible to confide to it any secret without its being soon communicated to France. They did not therefore impart the design carried to London, nor aught of the negotiations that followed it; but they cited to it every day the new encroachments of Napoleon, more particularly the conversion of the Italian republic into a kingdom, which would come to be, they said, a union of Lombardy with France, similar to that of Piedmont. They announced the most gigantic designs. They reported that Napoleon was going to make of Parma and Piacenza, of Naples, and, finally, of Spain itself, kingdoms for his own family; that soon Holland would experience a similar lot; that Switzerland would be incorporated, under the pretext of a rectification of the French frontiers; that cardinal Fesch would be shortly elevated to the Papal chair; that it was necessary to save Europe, menaced with a universal domination; that the courts which should obstinately live amid this insecurity, would be the cause of the common loss, and finish by being themselves enveloped. Knowing more particularly that the rivalry of Austria and Prussia was the principal cause which brought back the latter to the side of France, they endeavoured to reconcile these two powers. They requested Prussia to fix her pretensions, and to make them known; they told her that they would try and entreat of Austria the avowal of her own, and that they would force both one and the other to be reconciled through a definitive arbitration of their differences. They announced that by means of some Catholic voices more in the college of princes, a concession of very small importance, Austria would content herself for ever with the *recez* of 1803, and would sanction the new arrangements by her irrevocable adhesion, through which Prussia had gained so much. They even went so far as to insinuate, that if by any misfortune a contest should become inevitable, Prussia would be legally indemnified for the chances of the war. However, they did not avow that a coalition was ready to be formed; and that as far as concerned principle it was concluded; they appeared to express no more than the wish of seeing Prussia united with the rest of Europe, to guarantee the equilibrium of the world, at that time seriously menaced.

In fine, to be as near the court of Prussia as possible, they sent to it a Russian general, M. Vintzingerode, an enlightened officer of the staff, who was to open himself by little and little to the king, but to the king alone, and who having a knowledge of the military plan would be able, if he succeeded in making himself heard, to propose the means of execution, and to regulate the whole plan and details of the future war. M. Vintzingerode arrived at the end of the winter of 1804, the moment when Napoleon was preparing to set out for Italy; he kept up a great reserve near the Prussian cabinet, but gained ground a little near the king, and appealing to the friendship commenced at Memel between the two sovereigns, endeavoured to draw in the king through the title of that friendship to the common cause of kings. The young Frederick William, seeing himself further pressed, and comprehending at last what the real question was, protested his strong affection for the emperor Alexander, and his warm sympathy for the cause of Europe, but objected that he was exposed to the first attacks of Napoleon, that he did not believe himself sufficiently strong to combat with so powerful an adversary; that the succours which they led him to expect might not arrive until too late, because they were very far distant, and he should be vanquished, perhaps destroyed, before they could come to his aid. He obstinately refused all participation in a coalition, that they had suffered him to perceive without expressly avowing it. He made much too of the danger of placing himself in connexion with the suggestions of England, and even proposed, in order to prevent a general war, of which he was very much afraid, to act as the intermediate party between Russia and France.

In this delicate conjuncture, the king had called into consultation M. Haugwitz, who had for some

time retired to his estates in Silesia, and had discovered, in the advice he gave, a fresh encouragement for an ambiguous and pacific policy. If it became necessary for him to take a positive resolution, M. Haugwitz would have sooner leaned towards France; M. Hardenberg, who was his successor, would have preferred leaning towards Russia; but he was ready to decide, he said, in favour of France as soon as of Russia, provided that some part was taken. With less mind, tact, and prudence than M. Haugwitz, he was fond of censuring his tergiversations, and professed, as a distinguishing mark between himself and his predecessor, a taste for some party strongly decided. It was necessary, in the sense of his meaning, to take the side of France, if it were judged useful to do so, and embrace her cause, but in such a case to have the advantages and gather the price of a decided option. In this view, he was less agreeable to the king than M. Haugwitz, who left his prince to taste the sweets of his indecision; and it was possible already to perceive between M. Haugwitz and M. Hardenberg that difference of language through which ruptures begin between ministers, whether in courts or in free states.

The king, in reply to the mission of M. Vintzingerode, wished also to send a person of confidence to St. Petersburg, and despatched M. Zastrow with a commission to explain his position to the emperor Alexander, to make his reserved conduct palatable, and to penetrate, if it were possible, more deeply still into the yet veiled secret of the new coalition. While he sent M. Zastrow to Petersburg for the purpose of stating these things, Frederick William boasted to Napoleon of his resistance to the suggestions of Russia; he spoke of the neutrality of the north of Germany, not as a real neutrality, as it was in effect, but as a positive alliance, which should cover France on the north from all the enemies which she could have to combat. This prince, moreover, offered, as he had offered Russia, to play the part of a conciliator.

M. Vintzingerode, after having prolonged his stay at Berlin so far as to render himself regarded as a troublesome guest at the court, from its fear of being compromised by the prolonged presence of a Russian agent, proceeded to Vienna, where he made the same efforts as at Berlin. He had no need to hold with Austria the same dissimulation as with Prussia. It was not at all necessary. Austria was full of hatred to Napoleon, and she ardently desired the expulsion of the French from Italy. With this court, it was not necessary, as with the king of Prussia, to cover himself with the plausible semblance of disinterestedness. He might speak plain, and say what he wished; because Austria desired the same thing that was desired at St. Petersburg. She had not with her at least the illusions of youth and false sentimentalism, which agreed not with her old experience. Yet further, she knew how to keep a secret. If, in appearance, she had for France infinite care in management, and for the ear of Napoleon the constant language of flattery, she nourished at the bottom of her heart all the resentments of a mortified ambition, for ten years continually maltreated. She had, therefore, secretly entered, from the first, into the passions of Russia; but remembering her defeats, she had not consented to bind herself without extreme prudence, and had taken only conditional engagements, and with due precaution. She had signed with Russia a secret convention, which was for the south of Europe, that which the convention signed by Prussia was for the north[1]. She promised, in this convention, to throw off her inactive character, if France, committing new usurpations in Italy, extended further the occupation of the kingdom of Naples, actually limited to the Gulf of Tarentum, operated new incorporations, like that of Piedmont, or menaced some part of the Turkish empire, such as Egypt. Her contingent to the war was to be in that case 350,000 Austrians. She had the assurance, if fortune were favourable to the arms of the coalesced powers, of obtaining Italy from the Adda to the Po, leaving out the Milanese. They promised her besides to replace the two dukes of Tuscany and Modena in their former territories; to give her thus the country of Salzburg, and the Brisgau, become vacant. The house of Savoy was to have a grand establishment in Italy, composed of the Milanese, Piedmont, and Genoa. Here again appears the Russian plan. At Vienna, as at London, there remained only the party hostile to France, and advantageous to the coalesced powers. Austria had desired and obtained that this convention[2] should be buried in profound mystery, in

[1] Prussia, in spite of the game of duplicity which she played among the great powers, through the war conducted herself becomingly, in some circumstances under which it could scarcely have been expected she would have done so. Down to the present period of his history, our author, while he noticed the alleged ill conduct of Drake and Spencer Smith towards France (see page 540 and note), passes over the indefensible outrage committed by Napoleon a few months afterwards on the person of Sir George Rumbold, British *charge d'affaires* to the Hanse towns, and the states of the circle of Lower Saxony. On the 25th of October, in the same year, in which so much was said about the British agents, Drake and Smith, that according to our author, operated in the way it was designed to operate, "as a diversion to the death of the duke d'Enghien," to adopt our author's own words (which is singularly said in lord Hawkesbury's manifesto (see note, page 541) to be so evident, his lordship being thus corroborated by our author in the surmise thirty-five years afterwards); it was in that very year Napoleon glaringly violated the territory of Hamburgh, landing two hundred and fifty soldiers, and seized the British envoy and his papers at his residence at Grindal, a few hundred paces only from the gate of Hamburgh, carrying him off to Hanover, and from thence to Paris to the prison of the Temple. The French government found no papers compromising Sir George Rumbold, and he was released a day or two afterwards by the interference of Prussia, all the foreign ministers of Hamburgh instantly despatching couriers to their respective courts. Before Sir George was released, it is said, he was made to pledge his word that he would not return to Hamburgh, nor reside within fifty leagues of the French territory. He was finally put on board a British frigate off Cherburg by a flag of truce. In order to cover this atrocious outrage, a notice was issued by the French minister for foreign affairs, that France would not recognise the English diplomatic corps in Europe, until their government abstained from charging them with "military agency." The violation of a neutral territory for the purpose of such a seizure was passed over. The conduct of Prussia, acting no doubt under the feeling which inspired her Russian convention, was spirited and honourable. The total silence of the author about all this is singular.

[2] This convention was dated the 6th of November 1804. The text is here given, which until now was unknown to the

order not to be too soon compromised with Napoleon. This justice must be rendered to Austria, that she at least did not make, as Russia and Prussia did, a show of false virtues. She followed

world, as was the convention of Russia with Prussia (see page 543).

Declaration signed the { 25th of October, / 6th of November, } 1804.

The preponderating influence exercised by the French government on the neighbouring states, and the number of countries occupied by its troops, inspiring just uneasiness for the maintenance of the tranquillity and the general security of Europe; his majesty, the emperor of all the Russias, partakes with his majesty, the emperor king, the conviction that this state of things demands their mutual and most serious solicitude, and renders it urgent that they should unite themselves to that effect by a strict concert, adapted to the state of the crisis, and the danger to which Europe finds itself exposed.

The undersigned * * * * * furnished in consequence with instructions and powers to negotiate and conclude a work thus salutary with the plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor king to treat with him, after having mutually communicated the full powers in due form, has agreed with the said plenipotentiary in the stipulations stated in the following articles:—

Art. 1. His majesty the emperor of all the Russias promises and engages to establish, with a due regard to the crisis and the danger above mentioned, the most intimate agreement with his majesty the emperor and king, and the two monarchs will take care to inform and to understand each other mutually upon the negotiations and agreements that they shall in the present case form with other powers for the same end as that agreed upon between them, and any steps they may take in this regard shall be conducted in a manner, not in any mode to compromise the present engagements arranged between them, before they shall have decided by a common agreement to make them public.

Art. 2. His majesty the emperor of all the Russias, and his majesty the emperor king, will not neglect any occasion or facility to place themselves in a state to co operate in a manner efficacious for the active measures which they judge necessary to prevent the dangers which so immediately menace the general security.

Art. 3. If out of hatred to the opposition that the two imperial courts feel to the ambitious objects of France, in virtue of this mutual concert, one of them shall find itself immediately attacked (the Russian troops stationed for the moment in the seven Ionian Islands making a part of the present stipulations), each of the two high contracting powers obliges himself in the most formal manner, to put in action for the common defence, at the soonest moment possible, the forces hereinafter announced in Art. 8.

Art. 4. If it happen that the French government, abusing the advantages it possesses by the position of its troops that now occupy the territory of the Germanic empire, invade the adjacent countries, of which the integrity and independence are essentially allied with the interests of Russia, and that, consequently, not being able to see such an encroachment with an indifferent eye, his majesty the emperor of all the Russias finds himself obliged to move his forces thither, his majesty the emperor and king will regard such conduct on the part of France as an aggression which will impose upon him the duty of placing himself, at the earliest moment, in a situation to furnish prompt succour, conformably to the stipulations of the present agreement.

Art. 5. His imperial majesty of all the Russias partakes fully in the lively interest that his imperial and royal apostolic majesty takes in supporting the Ottoman Porte, whose vicinity is common to both, and as an attack directed against Turkey in Europe by any other power cannot but compromise the security of Russia and Austria, and that the Porte in his state of existing trouble cannot himself repulse any enterprise formed against him, on the said supposition, and if war on this account happen directly between one of the two imperial courts and the government of France, the other shall immediately prepare, in order to assist with the smallest possible delay the power at war, and contribute in concert to the preservation of the Ottoman Porte in his state of existing possession.

Art. 6. The fate of the kingdom of Naples must influence that of Italy, in the independence of which their imperial majesties take a particular interest, and it is intended that the stipulations of the present agreement shall have this effect in case the French shall wish to extend themselves in the kingdom of Naples beyond their actual limits, to take the capital, the fortresses of the country, or to penetrate into Calabria; in a word, if they force his majesty the king of Naples to risk every thing, and to oppose, by force, this new violation of his neutrality; and if his imperial majesty the emperor of all the Russias, by the succour that in this supposition he would furnish to the king of the Two Sicilies, shall find himself engaged in a war against France, his imperial and royal majesty obliges himself to commence upon his side operations against the common enemy according to the stipulations, and specially according to the Arts. 4, 5, 8 and 9 of the present agreement.

Art. 7. Seeing the uncertainty in which the two high contracting powers yet actually find themselves about the future designs of the French government, they reserve to themselves, besides all that is stipulated above, to agree according to the urgency of circumstances upon the different cases which shall be of such a nature as thus to require the employment of their mutual forces.

Art. 8. In all the cases in which the two imperial courts shall proceed to active measures in virtue of the present agreement, or of those agreements which they may ultimately form between themselves, they promise and engage to co-operate simultaneously, and according to a plan which will be settled immediately between themselves, with sufficient forces to hope for a successful combat with those of the enemy, and to repulse them in full strength, their forces not to be less than three hundred and thirty-five thousand men under arms for both the imperial courts; his imperial and royal majesty will furnish two hundred and thirty-five thousand on his part, and the remainder will be given by his imperial majesty of all the Russias. These troops will be sent and supported constantly on both sides, upon a complete footing, and there will be left besides a corps of observation, in order to be assured that the court of Berlin shall remain passive. The respective armies will be distributed in such a manner, that the forces of the two imperial courts, that shall act in concert, will not be inferior in number to those of the enemy whenever they shall have to combat.

Art. 9. Conformably to the desire manifested by the imperial royal court, his majesty the emperor of all the Russias engages himself to employ his good offices for the object of obtaining of the court of London for his imperial and royal apostolical majesty, in case of a war with France, as announced in the present declaration, or which may result from future agreements, that the two imperial courts reserve to themselves to make, under Art. 7, subsidies as well for the first movement of the campaign, as annually for the whole duration of the war, which would be as much as possible directed to the convenience of the court of Vienna.

Art. 10. In the execution of the plans arranged, there shall be a just regard borne to the obstacles which result as much from the actual state of the forces and frontiers of the Austrian monarchy, as from the imminent dangers to which it will be exposed in that state by the demonstrations and armaments which may immediately provoke a premature invasion on the part of France. In consequence, with the determination for active measures of which there will be a mutual agreement, and as much as the security of the two empires, and the essential interest of the common object will permit, the greatest attention shall be paid to combine

her own interest without distraction, without fickleness, and free from charlatanism. She is not to be censured in the circumstances, save for the falsity of her language at Paris.

However, in signing this convention, she indulged the hope that it would only be an act of simple precaution, because she did not cease to dread war. Thus, after having signed it, she refused all the solicitations of the emperor of Russia to pass immediately to military preparations; she had even despaired, judging by her inertness. But at the news of the arrangements made by Napoleon in Italy, she was, all of a sudden, aroused from her inaction. The title of king taken by Napoleon, and, above all, so general a title as king of Italy, which seemed as if it would extend itself to the entire peninsula, had alarmed her in the highest degree. She immediately commenced military preparations, that she had at first determined to defer; and she called to the ministry of war the celebrated Mack, who, although destitute of the qualities of a general in chief, was not deficient in the talent of organizing armies. She listened then with an attention altogether new to her to the pressing propositions of Russia, and, without engaging herself immediately by a written consent to an immediate war, she left it the care of pushing forward the negotiations in common with England, and to treat with that power on the difficult question of subsidies. Meanwhile, she discussed with M. Vintzingerode a plan for the war conceived under every imaginable hypothesis.

It was, therefore, at St. Petersburg that the new coalition was to be definitively formed, in other words, the third in number, reckoning from the commencement of the French revolution. That of 1792 had terminated in 1797 by the treaty of Campo-Formio, under the blow struck by general Bonaparte; that of 1798 was terminated in 1801, under the blows of the French consul; the third, that of 1804, was not to have an issue more fortunate, under the blows levelled at it by the emperor Napoleon.

Lord Gower had, as already said, full powers from his court to treat with the Russian cabinet. After long discussions, the following conditions were agreed upon. There was to be formed a coalition between the powers of Europe, comprehending at first England and Russia, and at a later period those powers whom they were able to draw into it. The object was the evacuation of Hanover

the movement with the time and the possibility of placing the forces and frontiers of his majesty the emperor and king in a situation to be able to open the campaign with the energy necessary to attain the object of the war. As soon as the encroachments of the French shall have established a case in which his said imperial and royal apostolic majesty shall be engaged to take a part in the war, by virtue of the present agreement, and of those other agreements which may be formed successively afterwards, he engages himself not to lose a moment to put himself in a state, with the shortest possible delay, which delay shall not exceed three months after the demand made to co-operate efficaciously with his imperial majesty the emperor of all the Russias, and to proceed with vigour in the execution of the plan which will be arranged.

Art. 11. The principles of the two sovereigns will not permit them in any case to desire to constrain the free wishes of the French nation; the end of the war shall not be to operate a counter revolution, but only to remedy the dangers common to all Europe.

Art. 12. His majesty the emperor of all the Russias, acknowledging that it is just that in case of a new warlike explosion the house of Austria should be indemnified for the immense losses which it has sustained in its last contest with France, engages himself to co-operate on his behalf to obtain this indemnity in the like case, as far as the success of their arms will permit. Still in the most fortunate result, his majesty the emperor and king will not extend his limit in Italy beyond the Adda on the West, and the Po on the South; well understanding that of the different mouths of this last river, it is the most southern shall be intended. The two imperial courts desiring that, in the supposed case of success, his royal highness the elector of Salzburg shall be replaced in Italy, and to this effect shall be placed in the possession of the grand duchy of Tuscany, or that he shall obtain some other convenient establishment in the north of Italy, supposing events render this arrangement practicable.

Art. 13. Their imperial majesties, under the same supposition, have at heart to procure the re-establishment of the king of Sardinia in Piedmont, even with a great ulterior aggrandisement. Under the hypothesis less fortunate, it is agreed always to assure to him a suitable establishment in Italy.

Art. 14. In the same case of great success, the two imperial courts are in an understanding on the lot of the Legations, and concur to make a restitution of the duchies of Modena, Massa, and Carrara to the legitimate heirs of the last duke; but in case events prevent this design, the said Legations or Modena will serve for the establishment of the king of Sardinia. The archduke Ferdinand will remain in Germany, and his majesty will content himself, if it be necessary, with a frontier in Italy, more approximating to the Adda, than to that which exists at present.

Art. 15. If circumstances permit the replacing the elector of Salzburg in Italy, the country of Salzburg, Berchtolsgaden, and Passau will be united to the Austrian monarchy. This will be the only case in which his majesty will obtain an extension of his frontiers in Germany.

As to the part of the country of Aichstadt, possessed at present by the elector of Salzburg, it will then be disposed of in the manner in which the two courts shall agree among themselves, and more particularly in favour of the elector of Bavaria, if by the side which he may take for the common cause, he places himself in a position to be favoured. Similarly in the supposed case in the preceding article of the re-establishment of the heirs of the deceased duke of Modena in his former possessions, the property of Brisgau and of Ortenau would become a means of encouragement of the good cause for one of the principal princes of Germany, and specially for the elector of Baden, in favour of whom it will be thence renounced by the house of Austria.

Art. 16. The two high contracting powers engage to each other never to lay down their arms, and never to treat for an accommodation with the common enemy but under mutual consent, and after a previous engagement between them.

Art. 17. In limiting for the moment to the objects and questions above the present preliminary agreement, respecting which the two monarchs promise on the one part and on the other the most inviolable secrecy, they reserve to themselves without any delay, and immediately, to agree to the ulteror arrangements insomuch as concerns a plan of operations. in case the war should become inevitable, as well as to all which relates to the maintenance of the respective forces, both in the Austrian states and in a foreign territory.

Art. 18. The present declaration, mutually acknowledged as obligatory as the most solemn treaty, will be ratified in the space of six weeks or sooner, if able to be done, and the acts of ratification be equally exchanged in the same space of time

In faith of which, &c.

and the north of Germany; the effective independence of Holland and Switzerland; the evacuation of all Italy, comprising the isle of Elba; the reconstitution and aggrandisement of the kingdom of Piedmont; the consolidation of the kingdom of Naples, and finally the establishment of an order of things in Europe, which should guarantee the security of all the states against the usurpations of France. This object was not designated in a more precise manner, for the purpose of leaving a certain latitude for treating with France, at least fictitiously. All the powers were to be afterwards invited to give in their adhesion.

The coalition had resolved to unite at least five hundred thousand men, and to bring into action out of those they thus had at least four hundred thousand. England was to furnish 1,250,000*l.* sterling, or 31,250,000f. per hundred thousand men. She granted besides a sum paid down at once, representing three months' subsidies, towards the expenses of entering upon the campaign. Austria engaged to furnish two hundred and fifty thousand men out of five hundred thousand; the remainder were to be furnished by Russia, Sweden, Hanover, England, and Naples. The question of the adhesion of Prussia was resolved in the boldest mode. England and Russia agreed to make common cause against every power that, by its hostile measures, or only by its too close alliance with France, should oppose itself to the designs of the coalition. It was in effect decided that Russia, dividing its forces into two parts, should send one by Gallicia to the succour of Austria, the other by Poland to the limit of the Prussian territory, if definitively Prussia refused to enter into the coalition, to pass over the body of that power before she could put herself in a posture of defence; and as they did not wish to give her too much suspicion by the union of such an army upon her frontier, it was agreed they should take for a pretext the desire they felt to come to her aid, in case Napoleon, in defiance of her, should throw himself upon her territory. They might, therefore, qualify these eighty thousand Russians as auxiliaries and friends, really designed to trample Prussia under their feet.

This violence projected against Prussia, although appearing a little bold to England, was very acceptable to her. She had nothing better to have recourse to that could save her from invasion, than lighting up a vast incendiarism on the continent, and exciting a frightful war, whoever were the combatants, whoever might be the victors or the vanquished. On the part of Russia, it was on the contrary a great piece of rashness; because to expose Prussia to throw herself into the arms of Napoleon, was to ensure herself a certain defeat, should the invasion of the Prussian territory be as prompt as they imagined it would be. But prince Czartoryski, the most obstinate of these young personages in pursuing an object, saw in all this only a means of wresting Warsaw from Prussia, in order to re-constitute Poland, and give it to Alexander.

The military plan indicated by the situation of the united powers, was always to attack in three masses; in the south with the Russians at Corfu, the Neapolitans, and the English, ascending the Italian peninsula, and joining a hundred thousand Austrians in Lombardy; in the east with the grand Austrian and Russian army, acting upon the Danube; finally, on the north with the Swedes, Hanoverians, and Russians descending the Rhine.

In respect to the diplomatic plan, it consisted in an intervention in the name of the "alliance of mediation," and in a previous negotiation before proceeding to hostilities. Russia kept strongly to this part of her original project, which preserved for her the attitude of an arbitrator, agreeably to her pride, and it must be said also to the secret feebleness of her sovereign. She hoped vaguely still that Prussia would be drawn in, provided it were not too much alarmed by the discovery of the design arranged for a coalition, and that Napoleon were placed between a fearful league of all Europe against him, and certain moderate concessions.

There was obtained from England her consent to a singular piece of dissimulation, the least worthy possible, but the best calculated for their views. England consented to be kept at a distance, and not to be named in the negotiations, more particularly with Prussia. Russia would in her attempts to gain over that power, always present herself as not being allied to Great Britain in any design of a common war, but as wishing to impose a mediation, in order to put a step to a state of things oppressive for all Europe. In a serious proceeding in the sight of France, Russia would, without acting ostensibly in the name of a coalition of powers, offer her mediation by affirming that she would make all the world accept equitable conditions, if Napoleon would accept the like. This was a double means, devised in order not to frighten Prussia, nor to irritate the pride of Napoleon. England would lend herself to this, provided Russia, compromised by this mediation, was definitively drawn into a war. As to Austria, the greatest care was taken to leave her in the shade, and not even to name her, because if she appeared to be in the plot, Napoleon would fling himself upon that country before Russia was in a state to afford it succour. Austria made active preparations, without mixing herself in any part of the negotiations. It was necessary to follow the same system of conduct in relation to the court of Naples, which was exposed in like manner to the first blows of Napoleon, because general St. Cyr was at Tarentum with a division of fifteen thousand or sixteen thousand French. They had recommended queen Caroline to enter into all the engagements of neutrality, or even of alliance, that Napoleon wished to impose upon her. In the meanwhile, Russia would transport troops by little and little in vessels that should pass the Dardanelles, and disembark at Corfu. It was there that a strong division might at the latest moment unite at Naples with a reinforcement of English, Albanians, and others. It would then be time enough to take off the mask, and to attack the French at the extremity of the peninsula.

In proposing to attempt a preliminary negotiation with Napoleon, it was necessary to have at least some specious conditions to present to him. There was nothing they had to offer, unless it was to make a tender of the evacuation of Malta by the English. The Russian cabinet had sent afar all the brilliant portion of its plan, such as the reorganization of Italy and of Germany, the reconstitution of Poland, and the digesting of a new code of maritime law. If Russia conceded Malta to the

English, in place of playing the character of an arbitrator between France and England, it would be no other than an English agent, or more than that, its docile ally and dependent. The Russian cabinet therefore kept to the evacuation of Malta, with an obstinacy which was not its customary practice, and when it was necessary to sign the treaty, it showed an invincible resolution on the point. Thus lord Gower was ready to agree to all things, in order to compromise Russia in any kind of agreement whatsoever with England; but upon once demanding that she should abandon a maritime position of the greatest importance, a position which was, if not the only cause, at least the principal cause of the war, she would not give it up. Lord Gower believed himself too strongly bound by his instructions to pass over such a matter, and he refused to sign the abandonment of Malta. The project therefore failed. Still the emperor Alexander consented to sign the convention of the 11th of April, declaring that he would not ratify it, unless the English cabinet renounced the island of Malta. A courier was then sent off to London, carrying the convention, as well as the condition that was annexed to it, upon which the Russian ratification depended.

It was arranged without loss of time, that the season for military operations might not pass by, to take the step agreed upon in relation to the emperor of the French. There was chosen for this purpose the same personage who had tied in London the knot of the third coalition, M. Nowositltzoff. There was destined to accompany him as an adjunct, the author of the plan itself of a new Europe, already so disfigured, the abbé Piatoli. M. Nowositltzoff was quite proud to be soon in Paris, and place himself before the great man, who for some years had attracted the regards of the whole world. If in proportion as the decisive time approached, the emperor Alexander felt the more anxiously a desire to see this previous mediation succeed, M. Nowositltzoff did not less desire the same thing. He was young, and ambitious; he regarded it as an infinite glory, first to treat with Napoleon, and secondly, to be the negotiator who, at the moment when Europe seemed ready to rush into war, all of a sudden pacified it by his able intervention. It may be reckoned, therefore, that he did not seek to add to the difficulties of the negotiation himself. After long deliberations, they agreed on the conditions that he was to offer to Napoleon, and they resolved to keep them a profound secret. He was ordered to present a first, second, and third project, each more advantageous for France than that which preceded, but with the recommendation not to pass from one to the other until after great resistance.

The base of all these projects was the evacuation of Hanover and Naples, the real independence of Switzerland and Holland, and in return the evacuation of Malta by the English, and the promise to digest ultimately a new code of maritime law. To all this Napoleon would not oppose any serious difficulties. In case of a solid peace, he had no objection to evacuate Hanover, Naples, Holland, and even Switzerland, on condition, as regarded the last, that the act of mediation should be maintained. The real difficulty was Italy. Russia, already obliged to renounce her plans of European re-constitution, had promised, in case war should become inevitable, a part of Italy to Austria, and another part to the future kingdom of Piedmont. Now, in the hypothesis of a mediation, it was very necessary, under the penalty of seeing the negotiator sent back from Paris the day following his arrival, to accord to France a part of this same Italy. It was necessary, in order that the mediation should appear serious, that it should appear so, above all, to Prussia; and that they should be able to attach and compromise her by the appearance of a negotiation attempted in good faith. Here therefore are the arrangements that they would successively propose. They would at first demand the separation of Piedmont, save the re-constitution of a state detached for a branch of the family of Bonaparte, and further, the abandonment of the actual kingdom of Italy, designed with Genoa for the house of Savoy. Parma and Piacenza would remain to form another endowment for a prince of the family of Bonaparte. This was no more than the first proposition. They would pass immediately afterwards to the second. According to this last, Piedmont would remain incorporated with France; the kingdom of Italy, adding Genoa, would be as in the last plan given to the house of Savoy; Parma and Piacenza would remain the sole endowment of the collateral branches of the house of Bonaparte. From this second proposition they would finally pass on to the third, which would be the following:—Piedmont would continue to be a French province, the actual kingdom of Italy being given to the Bonaparte family, the indemnity of the house of Parma would be reduced to Piacenza and Genoa. The kingdom of Etruria, assigned four years before to a Spanish branch, remained as it was then.

It must be said, that if to these last conditions the evacuation of Malta by the English be added, Napoleon had no legitimate reasons to refuse such a peace, because they were the conditions of Luneville and Amiens, with Piedmont over and above for France. The sacrifice demanded of Napoleon was limited in reality to that of Parma and Piacenza, become French property by the decease of the last duke, and of Genoa, so far independent. Napoleon would have it in his power to consent to such a project, if besides they managed to humour his dignity in the form given to the propositions.

All these five projects of the friends of Alexander turned therefore upon one very pretty result! After having dreamed of the re-constitution of Europe by means of a powerful mediation; after having seen this re-constitution of Europe converted at London into a project of destruction against France, Russia affrighted to be so far advanced, reduced her grand mediation to the obtainment of Parma and Piacenza as an indemnity for the house of Savoy; because the evacuation of Hanover and of Naples, the independence of Holland and Switzerland, that she demanded besides, had never been contested by Napoleon, peace being once established. But if one thing so little was not obtained, she had under hand a formidable war in reserve. A conduct thus unreflecting and rash had conducted Russia into a defile sufficiently narrow.

It was agreed besides, that they should demand

passports for M. Nowosiltzoff, through the mediation of a friendly court. Russia had only to choose for this purpose between Prussia and Austria. To address herself to the last-named power was to draw upon herself the penetrating eyes of Napoleon, and she wished, as has already been stated, to have her name forgotten as much as possible, in order that she might have time to prepare herself. Prussia, on the contrary, had offered to be mediatrix, which made it a natural thing that she should by her interference obtain passports for M. Nowosiltzoff. He in the meanwhile had gone forward to Berlin, to see the king of Prussia, and to attempt near that prince a last effort; to communicate to him alone, and not to his cabinet, the moderate conditions proposed to France, and to make him feel that if she refused such arrangements, it was clear she must have views that were alarming for Europe. Views irreconcilable with the independence of all the states, and that it was then the duty of the entire world to unite and march against the common enemy.

M. Nowosiltzoff therefore set out for Berlin, where he arrived in great haste, pressed as he was to commence the negotiation. He had with him the abbé Pistoli. He showed himself mild, conciliatory, and perfectly reserved. Unfortunately the king of Prussia was absent, occupied on a visit to his provinces in Franconia. This circumstance was vexatious. They ran a double danger; either of the refusal of England relative to Malta, which would render all negotiation impossible, or of some new enterprise of Napoleon in Italy, where he actually was at the moment, some enterprise that would ruin the advance of the different projects of the approximation to be carried on at Paris. The prompt arrival of M. Nowosiltzoff in France was to have had in consequence an immense influence on the side of peace. Besides, the young Russians who governed the empire were so liable to impressions, that their first contact with Napoleon would attract them to him, and seduce them, as the contact with Pitt had drawn them away so far from their plan of European regeneration. Hence there was ground greatly to regret the time they were about to lose.

The king of Prussia, having been apprised that they requested him to demand passports for the Russian envoy, strongly applauded the measure, and the probabilities of peace that he believed he foresaw. He did not himself doubt that behind this last attempt at an approximation, there was a war in design, much more ripened than they had informed him of, riper than they thought who had so rashly engaged in it. The pacific Frederick William gave an order to his cabinet that they should make an immediate demand of passports from Napoleon for M. Nowosiltzoff. This last was not to take at Paris any official quality, in order to avoid the difficulty of the acknowledgment of the imperial title borne by Napoleon; but in addressing him, he would style him sire, and majesty, and he had besides powers complete and positive which he was to show, should they be in accord, and which authorised him to concede the acknowledgment immediately.

While they were thus acting in Europe against Napoleon, he, environed with all the pomps of Italian royalty, abounded in ideas utterly opposed to those of his adversaries, even the most moderate. The sight of Italy, the scene of his first victories, the object of all his predilections, filled him with new designs for the grandeur of his empire, and the establishment of his family. Far from willing to partake it with any one, he thought on the contrary of occupying it entirely, and of creating there some of his vassal kingdoms, which would strengthen the new empire of the West. The members of the Italian consulta, that had attended at the formality of the institution of the kingdom of Italy, accompanied by the vice-president Melzi, and the minister Marescalchi, had gone in advance to prepare for the reception at Milan. Although the Italians would be proud to have him for a king, because his government rendered them more secure than any other, still the hope lost, or all hope adjourned at least, of a royalty purely Italian, the fear of a war with Austria in consequence of the change, even the general nature of the title, "king of Italy," made to be pleasing to them, but also to be alarming to Europe, all this had made them uneasy. M. Melzi and M. Marescalchi had found them more troubled, and yet less eager than before their departure. The liberal party aggravated, kept themselves more and more aloof every day, and the aristocracy did not make advances. Napoleon could alone alter such a state of things. Cardinal Caprara had arrived, and had attempted to inspire the clergy with sentiments of attachment to the emperor. M. de Segur, accompanying M. Marescalchi, had selected the ladies and the officers of the palace from the first Italian families. Some excused themselves at the beginning. The interference of M. Marescalchi, and a few of the members of the consulta, the general allurements produced by the fêtes which they prepared, had ended by bringing back those who had recalcitrated, and at last the arrival of Napoleon had sufficed to decide every body. His presence had produced, as it did in general, a deep emotion among the Italians; his presence as emperor and king would naturally affect them yet more; because this prodigy of fortune, whom they loved to see, was yet more aggrandised. Magnificent soldiers, united in the battle fields of Castiglione, were designed to execute grand manœuvres, and to represent immortal battles. All the foreign ministers were convoked at Milan. The influx of the curious that had been carried to Paris to see there the coronation, now flowed towards Lombardy. The movement was given, and the imaginations of the Italians had returned to love and admiration for the man who for nine years had so much agitated them. They had, in imitation of the towns of France, formed out of the youth of the best families guards of honour for his reception.

Arrived at Turin, he there encountered Pius VII., and exchanged with him a last and affectionate farewell. Then he received his new subjects with infinite kindness, and occupied himself with their interests, distinct yet from the interests of the rest of the French empire, with that intelligent solicitude that he carried upon all his journeys. He had repaired the faults and injustices of the administration, given justice to a vast number of requests, and displayed, to seduce the people, all the attractions of the supreme power. He afterwards employed some days in visiting the strong fortresses

which were his grand creation, and also the base of his Italian establishment, that of Alexandria. Thousands of workmen were assembled there at this time. Lastly, on the 5th of May, in the midst of the plain of Marengo, from the height of a throne elevated upon that plain, where, five years before, he gained the sovereign authority, he attended to the fine manœuvres representing that battle. Lannes, Murat, and Bessieres commanding the troops. There was no one wanting but Desaix. Napoleon laid the first stone of a monument designed to record the memory of the brave who died on that field of battle.. From Alexandria he proceeded to Pavia, where the magistrates of Milan had come to bring him the homages of the new capital, and he entered Milan on the 8th of May, to the sound of cannon and of bells, amid the acclamations of the people, enthusiastic at his presence. Surrounded by the Italian authorities and the clergy, he went to kneel in that old Lombard cathedral, the admiration of Europe, destined to receive from him its last archbishop. The Italians, sensitive to the highest point, sometimes displaying emotions for sovereigns whom they did not love, seduced, as all the people are, by the power of great sights; what should they not feel in presence of that man whose greatness had commenced under their own eyes, for that star, which they were able to boast, they had been the first to see in the European horizon !

It was in the midst of this intoxication of grandeur, that the proposition to admit M. Nowosiltzoff reached Napoleon. He showed the best disposition to receive the Russian minister, to hear him, and to treat with him, no matter in what form, official or not, provided it was seriously intended; and that in endeavouring to act upon him, he did not exhibit any partial condescension for England. As to conditions, he was far from having any reckoning with the Russians. But he was ignorant of their offers; he saw only the previous step, which was couched in fitting terms, and he took good care not to be guilty of wrong in repelling them. He replied that he would receive M. Nowosiltzoff towards the month of July; his maritime projects, with which he had not ceased to occupy himself in spite of his apparent distractions from them, would not demand his presence in France until that period. Therefore he proposed to receive M. Nowosiltzoff to judge if he were worth the trouble of listening to, and he would in the mean time keep himself always in readiness to interrupt this diplomatic interview, in order to go and cut the Gordian knot of all the coalitions in London.

Although he knew not the secret of that which he had to organize, and was far from believing war as far advanced as it was in reality, he judged truly of the character of Alexander, and the unreflecting allurements that drew him rapidly towards the policy of England. In addressing to Prussia the passports of M. Nowosiltzoff, he ordered to be communicated to that court the following observations.

"The emperor," said the minister for foreign affairs to M. Laforest, "the emperor, after having read your despatch, has found that it justifies fully the fears which he had manifested in his letter to the king of Prussia, and all that recalls to his majesty the language held by the British ministers, tends to support him in this state of distrust. The emperor Alexander is drawn on in spite of himself; he cannot recognise that the plan of the English cabinet in offering him the character of a mediator is to bind together the interests of England with those of Russia, and to bring the last some day to take up arms to sanction a cause which will become its own.

"At the moment, when through his experience in public affairs, the emperor had acquired precise notions of the character of the emperor Alexander, he had felt that one day or another he would be drawn into the interests of England, that had so many means for gaining over a court as corrupt as that of St. Petersburg.

"However true this prospect of the future appeared to the emperor Napoleon, he has considered it coolly, and has provided in time for all that depended upon him. Independently of the conscription of the year, he has made an appeal to the reserve of the years XI. and XII., and has augmented by fifteen thousand men the appeal made to the conscription of the year XIII.

"At the least word that M. Nowosiltzoff utters intending a threat, insult, or hypothetical treaty with England, he must be listened to no more. If Russia or any other power on the continent wishes to interfere in the public affairs of the moment, and presses equally upon France and England, the emperor will not find fault, and will with pleasure make sacrifices. England on her side is bound to make those which are equivalent; but if, on the contrary, sacrifices are exacted of France alone, then whatever may be the union of the powers, the emperor will help himself against all their extended power by means of his good cause, his genius, and his arms[1]." (Milan, 15th Prairial, year XIII., 4th June, 1805.)

On the 26th of May, Napoleon was crowned in the cathedral of Milan with as much eclat as had been exhibited in Paris six months before, in presence of the foreign ministers and the deputies of all Italy. The iron crown, reputed to be the ancient crown of the Lombard kings, had been brought from Monza, where it was carefully kept. After cardinal Caprara, archbishop of Milan, had blessed it with the ancient forms used in respect to the German emperors, for their coronation as kings of Italy, Napoleon placed it himself upon his head, as he had placed that of the emperor of the French, pronouncing in Italian these sacramental words, "Dio me l'ha data, guai a chi la toccherà !" or "God gives it me, touch it who dares[2] !" In saying these words, he made

[1] In a speech of Talleyrand's, or one purporting to be his, in remarking upon the reply given by lord Mulgrave to the letter of Napoleon to the king of England (see page 606), is the following passage, a portion of which resembles the close of the above communication:—"Should, on the contrary, this first appearance of accommodation prove but a false light, intended only to answer speculations of credit, to facilitate a loan, the acquisition of money purchases or enterprizes, then we shall know how far the dispositions of the enemy are implacable and obstinate; we shall have to banish all hope from a dangerous lure, and trust, without reserve, to the goodness of our cause, to the justice of Providence, and to the genius of the emperor."—*Speech of Talleyrand, Feb.* 4.

[2] As in several other instances our author does not note the inevitable inferences that follow some of his statements. Thus he makes Napoleon refuse to permit the pope to place

those around him start by the significant energy of his accents. This pompous ceremonial prepared by the Italians, and principally by the celebrated painter Appiani, surpassed all that had been seen in former times of the finest things of a similar nature in Italy.

After this ceremony, Napoleon promulgated the organic statute, by which he erected in Italy a monarchy in imitation of that of France, and nominated as viceroy Eugene Beauharnais. He presented afterwards this young prince to the Italian nation, in a royal sitting of the legislative body. He employed all the month of June in presiding in the council of state, and in giving to the administration of Italy the impulse that had been given to the government of France, occupying himself day after day with all the details of public affairs.

The Italians, to whom it was necessary in order for their satisfaction that they should have a government present among them, had one now under their own eyes, that joined to its real value a prodigious magic in its forms. Thus snatched from their discontents, and from their repugnance for strangers, they had already rallied, high and low, around the new king. The presence of Napoleon, supported by his formidable armies that he had organized and completed for every event, had dissipated their fears of the war. The Italians began to think that they should never more behold it upon their territory if it took place, and that the sound would only come to them from the banks of the Danube, and even from the gates of Vienna. Napoleon passed in grand review every Sunday the troops of Milan; then he re-entered his palace, and received at a public audience the ambassadors of all the courts of Europe, the strangers of distinction, and above all the representatives of the great Italian families, and of the clergy. It was in one of these receptions that he made the exchange of the insignia of the Legion of Honour, with the insignia of the more ancient and the more illustrious orders of Europe. The minister of Prussia presented himself first, and remitted to Napoleon the orders of the Black and of the Red Eagle; then came the ambassador of Spain, who presented him the order of the Golden Fleece; then finally the ministers of Bavaria and of Portugal, who presented him with the orders of St. Hubert and of Christ. Napoleon gave them in exchange the grand order of the Legion of Honour, and granted a number of decorations equal to those which he received. He distributed afterwards his foreign decorations among the principal personages of his empire. In a few months the Italian court found itself on the same footing with all the courts of Europe; it carried the same insignia, with the rich costumes, inclining towards the military habit. In the midst of this eclat, Napoleon retained his own simplicity of person, having for a sole decoration, the plate of the Legion of Honour upon his breast, wearing the dress of the chasseurs of the guard, without any gold embroidery, a black hat, in which was alone displayed a tri-coloured cockade, as if he wished it should be well understood that the luxury which surrounded him was not made for himself. His noble and handsome countenance, around which the imagination of men placed so many glorious trophies, was all which he desired to exhibit to the eager attention of the natives. Still his person alone was that sought by every eye. He only was wished to be seen in the midst of his numerous retinue, blazing with gold, and arrayed in the coloured dresses of all Europe.

The different towns of Italy sent him deputations to obtain the favour of receiving him within their walls. It was not merely an honour, but an advantage they thus made an object of their ambition, because every where his penetrating eye discovered some good to be effected, and his powerful hand found the means of its accomplishment. Resolved to give the spring and half the summer to Italy, the better to divert the attention of the English from Boulogne, he promised to visit Mantua, Bergamo, Verona, Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, and Piacenza. This still more increased the delight of the Italians, and made them all hope to participate in the benefits of the new reign

His sojourn in this fine country soon produced upon him those formidable allurements which gave so strong a reason to fear for the maintenance of the general peace. He began to conceive an extreme irritation against the court of Naples, which giving itself entirely up to the English and Russians, publicly protected by the last in all their negotiations, did not cease to exhibit the most hostile sentiments to France. The improvident queen, who had suffered the government of her husband to be compromised by the most odious cruelties, had taken a step very unfortunately imagined. She had sent to Milan the most clumsy of negotiators in the prince Cardito, to protest against the title of king of Italy, taken by Napoleon, a title that a good many persons translated by those words inscribed on the iron crown, "king of all Italy, *rex totius Italiæ*." The marquis de Gallo, the ambassador of Naples, a man of good sense, sufficiently agreeable to the imperial court, had endeavoured to prevent this dangerous proceeding, but without success. Napoleon had consented to receive the prince Cardito on the day of the diplomatic receptions. That same day he first gave the most gracious welcome to M. de Gallo, then he addressed in Italian the fiercest speech to the prince Cardito, declaring to him, in language as severe as it was contemptuous for the queen, that he would chase her out of Italy, and would scarcely leave her Sicily for a refuge. They took away the prince Cardito nearly fainting. The noise of this affair produced a great sensation, and soon filled the despatches from all the European powers. Napoleon at that moment thought of making the kingdom of Naples a royalty for his family, and one of the fiefs of his great empire. By little and little it began to enter into his mind to expel the Bourbons from all the thrones in Europe. Still the accidental zeal

the crown on his head (see page 600), because the nation and the army would be hurt at the idea of his so receiving the crown; that the reality of things should be observed, and that Napoleon resisted this part of the ceremonies from the public feeling. At Milan, where no such feeling could exist, the error of that plea is laid bare, Napoleon showed that his motive was his own pride, and that the reason given at Paris must have been a plausible deception.—*Translator.*

the Bourbons of Spain exhibited in the war against the English, postponed as far as regarded them the accomplishment of this formidable idea. But Napoleon did not doubt that he should soon have Europe to model again, whether he should be all powerful by passing the straits of Dover, or whether diverted towards a continental war from that which was maritime, he achieved the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy; he said that he would unite the Venetian states to his kingdom of Lombardy, and that he would then effect the conquest of Naples for one of his brothers. But all this, in his designs, was for the moment deferred. Exclusively occupied with the plan of descent upon England, he would not provoke actually a continental war. He had, however, a disposition which he deemed opportune and free from danger in completing, this was to place a term to the unfortunate situation of the republic of Genoa. This republic, placed on the Mediterranean, where England domineered, and Piedmont that France had joined to its own territory, was situated as if imprisoned between two great powers, and saw its former prosperity perish; because it had all the inconveniences of a union with France to sustain without the advantages. In fact, the English had not been willing to acknowledge it, considering it as annexed to the French empire, and they pursued the vessels that bore its flag. The barbarians themselves pillaged and insulted it without any kind of respect. France treating it as a foreign land, had separated it from Piedmont and the territory of Nice, by lines of custom-houses and exclusive tariffs. Genoa was smothered in consequence between the sea and land, both of which were closed upon her. As to France, she did not gather more advantages from Genoa, than she procured for her. The Apennines that separated Genoa from Piedmont formed a frontier continually infested with robbers; it required the most numerous as well as the bravest gendarmerie to maintain the security of the roads. In relation to the navy, the treaty which had been recently concluded, only insured in a very incomplete manner the services which Genoa was able to render. The loan of a foreign port in which to found a naval establishment, without any direct authority over it, was an attempt which called for something more. By uniting the port of Genoa and the population of the Two-Rivers to the French empire, Napoleon obtained from the Texel to the bottom of the principal gulph in the Mediterranean, an extent of coast and a number of seamen, that might be able, in sufficient time, when united, to make France, if not the equal of England on the seas, at least her respectable rival there.

Napoleon did not resist all these considerations. He believed that it was England alone who would take any real interest in this question. He had not ventured to decide the fate of the duchy of Parma and Piacenza, either on account of the pope, to whom this duchy was a motive of hope, or because of Spain which coveted it to aggrandize the kingdom of Etruria, or in fact on account of Russia itself, that never wholly despaired of the indemnity of the former king of Piedmont in Italy, while there remained any territory vacant in that country. But Genoa seemed to him of little interest for Austria, for it was situated too far away, of no consideration for the pope or Russia, not important, according to him, with any one but England; and not having any motive to humour her, and not believing her so strongly allied as she was to Russia, he resolved to unite the Ligurian republic to the French empire [1].

It was a fault, because in the disposition of the mind of Austria, it was to throw her into the arms of the coalition, and to settle a new union; it was to furnish to the enemies of France, who filled Europe with perfidious rumours, a new pretext grounded upon the cry against the ambition of France, and above all against the violation of her promises, while Napoleon himself, when instituting the kingdom of Italy, had promised the senate not to add a single province more to his empire. But Napoleon, who knew enough of the bad designs of the continent to believe himself free of the necessity of humouring it, but not enough to appreciate justly the danger of a new provocation, flattered himself besides that he was soon to resolve in London all the European ques-

[1] This breach of faith, admitted by our author, is not in the slightest degree softened by his attempted extenuation. There were other questions equally as much violations of acknowledged and implied engagements as the foregoing, which show that Napoleon, like all great conquerors, had no law but his own personal ambition. Austria, with all her faults, put forth incontrovertible aggressions on the part of Napoleon as grounds for the pending war. Among them, in a memorial issued at the time, were the following:—The occupation of Hanover, of the papal states, and of the kingdom of Naples, as well as the Helvetian republic, contrary to the solemn treaties of Ratisbon and Luneville; the incorporation of Piedmont with the French empire; the invasion of the German empire, by the seizure of the duke d'Enghien on neutral ground; the seizure of several islands on the Rhine, which, according to the treaty of Ratisbon, belonged to the German empire, the demand to occupy the sea-ports of Dalmatia; the demand to occupy the capital of Naples, its forts and sea-ports; the occupation of all the sea-ports of Etruria; the demand to occupy certain sea-ports in Sicily; the creation of a new kingdom in Italy, contrary to the secret articles of the treaty of Luneville; the incorporation of Genoa with the French empire; the insulting answers given to count Cobentzel, on his representations in behalf of the emperor of Austria; and, lastly, a plan discovered by the other powers for placing the brothers of Napoleon upon thrones in the south of Europe. These were strong circumstances in proof of the restless ambition of the emperor Napoleon, and that the sole absorption of Genoa into the French empire, and gift of Lucca to his sister, in a time of peace, and contrary to his own promises to the French senate, were not the only legitimate ground of complaint his enemies could rightly urge against him, while forming, in their own defence, however deficient in skill its execution might have been afterwards, a league which gave them some hope of overturning a system which, as the event proved, could not be otherwise than the precursor of a never-ending war in Europe. Indeed, his determination to found an empire of the West, admitted by M. Thiers, having attached to it vassal kings, was quite enough to justify war to the uttermost against a system so destructive of peace, of national rights, and overwhelmingly arbitrary. The splendid talents of Napoleon were thus obscured by an ambition it became the duty of every people to resist. Every effort to soften acts of ambitious and arbitrary violence, some of them, perhaps, admitting of partial excuses, are lost in the paramount duty of a universal resistance to predominant efforts for personal aggrandisement.—*Translator.*

tions, and therefore did not hesitate, indeed determined at once, to give up Genoa to the French navy. He had, as minister at the republic of Genoa, his compatriot Salicetti, whom he charged with the task of sounding and preparing the public mind. This task was not difficult, because the public mind in Liguria was very well disposed for the purpose. The aristocratical and anglo-Austrian party could not be more hostile than it was. The actual protectorate under which Genoa was placed, seemed to be as odious to that party as the union with France. As to the popular party, it saw in this union the freedom of its commerce with the interior of the empire, the certainty of great future prosperity, the guarantee that it should never again fall under the yoke of an oligarchy, in fact the advantage of belonging to the greatest power in Europe. The minority of the nobility, borne away by the revolutionary feeling, alone saw with pain the destruction of Genoese neutrality, but the great extortions of the imperial court were an inducement sufficient to indemnify the principal personages of this class.

The proposition proposed by some senators, and presented by the Genoese senate, was finally adopted by twenty-two members to twenty. It was afterwards confirmed by a species of popular suffrage, given on the plan employed in France subsequent to the consulate. Registers were opened, in which each individual might inscribe his name. The people of Genoa came forward, as they had done in France, to enter their suffrages, nearly all favourable. The senate and the doge, on the advice of Salicetti, went to Milan, there to present their wishes to Napoleon. They were introduced to his presence with a degree of preparation which recalled the times when vanquished nations came to demand the honour to become a part of the Roman empire. Napoleon received them upon his throne, on the 4th of June, declared that he granted their wish, and promised to visit them upon quitting Italy [1].

To this incorporation there was another added, less important, being no more than a drop of water that has run over the vessel. The republic of Lucca was without any government, and was without ceasing, tossed about between Etruria become Spanish, and Piedmont become French, like a vessel deprived of the helm, a small vessel it is true, upon a little sea. The same suggestions disposed the little state to offer itself to France, and its magistrates, in imitation of those of Genoa, went to demand at Milan the benefit of a constitution and a government. Napoleon also acceded to their wishes; but finding the state too far off to be united with the empire, he made of their territory an appanage for his eldest sister, the princess Eliza, a woman of judgment, having a fine mind, gifted with the qualities of a governing queen. She knew how to make her authority be loved in this little country, where she administered the government wisely; this caused her reception of the title devised appropriately for her by Talleyrand of the "Semiramis of Lucca." Napoleon had already conferred upon her the duchy of Piombino: he this time therefore gave to her and her husband, the prince Bacciochi, the country of Lucca in the form of an hereditary principality, dependent upon the French empire, to return to the crown in case of the extinction of the male line, with all the conditions in consequence, like the ancient fiefs of the Germanic empire. This sister was to bear for the future the title of the princess of Piombino and Lucca.

Talleyrand was ordered to write to Prussia and Austria, to explain these acts, that Napoleon regarded as matters of indifference to the policy of those powers, or at least as not being capable of arousing the court of Vienna from its inertness. However, so far concealed as were the armaments of Austria, something of them had been discovered, and the experienced regard of Napoleon had been struck by it. Corps were in movement towards the Tyrol, and towards the ancient Venetian provinces. The march of these troops could not be denied, and Austria did not deny it; but she was forced to declare that the great union of French troops at Marengo and Castiglione, appearing to her too considerable for simple military fêtes, she had caused some assemblages out of pure precaution—assemblages which had besides a sufficient motive, in that the yellow fever had broken out in Spain and in Tuscany, above all, in Leghorn. This excuse was, as far as to a certain point, credible; but it was a question to know, if the movement was limited to the change of place of some troops, or whether it was a real recruiting of the army; whether they were completing the regiments, and whether they were mounting their cavalry. More than one secret notice transmitted by Poles attached to France, began to give these things an air of truth. Napoleon immediately sent officers, disguised for the purpose, into the Tyrol, Friouli, and Carinthia, to judge with their own eyes of the nature of the preparations which they thus excused, and he demanded at the same time from Austria decided explanations.

He devised another mode to sound the dispositions of that court. He had exchanged the Legion of Honour with the orders of friendly courts; he had not yet effected this exchange with the Austrian orders, and he wished to place himself on the same footing with that power as with all the others. He had therefore an idea of addressing upon this subject an immediate proposition to Austria at once to assure himself of her real sentiments. He thought

[1] The union of Genoa with France took place at mid-day. The doge addressed the emperor, soliciting him to grant the people the happiness of being his subjects. Napoleon returned a very long answer, in which he said, "I will realize your wish; I will unite you to my great people. It will be to me a new means for rendering more efficacious the protection I have always loved to grant you. My people will receive you with pleasure. They know that, in all circumstances, you have assisted their arms with friendship, and have supported them with all your means. They find besides in your ports an increase of maritime power, which is necessary to them to sustain their lawful rights against the oppressor of the seas. You will find in union with my people a continent. You have only ports, and a marine. You will find a flag which, whatever may be the pretensions of my enemies, I will maintain on all the seas of the universe constantly free from insult and from search, and exempt from the right of blockade, which I will never recognise but for places really blockaded as well by sea as by land. You will find yourselves sheltered under it from this shameful slavery, the existence of which I reluctantly suffer with respect to weaker nations, but from which I will always guarantee my subjects."—*Translator.*

that if she had in fact decided upon an approaching war, she dared not in the face of Europe and its allies give a testimony of her cordial friendship, which, according to the usages of courts, was the most significant that could be given, above all, to a power as new as that of the French empire. M. de la Rochefoucauld had replaced at Vienna, M. de Champagny, now become minister of the interior. He was commanded to desire of Austria an explanation of her armaments, and to propose to her an exchange of her orders against that of the order of the Legion of Honour.

Napoleon continuing from the bottom of Italy to keep the English in the illusion, that the descent so long announced and so retarded, was no more than a feint, occupied himself continually to insure its execution in the summer. Never had an operation determined before the sending off so many couriers as that which was at this period the subject of meditation. Consular agents and officers of the navy, placed in the French and Spanish ports, at Carthagena, Cadiz, Ferrol, Bayonne, the mouth of the Gironde, Rochefort, the mouth of the Loire, Lorient, Brest, and Cherburg, having couriers placed at their disposal, transmitted the least news from the sea which reached them, and forwarded them to Italy. Numerous secret agents, maintained in the English ports, forwarded their reports, which were immediately transmitted to Napoleon. Lastly, M. de Marbois, who possessed an extensive knowledge of British affairs, received the particular injunction to read himself the journals published in England [1], and to translate the least news relative to naval operations; and it is a circumstance worthy of remark, that it was by these journals, more particularly, that Napoleon knowing how to anticipate with perfect correctness all the combinations of the English admiralty, came to be the better informed. Although oftentimes stating circumstances that were false, they furnished to his wonderful sagacity a means of divining real facts. There was something still more singular yet. On the strength of attributing to Napoleon the most extraordinary plans, and often the most absurd possible, some among these journalists had discovered, without doubting it, his real design, and had said that he had sent his squadrons to sea at a distance that they might suddenly re-unite in the channel. The admiralty had made no arrangement whatever that implied such a supposition, which was nevertheless the real fact. At least, their combinations leave it to be supposed that they did not credit any thing of the kind.

Napoleon, except one circumstance which had much thwarted him, and that had determined him to modify for the last time his vast design, had no reason to be dissatisfied with the progress of his operations. Admiral Missiessy, as has been seen before, had set sail to the West Indies in January. The details of his expedition were not yet fully known, but it was well known that the English were very much alarmed for their colonies, that one of them, Dominica, had been taken [1], and that they had sent reinforcements into the American seas, which was a diversion at least to the advantage of the French in the European. Admiral Villeneuvè sailed from Toulon on the 30th of March, after a navigation, the details of which were unknown, he appeared before Cadiz, and there rallied around him the Spanish squadron of admiral Gravina, with a Spanish division of six vessels of the line, and several frigates, besides the French ship of the line the Aigle, and had then sailed towards Martinique. There had been no news of him subsequently, but it was known that Nelson, who had been ordered to guard the Mediterranean, had not been able to overtake him, neither on his sailing from Toulon, nor on his exit from the straits of Gibraltar. The Spanish seamen had done their best in the state of deprivation in which they were so unfortunately left, under an ignorant government, inert and corrupt. Admiral Salcedo had united a squadron of seven sail of the line at Carthagena; admiral Gravina, as already seen, had six in Cadiz; admiral Grandellana, had a third squadron of eight sail in Ferrol, which would operate with the French division that was in harbour in that port. But they wanted seamen, in consequence of the fever, and of the bad state of the Spanish commerce, and they took fishermen and workmen in the towns to form the crews. Lastly, a dearth

[1] At present people are startled at the ignorance in the simplest results worked out by the English cabinet during the administration of Mr. Pitt, with all his ability. There was a want of acquaintance with what was really going on in the world, and of consequences inevitable in the then existing state of social life, that shows how contracted was the knowledge of government of the commonest details. While Bonaparte thus obtained and read the English papers, it had been believed by our rulers that during war no papers reached the enemy, and so perfect was this belief, at least prior to the treaty of Amiens, that in Mr. Pitt's act of parliament for restricting the liberty of the newspaper press, for it can be called nothing else, there is a penalty of 500*l.* attached to the parting with any English newspaper to an enemy, lest that enemy, it was supposed, should obtain information about England. In existing times the minister would be thought demented who should make it penal for any one to part with the copy of a journal of which tens of thousands were every where in circulation. The truth was, that the government then had no idea of an enemy ascertaining the real state of facts but through such means. Secret agency was believed scarcely to exist, being punishable with death. They had no idea that the best policy in a strong country is to make no secret of its strength. The suspicion of wrong colouring that attached to the statements of government partizans was then never thought equal to the neutralization of their deceptions. Bonaparte had a regularly organized connexion kept up between the English and French smugglers, who constantly exchanged newspapers. The French papers being under a strict censorship, the advantage derived from them was comparatively of no moment to England.—*Translator.*

[1] This is not correct, the island was never taken. On the 22nd of February, the French landed a large force off the town of Rosseau, into which the squadron of Missiessy, consisting of five sail of the line, three frigates, and two brigs, one the Majesteux, 120 guns, poured their fire. In all, they landed 4000 men; they were resisted by about an eighth part of that number of regulars and militia, who were compelled to retreat. The town of Rosseau was burned, but sir George Prevost maintained the island in the fort of prince Rupert; and the French, levying a contribution on the people of Rosseau, embarked again, remaining on shore only four or five days. They landed 500 men at Basseterre, St. Kitt's, burned some merchantmen, and levied a contribution of 18,000*l.* there being no force to resist them, their object was to ravage where no opposition of moment was to be expected. The conduct of general La Grange, who commanded the troops at Dominica, was humane and honourable.—*Translator.*

of corn joined to the financial difficulties, and the epidemic fever, had so much impoverished the Spanish resources, that they had not been able to procure more than six months' provision of the biscuit necessary for each squadron. Admiral Gravina had scarcely brought enough for three months, when he joined Villeneuve; and admiral Grandellana at Ferrol had barely enough for fifteen days' consumption.

Happily, M. Ouvrard, who it has been already seen was charged with business between France and Spain, had arrived at Madrid, had delighted by his very seducing projects a court over head and ears in debt, had obtained its confidence, had concluded with it a treaty of which a description will hereafter be given, and had put an end by his different combinations to the horrors of the scarcity. He had in the mean time provided for the Spanish fleet a certain quantity of biscuit. Things went on therefore in the ports of the peninsula as well as could be expected or hoped for under the destitution of the Spanish finances.

But while admiral Missiessy spread consternation through the English West India islands, and admirals Villeneuve and Gravina united, navigated without accident towards Martinique, Ganteaume who was to join them, owing to a sort of phenomenon in the season, had not been able to find a single day for the purpose of sailing out of Brest. There had never been seen in the memory of man a time when the equinox had not manifested itself by some gale of wind. The months of March, April, and May, 1805, had nevertheless passed away, without the English fleet having been once forced to retire by stress of weather. Admiral Ganteaume, who knew in what an immense operation he had been called upon to concur, waited with impatience the moment to get out to sea, and at last concluded by becoming ill from chagrin [1]. The weather always remained calm and serene. Sometimes a wind from the West, accompanied with dark clouds, had given them hopes of a storm, when all of a sudden the heavens became serene and fine. There remained no other resource than to deliver a disadvantageous battle to a fleet which was now about equal in number to the French squadron, and very superior in appointment. The English, without questioning precisely what it was that threatened, struck with the presence of a fleet at Brest, and another at Ferrol, aroused besides by the departures from Toulon and Cadiz, had augmented the force of their blockading squadrons. They had twenty vessels before Brest, commanded bp admiral Cornwallis, and seven or eight before Ferrol, commanded by admiral Calder. Admiral Ganteaume in this position sailed from the road, and entering again, went to moor at Berthaume, then returning to the interior anchorage, had kept for two months every body snug on board, both sailors and soldiers. He demanded in his mortification, if

[1] The last two letters here cited will prove the state of mind of this admiral, and the gravity of the grand naval projects, which persons who could always see faults where there were none, have supposed to be no other than a demonstration. These letters are not the only ones of the same kind. But these are selected from a number for the purpose of citation.

Ganteaume to the Emperor.

On board the Imperial, 11th of Floréal, Year XIII. 1st of May, 1805.

SIRE,—The extraordinary weather which has reigned since we were in communication is despairing; it is impossible to picture to you the painful sentiments that I experience in seeing myself thus detained in port, when the other squadrons are in full sail towards their destination, and that our delays and crosses may most cruelly compromise them; this last and affecting idea leaves me not a moment of repose; and as far as up to this day, I have resisted the impatience and torment that devour me; it arises from my not being able to see, in our hazarding ourselves at sea, any chances in our favour, when they are all for the enemy: a disadvantageous battle was, and is again, inevitable, while the enemy shall remain in his position, and then our expedition will be without the resource required, and our forces for a long while paralyzed.

Nevertheless, at the moment when I received the dispatch of your majesty, of the 3rd Floréal, I proposed to myself the hazard of setting sail; all the vessels were unmoored; the wind to the west, which had blown with little strength for twelve hours, made me hope that the enemy would have perhaps sailed at large, when his light squadron was perceived from our anchoring-ground, and his fleet signalled off Ushant, but the uncertainty and weakness of the wind prevented me from giving effect to my object. Certain to be obliged to bring up in the road of Bertheaume, and to fix the attention of the enemy, I have renounced all movement, and I hope I have made him believe that our desire was not to go to sea.

I permit myself here to reiterate to your majesty the assurance that I have already given in respect to the order and situation in which I keep all the ships; the crews are all at their posts, the communications with the shore only take place for such objects as are indispensable for the service, and at any hour of the day every vessel is in a state to execute the signals which may be made to it; these dispositions, which can alone enable us to profit by the first favourable moment, will be continued with the most perfect exactness.

Ganteaume to Decres.

The 7th Floréal, Year XIII. 27th April, 1805.

I Judge, my friend, that thou partakest in all I sustain. Every day that passes is a day of torment for me, and I tremble lest I am obliged at last to commit some piece of gross stupidity! The winds, that for two days had been to the west, but feeble, although accompanied with rain and a stormy appearance, went round yesterday to the N.N.W. fresh; and I have been tempted to run hazards, in spite of the enemy continuing to be signalled in the Yroise, that their advanced vessels were in sight of the road, and that the weather was very clear. The certainty, nevertheless, of the disadvantageous battle, that I should receive from his position and strength, has hindered me, and I felicitate myself to-day; but I do not remain less horribly vexed.

The length of the days, and the beauty of the season, make me nearly despair of the expedition; and then how support the idea of forcing our friends to wait uselessly at the place of rendezvous, and compromise them, by exposing them necessarily to delays, and to a return extremely dangerous? These ideas do not leave me a moment of tranquility, and I believe that they must equally torment thee. Still, my friend, thou wilt easily be persuaded that it is impossible for me to do better, at least to have been willing to run the hazard of an affair that had, independently of the chances that gave to the enemy his superiority, equally caused the failure of the expedition. Thus, as I have said, the weather has always been such, that it has been impossible for us to steal away.

Although thou hast recommended me in thy last letters to write often to the emperor, I dare not write him with nothing to say, as I have nought agreeable to announce; I hold my peace, and wait events, not willing for a little to importune him: I limit myself to desiring that he will do us justice.

they wished he should fight a battle to gain the open sea, the thing which he had been expressly forbidden from doing.

Napoleon, calculating that having arrived at the middle of May, it would become dangerous to make Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy wait longer in Martinique, as the English squadrons gone in their pursuit would finish by overtaking them, modified once again this part of his plan. He decided, that if Ganteaume was not able to set sail before the 20th of May, he would not be able to sail at all, and that he should wait at Brest until they came to raise the blockade. Villeneuve had orders therefore to return to Europe with Gravina, and to do that which was at first confided to Ganteaume, in other words to raise the blockade of Ferrol, where he would find five French and seven Spanish vessels, to touch afterwards at Rochefort, if possible to rally Missiessy, probably about that time returned from the West Indies, and finally to appear before Brest to open the sea to Ganteaume, which would carry his total forces up to fifty-six sail of the line. He would then enter the channel with that fleet, the greatest which had ever appeared upon the ocean.

This plan was perfectly practicable, and had even great chances of success, as the event will soon prove. However, it was less certain of success than the preceding. In effect, if Ganteaume had been able to put to sea in April, raise the blockade of Ferrol, which was possible, without a battle, because only five or six English vesselswere before the port, then to reach Martinique, the union having taken place between Villeneuve and Gravina, without any probability of a battle, they would have re-appeared in Europe to the number of fifty vessels, not needing to touch at any port before penetrating into the channel. He would not have had any other chances to run than those encountered at sea, chances so rare that they might be placed out of the account. The new plan, on the contrary, had the inconvenience of exposing Villeneuve to a battle before Ferrol, and another before Brest; and although the superiority of the force in the encounters would have been great, there was no assurance that the two squadrons of which he had come to raise the blockade, might have time to come to his aid, and take a part in the battle. The outlet from Ferrol, as well as from Brest, is by a narrow passage; there as elsewhere the wind that allows of entrance is not that which will permit the sailing out, and it was very possible, that a battle might be fought at the entrance of these ports, and be terminated before the fleet placed within them could arrive to participate in it. A battle of which the issue was doubtful, was capable of demoralising the admirals whose confidence at sea was not great, however brave they were personally. Admiral Villeneuve, above all, though an intrepid mariner, never had a degree of firmness proportionable to such hazards; and he had to regret indeed that the beauty of the weather had hindered the first combination.

There was yet another plan at which Napoleon stood still a moment, that would procure less force, but which would conduct a fleet into the channel in a manner yet more sure; this was to carry Villeneuve neither before Brest nor Ferrol, but to make him go about by Scotland, and then sail afterwards by the north sea before Boulogne. It is true he would have arrived with twenty sail in place of fifty; but that would suffice for three days command of the channel, and the flotilla, sufficiently protected, would have passed in perfect safety. This idea presented itself for an instant before the mind of Napoleon, he wrote it down, then wishing still more of security, he preferred a larger junction, and a more powerful force, to the greater certainty of arrival in the channel, and he returned to the plan of raising the blockade of Ferrol and Brest by Villeneuve.

This was the last change made in his design by circumstances. It was in the midst of a fête, as he recounted himself in the postscript of one of his letters, that he ruminated over all these combinations, and decided. He gave immediately the necessary instructions. Two vessels had been prepared at Rochefort; rear-admiral Magon commanded them. He set sail forthwith to announce at Martinique the change that had occurred in the determinations of Napoleon. Frigates equipped at Lorient, Nantes, and Rochefort, were ready to sail, when they were assured that Ganteaume would not go; they were ordered to carry Villeneuve a command to return immediately to Europe, in order to execute the new plan. Each frigate was to be accompanied by a brig, furnished with a duplicate of the orders. If the frigate were taken, the brig would save itself, and transmit the duplicate. The dispatches were enclosed in leaden boxes, and given to the captains in confidence, to be thrown into the sea in case of danger. These precautions and those which follow are worthy of being mentioned, for the information of governments.

To the end that the fleets of Brest and Ferrol should be able to second those which came to raise their blockade, great precautions had been taken. Ganteaume was to moor out of the road of Brest in the creek of Berthaume, an open place of doubtful security. In order to correct this defect, a general of artillery had been sent from Paris, and one hundred and fifty cannon were placed in battery for the support of the squadron. Gourdon replaced admiral Boudet at Ferrol, who had fallen sick, and was ordered to sail from Ferrol to Corunna, the anchorage of which is open, and to conduct thither the French divisions. It had been prescribed to admiral Grandellana to do the same with the Spanish vessels. The court of Spain had been solicited to take similar precautions to those which had been taken at Berthaume, with the object of ensuring the security of the anchorage by batteries. Finally, in order to provide in case the vessels charged with the duty of raising the blockade should have consumed their provisions, there were prepared at Ferrol, Rochefort, Brest, and Cherburg, barrels of biscuit amounting to many millions of rations, that could be embarked without losing an instant. An order awaited admiral Missiessy at Rochefort, if here turned and re-entered there, enjoining it upon him to depart again immediately, to go and make Ireland uneasy by appearing off the coast for a few days, and then to cruise at some distance from Ferrol in a determined latitude, when admiral Villeneuve having received notice of it by a frigate, would encounter him.

While these precautionary measures were taken

regarding the navy, the continual and secret cares bestowed upon the army tended to the effective augmentation of the war battalions on the shores of the ocean. The troops of the expedition amounted then to one hundred and sixty thousand men, not including the corps at Brest, that had been dispersed since the new destination assigned to Ganteaume. Admiral Verhuell, with the Batavian fleet, had received orders to unite at Ambleteuse, in order that the entire expedition should be able to set out from the four ports dependent upon Boulogne. These ports of artificial creation, had got blocked up with sand during the two years since they had been constructed. New works had cleared them again. Further, they had repaired the vessels of the flotilla, somewhat injured by their continual going in and out, and by a troubled mooring ground the whole length of the external anchorage.

While expediting such a multitude of orders, Napoleon continued his journey in Italy. He had visited Bergamo, Verona, Mantua, been present at a representation of the battle of Castiglione, by twenty-five thousand men, on the ground of the very same battle; he had dwelt several days in Bologna, to the delight of the learned men of that celebrated university; then he had traversed Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and finally the magnificent Genoa, acquired by the stroke of a pen. He passed there from the 30th of June to the 7th of July, in the midst of fêtes worthy of the marble city, and superior to all those which the Italians had devised of the finest character for his reception. He encountered there an illustrious personage, fatigued with an exile which had lasted for twelve years, and an opposition that his religious duties had no longer justified. The pope had given him an example which he was himself decided finally to follow, and he had taken the resolution of attaching himself to the restorer of the altar. It was at Genoa that he had managed to contrive the occasion for entering into favour. Like the partisans of Pompey, who one after another endeavoured to encounter Cesar in one of the cities of the Roman empire, in order to deliver themselves voluntarily to his seductions, Cardinal Maury in the city of Genoa had found himself incline towards the new Cesar. He was received with the courtesy of a man of genius, desiring to please a man of intellect, and was enabled to foresee that his return to France would be repaid with the highest dignities of the church.

After having received the oath from the Genoese, and prepared with the engineer Forfait the future naval establishment that he wished to form in that sea, confiding to the archtreasurer Lebrun the care of organizing the administration of this new part of the empire, Napoleon departed for Turin, where he feigned to occupy all his time with reviews of his troops; then on the 8th of July in the evening, leaving the empress in Italy, he went forward with two post carriages in the plainest manner, and passed on his way for the minister of the interior. He arrived in eighty hours at Fontainbleau, which he reached at eleven in the morning. The archchancellor Cambacérès and the ministers were there to receive his commands. He was going to set off upon an expedition that would either make him absolute master of the world, or like a new Pharaoh would engulph him in the ocean. He had never been more calm, nor more full of activity, nor more confident of success. But men of the greatest talent may have noble wishes; while their wills, powerful as ever they may be, as the wills of all men, are scarcely more than caprices without force, when Providence decrees it otherwise. Here is a very memorable example of this fact. Whilst Napoleon had prepared every thing for an encounter with Europe in arms between Boulogne and Dover, Providence had prepared the contest for him in very different and distant places!

The emperor Alexander had adjourned the ratification of the treaty which constituted the new coalition, until the moment when England consented to evacuate Malta. Not doubting of a favourable reply, he had demanded passports for M. Nowosiltzoff, in order to place him as early as possible in relation with Napoleon. The emperor Alexander, less belligerent in a certain degree as he approached the moment that was to decide peace or war, had hoped by this promptitude to augment the chances of peace. But he had illjudged the feeling of the cabinet of London, resolved to keep the capital position, which the hazard of events and an act of bad faith had placed in its hands. It positively refused to abandon the Island of Malta. This intelligence received in St. Petersburg, while M. Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, had thrown the Russian cabinet into indescribable trouble. What should be done! Passing over to the will of England, submitting to her intractable ambition, was in the eyes of Europe to accept the most secondary character. It was to renounce the negotiation of M. Nowosiltzoff, because he would be sent from Paris, even on the day of his arrival, and perhaps in a very humiliating fashion, if he did not take with him the evacuation of Malta. This was then equal to an immediate war on account of England, at her suit and expence, and Europe knowing, too, that it was so. On the contrary, to treat with her upon her refusal, was to avow, publicly, that Russia had treated with her politically without making it known, it was to give up the game to the advantage of Napoleon in the face of the world, and to place Russia in a ridiculous state of isolation, embroiled with England for her purposes and with France for acts of rashness. Russia could not wish to be at the mercy of England, nor to fall back upon the mercy of Napoleon, who would be the master of the conditions upon which it should be on terms of approximation with France.

If Napoleon, by the error he had committed of uniting Genoa with France, had not come to the aid of the Russian cabinet[1], he would have seen his enemies plunged into the greatest confusion. In fact, the Russian cabinet was occupied in deliberating upon this serious subject, when it was apprised of the annexation of Genoa. This was a matter of real joy, because that unforeseen event drew out from a state of embarrassment the men of the cabinet, who were so very imprudently committed. They resolved to make much noise about it, and to say in very high terms, that they were

[1] It is upon authentic documents that I recount this embarrassment of the Russian cabinet.—*Note of the Author.*

no longer able to treat with a government, which every day committed fresh usurpations. They found here a pretext quite natural for recalling M. Nowosiltzoff from Berlin, and immediately sent him an order to return to Petersburg, leaving a note for the king of Prussia [2], to explain this change of determination. They held themselves now dispensed with insisting on any thing relative to Malta on the part of England; they ratified the treaty, comprising the third coalition, and alleged the recent usurpations of the emperor of the French as the cause.

M. Nowosiltzoff was himself at Berlin, where the king of Prussia had finally arrived. The order for his recal surprised and mortified him deeply, because it was an opportunity lost to enter upon the finest of negotiations. He did not dissimulate his displeasure to the king himself, and to let his majesty know his own personal disposition to attempt every thing to gain the emperor Napoleon, if he had himself gone to Paris, and the concessions to which he would have subscribed in the name of his court. This was another reason for the king of Prussia to deplore the new allurement to which Napoleon had yielded, and to make to him his ordinary complaints, very mild according to custom, but also very plaintive, because every chance more of the kind added to the chances of war, which were already so numerous and deeply affecting to him.

At Vienna the effect was still more decisive. It was not the embarrassment of the rash conduct, that had been suddenly disclosed by the annexation of Genoa, it was the protracted hesitation of prudence. Austria had long seen that Napoleon desired to have the entire of Italy, and was unable to brook the abandonment of it to him, without combating another time with the courage of despair. But the Austrian finances were in a deplorable state; a frightful dearth of corn afflicted higher and lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. Bread was so dear at Vienna, that the people of that capital, commonly so mild and submissive, carried themselves so far as to pillage the shops of some of the bakers. In this situation they would have hesitated a great while to run themselves into the expences of a third contest against so formidable an adversary as Napoleon; but on hearing of the annexation of Genoa, and the creation of the duchy of Lucca, all these uncertainties ceased at the same moment. The resolution to combat was immediately taken. Despatches sent to St. Petersburg announced the definitive resolution, and filled the Russian cabinet with joy, that seeing itself drawn into a war, regarded the concurrence of Austria as the most fortunate of events.

The adhesion of this court to the treaty of coalition was signed on the spot. Russia was charged

[1] This note, addressed to baron Hardenberg the Prussian minister, on the 10th of July, 1805, was as follows:—

"His imperial majesty of Russia availed himself of the mediation of his Prussian majesty when he required passports for his plenipotentiary. He declared that he should only receive them on that particular condition, namely, that his plenipotentiary should enter directly upon a negotiation with the chief of the French government, without acknowledging the new title which he had assumed; and that Bonaparte should give explicit assurances that he was still animated by the same wish for a general peace which he had appeared to show in his letter to his Britannic majesty.

"This preliminary assurance was the more necessary, since Bonaparte had assumed the title of king of Italy immediately after the receipt of the answer given by his Britannic majesty to his letter of the 1st of January; a title which in itself put a new obstacle in the way of the desired restoration of peace.

"After his Prussian majesty had transmitted the positive answer from the cabinet of the Tuileries, that it persevered in the intention sincerely to lend its hand to a pacific negotiation, his imperial majesty of Russia accepted the passports more readily, because the French government showed so strong an inclination to transmit them.

"By a fresh transgression of the most solemn treaties, the union of the Ligurian republic with France has been effected. This event of itself, the circumstances which have accompanied it, the formalities which have been employed to hasten the execution, have, alas! formed an aggregate which must terminate the sacrifice which his imperial majesty of Russia would have made, at the pressing request of Great Britain, and in the hope of restoring the necessary tranquillity to Europe by the means of negotiation.

"Without doubt his imperial majesty of Russia would not have insisted so strenuously on the conditions fixed by him, if the French government had fulfilled the hope that it would respect the first tie which holds society together, and which upholds the confidence of engagements between civilized nations; but it cannot possibly be believed that Bonaparte, when he granted the passports, which were accompanied with the most pacific declarations, seriously intended to fulfil them; because, during the time which would necessarily elapse between the granting of the passports and the arrival of the undersigned at Paris, he took measures which, far from facilitating the restoration of peace, were of such a nature, that they annihilated the very grounds of peace.

"The undersigned, in recalling to the recollection of his excellency baron Hardenberg, facts with which the cabinet of his Prussian majesty is very minutely acquainted, must at the same time inform him, that he has just now received from his Russian majesty an order, dated the 9th (21st) June, to return the annexed passports immediately, and to request your excellency to transmit the same to the French government, with this present declaration, since no use can be made of them in the present state of affairs."

The following note, with a copy of the above, was transmitted by baron Hardenberg, the Prussian minister of state, to M. Laforest, the French minister at the court of Prussia, dated July 11, 1805:—

"The undersigned minister of state and of the cabinet, with the deepest regret finds himself under the necessity of communicating to M. Laforest, envoy-extraordinary and minister-plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of the French, the note which M. Nowosiltzoff has addressed to him, upon returning him the French passport (the original is here annexed); at the same time announcing to him the order which his majesty of all the Russias has transmitted to him, in consequence of the recent changes in Italy, and especially the union of the Ligurian republic with the French empire, not to proceed upon his journey to France. His majesty could not but feel the greatest concern in seeing thus confirmed the fears which, from the moment the intelligence of that unexpected event transpired, it was impossible not to entertain respecting the effect which it might produce on the salutary negotiation which it was under deliberation to open. The earnest desire which his majesty has always cherished, and of which he has given repeated proofs, for the restoration of peace, is the strongest assurance of the sentiments of concern with which he is affected upon this occasion."

to negotiate with England for the service of Austria the largest possible sum as a subsidy. They demanded and obtained, for the first expenses of opening the campaign, 1,000,000*l.* sterling, or 25,000,000 f. More than that, the instantaneous remission of half the annual subsidy of 2,000,000*l.* sterling, or 50,000,000f. The plan of the campaign was discussed between M. Vinzingerode and the prince Swartzenberg, and arranged on the 16th of July. It was agreed that ten thousand Russians, and some thousand Albanians, thrown in a proper season and place upon Naples, should there operate a movement towards Lower Italy, whilst one hundred thousand Austrians should march upon Lombardy; that the grand Austrian army, supported by a Russian force of sixty-thousand men at least, should enter by Gallicia, and act in Bavaria; that an army of eighty-thousand Russians should advance towards Prussia; that another Russian, English, Hanoverian, and Swedish army, assembled in Swedish Pomerania, should be directed upon Hanover; that, in fine, the Russians should have considerable reserves to bring up in case of need. The English were to operate by disembarkations upon those points of the French empire that were judged most accessible, as soon as the diversion with which Napoleon was threatened should have brought about the dispersion of the army assembled upon the shores of the ocean. It was agreed that the troops designed to go to the succour of Austria should be ready to march before the autumn of the existing year, in order to hinder Napoleon from taking advantage of the winter season to crush the Austrian army.

It was agreed besides that the court of Vienna, continuing its system of profound dissimulation, should persist in the denial of its armaments, while arming more actively than ever; and then, when it could no longer dissimulate, it should speak of negotiation, and retake up for itself and Russia the negotiations abandoned by M. Nowositzoff. It was again, this time, to deny all connexion with England, and to appear to treat only for the continent. The ordinary falsehood of weakness characterised all this conduct. Prussia suffered cruel anxiety: she foresaw, without penetrating it completely, the determination made to commence war, and she defended herself against any engagement on one side or another, by saying to Russia that she was too much exposed to the blows of Napoleon; and by saying to Napoleon, that she would have renewed her offers of alliance had she not been too much exposed to the blows of Russia.

M. Zastrow had returned from Petersburg after a very disagreeable mission, followed by no result. An unforeseen circumstance just missed bringing about the sudden discovery of the coalition, and the obligation that Prussia should declare herself. Since a treaty of subsidy, concluded between England and Sweden, had secured to the coalition the concurrence of that foolish crown, Stralsund was filled with troops. It was known that this was the last footing of Sweden in the north of Germany. Napoleon had seen, through the reports of certain diplomatic agents, that they were preparing something on that coast, and had given notice of it to the king of Prussia, by telling him to take care of the neutrality of the north of Germany, the object of all his solicitudes; that, as to himself, on the first alarm of danger, he should send thirty-thousand men more into Hanover. These few words had sufficed to move the king of Prussia, who signified to the king of Sweden that he must cease his armaments in Swedish Pomerania. The king of Sweden replied to the king of Prussia, that he was master of his own territory, and that he had ordered the armaments because he judged them necessary for his own security. That if Prussia would restrain his freedom, he counted upon the emperor of Russia and king of England, his allies, to aid him in making the independence of his states respected. Not limiting here his insults, he sent back to the king, Frederick William, the orders of Prussia, saying to him that he would not wear them more, since that monarch had given them to the most cruel enemy of Europe.

This outrage irritated Frederick William, who, all prudent as he was, would have taken vengeance, if Russia, immediately intervening, had not declared to Prussia, that the territory of Swedish Pomerania was under her care, and should rest inviolable. This species of forbidding her to act, signified to Prussia, gave her to think deeply, and cruelly humiliated her. She took the resolution of making no reply, limiting herself to sending away the minister of Sweden, and declared to Napoleon, that she was not able to answer for what events might pass in Hanover; that, notwithstanding this, she guaranteed to him that the Prussian territory should not serve as a road to an invading army.

The horizon then changed on every side, and in a manner very obvious to the least clear-sighted vision. From all parts assemblages of troops were announced, in Friuli, in the Tyrol, and in higher Austria. They did not speak of simple concentrations of troops, but of the organization of troops of particular arms, which was much more significant. The cavalry remounted, the artillery provided with horses, and conducted in numerous trains to the banks of the Adige; considerable magazines every where formed; bridges thrown over the Piava and Tagliamento; field-works raised in the lagunes of Venice; all these could leave no doubt of the object. Austria denied it, with a falsehood which has but few examples in history, and only admitted certain precautions in the Venetian states, caused by the French assemblage of troops formed in Italy. In respect to the exchange of the grand decorations which had been asked of her, she refused them under various pretexts.

It was upon this assemblage of circumstances that Napoleon had to decide during the first days which he was to pass at Fontainbleau and at St. Cloud before going off to Boulogne. It was necessary for him to decide at once on the descent, or to march with his thunder upon the continental powers. On the 11th of July, the same day of his arrival at Fontainbleau, the archchancellor Cambacérès met him there, and began to confer with him about the business of the moment. This grave personage was affrighted at the state of the continent and the striking symptoms of approaching war, and, with reason, regarded the annexations which had taken place in Italy as being the certain cause of a rupture. In that situation, he could not but express his opinion that Napoleon left Italy and France exposed to the attacks of the coalition, in order to throw himself upon England. Napo-

leon, full of confidence and fondness for his vast maritime plan, of which he had not entrusted the entire secret even to the archancellor, did not feel embarrassed by any of these objections. According to him, the taking possession of Genoa and Lucca was of no concern to Russia, because Italy was not made to submit to her influence. This court ought to be happy that he did not demand an account from her of what she did in Georgia, in Persia, and even in Turkey. She had engaged herself in the policy of England; she was visibly in coalition with England; M. Nowosiltzoff was only an English commissioner that they wished to send to him, but he would have received him in consequence. Very evidently, the partnership between Russia and England was strongly linked, but these two powers were unable to do any thing without Austria, destitute of the armies and the territory of that power. Austria, always deeply in fear of France, would hesitate yet some time before they could draw her in entirely. In any case, she would not be ready soon enough to hinder the expedition to England. A few days would suffice to execute that expedition; and the sea once passed, all the coalitions would be destroyed at a single blow: the arm of Austria, actually raised against France would be beaten down at the same instant. "Depend upon me," said Napoleon, to the archchancellor Cambacérès; "trust to my activity: I shall surprise the world by the greatness and rapidity of my blows."

Immediately afterwards he gave some orders respecting Italy, and the frontier of the Rhine. He enjoined it upon Eugene Beauharnais to remain at Milan, and to marshal Jourdan his military guide, to commence provisioning the fortresses, and getting together the field artillery, to buy draught horses, and form the parks. The troops which came from the parades at Marengo and Castiglione, were ordered to approach the Adige. He had for some time past disposed a division of reserve in the environs of Pescara, for the purpose of supporting general St. Cyr if that general had need of it. He directed this general to get good information, and if he learned of the least attempt of the Russians or the English to move upon any point whatever of the Calabrias, to march from Tarentum to Naples itself, throw the court upon the sea, and take possession of the kingdom.

He marched upon the Rhine the heavy cavalry which was not designed to embark for England, and directed to the same point the regiments which were not to be comprised in the expedition. He ordered in a particular manner that at Metz, Strasburg, and Mayence, the formation of the field artillery should be completed.

He gave afterwards his last instructions to M. de Talleyrand, relative to diplomatic affairs. It was necessary at each new piece of information gathered in relation to the armaments of Austria, to make it known to that court, to show how bad was its faith, and to make it tremble for the consequences of its conduct. This time Austria should be ruined, no quarter should be given, if it interrupted the expedition to England. As to Prussia, a conference had long been open with her respecting Hanover. They would avail themselves of the occasion to sound her upon this valuable acquisition, to meet her well-known desire, and if she bit at this bait, to offer it to her immediately on conditions of her alliance with France, concluded instantly, and publicly proclaimed. With such an alliance, Napoleon was certain to freeze Austria with fear, and to render her immovable for some years to come. In any case he believed that between Boulogne and Dover he was in a way to advance his objects much better than could be done by the most able and successful negotiations.

Time pressed; all was ready upon the sea coast, and every moment which passed might bring admiral Villeneuve before Ferrol, before Brest, and into the channel. Admiral Missiessy had returned to Rochefort, after having sailed through the West Indies, taken Dominica from the English [1]; landed troops, arms, and ammunition in Guadaloupe and Martinique, made many prizes, and exhibited the French flag on the ocean without receiving a single check. Still he had returned too soon, and as he showed some repugnance to proceed again to sea, Napoleon replaced him by captain Lallemand, an excellent officer, whom he had forced to set off before the vessels were repaired, to go to meet admiral Villeneuve in the vicinity of Ferrol. All this arranged, Napoleon proceeded to Boulogne, leaving Cambacérès and Talleyrand in Paris, taking with him marshal Berthier, and giving admiral Decrès orders to join him there without delay. He arrived at Boulogne on the 3rd of August, in the midst of transports of joy from the army, which had begun to feel tired, in repeating every day the same exercises for two years and a half, and who firmly believed this time that Napoleon had placed himself at their head in order to pass definitively into England.

The day following his arrival, he had all the infantry assembled on the beach at low water. It occupied more than three leagues, presenting the enormous mass of one hundred thousand infantry, ranged in one line, and occupying more than three leagues [2] of ground. Since he had commanded an army, he had never seen a finer sight. Afterwards, on returning to head quarters, he wrote to admiral Decrès these significant words: "The English know not what is hanging over their ears. If we are masters of the passage for twelve hours, England is conquered [3]."

He had now united in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Wimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, that is to say, to the left of Cape Grisnez, and to the same point as Boulogne, all the corps which were to embark in the flotilla. The wish formed two years before was now accomplished, thanks to the care that had been bestowed upon bringing them together, and thanks to a superb contest that the Batavian flotilla had sustained under the orders of admiral Verhuell, in doubling Cape Grisnez before the English squadron. This combat, that took place on the 18th of July, or 29th Messidor, some days before the arrival of Napoleon, was the most considerable that the flotilla had sustained against the English. Several divisions of Dutch gun-vessels had encountered at Cape Grisnez forty-five sail of

[1] See note page 636.

[2] The French league is 2 miles 3 furlongs 15 poles English.

[3] Letter to M. Decrès, of the 16 Thermidor, year XIII, of 4th August, 1805.—*Depôt of secretary of state.*

English ships, consisting as well of vessels of the line, as frigates, corvettes, and brigs, and had combated with rare coolness and complete success. This encounter at the Cape was dangerous, because towards this point the water being deep, the English vessels, without fear of grounding, were able to come nearer the frail vessels of the French. In spite of this advantage on the part of the enemy, the Dutch gun-vessels supported themselves in the presence of their powerful adversaries. The artillery that guarded the shore had hastened to sustain them, and the flotilla of Boulogne went out to their support, and in the midst of a hail shower of projectiles, admiral Verhuell having at his side marshal Davout, passed at half cannon shot distance from the enemy without losing a single vessel. This combat had raised the reputation of admiral Verhuell in the army, who was already held in high estimation, and had filled with confidence the one hundred and sixty thousand soldiers and seamen, ready to traverse the channel in the French and Batavian flotillas.

Napoleon had all his army now under his hand. In two hours, men and horses could be embarked, and in two tides, that is to say, in twenty-four hours be transported to Dover[1]. As to the stores, they had been long since on board the vessels.

The army assembled upon this point successively increased, now presented a force of nearly one hundred and thirty-two thousand men, and fifteen thousand horses, independently of the corps of general Marmont placed in the Texel, amounting to twenty-four thousand men, and four thousand at Brest, embarked in the squadron of Ganteaume.

These one hundred and thirty-two thousand men, who would cross in the flotilla, and depart from the four ports of Ambleteuse, Wimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, were distributed in six *corps d'armée*. The advanced guard, commanded by marshal Lannes, fourteen thousand strong, composed of the division of Gazan, and the famous grenadiers encamped at Arras, was to embark at Wimereux. These ten battalions of grenadiers, forming of themselves a corps of eight thousand men, of the finest infantry existing in the world, embarked in a light division of pinnaces, were called to the honor of first landing upon the coast of England, under the alluring impulse of Lannes and Oudinot. Then came the main body of the army, divided into right and left wings and centre. The left wing commanded by Davout, and numbering twenty-six thousand men, composed of the brave divisions of Morand[1], Friant, and Gudin, that immortalised themselves afterwards at Auerstadt and in a hundred combats, was designed to embark at Ambleteuse in the Dutch flotilla. The centre under marshal Soult, forty thousand strong, distributed in five divisions, at the heads of which were generals Vandamme, Suchet, Legrand, and St. Hilaire, was to embark in the four divisional squadrons or "escadrilles" assembled at Boulogne. Lastly, the left wing, or camp of Montreuil, was commanded by the intrepid Ney. It consisted of twenty-two thousand men, and reckoned three divisions, more particularly that of Dupont, which soon covered itself with glory at Albek, at the bridge of Halle, and at Friedland. This corps was to depart from Etaples, in two "escadrilles" of the flotilla. A chosen division of the guard, three thousand strong, and then actually on the march, was on reaching Boulogne to join itself to the corps of the centre.

Lastly, the sixth subdivision of this grand army, was that denominated the reserve. It had for its chief, prince Louis Bonaparte; and comprehended the foot dragoons and chasseurs, commanded by generals Klein and Margaron; the heavy cavalry commanded by Nansouty, and an Italian division perfectly disciplined, and not yielding in bearing to the finest of the French divisions. Napoleon said that he would show the English what they had not seen since the time of Cesar, the Italians in their island, and teach these Italians to estimate themselves, by bringing them to fight as well as the French. This reserve, amounting to twenty-seven thousand men, placed in the rear of all the camps, would occupy the shore when the five first corps of the army had departed, and as it was supposed that a squadron covering the passage would be master of the strait for some days, the flotilla of transport, separating itself for some hours from the war flotilla, would come to fetch this reserve, as well as the second moiety of the horses. In fact, of fifteen thousand horses the flotilla would not be able to embark more than eight thousand at one time. A second voyage would have brought over the seven thousand remaining.

Thus, besides the twenty-four thousand men of Marmont's force embarked in the fleet of the Texel, and the four thousand embarked at Brest, Napoleon would be enabled to move a total mass of one hundred and thirty-two thousand men, of whom one hundred thousand were infantry, seven thousand cavalry mounted, twelve thousand cavalry not mounted, and thirteen thousand artillery[1].

It was amid this formidable state of preparation that Napoleon awaited the arrival of the squadron of Villeneuve.

This admiral, as has been seen, had departed on the 30th of March from Toulon, with eleven sail of the line, of which two were of eighty guns, and six frigates. Nelson was cruising towards Barcelona. He endeavoured to make it be believed that his intention was to remain in that latitude, and then he had suddenly gone to the south of Sardinia, in the hope that the French, cheated by the reports thus spread abroad, would endeavour to avoid the coast of Spain, and come of themselves to the encounter with him. The French fleet sailed with a fair wind, and informed of the truth of the state of things by a Ragusan

[1] See page 504, where our author states an incontrovertible fact, that such a flotilla could not move out of the harbour in one tide, requiring two tides at least for that purpose; how the transportation to Dover was now to be effected in twenty-four hours or two tides is not explained. Forty-eight hours were considered needful for such a purpose in a previous passage of his history.

[2] At this time the division of Bisson.

[1] I borrow all these numbers from the little book of the emperor, the same which he carried with him. This book is to be found in the depôt of the Louvre, and it alone gives the true returns of the army of the ocean, which are neither at the depôt of war nor of the navy. In consequence, all military works have given incorrect numbers relative to the composition of that army.—*Note of the Author.*

vessel, steered between the Balearic Islands and Carthagena, touched at this last port on the 7th of April, and remained there for a day in consequence of a dead calm. Villeneuve invited the Spanish admiral Salcedo to join his flag, which intention he was not able to effect for want of superior orders. Villeneuve then proceeding with a favourable wind arrived on the 9th of April at the entrance of the straits. The same day, at noon, he had entered the straits, formed in two columns, his frigates in advance, the hammocks down and in, the nettings on board all the ships, and every thing cleared for action. They recognized the French fleet from Gibraltar, and had given the alarm by ringing the bells and firing the alarm gun, because they had in that port only a very weak division of vessels. Villeneuve appeared in the evening of the same day off the port of Cadiz. Warned by signals, the captain of the Aigle prepared to leave the road, and the brave Gravina, who had neglected nothing to place himself in readiness, hastened to weigh anchor in order to join the French admiral. But many things in Cadiz were still backward. The two thousand five hundred Spaniards, whom they were to transport to the islands, were not even embarked. They had finished getting the provisions on board, but it would have required at least forty-eight hours more for admiral Gravina to get ready, and Admiral Villeneuve pressing, declared that he would not wait if the junction did not immediately take place. Although a little recovered from the anxiety of his first departure, the French admiral was incessantly pursued by the image of Nelson, whom he believed he always saw close in his wake.

Gravina, strongly devoted to Napoleon and his projects, embarked with every thing in confusion, proposing to himself to complete his arrangements on the ocean, and went out of Cadiz during the night. It so happened that one vessel struck the ground in the extreme precipitation of getting out to sea.

Towards two o'clock in the morning, Villeneuve, who had limited himself to dropping a single anchor, availed himself of the wind, and re-took his direction westward. He was on the 11th of the month at large on the ocean, having escaped the formidable look-out of the English. The 11th and 12th he lay to for the Spanish vessels, but two only appeared, and not wishing to lose more time, he set sail, calculating that he should be rejoined at a later period, either on the passage or at Martinique itself; because each commander had received an indication of the common place of rendezvous. No one besides Villeneuve knew the great and important destination of the squadron.

Villeneuve should now have felt reassured and have acquired some self-confidence, since he had overcome the more serious difficulties of the navigation in quitting Toulon, in traversing the straits, and in rallying Gravina without any accident. But the sight of his crews filled him with mortification. He found them very far beneath those of the English, or those which the French formerly had in the time of the American war. This was natural when they thus came out of port for the first time. He complained not only of the crews, but of the materials composing his vessels. Three of them sailed either slow or badly; these were the Formidable, Intrepid, and Atlas, the last worse than either. The iron-work of the Pluto, a new vessel, was bad, and gave way frequently. Admiral Villeneuve felt from all these things an excessive annoyance which affected his moral bearing. Lauriston, the aide-de-camp of the emperor, made every effort to raise his spirit, but did not succeed to any great extent. Villeneuve had besides excellent captains, who as much as possible supplied the inexperience of the crews and the defects of the vessels. Villeneuve could only derive consolation from seeing the state of the Spanish vessels, which were very much inferior to his own. Still the navigation, although delayed by those vessels, which is not very extraordinary when a squadron sails together, appeared to be in the way of good fortune, and proceeded without any accident.

Nelson deceived, had at first searched for the French squadron southward and eastward in the Mediterranean. He had known as early as the 16th of April, that it had advanced towards the straits, but had been himself detained there by westerly winds until the 30th. He had moored on the 10th of May in the bay of Lagos, and after having detached one of his vessels to escort a envoy, he did not get out at sea upon his voyage to the West Indies, where he supposed the French fleet had gone, until the 11th of May.

At this epoch, Villeneuve was very near his object, for on the 14th of May he reached Martinique, after six weeks' navigation. He had had the satisfaction of finding that the four Spanish vessels separated from the squadron arrived nearly at the same time with himself. This was a great advantage to him, and he ought to have reckoned a little more upon his lucky star, that had so far managed to favour him with propitious results.

This voyage had been very useful. It had given experience to the crews. As the weather afforded time, he had availed himself of it to set the rigging in order. "We are a third stronger than at the moment of our departure from Toulon," general Lauriston wrote to the emperor [1]. A fleet well manœuvred and exercised gains nothing in sailing fifteen hundred leagues or more, but a fleet which has not been accustomed to navigate, is thus able to acquire the main part of its instructions, and such was the case with the present fleet of France.

Admiral Villeneuve, fearful of his responsibility, did not appreciate the advantages which had thus been gained, he found that the fleet was deprived of so much yet wanting, that some few ameliorations obtained upon the voyage did not suffice to replace those which were still deficient. He had the fault, like a man whose

[1] All our vessels are in a good state, in a better state in my opinion than when we left Toulon. The fine weather has afforded the means of bending the rigging and setting it in order proportionably; in spite of that the shrouds and all the irons of the Pluto and of the Hermione are of a bad quality, as well as the cordage, the wood of the masts and the yards, so that many of them are broken.

Actually all is arranged, all repaired; the mariners have learned much; there is a sensible difference in their manœuvring; we are a third stronger than at the moment of our departure.—(*Letter of general Lauriston to the emperor.*)

moral feeling is affected, of exaggerating the merit of the enemy and depreciating that of his own crews. He said that with twenty Spanish or French vessels he would not willingly combat with fourteen English, and he held this kind of language before his own officers. Fortunately the officers and seamen were animated with the best dispositions, feeling no less than the commander the insufficiency of their means, but full of confidence in their own courage, they desired with ardour an encounter with the enemy. General Lauriston, placed with admiral Villeneuve by the emperor, in order to support and excite him, fulfilled his duty with unflagging zeal, but only contributed to mortify and irritate him by contradiction. Gravina, simple, sensible, full of energy, thought as Villeneuve did about the quality of the vessels, and as Lauriston did about the necessity of devoting himself to his object, and was decided to lose his life, no matter where, in order to second the design of Napoleon.

Now that they had escaped the dangers of the voyage, it was necessary to wait forty days at Martinique for the arrival of Ganteaume; of whose forced immobility at Brest, in consequence of an equinox without a gale of wind, they were still ignorant. Villeneuve had arrived on the 14th of May, had then remained in those latitudes until the 23rd of June; and said to himself, chagrined as he was, that more than the necessary time had passed for Nelson to overtake him, and block him up in Martinique, or beat him if he attempted to come out.

His orders were to await Ganteaume, which implicated him in a species of inaction, and as those feel who are ill at ease, he wished to be moving. He complained of not being able to go and ravage the English islands, as he could easily have done with a strength of twenty vessels. In order to kill the time, they had captured Fort Diamond placed in front of Martinique, that admiral Missiessy, to the great regret of Napoleon, had neglected to take. They cannonaded it with several ships of the line, then a few hundred men disembarked from the boats and took it [1]. They would have completed the occupation of Dominica by the capture of Morne Cabry, of which admiral Missiessy had neglected to render himself master; but this position, very well fortified both by nature and art, demanded a regular siege, and this it was not ventured to undertake [2]. Villeneuve sent his frigates, being excellent sailers, to make prizes and procure him intelligence of the English squadrons.

They had brought out troops, and Missiessy had also brought out a considerable number; there were about twelve thousand men in the French West Indies. Such a force would have permitted them to execute important operations, but they dared not venture upon any through fear of missing Ganteaume; besides, the French islands were in the best state, provided with soldiers and ammunition, abundantly supplied with provisions, thanks to the privateers, and animated with the best spirit.

Still, not to expose the crews to the maladies which had begun to gain upon them through their sojourn in these climates, and also to prevent desertion, to which the Spaniards were very much inclined, they had resolved to attempt a sudden attack upon Barbadoes, where the English had important military establishments. It was there, in fact, they kept the depôts of their colonial troops. General Lauriston had brought with him a good division of five thousand men, organized and equipped with the greatest care. It was destined for this operation. General Lauriston designed to pass by Guadaloupe, and to take a battalion more from thence; because he reckoned upon finding twelve thousand men in Barbadoes [1].

They decided to set sail on the 4th of June; but on the same day assigned for his departure, rear-admiral Magon arrived with the two vessels from Rochefort that Napoleon had sent, to give the first intelligence of the change which he had made in his design. Magon came to say, that Ganteaume not being able to come out of Brest, it was necessary to go and raise the blockade, not only with his squadron, but that of Ferrol as well; and, after having rallied the fleets that they found in these ports, they were to enter the channel in a mass. He also brought an order at the same time for the admiral to wait until the 21st of June, because, up to the 21st of May, it was possible that Ganteaume might get out of Brest, and, supposing a month for the voyage from Brest to Martinique, it could not be positively known until the 21st of June whether that admiral had been able to set

[1] The Diamond Rock was not captured in the mode here described: it was an almost impregnable position, too much so to storm, close to Martinique. Captain Maurice, the English naval commander, only surrendered through his utter destitution of water and provisions, obtaining from the French honourable terms of capitulation.—*Translator.*

[2] See page 636, where our author states that admiral Missiessy had taken the island of Dominica. Sir George Prevost was the governor, and finding the enemy's force overwhelming, he withdrew into the fort of prince Rupert, which the French did not even see or besiege, thus preserving the colony to England. Even the *Moniteur* of June 1, 1805, stated, that "it appeared to have been intended to take, and to keep possession of Dominica, but the plan was abandoned in order to assist the town of St. Domingo, then besieged by the negroes!" The same paper alleges that the setting fire to Rosseau was not the act of the French: it was probably accidental during the cannonade.—*Translator.*

[1] Admiral Villeneuve, in his despatches to his government, dated from the road of Fort de France, 27th of Floréal, or May 17th, 1805, after mentioning his arrival at Martinique on the 14th of May, and all his proceedings, says: "I am employed in taking in my water; I have found the colony abundantly supplied with provisions. General Lauriston is setting out for Guadaloupe, to collect there as many transports as he can procure—(a different object from that assigned by our author). From the intelligence I have been able to obtain, I have reason to believe that admiral Gravina will experience no difficulty in his expedition; and when he shall have joined me, which I hope will be very soon, I will not lose a moment in repairing to my destination. VILLENEUVE."

Lieutenant Clanet sent from Martinique, who reached France in the French brig Lynx with despatches for his government, of which the above is an extract, states, as a rumour, that the inhabitants of Trinidad had taken refuge in the interior of the island, and that the colony would offer no resistance to any division which should present itself. The same officer adds, that he had heard that Gravina had landed two thousand men in Trinidad. In fact, Trinidad, and not Barbadoes, seems to have been the real object of the expedition. Nelson imagined the same, not, it is probable, without information from some quarter on which he thought he could rely.—*Translator.*

sail. There was, therefore, time left to persist in the design on Barbadoes. Magon had on board with him troops and ammunition. He followed the squadron, now twenty-seven sail strong, of which fourteen were French, six Spanish of the line, and seven frigates. On the 6th of June, they were before Guadaloupe: on the 7th, they had reached as far as Antigua: on the 8th, they had passed that island, which had not disappeared, when there was a convoy perceived, consisting of fifteen sail, that had just left it. They were merchant vessels, loaded with commercial produce, and escorted by a single corvette. The admiral immediately gave the signal for the chase; the vessels were ordered to follow according to their sailing qualities, or each vessel, as fast as it was able, taking the place which its speed best permitted. Before the close of the day, the convoy was taken. It was valued at 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 f. Some American and Italian passengers on board gave intelligence of Nelson. They said he had arrived at Barbadoes, the very place to which the French were then going. They differed about the strength of his squadron, but, generally, made his force amount to a dozen vessels. But he had joined admiral Cochrane, who guarded those seas. This news produced an extraordinary impression upon admiral Villeneuve. He saw Nelson with fourteen, sixteen, perhaps eighteen vessels, that is, with a force nearly equal to his own, ready to meet and fight him. He, therefore, formed immediately the resolution to return to Europe. Lauriston, on the contrary, relying upon the assertion of the prisoners, that gave but two vessels to Cochrane, and having reason to suppose Nelson had no more than fourteen, supported the idea that, with twenty sail, they were in a condition to combat advantageously, and that, after being freed from all fear of pursuit by a battle, they would be much better assured of fulfilling their object. Villeneuve was not of this opinion, and insisted absolutely on setting sail for Europe. He was so urgent, that he would not consent even to return to the French islands to restore to them the troops which he had embarked. He would have failed to make them with the wind, which blew from east to west, the length of the islands; and they were then at Antigua, much to the west of Martinique. They would perhaps have lost ten days, and would have been exposed to encounter the English. He, therefore, decided on choosing four of the best frigates, to turn into them as many troops as they were able to take, and to dispatch them towards Martinique. He gave them orders to join the squadron at the Azores. But there still remained four thousand, or five thousand, men in the fleet—a charge very embarrassing. By keeping them, the colonies would be deprived of a valuable force, which it was extremely difficult to send to them from the mother country; and there were so many more mouths on board to feed, which was vexatious, because provisions were scant, and there was scarcely water for the passage home. Lastly, they ran the danger of missing Ganteaume, because up to the 21st of June, they could not be in a manner certain that he had not sailed from Brest for Martinique. Judging from the fact, they were right in supposing that he had not left; but of this they were ignorant, it was therefore a serious error. To these objections, Villeneuve replied, that if Ganteaume had sailed, it was right to be thankful; that there would no longer be any blockade of Brest, and that they should be able to pass that port without difficulty, and enter the channel.

Villeneuve determined the matter immediately, placed all the troops he was able on board the frigates, and sent them to Martinique. Not wishing to embarrass himself with the captured convoy, nor to lose it, he gave it in charge to another frigate to escort as far as one of the French islands. On the 10th of June, he was on his way to Europe, his resolution, although blameable in principle, was not bad in point of fact, if he had returned to Martinique to dispose of his soldiers, to take on board water and provisions, and to collect the latest news from Europe.

Nelson, whom he so much dreaded, had arrived at Barbadoes at the commencement of June, after a navigation of prodigious rapidity, sailing without fear when he had only nine vessels. Supposing the French were gone to re-conquer Trinidad on behalf of the Spaniards, he had taken on board two thousand men at Barbadoes, joined the two vessels of admiral Cochrane to his own squadron, and without ever stopping to victual or refit, he was on the 7th of June in the gulf of Paria in the island of Trinidad. There discovering his error, he departed again, and on the 10th was at Grenada. He then went up to Barbadoes, to leave there the troops that he had taken away to no purpose, and set out to return to Europe with eleven vessels. What activity! What energy! What an admirable employment of time! A new proof that in war, and in naval war still more than in that on land, the quality of the force is always worth a great deal more than the quantity. Nelson with eleven vessels had self-reliance and confidence, upon the same ocean where Villeneuve trembled with twenty, manned too with heroic seamen.

Villeneuve sailed towards Europe, steering to the north-east over a very favourable sea. Having reached the Azores on the 30th of June, he there found the frigates, which had not consumed more than four days in discharging their troops, and had no where met with the English, which proved that Villeneuve would have been able to have done as much without danger. The four frigates detached had met with the fifth, escorting the captured convoy, and not being able to succeed in conducting them, decided upon burning them, causing thus a loss of 10,000,000 f. The fleet was now all united at the Azores, and proceeded on its voyage, numbering twenty sail of the line, and seven frigates, steering towards the coast of Spain. They were indemnified for the loss of the convoy which they had captured by a rich prize, being a galleon of Lima laden with dollars, to the value of 7,000,000 f. or 8,000,000 f. taken by an English privateer, and re-taken from the privateer. This was a resource which soon became very useful. All on a sudden, during the first days of July, not having more than sixty leagues to make Cape Finisterre, the wind changed, and blowing from the north-east, became quite contrary. They then plied to windward, in order to gain time, and not to be driven back. But the wind remained fixed to the point, and became so violent that some of the vessels were damaged, and several lost their top-masts. The two vessels that rear-admiral Magon had taken with him from Rochefort, having brought out with them

the fever of the Charente, they were encumbered with the sick. The troops which had been brought back from America to Europe, without once touching land, were labouring under every species of suffering. Sadness reigned throughout the squadron. Eighteen days of contrary wind increased it to an overflow, and contributed to shake yet more the courage of admiral Villeneuve. He wished to run to Cadiz, which was in fact the opposite point to that at which Napoleon waited, and to which his instructions called him. General Lauriston resisted this with all his power, and finished by successfully overcoming him. Towards the 20th of July, the wind having changed, the fleet set sail on its new route towards Ferrol.

The bad weather which had supervened had caused two misfortunes; the first to affect the moral courage of the squadron and its chief; the second, to convey the intelligence of its course to the English admiralty. Nelson had sent before him the brig Curieux to convey to England the particulars of his operations. This brig had observed the French squadron, and making all sail, had reached Portsmouth on the 7th of July. On the 8th, the dispatches were in the hands of the admiralty. Without knowing the object of the French squadron, but imagining that it would attempt perhaps to open the port of Ferrol, the admiralty ordered admiral Stirling, first detached from the blockade of Brest to observe Rochefort, to go with five vessels, and join admiral Calder, who was cruizing near Cape Finisterre. The long time that had passed since Napoleon thought on his great naval combination, the different attempts to get out recently made, the departure of Villeneuve, his passage to Cadiz, his junction with Gravina, his return to Europe, where two fleets intended to set sail so long ago, one at Brest, the other at Ferrol, seemed only to await a force sufficient to open the ports to them; all these circumstances had concluded by leading the English, little by little, to suspect, at least vaguely, a part of the designs of Napoleon. They did not exactly think of a union of the French squadrons in the channel, but they wished to prevent the raising of the blockade of Brest and Ferrol, which it appeared probable would be attempted. Thus they had raised the fleet of Cornwallis before Brest to twenty-four vessels, of which five were detached to Rochefort; there were ten sail before Ferrol. This last squadron had been increased by the junction of the Rochefort division to fourteen or fifteen sail. Every delay is a misfortune to a design which requires secrecy in the execution. It gives an enemy time to reflect, sometimes to guess the secret by force of reflection, or often to acquire by this means the indications which terminate in his instruction.

On the 22nd of July, Villeneuve, sailing in three columns, was making way towards Ferrol, that is to say, towards the north-east, under a very good side breeze from the north-west. He descried towards the middle of the day twenty-one sail, of which fifteen were of the line [1]. This was the English squadron of admiral Calder advancing in a contrary direction, and coming to encounter him by cutting off the passage to Ferrol. They were about forty leagues from that port.

There now could be no doubt of a naval battle. Villeneuve did not seek to avoid it, because it was the responsibility, and not the danger, which he feared; but always devoured with anxiety, he lost much precious time in making ready for action. General Lauriston stimulated him without ceasing, and pressed him from eleven o'clock until one to give the necessary orders. The best part of the day was thus lost, which they soon had to regret. The vessels of the two combined squadrons employed two hours in ranging themselves in order of battle, and it was not until three o'clock, that the twenty French and Spanish sail of the line were in regular order. The Spaniards occupied the head of the column, and admiral Magon the rear with the division of Rochefort and several frigates. The English admiral with fifteen sail, of which several were of a hundred guns, while the strongest of the French did not exceed eighty, placed himself in his turn in battle array, forming a long line parallel with the French, but in a contrary direction. The English steered towards the south-west, the French to the north-east. The wind blowing from the north-west, the two squadrons received it on the beam. Thus steering in opposite directions they would have soon terminated the affair in passing each other, when admiral Calder turned in the head of his squadron upon the French rear in order to envelope it. Villeneuve, to whom danger restored all the resolution of a man of fortitude, perceiving that the English admiral, pursuing a system of tactics often repeated in the present day, wished to envelope the French rear in order to place it between two fires, imitated the manœuvre of his enemy, and turning about, or, as the mariners say, tacking about by the counter-march [2], cleared the rear of his column, and came round to pre-

[1] Fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter and a lugger, nineteen in all; the French force, according to the English statement, was twenty-sail of the line, five frigates, three brigs, and three vessels armed *en flute*, apparently of fifty guns, in all thirty-one. The action occurred in lat. 43° 30′ n. long. 11° 17′ west. The English admiral's account of the action differs from our author in some respects: "I was favoured," said sir Robert Calder, "with a view of the combined squadrons of France and Spain, consisting of twenty sail of the line, also three large ships armed *en flute*, of about fifty guns each, with five frigates and three brigs; the force under my direction at this time consisting of fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter and lugger. I immediately stood towards the enemy with the squadron, making the needful signals for battle in the closest order, and on closing with them, I made the signal for attacking their centre. When I had reached their rear, I tacked the squadron in succession: this brought us close up under their lee, and when our headmost ships reached their centre, the enemy were tacking in succession; this obliged me to make again the same manœuvre, by which I brought on an action which lasted upwards of four hours, when I found it necessary to bring-to the squadron to cover the two captured ships, whose names are in the margin (St. Raphael, 84 guns, and Firmo, 74 guns). I have to observe, that the enemy had every advantage of wind and weather during the whole day. The weather had been foggy a great part of the morning, and very soon after we had brought them to action the fog was so very thick at intervals, that we could with great difficulty see the ship ahead or astern of us. This rendered it impossible to take advantage of the enemy by signals, as I could have wished to have done: had the weather been more favourable, I am led to believe the victory would have been more complete."—*Translator.*

[2] Lof pour lof par la contremarche.

sent his head to that of the enemy. In this double movement, the two squadrons encountered. The first Spanish vessel, the Argonauta, commanded by admiral Gravina, found herself engaged with the Hero, the first of the English vessels. The English and French pursuing their course, were soon engaged along the whole extent of their line. But the English squadron being less numerous than the French, their fire did not extend much on the French line, beyond the thirteenth or fourteenth vessel. The French rear, having no enemy alongside, received scarcely more than a few spent balls; this was, too, just the situation to enable it to undertake some decisive manœuvre. Unfortunately a thick fog at that time filled a space of some hundreds of leagues, for it was noticed at Brest, and covered the two fleets to such a degree, that the admiral's ship was some moments in discovering if it had the enemy larboard or starboard. Each vessel could only see that which was alongside, and could combat with no other. A warm and continued cannonade was heard, but not too precipitate. The French and Spaniards, in spite of their inexperience, fought with order and coolness. The crews had not yet acquired that precision of fire, which at this day distinguishes them; nevertheless, in this species of duel between vessel and vessel, the English suffered as much as the French [1]. If the French rear-guard, which had no enemies to fight, had been able to discover what was passing, and falling upon the English line, had placed a part of it between two fires, the victory would have been secured. Villeneuve, seeing nothing through the fog, could with difficulty communicate his orders. Rear-admiral Magon, it is true, had acquainted him that he was in a state of inactivity; but this notice, in consequence of the thickness of the atmosphere, not having been transmitted, save by the frigates, had arrived late, and had caused no determination to be taken in the matter by the French admiral, who, after a moment of decision at the commencement of the battle, had fallen again into his customary state of indecision, fearing to act in the obscurity, and to make false movements. All that he dared to do was to fight bravely with his own vessel.

After a long cannonade, the English vessel, the Windsor, was so ill-treated, that a frigate was obliged to withdraw it from the action to prevent its falling into the hands of the French. Other English vessels experienced great damage. The French vessels on the contrary comported themselves valiantly, and were happy enough not to have suffered any great injury. The Spaniards, their allies, who composed the van third of the line of battle, suffered much without its having been their own fault.

The three vessels, the España, San Firmo, and San Rafael, the nearest to the French ships, found themselves in a miserable state. The San Firmo particularly had lost two masts. As the wind bore the French ships down to the English, those vessels incapable of manœuvring were drifting towards the enemy. Seeing this to be the case, the gallant captain of the Pluto, M. de Cosmao, placed nearest to the Spaniards, sailed out of the line, in order to cover with his ship the Spanish vessels that were injured. The first of these three vessels driving, the San Rafael, a Ibad sailer, had thought of suffering itself to slip away between the two lines towards the rear, in the hope to save itself by this manœuvre. The San Firmo, worse treated, was in vain defended by M. de Cosmao, who was unable to prevent it from falling before the wind, and thus being wafted into the midst of the English. But M. de Cosmao succeeded in saving the España, which, thanks to him, was maintained in the line. Towards six o'clock, a clearer atmosphere discovered the spectacle to admiral Villeneuve of the San Rafael escaping towards the rear, the San Firmo already surrounded with enemies, and drifting by little and little more towards the English. As they were cannonading at a distance, there remained space enough between the two fleets for the French line to steer in advance before the wind, and by this movement to replace in their line the vessels that were endangered. General Lauriston had not quitted Villeneuve; he heard the officers of the squadron propose this manœuvre. He counselled him, therefore, to make the signal to let them arrive all together, that is, to go before the wind, which leading down upon the English, would have placed the disabled vessels in safety in the midst of the French fleet. This would be to approach nearer to the enemy, who, ill-treated and less numerous, would have probably given way before such an offensive movement. Villeneuve, owing to the fog, seeing badly what had taken place, fearing to derange the order of battle and to run new hazards, preferred the loss of the two vessels to risking a fresh engagement. He therefore refused to give the order which was on all sides solicited from him. At the same moment night approached, and the firing had nearly ceased. The English retired, towing away two of their vessels very much injured by the fire, and the two Spanish ships that had been abandoned to them by the fault of the French.

As to the French, they had suffered little; there was not one of the crews but was ready to renew the conflict, and that did not believe itself the victor, on seeing the field of battle remain to them. They were yet ignorant in the fleet of the loss of the Spanish ships.

All night the English were seen carrying lights on the poop, far before the wind, employed in repairing their damages.

On the side of the French the same labour was performed. At break of day the position of the two fleets could be clearly seen. The English were retreating; but taking with them the two Spanish vessels, the sorrow and exasperation on

[1] The total English loss throughout the whole fleet was forty-one killed, and one hundred and fifty-eight wounded, of which number the Windsor Castle lost a fourth, or ten killed, and thirty-five wounded, having had five vessels firing upon her at once; her yards and rigging were much cut up, and she was sent with the two prizes to Plymouth on that account. The two prizes had more killed and wounded on board them than all the English fleet. No other English ships were injured in any manner that they could not make good at sea very speedily. The statement of a frigate taking away this vessel lest it should fall into the hands of the French, is a singular piece of misinformation on the part of our author, as well as that two of the English ships were towed away disabled.—*Translator.*

board the fleet were great. They required to fight and to come to a decisive action. The wind was in their favour, for it was in the same point as on the preceding evening, and carried them down towards the English. If at that moment Villeneuve had resolutely made the signal to bear down upon the enemy, without any order of battle but that of fast sailing, fourteen of the French vessels out of eighteen that remained sailing well together would have arrived at one time upon the English, the four others would have arrived soon afterwards, and the combat would have certainly been to the advantage of the French. Urged by the entreaty that came from all his officers, Villeneuve in fact prescribed this movement, and went with Lauriston on board the frigate Hortense, to give his orders verbally to each chief of division. The Argonauta, the Spanish admiral's ship, having the mizen mast yard broken, requested time to replace it. Villeneuve wished to wait, and it occupied until middle day. Then he commenced the pursuit, but the wind dropped, and he saw the English steal away before him, without being able to gain much upon them, even with all sail set. Imagining he should not come up with them, except during the night, he postponed closing until the next day, in order to combat by daylight. But in the morning the wind had gone round to the north-east, that is to say, in a direction altogether contrary. The English had now the advantage of the wind, and to join battle with them had become difficult. Villeneuve had on that account a good reason for stopping his course. He was getting away from Ferrol, and ran the risk of finding the English reinforced, and for two vessels lost he would expose himself to miss his object, which was to open Ferrol, and complete the end of his mission.

Thus terminated this action, which might have passed for a victory, but for the loss of the two Spanish vessels. The crews, in spite of their inexperience, had fought well; but on one hand the fog had added to the natural irresolution of admiral Villeneuve; on the other, his exaggerated mistrust of himself and his seamen had paralyzed the resources which he possessed, and prevented the battle from becoming a distinguished success. Here, as in so many naval battles, one wing of the fleet did not come to the succour of the other; but this time it was not the fault of the wing that remained inactive, because rear-admiral Magon was not a man to remain voluntarily beyond the reach of fire. In the first moments that followed the battle, Villeneuve was very happy to have been able to encounter the English without suffering a disaster; but once out of the action and become himself again, his habitual gloom had changed into deep sorrow. He saw himself exposed to censure from Napoleon and public opinion, he having lost two vessels fighting with twenty against fifteen. He believed himself dishonoured, and fell into a sort of lowness of mind bordering upon despair. The severe judgment of his crews, who complained loudly of his irresolution, and who exalted the bravery and decision of admiral Gravina, pierced him to the heart. To add to the misfortune, the wind, for two days favourable, had become contrary. To the sick, of whom the numbers had increased, was to be added the wounded. The necessary refreshments to give them were wanting; they had no more water than would last them for five or six days. In this state, Villeneuve wished to proceed to Cadiz. General Lauriston opposed himself to that step anew; they came to an agreement and sought a harbour in Vigo.

This port was not very safe, and presented besides but very few resources. Still means were found there for alleviating the sufferings of the sick and wounded. Three allied vessels, the Atlas, America, and España, were such bad sailors that they were not fit to navigate with a squadron, and Villeneuve decided to leave them at Cadiz. The Atlas was fitted up as a hospital ship, in which the sick and wounded were placed. General Lauriston had brought with his division the necessary materials for a moveable hospital; he employed them for the use of the seamen left at Vigo. They had money out of the Spanish galleon, which served to procure all of which the squadron stood in need. They furnished it with fresh provisions, took on board water for a month, gave their pay to the whole squadron, and having somewhat re-animated their spirits, which was soon done with men of a lively temperament, they set sail after a rest of five days, which had been most useful to them. The wind was not unfavourable, the squadrons ascended from Vigo as high as Ferrol, and on the 2nd of August entered the open road which separates Ferrol from Corunna.

At the very moment when the French squadron appeared, the consular agents placed on the shore, by the command of Napoleon, communicated to admiral Villeneuve the orders which were destined for him. Those orders were, not to enter into Ferrol, from whence it was not possible to get out with facility; to take the bare time necessary to unite with himself the divisions that awaited the junction, and then to depart for Brest. Villeneuve transmitted this order to Gravina, but he was already in the port, unable to retrograde, and a part of the fleet had entered with him, the rest obeying Villeneuve, remained opposite outside at Corunna.

This was a separation which placed the two squadrons at three or four leagues distance from each other. The utmost injury that could happen was the loss of two or three days in getting out. This loss would have been deeply regretted by an admiral who had not often lost his time; but Villeneuve might easily console himself under such a circumstance.

The admiral found at Corunna the pressing orders of Napoleon, his encouraging words and magnificent promises, together with letters from Decrès, the friend of his youth. The emperor and the minister urged him alike not to delay a moment in proceeding before Brest, to deliver battle to Cornwallis, even to destroy his own force if it was necessary, provided Ganteaume was enabled to get out safe and sound, and rallying what might remain of the squadron that raised the blockade, to proceed into the channel. All this news elevated for a moment the moral courage of Villeneuve. The little importance Napoleon attached to the sacrifice of his vessels, in order that a fleet might arrive in the channel, had somewhat encouraged him. If he had well understood his mission, he would have been satisfied rather than unhappy. After all, if two vessels had been taken from him

in the last battle, he had got to Ferrol safe and sound, escaped the enemy's squadrons, and eluded all the precautions of the English admiralty. Of the two admirals, English or French, the most ill-treated by fortune was Calder and not Villeneuve, because Villeneuve had attained his object and Calder had failed in his. In losing the two vessels taken, and those left at Vigo, he had still twenty-nine French and Spanish vessels in Ferrol, which would be increased by the division of Lallemand to thirty-four, and was thus numerous enough to venture upon raising the blockade of Brest. Besides, the English admiralty itself and Napoleon judged thus a few days afterwards. The admiralty brought Calder before a court-martial, and Napoleon published great eulogies upon Villeneuve, he having fulfilled the object of his mission, although two vessels had remained in the power of his enemy.

What fear then is it possible to conceive such a responsibility could have for an officer whose master was all-powerful, disposing of the reputation and fortune of his lieutenants, and never ceasing to urge, "give battle, even to self-destruction, provided that by your efforts you open the port of Brest." But it seemed that a sort of fatality attached to the steps of this unhappy seaman, to trouble his mind, and conduct him by unhappiness upon unhappiness to the result that he would fain elude, in other words, to a great battle lost, and lost without his obtaining the sole result that was demanded of him by Napoleon, that of being in the channel for twenty-four hours.

He found some consolation in seeing the division of rear-admiral Gourdon, that had navigated much at sea before it was blockaded in Ferrol, that had been carefully repaired and completed, and that merited the fullest confidence. He saw with no less satisfaction the nine Spanish vessels equipped by Señor Grandellana, and much superior to those of admiral Gravina, because they had bestowed that time upon their equipment which had been wanting for those which had left Cadiz. "Would to God," cried Villeneuve, in comparing the Ferrol division with that of Cadiz, "that the Spanish squadron (except the Argonauta) had never made a part of mine. Those vessels are absolutely not fit for any thing except to compromise all, and this they have continually done. These are the vessels that conducted us to the last degree of misfortune."

This language shows to what point the mind of Villeneuve was affected, when he called the last degree of misery a campaign which thus far had attained the object indicated by Napoleon, and which was even worth to him eulogies on the part of a difficult master.

Villeneuve at this moment entirely gave himself up to consider what might happen on going out of Ferrol. He supposed that Calder would re-appear joined by Nelson or Cornwallis, and that he should meet to fight a new battle, in which, this time, he might possibly be destroyed. Letters from Cadiz stated to him, in effect, that Nelson had returned to Europe, that he had been seen at Gibraltar, but that he had departed for the ocean, in order to unite with Calder before Ferrol, or Cornwallis before Brest. The truth was, that Nelson, sailing with prodigious rapidity, had arrived at Gibraltar towards the end of July, at the very moment when Villeneuve had given battle to Calder; that he had re-passed the strait, continually struggling with contrary winds to regain the ocean; that he had only eleven vessels with him, that he had as yet neither joined Calder nor Cornwallis; that his intention, after two years of continual navigation, was to enter harbour for a moment to relax and revictual his worn-down squadron. Villeneuve was ignorant of these circumstances; but he knew his orders, that for a man of fortitude were most facile in the execution, when he was not commanded to conquer, but merely to raise the blockade of Brest by fighting to the utmost. If he were before Brest, he would be seconded by Ganteaume: it was not probable that a battle, delivered with fifty or fifty-five vessels against twenty or twenty-five [1], would be lost. If, on the contrary, the situation of the sea hindered Ganteaume from taking a part in the action, Villeneuve in fighting to the utmost, even so far as to suffer himself to be destroyed, would place Cornwallis out of the possibility of keeping at sea and continuing the blockade, and Ganteaume, gathering up with his fleet all that remained entire of that other fleet which had been gloriously vanquished, would have still been able to domineer for some days in the channel. This was all that Napoleon required of his admirals.

Unhappily, Villeneuve had touched the shore. His vessels that had combated he held it needful to repair. They could have navigated a month or two longer still if they had been obliged to keep out at sea; but at the gates of a great arsenal, they were all determined to repair some injury. They must change their masts, their rigging was not in order, or they leaked; they must turn over the surplus provisions of those vessels that had most still on board, to those that had least. Thus the squadron was laid by for forty-five days. The orders of Napoleon to have biscuit ready to the extent of two or three millions of rations in each port, they had not been able to execute in Ferrol, in consequence of the dearth of food throughout Spain. But they might be obtained at Brest, Cherburg, or Boulogne. Still forty-five days sufficed them, and finally on the 10th of August, matters were so disposed as to permit them to weigh anchor. Villeneuve placed himself outside Corunna, in the bay of Ares, wait-

[1] Thirty-four or thirty-five sail, for on the 11th of August Calder had joined Cornwallis off Brest. A step Calder (perhaps wisely) thought better than to risk his fourteen sail against thirty and upwards of the French, whose reinforcement he apprehended. Cornwallis would have fought Villeneuve, Ganteaume, and their fifty sail with this force. This extraordinary admiral, to whose perseverance and bravery, if our author is to be credited, England, it is now seen, owed her safety from invasion, never suffered a superiority of force to discourage him. On the 17th of June, 1795, with one ship of a hundred guns, four seventy-fours, and two frigates, he sustained a severe action with thirteen French sail of the line and seven frigates, from seven in the morning until night, and lost not a single ship. His blockade of Brest through wintry storms was a thing unheard of, save under his command. Fortune did not favour him with the opportunity of doing more than he did, but what he was enabled to undertake, he executed admirably. In the English navy he had the cognomen of "Billy Blue."—*Translator.*

ing while Gravina and the second Spanish division came out of Ferrol, not an easy movement on account of the wind. He waited three days, and employed them in self-torment. He wrote to the minister Decrès, "they make me the disposer of the greatest interests; my despair redoubles, as more confidence is testified towards me, because I am not able to aspire at success, whatever step I may take. It is to me well demonstrable that the navies of France and Spain are not able to act in large squadrons. Divisions of three, four, or five vessels, or thereabouts, are all that we can make capable of being well under command. When Ganteaume comes out, he will judge of this. Public opinion will be settled on the question.

"I am setting sail, but I know not what I shall do. Eight vessels are in view of the coast, at eight leagues' distance. We shall follow them; I shall not be able to close with them, and they will go and unite themselves with the squadrons before Brest or Cadiz, according as I make my way for one or the other of these two ports. It will be much, if sailing from hence with twenty-nine vessels, I am considered able to fight against the many vessels approaching; I fear not to say it to you, I should be very sorry to encounter twenty. We have a superannuated system of naval tactics; we know only how to place ourselves in line, and that is just what the enemy requires. I have not the means nor the time to adopt any other system with the commanders to whom the vessels of the two navies are confided. I foresaw all that before leaving Toulon; but I was under an illusion until the day when I beheld the Spanish vessels which are now united to mine; then it was impossible not to despair of all!"

At the moment of departure, the vessels that came from Rochefort, the Algesiras and Achilles, had been newly attacked by the fever; some Spanish vessels, on coming out of Ferrol, had run foul of each other; they had the ends of their bowsprits broken, and their sails torn. These accidents, of little moment in themselves, added to all the crosses that Villeneuve had already experienced, ended by reducing him to despair. Ready to set sail, he now gave his orders to captain Lallemand, who, with an excellent division of five vessels and several frigates had arrived at Vigo on the 15th or 16th of August. It should have sufficed Villeneuve to sail there in order to form a junction with that division, and thus procure an augmentation of his force; but not daring to move himself, always in fear of encountering Nelson, he sent an officer to captain Lallemand, and ordered him to proceed to Brest without being sure of going there himself, thus exposing this division to be lost if it arrived at that port alone and unsupported. He wrote to admiral Decrès a dispatch, in which laying open his unhappiness of mind, he discovered a disposition to proceed to Cadiz rather than to Brest; but to Lauriston, whose importunate presence recalled to him that of the emperor, he said that he would make sail for Brest. Lauriston, afflicted to see him in such a state, but charmed at his resolution, wrote to the emperor by a courier dispatched from Ferrol, that now finally they should proceed to Brest, and from Brest into the channel.

In the midst of these deplorable anxieties, Villeneuve sailed away from Corunna, and lost sight of the land on the 14th. In order to add to his misfortunes, the wind blowing strong from the north-east, was far from carrying him towards his grand destination. Melancholy consequence of that discouragement, which makes us so often neglect the finest favours of fortune! At that very moment, Calder and Nelson were not, as Villeneuve dreaded, united near Ferrol. Nelson, after having vainly searched for the French at Cadiz, had gone northwards, working up against the same north-east wind which was then blowing, and had finally joined Cornwallis before Brest the same day, the 14th of August, that the French squadron had come out of Ferrol. He left with Cornwallis the small number of his vessels which were able to keep the sea, and went with the others to refit at Portsmouth, which he reached on the 18th of August. Calder, on his side, after the battle of Ferrol had rejoined Cornwallis with his maltreated fleet. A part of his vessels had been sent into the channel ports to refit [1]. Cornwallis had immediately recomposed a squadron of seventeen or eighteen sail, and sent them off Ferrol, keeping about eighteen sail there. Calder returned, but found Ferrol evacuated. If Villeneuve, imbibing a little confidence, had joined Lallemand at Vigo, and proceeded towards the channel, he would have crossed without encountering Calder, who came to blockade Ferrol, now empty; he would have surprised Cornwallis, separated from Nelson and Calder, having eighteen or twenty vessels more, he would have attacked him with thirty-five, not reckoning those of Ganteaume. What a chance did the depression of his mind thus make him lose! Besides, general Lauriston beset him with the strongest entreaties; a moment's turn in the wind, and in the depressed spirits of Villeneuve, and the grand desire of Napoleon would still have been accomplished.

It is difficult to picture the impatience which Napoleon exhibited upon the shore of Boulogne, where he waited in expectation every moment of the appearance of his fleet, and of the opportunity so much desired for invading England. All his forces had embarked, from the Texel to Etaples. At the Texel, the artillery horses and cavalry had been on board for some weeks. The troops, without exception, had been in the vessels. The squadron of the line charged to escort the convoy had to wait merely for the signal of their unmooring. In the four ports of Ambleteuse, Wimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, they had several times made the one hundred and thirty thousand men, designed to cross in the flat-bottomed boats, take up their arms. They had brought them to the quays, and had made them all occupy every one his place in the vessels. They had thus found what time would be needful for this operation. At Ambleteuse, the men of the corps of Davout had been embarked in an hour and a quarter, and the horses in an hour and a half. It had been the same at Etaples and at Boulogne, allowing for the different proportions of men and horses.

All therefore had been ready, when Napoleon was at last apprised of the battle of Villeneuve off Ferrol,

[1] See note page 648. Calder joined Cornwallis with fourteen sail of the line, on the authority of an admiralty note now existing; the Windsor Castle, the fifteenth vessel of his squadron, had gone to repair at Plymouth.—*Translator.*

of his entering the harbour of Vigo, and lastly, of his entrance into Corunna. Whatever displeasure the moral state of Villeneuve had caused him, however severely he had judged him, he was still satisfied with the entire result, and by his orders all the Gazettes contained an account of the naval combat, with the most praiseworthy reflections upon Villeneuve and the combined squadrons. The two vessels lost, appeared to him no more than an accident arising from the fog, no doubt to be regretted, but of no importance to the result obtained, that of the entrance into Vigo, and of the junction of the two fleets [1].

[1] The following are the letters that Napoleon wrote upon this subject to admiral Villeneuve and his aide-de-camp Lauriston:—

To Admiral Villeneuve.

Boulogne, the 23rd Thermidor, Year XIII. August 13, 1805.

Monsieur vice-admiral Villeneuve,—I have seen with pleasure, by the combat of the 3rd Thermidor, that several of my vessels have behaved with the bravery that I might have expected. I am obliged to you for the fine manœuvre that you executed at the commencement of the action, which completely defeated the enemy's designs. I could have desired that you had employed the great number of your frigates in succouring the Spanish vessels, that, finding themselves first engaged, were of necessity in the most need of it. I should have equally desired, that on the day following the battle, you had not given time to the enemy to place in security their vessels, the Windsor Castle and Malta, and the two Spanish ships, which, being unrigged, rendered their sailing embarrassed and slow. This would have given to my arms the eclat of a great victory. The slowness of this manœuvre gave time to the English to send them into their ports. But I feel bound to think that victory remained to my arms, seeing that you have entered Corunna. I hope that this dispatch will not find you there; that you will have resumed your cruize to form your junction with Captain Lallemand: sweep all which you find before you, and come into the channel, where we await you with anxiety. If you have not done so, do it. March boldly up to the enemy. The order of battle which to me appears preferable would be, to intermingle the Spanish vessels with the French, and to place behind each Spanish vessel a frigate to succour them during the action, and to make use thus of the great number of frigates which you have with you. You will be able yet further to add to this increase by means of the Guerriere and the Revanche, that will take the crew of the Atlas; but without this being any delay to your operations. You have at this moment under your command eighteen of our vessels, and twelve, or at least ten of those belonging to the king of Spain. My intention is, that wherever the enemy shall present himself before you with less than twenty-four vessels, that you should attack him.

By the return of the frigate President, and several others, that I had sent to you at Martinique and Guadaloupe, I have been apprised, that in place of disembarking troops in those two islands, they find themselves weaker in force than they were before. Nelson had but nine vessels. The English are not so numerous as you think. They every where stand at bay. If you appear for three days, or for only twenty-four hours, your mission will be fulfilled. Let admiral Ganteaume be made acquainted by an extraordinary courier with the moment of your departure. Lastly, for a great object, a squadron must always run some hazards; and never will our soldiers, by land or sea, have spilled their blood to procure a greater or more noble result. For the grand object of favouring a descent upon that power which for six centuries has oppressed France, we are all willing to die without regretting life. Such are the sentiments which should animate you—which should animate all my soldiers. England has not in the Downs more than four vessels of the line, which we harass every day with our praams and flotilla.

Now he was no more in doubt that Villeneuve would make his appearance off Brest. Ganteaume was at Barthaume, that is, outside the inner road in front of the open sea, supported by one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon disposed in battery on the shore. It would be one of the greatest of misfortunes if Ganteaume should not be able to take a part in the battle for raising his blockade, and the French uniting fifty vessels, twenty-nine under Villeneuve, and twenty-one under Ganteaume, should not succeed in driving the enemy before them, and on entering the channel with thirty or forty, even if they lost ten or twenty sail.

"You see well," said Napoleon to Decrès, who was with him at Boulogne, "that in spite of a crowd of faults and unfavourable accidents, the nature of the plan is so thoroughly good, that all the advantages are yet on our side, and that we are very near success."

Decrès, who had received in secret confidence the complaints of Villeneuve, and who partook in his distrust of fortune, was not quite as tranquil as Napoleon. "All that is very possible," he replied, "because all has been perfectly well calculated; but if it should succeed, I shall see in it the hand of God. It has shown itself indeed so often in the operations of your majesty, that I shall not be astonished to see it again appear upon the present occasion [1]."

On the 14th of August, he was more desirous than ever of the expedition, in spite of Decrès.

To General Lauriston.

Boulogne, 26 Thermidor, Year XIII., or 14th August, 1805.

Monsieur general Lauriston,—I have received your two letters of the 9th and 11th Thermidor. I hope that this despatch will find you no longer at Ferrol, and that the squadron will have already set sail to proceed to its destination. I do not see why you did not leave the 67th and 16th regiments at Martinique and Guadaloupe. It was well explained in your instructions. Thus, after an expedition so extensive, I have not even the pleasure to see my islands safely sheltered from attack. There are not at present there three thousand men, and after Vendémiaire there will not be more than two thousand five hundred. I hope that Villeneuve will not suffer himself to be blockaded by an inferior squadron to his own. He must have actually thirty vessels of the line. I think that, with this squadron, he is well in a position to attack one of twenty-four. Help and push on the admiral as much as possible. Arrange with him about the troops which you have on board, and send me the statement of their situation; you may leave them on board, or, if the admiral judges it convenient, you can disembark them, and form them into a division at Ferrol.

Take measures to form a depôt of the men you disembarked at Vigo, that all the troops which may arrive from Ferrol may be able to rejoin their corps from thence afterwards.

Captain Lallemand made his appearance off the coast of Ireland in the beginning of Thermidor. He ought to be at the place of rendezvous long since. He will seek to obtain intelligence of the squadron, if he has not already a knowledge of it at Vigo, where an officer will be, under the supposition that admiral Villeneuve had not appeared on the 20th Thermidor. We are every where ready. An appearance of twenty-four hours in the channel will be sufficient."

[1] I limit myself to analysing textually the numerous notes which Napoleon and admiral Decrès wrote every day, although they were only at the distance of half-a-league from each other. The one was at Pont de Briques, the other on the sea-shore.—*Note of the Author.*

From the 15th to the 20th of August Napoleon remained at Boulogne a prey to the keenest anxiety. Signals placed upon all the more elevated points of the coast were designed to inform him when the French fleet appeared in the horizon. Attentive to each courier that arrived from Paris or the ports, he gave at every moment fresh orders, to prevent those accidents which would have been likely to contravene his designs. Talleyrand having apprised him that the armaments of Austria became every day more and more significant and threatening, and that a continental war was to be apprehended, but that at the same time Prussia, seduced by the bait that they had made so tempting before her eyes, that of Hanover, was ready to conclude an alliance with France; Napoleon, without deliberating a single hour, called for Duroc, remitted to him a letter for the king of Prussia, and all the powers necessary to sign a treaty. "Set off immediately," he said to him, "go to Berlin without passing through Paris, and determine Prussia to sign an alliance with me. I have given him Hanover, but only upon the condition that he decide instantly. The present that I make him is worth the trouble. In fifteen days I shall not renew to him the same offer. To-day I have need to be covered on the side of Austria while I embark. To obtain this service of Prussia I give to it a large country which will add forty thousand men to its army. But if by delay I shall be obliged to quit the shores of the ocean to turn myself towards the continent, my camps struck, my designs against England abandoned, I shall have no need of any one to bring Austria to reason, and I shall not pay so dearly for a service that will in that case become useless to me. In consequence, Napoleon required that Prussia should immediately make movements of troops towards Bohemia: he would not consent besides that the treaty should be overcharged with conditions relative to Holland, Switzerland, or Italy. He would cede Hanover, and wished that it should be united to Prussia without being burdened by any other conditions[1].

It is easy to judge, by so serious a step thus promptly decided upon, of the high price Napoleon attached at that moment to the free accomplishment of his projects. The same day that he gave these instructions to Duroc, that is to say, on the 20th of August, a courier arrived that had left Ferrol during the time Villeneuve was setting sail to arrive at Boulogne. Napoleon received directly the dispatch of Lauriston, while at the little chateau of Pont de Briques; while that of Villeneuve, addressed to Decrès, was sent to him on the seashore, at the barrack in which he had taken up his quarters.

Napoleon delighted at the words of Lauriston, "we are off for Brest," immediately dictated two letters to Villeneuve and Ganteaume. They are too well worthy of preservation by history not to give them here.

He said to Ganteaume:—

"I have already made known to you by telegraph, that my intention is, you should not suffer Villeneuve to lose a single day, in order that profiting by the superiority which is afforded me by fifty ships of the line, you should go at once to sea, in order to fulfil your destination, and carry yourself into the channel with all your strength and force. I reckon upon your talents, firmness, and character under such important circumstances. Depart and come hither. We shall avenge six centuries of insult and reproach. Never before for an object so great will my forces by land and sea have risked their lives!" (From the imperial camp at Boulogne, August 22, 1805.)

He wrote to Villeneuve:—

"Monsieur the vice-admiral, I hope that you have arrived at Brest. Depart, lose not one moment, and with my united fleet enter the channel. England is ours! we are all ready; every thing is embarked. Appear but for twenty-four hours and all will be terminated." (From the imperial camp at Boulogne, August 22.)

But while Napoleon, deceived by the despatch of Lauriston, addressed these earnest words to the two admirals, Decrès had received from Villeneuve, by the same courier, a very different despatch, which left him little hope of the voyage to Brest. He hastened to the emperor, to make him acquainted with the sad moral state in which Villeneuve found himself upon quitting Ferrol.

On hearing this contradictory news, Napoleon was seized with a violent fit of anger. The first bursts of his passion fell upon admiral Decrès, who had given him such a man to command his fleet. He bore much more heavily upon this minister, because he attributed to him, besides the choice of Villeneuve, analogous opinions to those which had deprived the unhappy admiral of all courage. He reproached him with the weakness of his friend, and that slandering of the French navy which conveyed despair into the hearts of all the seamen. He complained of not being seconded in his great designs, and only able to find men, who to take care of their persons and reputations, knew not even how to lose a battle, when all that was required of them was only the courage to fight and to lose one. "Your Villeneuve," he said to Decrès, "is not even capable of commanding a frigate. What is to be said of a man who, for a few sailors fallen sick in the ships belonging to his squadron, because of a broken bowsprit, a few torn sails, a report of the junction between Nelson and Calder, loses his senses and renounces his designs?" But if Nelson and Calder had joined, they would be at the entrance of Ferrol, ready to attack the French at the passage out, and not in the open sea. All this is plain and simple, and strikes the eyes of any one who is not blinded by his own fear[1]! Napoleon again called Villeneuve a poltroon, even a traitor, and prescribed the making out immediate orders to bring him forcibly back from Cadiz into the channel, if he had sailed to Cadiz; and in case he should have made sail towards Brest, to give Ganteaume the command of the two united squadrons. The minister of the navy, who had not yet dared

[1] This is the analysis of the secret instructions given to the grand marshal Duroc.—*Note of the Author.*

[1] These scenes, of which there are no longer any living witnesses, would be lost to history without the private letters and autographs of admiral Decrès and the emperor. In these are seen all the agitations of those memorable days. There is a great number for the same day, although the emperor and Decrès were only half-a-league distant the one from the other.—*Note of the Author.*

to give the whole of his opinions upon the junction of the fleets in the midst of the channel, in the present dangerous circumstance, but who believed this junction was horribly dangerous, since the English, on the alert, had concentrated their force between Ferrol, Brest, and Portsmouth, supplicated the emperor not to give so fatal an order, told him that the time had advanced too far, that the English were too much upon their guard, and that if he persisted, they should not fail to suffer some terrible catastrophe before Brest. Napoleon had at once a reply, that fifty sail would be united before Brest if they but once appeared there, that the English would never have the same number there; that in any case one of the two fleets lost would be nothing to him, if the other, set free, was able to enter the channel and domineer there for twenty-four hours.

Decrès, borne down by the emperor, took the step of putting into writing what he dared not venture to say to him, and the same evening addressed the following letter to him at Pont de Briques :—

"4th Fructidor, year XIII., or 22 August, 1805.

"I threw myself at his majesty's feet to supplicate him not to associate the operations of his squadrons with the Spanish vessels. Far from having obtained something in this regard, your majesty intends that this association shall be increased by vessels from Cadiz and Carthagena.

"Your majesty wishes, that with a like assemblage of vessels, there should be undertaken a thing of itself exceedingly difficult, and which becomes more so in considering the elements of the force of which the fleet is composed, and the inexperience of the commanders, their want of the habit of command, and, in fine, the circumstances that your majesty knows as well as myself, and that it would, therefore, be superfluous to retrace.

"In this state of things, when your majesty reckons for nothing both my arguments and experience, I know of no situation more painful than my own. I wish your majesty would take well into consideration, that I have no interest but that of his flag and the honour of his arms; and if his squadron is at Cadiz, I pray him to consider that event as a decree of destiny which has reserved it for other operations. I supplicate him not to make it come from Cadiz into the channel, because it will not be done without the misfortunes that must attend such an effort at the present moment. I supplicate him above all not to order this voyage to be attempted with two months' provisions, because M. d'Estaing, I believe, took seventy or eighty days to come from Cadiz to Brest, and perhaps more.

"If the prayer which I address to your majesty should not appear to him to have any weight, he can judge of what passes in my heart.

"It is at this moment more particularly, while I am able to stop the emission of the orders, fatal to the service of your majesty in my view, that I am bound to insist upon it the more. May I be more fortunate in this circumstance than I have been heretofore.

"But it is unfortunate for me that I am acquainted with the naval service, when this knowledge does not obtain for me any confidence, and produces no result upon the combinations of your majesty. In truth, sire, my situation becomes too painful. I censure myself for not knowing how to convince your majesty. I doubt that any single individual can succeed in doing so. For the purpose of naval operations, be so good as to form a council, an admiralty, any thing that will be agreeable to your majesty; but for myself, I feel that in place of being strengthened, I every day grow less strong in your majesty's opinion. It is but too true, that a minister of the navy subjugated by your majesty in what relates to the navy, serves you ill, and becomes nullified as respects the glory of your arms, if he does not become prejudicial to it.

"It is in the bitterness of my soul, that, diminished nothing in my devotion and fidelity to your person, I pray your majesty to receive my profound respect.

(Signed) "DECRES."

The emperor, discontented but affected, answered immediately from the Pont de Briques. "I pray you to send to me, during the day or to-morrow, a memoir upon this question. In the present situation of things, if Villeneuve remains at Cadiz, what must he do? Raise yourself to the height of the circumstances and the situation in which France and England are placed; write me no more such letters as that you have now written, it notifies nothing. As to myself, I have but one necessity, and that is, to succeed." (August 22nd, depôt of the Louvre.)

On the following day, the 23rd, Decrès proposed his plan to the emperor. It was at first to adjourn the expedition to the winter, because it was too late to bring back the fleet from Cadiz into the channel. They would be exposed to the necessity of executing the enterprise in the midst of the equinoctial storms. Besides, the English were aware of the design. Every body finished by having a glimpse of the project of a naval junction between Boulogne and Brest. According to him, it was necessary to divide each squadron now too numerous into seven or eight cruising squadrons of five or six vessels each. That which had been done at this very time by captain Lallemand, was a proof of what it was possible to do with detached divisions. It was necessary to compose them of the best officers and the best vessels and to send them on the ocean. They made the English despair by ruining their commerce, and formed excellent seamen and commanders of squadrons. From these there could be drawn the elements of a fleet for a great ulterior design.

"This," said admiral Decrès, "is the system of warfare after my own heart. If, finally," he added, "you wish in the winter to have a fleet in the channel, there is a means of bringing it there. You will have at Cadiz forty vessels. Embark an army on board them, and give to this embarkation the colour of a design upon India or Jamaica; then divide the fleet into two parts. Take from among these vessels the best sailors; from among the officers, those who have been proved the most resolute and capable for the preceding year; set sail secretly with twenty vessels only, taking care to keep twenty behind, in order to attract the attention of the English; then convey this twenty round Ireland and Scotland, and thus into

the channel. Call Villeneuve and Gravina to Paris, animate their hearts, and they will to a certainty execute this manœuvre."

On reading this scheme, Napoleon renounced entirely the idea of making the flotilla return immediately from Cadiz, if in fact it had gone there at all, and he wrote with his own hand on the back of the dispatch, "Form seven cruising squadrons; distribute them between Africa, Surinam, St. Helen's, the Cape, the Isle of France, the Western Islands, the United States, the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, and the mouth of the Thames[1]. Then he set himself to read and re-read the despatches of Villeneuve, of Lauriston, and of the consular agent who had for a long time followed with his spying-glass the course of the French squadron when it had lost sight of the heights of Ferrol. He searched there, as if in the page of a book of destiny, for an answer to this question: Has Villeneuve sailed towards Cadiz or Brest? The uncertainty in which the despatches left him, irritated him yet more than he would have been irritated had he a certain knowledge of the course having been taken to Cadiz. In this state of agitation, and above all, in the situation of Europe, it had been the most important service to let him know how the matter really stood, because the news from the frontiers of Austria were every moment more alarming. The Austrians no longer concealed their projects: they were on the Adige in considerable force, and threatened the Inn and Bavaria. But if he did not strike a thunder-bolt on London which would make Europe tremble and fall back, it was necessary he should direct his forces towards the Rhine to prevent what they had prepared for him, the being on his frontier before him. Being under the necessity of knowing the truth, he wrote several letters to admiral Decrès from the Pont au Briques to the camp, to inquire of him his private opinions as to the probable determination of Villeneuve. The admiral fearing to irritate the emperor too much, and at the same time being scrupulous about deceiving him, answered him each time in a way almost contradictory, saying sometimes yes, and sometimes no, partaking in the anxiety of his master, but visibly inclining towards the opinion that Villeneuve would go to Cadiz. In reality he scarcely doubted that such was the case. It was thus that Napoleon, in order not to be taken in an unprovided manner, was divided between two projects, and passed some days in one of those ambiguous situations, insupportable for a character like his own, ready at the same time to pass over the sea or to throw himself upon the continent; to make a descent upon England, or a military march towards Austria. He had the peculiar trait in his character, that when it was necessary to act, he commanded himself instantly, and returned all at once from the anger to which he had seen fit to deliver up his soul for a moment, as if to be more master in taking it back again and governing it at the moment that he had the necessity. After numerous perplexities during the day, the 23rd of August, he gave the necessary orders under a double hypothesis. "My resolution is fixed," he wrote to Talleyrand, "my fleets were lost sight of from the heights of Cape Ortegal, on the 14th of August. If they come into the channel, there is still time, I will embark and make the descent. I shall go to London and cut the knot of all the coalitions. If, on the contrary, my admirals want character and manœuvre ill, I strike my camps of the ocean, and I enter Germany with two hundred thousand men, and I shall not stop until I have touched the barrier at Vienna, taken away Venice, and all that Austria yet keeps in Italy, and chased the Bourbons out of Naples. I will not suffer the Austrians and Russians to unite; I will strike them before their junction. The continent pacified, I will return to the sea, and go to work anew to procure a maritime peace."

Then with that profound and incomparable knowledge of warlike affairs which he had acquired, and with that unparalleled discernment of what is more or less urgent in the dispositions required to be taken, without in any way deranging his maritime expedition, which remained continually ready for movement, all the troops being on board or close to the vessels, he gave his first orders for the continental war. He began with Naples and Hanover, the two points most distant from the operation of his own will. He ordered that there should be added to the division which he had organized at Pescara, under general Reynier, seven regiments of light cavalry, and some batteries of horse artillery, in order to form in that country of guerillas a number of moveable columns. He transmitted to general St. Cyr, an order to take to himself the division of Reynier at the first sign of hostility, and to join it with the corps which he had carried back to Tarentum, and on the first sign of hostility to throw himself upon Naples with twenty-one thousand men, in order to prevent the descent in Italy of the Russians from Corfu, or the English from Malta.

He then commanded prince Eugene, who although viceroy of Italy, was under the military tutorship of marshal Jourdan, to assemble immediately the French troops spread over the country from Genoa to Bologna and Verona, to march them to the Adige, to buy artillery horses throughout all Italy, and harness immediately a hundred pieces of cannon. As the French troops were formed in divisions upon the war footing, these dispositions were easily and promptly executed. He ordered recruits to be sent to the depôts. He prescribed at the same time the baking of biscuits every where to provision the Italian fortresses. Alexandria was not yet finished, he therefore ordered that the citadel of Turin should serve as the depôt fortress for Piedmont.

He made similar dispositions in regard to Germany. The same day, the 23rd, he sent off a courier to Bernadotte, who had replaced general Mortier in the command of Hanover. He enjoined it upon him, under the seal of the closest secresy, and without giving any external sign of his new destination, to assemble at Gottingen, at the extremity of that electorate, at the head of the troops of central Germany, the larger part of his *corps d'armée;* to begin by marching towards that point the artillery and heavy baggage; to execute these movements in such a manner that none should be able to discern clearly the object before ten or

[1] It is from the same document that I transcribe these details.—*Note of the Author.*

fifteen days had passed; and in order to prolong the doubt, to show himself personally at the opposite point, to await there the definitive order to place himself on the march. His idea was, if he came to an understanding with Prussia relative to Hanover, as he did not doubt he should do, to evacuate that kingdom, and cross without permission all the small states of central Germany, to carry into Bavaria the army that he should withdraw from Hanover.

By the same courier he enjoined it upon general Marmont, at the Texel, to prepare immediately his draught horses and *materiél*, in order to be able in three days to place himself on the march with his corps, recommending him to keep it a secret, and to change nothing in regard to the embarkation of the troops before he received further orders. Lastly, around himself at Boulogne, he made a first and only diversion of the troops which he had with him, those of the heavy cavalry and dragoons. He had assembled much more cavalry than was in reality necessary, and much more particularly than he would probably be able to embark. He sent a march to the rear the division of the cuirassiers of Nansouty, and assembled at St. Omer the dragoons mounted and dismounted, placed under the orders of Baraguay d'Hilliers. He added to them a certain number of guns of the horse artillery, and sent them immediately on the road to Strasburg. He ordered the assemblage in Alsace at the same time of all the heavy cavalry that remained in France, despatched Songis, the general-in-chief of the artillery, to prepare a field park between Mentz and Strasburg, with funds to buy in Lorraine, Switzerland, and Alsace, all the draught horses which he was able to procure. An order was given for the infantry which was to be marched upon the eastern frontier. Five hundred thousand rations of biscuits were ordered at Strasburg. This numerous cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery, attended by a species of infantry in the dismounted dragoons, would furnish the first support to the menaced Bavarians, demanding succour with earnest entreaties. Some regiments of infantry were to be very near, in order to aid them. Finally, Bernadotte would be able to reach Wurtzburg in ten or a dozen marches. Thus, in a few days, without having in any way diverted from their purpose the forces of the embarkation, except some divisions of heavy cavalry and of dragoons, he was ready to support the Bavarians, upon whom Austria would strike her first blow.

These dispositions having carried into effect with the promptitude of a great character, he regained a little his tranquillity of mind, and set himself to watch for what the wind might bring to him.

He was sombre, reserved, harsh towards admiral Decrès, in whose countenance he seemed to see all those opinions which had shaken the resolution of Villeneuve, and he kept continually on the seashore, looking towards the horizon in expectation of some unexpected appearance. Officers of the navy, placed with glasses on different points of the coast, were ordered to watch all the circumstances occurring at sea, and to give him an account of them. In that way, he passed three days in one of those situations of uncertainty, the most repugnant to ardent and powerful minds that are attached to decisive action. Lastly, admiral Decrès, interrogated incessantly, declared that in his opinion, seeing the space of time gone by, and the winds that had prevailed along the coast, from the gulf of Gascony as far as the straits of Dover, and considering the moral disposition of Villeneuve, he was persuaded that the fleet had made sail towards Cadiz.

It was with deep pain, intermingled with violent expressions of anger, that Napoleon finally renounced the hope of seeing his fleet arrive in the straits. His irritation was so great, that the man whom he most particularly loved, the learned Monge, who almost every morning made a truly military breakfast with him on the sea-shore in the imperial barrack, seeing him in such a state of mind, discreetly retired, judging even his presence inopportune. He went to M. Daru, then the principal war commissary, to whom he recounted what he had just seen. At that very moment, M. Daru was himself called, and commanded to go to the emperor. He found him agitated, speaking to himself, and seeming not to remark any one who came into his presence. Scarcely had he entered, standing still, silent, awaiting his orders, when Napoleon, encountering him, and addressing him as if he was acquainted with all the circumstances, said, "Do you know where Villeneuve is? He is at Cadiz!" Then he made a long harangue on the weakness and the incapacity of all that were about him; said he was betrayed by the faint-heartedness of men, deplored the ruin of his fine plan, the most certain of success he had ever conceived in his life, and exhibited, in all his bitterness of soul, the grief felt by genius when abandoned of fortune. Then, all at once recovering from his excitement, he calmed himself of a sudden, and directing his mind with surprising facility from the closed route of the ocean towards the open routes of the continent, he dictated during several successive hours, with a presence of mind, and a most extraordinary precision of detail, the plan which will be found in the following book. It was the plan of the immortal campaign of 1805. There was no longer the slightest trace of irritation in his features, nor in his voice[1]. His great mental conception had thus dissipated the sorrow upon his spirit. In place of attacking England by the direct road, he went to combat it by the long and sinuous route of the continent; he went to find on that road incomparable greatness, before, upon the same road, he encountered his destruction.

Would he have more certainly attained his object by the direct way of the descent? It is this question which will be often asked both in the present and the future time, and which it is very difficult to decide. Still, if Napoleon had been once transported across to Dover, it is no offence to the British nation to believe that it might have been vanquished by the army and captain, who in eighteen months vanquished and forced into submission, Austria, Germany, Prussia, and Russia. There was not, in fact, a man more in this army of the ocean than fought the eight hundred thousand soldiers of the continent, at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland. It must even be confessed, that the territo-

[1] I extract this recital from a part of the memoirs of M. Daru, of which the copy is actually in my possession through the obliging kindness of his son.—*Note of the Author.*

rial inviolability enjoyed by England had not made her sensible to the danger of invasion, a circumstance which does not detract from the glory of her navy, nor of her regular army. It is therefore, from that circumstance, little probable that she would venture to hold out against the soldiers of Napoleon, not yet worn down with service, nor decimated by war. An heroic resolution of her government to take refuge in Scotland, for example, and suffer England to be ravaged, until Nelson came with all the English squadrons, to shut up, in turn, Napoleon victorious, and to expose him to be a prisoner amid his conquest, would have no doubt brought about singular combinations ; but that was out of all probability. We are firmly persuaded that Napoleon once in London, England would have treated.

The question, therefore, rested wholly upon the passage of the Straits. Although the flotilla might have been able to pass in a calm in summer, and in winter during a fog, the passage, in either case, was hazardous. Thus Napoleon had considered the aid of a fleet necessary to protect the expedition. The question then returned, it was observed, to the original difficulty, that of being superior to the English at sea. Not because it was thought about surpassing them, or even to be equal to them there. It rested solely upon causing a fleet to arrive in the channel by an able combination of means and circumstances, availing itself of the chances of the sea and of its vast superficies, which render encounters upon it so difficult. The plan of Napoleon, so often re-examined, and re-produced with so much copiousness, had every chance of success in the hands of a firmer man than Villeneuve. There is no doubt Napoleon found here, under another form, the inconvenience of his maritime inferiority ; Villeneuve felt keenly this inferiority, and was disconcerted by it ; but he made too much of it, and this in a manner which compromises his honour in history. After all, his fleet had fought well at Ferrol, and if it be supposed that he gave before Brest the same disastrous battle that he did, not long afterwards, at Trafalgar, Ganteaume would have come out, and in losing it, was it not worth more to do so to ensure the passage of the channel ? Would it be possible in such a case to say the battle had been lost ? Villeneuve was wrong therefore, although he has been too much cried down, according to the usage practised towards all who are unfortunate. A man of his business still, but forgetting that devotion often supplies what is wanting under the head of material, he knew not how to raise himself to the full elevation of his mission, and to do that which Latouche Treville would have certainly done had he been in his place.

The enterprize of Napoleon was not then a chimera ; was perfectly possible in the realization, in the mode he had proposed to do it ; and, perhaps, the enterprize which had no result, did him more honour than those which had been crowned with the most startling success. It was not a feint, as some persons have imagined, who would search out profundities where none exist. Some thousand letters of the ministers and of the emperor, leave no doubt in this respect of the fact. It was a serious undertaking, pursued for several years with real earnestness. It has been equally pretended that if Napoleon had not repelled Fulton, who came to offer him steam navigation, he would have crossed the Straits. The character of steam navigation it is impossible to predict now in relation to future events. That it gives more means to France of acting against England is probable. That it renders the Straits more easy to be crossed, must depend upon the efforts that France shall make to assume a superiority in the employ of the new power. That will depend upon her patriotism and foresight. But that which may be affirmed in regard to the refusal of Napoleon is, that Fulton proposed to him an art in its perfect infancy, which at the moment could not have been of the smallest aid to his objects. Napoleon did all that he was able to do. There is not a single fault under this head with which to reproach him. Providence no doubt intended that he should not succeed—and wherefore ? He who had not always justice with him in dealing with his enemies, had here the right upon his side.

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HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE.

BOOK XXII.

ULM AND TRAFALGAR.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNION OF GENOA WITH THE FRENCH EMPIRE.—THIS UNION, THOUGH AN ERROR, PRODUCES FORTUNATE RESULTS.—VAST FIELD DISCLOSED TO THE MILITARY COMBINATIONS OF NAPOLEON.—FOUR ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST FRANCE.—NAPOLEON EMPLOYS HIMSELF SERIOUSLY WITH ONE, AND BY THE MODE IN WHICH HE INTENDS TO REPEL IT, HE PROPOSES TO DEFEAT THE OTHER THREE.—EXPLANATION OF HIS PLAN.—MOVEMENT OF SIX CORPS OF THE ARMY, FROM THE SHORE OF THE OCEAN TO THE SOURCES OF THE DANUBE.—NAPOLEON KEEPS HIS DISPOSITIONS A PROFOUND SECRET, AND COMMUNICATES THEM TO THE ELECTOR OF BAVARIA ALONE, IN ORDER TO ATTACH THAT PRINCE TO HIMSELF, AND TO GIVE HIM CONFIDENCE.—PRECAUTIONS WHICH HE TOOK FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE FLOTILLA.—HIS RETURN TO PARIS.—ALTERATION OF PUBLIC OPINION RESPECTING HIM.—REPROACHES MADE TO HIM.—STATE OF THE FINANCES.—COMMENCEMENT OF THE ARREARS.—DIFFICULT SITUATION OF THE PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL PLACES.—SCARCITY OF MONEY.—COMMERCIAL EFFORTS MADE TO PRODUCE THE PRECIOUS METALS.—ASSOCIATION OF THE COMPANY OF UNITED MERCHANTS WITH THE COURT OF SPAIN.—SPECULATION IN DOLLARS.—DANGER OF SUCH A SPECULATION.—THE COMPANY OF UNITED MERCHANTS HAVING MINGLED AND CONFUSED TOGETHER THE AFFAIRS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN WHILE IN ITS HAND, MAKE THE EMBARRASSMENT OF ONE COMMON TO THE OTHER.—CONSEQUENCES OF THIS EMBARRASSMENT TO THE BANK OF FRANCE.—IRRITATION OF NAPOLEON AGAINST THE MEN OF BUSINESS.—CONSIDERABLE SUMS OF GOLD AND SILVER SENT TO STRASBURG AND ITALY.—LEVY OF THE CONSCRIPTION BY A DECREE OF THE SENATE ALONE.—ORGANIZATION OF THE REVENUES.—EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARDS.—SITTING OF THE SENATE.—COLDNESS SHOWN TOWARDS NAPOLEON BY THE PEOPLE OF PARIS.—NAPOLEON FEELS PAIN AT THIS, BUT DEPARTS FOR THE ARMY, CERTAIN OF SOON CHANGING THIS COLDNESS INTO TRANSPORTS OF ENTHUSIASM.—DISPOSITIONS OF THE COALESCED POWERS.—MARCH OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES, ONE INTO GALLICIA TO SUCCOUR THE AUSTRIANS, THE OTHER INTO POLAND TO THREATEN PRUSSIA.—THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER AT PULAWI.—HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COURT OF BERLIN.—MARCH OF THE AUSTRIANS INTO LOMBARDY AND BAVARIA.—PASSAGE OF THE INN BY GENERAL MACK.—THE ELECTOR OF BAVARIA, AFTER GREAT PERPLEXITY, THROWS HIMSELF INTO THE ARMS OF FRANCE, AND TAKES REFUGE AT WÜRTZBURG WITH HIS COURT AND ARMY.—GENERAL MACK TAKES POST AT ULM.—CONDUCT OF THE COURT OF NAPLES.—COMMENCEMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE SIDE OF THE FRENCH.—ORGANIZATION OF THE GRAND ARMY.—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE.—MARCH OF NAPOLEON WITH SIX CORPS ALONG THE SUABIAN ALPS, IN ORDER TO TURN GENERAL MACK.—THE 6TH AND 7TH OF OCTOBER, NAPOLEON REACHES THE DANUBE TOWARDS DONAUWERTH, BEFORE GENERAL MACK HAS ANY SUSPICION OF THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH.—PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE.—GENERAL MACK IS ENTANGLED.—COMBATS OF WERTINGEN AND GÜNZBURG.—NAPOLEON AT AUGSBURG; MAKES HIS DISPOSITIONS WITH THE DOUBLE OBJECT OF INVESTING ULM AND OCCUPYING MUNICH, IN ORDER TO SEPARATE THE RUSSIANS FROM THE AUSTRIANS.—ERROR COMMITTED BY MURAT.—DANGER OF DUPONT'S DIVISION.—COMBAT OF HASLACH.—NAPOLEON HASTENS UNDER THE WALLS OF ULM, AND REPAIRS THE FAULTS COMMITTED.—COMBAT OF ELCHINGEN, ON THE 14TH OF OCTOBER.—INVESTMENT OF ULM.—DESPAIR OF GENERAL MACK, AND RETREAT OF THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND.—THE AUSTRIANS REDUCED TO A CAPITULATION.—UNHEARD OF TRIUMPH OF NAPOLEON.—HE DESTROYS IN TWENTY DAYS AN ARMY OF EIGHTY THOUSAND MEN, WITHOUT FIGHTING A BATTLE.—SEQUEL OF THE NAVAL OPERATIONS, AFTER THE RETURN OF ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE TO CADIZ.—SEVERITY OF NAPOLEON AS RESPECTS THIS ADMIRAL.—ADMIRAL ROSILY SENT TO REPLACE HIM.—COMMAND FOR THE FLEET TO SAIL FROM CADIZ, IN ORDER TO ENTER THE MEDITERRANEAN.—GRIEF OF ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE, AND HIS RESOLUTION TO GIVE BATTLE IN HIS DESPAIR.—STATE OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH FLEETS, AND OF THAT OF THE ENGLISH.—INSTRUCTION OF NELSON TO HIS CAPTAINS.—HASTY SALLY OF ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE.—ENCOUNTER OF THE TWO FLEETS OFF CAPE TRAFALGAR.—ATTACK OF THE ENGLISH, FORMED IN TWO COLUMNS.—RUPTURE OF THE LINE OF BATTLE.—HEROIC COMBATS OF THE REDOUBTABLE, BUCENTAURE, FOUGUEUX, ALGESIRAS, PLUTO, ACHILLE, AND PRINCE OF ASTURIAS.—DEATH OF NELSON, AND CAPTIVITY OF VILLENEUVE.—DEFEAT OF OUR FLEET AFTER A REMARKABLE CONTEST.—FEARFUL TEMPEST AFTER THE BATTLE.—SHIPWRECKS SUCCEED THE COMBATS.—CONDUCT OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO THE FRENCH NAVY.—SILENCE ENJOINED REGARDING THE RECENT EVENTS.—ULM CAUSES TRAFALGAR TO BE FORGOTTEN.

It was a serious fault to annex Genoa to France on the eve of the expedition to England, and thus to furnish Austria with the strongest reason which could decide her upon war. It was to provoke and draw upon France a formidable coalition, at the moment when absolute repose was necessary upon the continent, in order to have perfect freedom of action against England. Napoleon, it is true, had not foreseen the consequences of the union of Genoa. His error consisted in undervaluing Austria

too much, and in believing her incapable of acting, whatever liberty he might take with her. Still, although this union, effected under such circumstances, has been made a ground for justly reproaching him, it was in reality a fortunate circumstance. Doubtless, if admiral Villeneuve had been able to set sail up the Channel, and to appear before Boulogne, he would never have had to regret the pains incurred in the execution of his vast scheme; but the admiral did not come; Napoleon, reduced at once to inaction, unless he had been bold enough to cross the Straits without the protection of a fleet, would have found himself in a state of extreme embarrassment. This expedition so often announced, thrice failing of effect, would have terminated by exposing him to a species of ridicule, and thus, in the sight of Europe, have placed him opposed to England in a state of impotency. The continental coalition, in furnishing him with a field of battle that was wanting, repaired the fault which he had committed, by committing one itself, and drawing him most opportunely from an indecisive and vexatious situation. The chain which links together the events of this world is sometimes marvellously unaccountable and strange! Oftentimes that which is the wisest of combinations fails, and that which is faulty succeeds. This is no motive, however, to consider all prudence vain, and in its place to prefer the impulses of caprice in the government of empires. On the contrary, calculation must ever be preferred to the succession of chances in the conduct of public affairs; but it is not possible to hinder the acknowledgment, that high above the designs of man soar the designs of Providence, surer and more profound than his own, and that this is a reason for the modesty, not the abandonment, of human wisdom.

It was necessary to have seen close at hand the difficulties of the government; it was necessary to have felt how difficult it is to take great determinations, to prepare them, to accomplish them, and to move men and things, in order to appreciate the resolution of Napoleon taken under this circumstance. The mortification to see the Boulogne expedition fail being once over, he delivered himself up entirely to his new plan for the continental war. Never had he such great resources at his disposal; never had he seen open to him a more extended field of operations. When he commanded the Italian army, he found the limit of his movements in the plain of Lombardy and the circuit of the Alps; and if he dreamed of carrying his views beyond that circuit, the prudence of the director Carnot was alarmed, and arrested his combinations. When as first consul he conceived the plan of the campaign of 1800, he was obliged to manage his lieutenants, who were still his equals; and if, for example, he planned for Moreau a scheme which must have had the most fortunate results, he was stopped by the timidity of that general; he was forced to let him act in his own manner, a safe but limited manner, and to shut himself up in the isolated field of Piedmont. It is true that he signalized his presence there by an operation that will remain a prodigy in the art of war, but his genius in displaying itself had always before found obstacles. For the first time he was free, free as Cæsar and Alexander had been. Those of his companions in arms that their jealousy or reputation rendered unaccommodating, were themselves excluded from the list by culpable or imprudent conduct. There remained only such lieutenants as submitted to his will, and united in the highest degree all the qualities necessary for the execution of his designs. His army, tired of a long inaction, breathing only of glory and battles, formed by ten years of war and three of encampment, was prepared for the most difficult enterprises and the boldest marches. The entire of Europe was open to his combinations. He was at the West, on the shores of the North Sea and the Channel; and Austria, aided by the Russians, Swedes, Italians, and English, was at the East, pushing upon France the masses that a sort of European conspiracy had placed at its disposition. The situation, the means, all was grand. But if he never before found himself better able to face sudden and serious peril, never had the difficulty been equal. This army, so prepared that it might be said it had at no time its equal—this army was on the border of the ocean, far from the Rhine, the Danube, and the Alps; which explains why the continental powers suffered the Genoese union without remonstrating, and it was now necessary to transport that army suddenly to the centre of the continent. There was the problem to be solved. We shall see how Napoleon acted to pass the space which separated him from his enemies, and place himself in the midst of them, on that point which was most proper to dissolve their formidable coalition.

Although he was firm in his belief that the war was less near than in reality, he perfectly discerned the preparations and the plan. Sweden made armaments in Stralsund, in Swedish Pomerania; Russia at Revel, in the Gulf of Finland. There were announced two grand Russian armies concentrating, one in Poland, for the purpose of involving Prussia, the other in Gallicia, to succour Austria. It was not limited to suspicion, but was well known, that two Austrian armies were in the course of formation, one of 80,000 men in Bavaria, the other of 100,000 in Italy, both connected by a corps of 25 or 30,000 men in the Tyrol. Finally, the Russians assembled at Corfu, the English at Malta, symptoms of agitation in the court of Naples, these did not permit a doubt of some attempt in the south of Italy.

Four different attacks were then preparing. The first was in the north by Pomerania, upon Hanover and Holland, to be executed by the Swedes, the Russians, and the English. The second in the east by the valley of the Danube, confided to the Russians and Austrians combined; the third in Lombardy, reserved to the Austrians alone; and the fourth in the south of Italy, to be effected a little later by a union of Russians, English, and Neapolitans.

Napoleon had laid hold of this plan as clearly as if he had assisted at the military conferences of M. de Vintzerode at Vienna, which have been already mentioned. There was but one circumstance concealed from him, as well as from his enemies—was Prussia to be drawn in? Napoleon did not believe it could be so. The coalesced powers hoped to bring it about by intimidating the king, Frederick William. In this case the attack in the north, in place of being an accessory attempt, much annoyed by the Prussian neutrality,

would become a menacing enterprize against the empire, from Cologne to the mouths of the Rhine. Still this was little probable; and Napoleon considered as serious only the two grand attacks by Bavaria and Lombardy, and regarded as more or less worthy of certain precautions, those prepared in Pomerania and towards the kingdom of Naples.

He resolved then to carry the main body of his forces into the valley of the Danube, and to defeat all the secondary attacks by the mode in which he repulsed the principal. His profound conception rested upon a simple fact—the distance of the Russians, which would make them arrive late to the assistance of the Austrians. He thought that the Austrians, impatient to enter Bavaria, and to occupy, according to their custom, the famous position of Ulm, would consider, in judging the distance which naturally separated them from the Russians, that these allies would, from that circumstance, place themselves tardily in line, mounting the Danube with their principal army united to the Austrian reserves. In striking a blow at the Austrians before the arrival of the Russians, Napoleon therefore proposed to himself to go directly afterwards upon the Russians, deprived of the aid of the principal Austrian army, and thus use the means so facile in theory, but difficult in practice, of beating his enemies one after the other.

To succeed, this plan demanded a mode altogether peculiar, in order to transport himself to the theatre of operations in the valley of the Danube. If, after the example of Moreau, Napoleon mounted the Rhine to pass from Strasburg to Schaffhausen, if he came there by the defiles of the Black Forest, to open between the Alps of Suabia, and the lake of Constance, he would thus attack the front of the Austrians, established behind the Iller, from Ulm to Memingen, and would not completely fulfil his object. Even in beating the Austrians, as he had more than ever the certainty of doing, with the army formed in the camp of Boulogne, he would still push them before him back upon the Russians, and thus conduct them, simply enfeebled, to a junction with their northern allies. It was necessary, as at Marengo, and even more so than at Marengo itself, to turn the Austrians, and not limit himself to beating them, but to envelope them effectually, and send them all prisoners to France. Then Napoleon would be able to fling himself upon the Russians, who would only have the Austrian reserves to sustain them.

For this purpose a very simple march presented itself to his mind. One of his corps, that of marshal Bernadotte, was in Hanover; a second, that of general Marmont, in Holland; the others at Boulogne. He conceived the idea of making the first descend and traverse Hesse, in Franconia, upon Würtzburg and the Danube; of making the second advance along the Rhine, using such facilities of transport as that river furnished, and to unite itself by Mayence and Würtzburg, to the corps arriving from Hanover. While these two grand detachments descended from the north to the south, Napoleon resolved to carry, by a movement from the west to the east, or from Boulogne to Strasburg, the corps encamped on the shore of the Channel, to feign with these last a direct attack by the defiles of the Black Forest, but in reality to leave that forest on the right, to pass to the left, to traverse Wurtemburg, to join himself in Franconia to the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, to pass the Danube below Ulm, in the environs of Donauwerth, to place himself thus behind the Austrians, to encircle them, to take them, and after being disembarrassed of them to march upon Vienna, and encounter the Russians.

The position of marshal Bernadotte coming from Hanover, and of general Marmont from Holland, was an advantage, because it would not need more than seventeen days for one, and for the other only fourteen or fifteen, to transport themselves to Würtzburg, on the flank of the enemies' army encamped at Ulm. The movement of troops departing from Boulogne to Strasburg would require twenty-four days, and would naturally fix the attention of the Austrians upon the ordinary opening of the Black Forest. In the space of twenty-four days, Napoleon would be able to arrive at the decisive point. In deciding instantly, in hiding his movements as long as possible, by prolonging his residence at Boulogne, in dispersing false reports, in concealing his intentions with such art as to deceive the enemy (which art he possessed to a great extent), he would be able to pass the Danube in the rear of the Austrians before there could be a question of his presence. If he succeeded it would thus occupy the month of October to disembarrass himself of the first army of the enemy, and he could employ November in marching upon Vienna, and encountering the Russians in the environs of that capital, whom he had never beheld, whom he knew to be firm infantry, but not invincible, because Moreau and Massena had before beaten them; and he promised himself he should again beat them more soundly than either. When he arrived at Vienna, he should have passed considerably the position of the Austrian army of Italy, which would become a pressing motive for its retreat. The plan of Napoleon was to confide to Massena, the most vigorous of his lieutenants, and who best knew Italy, the command of the French army on the Adige. It could not be more than 50,000 men, but they were composed of the best troops, because they had made all the campaigns beyond the Alps from Montenotte to Marengo. Provided Massena was able to stop the archduke Charles on the Adige for a month, which seemed out of all doubt, with soldiers accustomed to vanquish the Austrians, whatever might be their number, under a general, too, who never retreated; Napoleon, once arrived in Vienna, would disengage Lombardy, as he had disengaged Bavaria. He would draw the archduke Charles upon himself, but at the same time he would draw Massena; and joining him to the 150,000 men with which he had marched along the Danube, with the 50,000 coming from the banks of the Adige, he would find himself at Vienna at the head of 200,000 victorious French. Disposing directly of such a mass of force, having baffled the two principal assailants, those of Bavaria and Lombardy, what did the two others matter, prepared in the north and south towards Hanover and Naples! Europe entire in arms he had nothing to fear from the universality of its forces.

In the mean time, he did not neglect to take certain precautions in regard to Lower Italy. Gene-

ral St. Cyr occupied Calabria with 20,000 men. Napoleon gave him instructions to march to Naples, and to take possession of that capital on the first symptom of hostilities. Without doubt, it had been more conformable to his principles not to cut in two parts the army of Italy, not to place 50,000 men under Massena on the bank of the Adige, and 20,000 under general St. Cyr in Calabria, but on the contrary, to unite in one mass 70,000 men, which, certain to conquer in the north of Italy, could have little to fear from the south. But he judged that Massena, with 50,000 men and his well known character, would suffice to stop the archduke Charles for a single month; and he regarded it as dangerous to permit the Russians and English to get a footing in Naples, and to foment in Calabria an insurrectionary war, difficult to extinguish. It was on this account he left general St. Cyr and 20,000 men in the Gulf of Tarentum, with an order to march upon Naples at the first signal, and fling the Russians and English upon the sea, before they should get time to establish themselves on the main land of Italy. As to the attack prepared in the north of Europe, so far from the frontiers of the empire, Napoleon limited himself in facing it, to continue the negotiation entered into at Berlin relative to the kingdom of Hanover. He had made an offer of this kingdom to Prussia, as the price of her alliance; hoping but little of the formal alliance of a court so timid, he had proposed to place Hanover in its hands as a deposit, if Prussia would not receive it under the title of a definitive gift. In any case, Prussia would be obliged to keep any belligerent force at a distance, and her neutrality sufficed so far to protect the north of the empire.

Such was the plan Napoleon conceived. Moving the different corps of his army by a rapid and unexpected march from Hanover, Holland, and Flanders, to the centre of Germany, passing the Danube below Ulm, separating the Austrians from the Russians, enveloping the former, ruining the second, pushing them along the valley of the Danube as far as Vienna, and by this movement disengaging Massena in Italy, and soon repelling the two principal attacks directed against his empire. His victorious armies being thus united under the walls of Vienna, he would have nothing more to trouble him, than an attempt in the south of Italy, that general St. Cyr would render of no moment, and another in the north of Germany, that the Prussian neutrality would every where reduce to straits.

Never had any soldier, in ancient or modern times, conceived and executed plans upon an equal scale of vastness. This arises from the fact, that a more powerful mind, more free to act agreeably to its own inclination, having at its disposal more ample means, never had to carry on operations on such an extent of country. What, indeed, was observed elsewhere, during the greater part of the time? Irresolute governments, that deliberated when they should act; improvident governments, that thought about the organization of their power when they ought to have been on the field of battle; and, inferior to them, subordinate generals, who were only able to move with difficulty on the circumscribed theatre assigned to their operations. Here, on the contrary, genius, will, foresight, absolute freedom of action, concurred in one mind to the same object. It is rare that such circumstances are encountered together, but when they are found united, the world has its master.

At the close of the month of August, the Austrians were already on the banks of the Adige and of the Inn, the Russians on the frontier of Gallicia. It seemed as if they would fain surprise Napoleon; but to him this was nothing serious. He gave all his orders at Boulogne on the same day, the 26th of August, 1805, with the recommendation not to issue them until the 27th at ten o'clock at night. He wished to husband for business the whole of the 27th before definitively renouncing his great maritime expedition. The courier departing on the 27th would not arrive at Hanover until the 1st of September. Marshal Bernadotte already advised, should commence his movement on the 2nd, have assembled his corps on the 6th at Gottingen, and be on the 20th at Würtzburg. He had an order to unite in the strong fortress of Hameln the artillery taken from the Hanoverians, the warlike stores of all kinds, the sick, the depôts of his own *corps d'armée*, and a garrison of 6000 men commanded by an energetic officer upon whom he could rely. The garrison was to be provisioned for a year. If an arrangement was made with Prussia about Hanover, the troops left at Hameln were immediately to rejoin the corps of Bernadotte; if not, they were to remain in that place and to defend it to the last, in case the English should send an expedition by way of the Weser, that the Prussian neutrality might not be wounded. "I will be as prompt," wrote Napoleon, "as Frederick, when he went from Prague to Dresden and Berlin. I will soon rush to the succour of the French defending my eagles in Hanover, and I will drive into the Weser the enemy that shall have arrived there."

Bernadotte had orders to cross the two Hesses, saying to the governments of those two countries that he was going to France by Mayence, but to force a passage if it were refused him, to march with money in hand in the other case to pay for every thing, and to observe the most rigid discipline.

The same evening, the 27th of August, a courier carried to general Marmont the order to set himself in movement with 20,000 men, and forty pieces of cannon well harnessed, to follow the banks of the Rhine as far as Mayence, and to proceed by Mayence and Frankfort to Würtzburg. The order would arrive at Utrecht on the 30th of August. General Marmont having already received a first notice, would set himself in movement on the 1st of September, have arrived at Mayence the 15th or 16th, and the 18th or 19th at Würtzburg; thus the two corps of Hanover and Holland would be in the middle of the Franconian principalities of the elector of Bavaria on the 18th or 19th of September, and present a force of 40,000 men. As it had been recommended to the elector to take refuge at Würtzburg, if the Austrians attempted violent measures, he was thus certain to find there the requisite succour for himself and his army.

Finally, on the 27th, in the evening, orders were issued to the camps of Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Montreuil. These orders were to commence exo-

cution on the 27th of August in the morning. The first day were to depart by three different routes the first divisions of each corps; the second day the second divisions; the third day the last. They therefore followed each other in consequence at an interval of twenty-four hours. The three routes indicated, were, for the camp of Ambleteuse—Cassel, Lille, Namur, Luxemburg, Deux-ponts, Manheim; for the camp of Boulogne—St. Omer, Douai, Cambrai, Mezières, Verdun, Metz, Spire; for the camp of Montreuil—Arras, La Fère, Rheims, Nancy, Saverne, Strasburg. As it demanded twenty-four marches, the entire army might be transported to the Rhine, between Manheim and Strasburg, from the 21st to the 24th of September. That time would suffice to be of all the use required, because the Austrians, wishing to keep up appearances, in order the better to surprise the French, remained in the camp of Wels near Lintz, and would be unable from thence to be in line before Napoleon. Besides, the more they kept themselves on the high Danube, the more they approached the frontier of France, between the lake of Constance and Schaffhausen, and the more had Napoleon in consequence the chance of enveloping them. Officers sent with the necessary funds on the routes that the troops would take, were charged to prepare provisions in every magazine on the march. Formal orders, continually reiterated, as were all those given by Napoleon, enjoined the furnishing to each soldier a cloak and two pairs of shoes.

Napoleon keeping his secret profoundly, which was alone confided to Berthier and M. Daru, told those who were near him that he was sending 30,000 men to the Rhine. He wrote the same intelligence to most of his ministers. He said no more to M. Marbois, merely enjoining him to deposit in the chest of Strasburg as much money as possible; the end of which was explained sufficiently by the news avowed of the mission of 30,000 men to Alsace. He ordered M. Daru to set out instantly for Paris, to order M. Dejean, minister for military stores, to expedite with his own hand all the accessory orders which the removal of the army rendered necessary, and not to let a single commissary into his confidence. Napoleon determined to remain himself six or seven days longer at Boulogne, in order the better to deceive the public in regard to his real designs.

As all the corps were to march across France, except that of marshal Bernadotte, which would be reported in Germany as a corps destined to repass the frontier, it would be requisite they should be already in full march to give the sign of their presence any where. This would have to be transmitted to Paris, and from Paris to foreign countries, and thus a good many days would elapse before the enemy would be apprized of the camp at Boulogne being struck. Besides the news of these movements would be explained by the detaching, which was not attempted to be concealed, 30,000 men to the Rhine, and would leave in a state of doubt the most far-seeing minds; thus there was a great chance to find the army on the Rhine, the Neckar, or the Main, when it would be supposed still on the shores of the Channel. In the mean time Napoleon made Murat and his aides-de-camp, Savary and Bertrand, depart for Franconia, Sunbia, and Bavaria. They had an order to explore all the roads that led from the Rhine to the Danube; to observe their nature, the military positions they might find, the means of forage which they offered, in fact, all the convenient points to cross the Danube. Murat was to travel under a feigned name, and having terminated his exploring excursion, to return to Strasburg, in order to take the command of the first columns that arrived upon the Rhine.

To keep the Austrians as long as possible in ignorance of his intentions, Napoleon recommended besides to M. de Talleyrand, to delay the manifesto intended for the cabinet of Vienna, and designed to make that court explain itself definitively. He expected only falsehood in reply to his demand; and as to convicting that court of duplicity in the face of Europe, it would be sufficient to do so at the moment of the commencement of hostilities. He sent to Carlsruhe general Thiard (who had entered the service of France since the return of the emigrants), and charged him with the negotiation of an alliance with the grand duke of Baden. He addressed offers of the same character to Wurtemburg, alleging that he foresaw war, judging from the Austrian preparations; but he never said at what point he himself was ready to commence it. In fact, he imparted the entire of his secret alone to the elector of Bavaria. The unfortunate elector hesitated between Austria that was his enemy, and France that was his friend; but the one was near, the other far away; remembering, too, that in the former wars, constantly trodden under foot by one or the other, he had always been forgotten at the peace: thus the unhappy prince did not know to which he should attach himself. He well knew that in giving himself to France, he had hope of the enlargement of his territories; but yet, ignorant of the camp of Boulogne being struck, he saw there, at the time at which he had to act, that all were occupied with the contest against England, and though importuned by their German allies, not in a position to succour them. Thus he never ceased to speak to the French minister, M. Otto, of an alliance, without ever daring to conclude it. This state of things was soon changed after the letters of Napoleon, who wrote directly to the elector, and announced to him (telling him it was a state secret confided to his honour) that he had adjourned his design against England, and should march with 200,000 men into the centre of Germany:—"You will be succoured in time," he sent him word; "and the house of Austria vanquished shall be forced to compose for you a considerable territory with the wrecks of its own patrimony." Napoleon held fast to gain the elector, who had 25,000 organized soldiers, and well-furnished magazines in Bavaria. It was an important advantage to snatch these 25,000 men from the coalition, and to give them to his own side. Besides, the secret was not endangered, for the prince had a thorough hatred for the Austrians, and once assured of his security, desired nothing better than an alliance with France.

Napoleon employed himself after this with the Italian army. He ordered the union under the walls of Verona of the troops dispersed between Parma, Genoa, Piedmont, and Lombardy. He withdrew the command of these troops from mar-

shal Jourdan, observing great management towards the marshal, for whom he felt much esteem, but in whom he did not find a character equal to the level of the circumstances, and who had, besides, no knowledge of the country between the Po and the Alps. He promised to employ him on the Rhine, where he had always commanded; and enjoined Massena to set out for Italy without delay. The distance of Italy rendered the knowledge of these orders little hazardous, because they could not but be tardily known.

These dispositions finished, Napoleon devoted the time which he passed at Boulogne in himself prescribing the minutest precautions to place the flotilla in safety from any attack on the part of the English. It was natural to think that they would profit by the departure of the army, to attempt a disembarkation, and burn the various materials accumulated in the basins. Napoleon did not give up the intention of soon returning to the shores of the Channel, after a fortunate campaign; and he would not, besides, suffer such an outrage as the burning of the flotilla. He ordered the following precautions to be taken by the ministers Decrès and Berthier:—The divisions of Etaples and Wimereux were to be united to those of Boulogne, and the whole placed at the bottom of the basin of the Liane, out of reach of the projectiles of the enemy. It was not possible to do the same for the Dutch flotilla, which was at Ambleteuse; but all was disposed so that the troops stationed at Boulogne should be able to proceed to the other point in two or three hours. Chains of a particular kind, attached to strong anchors, prevented the introduction of any incendiary missiles, which might be sent under the form of floating bodies.

Three entire regiments, comprising their third battalions, were left at Boulogne. To these were added twelve third battalions of regiments gone to Germany. The seamen belonging to the flotilla were formed into fifteen battalions of a thousand men each, armed with muskets, and having officers of infantry for their instruction. They were to serve alternately on board the vessels remaining afloat, or around those aground in the port. This union of military and naval troops, amounted to a strength of thirty-six battalions, commanded by marshal Brune, the same officer who in 1799 had driven the English and Russians into the sea. Napoleon ordered the construction of intrenchments in earth all around Boulogne, to cover the flotilla and the immense magazines which he had formed. He desired that chosen officers should be attached to each intrenched position, preserving continually the same post, in order that, being answerable for its security, they might study unceasingly to make the defence perfect.

He afterwards ordered M. Decrès to assemble the naval officers, and marshal Berthier those of the army, to explain both to one and the other the importance of the post confided to their honour; to console themselves for remaining in inaction while their comrades went to active service, by promising them they should be employed in turn, that they would soon have the glory to join in the expedition to England, because, after having punished the continent for its aggression, Napoleon would repair to the borders of the Channel, perhaps in the following spring.

Napoleon was present in person at the departure of each division of the army. It would be difficult to give an idea of their joy, of their ardour, when they learned that they were about to undertake a great campaign. There had five years passed since they fought; there had been two and a half that they had vainly waited for the opportunity to pass over into England. Old and young soldiers became equals by a life in common of many years; confident in their officers, enthusiasts regarding the chief that would conduct them to victory, hoping for the highest rewards under a regime that had placed on the throne a fortunate soldier; full, in fact, of the sentiment which at this time had supplanted all others, the love of glory, all, old and young, expressed their wishes for the war, for battles, for perils, and distant expeditions. They vanquished in imagination the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians; they undervalued all the soldiers of Europe, and did not think that there was an army in the world capable of resisting them. Accustomed to fatigue as were the old Roman legions, they viewed without fear the long routes which they had to march to the conquest of the continent. They departed singing and shouting "Long live the emperor," and calling for the earliest encounter with the enemy. Doubtless there was in their spirits boiling with courage less of pure patriotism than with the soldiers of 1792; there was more of ambition, a noble ambition, that of glory, of rewards legitimately acquired, and a confidence, a disdain of perils and difficulties, which constitutes the soldier destined to perform great things. The volunteers of 1792 wished to defend their country against an unjust invasion; the soldiers of 1805 wished to render it the first power on earth. Not to draw distinctions between such sentiments, it is noble to run to the defence of our country in peril; it is noble in like manner to devote oneself for that which is great and glorious.

After having seen with his own eyes his army in full march, Napoleon quitted Boulogne on the 2nd of September, arriving on the 3rd at Malmaison. None were informed of his resolutions; it was believed that he was still constantly occupied with his scheme against England. People disturbed themselves only about the intentions of Austria, and explained the movements of troops, which had begun to be a question, by the mission, already public, of a corps of 30,000 men, which was to watch the Austrians on the upper Rhine.

The public was not aware of the exact nature of facts, ignorant to what a point the deep intrigue of the English had tied the knot of the new coalition, it reproached Napoleon with having pushed Austria to an extremity by putting the crown of Italy upon his own head, uniting Genoa to the empire, and giving Lucca to the princess Eliza. It ceased not to admire, and always found itself fortunate to live under a government so firm and just as his, but it reproached him with the excessive love of that which he carried on so well, the love of war. No one was capable of thinking that he was unhappy under such a leader. Austria, Russia, and a part of Germany in the pay of England, were heard spoken of; no one knew if the new contest would be of long or short duration, and the troubles of the first wars of the

Revolution were involuntarily recalled to mind. Notwithstanding this, confidence prevailed much over other sentiments; but a slight murmur of disapprobation, very sensible to the nice ear of Napoleon, did not fail to make itself heard.

That which above all contributed to render more painful the sensation experienced by the public, was an extreme pressure on the finances. This had been produced by various causes. Napoleon had persisted in the scheme of never borrowing money. "While living," he wrote to M. Marbois, "I will not issue any paper." (Milan, May 18th, 1803.) In effect, the discredit produced by the assignats, by the mandats, by all the emissions of paper, still remained; and all powerful, all redoubtable as was the emperor of the French, he would not allow the acceptance of an interest of five francs for a capital of more than fifty, which would constitute a loan of ten per cent. Still this situation caused serious embarrassments, because the richest country would not suffice to meet the charges of war, without throwing a part of them upon futurity.

We have already made known the state of the budgets. That of the year XII., September 1803 to September 1804, estimated at 700,000,000f., not including the expense of collections, had been raised to 762,000,000f. Happily the taxes had received from the prosperity of the public, that war had not interrupted under a powerful government, an accession of about 40,000,000f. The product of the registration stood for about 18,000,000f.; that of the customs for 16,000,000f., in the increase of the revenue. There rested therefore to be met a deficiency of 20,000,000f. and some odd.

The return of the year XIII., or September 1804 to September 1805, which terminated at this moment, presented deficiencies still greater. The naval constructions were in part completed; it was believed at first that this part of the expenditure could be much reduced, although the expenditure of the year XII. had arisen to 762,000,000f., it was hoped to pay that of the year XIII. with 684,000,000f. But the months passed thus far, showed an expense of about 60,000,000f. each, which implied an annual sum of 720,000,000f. There was to meet this the extraordinary imposts and resources. The imposts which in 1801 produced 500,000,000f., had arisen through the sole effect of the general prosperity, and without any alteration in the taxes, to a product of 560,000,000f. The indirect contributions recently established, had returned nearly 25,000,000f. this year; the voluntary gifts of communes and departments, converted into additional centimes, furnishing nearly 20,000,000f., the sum of 600,000,000f. of permanent revenue was attained. It was then necessary to find 120,000,000f. to complete the budget of the year XIII. The Italian subsidy of 22,000,000f. would make up a part. But the Spanish subsidy of 48,000,000f. had ceased in December 1804, after the brutal declaration of war that England had made against Spain. This last country serving hereafter the common cause by its fleets, had no more to contribute from its finances. The American funds, the price of Louisiana, were consumed. To supply the required resources, there were added to the Italian subsidy of 22,000,000f. a sum of 36,000,000f. in new securities, a species of loan of which the mechanism has been elsewhere explained, then an alienation of national property to the extent of 20,000,000f., and finally some repayments due from Piedmont amounting to 6,000,000f., the whole making with the ordinary taxes 684,000,000f. There thus remained a deficiency of 36,000,000f. or 40,000,000f. to reach 720,000,000f.

Then there was still an arrear of 20,000,000f. for the year XII., and of 40,000,000f. for the year XIII. But this was not all. The accounts, as yet, far from reaching perfection, did not reveal as they do now all the facts at the same moment; there were discovered some remnants of expenses not paid, and some not valued in the receipts, reported as belonging to anterior expenditures, which constituted again a charge of 20,000,000f. more. Adding these different deficiencies, 20,000,000f. for the year XII., 40,000,000f. for the year XIII., and 20,000,000f. of recent discovery, these must be estimated at 80,000,000f. of arrears, which had begun to form after the renewal of the war.

Different means had been employed to provide for these. At first, a debt was incurred with the sinking fund. There was due to reimburse this fund, on account of 5,000,000f. per annum, the securities which had been made available as a resource for that purpose. There was due, to be turned over also, an account of 10,000,000f. per annum, the 70,000,000f. in value of the national property, which the law of the year IX. had devoted to it, for the purpose of compensating the augmentation of the public debt. None of these two sums had been remitted. It is true, it had security on the national property, and it was not a very pressing creditor. The treasury owed it 30,000,000f. at the end of the year XIII., or September, 1805.

They had discovered some other resources in the many improvements effected in the service of the treasury. If the state did not inspire in general any great confidence on the score of its finances, certain agents of the finances, within the limit of their service, inspired much. Thus the central cashier of the treasury, established in Paris, charged with all the movements of the funds between Paris and the provinces, sent drawn upon himself, or upon the accountants, his correspondents, drafts which were always paid on the open counter, because the payments were executed even in the midst of the embarrassments with proper exactness. This species of bank had been able to put into circulation as far as 15,000,000f. in drafts, accepted as cash.

Lastly, a real amelioration in the service of the receiver-general had procured a resource very nearly equal in amount. For the direct contributions resting upon land and buildings, of which the value was known beforehand, and the payment fixed as a rent, the accountants were made to subscribe obligations, payable month and month to their chest, under the title often mentioned, of the "Obligations of the Receivers-General." But for the indirect contributions, which were irregularly paid, as part, and to the extent of the consumed articles, or of the transactions upon which they rested, they waited until the produce was realized, in order to draw upon the receiver-general the paper entitled "Bills at Sight." They thus enjoyed a part of the state funds for about

fifty days. It was established for the future, that the treasury should draw bills upon them in advance every month, for two-thirds of the known amount of the indirect contributions (the sum was 190,000,000f.), and that the last third should remain in their hands to meet the variations in their receipts, and should not arrive at the treasury, but under the form before used, of "Bills at Sight." This quicker return of a part of the state funds answered to an aid of about 15,000,000f.

Thus, by becoming in debt to the sinking fund, by creating drafts to the central cashier of the treasury, and by accelerating certain payments, resources were found for about 60,000,000f. If the deficiency be supposed 80,000,000f. or 90,000,000f., there would still be wanting 30,000,000f. They met this, by getting into arrear with the contractors, in other words, with the famous company of United Merchants, whom they did not pay punctually for their contracts, or by discounting in advance a sum of the obligations of the receivers-general, beyond the amount which was due to them.

Napoleon, who would not engage himself too much in this mode of arrear, had imagined, during the time he was in Italy, an operation which, according to himself, had nothing in common with an issue of paper. Of 300,000,000f. or 400,000,000f. of national property existing in 1800, there remained nothing in 1805. Not that they had entirely expended this precious property, but on the contrary, because with the view to preserve it, a dotation had been made of it to the sinking fund, the senate, the legion of honour, the invalides, and to public instruction. Certain portions of it, that still figured in the budgets, composed a last remnant, which was delivered to the sinking fund in acquittance of what was due to it, and of what remained unpaid. Napoleon had the idea of recalling from the legion of honour and the senate, the national domains which had been devoted to their use, and in its place to give stock, and to dispose of these domains through an operation with the contractors. In effect, he would deliver stock to the senate and legion of honour, in exchange for their immovable property. For 1000f. revenue in hand, he would grant them 1750f. revenue in stock, in order to compensate for the difference in price between one and the other. The senate and legion of honour would thus gain an augmentation of annual endowment. The national domains would then be taken, and delivered to the contractors at the price agreed upon. These, obliged to borrow of the capitalists that lent them the funds of which they had need, would find in the immovable property a pledge, through the aid of which they would obtain credit, and procure the means to continue their services. It was the sinking fund to which this operation was confided, and which took from the stock redeemed the sum necessary to indemnify the senate and the legion of honour. The state, in its turn, would be indemnified, by creating to its profit a sum in stock, correspondent to that of which it despoiled itself. It was with such different expedients, the one legitimate, as ameliorations or improvements of the service; the others vexatious, as retarding the payments to the contractors, and the resumption of property given to different establishments—it was with these expedients, they tell us, that they arrived at the point of meeting the deficit which two years had produced. At this time the floating debt, for which the "*Bons Royaux*" now make provision, permit the support of a charge four or five times more considerable.

All this had offered but a middling degree of embarrassment, if the situation of commerce had been good; but it was not so. The French merchants in 1802, believing in the continuance of a maritime peace, had engaged in considerable operations, and had sent goods to every country. The violent conduct of England, in pursuing our flag before any declaration of war, had caused them immense losses. Many houses had dissimulated in regard to their distress, and in resigning themselves to great sacrifices in aiding one another with their credit, had supported themselves against the first stroke. But the new blow, resulting from the continental war, could not but accomplish their ruin. Already bankruptcies began in the principal commercial places, and produced general trouble. Nor was this the sole cause of the perplexity of affairs. Since the fall of the assignats, the circulating medium, although it had been promptly repaired, had always been insufficient, from a cause easy of comprehension. The paper money, being entirely discredited from the first day of its emission, had still done the office of a circulating medium, for some portion, whatever it might be, of the exchange, and had expelled from France a part of the metallic specie. The public prosperity, suddenly restored under the consulate, had not endured long enough to recall the gold and silver which had left the country. They were wanting in all transactions. To procure them at this time was one of the constant anxieties of commerce. The bank of France, which had developed itself rapidly, because it furnished, by means of its notes well accredited, a supplementary circulating medium, had the greatest trouble to keep in its coffers a metallic reserve proportioned to the emission of its notes. It had made, under this head, very praiseworthy efforts, and drawn out of Spain an enormous quantity of dollars. Unfortunately, a mode of diminution opened at that time to the circulation, and suffered it to escape as fast as it was possible to bring it in,—this was the payment for colonial commodities. Formerly, that is to say, in 1788 and 1789, when France possessed St. Domingo, she drew from her colonies in sugar, coffee, and other colonial productions, as much as 220,000,000f. per annum, of which she consumed 70,000,000f. or 80,000,000f., and exported up to 150,000,000f., particularly in the shape of refined sugars. If the difference between the prices of that time and ours is considered, a difference which is at least double, it may be judged what an immense source of prosperity was now dried up. It was necessary to go and search far beyond France, and to receive from her enemies the colonial productions that twenty years before she sold to all Europe. A considerable portion of the circulating medium in specie was carried to Hamburgh, Amsterdam, Genoa, Leghorn, Venice, and Trieste, to pay for the sugar and coffee that the English made to enter by open commerce or contraband traffic. They sent into Italy much above 22,000,000f. that

France paid to that country. All the commercial men of the time complained of this state of things, and the subject was daily discussed at the bank by the most enlightened merchants of France.

It was from Spain that Europe had been in the habit of obtaining the precious metals. That celebrated nation, for which Columbus had procured ages of rich and fatal idleness, in opening before it the mines of America, had run into debt, in consequence of its ignorance and disorder. The miseries of war had added to bad government; it was then the most needy of nations, and presented the spectacle, always so melancholy in itself, of the rich reduced to misery. The galleons stopped by the English navy caused a want of money, not only in Spain, but throughout the whole of Europe. Although the export of dollars was prohibited in the Peninsula, France obtained them through the smuggler, for which it was indebted to the long contiguity of territory; and the neighbouring nations often received them from France by the same means. This contraband traffic was as established and extensive as a lawful trade. But it was at this period much thwarted by the interruption of remittances from America; and singular enough, England itself suffered. Habituated to draw from the resources of France and Spain, it had submitted to the common privation of which it was itself the cause. The money which accumulated in the vaults of the Spanish governors of Mexico and Peru, came no more to Cadiz, Bayonne, Paris, or London. England wanted the precious metals for all purposes, but above all for the payment of the European coalition, because the colonial productions and merchandize which she furnished, whether to Austria or Russia, were not sufficient to balance the subsidies that she had engaged to furnish them. Mr. Pitt had himself given this reason for disputing with the coalesced powers a part of the sums which they demanded. After having given nearly for nothing enormous masses of sugar and coffee to the coalesced powers, the British cabinet sent them, in place of money, notes of the bank of England. These were found in the hands of Austrian officers.

Such were the principal causes of the commercial and financial distress. If the company of united merchants, which at that time did all the business of the treasury, furnished the provisions, discounted the obligations, and also the Spanish subsidy, had limited itself to the service in which it was specially engaged, although with difficulty, it would have been able to meet the exigency of circumstances. It no longer found a discount at ¾ per 100 per month, or six per cent. per annum, for the obligation of the receivers-general; it was as much if it found capitalists who would discount them to itself at ¾ per 100 per month, or nine per cent. per annum, which involved an enormous loss. However, the treasury, in transacting business with the company, and indemnifying it for the usury exercised by the capitalists, had been the means of facilitating the continuation of its services. But its principal director, M. Ouvrard, had founded upon this situation of things an immense scheme, very ingenious assuredly, very advantageous even, if the plan had joined to the merit of its invention, the merit, still more necessary, of precision in calculation. The three contractors forming the company of united merchants, were thus seen dividing among themselves different characters. M. Desprez, formerly a cashier, enriched by a rare ability in the business of paper, was charged with the discounts of the treasury. To M. Vanlerberghe, who understood remarkably well the corn trade, was committed the furnishing of provisions. To M. Ouvrard, the boldest of the three, and the most fertile in resources, was reserved the great speculations. Having accepted from France the proceeds with which Spain paid its subsidy, and having promised to discount them, (which had misled M. de Marbois,) he had been led to the idea of effecting great transactions with Spain, that sovereign of Mexico and Peru, from whose hand came the precious metals, that were the object of universal desire. He went to Madrid, where he found the court saddened by the effect of the war, by the yellow fever, by a frightful amount of debt, and by the necessities of Napoleon, to whom it was a debtor. Nothing of all this appeared to surprise or embarrass M. Ouvrard. He delighted by his ease and assurance the old gentry who governed all things at the Escurial, as he had delighted M. de Marbois himself, in procuring for him the resources which he knew not where to find elsewhere. He offered at setting out to balance the subsidy due to France at the close of 1803, and for the whole of 1804, which was a primary relief coming very opportunely. Then he had furnished some immediate supplies in money, of which the court stood in pressing need, and he took upon himself, besides, to send corn into the ports of Spain, and to procure for the Spanish squadrons the provisions of which they stood in need. All these services had been accepted with great acknowledgments. M. Ouvrard had immediately written to Paris, and through M. de Marbois, had obtained the permission, ordinarily refused, to permit some cargoes of corn to be sent from France to Spain. These sudden arrivals had put an end to the hoarding of grain in the ports of the Peninsula, and to the dearth, which had occurred more through the factitious elevation of the price, than the deficiency of the grain itself. M. Ouvrard had thus relieved, as if by enchantment, the more pressing misery of the Spanish people. It wanted not so much to seduce and draw into his views the shortsighted rulers of the Spanish affairs.

It was naturally demanded, with what resources the court of Madrid would be able to pay M. Ouvrard for all the services it received at his hands; the means were simple. M. Ouvrard desired that they should abandon to him the obtainment of the dollars from Mexico. He in fact obtained the privilege to draw them from the Spanish colonies, at the price of three francs seventy-five centimes, while in France they were valued at five francs at least. This was an extraordinary profit; but certainly well merited, if M. Ouvrard succeeded in eluding the English cruisers, and in transporting from the new to the old world the metals that were become so valuable. Spain which sunk beneath her misery, was very happy even with the loss of a quarter part of her riches to realize the other three quarters. The idle and lavish heirs of rich families, do not always treat as advantageously with the money-lenders who extort from their prodigality.

But how was it possible to bring over the dollars in despite of Mr. Pitt and the English fleets. This difficulty was no more embarrassing to M. Ouvrard than any of the others. He hit upon the idea of serving the purpose of Mr. Pitt himself by means of the most singular of combinations. There were Dutch houses, particularly that of Hope, which were established both in England and Holland. He had the idea of selling there the Spanish dollars at a rate which insured to his company a considerable advantage; and it was for these houses to obtain from Mr. Pitt the means of bringing them from Mexico. As Mr. Pitt had need of them upon his own account, it was possible that in his desire to procure them, he would let a certain sum pass, although he knew that his enemies might participate in them. This was a species of tacit contract of which the Dutch houses associated with the English would become the intermediate agents. Experience proved, at a later time, that this contract was capable of being executed for one party, if not for all. M. Ouvrard considered also that he should serve the American houses; that with his commission, thanks to the national flag, it would be able to search out the dollars in the Spanish colonies in order to convey them to Europe. But the question was, to know whether Mr. Pitt would allow the dollars to pass, and whether the Americans would be able to bring them under cover of their neutral character. If there had been time a similar speculation would have succeeded, rendered important services to France and Spain, and procured to the company abundant and legitimate profits. Unfortunately the pressure on the company was very urgent. On the 80,000,000f. or 90,000,000f. of arrear which it was necessary the treasury should meet by expedients, there were about 30,000,000f. which it owed to the company of united merchants, and that it paid with immoveable or unconvertible property. It had then to support this first burthen. It had besides to furnish to the French treasury the amount of the Spanish subsidy, about 40,000,000f. or 50,000,000f.; it had to discount itself the "obligations of the receivers-general;" it had lastly to pay for the corn sent into the ports of the peninsula, and for the provisions supplied to the Spanish vessels. This was a situation little adapted to await the success of hazardous and distant speculations. At this time the company was reduced to an existence by expedients. It had pledged to money-lenders the immoveable property received in the state payment. Having succeeded, owing to the easiness of M. de Marbois, in holding almost exclusively the portfolio of the treasury, it grasped by handfuls the "obligations of the receivers-general," which it transferred to capitalists, borrowing their money on pledge at a usurious rate. It got a part of those "obligations" discounted by the bank of France, that, drawn in by its connection with the government, refused it nothing which was demanded on the part of the public service. The company received the value of the discount in notes of the bank of France, and this position of things resolved itself from that time into an emission of notes which became every day more considerable. But the reserve in the precious metals did not increase in proportion to the mass of notes issued, and from that a real danger resulted; and it was the bank which came soon in reality to support the weight of the embarrassment of every body. Thus voices were raised in the council of regency, to demand that an end should be put to the succours granted to M. Desprez, representing the company of united merchants. But other voices, more prudent and patriotic, above all that of M. Perrégaux, pronounced against such a proposition, and granted the aid requested by M. Desprez.

The French treasury, the Spanish treasury, and the company of united merchants that served as the link binding the connexion, conducted themselves like mercantile firms in a state of embarrassment, that lend each other their signatures, and help each other to keep up a credit they do not really possess. But it must be acknowledged that the French treasury was the least pressed of the three associated houses, and that it was exposed to much injury under a similar community of business; because, at bottom, it was with its resources alone—in other words, with the obligations of the receiver-general, discounted by the bank—that they were able to face their necessities, and that they provided for the Spanish as well as the French armies. Above all, the whole secret of this extraordinary situation was not known. The associates of M. Ouvrard, whose engagements with him had never been accurately defined, although those engagements had been the subject of legal proceedings, knew not themselves the whole extent of the burden which lay upon them. Feeling already much pressure, they called loudly for M. Ouvrard, and had given him the order, through M. de Marbois, to return immediately to Paris. M. de Marbois, little able to judge by himself all the details of the vast administration of the funds—deceived, too, by a dishonest clerk—never suspected to what an extent the resources of the treasury were abandoned to the company. Napoleon himself, although he extended over every thing his indefatigable vigilance, did not see more in the details of the service, than a real deficiency of 60,000,000f., which might be supplied by the national property and by other expedients: ignorant of the confusion which had taken place between the operations of the treasury and those of the united merchants, he did not hit upon the real cause of the embarrassments and disquietude which had begun to show themselves. He attributed the constraint which was every where suffered, to bad commercial speculations—to the usury that the possessors of capital endeavoured to exercise, and complained of the men of business, much as he complained of the idealogists, when he encountered contradictory notions. However this might be, he did not wish they should draw from such a state of things objections to the execution of his orders. He had demanded 12,000,000f. in specie at Strasburg, and had demanded them so imperiously, that they had recourse to the extremest means to raise them. He had need of another 10,000,000f. in Italy; and the company, obliged to buy them at Hamburgh, sent them to Milan, whether in gold or silver, along the Rhine and the Alps. Napoleon, too, calculated to strike such blows, in fifteen or twenty days, as should put an end to every embarrassment. "Before fifteen days are over," he said, "I shall have beaten down the Russians, the

Austrians, and the gamblers." These resources, well or ill obtained by the treasury, he employed himself in the conscription and the organization of the reserve. The annual contingent was then divided into halves, each of 30,000 men. The first was called into active service; the second left among the rest of the population, but capable of being united under the colours, on a simple order from the government.

There still remained a great part of the contingent of the years IX., X., XI., XII., and XIII. They were men of a mature age, whom the government could dispose of by a decree. Napoleon called out all; but he resolved besides to advance the levy of the year XIV., comprehending the individuals who had attained the requisite age, from the 23rd of September, 1805, to the 23rd of September, 1806; and as the Gregorian calendar was to come into usage on the 1st of January following, he added to that levy the youths who had attained the legal age from the 23rd of September to the 31st of December, 1806. He resolved then to comprehend in a single levy of fifteen months all the conscripts to whom the law should be applicable, from the month of September, 1805, to the month of December, 1806. This increase would furnish 80,000 men, of whom the last did not reckon quite twenty years of age. But he did not think of employing them immediately in war service; he proposed to prepare them for service by placing them in the third battalion, which composed the depôt of each regiment. These men would thus have a year or two, whether for instruction, or to strengthen themselves, and would furnish, in fifteen or eighteen months, excellent soldiers, nearly as well formed as those in the camp of Boulogne. This was a combination, beneficial at the same time for the health of the men and for their military instruction; because the conscript of twenty years old, if he entered immediately upon service, would soon conclude it in the hospital. But this combination was only possible under a government, that, having an army well organized to present to the enemy, had no need of the annual contingent, save under the name of a reserve.

The legislative body was not sitting; time would be lost in convoking it. Napoleon would not consent to this retardation, and thought of addressing the senate instead, founded upon two motives: the first, the irregularity of a contingent which comprised more than a levy of twelve months, and some conscripts under twenty years of age; secondly, under the urgency of the circumstances. In regard to the legality in thus acting, the senate was neither able to vote a money contribution, nor a contribution in men. It was charged with functions of a different order: to stop the adoption of unconstitutional laws, to fill up the vacancies in the constitution, and to watch over the acts of the government that were too arbitrary. To the legislative body alone belonged the votes relative to taxes and levying men. It was a fault to violate the constitution, already too flexible, and to render it too illusory, by neglecting to observe its forms with so little ceremony. It was another fault, not to have husbanded more the use of the senate, which was a common resource in all cases of difficulty, and to indicate too clearly that its docility was calculated upon much more than that of the legislative body. The archchancellor Cambacérès, not loving any excesses of power which were not indispensably necessary, made these remarks, and maintained that it was needful at least, in order to observe forms, to attach, by an organic measure, the vote of the contingents to the senate. Napoleon, who, without forgetting the considerations of prudence, postponed them, when he was pressed, to a future time, would neither admit the general regulations, nor defer the levy of the contingent. In consequence, he decreed, for the preparation of the levy of the conscription of 1806, a *senatûs consultum*, founded upon two extraordinary considerations: the irregularity of the contingent embracing more than an entire year; and the urgency of the circumstances, which did not allow of waiting for the meeting of the legislative body.

He considered also of a recurrence to the national guard, instituted in virtue of the laws of 1790, 1791, and 1795. This third coalition having the character of the two first—although the times were changed, and Europe hated much less the principles of France, and much more her greatness—he thought that the nation owed to its government a concurrence as energetic and unanimous as formerly. It might not be attended with the same impulse, because the same revolutionary enthusiasm no longer existed; but it was possible to reckon upon a perfect submission to the law on the part of the citizens, and upon a deep sentiment of honour being prevalent among those whom the law called upon. He decreed, therefore, the organization of the national guard, but attempted to render them more obedient and soldier-like. For this end he proposed a *senatûs consultum*, which authorized the regulation of this organization by imperial decrees. He resolved to reserve to himself the nomination of officers, and to unite in the companies, both of chasseurs and grenadiers, the youngest and most warlike of the population. He designed them for the defence of the fortresses, and for incidental assemblages upon threatened points of the French territory, such as Boulogne, Antwerp, and La Vendée.

These different military elements were disposed in the following manner. Nearly 200,000 men were marching in Germany; 70,000 defended Italy; twenty-one battalions of infantry, increased by fifteen battalions of seamen, guarded Boulogne. It has been already seen that these regiments were composed of three battalions, two of war, and one of depôt. The last was charged to receive the sick or convalescent soldiers, and to instruct the conscripts. Already, a certain number of these third battalions had been stationed at Boulogne. All the others were placed at Mayence and Strasburg. Towards these three points were directed the men remaining, of the levy of the years IX., X., XI., XII., XIII., and the 80,000 conscripts of 1806. These were turned into the third battalions, to be exercised, and to acquire full strength. The more aged, when they were formed, were to come later, organized in marching corps, to fill the vacancies that war had caused in the ranks of the army. This was a reserve of 150,000 men, at least, guarding the frontier, and secured the filling up of the corps. The national guards, supporting this reserve, were to be organized in the north and west, to proceed to the defence of the coasts, above all

to Boulogne and Antwerp, if the English should attempt to burn the flotilla, or to destroy the building-yards in the Scheldt. Marshal Brune had already been charged with the command at Boulogne, marshal Lefebvre had the command at Mayence, and marshal Kellermann at Strasburg. These nominations attested the perfect tact of Napoleon. Marshal Brune possessed a reputation acquired in 1799, he having repulsed a descent of Russians and English. Marshals Lefebvre and Kellermann, old soldiers, who had received for their services places in the senate, and the baton of honorary marshals, were the most proper to watch over the organization of the reserve, while their companions in arms that were younger were engaged in active service. These became, at the same time, the cause of the derogation of the law, which forbade public functions to the senators. This law much displeased the senate, and it was got rid of very adroitly, by summoning some of the members to form the *arrière-ban* [1], in the national defence.

These arrangements being completed, Napoleon had taken to the senate the measures thus enumerated, and presented them himself in an imperial sitting, held in the Luxembourg, on the 23rd of September. He there spoke in precise and firm terms of the continental war, which had come upon him by surprise, while occupied with the expedition to England, of the explanations demanded of Austria, of the ambiguous replies of that court, of the falsehoods clearly shown, when the armies of that power had passed the Inn on the 8th of September, at the same moment that she protested so strongly her love of peace. He made his appeal to the devotion of France, and promised soon to annihilate this new coalition. The senators gave him the strongest proofs of their assent; although at the bottom of their hearts they attributed to the union of the Italian states with France the new continental war. In the streets, through which the imperial procession had to pass, from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries, the popular enthusiasm, compressed by suffering, was less expressed than was customary. Napoleon, perceiving this, was piqued, and showed some vexation at it to the archchancellor, Cambacérès. He saw in it an injustice on the part of the Parisian people towards himself; but he appeared to take his ground, promising himself soon to excite shouts of enthusiasm, greater and more lively than those which had so many times resounded in his ears; and he turned his thoughts, which had not time to dwell upon any subject, towards the events which were preparing for him on the banks of the Danube. Pressed to depart, he made regulations for the organization of the government in his absence. His brother Joseph was to preside in the senate; his brother Louis, in quality of constable, was to employ himself with the levies of men, and the formation of the national guard. The archchancellor, Cambacérès, was charged with the presidency of the council of state. All the business transacted was to be treated of in a council, composed of the ministers, and of the great dignitaries, over which presided his brother Joseph, grand-elector. It was settled that couriers should depart daily, to carry to Napoleon the reports of every business transacted, with the opinion of the archchancellor, Cambacérès. The last, fearing that Joseph Bonaparte, president of the council of government, might be hurt with the character of supreme critic attributed to one of the members of the council, made the remark to Napoleon. Napoleon interrupted him sharply, saying, that to spare any vanity, he would not deprive himself of knowledge most useful to him. He persisted. His decisions came to Paris on their return, after the report sent by the archchancellor. It was only in urgent cases that the council was authorised to act, before the will of the emperor was expressed, and to give orders, which each minister executed on his personal responsibility. Thus Napoleon reserved to himself the decision of every thing, even in his absence, and made of the archchancellor, Cambacérès, the eye of his government, while he was far away from the centre of the empire.

All who were around him saw him depart with mortification. They knew not the secret of his genius, nor how much he would cut short the war. They feared it would be long, and they felt assured that it would be sanguinary. They demanded what would be the fate of France, if such a head were to be struck by the bullet that pierced the breast of Turenne, or by the ball that fractured the brow of Charles XII. Besides, those who approached him, all *brusque*, all absolute he was, were unable to prevent themselves from loving him. It was therefore with deep regret that they saw him go to a distance. He consented to be accompanied as far as Strasburg by the empress, who was always the more attached to him, the greater fear she had about the duration of her union with him. He carried with him marshal Berthier, leaving M. de Talleyrand an order to follow the head-quarters at a certain distance, with some clerks. Leaving Paris on the 24th, Napoleon arrived on the 26th at Strasburg.

Already, to the great astonishment of Europe, the army which, twenty days before had been on the borders of the ocean, was in the centre of Germany, on the banks of the Main, the Necker, and the Rhine. Never had a march more secret, or more rapid, been at any time performed. The heads of columns were perceived every where at Würtzburg, Mayence, and Strasburg. The joy of the soldiers was at its height when they saw Napoleon. They welcomed him with cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" a thousand times repeated. This innumerable mass of troops, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, suddenly united; convoys of provisions and ammunition formed in haste; long files of horses bought in Switzerland and Suabia; all the movements, in fact, of an army which was only a few days before expected, and that had suddenly appeared, presented a unique spectacle, still more elevated by the presence of a military court, at the same time brilliant and rough, and by an immense affluence of the curious, who had come to see the emperor of the French going to war.

The coalition had made haste on its own side; but it was not so well prepared as Napoleon, and, more than all, not as active, although animated by the most ardent passions. It had been agreed between the coalesced powers, that they should carry

[1] The ancient usage of convoking the nobles to the defence of the country was so denominated.—*Translator.*

their principal forces towards the Danube before the winter, to the end that Napoleon might not be able to profit by the difficulty of communication during the bad season, in order to crush Austria, isolated from her allies. All the orders for the movements of the troops had therefore been given for the end of August and the commencement of September. In acting thus, the coalesced powers believed they should be strong in advance of Napoleon, and flattered themselves to have it in their power to commence hostilities at the time they judged most opportune. They did not understand they should find the French so soon at the theatre of war.

An assemblage of the Russian forces had been formed at Revel, and had embarked in the early days of September for Stralsund. It was composed of 16,000 men, under the command of general Tolstoy. Twelve thousand Swedes had already gone to Stralsund. They were to proceed by Mecklenburg into Hanover, and were to be joined by 15,000 English, disembarked from the Elbe at Cuxhaven. This army of 43,000 men was designed to execute the attack on the north. This attack was to be made principal or accessory, accordingly as Prussia should or should not form a junction with it.

Two grand Russian armies of 60,000 men each advanced, one by Gallicia, under general Kutusof; the other by Poland, under general Buxhöwden. The Russian guard, under the archduke Constantine, consisting of 12,000 chosen men, followed the second army. An army of reserve, under general Michelson, was formed at Wilna. The young emperor Alexander—driven into the war by his levity, clearsighted enough to perceive his fault, but not resolute enough to repair it, or to correct it by energy of execution—the emperor Alexander, governed, without avowing it, by secret fear, had not decided until very late to make the last preparations. The corps of Gallicia, that, under general Kutusof, should have come to the succour of the Austrians, had not reached the frontier of Austria until the end of August. It had to march across Gallicia from Brody to Olmutz; in Moravia, from Olmutz to Vienna; in Austria and Bavaria, to Ulm. This was a much greater distance, in route, than the French had to march from Boulogne to Ulm; and the Russians knew not how to march long distances as the French did. Europe, which had witnessed the march of French soldiers, well knew that none existed who were equal to them in rapidity. The foresight of Napoleon then was fulfilled; the Russians were behind.

The second Russian army, placed between Warsaw and Cracow, near Pulawi, was, with the guards, 70,000 strong, and awaited the arrival of the emperor Alexander to receive his directions in regard to Prussia. This monarch had seen the embarkation of the troops at Revel before he set off for the army of Poland, and had arrived at Pulawi, the fine mansion of the illustrious family of the Czartoryski at some distance from Warsaw. He remained there with his young minister for foreign affairs, prince Adam Czartoryski, to communicate as early as possible with the court of Berlin.

At the side of Alexander was seen prince Peter Dolgorouki, an officer making his entrance in the career of arms, full of presumption and ambition, the enemy of the circle of young men of mind who governed the empire, endeavouring to persuade the emperor that these young men were faithless, and, being in the interest of Poland, betrayed Russia. The fickleness of Alexander gave prince Dolgorouki more than one chance of success. It was false that prince Adam Czartoryski, the most upright of men, was capable of betraying Alexander. But he hated the court of Prussia, the feebleness of which he mistook for duplicity. He wished, through a sentiment entirely Polish, that the scheme to do violence to that court, if it did not adhere to the views of the coalition, should be accomplished; that they should break with her; and that, passing over the bodies of her armies, scarcely formed, Warsaw and Posen might be taken from her, in order to proclaim Alexander king of reconstituted Poland. This was a natural wish on the part of a Pole, but inconsiderate in a Russian statesman. Napoleon alone sufficed to beat the coalition: what would it be if the forced alliance of Prussia were given to him!

Moreover, it was too much to exact from the irresolute character of Alexander. He had sent his ambassador to Berlin, M. Alopeus, to make an appeal to the friendship of Frederic-William, and to demand from him at first a passage for a Russian army across Silesia, and to insinuate to him subsequently that they did not doubt of the concurrence of Prussia in a work so meritorious as European deliverance. The negotiator was even authorized to declare to the Prussian cabinet that it could not hold the balance, that neutrality was impossible, and that if the passage was not granted with good grace, it would be taken by force. M. Alopeus was to be seconded by prince Dolgorouki, aide-de-camp of Alexander. He was charged to let it be seen clearly at Berlin, that the decision was to draw in Prussia by mild means, or to decide her by violence. They had so far pushed matters at Pulawi, as to compose the manifesto which was to precede hostilities.

While these strong solicitations were addressed to Prussia by the Russian agents, she found before her the French negociators, Duroc and Laforest, ordered by Napoleon to make her the tender of Hanover. It must be remembered that the grand marshal of the palace, Duroc, had left Boulogne with the mission, to carry that offer to Berlin. The probity of the young king had not stood firm, and the sentiments of M. Hardenberg, who was called in Europe "the right-thinking minister," had not stood firm either. M. Hardenberg only saw one difficulty in the affair, that was, to discover a form which should preserve the honour of his master in the eyes of Europe. The two months of July and August had been employed in searching for this form. They hit upon one which was not wanting in ingenuity. It was the same that the coalition on its own side had conceived for the purpose of commencing the war upon Napoleon, an armed mediation. The king of Prussia would, for the sake of peace, which they said was needful for all the powers, declare upon what conditions the equilibrium of Europe seemed, in his view, sufficiently guaranteed, announce what those conditions were, and then give it to be understood that he would declare himself for those

who admitted them, against those who refused; which meant, that he would make half a war against France, with the object of gaining Hanover. He would adopt, in effect, in his declaration, most of the conditions of Napoleon,—such as the creation of the kingdom of Italy, with the separation of the two crowns at the time of the general peace, the union of Piedmont and Genoa to the empire, the free disposal of Parma and Placentia by France, the independence of Switzerland and Holland, and, lastly, the evacuation of Tarentum and Hanover at the peace. Here was no difficulty, except in the manner in which the independence of Holland and Switzerland was to be understood. Napoleon, who had then no object in view regarding the two countries, still would not guarantee their independence in terms which permitted the enemies of France to effect a counter-revolution. The discussions upon this subject were prolonged until the end of the month of September, and the young king of Prussia was about to finish by resigning himself to the violence which was intended him, when he clearly recognized, by the march of the Russian, Austrian, and French armies, that war was approaching, and inevitable. Struck with fear at this aspect of things, he drew back, and spoke no more of an armed mediation, nor of the acquisition of Hanover as the price of this mediation. He returned to his ordinary system of the neutrality of the north of Germany. Then Duroc and M. Laforest, according to the orders of Napoleon, offered him that which the cabinet of Berlin had so many times itself demanded, the remittance of Hanover into the hands of Prussia, under the denomination of a deposit, on condition that she should assure the ultimate possession to France. But whatever pleasure the retreat of the French might cause to king Frederick-William, and the remittance to him of so precious a thing, he saw that he must then oppose himself to the northern expedition, and still continued his refusal. He made a thousand protestations of attachment to Napoleon, to his dynasty and his government; adding, that if he did not yield to his sympathies, it was because he was without defence against Russia on the side of Poland. To that objection Duroc and M. Laforest replied by an offer of an army of 80,000 French, to be ready to join the Prussians. But this was still war, and Frederick-William rejected it under this new shape. It was at this moment that M. Alopeus and prince Dolgorouki arrived at Berlin, in order to demand of the Prussian government a declaration for the coalition. The king was not less frightened at the demand of the one than the protestations of the other. He replied by protestations exactly like those which he had addressed to the French negotators. He was, he said, full of attachment for his young friend, of whom he had made the acquaintance at Memel; but he should be the first object for the blows of Napoleon; and he was unable to expose his subjects to such great danger, and render himself culpable towards them. The Russian envoys insisted; they said that the assemblage of troops formed between Warsaw and Cracow, was exactly placed to succour him; that it was an amicable foresight of the emperor Alexander, that the 70,000 Russians, composing this assemblage, were to traverse Silesia and Saxony, to march to the Rhine, and receive the first shock of the French armies. These reasonings did not draw in Frederick-William. Then they went further, and led him to understand that he was too late, that, not doubting of his adhesion, they had already ordered the Russian troops to pass the Prussian territory. At this species of outrage, Frederick-William no longer contained himself. They were mistaken in his character. He was irresolute, which often gave him the appearance of feebleness and double-dealing; but pushed to the point, he became obstinate and choleric. He fell into a passion, called a council, to which were invited the old duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf, and decided, in spite of his parsimony, to place the Prussian army upon a war footing. Seeing himself on the point of being outraged by one or the other, he resolved to take his precautions, and ordered 80,000 men to be assembled, which would cost him sixteen millions of Prussian crowns, or sixty-four millions of francs, to raise beforehand, part from the state revenues, and part out of the treasure of the great Frederick,—a treasure dissipated during the preceding reign, and replaced during the present by the force of strict economy.

M. Alopeus, alarmed at these dispositions, hastened to write to Pulawi, to advise the emperor, in the strongest way, to humour the king of Prussia, unless he wished to have all the forces of the Prussian monarchy upon his hands.

When the news arrived at Pulawi, it shook the resolution of Alexander. Prince Adam Czartoryski had strongly pressed to him decision, not to give Prussia time to place herself on her guard, and to force the passage, in place of soliciting it for so long a time. "If Prussia goes to war," said Prince Adam, "they would declare Alexander king of Poland, and organize that kingdom in the rear of the Russian armies. If, on the other hand, Prussia consented, the plan of the coalesced powers would have succeeded, and another ally would be gained." But Alexander, enlightened by the correspondence of M. Alopeus, opposed the advice of the young minister, and sent back his aide-de-camp Dolgorouki to Berlin, to assure his royal friend that he never had the intention to force his inclination; that, on the contrary, he gave orders that the Russian army should halt on the Prussian frontier; that, in acting thus, he had done so out of deference to him; that such important matters were not easily to be treated of by intermediate agency; and that he requested an interview. Frederick-William, fearing to be overcome by the flatteries of Alexander as much as he could be by his armies, did not feel any taste for such an interview. Still the court, which inclined towards the coalition and war,—the queen, whose sentiments accorded with those of the young emperor,—both persuaded the king that he could not refuse. The interview was agreed upon for the first days of October. In the meanwhile Duroc and M. Laforest were still at Berlin, receiving on their side every kind of assurance of a neutrality.

While the Russians employed the month of September in this way, Austria made a better usage of the precious time. While she charged M. Cobentzel to repeat at Paris, without ceasing, that her only desire was to negotiate, and to obtain

guarantees for the future position of Italy, she turned to profit the subsidies of England with extreme activity. She united at first 100,000 men in Italy, under the archduke Charles. It was there she placed her best generals and her strongest army, in order to recover the provinces, the loss of which she most regretted. About 25,000 men, under the archduke John—the same who had commanded at Hohenlinden—guarded the Tyrol; while 80,000 or 90,000 were destined for the invasion of Bavaria, to enter Suabia, and to take up the famous position of Ulm, which marshal Kray, in 1800, had so long retained against general Moreau. The 50,000 or 60,000 Russians, under general Kutusof, on their way to join the Austrian army, would form a mass of 140,000 combatants, with which it was hoped to give the French army occupation enough to procure to the other Russian armies time to arrive; to the archduke Charles time to re-conquer Italy; and to the troops sent to Hanover and Naples the time to make a useful diversion. The famous general Mack, who had been the designer of all the plans of the campaigns against France, and who had, with much activity and a certain degree of intelligence in military details, placed the Austrian army upon a war footing, was the general who was charged with the command of the army in Suabia, in concert with the archduke Ferdinand.

They had availed themselves of the towns belonging to Austria in that country, to prepare magazines between the lake of Constance and the upper Danube. The town of Memmingen, on the Iller, forming the left of the position of which Ulm formed the right, was one of these places. They had collected there an immense stock of provisions, and raised some entrenchments, which it was not possible to do at Ulm, because that place belonged to Bavaria.

All this had been done in the last days of August. But Austria, through a precipitation which was by no means usual to her, committed here a serious fault. She was not able to occupy the position of Ulm without breaking in upon the Bavarian frontier. Further, Bavaria possessed an army of 25,000 men, large magazines, the line of the Inn; and Austria had every kind of reason and chance to be the first to possess so rich a prize. She imagined it best to act with Bavaria as Russia did with Prussia—to surprise, and thus draw her over. It was more easy, it is true; but the consequences, in case of failure, must be disastrous.

General Mack, having arrived on the banks of the Inn, prince Schwartzenberg was sent to Munich, to make the strongest entreaties to the elector from the emperor of Germany. He was charged to demand of him to pronounce himself in favour of the coalition; to join his troops to those of Austria; to consent that they should be incorporated in the imperial army, dispersed regiment by regiment in the Austrian divisions; to deliver over his territory and his magazines to the coalition; and to join himself, in one word, in this new crusade against the common enemy of Germany and of Europe. Prince Schwartzenberg was authorized, if it was needful, to offer to Bavaria, in the territory of Salzburg, even in the Tyrol, the greatest aggrandizements; for, provided Italy was recognized by the united powers, they would be able to place in that country the collateral branches of the imperial house, which had been sent away.

When prince Schwartzenberg arrived at Munich, the elector found himself in a situation very much like that of Prussia itself. M. Otto, who in 1801, had with so much ability negotiated the peace of London, was the French minister at Munich. Affecting, in the midst of that capital, to be neglected by the court, he had, notwithstanding, his secret interviews with the elector, and set himself to demonstrate that Bavaria only existed through the protection of Napoleon. It was certain, that in the present circumstances, as in many others, she was not able to preserve herself from Austrian covetousness, but by relying upon France. If even in 1803, she had obtained a reasonable portion of the Germanic indemnities, she only obtained them through French intervention. M. Otto, in insisting upon these points, had put an end to the hesitations of the elector, and brought him to bind himself, on the 24th of August, by a treaty of alliance. The deepest secresy had been promised and kept regarding it. Some days afterwards, on the 7th of September, it was, that prince Schwartzenberg appeared at Munich. The elector, who was very irresolute, had near him a new cause of irresolution, in the electress, his wife, one of the three handsome princesses of Baden, who mounted the thrones of Russia, Sweden, and Bavaria, and who were all three noted for their animosity to France. Of the three, the electress of Bavaria was the most inimical. She flounced, wept, and exhibited the deepest vexation to find her husband bound to Napoleon, and made him much more unhappy than he would have naturally been through his own unsettled feelings. M. Schwartzenberg, followed at only two marches' distance by the Austrian army, seconded by the tears of the electress, sought to shake the elector, and obtain the promise from him to become the ally of Austria. The elector, meanwhile, affrighted at the consequences of this sudden change of affairs, fearing general Mack, who was near, and Napoleon, although he was far away, believed he could prevail upon M. Otto to excuse his conduct, alleging his unfortunate position, and soliciting the indulgence of France. M. Otto, having notice of this intention, went to the elector, exhibited to him the danger of such a defection, and the certainty of soon having Napoleon victorious at Munich, making peace with the sacrifice of Bavaria to Austria. Certain circumstances occurred to second the arguments of M. Otto. The demand to dislocate the Bavarian army, and to disperse it among the different Austrian divisions, had made the generals and officers of the army highly indignant. It was learned, at the same time, that the Austrians, without waiting for the consent demanded at Munich of the elector, had passed the Inn; and public opinion was outraged by such an act of territorial violation. People said, in a loud tone, that if Napoleon was ambitious, Mr. Pitt was not less so; that Mr. Pitt had purchased the cabinet of Vienna; and that, thanks to the gold of England, Germany was about to be trampled on anew under the feet of the soldiers of all Europe. Independently of these favourable circumstances for M. Otto, the elector had an able minister, M. Montgelas, full of ambition in behalf of his country,

dreaming, in the nineteenth century, of similar aggrandisements for Bavaria, to those which Prussia had acquired in the eighteenth, endeavouring unceasingly to discover if it was at Vienna or Paris that he had the chance of obtaining his desire; and finishing by the belief, that it was through the more innovating power, or through France. He therefore wished for the treaty of alliance signed with M. Otto. Affected, nevertheless, by the offers of the prince Schwartzenberg, he was shaken a moment under the influence of ambition, as his master had been under that of irresolution. But he was soon brought back, and by the entreaties of M. Otto, seconded by public opinion, by the irritation of the Bavarian army, and by the counsels of M. Montgelas, a second time urged, the elector was secured to France. In the disorder of mind in which this prince was, they made him perform all that they wished. It was proposed to him to take refuge at Würtzburg, the bishopric secularized for Bavaria in 1803, and to cause himself to be followed by his army. He accepted this proposition. In order to gain time he announced to M. Schwartzenberg, that he had sent M. Nogarola, a Bavarian general, to Vienna, a known partisan of the house of Austria, and charged him to treat with it. This done, the elector set out with all his court in the night of the 8th of September, and first proceeding to Ratisbon, went from thence to Würtzburg, where he arrived on the 12th of that month. The Bavarian troops united at Amberg and Ulm, received orders to concentrate themselves at Würtzburg. The elector in quitting Munich published a manifesto, to announce to Bavaria and Germany the violence of which he had been made the victim.

M. Schwartzenberg and general Mack, who had passed the Inn, thus saw the elector, his whole court and army, escape, and incurred ridicule as well as indignation. The Austrians advanced by forced marches without being able to come up with the Bavarians, and every where found the opinion of the country aroused against them. One circumstance contributed much to irritate the people of Bavaria. The Austrians had their hands full of a paper money, which only circulated at Vienna at a great loss. They obliged the inhabitants to take for money this discredited paper. A serious pecuniary injury united itself, therefore, with the other national feelings, that had been ruffled still further to exasperate the Bavarians.

General Mack, after this mortifying expedition, for which in fact he was less responsible than the Austrian envoy, marched on the higher Danube, and took a position which had for a long time been assigned to him, his right at Ulm, his left at Memmingen; his front covered by the Iller, that flowed by Memmingen, to join the Danube at Ulm. The officers of the Austrian staff had never ceased to boast of this position for some years before, as the best which they were able to occupy, to make head against the French, when issuing from the Black Forest. They had one of their wings resting on the Tyrol, the other on the Danube. They believed themselves therefore well secured on these two sides; and as to their rear, they had no care about that, not imagining that the French were able to arrive otherwise than by the accustomed route. General Mack had drawn towards him general Jellachich with the divisions of the Vorarlberg. He had 65,000 men directly under his hand, and on his rear, to connect himself with the Russians, general Kienmayer at the head of 20,000. This was a total of 85,000 combatants.

General Mack was, therefore, in the position that Napoleon had supposed and desired he should be —in other words, on the upper Danube—and separated from the Russians by the distance from Vienna to Ulm. The elector of Bavaria was at Würtzburg, with his court in grief, his army indignant against the Austrians, and in expectation of the early arrival of the French.

It only remains now, to have a complete idea of the situation of Europe during this great crisis, and to cast the eyes for an instant on what was passing in the south of Italy. The supreme council of the coalition, not wishing that the court of Naples, watched by 20,000 French, under general St. Cyr, should compromise itself too much, had suggested to it a treason, which could cost little to a court blinded and demoralized by hatred. They had advised it to sign a treaty of neutrality with France, in order to obtain the retirement of the troops which were at Tarentum. When this corps should be withdrawn, the court of Naples, less observed, would have, they said, time to declare itself, and to receive the Russians and English. The Russian general, Lacy, a prudent and sensible man, was at Naples, charged to prepare every thing secretly, and to bring in the coalesced powers when the moment should be judged opportune. There were 12,000 Russians at Corfu, besides a reserve at Odessa, and 6000 English at Malta. They reckoned, too, 36,000 Neapolitans, some less ill organized than was customary, and a levy in mass of the brigands of Calabria.

This treaty, proposed to Napoleon on the eve of his departure from Paris, had appeared acceptable in his view, because he did not believe that so weak a court would commit itself with him to the consequences of such treachery. He figured to himself, that the terrible example that he had made of Venice in 1797, had cured the Italian governments of their base inclinations. He found in a treaty of neutrality, which excluded the English and Russians from the south of Italy, the advantage of being able to give 20,000 men more to Massena, if the 50,000 which he had placed at his disposal were not sufficient for the defence of the Adige.

He therefore accepted the proposition, and by a treaty signed at Paris, on the 24th of September, he consented to withdraw his troops from Tarentum, on the promise made him by the court of Naples, not to suffer any disembarkation of the Russians or English. On this condition, general St. Cyr had orders to march towards Lombardy; and queen Caroline, as well as her weak-minded husband, were enabled to prepare a sudden raising of bucklers in the rear of the French.

Such was, on the 24th or 25th of September, the situation of the coalesced powers. The Russians and Swedes, who were to make the attack in the north, assembled at Stralsund, in order to combine themselves with a disembarkation of the English at the mouth of the Elbe. A Russian army was organized at Wilna, under general

Michelson. The emperor Alexander, with the corps of his guards and the army of Buxhöwden, was at Pulawi, on the Vistula, soliciting an interview with the king of Prussia; another Russian army, under the orders of general Kutusof, had penetrated by Gallicia into Moravia, to form a junction with the Austrians. These last were about as high up as Vienna, and were to ascend the Danube. General Mack, more advanced by a hundred leagues, had taken up a position at Ulm, at the head of 85,000 men, awaiting the issue of the French from the Black Forest. The archduke Charles was with 100,000 men upon the Adige. The court of Naples meditated a surprise, which was to be executed in concert with the Russians from Corfu, and the English from Malta.

Napoleon, as has been already seen, arrived at Strasburg on the 26th of September. His columns had exactly fulfilled his orders, and had passed over the routes which he had pointed out for them. Marshal Bernadotte, after having furnished with provisions the fortress of Hameln, and placed there the soldiers least capable of bearing the fatigues of the campaign, had left Göttingen with 17,000 men, all in a condition to endure the greatest hardships. He had given notice of his passage to the elector of Hesse, and done all in the forms prescribed by Napoleon. He had at first encountered some dissatisfaction, then a refusal, of which he had taken no notice, and had passed through Hesse without encountering any resistance. Commissaries preceded the corps, ordered provisions at every station, and, paying for all in ready money, found speculators press forward to supply the troops with what was wanted. An army that carries money with it is able to sustain itself without magazines, without loss of time, without trouble to the country through which it passes; and for little, if the country be abundant in the productions wanted for food. Bernadotte by this means traversed without difficulty through the two Hesses, the principality of Fulda, and the estates of the prince-arch-chancellor, to Bavaria. He marched in a direct line from north to south. He arrived near Cassel on the 17th of September, on the 20th at Giessen, and on the 27th at Würtzburg, to the great joy of the elector of Bavaria, who was killing himself with fear, in the midst of the contradictory news of the French and Austrians. A minister belonging to the emperor of Germany had come to the elector, to offer excuses for what had occurred, and to attempt to bring him back. The Austrian minister knew nothing of the march of the corps of Bernadotte, until the French cavalry appeared upon the heights of Würtzburg. He immediately went away, leaving the elector to the French for ever—at least, as long as French prosperity continued.

M. Montgelas, in order to give the better colouring to the conduct of his master, made a request not very honourable for Bavaria, this was, to alter the date of the treaty of alliance concluded with France. This treaty had been signed in reality on the 24th of August. M. Montgelas expressed a desire that another date should be attributed to it, that of September 23rd. This was assented to; and he was thus enabled to assert to his friends at Ratisbon, that he had not given himself up to France until the day after the outrages of Austria.

General Marmont ascended the Rhine, which river served for the transport of the baggage and stores of his army. He took his march by the fine road that Napoleon had opened along the left bank of that river, which is one of the most remarkable works of his reign. He was on the 12th of September at Nimeguen, the 18th at Cologne, the 25th at Mayence, the 26th at Frankfort, and the 29th in the environs of Würtzburg. He brought with him a corps of 20,000 men, a park of forty pieces of cannon, well harnessed, and very considerable warlike stores. In these 20,000 men was comprised a division of Dutch troops, under general Dumonceau. In regard to the 15,000 men comprising this corps, one fact, without example in the history of warfare, will give a just idea of its quality. They had traversed a part of France and of Germany, and had marched twenty days successively without halting, and only nine men were wanting in all upon their arrival at Würtzburg. There is no general who would not think himself fortunate, if he had only lost two or three hundred, since it is upon entering a campaign, and through the effect of the first march or two, that the weaker constitutions show themselves by remaining in the rear.

Towards the end of September, Napoleon, therefore, had in the centre of Franconia, six days' march from the Danube, menacing the Austrian flank, marshal Bernadotte with 17,000 men, and general Marmont with 20,000. It is proper to add to these the 25,000 Bavarians assembled at Würtzburg, and animated with real enthusiasm for a cause now become their own. They clapped their hands on beholding the appearance of the French regiments. Marshal Davout, with the corps which left Ambleteuse, marshal Soult with that which had left Boulogne, and marshal Ney with that which had left Montreuil, traversed Flanders, Picardy, Champagne, and Lorraine, and were upon the Rhine on the 23rd or 24th of September, preceded by the cavalry that Napoleon had set in motion four days before the infantry. The whole had marched with unequalled spirit. The division of Dupont, in crossing the department of the Aisne, had left behind about fifty men belonging to that department. They had gone to visit their families, and on the next day but one they had all rejoined their regiments. After having marched a hundred and fifty leagues in the middle of autumn, without resting a single day, this army had neither sick nor laggers behind; a singular example, owing to the spirit of the troops and their long encampment.

Marshal Augereau had formed the divisions in Britany. Departing from Brest, passing by Alençon, Sens, Langres, and Béfort, he had France to cross at its greatest extent of territory, and was to be on the Rhine fifteen days after the other corps. Thus he was intended to form the reserve.

Never was astonishment surpassed by that which filled all Europe at the sudden arrival of this army. It was believed to be on the borders of the ocean; and in about twenty days—that is to say, in about the time required for the news of the march to commence spreading—it appeared on the Rhine, and inundated southern Germany.

This was the effect of extreme promptitude in deciding, and profound art in concealing, the determination taken.

The news of the apparition of the French spread abroad at that moment, gave no other idea than that the principal theatre of the war would be in Germany, and not in Italy; since Napoleon and the army of the ocean had appeared there. There was no other result than a demand made to augment the Austrian forces in Suabia, and the order, which much displeased the archduke Charles, to send a detachment of his troops from Italy into the Tyrol, in order to come by the Vorarlberg to the succour of General Mack. But the real design of Napoleon remained completely in concealment. The troops assembled at Würtzburg appeared to have for their object only to welcome the Bavarians and to protect the elector. The assemblage principally placed upon the upper Rhine, at the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest, seemed destined to engage them seriously. General Mack, therefore, became every day more confirmed in his idea of keeping the position of Ulm, which had been assigned to him.

Napoleon having united his whole army, gave it an organization which it has ever afterwards preserved, and a name which it will continually keep in history—that of the "grand army."

He divided it into seven corps. Marshal Bernadotte, with the troops brought from Hanover, formed the first corps of 17,000 men. General Marmont, with the troops from Holland, formed the second corps, which reckoned 20,000 men under colours. The troops of Marshal Davout, encamped at Ambleteuse, occupying the third place on the sea-shore, had received the title of the third corps, and rose to the number of 26,000 men. Marshal Soult, with the centre of the grand army of the ocean, encamped at Boulogne, and, composed of 40,000 infantry and artillery, formed the fourth corps. The division of Suchet was soon to be detached, in order to make a part of the fifth corps, with the division of Gazan and the grenadiers of Arras, known hereafter under the denomination of the grenadiers of Oudinot, from the name of their brave chief. Independently of Suchet's division, the fifth corps consisted of 18,000 men. It was designed for the faithful and heroic friend of Napoleon, marshal Lannes, who had been recalled from Portugal to take a part in the perilous expedition from Boulogne, and who hereafter followed the emperor to the banks of the Morawa, the Vistula, and Niemen. Under the intrepid Ney, the men of the camp of Montreuil composed the sixth corps, and reckoned 24,000 combatants. Augereau, with two divisions about 14,000 strong, placed last on the sea-shore line, at Brest, composed the seventh corps. The title of the eighth corps was given later to the Italian troops, when they came to act in Germany. This organization was that of the army of the Rhine, but with important modifications, adapted to the genius of Napoleon, and necessary to the great things of which he meditated the performance.

In the army of the Rhine, each corps, complete in every branch of service, presented in itself a little army, sufficient and capable to give battle. Thus such corps tended to their own isolation, above all, under such a general as Moreau, who commanded only in a mode commensurate with his peculiar genius and character. Napoleon had so organized his army, as to keep it whole and entire in his own hand. Each corps was alone complete in infantry; it had in artillery only what was necessary; and in cavalry only just as much as was needful to guard it safely; in other words, some squadrons of hussars or of chasseurs. Napoleon reserved to himself afterwards the completion of these corps in artillery and cavalry, by the aid of the reserve of those two branches of the service of which he himself disposed solely. According to the nature of the ground, and other circumstances, he withdrew one to give to another, a reinforcement of guns, or a mass of cuirassiers.

He kept, above all, to the practice of retaining, under the same command and in immediate dependence upon his own order, the principal mass of his cavalry. As it is with this arm that an enemy is watched, by going incessantly around him, that his defeat is operated when he is shaken, and he is pursued by it and cut off when in flight, Napoleon wished to reserve to himself exclusively the means to prepare for victory, to decide it, and to gather its fruits. He had, therefore, united in a single corps the heavy cavalry, composed of cuirassiers and carbineers, commanded by generals Nansouty and Hautpoul; to which he added the dragoons, as well foot as horse, under the orders of generals Klein, Walther, Beaumont, Bourcier, and Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and had confided the whole to his brother-in-law Murat, who was the officer of cavalry the best trained of that time, and who, under his orders, represented the *magister equitum* of the Roman armies. The batteries of flying artillery followed this cavalry, and gave it, besides the power of the sabre, that of their fire. They will be soon seen spreading themselves in the valley of the Danube, overturning the Austrians and Russians, entering with them pell mell into astonished Vienna, then conveying themselves to the plains of Saxony and of Prussia, to proceed to the shores of the Baltic, and take the entire Prussian army; or, precipitating themselves at Eylau on the Russian infantry, preserving the good fortune of Napoleon by one of the most impetuous shocks that ever armed masses have given or received. This reserve numbered 22,000 horse, of which 6000 were cuirassiers, 9000 or 10,000 mounted dragoons, 6000 foot dragoons, and 1000 horse artillery.

Finally, the general reserve of the grand army was the imperial guard, a chosen body of men, the finest in the world—serving at once for the purpose of emulation, and the means of rewarding the soldiers who might distinguish themselves; because none were admitted into the ranks of this corps until they had given proofs of their worthiness. The imperial guard was composed, as the consular guard had been, of foot grenadiers and chasseurs, and horse grenadiers and chasseurs, nearly in the same way as a regiment of which only the select companies are retained. It comprehended besides, a fine Italian battalion, representing the royal guard of the king of Italy; a superb squadron of Mamelucks, the last memorial of Egypt; and two squadrons of chosen *gens-d'armerie*, to act as the police of the head quarters. The whole were 7000 men. Napoleon added to it a

large proportion of artillery, the branch of the service to which he was most attached, because on some occasions it supplied all the others. He had formed a park of twenty-four pieces of cannon, fitted and harnessed with particular care ; a number which made nearly four pieces to each thousand men.

The guard rarely quitted the head quarters, it marched almost always near the emperor with Lannes and the grenadiers of Oudinot.

Such was the grand army. It presented a mass of 186,000 men, present under colours. It reckoned 38,000 cavalry, and 340 pieces of cannon. If to these be added the 50,000 men under Massena, and 20,000 under general St. Cyr, we shall have a total of 256,000 French, spread from the gulf of Tarentum as far as the mouths of the Elbe, with a reserve of 150,000 young soldiers in the interior. If to these are added 25,000 Bavarians, 7000 or 8000 subjects of the sovereigns of Baden and Würtemberg, ready to enter in line, it may be said that Napoleon went with 250,000 French, 30,000 and some odd Germans, to fight 500,000 coalesced enemies, of which 250,000 were Austrians, 200,000 Russians, 50,000 English, Swedes, and Neapolitans, having also their reserve in the interior of Austria, of Russia, and in the English fleets. The coalition hoped to be joined by 200,000 Prussians. This was not impossible if Napoleon did not make haste to conquer.

He was pressed, in fact, to enter upon action; and he ordered the passage of the Rhine to take place on the 25th or 26th of September, having devoted two or three days to rest his men, and repair some damages in the accoutrements and harness of the cavalry and artillery, as well as to exchange some hurt or tired horses for those which were fresh, collected in a great number in Alsace, and finally to prepare the grand park of artillery and considerable quantities of biscuit. The following were the dispositions for turning the Black Forest, behind which general Mack, encamped at Ulm, awaited the advance of the French.

On fixing the sight upon this country, so often gone over by the French armies, and on that account so often described in this history, the Rhine is seen flowing out of the lake of Constance, running westwards as far as Basle, to return nearly due north. The Danube, on the contrary, issuing from some small sources near the point where the Rhine issues from the Lake of Constance, turns to the east, and follows that direction, with few deviations, as far as the Black Sea. A chain of mountains, not lofty, very improperly called the Alps of Suabia, separates the two rivers, and turns the Rhine towards the northern seas, and the Danube towards those of the east. These mountains show towards France their steeper summits, and incline, lowering insensibly, to terminate in the plains of Franconia between Nordlingen and Donauwerth. Their flank, partly open and partly clothed with forests, which are known by the general name of the Black Forest, runs to the left, that is to say, towards the Rhine, the Necker, and the Main, to the right of the Danube, that passes along their reverse, which is nearly naked of wood, and terraced. They are pierced by narrow defiles, that must necessarily be passed through to go to the Rhine or Danube ; at least, those mountains are not to be avoided, whether in ascending the Rhine as far as below Schaffhausen, or whether passing their foot from Strasburg to Nordlingen, as far as the plains of Franconia, where they disappear. In anterior wars, the French had alternately followed two routes. Sometimes opening from the Rhine between Strasburg and Huningen, they had traversed the defiles of the Black Forest ; sometimes ascending the Rhine as far as Schaffhausen, they had passed that river near the lake of Constance, and thus found themselves at the sources of the Danube, avoiding the passages through the defiles.

Napoleon, who sought to place himself between the Austrians who were posted at Ulm, and the Russians who were arriving to their succour, must therefore follow some other route. Studying at first to fix the attention of the Austrians upon the defiles of the Black Forest, by the spectacle of his columns ready to enter them, he would afterwards coast along the Suabian Alps, without crossing them; coast them as far as Nordlingen, to turn with all his united force their low extremity, and cross the Danube at Donauwerth. By this movement he rallied on his way the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont, already arrived at Würtzburg, he passed beyond the position of Ulm, opened in the rear of general Mack, and realized the plan a long while before arranged in his mind, and from which he awaited an immense result.

The 25th of September, he ordered Murat and Lannes to pass the Rhine at Strasburg, with the reserve of cavalry, the grenadiers of Oudinot, and the division of Gazan. Murat was to take his dragoons from Oberkirch to Freudenstadt, Offenburg to Rothweil, Friburg to Neustadt, and thus present them at the head of the principal defiles, in such a manner, as to make it be supposed that the army itself was about to traverse them. Provisions were ordered on this route, to complete the illusion of the enemy. Lannes was to support this reconnoitring by some battalions of grenadiers ; but, in reality, to place himself with the main part of his corps in advance of Strasburg, on the road to Stutgard. He was ordered to cover the movements of the marshals Davout, Soult, and Ney, who had been commanded to cross the Rhine below. General Songis, who commanded the artillery, had thrown over two bridges of boats, the first between Lauterburg and Carlsruhe, for the corps of marshal Ney ; the second, in the environs of Spire, for the corps of marshal Soult. Marshal Davout had at his disposal the bridge of Manheim. These marshals were to pass transversely the valleys which descend from the Suabian Alps, coast the chain, and rest one upon the other in such a manner, as to be able to afford succour in case of the sudden appearance of the enemy. Orders were given to them all, to have four days' bread in their sacks, and four days' biscuit in the cars, in case they should be required to make forced marches. Napoleon did not quit Strasburg, until after he saw in movement his parks of artillery, and his reserves under the escort of a division of infantry. He passed the Rhine on the 1st of October, accompanied by his guard, after having bade adieu to the empress, who continued to sojourn at Strasburgh, with the imperial court, and the chancellery of M. de Talleyrand.

Arrived on the territory of the grand duke of Baden, Napoleon found there the reigning family come to render him homage. The old elector presented around him three generations of princes. He had desired, as did all the German sovereigns of the second and third order, to obtain the advantage of a neutrality, which under such circumstances was truly a mere idle dream, because, when the petty German powers do not know how to prevent war by resisting the greater powers, who desire it, they must not flatter themselves to escape the misfortune by a neutrality, which is impossible, when they are nearly all in the route which the belligerent armies are obliged to take. Napoleon, in lieu of a neutrality, offered them his alliance, and promised to terminate to their profit, the questions of sovereignty or of territory, on which they differed with Austria, since the unsettled arrangements of 1803. The grand-duke of Baden finished the argument by accepting the alliance, and promised to furnish 3000 men, with their provisions, and means of transport to be paid for in Baden.

Napoleon having slept at Ettlingen, set out on the 2nd of October, on the road to Stuttgard. Before his arrival, a collision had taken place between the elector of Wurtemberg and marshal Ney. The elector, known throughout Europe by the extreme vivacity of his mind and character, discussed at that moment with the French minister the conditions of an alliance, which did not much please him. He would not, while awaiting the conclusion of the treaty, that troops should enter, whether at Louisburg, where was his country house, or at Stuttgard, which was his capital. Marshal Ney readily consented not to enter Louisburg, but he planted his guns against the gates of Stuttgard, and by that means procured their being opened to him. Napoleon arrived opportunely to calm the anger of the elector. He was received with great magnificence, and he stipulated with the elector an alliance, which was the foundation of the greatness of his house, as it made that of all the princes of the south of Germany. The treaty was signed on the 5th of October, and contained an engagement on the side of France, to aggrandize the house of Wurtemberg, and on the side of that house, to furnish 10,000 men, provisions, horses, and cars, to be paid for on being taken.

Napoleon remained three or four days at Louisburg, in order to manage so that his corps on the left wing might have time to arrive in line. It was a movement of great nicety to coast for forty leagues along the vicinity of an enemy 80,000 or 90,000 strong, without arousing his watchfulness too much, and without his coming suddenly upon one of the wings. Napoleon had provided for this with an address and foresight truly admirable. Three roads traversed Wurtemberg, and abutted on the diminished extremities of the Alps of Suabia, which he was endeavouring to attain, to arrive at the Danube between Donauwerth and Ingolstadt. The principal road, that of Pforzheim, Stuttgard, and Heidenheim, passed along the very flank of the mountains, and was by a number of defiles in communication with the position of the Austrians at Ulm. It was that space which he had to pass over with the greatest precaution, on account of the vicinity of the enemy. Napoleon occupied it with the cavalry of Murat, the corps of Marshal Lannes, that of marshal Ney, and the guard. The second, or that route which passed by Heilbronn, Hall, and Ellwangen, to terminate in the plain of Nordlingen, was occupied by the corps of marshal Soult. The third, departing from Manheim, passing by Heidelberg, Neckar-Elz, and Ingelfingen, ended at Œttingen. This was passed by marshal Davout. It approached the direction which the corps of Bernadotte and Marmont must follow in order to arrive from Würtzburg at the Danube. Napoleon disposed the march of his columns in such a manner, that they should all arrive on the 6th and 7th of October, in the plain which extends to the bank of the Danube, between Nordlingen, Donauwerth, and Ingolstadt. But in this movement of conversion, his left pivoting on his right, this last had to describe a circle less extended than the left; he, therefore, slackened the march of his right, in order to give time to the corps of Marmont and Bernadotte, that formed the extreme left, to marshal Davout who followed them, and finally to marshal Soult who came after marshal Davout, and united the whole with the head quarters, to complete the movement.

After having waited the necessary time, Napoleon commenced his march on the 4th of October, with the whole of his right. Murat, moving rapidly and continually at the head of his cavalry, appeared in turn at the entrance of each defile between the mountains, doing no more than showing himself, and then withdrawing his squadrons, until the artillery and baggage were sufficiently advanced to have nothing more to fear. Napoleon, with the corps of Lannes, Ney, and the guard, followed on the road from Stuttgard, ready to arrive with 50,000 men to the succour of Murat, should the enemy appear in force in any one of the defiles. As to the corps of Soult, Davout, Marmont, and Bernadotte, forming the centre and left of the army, they were in no danger until the moment when the movement that was executing in coasting along the foot of the Suabian Alps should be completed, and they opened upon the plain of Nordlingen. It was possible that general Mack, made acquainted in sufficient time, might fall back from Ulm upon Donauwerth, pass the Danube, and come to fight in that very plain of Nordlingen, in order to stop the French there. Napoleon had disposed every thing in such a way, that Murat, Ney, Lannes, with the corps of marshals Soult and Davout at least, should converge about the 6th of October, between Heidenheim, Œttingen, and Nordlingen, in a manner so as to present an imposing mass to the enemy, should he make his appearance. But thus far Napoleon's efforts tended to deceive general Mack sufficiently long to prevent his thinking of decamping, that he himself might be able to reach the Danube at Donauwerth before that general quitted his position at Ulm. From the 4th to the 6th of October, every thing continued to wear the best aspect. The weather was very fine; the soldiers, well provided with shoes and cloaks, marched gaily along. A hundred and eighty thousand French advanced thus upon a line of battle of twenty-six leagues in extent; their right touching the mountains, their left converging towards the plains of the upper palatinate, was able in a few hours to unite, to the number of

90,000 or 100,000 men, on one or the other of their wings, and, what is most extraordinary, without the Austrians having any idea of so vast an operation.

"The Austrians," Napoleon wrote to M. de Talleyrand and marshal Augereau, "are at the openings of the Black Forest. May it please God to keep them there! My sole fear is that we shall not make them enough afraid. If they suffer me to gain a few marches, I hope to turn them, and to find myself with all my army between the Lech and the Isar." He also wrote to the minister of police, "Forbid the gazetteers of the Rhine to speak more of the army than if it had no existence."

To arrive at the point which was indicated to them, the corps of Bernadotte and of Marmont were to pass through one of the provinces which Prussia possessed in Franconia—that of Anspach. In strictness, this corps should have drawn itself close to that of marshal Davout; Napoleon would then have been able to have brought it nearer to himself, and thus have avoided touching upon the Prussian territory. But the roads were already encumbered; the accumulation of fresh troops would have been a great inconvenience both to the movements and the provisioning. Further, in contracting the circle described by the army, there had been a less chance of enveloping the enemy. Napoleon, in his movements, embraced the whole course of the Danube as far as Ingolstadt, in order to open out as far as possible in the Austrian rear, and to have it in his power to stop them in case they should retrograde from the Iller as far as the Lech. They did not imagine, in the state of existing relations with Prussia, that she would throw any difficulty in the way; reckoning, after the usage established in the later wars, on traversing the Prussian provinces of Franconia, because they were beyond the line of neutrality, and not having received any notice that it would be otherwise now than before. Napoleon gave himself no trouble about borrowing the territory of Anspach in this way, and issued the order accordingly to the corps of Marmont and Bernadotte. The Prussian magistrates presented themselves at the frontier, to protest, in the name of their sovereign, against the violence that was thus done to them. The reply they received was, the production of the orders of Napoleon, and besides passing, to pay in money for all which they had, and to observe the most rigid discipline. The Prussian subjects, well paid for the bread and meat they furnished to the soldiers, did not appear very angry at the alleged violation of their territory.

On the 6th of October, the six corps of the army had arrived without accident beyond the Suabian Alps; marshal Ney at Heidenheim, marshal Lannes at Neresheim, marshal Soult at Nordlingen, marshal Davout at Œttingen, general Marmont and marshal Bernadotte on the route to Aichstedt; all in sight of the Danube, much below the position of Ulm.

But what were general Mack, the archduke Ferdinand, and the officers of the Austrian staff about all this time? Fortunately, the intention of Napoleon was not revealed to them. Forty thousand men, that had passed the Rhine at Strasburg and had entered at first the defiles of the Black Forest, had confirmed the Austrians in the idea that the French had followed the customary route. False reports of the spies, adroitly dispatched by Napoleon, had yet more strengthened them in this opinion. They had heard spoken, it was true, of some French troops having been spread about in Würtemberg; but they supposed they had come for the purpose of occupying some of the lesser states of Germany, and perhaps to bring aid to the Bavarians. Besides, nothing is more contradictory or more confusing than such a multitude of reports from spies or officers sent to reconnoitre. The one place whole corps of an army where they have only seen detachments; the others take for simple detachments the entire corps of the army they have been reconnoitring. Often they have not seen with their own eyes that of which they make a report, and have only gathered the sayings of individuals affrighted, surprised, or astounded. The military police, like the civil, lies, exaggerates, and contradicts itself. In the chaos of such reports, the superior mind alone discovers the truth; that which is mediocre in capacity loses itself. Above all, if an anterior idea pre-occupy the mind—if it has a leaning to a belief that the enemy will arrive by one point sooner than another—the facts collected are all interpreted in one sole sense, however little they may really belong to it. It is thus great mistakes are produced, that oftentimes ruin armies and empires.

Such was at this moment the situation of the mind of general Mack. The Austrian officers had long cried up the position which, resting its right upon Ulm and its left on Memmingen, presented a front to the French issuing from the Black Forest. Authorized by a general opinion, and obeying the most positive instructions, general Mack had placed himself in this position. He had there his provisions and ammunition; and he could not but persuade himself that he was very favourably situated. The sole precaution which he had taken towards his rear consisted in sending general Kienmayer, with a few thousand men, to Ingolstadt, to watch the Bavarians who had taken refuge in the upper palatinate, and to connect him with the Russians, whom he expected by the road from Munich.

While general Mack's mind, thus governed by a preconceived opinion, remained immoveable at Ulm, the six corps of the French army issued out, on the 6th of October, upon the plain of Nordlingen, beyond the mountains of Suabia which they had turned, and on the banks of the Danube which they were to cross. On that day, in the evening, the division of Vandamme, belonging to the corps of marshal Soult, advancing before the others, reached the Danube, and surprised the bridge of Münster, a league below Donauwerth. On the following day, the 7th of October, the corps of marshal Soult carried the very bridge of Donauwerth itself, which was weakly disputed by the battalion of Colloredo, that, not able to defend it, attempted its destruction in vain. The troops of marshal Soult had very quickly repaired the injury, and then passed over with all speed. Murat, with his division of dragoons, preceding the right wing formed of the corps of marshals Lannes and Ney, marched to the bridge of Münster, already surprised by Vandamme. He required this bridge for his own troops and those which followed him,

abandoning that of Donauwerth to the troops of marshal Soult, passed at the same moment with a division of dragoons, and went down the bank of the Danube in pursuit of an object of great importance, being no less than the occupation of the bridge of Rain on the Lech. The Lech, which runs behind the Iller, nearly parallel with it, to fall into the Danube, forms a position situated below that of Ulm ; and in occupying this bridge, the Iller and the Lech were both turned at the same time, leaving to general Mack very little chance of retreating in time. It only required a gallop of the dragoons of Murat to take Rain and its bridge over the Lech. Two hundred cavalry cut down all the patrols of Kienmayer's corps, while marshal Soult established himself in force at Donauwerth, and marshal Davout arrived in sight of the bridge of Neuburg.

Napoleon on the same day entered Donauwerth. His hopes were henceforth realized; but he did not hold his success to be complete until he had obtained the full result of his fine manœuvre. Some hundred prisoners had already been made, and they were unanimous in the statement that general Mack was at Ulm on the Iller ; it was his rear-guard, commanded by general Kienmayer, designed to connect him with the Russians, that had been encountered below on the Danube. Napoleon considered immediately about taking a position between the Austrians and Russians, in such a manner as to prevent a junction. The first movement of general Mack, if he knew how to form a resolution in time, would be to quit the banks of the Iller, to fall back upon the Lech, and to cross Augsburg to rejoin general Kienmayer on the route to Munich. Napoleon, without a moment's delay, ordered the following dispositions to be made. He would not take the corps of marshal Ney beyond the Danube, but left it on the roads that lead from Wurtemberg to Ulm, to guard the left bank of the Danube by which the army had arrived. He ordered Murat and Lannes to pass over to the right bank, by the two bridges of which he was master,—those of Münster and of Donauwerth,—to ascend the river and place themselves between Ulm and Augsburg, to hinder general Mack from retiring by the great road from Augsburg to Munich. The intermediate point which they had to occupy was Burgau. Napoleon ordered marshal Soult to march from the mouth of the Lech, where he could be in a position to ascend that river from the Danube to Augsburg with the divisions of St. Hilaire, Vandamme, and Legrand. The division of Suchet, the fourth of marshal Soult's corps, was already placed under the orders of marshal Lannes. Thus marshal Ney with 20,000 men was on the left bank of the Danube, that had been vacated; Murat and Lannes with 40,000 on the right, which they had occupied; marshal Soult with 30,000 on the Lech, environing general Mack by whatever opening he might attempt to elude them.

From this object passing immediately to others, Napoleon ordered marshal Davout to pass the Danube at Neuburg, and to clear Ingolstadt, where Marmont and Bernadotte would terminate their march. The route they had followed being longer, they were two marches in arrear. Marshal Davout was to proceed afterwards to Aichach on the road to Munich, to push before him general Kienmayer, and to make the rear-guard of the masses accumulating around Ulm. The corps of Bernadotte and Marmont had orders to accelerate their march, to pass the Danube at Ingolstadt, and to march upon Munich, in order to replace the elector in his capital, one month only after he had quitted it. It was marshal Bernadotte, at that moment accompanying the Bavarians, for whom he reserved the honour of reinstating them in their country. By this disposition of his army, Napoleon presented to the Russians coming from Munich, Bernadotte and the Bavarians ; then, in case of need, Marmont and Davout, who were, according to circumstances, either to carry themselves to Munich, or to Ulm, to aid, if necessary, in the complete investment of general Mack.

The following day, the 8th of October, marshal Soult ascended the Lech in order to reach Augsburg. He found no enemies on his way. Murat and Lannes, who were designed to occupy the space of country between the Lech and the Ulm, ascended from Donauwerth to Burgau, traversing a district slightly obstructed, here and there wooded, or crossed by small rivers which flowed into the Danube. The dragoons were marching in advance, when they encountered a body of the enemy, more numerous than any they had seen before, posted in advance, and around, a large village called Wertingen. This body was composed of six battalions of grenadiers and three of fusileers, commanded by the baron Auffenberg; of two squadrons of the cuirassiers of duke Albert, and two squadrons of the light horse of Latour. They had been sent out to reconnoitre by general Mack, on a vague report which had been spread of the appearance of the French on the banks of the Danube. The Austrians always believed that the French thus spoken of belonged to the corps of Bernadotte, placed, they said, at Würtzburg to aid the Bavarians. The officers were at table when the announcement was made to them that the French were in sight. They were in extreme surprise, and refused at first to credit the report, but not being longer able to doubt the fact, they precipitately mounted their horses to put themselves at the head of their troops. In advance of Wertingen, there was a hamlet called Hohenreichen, guarded by some hundreds of Austrian cavalry and infantry. Sheltered by the houses, they kept up a very annoying fire, and held in check the regiment of dragoons that first arrived at the spot. The commander of the squadron, Excellmans, who afterwards signalized himself by so many brilliant actions, then a simple aide-de-camp of Murat, came up at the sound of the firing. He ordered two hundred dragoons to dismount, who threw themselves, musket in hand, into the hamlet, to dislodge those who held it. Fresh detachments of dragoons having come up in the interim, they pressed the Austrians yet harder; penetrating after them into Wertingen, they passed the village, and found on a species of elevated plain the nine battalions formed in a square, of little extent but close and deep, having cannon and cavalry on the wings. The brave Excellmans charged the square immediately with uncommon hardihood, had his horse killed under him, and at his side colonel Meaupetit, who was brought down by the thrust of a bayonet. But however vigorous was the attack, they were not able to penetrate the

compact mass of the enemy. Thus a certain space of time elapsed, during which the French dragoons endeavoured to sabre the Austrian grenadiers, who returned musketry and thrusts from their bayonets. At last Murat came up with the main body of the cavalry, and Lannes with Oudinot's grenadiers, both the one and the other attracted by the sound of the cannon. Murat soon charged the enemy's square with his cavalry, while Lannes hastened his grenadiers to the borders of a wood which he perceived below, in such a way as to cut off all retreat to the Austrians, who, charged in front and threatened from behind, retired at first in a compact mass, then fell into disorder. If the grenadiers of Oudinot had been able to reach the ground a few minutes sooner, the nine Austrian battalions must have been taken to a man. Still 2000 prisoners were made, and several pieces of cannon and colours taken.

Lannes and Murat, who had seen Excellmans at the point of the enemies' bayonets, desired he should go himself with the news to Napoleon of this first success, and bear the captured colours. The emperor received this young and hopeful officer at Donauwerth, granted him a step in the legion of honour, and gave him the insignia in presence of his staff, in order to impart the more éclat to the first recompense merited in the new war.

The same day, being the 8th of October, marshal Soult entered Augsburg without striking a blow. Marshal Davout had passed the Danube at Neuburg, and had reached Aichach, to take the intermediate position assigned to him among the French corps which were about to invest Ulm, and those who were stationed at Munich to make head against the Russians. Marshal Bernadotte and general Marmont made preparations for the passage of the Danube at Ingolstadt, with the intention of marching to Munich.

Napoleon ordered the position of Ulm to be contracted. He commanded marshal Ney to ascend the left bank of the Danube, and to secure all the bridges, in order to be able to act, if necessary, on both banks. He bade Murat and Lannes to ascend the right bank, and to contribute with Ney to the closer investment of the Austrians. On the 9th of October, marshal Ney, prompt to execute the orders which he had received, above all where those orders brought him nearer to the enemy, reached the bank of the Danube, and ascended it as far as the heights of Ulm. The first which appeared were those of Günzburg, and he ordered the division of Malher to take them.

These bridges were three in number. The principal was in front of the little town of Günzburg; the second above, at the village of Leipheim; and the third below, before the little hamlet of Reisensberg. General Malher had them all attacked at the same time. He desired the staff-major Lefol to attack that of Leipheim with one detachment, and general Labassée to attack that of Reisensburg with the 59th regiment of the line. General Malher at the head of the brigade of Marcognet, reserved to himself the attack of the principal bridge at Günzburg. The bed of the Danube not being regularly formed in that part of its course, it flows among a multitude of islands in little branchings, bordered with willows and poplars. The advanced guard went forward resolutely, passing by ford all the streams that presented an obstacle to them, and taking baron Aspre, a major-general, who commanded at that spot, with two or three hundred Tyrolese prisoners. The French soon arrived at the largest arm of the river, over which was constructed the bridge of Günsburg. The Austrians in retiring had destroyed some of the wooden flooring, which general Malher wished to restore; but on the opposite bank were many Austrian regiments and a numerous artillery, while the archduke Ferdinand himself came up with considerable reinforcements. The Austrians now began to comprehend that the operation attempted in their rear was in reality a very serious one. They therefore wished to make a great effort to save at least the bridges that were nearest to Ulm. They directed a murderous fire of musketry and cannon upon the French, who, no longer under shelter of the wooded islets, standing exposed upon the gravel of the river side, supported the fire with great fortitude. To pass by fording the stream was impossible. They then sprang upon the piers of the bridge, in order to repair it by means of joists. But the workmen, hit one by one with the enemies' balls, were not able to succeed; and the French lines, exposed all the time to the Austrian missiles, experienced a cruel loss. General Malher then fell back upon the woody islets, in order not to prolong a useless temerity.

This fruitless attempt cost some hundreds of men. The two other attacks were made simultaneously. Impracticable marshes rendered that upon the bridge of Leipheim impossible. That of Reisensburg was more fortunate. General Labassée, having colonel Lacuée at his side, who commanded the 59th regiment, went with that regiment to the bank of the larger arm of the Danube. The Austrians had again destroyed one of the communications at this bridge, but not so completely as to prevent the French from repairing it and passing over. The 59th crossed the bridge and took Reisensburg and the environing heights, in despite of a force triple its own number. Its colonel, Lacuée, was killed there fighting at the head of his men. On seeing a French regiment throw itself alone beyond the Danube, the Austrian cavalry hastened to the aid of the infantry, and charged home on the 59th formed in a square. Three times did this cavalry rush up to the bayonets of the regiment, and three times was it arrested by a volley of musketry when close up. The 59th remained master of the field of battle, after efforts of which the memory well deserves to be preserved.

One of the three bridges being free, general Malher took his division over to Reisensburg entire, towards the close of the day. The Austrians were not then so solicitous to dispute Günzburg. They fell back upon Ulm the same night, leaving to the French a thousand prisoners and three hundred wounded.

Great honours were rendered to the remains of colonel Lacuée. The division of Ney's corps assembled at Günzburg attended his funeral on the 10th, and expressed their unanimous regret at his loss. Marshal Ney placed the division of general Dupont on the left bank of the river, and ordered the divisions of Malher and Loison to pass to the right, to keep up his communication with Lannes.

Napoleon had remained until the evening of the 9th at Donauwerth. He then left that place for Augsburg, because it was the centre of the information to be gathered, and the orders to be issued. At Augsburg he was between Ulm on one side, and Munich on the other; between the army of Suabia, which he was going to envelope, and that of the Russians, of whom a general rumour announced the approach. In keeping afar from Ulm for a day or two, he could concentrate the command there. From a motive of relationship, much more than from any ground of superiority, he placed marshals Ney and Lannes under the orders of Murat, which much displeased them, and brought about vexatious squabbles. These were embarrassments inseparable from the new régime established in France. The republic had its inconveniences, which are sanguinary rivalries; the monarchy had those of its own kind, which were to be found in family compliances. Murat had thus 60,000 men at his disposition, to keep general Mack in respectful bearing under the walls of Ulm.

Napoleon having arrived at Augsburg, found marshal Soult there with the fourth corps; marshal Davout being established at Aichbach; general Marmont following, and Bernadotte marching over the road to Munich. The French army was then very much in the same position it had been before when at Milan, after having so miraculously crossed over the St. Bernard; when, too, it was in the rear of Melas, endeavouring to entangle him, but ignorant of the route that he should take to meet him. The same uncertainty now reigned in regard to the designs of general Mack. Napoleon applied himself to discover what he might be tempted to do under his present pressing peril, and had the greater trouble to guess, because general Mack did not know himself. It is more difficult to guess what an irresolute adversary will do, than one who is resolute; and if the uncertainty should not lead you to loss the next day, it will serve in the evening of the day to deceive the enemy himself. In the doubt in which he found himself, Napoleon gave the most reasonable design to general Mack, that of flying by the Tyrol. This general, in fact, in directing himself towards Memmingen, on the left of the position of Ulm, had not more than two or three marches to make to gain the Tyrol by Kempten. He would thus unite himself to the army which guarded the chain of the Alps, and to that which occupied Italy. He would save himself, and go to make up a mass of 200,000 men; a mass always formidable, whatever post it might occupy in the general theatre of operations. He would escape in any case from such a catastrophe as was never before known in the annals of war.

Napoleon attributed this design to him, and had not thought of another plan that general Mack might have had, and that he did conceive for a moment; this plan was to fly by the left bank of the Danube, which was only guarded by one of the divisions of marshal Ney, that of Dupont. This act of despair was the less to be guessed at, because it required extraordinary audacity. He must cut across the route that the French had taken, a route still covered with their equipages and their depôts, to expose himself, perhaps, to encounter them in a body, which must be overcome in order to retire into Bohemia. Napoleon would not admit even the probability of this, and only considered how he might close the roads of the Tyrol. He ordered marshal Soult to ascend the Lech as far as Landsberg, then to go and occupy Memmingen, and intercept the route from Memmingen to Kempten. He replaced the corps of marshal Soult in Augsburg with that of general Marmont. He established, besides, in that city his own guard, which customarily followed the head quarters. There he attended to the different movements of the corps of his army, rectifying their march whenever he saw a necessity.

Bernadotte, pushing before him the rearguard of Kienmayer, entered Munich on the 12th of October in the morning, just a month after the invasion of the Austrians and the retreat of the Bavarians. He made a thousand prisoners from the detachment of the enemy which he drove before him. The Bavarians, in transports of joy, received the French with loud cheering. They had not been able to go quicker or more surely to the help of their allies, above all when they had been but some days before at the extremity of the continent, on the shores of the Channel. Napoleon wrote immediately to the elector, to prevail on him to re-enter his capital. He invited him to return with all the Bavarian army, which was utterly useless at Würtzburg, and which had been designed to occupy the line of the Inn conjointly with the corps of Bernadotte. Napoleon, however, recommended its employment in reconnoitring, because it was familiar with the country, and it would be able to give the best intelligence about the march of the Russians, who would come by the route of Vienna and Munich.

Marshal Soult, dispatched on the side of Landsberg, encountered nothing but the cuirassiers of prince Ferdinand, who were falling back on Ulm by forced marches. The ardour of the French troops was so great, that the 26th chasseurs did not dread to try their strength against the Austrian heavy cavalry, and took an entire squadron with two guns. This encounter proved that the Austrians, in place of flying to the Tyrol, had concentrated themselves behind the Iller, between Memmingen and Ulm, and that they would inevitably go there to find a new battle of Marengo. Napoleon disposed every thing to give it with the largest possible mass of his forces. He supposed that it might take place on the 13th or 14th of October. But not being pressed, as the Austrians would not begin, he preferred the 14th, in order to allow more time to unite his troops. At first he modified the position of marshal Davout, whom he moved from Aichach to Dachau, in such a way that this marshal, in an advantageous post between Augsburg and Munich, would be able, in two or three hours, either to march upon Munich to oppose, with Bernadotte and the Bavarians, 60,000 men to the Russians, or to carry himself towards Augsburg to second Napoleon in his operations against the army of general Mack. After having taken these precautions in his rear, Napoleon made the following dispositions in his front, in contemplation of the day of battle, supposed on the 14th. He ordered marshal Soult

to establish himself on the 13th at Memmingen, pressing this position with his left, and connecting himself by his right with the different corps which were to be carried upon the Iller. He sent his guard to Weissenhorn, where he intended to go himself. He hoped thus to assemble 100,000 men in the space of ten leagues between Memmingen and Ulm. The troops, in effect, would be able to make a march of five leagues, and to fight on the same day. It was easy for him to unite on the same field of battle the corps of Ney, Lannes, Murat, Marmont, Soult, and his guard. As it happened, destiny reserved for him a different triumph from that which he thus awaited—a new kind of triumph, and not less astonishing in its great consequences.

Napoleon left Augsburg at eleven o'clock at night on the 12th, in order to reach Weissenhorn. On the route he encountered the corps of Marmont, composed of French and Dutch, worn down with fatigue, burthened at the same time with their arms and their rations for several days. The weather, which had been fine as far as the passage of the Danube, had on a sudden become frightfully severe. There fell a thick snow, which when thawed changed into mud and made the roads impassable. All the small rivers which run into the Danube were overflown. The soldiers proceeded in the midst of real marshes, often annoyed in their way by convoys of artillery: still they did not murmur. Napoleon stopped on his way to harangue them, made them form a circle around him; laid open to them the situation of the enemy, the manœuvre by which he hoped to envelope them, and promised them a triumph as glorious as that of Marengo. The soldiers, delighted at what he said, proud to see the grand captain of the age explain to them his plans, at once gave themselves up to transports of the most lively enthusiasm, and replied by unanimous shouts of "Long live the emperor!" They went on their route impatient to take a part in the great battle. Those who had heard the words of the emperor, repeated them to those who had not been able to hear them, and all cried with joy that it was over with the Austrians, that they would be taken to the last man.

It was high time Napoleon returned to the Danube, because his orders, ill comprehended by Murat, had caused great mischief if the Austrians had been a little more enterprising.

While Lannes and Murat invested Ulm on the right bank of the Danube, Ney remained resting on both sides of the river, with two divisions on the right bank, and one only, that of general Dupont, on the left. In approaching Ulm in order to invest it, Ney had seen the error of such a situation. Enlightened by facts which he saw to be near, guided by his instinct in war, confirmed in his opinion by colonel Jomini, an officer of the staff-major of the highest merit, Ney had perceived the danger of leaving only one division on the left bank of the river. "Why," said he, "do not the Austrians seize the opportunity to escape by the left bank of the Danube, trampling under their feet all our baggage and artillery, which cannot certainly oppose to them any very great resistance?" Murat would not admit that it could be possible, resting his opinion upon the last letters received from the emperor, badly interpreted by himself, which, in the contemplation of some serious action on the Iller, ordered the concentration of all the troops there. Murat began to think that the division of Dupont on the left bank was too much, because that division would be out of the way of acting on the day of the battle. This difference of opinion originated a brisk altercation between Ney and Murat. Ney was hurt to be obliged to obey a commander whom he thought far beneath himself in military talent, if he was above him by his relationship with the imperial family. Murat, full of arrogance from his new rank, proud above all to be initiated in the confidence of Napoleon, made marshal Ney feel his official superiority, and finished by giving him peremptory orders. But for the interference of friends, these lieutenants of the emperor would have decided their dispute in a mode little conformable to their high stations. From this altercation the result was, that contradictory orders were sent to the division of Dupont, a situation of things very perilous for him. Happily, while they were disputing about the post which it was best for him to occupy, he escaped from the danger in which he had been placed by the error of Murat, through an ever-memorable combat.

General Mack, no longer able to doubt his misfortune, had made a change of front. In place of having his right at Ulm, he had his left there; and in place of his left at Memmingen he had placed his right there. Always supported on the Iller, he had his back to France, as if he had come from thence, while Napoleon showed his back to Austria, as if the place of his departure had been from there. This was the natural position of two generals, one of whom had turned the other. General Mack, after having called in the troops scattered in Suabia, as well as those which had returned back beaten from Wertingen and Günzburg, had left some detachments on the Iller from Memmingen to Ulm, and had assembled the greater part of his troops at Ulm itself, in the intrenched camp which overlooked that city.

The situation and form of that camp has been already described in this work. At this point the left bank of the Danube overlooks the right. This last bank presents to the view a marshy plain, slightly inclined towards the river. The left bank, on the contrary, presents a succession of heights standing terrace fashion, and washed at the base by the Danube, just as the terrace of St. Germain's is washed by the Seine. The Michelsberg is the principal of these elevations. There the Austrians were encamped to the number of 60,000 men, having at their feet the city of Ulm.

General Dupont, who had remained alone on the left bank, and who in pursuance of the orders of marshal Ney, was to approach Ulm on the 11th of October in the morning, had arrived in view of that place by the road from Albeck. This was at the very same moment that Murat and Ney were disputing together at Günzburg, and that Napoleon, gone to Augsburg, was employed in making his general arrangements. General Dupont having arrived at the village of Haslach, whence the Michelsberg is seen in all its extent, discovered there 60,000 Austrians in a very imposing array. His latest marches, executed in the midst of the

bad weather, had reduced his divisions to 6000 men. They had left him still the dragoons of Baraguay-d'Hilliers, which, during the march from the Rhine to the Danube, had been attached not to Murat but to marshal Ney's force. This was a great resource at such a time, being a reinforcement of 5000 men, which would have been of utility if they had not remained at Langenau, three leagues in the rear.

General Dupont, thus arrived in the presence of Michelsberg and of 60,000 men which occupied it, found himself there with only three regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and a few cannon. This officer, afterwards so unfortunate, was seized at the sight with a species of inspiration which would do honour to the greatest general. He judged that if he retreated he should reveal his weakness, and should soon be surrounded by 10,000 cavalry sent in his pursuit; that if, on the contrary, he showed some act of boldness, he might cheat the Austrians, persuade them he was the advanced guard of the French army, oblige them to move with circumspection, and thus have time to retire out of the unlucky situation in which he had placed himself.

In consequence, he immediately made his dispositions for action. On his left he had the little village of Haslach, surrounded by a small wood. He placed there the 32nd regiment, celebrated in Italy, and commanded at that time by colonel Darricau, the 1st hussars, and a part of his artillery. On his right, backed in the same way by a wood, he placed the 96th regiment of the line, commanded by colonel Barrois, the 9th light, commanded by colonel Meunier, and the 17th dragoons. A little in advance on his right was the village of Jungingen, surrounded also with some clumps of wood, and that he occupied with a detachment.

It was in this position that general Dupont received the Austrians, detached to the number of 25,000 under the archduke Ferdinand, to encounter 6000 French. General Dupont, under the present circumstances, still happily inspired, promptly saw that his divisions must be destroyed by the Austrian musketry alone, if he suffered them to deploy into line and extend their fire. Joining, therefore, the audacity of determined resolution to that of a vigorous execution, he ordered the two regiments on his right, the 96th and the 9th light, to charge with the bayonet. At the signal given by himself, those two brave regiments moved forwards; dashing with bayonets at the charge upon the first Austrian line, they overturned it, throwing it into complete disorder, and making 1500 prisoners, whom they sent to the left to be shut up in the village of Haslach. General Dupont, after this feat of arms, placed himself in position with his two regiments, and awaited immoveable the sequel of this singular contest. The Austrians would not hold themselves beaten, and came on with fresh troops. The French advanced a second time with the bayonet, repulsed the Austrians, and again made a number of prisoners. Tired of making useless attacks on the front, the Austrians directed their efforts against the French wings. They assailed the village of Haslach, which covered the left of Dupont's division, and which contained the prisoners. The 32nd regiment, whose turn was now come to resist, disputed the possession of the village with great spirit, while the 1st hussars rivalling the infantry, made vigorous charges upon the repulsed columns. The Austrians did not confine themselves to the attack on Haslach, they made an attempt on the opposite wing, and tried to carry the village of Jungingen, which lay on general Dupont's right. By favour of numbers, they penetrated into it, and for a moment made themselves its master. General Dupont, sensible of the danger, attacked it with the 96th and succeeded in taking it. The Austrians re-took it, and then he again made himself its master. The village was thus taken by main force five times successively, and in the confusion of their reiterated attacks, the French made prisoners every time. But while the Austrians wearied themselves by impotent efforts against this handful of men, their immense cavalry overflowing the field, attacked the 17th dragoons, charged it repeatedly, killed its colonel the brave Saint-Dizier, and obliged it to fall back into the wood behind. A cloud of Austrian cavalry also spread itself over the neighbouring plain, and went as far as the village of Albeck, where a part of the division of Dupont had been stationed, seizing upon the baggage that the dragoons of Baraguay-d'Hilliers should have defended, and thus obtaining some common-place trophies that were but a poor consolation for a defeat experienced by 25,000 men against 6000.

It became urgent to put an end to an engagement thus perilous. General Dupont, after having wearied the Austrians by five hours' sanguinary contest, took advantage of the night to retire upon Albeck. He marched there in good order, making 4000 prisoners precede him on the road.

If general Dupont in giving this extraordinary battle had not stopped the Austrians, they would have fled into Bohemia, and one of the finest combinations of Napoleon would have completely failed. This is a proof that great generals must also have good soldiers, because the most illustrious captains have often need that their soldiers should repair by their heroism, either the hazard of war, or the errors that genius itself may be liable to commit.

This encounter with a part of the French army caused some stormy debates at the Austrian head quarters. They had been informed there of the presence of marshal Soult at Landsberg; they could not suppose that general Dupont was alone at Albeck. They began to think they were every where encircled. General Mack, on whom the Austrians have wished to throw all the disgrace of the disaster, had fallen into a state of mind easy to conceive. Those who have judged the matter subsequently to the event, have said, that to save him, an inspiration from above could only have revealed to him the weakness of the corps which was before him, and the possibility of crushing it and retiring into Bohemia. This unfortunate man could not know that which he knew afterwards, and could little think that the French were so weak on the left bank. He deliberated with the august companion of his sad fate, the archduke Ferdinand. He lost in mental agitation the precious time, and knew not whether to resolve to fly into Bohemia, passing over the corps of general Dupont, or to fly to the Tyrol, forcing the passage of Mem-

mingen. The part which it appeared to him the safest to take, was to establish himself more solidly still in his position at Ulm, to concentrate his army, and await there in a strong mass, difficult to carry by assault, the arrival of the Russians by Munich, or of the archduke Charles by the Tyrol. He reasoned that general Kienmayer with 20,000 Austrians, and general Kutusof with 60,000 Russians, were about to make their appearance on the road to Munich; that the archduke John with the corps of the Tyrol, even the archduke Charles with the army of Italy, would not be wanting to fly to his aid by Kempten, and that then it would be Napoleon who would find himself in peril, because he would be pressed between 80,000 Austrians and Russians, arriving from Austria; 25,000 Austrians descending from the Tyrol, and 70,000 Austrians encamped at Ulm, which would make 175,000 men. But it was not possible that these different junctions could take place in spite of Napoleon placed in the centre, with 160,000 men accustomed to conquer. In any unfortunate state we cherish the least spark of hope, and general Mack believed up to that time the false reports which were made to him by spies sent by Napoleon. These spies told him that soon a disembarkation of the English would take place at Boulogne, and recall the French from the Rhine; and that the Russians and the archduke Charles would in a short time arrive upon the road to Munich.

In difficult situations, subordinates become bold and great talkers; they censure their superiors, and have opinions of their own. General Mack had around him subordinates, who were great nobles, and did not fear to speak aloud. These would fly into the Tyrol, those into Wurtemberg, others into Bohemia. The last, who reasoned upon a chance, and who were right by chance, relied upon the combat of Haslach to show that the road to Bohemia was open. The ordinary effect of contradiction on an agitated mind is still to enfeeble it, and to bring back half-party measures, always the most unfortunate of any. General Mack, to yield something to the opinions which he opposed, took two singular determinations, for one who had decided to remain in Ulm. He sent the division of Jellachich to Memmingen to reinforce that post, which general Spangen guarded with 5000 men, in the intention by this means to keep open his communication with the Tyrol. He also made general Riesc occupy the heights of Elchingen, with an entire division, in order to extend himself on the left bank, and to make a strong observation of the French communications.

To remain at Ulm in order to await help, and there to give in case of need a defensive battle, it was necessary to remain in a compact body, and not to send corps to the extremities of the line that he occupied, because it exposed them to be destroyed one after the other. However that might be, general Mack had the convent of Elchingen occupied by general Riesc, situated on the heights of the left bank, very near Haslach, where the combat had taken place on the 11th; at the foot of these heights, and beneath the convent, was a bridge, that Murat had occupied with a French detachment. The Austrians had before attempted to destroy it. The detachment of Murat, to cover itself on the approach of the troops of general Riesc, destroyed it by fire. Still the piers remained fixed in the stream, preserved by the water from destruction. In this state of things the French army was without any communication with the left bank, other than by the bridge of Günzburg, placed very far below Elchingen. The division of Dupont had retired to Langenau. Retreat was therefore still open to the Austrians. Fortunately they were ignorant of all this.

It was under these circumstances that Napoleon left Augsburg on the 12th of October, in the evening, coming to Ulm the next day. Scarcely arrived, he visited on horseback, in dreadful weather, all the posts that his lieutenants occupied. He found them much opposed one against the other, and holding very different opinions. Lannes, whose judgment in war was sure and penetrating, had agreed with marshal Ney, that in place of wishing to accept a battle on the Iller, the Austrians only considered how they should best fly into Bohemia by the left bank, crushing the division of general Dupont. If Napoleon had his doubts when absent, no more remained when he visited the place itself. Besides, in ordering the watching of the left bank, and in placing there the division of Dupont, he said that they ought not to have left that division without support, above all without assurance of the means to pass from one bank to the other, to succour him if he should be attacked. Thus the instructions of Napoleon had not been better comprehended than the situation itself. He gave complete justice to the judgment of Ney and Lannes against Murat, and commanded the immediate repair of the serious faults committed on the preceding days. He resolved to re-establish the communications of the right with the left bank of the river, by the nearest bridge to Ulm, that of Elchingen. They had now to descend to that of Günzburg, which belonged to the French, there to repass the Danube, and ascend to the division of Dupont with reinforcements as far as Ulm. But it was a movement sufficiently protracted to leave the Austrians time to escape. It was much better at day-break on the 14th to re-establish by main force the bridge of Elchingen, that was under their eyes, and to send over a sufficient force to the left bank, while general Dupont turning back, ascended from Langenau on Albeck and Ulm.

Napoleon issued his orders in consequence for the following day, the 14th. Marshal Soult had been sent to the extremity of the line of the Iller, towards Memmingen. General Marmont advanced intermediately on the Iller. Lannes, Murat, and Ney united under Ulm, now set themselves to occupy both sides of the Danube, in order to connect themselves with Dupont's division on the left bank. But for this object it was necessary to re-establish the bridge of Elchingen. To Ney was reserved the honour of executing this operation in the morning of the 14th, a decisive act, that would give the French possession of both banks of the river.

The intrepid marshal could not reconcile to himself some of the unbecoming words which had been addressed to him by Murat in the recent altercations which they had had together. Murat, pressed by too long reasoning upon the subject under discussion, had told him that he understood nothing of the plans they thus communicated to

him; that he was in the habit of not making his own until he was in front of the enemy. This was the haughty answer that a man of action might have given to a vain talker. The marshal on horseback on the morning of the 14th, in full uniform, adorned with his decorations, seized the arm of Murat, and shaking it forcibly before all the staff and the emperor himself, said to him in a proud tone, "Come, prince, come and form your plans with me in the face of the enemy." Then passing at a gallop towards the Danube, he went, under a shower of ball and grape shot, with the water up to the belly of his horse, to direct the perilous operation which he had been ordered to perform.

It was necessary to repair the bridge, of which there only remained standing the upright piers, without the cross timbers; then to pass over it, cross a small meadow which extended itself between the Danube and the foot of the heights; and carry the village and convent of Elchingen, which rose in the form of an amphitheatre, guarded by 20,000 men and a formidable artillery.

Marshal Ney, whom so many obstacles did not deter, ordered an aide-de-camp of general Loison, captain Coisel, and a sapper, to seize the first plank and to carry it to the piles of the bridge, in order to establish it, under the Austrian fire. The brave sapper had his leg carried away by the shot of the enemy, but his place was immediately filled up. A plank was first placed in the way of a joist, then a second and third. After having repaired the first space from pier to pier, they repaired another, and arrived to cover the last pier under a murderous fire of musketry, which the enemy's adroit tirailleurs directed from the other bank upon the workmen. Soon after, the voltigeurs of the 6th light, the grenadiers of the 39th, and a company of carabineers, without waiting until the bridge was entirely completed, passed to the other side of the Danube, dispersed the Austrians that guarded the left bank, and so cleared space enough for the division of Loison to come to their aid.

Marshal Ney then ordered over the 39th and 6th light to the other bank of the river, and commanded general Villatte to place himself at the head of the 39th, and to extend himself on the right in the meadow, in order to make the Austrians evacuate it, while he himself with the 6th light took the convent. The 39th, stopped while it traversed the bridge, by the French cavalry, which had pressed forward upon it in haste, did not all succeed in crossing. The 1st battalion alone was able to execute the order which it had received. It had to sustain the charges of the Austrian cavalry, and the attack of three of the enemy's battalions; and was even, after an obstinate resistance, driven back for a moment to the opening of the bridge. But being soon succoured by its second battalion, joined by the 69th and 76th of the line, it recovered the lost space, remained master of all the meadow to the right, and obliged the Austrians to regain the heights. During this time, Ney, at the head of the 6th light, mounted the tortuous streets of the village of Elchingen, under a plunging fire from the houses, which were filled with infantry. He carried the village, one house after the other, from the hands of the Austrians, together with the convent, which stands upon the summit of the elevation. Arrived at that spot, he had before him the undulating levels, partially covered with wood, on which the division of Dupont had fought on the 11th. Those levels extend as far as to the Michelsberg, above the town of Ulm itself. Ney wished to establish himself there, in order not to be overthrown into the Danube by an offensive return of the enemy. A large clump of wood extended to the edge of the height, joining the convent and village of Elchingen. Ney resolved to secure it as a support for his left. He desired, his left being well secured, to pivot upon that, and push his right in advance. He threw the 69th of the line into the wood, which it entered in despite of a warm discharge of musketry. While they contested on that side with great obstinacy, the rest of the Austrian corps formed in several squares of two or three thousand men each. Ney attacked them with dragoons, followed up by the infantry in column. The 18th dragoons executed on one of them so vigorous a charge, that it broke it, and constrained the men to throw down their arms. The other Austrians at the sight of this affair retired in great haste, first flying towards Haslach, and at last going and rallying upon the Michelsberg.

During these occurrences, general Dupont, who had returned from Langenau towards Albeck, had encountered the corps of Werneck, one of the two which had gone out of Ulm in the evening with the intention of reconnoitring on the left bank of the Danube, and to find a means of retreat for the Austrian army. On hearing the sound of cannon in his rear, general Werneck had retraced his route, and had returned towards the Michelsberg, by the road from Albeck to Ulm. He arrived at the same moment that the division of Dupont reached it on the French side, and that marshal Ney had carried the heights of Elchingen. A new contest now took place at this point between general Werneck, who wished to regain Ulm, and general Dupont, who, on the contrary, desired to prevent him. The 32nd and 9th light threw themselves upon the Austrian infantry in close column, and repulsed it, while the 90th received in a square the charges of their cavalry. The day ended in the midst of this medley: Marshal Ney having gloriously reconquered the left bank; and general Dupont having cut off the corps of Werneck on their return to Ulm. They had made 3000 prisoners, and taken many pieces of artillery. But what was of more worth still, the Austrians were definitively shut up in Ulm, and this time without any chance of saving themselves, even if the most lucky ideas inspired them at this their last moment.

While these events took place on the left bank, Lannes had approached Ulm on the right. General Marmont had advanced towards the Iller, and marshal Soult, extending his corps beyond the Austrian position, had possessed himself of Memmingen. They were still working upon the palisades of the town, when marshal Soult arrived there. He had rapidly invested it, and had obliged general Spangen to lay down his arms, with 5000 men, all his artillery, and a number of horses. General Jellachich, coming too late to succour Memmingen with his division, found himself in front of a corps of 30,000 men. He retired, not

upon Ulm, which he feared it was not in his power to regain, but upon Kempten and the Tyrol. Marshal Soult then took the road to Ochsenhausen, to complete, in every sense of the term, the investment of the place and of the entrenched camp of Ulm.

Such was the situation of things at the close of the day, on the 14th of October. After the departure of general Jellachich, and the different combats which had been fought, general Mack's force was reduced to 50,000 men. Again it would be necessary to deduct the corps of general Werneck, separated from him by the division of Dupont. The unhappy general, therefore, found himself in a very desperate situation. He had no safe part to take. His only resource was to throw himself, sword in hand, upon one of the points of the iron circle within which he had been enclosed, either to die or force his way out. To throw himself upon Ney and Dupont was the least disastrous chance. He would certainly have been beaten; because Lannes and Murat could now pass over by the bridge of Elchingen to the aid of Ney and Dupont, and it did not require a union of so great a force to conquer demoralized soldiers. Still the honour of his arms would have been saved; after a victory, the most valuable result that can be obtained. But general Mack persisted in his resolution of concentrating at Ulm, and there awaiting the aid of the Russians. He sustained violent attacks on the part of the prince Schwartzenberg and the archduke Ferdinand. The last, before all things, wished to escape the misfortune of being made a prisoner. General Mack showed the power given him by the emperor, which, in case of any dissension, gave to him the supreme authority. But this was only enough to render him responsible, not to make him obeyed. The archduke Ferdinand, by favour of his less dependent position, resolved to evade the orders of the general-in-chief. When the night came on, he made choice of that of the gates of Ulm, the least exposed to an encounter with the French, and sallied forth, with 6000 or 7000 cavalry and a body of infantry, in the design to join general Werneck, and fly by the upper Palatinate into Bohemia. By uniting himself with the detachment which followed him, and the corps of general Werneck, the archduke Ferdinand deprived general Mack of 20,000 men, and left in Ulm only 30,000, blockaded on all sides, and reduced to lay down their arms in the most ignominious manner.

It is falsely asserted that the departure of the prince proved the possibility of leaving Ulm. It is at the first glance an improbable thing that an army with its stores and artillery could make its escape like a simple detachment, for the most part composed of cavalry. But what occurred a few days after to the archduke Ferdinand, demonstrated that the army itself had met with its utter ruin in such a flight. The great fault was to separate. It was necessary to remain or to sally forth together; to remain and fight an obstinate battle at the head of 70,000 men; or to sally forth suddenly, throw itself, with 70,000 men, on one of the investing points, and either find there death or the success that fortune sometimes concedes to despair. But to divide, the one to fly with Jellachich towards the Tyrol, the other to escort a prince in his flight into Bohemia, the rest to sign a capitulation in Ulm, was, of all modes of conduct in such a case, the most deplorable. For the rest, experience teaches that in these situations, when the human soul is borne down, when it begins to descend, it falls so low that between all courses it takes the worst. It must be added to be just, that general Mack always afterwards defended himself against the charge of having desired this division of the Austrian forces and these separate retreats [1].

Napoleon passed the night of the 14th and 15th in the convent of Elchingen. On the 15th, in the morning, he resolved to terminate the matter, and ordered marshal Ney to take the heights of Michelsberg. These elevations, in advance of Ulm, when approached on the side of the left bank of the Danube, overlook that town, which is, as already said, situated at their foot, on the same bank of the river. Lannes had passed over with his corps by the bridge of Elchingen, and flanked the attack of Ney. He must first take the Frauenberg, a neighbouring eminence to that of the Michelsberg. Napoleon was upon the ground, Lannes being near him, observing on that side the positions that Ney had to take at the head of his regiments, and on the other throwing his glance at the town of Ulm lying at the bottom. Suddenly a masked battery belonging to the Austrians vomited forth grape shot upon the imperial groupe. Lannes seized at once the reins of Napoleon's horse, to withdraw him from the murderous fire. Napoleon, who had neither sought the fire nor avoided it, because he had only approached it as near as was necessary to judge of things with his own eyes, placed himself in such a manner as to see the action with less peril. Ney moved his columns, mounted to the entrenchments elevated on the Michelsberg, and carried them with the bayonet. Napoleon, fearing that the attack of Ney would be too prompt, wished to slacken it to give Lannes time to attack the Frauenberg, and thus to divide the attention of the enemy. "Glory is not to be divided," replied Ney to general Dumas, who

[1] The Austrians have never made known their operations in this first part of the campaign of 1805. There have, notwithstanding, been a good many statements published in Germany, which have been directed to bear down general Mack, and to exalt the archduke Ferdinand; to account, by the incapacity of one man, for the disaster of the Austrian army, and at the same time to diminish the glory of the French. These writings are partial and incorrect, and are for the most part founded upon circumstances in themselves false, of which even the impossibility is demonstrable. I have procured, with much trouble, one of the rare copies of the defence, presented by general Mack to the Council of War, before which he was compelled to appear. This defence, singular in form, and constrained in tone, above all in regard to the archduke Ferdinand, fuller of declamatory reflections than of facts, has nevertheless furnished me with the means to be precise upon the intentions of the Austrian general, and to rectify a great number of absurd suppositions. I believe, therefore, I have arrived at the truth in the present statement, or at least, as much as it is possible to hope in regard to events, which have not been stated in Austria in any publication, and which are nearly without living witnesses at the present time. The principal personages, in fact, are dead, and there has been in Germany a very natural motive, very excusable, for disguising the truth, that of saving the national self-love, by laying all upon the shoulders of one man.—*Author's Note.*

brought him the order to await the aid of Lannes, and he continued his advance, surmounted all obstacles, and arrived with his corps on the reverse of the heights above the town of Ulm itself. Lannes, on his side, took the Frauenberg, and, uniting, they descended together to approach the walls of the place. In the ardour which drew the columns of attack onward, the 17th light, under the orders of colonel Vedel of Suchet's division, scaled the bastion nearest the river, and established themselves there. But the Austrians, perceiving the adventurous situation of the regiment, attacked, repulsed it, and made some prisoners.

Napoleon suspended the contest, and put off to the following day the duty of summoning the place; then, if it resisted, he determined to take it by assault. That day general Dupont, who had remained front to front with the corps of Werneck from the evening before, had engaged with him anew to prevent his entering Ulm. Napoleon had sent Murat to see what was passing on that side, since he had the greatest trouble to discover, being ignorant of the sally on the part of the Austrian army. It soon became evident to him that several Austrian detachments had succeeded in escaping by one of the gates of Ulm, that which was least exposed to the view and reach of the French. He ordered Murat instantly, with the cavalry reserve, the division of Dupont, and the grenadiers of Oudinot, to follow to the last that portion of the enemy's army which had thus made its escape from the city.

The following day, the 16th of October, he commanded some shells to be thrown into Ulm; and, in the evening, gave orders to one of the officers of his staff, M. de Ségur, to proceed to general Mack, and summon him to lay down his arms. Obliged to go by night in very bad weather, M. de Ségur had the greatest trouble to penetrate into the town. He was brought with his eyes bandaged before general Mack, who, forcing himself to conceal his deep anxiety, still was not able to dissimulate his surprise and sorrow in learning the whole extent of his disaster. He had not known it entirely, because he was yet ignorant that he was surrounded by 100,000 French, and that 60,000 more occupied the line of the Inn; that the Russians, on the contrary, were very far away, and that the archduke Charles, retained upon the Adige by marshal Massena, could not arrive there. Each of these pieces of intelligence, which he would not at first believe, but which he was soon obliged to admit, on the reiterated and veracious assertion of M. de Ségur, rent his soul. After having remonstrated strongly against the proposition to capitulate, general Mack finished by admitting the idea on condition of waiting some days for the Russian succours. He was ready, he said, to wait eight days, and to surrender, if the Russians should not appear at Ulm. M. de Ségur had an order to grant five, or at the utmost six. In case of refusal, he was to threaten an assault, and the most rigorous treatment for the troops under his command.

The unfortunate general placed it on his honour, thenceforward lost, to obtain eight days in place of six. M. de Ségur then returned to carry the answer to the emperor. The parleyings continued; and finally Berthier introduced himself into the place, and agreed with general Mack upon the following conditions. If on the 25th of October before midnight an Austro-Russian corps capable to raise the blockade of the place did not appear, the Austrian army should lay down its arms, become prisoners of war, and be conducted to France. The Austrian officers might return home to Austria, on condition that they should no more serve against France. The horses, arms, ammunition, colours, all to become the property of the French army.

The treaty was made on the 19th of October; but it was dated the 17th, which had the appearance of giving general Mack the eight days he had required. This unfortunate man arrived at the emperor's head quarters, and being received with the respect due to his misfortune, repeatedly affirmed, that he was not culpable in regard to the disasters of his army, that it was established at Ulm by order of the Aulic council, and that since the investment, his forces had been divided, despite his declared will.

This was, as may be perceived, a new treaty of Alexandria, divested of the terrible effusion of blood at Marengo.

In the interim, Murat, at the head of Dupont's divisions, the grenadiers of Oudinot, and the reserve of cavalry, redeemed his recent fault by pursuing the Austrians with very extraordinary rapidity. He followed to the utmost general Werneck and prince Ferdinand, swearing that not a single man should escape him. Setting off in pursuit on the morning of the 16th of October, he gave battle in the evening to the rear guard of general Werneck, and took 2000 prisoners. The following day, the 17th, he marched upon Heidenheim, endeavouring to outflank the enemy by the rapid movement of his cavalry. General Werneck and the archduke Ferdinand then united made their retreat together. During the day the French passed Heidenheim, and arrived at Neresheim in the night, at the same time as the rear guard of the corps of Werneck. They threw it into disorder, and forced it to disperse in the woods. On the 18th, the day after, Murat followed the enemy on Nordlingen. The whole regiment of Stuart being there surrounded gave itself up prisoners. General Werneck seeing himself encompassed on all sides, and being no longer able to proceed with his harassed infantry, having neither the hope nor even the will to save himself, offered to capitulate. The offer was accepted, and the general with 8000 men laid down their arms. Three Austrian generals, carrying off a part of the cavalry, made their escape in despite of the capitulation. Murat sent them an officer, to recall them to the execution of their engagement. They would hear nothing, and went off to join prince Ferdinand. Murat promised himself to punish such a breach of faith by a more active pursuit on the morrow. In the night he took their great park, composed of five hundred carriages.

This route exhibited a spectacle of unexampled confusion. The Austrians, thrown upon the French communications, had taken a number of the equipages of the carriages, and a part of Napoleon's treasure. All they had thus taken for a moment was re-captured and their artillery besides, their equipages and their own treasure. The soldiers and persons employed by the two armies were seen flying in disorder without knowing where

they were going, ignorant who were the conquerors or the conquered. The peasants of the upper Palatinate ran after the fugitives, despoiled them, and cut the traces of the Austrian artillery, in order to carry off the horses for themselves. Murat continuing the pursuit, arrived on the 19th at Gunzenhausen, a frontier town of Prussia Anspach. A Prussian officer had the boldness to demand respect for the neutrality of the country, when the Austrian fugitives had obtained leave to traverse it. Murat, in place of replying, entered by main force into Gunzenhausen and followed the archduke beyond. On the following day, the 20th, he passed Nuremberg. The enemy, finding his strength worn out, finished by halting. A combat ensued between the cavalry on both sides. After a number of charges received and given, the squadrons of the archduke dispersed, the larger part laid down their arms. Some infantry which remained, surrendered themselves prisoners. Prince Ferdinand owed the advantage of saving his person to the devotion of a sub-officer, who gave him up his horse. He gained at last, with two or three thousand horse only, the road to Bohemia.

Murat did not believe himself bound to follow the pursuit further. He had marched three days without resting; making more than ten leagues a day: his troops were worn out with fatigue. Prolonged, too, beyond Nuremberg, the pursuit would have been carried beyond the circle of the operations of the army. Besides, all that remained to prince Ferdinand was not worth another day's march. In this memorable affair Murat took 12,000 prisoners, 120 pieces of cannon, 500 carriages, eleven stand of colours, 200 officers, seven generals, and the treasure of the Austrian army. He had done his part in this immortal campaign.

The plan of Napoleon was fully and completely realized. It was the 20th of October; and in twenty days, without giving battle, by a succession of marches and some secondary combats, an army of 80,000 men had been destroyed. There had only fled in safety general Kienmayer, with 12,000 men; general Jellachich, with 5000 or 6000; and prince Ferdinand, with 2000 or 3000 horse. There had been collected at Wertingen, Günzburg, Haslach, Munich, Elchingen, Memmingen, and the pursuit undertaken by Murat, about 30,000 prisoners[1]. There remained 30,000 that were in Ulm. These would make 60,000 men in all, which had been taken, with their artillery composed of 200 pieces of cannon, 4000 or 5000 horses very fit to remount the French cavalry, all the stores of the Austrian army, and eighty stand of colours.

The French army had several thousand men lamed in consequence of their forced marches, and reckoned about 2000 killed and wounded.

[1] Here is an approximative enumeration, more reduced than exaggerated of these prisoners.

Taken at Wertingen . .	2000
Günzburg . .	2000
Haslach . . .	4000
Munich . . .	1000
Elchingen . . .	3000
Munningen . .	5000
Murat's pursuit.	12 or 13,000
TOTAL .	29 or 30,000

Napoleon, secure in regard to the Russians, was not annoyed at remaining four or five days before Ulm, in order to give his soldiers time to rest; and, above all, to rejoin their colours; because the last operations had been so rapid, that a certain number of them had been left in the rear. "Our emperor," they said, "has found a new mode of making war; he no more makes it with our arms, but our legs."

Napoleon would not wait longer, and wished to gain the three or four days which remained to run, in virtue of the capitulation signed with general Mack. He made him come to him, and, by giving his feelings some consolation, received from him a new concession, which was the delivery up of the place on the 20th, provided Ney remained before Ulm until the 25th of October. General Mack believed he had fulfilled his latest duties by paralyzing a French corps up to the eighth day. In other respects, in the situation to which he was now reduced, all that was in his power was of little moment. He therefore consented to leave the place on the following day.

On the 20th of October, 1805—a day for ever worthy of remembrance—Napoleon, standing at the foot of Michelsberg, in front of Ulm, saw the Austrian army file before him. He occupied an elevated slope, having behind him his infantry ranged in a semi-circle on the turn of the heights, and opposite his cavalry formed in a right line. The Austrians filed between, depositing their arms at the entrance of this species of amphitheatre. A great bivouac fire had been made, near which Napoleon stood. General Mack was the first who appeared and gave up his sword, saying, in the accents of deep grief, "Here is the unfortunate Mack!" Napoleon received him and his officers with perfect courtesy, and made them stand on both sides of him. The Austrian soldiers, before arriving in his presence, threw down their arms with an indignation honourable to them, and were only turned from that feeling by the sentiment of curiosity which came upon them as they approached Napoleon. All seemed to devour with their eyes that terrible conqueror who, for six years, had submitted their colours to such painful insults.

Napoleon conversed with the Austrian officers, saying to them, loud enough to be heard and understood by all, "I know not wherefore we are thus engaged in war. I did not desire it; I only considered how to make war upon the English, when your master thought proper to give me the provocation. You see my army: I have in Germany 200,000 men. Your soldiers, prisoners, will see 200,000 others, who traverse France, to come to the support of the first. I have no need of them—you know it—to come here to conquer. Your master should consider about peace; otherwise the fall of the house of Lorraine may very soon happen. I do not court new territories upon the continent; they are ships, colonies, and commerce that I wish to possess; and this ambition is as profitable for you as myself."

These words, pronounced with some haughtiness, were only met by silence on the part of the officers, and regret to feel the reproof was merited. Napoleon afterwards conversed with the best known of the Austrian generals, and for five hours remained at this extraordinary spectacle. There

filed before him on this occasion 27,000 men; from 3000 to 4000 wounded remained in Ulm.

According to his usual custom, he addressed to the grand army, on the following day, a proclamation, couched in the following terms:

"From the imperial head-quarters of Elchingen, the 29th Vendémiaire, year XIV. (21st October, 1805.)"

"SOLDIERS OF THE GRAND ARMY,

"In fifteen days we have made a campaign. That which we proposed to ourselves we have fulfilled. We have chased the troops of the house of Austria out of Bavaria, and re-established our ally in the sovereignty of his states. That army which, possessing as much ostentation as imprudence, had come to place itself upon our frontiers, is annihilated. But what does that matter to England? Her end is attained—we are no longer at Boulogne!

"Of 100,000 men which composed that army, 60,000 are prisoners: they shall go to replace our conscripts in their rural labours. Two hundred pieces of cannon, ninety colours, all the generals, are in our power; and there have not escaped of that army 15,000 men. Soldiers, I had given you expectations of a great battle; but, thanks to the bad combinations of the enemy, I have obtained the same success without running any risk; and, what is without example in the history of nations, so great a result has not weakened us more than 1500 men.

"Soldiers, that success is due to your unlimited confidence in your emperor, to your patience in supporting the fatigues and privations of every kind, and to your unparalleled intrepidity.

"But we must not stop here: you are impatient to commence a second campaign. This Russian army, that the gold of England has brought from the extremity of the earth, we go to make experience the same fate.

"It is for this new conflict more especially to confer honour on the infantry. It is this which has to decide for the second time the question, which has already been decided in Switzerland and Holland—whether the French infantry is the second or first in Europe. No generals will be there against whom I can have any glory to acquire. All my care will be to obtain victory with the least possible effusion of your blood. My soldiers are my children."

The day after the reduction of Ulm, Napoleon departed for Augsburg, with the intention to arrive upon the Inn before the Russians; to march upon Vienna, as he had before resolved; to disconcert the four attacks which were directed against the empire, by the single march of the grand army on the capital of Austria.

Wherefore is it necessary, after this fortunate recital, to be obliged to recount immediately any which are painful! During the same days of October, 1805, for ever glorious for France, Providence inflicted upon our fleets a cruel compensation to balance the victories of our armies. History, on which is imposed the duty of retracing by turns the triumphs and reverses of nations, and to impart to posterity, curious in their regard, the emotions of joy or sorrow which were experienced in the times of the generation of which the existence is recounted—history is bound to submit, after the wonders of Ulm, a description of the horrible scene of destruction which occurred at the very same moment along the coast of Spain, in sight of Cape Trafalgar.

The unfortunate Villeneuve, in sailing from Ferrol, was agitated by the desire to direct his course towards the Channel, in order to conform himself to the grand views of Napoleon; but was driven back by an irresistible feeling towards Cadiz. The intelligence that Nelson had joined admirals Cornwallis and Calder, had struck him with a species of dread. True in some respects, because Nelson going to England had visited the fleet of Cornwallis before Brest, this news was false in that which was of most importance, since Nelson had not remained before Brest, but had made sail for Portsmouth. Admiral Calder had been sent alone towards Ferrol, and he had not appeared there until after the sailing of admiral Villeneuve. They had gone therefore vainly the one in search of the other, as often happens upon the vast surface of the ocean; and Villeneuve, if he had proceeded to Brest, would have found before that port, Cornwallis alone, entirely separated from Nelson and Calder. He thus missed the finest of opportunities, and lost it to France. Though still it is not possible to say what would have been the result of that extraordinary expedition, if Napoleon had found himself at the gates of London, whilst the armies of Austria would have been on the frontiers of the Rhine. The rapidity of his blows, ordinarily quick as the thunderbolt, would have solely decided, if forty days, from the 20th of August to the 20th of September, would have sufficed to subjugate England, and to give to France the two united sceptres of the sea and land.

On quitting Ferrol, Villeneuve had not ventured to say to general Lauriston that he was going towards Cadiz; but, once at sea, he no longer concealed the disquietude of which he was the victim, and which urged him to keep away from the Channel, and direct himself towards the extremity of the Peninsula. At the strong arguments of general Lauriston, who set himself to trace out to him all the greatness of the designs of which he was about to cause the miscarriage, he returned for a moment to the navigation towards the Channel, with his prow to the north-east; but the wind ahead, which blew from the north-east itself, prevented his pursuing that course, and he took definitively that of Cadiz, his mind tormented with a new cause of fear in running the risk of the anger of Napoleon. He appeared in view of Cadiz on the 20th of August. An English squadron of middling strength ordinarily blockaded that port. Arriving at the head of the combined squadrons, he could have taken the blockading force if he had suddenly presented himself there with his fleets united. But, ever pursued by the same fears, he sent forward an advanced guard to make sure that there was not before Cadiz a naval force capable of giving battle; he thus alarmed the English squadron, which had time to retire. Admiral Ganteaume in 1801, having missed the object of his expedition to Egypt, at least made a capture of the Swiftsure. Villeneuve had not the small consolation upon entering Cadiz, of bringing in two or three captured English vessels to make up for his useless cruise.

He naturally awaited a strong expression of Napoleon's anger, and passed some days in deep despair. He was not deceived. Napoleon, on receiving from his aide-de-camp, Lauriston, a detailed report of all that had taken place, regarding as an act of duplicity the language of that character held upon his sailing, and as a sort of treason the ignorance in which he had left Lallemand of the return of the fleet to Cadiz, which exposed this last officer to present himself alone before Brest, imputing above all to Villeneuve the failure of the greatest design he had ever conceived, characterized him, in presence of the minister Decrès, with the most violent expressions, and called him a coward and a traitor. The unfortunate Villeneuve was neither a coward nor a traitor. He was a good sailor and a good citizen, but too much discouraged by the state of the French navy, and the imperfections of the *materiel*. Frightened by the complete disorganization of the Spanish force, he saw nothing but certain defeat in any encounter with the enemy; and he was in perfect despair at bearing the character of a vanquished man, for which Napoleon necessarily destined him. He had not understood sufficiently, that what Napoleon wanted was not to conquer, but to be destroyed himself, provided the Channel were opened. But if he understood this terrible destination, he had not perhaps known how to resign himself to it. We shall see that he went to Cadiz to become the same sacrifice, and this without any result which could shed lustre upon his defeat.

Napoleon, amid the torrent of important affairs that bore him along, had soon lost sight of Villeneuve and his behaviour. Still, before he set out for the banks of the Danube, he took a parting view of his navy, and the employment he judged most suitable to give to it. He ordered the separation of the Brest fleet, and its division into several squadrons, conformable to the plan of M. Decrès, which consisted in avoiding great naval actions until the navy was perfectly formed, and in the mean while to undertake distant expeditions, composed of few vessels, difficult for the English to capture, and injurious to their commerce as well as advantageous for the instruction of the French navy. He wished besides to afford to the army of general St. Cyr, who occupied Tarentum, the support of the Cadiz squadron and the troops which it had embarked on board. He calculated that this fleet, consisting of forty vessels, and even of forty-six vessels after it had been joined to the squadron in Carthagena, would be predominant for some time in the Mediterranean, as that of Bruix had formerly been; take the weak English squadron which was stationed before Naples, and furnish to general St. Cyr the useful aid of four thousand soldiers that it had carried to sea with it before. He therefore ordered it to set sail from Cadiz, to enter the Mediterranean, join the Carthagena division, sail immediately afterwards to Tarentum, and in case either of the English squadrons should be found united before Cadiz, not to let them blockade it, but to go out if he was superior in number, because it was better to be beaten than dishonoured by pusillanimous conduct.

These resolutions, taken by Napoleon under the impression that he had proof of the timidity of Villeneuve, not sufficiently matured, and more than all not sufficiently contested by the minister Decrès, who did not venture to repeat that in which he feared he had already gone too far, were immediately transmitted to Cadiz. Admiral Decrès did not state to Villeneuve every thing that Napoleon had said; but he enumerated to him, retrenching the violent expressions, the reproaches for his conduct from the time of his sailing from Toulon to his return to Spain, and did not dissimulate to him that he had much to perform in order to regain the esteem of the emperor. Informing him of his new destination, he ordered him to set sail, and to touch successively at Carthagena, Naples, and Tarentum, to execute the instructions already detailed. Without ordering him to sail under all circumstances, he made him acquainted with the fact that the emperor wished that the French navy, when the English were inferior in force, should never refuse to fight. He stopped here, not venturing to declare to Villeneuve all the truth, nor to renew his arguments with the emperor to prevent a great naval battle, which had no longer the excuse of necessity. Thus all contributed their part in error towards a great disaster, Napoleon his anger, Decrès his concealments, and Villeneuve his despair.

Ready to set out for Strasburg, Napoleon gave a last order to M. Decrès relative to the naval operations.—"Your friend, Villeneuve," said he, "will probably be too cowardly to sail from Cadiz. Send admiral Rosily, who will take the command of the fleet, if he is not yet gone, and order admiral Villeneuve to come to Paris to give me an account of his conduct." M. Decrès had not the courage to announce to Villeneuve this new misfortune, which deprived him of every means of restoring himself, and contented himself with acquainting him of the departure of Rosily, without letting him know the motive [1]. He did not give Villeneuve the advice to set sail before the arrival of admiral Rosily at Cadiz, but he hoped this would be the case; and in his embarrassment, between an unfortunate friend, of whom he did not forget the faults, and the emperor, whose wishes he deemed imprudent, he was guilty of a too frequent mistake, in leaving things to themselves instead of taking the responsibility of their direction [2].

Villeneuve, on receiving the letters of M. Decrès, guessed all which had not been communicated to him, and was as unhappy as he could possibly be at the reproaches which he had incurred. That which most touched his feelings was the imputa-

[1] This is not very reconcileable with the fact, that the flag of admiral Rosily was in the battle of Trafalgar. "The French ship, Héros, 74, M. Poulain, returned to Cadiz, with her lower masts in, and admiral Rosily's flag on board," wrote admiral Collingwood, after the battle, when he could not have known the name of Rosily at that moment, in any other way than by having seen the flag, and asked to whom it belonged. Nothing is said of Rosily himself; but how could his flag be in the Héros? *Translator.*

[2] There has been a host of conjectures on the causes which brought about the sailing in a body of the fleet from Cadiz, and the battle of Trafalgar. There is no truth in any, save that which is here stated. This recital is borrowed from the authentic correspondence of Napoleon, and that of admirals Decrès and Villeneuve. There is not in that sad event any thing, or cause, beyond what may be seen here. *Author's Note.*

tion of cowardice, which he well knew he never merited, and which he believed he saw under the concealments of the minister himself, his protector and friend. He replied to M. Decrès: "The sailors of Paris and the departments will be very unworthy and very foolish if they throw stones at me. They have prepared for themselves the condemnation which, at a later time, will come upon them. Let them come on board the fleets, and see with what elements they would be forced to fight! For the rest, *if the French navy only wants boldness, as they pretend, the emperor will be soon satisfied; he will be able to reckon upon the most brilliant success.*"

These bitter words contained the prognostic of that which was soon to happen. Villeneuve made preparations for sailing again, disembarked the troops in order to refresh them, and the sick that they might be recovered. He gave all the assistance in his power to aid the means, very much impoverished in Spain, for refitting ships wanting repair after being long at sea, to procure at least three months' provision, and to reorganize the different portions of his fleet. Admiral Gravina, by his advice, got rid of his bad vessels, changing them for others that were in the arsenal of Cadiz. The whole month of September was devoted to these objects. The fleet gained much there as to improvement of the *materiel*; the personal part remained the same as before. The French crews had acquired some considerable experience during nearly eight months of navigation, and were full of ardour and devotedness. All the captains were excellent officers; but among those of inferior rank, too large a number were found who had been but recently engaged in commerce, not having the knowledge nor the spirit of the military navy. The instruction, above all, in the artillery had been too much neglected. The seamen were not then as able artillerists as they have become in later times, for which they are indebted more especially to the care now taken of that part of their instruction for the service. That which was wanted in the French navy, was a system of tactics appropriate to the new mode of fighting adopted by the English. In place of meeting in battle in two opposite lines as was formerly the case, advancing methodically, each keeping in his place, and taking for his adversary the vessel that was face to face in the opponent line, the English, after the plan of Rodney in the American war, and of Nelson in the revolutionary war, had adopted the custom of advancing boldly, without taking any other order than that which resulted from the speed of the vessels, throwing themselves upon the enemy, dividing him, detaching a portion, to place it between two fires, and not to fear intermingling at the risk of firing one upon the other. The experience and ability of their crews, and the confidence which they owed to success, always ensured them in these bold enterprizes the advantage over their adversaries, less agile, less confident, although possessed of as much bravery, often more. The English had, therefore, effected at sea a revolution somewhat resembling that of Napoleon on the land. Nelson, who had contributed greatly to this revolution, did not possess a superior universal mind, like Napoleon; he wanted it; he was limited in the knowledge of things foreign to his pursuit. But he had the genius of his profession; he was intelligent, resolute, and possessed in a very high degree the qualities demanded in offensive warfare, activity, audacity, and a rapid glance of vision.

Villeneuve, who, endowed with mind and courage, had not that firmness of soul which belongs to a commander-in-chief, knew perfectly in what the fault of the French manner of fighting consisted. He had written letters on the subject full of sound sense to M. Decrès, who was of his opinion, because all seamen partook in the same. But he believed it impossible to prepare new instructions under active service, and to render them so familiar to his captains, that they should be able to apply them in an encounter expected to be soon at hand. He had, however, opposed to the English in the battle of Ferrol, as will doubtless be remembered, an unexpected manœuvre, strongly approved by Napoleon and M. Decrès. Admiral Calder bore down in column on the rear of his line, in order to divide it, he had the art to elude the attack with great promptitude. But, once engaged in battle, he had not known how to manœuvre; he had left idle a part of his force; and when a movement in advance executed by all the line would have sufficed to retake the two Spanish vessels captured, he had not dared to command it. Villeneuve, however, exhibited real talent in this battle, according to the judgment of Napoleon, but not enough of decision for the knowledge he possessed. Afterwards he gave his captains no other instructions than to obey the signals which he made during action, if the state of the wind permitted manœuvring, and if it did not permit it, to do their best to get into the fire and find an adversary. "They are not to await," he said, "the signal of the admiral, who in the confusion of a naval battle, is not often able to hear, or see what is passing, or to give orders, or above all to make them be fulfilled. Each captain ought to hear nothing but the voice of honour, and betake himself to the post of the greatest danger. *Every captain is at his post if he is in the fire.*" Such were his instructions, and in other respects, admiral Bruix himself, so superior to Villeneuve, had addressed no others to the officers whom he commanded. If in all our great encounters at sea, every captain had followed these simple rules, dictated by honour as much as by experience, the English would have counted fewer triumphs, or would have paid more dearly for them.

That which more than all alarmed admiral Villeneuve was the state of the Spanish fleet: it was composed of fine and large vessels, one of them in particular, the Santissima Trinidada, of 140 guns, was the largest which had been built in Europe. But these vast warlike machines, which recalled the old éclat of the Spanish monarchy under Charles III., were like the Turkish ships, superb in their appearance, but useless in the moment of danger. The destitution of the Spanish arsenals did not allow them to refit their vessels as they should have done; and in regard to the crews, they exhibited desponding weakness. They had manned them with people of all sorts, collected without selection in the maritime towns of the peninsula, having had no instruction, no experience of the sea, and incapable, in all respects,

of contending with the old sailors of England, although the generous blood of Spain ran in their veins. The officers for the most part were no better than the men. Still among the number some, as admiral Gravina, vice-admiral Alava, and the captains Valdèz, Churruca, and Galiano, were worthy of the finest times of the Spanish navy.

Villeneuve, decided upon proving that he was not a coward, employed the month of September and the first days of October in forming some system, and establishing some order in the amalgamation of the two fleets. He formed two squadrons, one of battle and one of reserve. He himself took the command of the squadron for battle, composed of twenty-one vessels, and divided them into three divisions of seven vessels each. He had under his direct orders the centre division; admiral Dumanoir, whose flag was on board the Formidable, commanded the rear division; vice-admiral Alava, whose flag was in the Santa Anna, commanded that of the van. The squadron of reserve was composed of twelve vessels, in two divisions of six each. Admiral Gravina was the commander of this squadron, and had under him, to command the second division, rear-admiral Magon, on board the Algesiras. It was with this squadron of reserve, detached from the main body of the line of battle, and acting apart, that Villeneuve wished to ward off the unforeseen manœuvres of the enemy, if at the time the wind should permit him to manœuvre himself. In the contrary case, he must trust to the call of honour imposed upon all his captains to get into fire.

The combined squadron was composed therefore of thirty-three vessels of the line, five frigates, and two brigs. In his impatience to set sail, Villeneuve wished to gain advantage, on the 8th of October (16th Vendémiaire), of an east wind to come out of the road, because it is necessary, in order to come out of Cadiz, to have the wind north-east and south-west. Three of the Spanish vessels had just left the basin, and the crews had embarked there the evening before. These were the Santa Anna, Rayo, and San Justo. Fit or not to sail with the fleet, they were incapable of keeping their place in a line of battle. This was the remark made by the Spanish officers. Villeneuve, in order to cover his responsibility, wished to call a council of war. The braver officers, both naval and military, declared that they were ready to go wherever it was necessary to second the views of the emperor Napoleon; but that to present themselves immediately before the enemy, in the state of the greater part of the vessels, was a most hazardous imprudence; that the fleet on sailing from the road, having had scarcely time to manœuvre for a few hours, would encounter an English fleet of equal or superior force, and would infallibly be destroyed; that it was better to wait a more favourable occasion, such as a separation of the English fleet, from any cause, and until then terminate the organization of the vessels which had been the last to get ready.

Villeneuve sent this result of the deliberations to Paris, adding to this opinion his own, which was contrary to fighting any great battle in the present state of the two fleets. But he sent these useless documents as if to display his tranquil resignation; he added, that he had taken the resolution to sail with the first east wind that would allow him to get the fleet out of the roads.

He waited, therefore, impatiently for a propitious moment to quit Cadiz at any risk. He had, in fact, before him that redoubtable Nelson, whose image pursued him over every sea, and made him fail in the most important of commissions for fear of encountering him. Now he did not fear his presence, although that was more to be dreaded than ever, because his mind, racked by despair, wished for peril, almost for defeat, to prove that he had a reason for avoiding an encounter with the British fleet.

Nelson, after having touched for a moment the shores of England (which he was never to see again), had set sail for Cadiz. He took with him one of the fleets that the British admiralty, penetrating, after two years, the designs of Napoleon, had united in the Channel. He was naturally led to Cadiz by the rumour which had crossed the sea, of the return of Villeneuve to the extremity of the Peninsula.

Nelson had at his disposal about the same force as Villeneuve, or about thirty-three or thirty-four vessels, but all well experienced by long cruises, having over the combined fleets of France and Spain that superiority that blockading squadrons have over those that are blockaded. Not doubting, from his preparations, of which he was exactly informed by Spanish spies, of attacking Villeneuve upon his passage, he observed his movements with the utmost attention, and had addressed to the English officers, regarding the battle which he foresaw approaching, the instructions since so well-known and admired by all sailors.

He had laid down the manœuvre which he preferred, taking care to detail his motives. "To place ourselves in line," he said, "would lose too much time, because all the vessels would not behave themselves alike under sail, and then it would be necessary that a fleet should regulate its movements by those that sailed worst. We thus give the enemy, who wishes to avoid a battle, time to escape. But it is necessary to keep the French and Spanish fleets from escaping on the present occasion." Nelson supposed that Villeneuve had been joined by Lallemand, and perhaps by the division from Carthagena, which would have made a fleet of forty-six sail. He hoped himself to have forty, counting those of which the approaching arrival had been announced; and the more numerous his fleet should be he was the less willing to attempt to place it in line. He had therefore ordered it to form two columns, one immediately under his own command, the other under that of vice-admiral Collingwood, to bear briskly down upon the enemies' line, without observing any order but that of quickness of sailing, to cut the opponent's line in two places, in the centre and towards the rear; to engage immediately the portions so cut off, and to destroy them. "The part of the enemies' fleet which you leave out of attack," he added, judging from numerous experiences in late times, "will come up with difficulty to the aid of the portion attacked, and you will have beaten that before it can arrive." It was impossible to foresee with more sagacity and justness the consequences of such a manœuvre. Nel-

son had beforehand made the idea familiar to each of his lieutenants, and he expected every moment an opportunity to realize it. In order not to intimidate his adversary too much, he had taken the precaution not to hug Cadiz very closely. He watched the road with simple frigates; and as to himself, he cruised with his vessels in the broad mouth of the straits, tacking from east to west, far from the sight of the coast.

Informed of the true state of the force of Villeneuve, who had neither been joined by Salcedo nor Lallemand, Nelson did not fear to leave four vessels at Gibraltar, to give one to admiral Calder to go to England, he having been recalled, and to send another to Gibraltar to take in water. This circumstance, known at Cadiz, confirmed Villeneuve in the resolution to set sail. He had believed the English force more numerous, for he supposed it thirty-three or thirty-four vessels, and he was pleased to learn that they had not so many. He supposed them even fewer than they really were, that is, not more than twenty-three or twenty-four sail.

It was during these circumstances that the last dispatches arriving from Paris, announced the departure of admiral Rosily. Villeneuve was not at first much affected. The idea of serving honourably under a commander, his superior in age and grade, and to conduct himself at his side as an honest and valiant lieutenant, rather solaced a mind already weighed down by too great a responsibility. But admiral Rosily was already at Madrid. Not any dispatch from the minister had explained to Villeneuve the fate that was reserved for him under the new admiral. Villeneuve soon began to believe that he was deprived altogether of the command of the fleet, and that he would not have the consolation to retrieve himself by fighting even in a secondary rank in a manner to be distinguished. Pressed to preserve himself from this dishonour, and profiting by the instructions which authorized his setting sail, which had become even a duty, when the enemy's force should be inferior, he considered the advices last received as an authority to move. He immediately made the signal. On the 19th of October (27 Vendémiaire) a weak breeze from the south-east sprung up, and he sent rear-admiral Magon out of the road with a division. They gave chase to a vessel and some of the enemy's frigates, and that night anchored outside the road. The following day, the 20th of October (28 Vendémiaire), Villeneuve himself sailed with all his fleet. The winds, weak and variable, blew from the east. He turned his bow to the south, having ahead and a little on the larboard quarter the squadron of reserve under admiral Gravina. The combined fleet was, as has been said, thirty-three sail of the line, five frigates, and two brigs. The French vessels manœuvred well, but the Spanish badly, for the larger part.

Although they did not yet see the enemy, the movements of his frigates gave reason to believe he was not far away. One vessel, the Achille, terminated the suspense by discovering his fleet, but only saw and signalled eighteen sail. They flattered themselves that they should encounter the English with a very superior force. A gleam of hope beamed upon the soul of Villeneuve—it was the last that shone upon his life.

He gave orders in the evening that the fleet should be placed in order of battle according to its speed, forming the line on the vessel which should have most way under the wind, which meant that each vessel should be placed after its rate of sailing, not in its accustomed order, or should be in line with that which had most ceded to the wind. The breeze was variable. They had their heads to the south-east, in other words towards the entrance into the Straits. All the vessels of the fleet were cleared for action.

During the night there was no cessation to seeing or hearing the signals of the English frigates, that by lights and firing of cannon conveyed to Nelson the direction of the combined fleet. At break of day the wind was to the westward, always weak and variable, the sea rolling, the waves high, but not breaking, the sun brilliant; the enemy were seen formed in several groups, of which the numbers appeared, to some two, to others three. They bore down towards the French fleet, and were yet at the distance of five or six leagues. Instantly Villeneuve ordered the regular formation of the line, each vessel keeping the place which it had taken during the night, but closing as near as possible to its neighbour, and being on the starboard tack, by which disposition the wind was received upon the right; which was natural, when the wind was in the west to sail towards the south-east from Cadiz to the Straits. The line was badly formed. The waves ran high, the breeze was weak, and they manœuvred with difficulty; circumstances which made more to be regretted the inexperience of a part of the crews.

The squadron of reserve, composed of twelve vessels, sailed independently of the main body of the fleet. It had constantly kept above it in the direction of the wind, which was an advantage, because by dropping to leeward, it was always able to join the main body in taking the position which might be found most convenient, as for example, to place the enemy between two fires when he should be occupied in fighting. If the creation of a squadron of reserve had a useful motive, it was no doubt under the circumstances in which it was now placed. Admiral Gravina, whose mind was prompt and correct in the middle of action, made the signal to Villeneuve to be allowed to manœuvre in an independent manner. Villeneuve refused, on what ground it is difficult to comprehend. Perhaps he feared that the squadron of reserve was compromised by its advanced position, and he despaired of having power to go to its succour, seeing that he was placed to leeward. Yet this reason was not sufficient; because if he was not certain of being able to go to it, he was always sure of the power of bringing it down upon himself. In making it enter immediately into line he deprived himself without return of a moveable detachment very usefully placed for manœuvring. He lengthened his line too much without advantage, already too long when it consisted of twenty-one vessels, and this extended it to thirty-three. Nevertheless, he enjoined it upon admiral Gravina to come and join the principal line. The signals were visible to the whole fleet. Rear-admiral Magon, who was not less happily endowed than admiral Gravina, perceiving the signals on the masts of the two admirals, the demand and reply, exclaimed that it was a fault,

and expressed his chagrin in a manner to be comprehended by the whole of his officers.

About half-past eight, the intention of the enemy became more manifest. The different groups of the English fleet, less difficult to discern as they came nearer, appeared now to form only two. They revealed distinctly the plan of Nelson, to cut the French line into two parts. They came down with all their sails displayed, the wind aft, highly favoured in their design to throw themselves across the French line of sailing, since with the wind westerly they came down upon a long line formed from north to south, inclined a little to the east. The first column, placed to the north of the French line, consisted of twelve vessels commanded by Nelson, threatening the French rear. The second placed to the southward, fifteen vessels strong, commanded by admiral Collingwood, menaced the French centre. Villeneuve, from that instinctive feeling which always directs itself to secure the party in danger, wishing to proceed to the aid of his rear-guard, and to maintain at the same time his communication with Cadiz, which was astern of him to the northward, in case of defeat to have a refuge assured there, made the signal to tack all at once, each vessel by this means turning on itself; the line remained as it was before, long and straight, but ascending towards the north, in place of descending towards the south.

This movement could have had no other advantage than that of approaching more towards Cadiz. The French fleet ascending in a column northwards, in place of descending towards the south, might have been encountered in different points, but always could be encountered by the two columns of the enemy which had come to take them athwart ship. The independent position to windward, which had been a little before that of the squadron of reserve, was now more than ever to be regretted—a position that would have permitted it at that moment to manœuvre against one of the two groups of the English fleet. In the existing state of things, all that it was practicable to do was to keep the line close and regular, and as much as possible to recall to their posts the vessels, which having dropped to leeward, left void spaces between, through which the enemy might be able to pass.

But to replace in the line vessels that had fallen to leeward was not very easy, above all, in the state of the wind and with the inexperience of the crews. They could have dropped to leeward altogether, in order to form the line upon the vessels that had fallen before the wind; but that would have occasioned a general displacement, and perhaps have caused fresh irregularities, greater than those which they wished to correct. It was not thought advantageous to do this. The line therefore remained badly formed, the distance not being equal between all the vessels; several being to the right or astern of their proper posts. The variable breeze, having acted most upon the rear and on the centre had produced a little crowding together in those parts. Villeneuve had ordered the ships there to crowd all sail a-head, in order to give to the parts crowded the means of disengaging. He thus multiplied the signals, to bring each into his place; but with little success, in despite of the good will and obedience of all. The frigates ranged on the right and to leeward of the squadron, each at the height of its admiral's vessel, were a little too far to render other services than the repetition of signals.

Finally, towards eleven o'clock, the two hostile columns, advancing with the wind astern, and all sails set, came down upon the French fleet. They sailed according to their speed, with the sole precaution to place at their head their three-decked ships. They reckoned seven, and we only four. Unfortunately, the Spaniards were less capable of rendering their superiority useful. Thus, although the English had twenty-seven vessels and the French thirty-three, they possessed the same number of cannon, and on that account an equal force[1]. They had on their side the experience of the sea, the habit of conquering, a great commander, and even on that day the favour of fortune, since the advantage of the wind was on their side. The French wanted all the contributions to success; but they had one virtue which is sometimes able to charm destiny itself—the resolution to fight to the last of life.

The fleets arrived at cannon-shot distance. Villeneuve, through a precaution often ordered at sea, but very little used now, had commanded that they should not fire until the English were within a just range[2]. The English columns presented a great accumulation of vessels, and each shot would have caused them numerous casualties. However that may have been, about noon, the southern

[1] M. Thiers must have had the means at his disposal of knowing the truth. The number of guns was *not* equal in the two fleets, as he asserts. The French and Spaniards received the British in a crescent line, convexing to leeward, and their ships were intermingled in that line, without any regard to the difference of the two nations. First, as to guns, the combined fleets had, reckoning line of battle ships alone, 2564 guns; the English, 2168: difference 396! How is the veracity of the historian to be supported, under such errors? To recapitulate. The French and Spaniards had four ships of 100 guns and upwards, six of 80, and twenty-two of 74 guns. The English had three of 100 guns and upwards, four of 98, one of 80, sixteen of 74, and three of 64. This proves how exceedingly loose the observation is, that the English "*possessed the same number of cannon, and on that account an equal force.*"

In enumerating the fleet, M. Thiers makes other errors. He says the combined fleets were thirty-three sail of the line, five frigates, and two brigs. This is not very important, but that as accuracy is, according to M. Thiers, the duty of an historian, he should at least give the example, as far as the frailty of authorship will admit. Now we make out the combined tender force that day, to be, five French frigates of 40 guns each; viz. the Hermione, Hortense, Cornelie, Thames, and Rhin; the Ferrete 18, Argus 16, and Observateur 16. Then of the Spaniards, the Flora frigate 44, and the Mercurio 24. The English had the frigates Sirius 36, Naiad 36, Phœbe 36, Euryalus 36, Entreprenante cutter 10, and Pickle schooner 10. Here are 318 guns in the tenders, or aides-de-camp of the combined fleet, to 164 among the English! *Translator.*

[2] Villeneuve acted correctly: a random shot was fired now and then from the combined fleets, to ascertain the range as the headmost ships of the attack came down. The effect was severe enough in the English vessels. In Nelson's own ship, 100 men out of 141 killed and wounded on board, were struck before the Victory fired a gun—it was the same with the Royal Sovereign. The fire of the combined fleet was comparatively never effective afterwards. *Translator.*

column, commanded by admiral Collingwood, somewhat advanced before that of the north, commanded by Nelson, reached the middle of the French line, at the point where the Santa Anna, a Spanish vessel of three decks, was stationed. The French vessel the Fougueux, placed astern of the Santa Anna, quickly opened her fire upon the Royal Sovereign, the vessel at the head of the English column, having 120 guns[1], and carrying the flag of admiral Collingwood. All the French line, followed the example, and directed a heavy fire upon the enemy's squadron. The injury thus inflicted gave reason to regret that the firing had commenced so late. The Royal Sovereign continued her course, and endeavoured to penetrate between the Santa Anna and Fougueux, which were not close enough together, in order to pass between those vessels. The Fougueux carried all sail, in order to fill up the void space; but could not get forward in time. The Royal Sovereign, passing astern of the Santa Anna and ahead of the Fougueux, sent her larboard broadside into the Santa Anna, loaded with a double charge of ball and grape-shot, which, raking her whole length, produced great havoc in the Spanish vessel. She sent, at the same moment, her starboard broadside into the Fougueux, but without any great effect, while she herself received in return considerable injury. The other English vessels of this column, that had followed close after their admiral, fell upon the French line from the north to the south, endeavouring to break it, enter into the intervals, and place it between two fires, by proceeding themselves towards its extremity. They were fifteen in number, engaged against sixteen. If, therefore, each had fulfilled its duty, sixteen French and Spanish vessels ought to have held out against fifteen English, independently of any succour from the van of their line. But several vessels, badly managed, had already fallen out of their position. The Bahama, Montanez, and Argonauta, all Spanish, were on the right, or astern of the places which they should have occupied in the line of battle. The Argonaute, a French vessel, followed no better example. On the contrary, the Fougueux, Pluton, and Algesiras, engaged in the contest with wonderful vigour, and, by their energy, drew upon themselves the greater number of the enemy's vessels, in such a manner that each had several to fight at once. The Algesiras particularly, which bore the flag of admiral Magon, was singly engaged with the Tonnant, which it cannonaded with great fury, and made preparations to board. The Prince of Asturias, commanded by admiral Gravina, terminated the line of the combined fleet, and, surrounded by enemies, avenged the honour of the Spanish flag for the bad conduct of others of his compatriots.

There had been scarcely the lapse of half an hour from the commencement of the engagement, and already the smoke, which the expiring breeze no longer cleared away, completely enveloped both friends and foes. From amid this dense cloud there issued terrible and continuous thunders; and all around the fleets floated the wrecks of masts, and numbers of human bodies horribly mutilated.

The northern column, commanded by Nelson, arrived twenty or thirty minutes at the French line after that of Collingwood, about the centre, and across the Bucentaure. There were here seven vessels, ranged in the following order: the Santissima Trinidada, with the flag of admiral Cisneros, immediately after the Bucentaure with the flag of admiral Villeneuve, both in line, and so close that the bowsprit of the second touched the stern of the other; the Neptune, a French vessel, the San Leandro, a Spanish ship, both fallen to leeward, having left a double vacancy in the line; the Redoubtable, correct in its position and in the wake of the Bucentaure, but placed in regard to that ship at the distance of two vessels apart; finally, the San Justo and Indomptable, fallen to leeward, leaving two places again vacant between that group and the Santa Anna, which was the first of the group attacked by Collingwood. Of these seven vessels there were therefore in line only the Santissima Trinidada and the Bucentaure, that were close to each other, and the Redoubtable, having two places vacant ahead and two astern. Fortunately, not for the success of the battle, but for the honour of the French arms, there were men present whose courage was superior to every danger. It was against these three ships—the only ones that remained at their post of the seven—that the entire of Nelson's column bore upon, composed of twelve vessels, of which several were of three decks.

The Victory, which bore the flag of Nelson, was to be preceded by the Téméraire. The English officers, expecting to see the leading vessel bear the brunt of the attack, requested Nelson to permit the Téméraire to precede the Victory, in order not to expose a life so valuable as his own. "I am perfectly willing that the Téméraire shall lead," replied Nelson, "if she can." He spread every sail in the Victory, and thus continued at the head of his column. Scarcely had the Victory arrived within cannon shot, than the Santissima Trinidada, the Bucentaure, and Redoubtable, opened upon her a terrible cannonade. In a few minutes they shot away one of her top-masts, damaged her rigging, and killed and wounded fifty men. Nelson, who sought for the French admiral, discovered he had found him not in the great Spaniard, the Santissima Trinidada, but in the Bucentaure, a French vessel of eighty guns, and he endeavoured to turn that vessel by passing through the interval which separated it from the Redoubtable. But an intrepid officer, captain Lucas, commanded the Redoubtable: comprehending Nelson's intention by the direction of his vessel, he had spread all his sail to receive the least breath of wind, and had been fortunate enough to arrive in time, so that with his bowsprit he struck and broke the crownwork which ornamented the stern of the Bucentaure. Nelson found the space closed. He was not the man to retreat. He stood on, and not being able with his fire to separate the two vessels so firmly united, he suffered his ship to fall alongside of the Redoubtable. By the shock and a remnant of wind they were borne out of the line, and the way was opened anew astern of the Bucentaure. Several English vessels came in at once, in order to attack the Santissima Trinidada and Bucentaure. Others ascended along the French line, in which ten vessels remained without opponents; they fired

[1] Only 110. *Translator.*

several broadsides at them, and immediately attacked the French vessels in the centre, of which three opposed to them the most heroic resistance.

The ten French vessels in the rear became nearly useless, as Nelson had foreseen they would. Villeneuve hoisted at his foremast and mizen the signal that every captain was not at his post who was not in the fire. The frigates, according to regulations, repeated the signal, which was more visible on their masts than on those of the admiral, continually enveloped in a cloud of smoke; and according to the regulations they added to the signals the number of the vessels remaining out of fire, until those which were designated answered to the call of honour.

While they thus called into danger those whom the manœuvre of Nelson had kept aloof from it, an unexampled struggle was taking place in the centre. The Redoubtable had, besides the Victory on her larboard side, to contend with the Téméraire, which had placed itself a little astern on the starboard side, and to sustain against these two enemies a furious contest. Captain Lucas, after giving several broadsides from the larboard side of his vessel, which made a fearful ravage in the Victory, was obliged to cease firing with his lower deck guns, because at this part the convex sides of the vessel touched, and there was no more the means of running them out. He had sent his seamen thus disposable, into the shrouds and tops, to pour upon the deck of the Victory a heavy fire of grenades and musketry. In the meanwhile he directed his starboard batteries against the Téméraire at some little distance. To finish his combat with the Victory, he ordered her to be boarded, but his vessel had only two decks and the Victory had three. He had the height of a deck to ascend over, and a species of void distance to pass from one ship to the other where they receded, although they touched at the water line. Captain Lucas then ordered yards to be laid, to form a means of passage between his vessel and the Victory. During this time the fire of musketry continued from the masts and shrouds of the Redoubtable upon the deck of the Victory. Nelson, dressed in an old frock coat which he had worn in his days of battle, having at his side his flag-captain Hardy, was not willing to abandon his post for a moment. Already his secretary had been killed at his side, captain Hardy had had one of the buckles of his shoes torn away, and a bar shot had killed eight seamen at once. This great seaman, the just object of French hatred and admiration, impassive upon his quarter-deck, was observing this horrible scene, when a ball, fired from the top of the Redoubtable, struck him on the left shoulder and fixed itself in his loins. Dropping on his knees, he fell upon the deck, endeavouring to sustain himself on his one hand. In falling he said to his flag-captain, "Hardy, the French have done for me." "Not yet," replied captain Hardy. "Yes, I shall die," added Nelson. They carried him to the place where the wounded were taken, but he had nearly lost all sensibility; there only remained a few hours for him to live. Reviving at intervals, he inquired the state of the battle, and repeated advice, the profound foresight of which was soon fully proved. "Anchor," said he, "anchor the fleet at the close of the action."

His death produced a singular sensation on board the Victory [1]. The moment was favourable for boarding. Ignorant of what passed there, the brave Lucas at the head of a troop of chosen seamen was already mounted on the yards laid across the two vessels, when the Téméraire, never ceasing to second the Victory, fired a terrible broadside of grape, before which near 200 French fell killed or wounded. There fell nearly all of those who were ready to board. There no longer remained hands enough to persist in the attempt. They returned to the starboard batteries, and redoubled against the Téméraire an avenging fire, which dismasted and horribly cut her up. But as if it did not suffice to have two vessels of three decks to combat one of two, a new vessel joined to crush the Redoubtable. The English ship the Neptune, taking her athwart the stern, fired into her broadsides that soon reduced her to a most deplorable state. Two of the masts of the Redoubtable had fallen on the deck; a part of her artillery was dismounted; one of her sides nearly demolished seemed but one large port-hole, the helm was rendered useless, many shot holes between wind and water introduced torrents into the hold, all the commissioned officers were wounded, ten midshipmen out of eleven were killed. Of a crew of 640, there were 522 struck down, 300 being killed, and 222 wounded. In such a state as this, the heroic vessel could do no more in her defence. She struck her colours; but before she struck, she had avenged upon the person of Nelson the misfortunes of the French navy.

The Victory and Redoubtable, having been forced out of the line in falling on board each other, it was open to the enemies' vessels that endeavoured to overwhelm the Bucentaure and Santissima Trinidada. These two ships kept themselves strongly united one to the other, the bowsprit of the Bucentaure being entangled in the stern gallery of the Santissima Trinidada. Beyond both these was the Héros a-head, the nearest of the ten vessels in action, that had at first given them some aid, but after having sustained a heavy cannonade, she had fallen to leeward, and abandoned the Santissima Trinidada and the Bucentaure to their unhappy fate. The Bucentaure, at the commencement of the battle, had received several broadsides from the Victory, which raking her by the stern, had caused her much damage. Soon afterwards several English vessels replaced the Victory and surrounded her. Some placed themselves about the stern, the others doubling the line, placed themselves on her starboard side. She was thus fired upon astern and starboard by

[1] It need not be remarked how incorrect this statement is, to those who are familiar with the facts, from the details of numerous witnesses of the contest, who were in the Victory. Here the author errs exceedingly The battle was over when Nelson expired. No agitation was caused in the Victory, favourable to boarding. Engaged amidst a thick smoke, between decks, in the fury of the battle, the greater part of his crew did not even know Nelson was wounded, until the fire slackened, and the Redoubtable had struck. The English sailors at their guns, did not stop to cultivate the sensations at such a moment that were favourable to an enemy's boarders. *Translator.*

four vessels, of which two were of three decks. Villeneuve, as firm in the midst of the bullets as he was indecisive under the torments of his command, remained on the quarter-deck, hoping, that among so many French and Spanish vessels that surrounded him, some one would detach itself to succour its chief. He fought with extreme resolution, and not without some hope. Having no enemies on the larboard side, but several astern and to starboard, in consequence of an English movement made in passing within the line, he wished to change his position, in order to secure his stern as well as his starboard batteries, which were much injured, and to turn his larboard guns upon the enemy. But entangled by his bowsprit in the gallery of the Santissima Trinidada, he was unable to move. He ordered, by shouting to the Santissima Trinidada, that she should fall to leeward, to separate the two vessels; but she was unable to move, for being deprived of her masts, she was reduced to a state of complete immobility.

The Bucentaure, nailed to her station, was thus obliged to sustain a crushing fire, both astern and on her starboard side, without being able to use her larboard batteries. Still sustaining nobly the honour of the flag, she answered it by a fire as heavy as that which she endured. After an hour's engagement, the flag-captain, Magendie, was wounded, lieutenant Daudignon, who had replaced him, was wounded also, and in his turn replaced by lieutenant Fournier. The main and mizen masts soon fell upon the deck, and produced there a scene of fearful disorder. The flag was then hoisted on the foremast. Buried in a dense cloud of smoke, the admiral could no longer distinguish what was passing among the rest of the fleet. Perceiving, by favour of a momentary clearing of the smoke, that the vessels ahead remained immoveable, he ordered them, by hoisting signals on the mast that remained, to come about and carry themselves into fire. Enveloped anew in the murderous cloud of smoke and flame, which vomited destruction and death, he continued the combat, foreseeing that he must, in a few moments, abandon his own vessel to go and fulfil his duty in some other. Towards three o'clock his third mast fell, and the deck was now completely encumbered with wreck.

The Bucentaure, with her starboard side shattered, her stern demolished, her masts gone, was levelled like a raft. "My character in the Bucentaure is finished!" exclaimed the unfortunate Villeneuve; "I will go and try to invoke Fortune in another!" He then wished to get into a boat to reach the vanguard, in order to bring it himself into action. But the boats that were on board the Bucentaure had been crushed to pieces by the successive fall of the masts and rigging. Those which were at the bow had been riddled by bullets. They hailed the Santissima Trinidada with their voices, to request a means of embarking him—vain efforts. In the midst of such confusion, no human voice could be heard! The French admiral saw himself attached to the mere corpse of his ship, which was ready to sink, unable longer to issue a command, or to attempt anything to save the fleet confided to his trust. The Hortense frigate, which should have come to his aid, made no movement, either being prevented by the wind, or terrified at sight of so horrible a spectacle. Nothing remained to the admiral but to die, and more than once he felt that desire. His chief officer, M. de Prigny, was wounded by his side. Nearly the whole of his crew were killed or wounded. The Bucentaure, deprived of masts, riddled with balls, no longer able to work its batteries, which were dismounted and obstructed by the wreck of the rigging, had not even the cruel satisfaction to return one of the shots it received. It was a quarter past five o'clock; no succour arrived, and the admiral was obliged to strike his flag. An English boat came for him, to conduct him on board the Mars. He was received there with all the respect due to his rank, his misfortunes, and his bravery—a feeble reparation for so much misery! He had at last found that disaster which at times he feared to encounter in the West Indies, and at others in the Channel. He met it at Cadiz, on the spot where he expected to avoid it; and he succumbed under it without the consolation of perishing in the accomplishment of a great design.

During the action, the Santissima Trinidada, surrounded by enemies, was taken. Thus of seven vessels attacked by Nelson's column, three, the Redoubtable, Bucentaure, and Santissima Trinidada, had been crippled without being succoured by the four others, the Neptune, San Leandro, San Justo, and the Indomptable. These last, fallen to leeward at the commencement of the action, had not been able to return into it. They had no other means to be useful than to descend in the line, under the feeble breeze which continued to blow from the west, and to go into action with the sixteen vessels attacked by admiral Collingwood. One alone, the Neptune, commanded by a good officer, captain Maistral, executed this movement, keeping himself always in the place of danger. He sent successive broadsides into the Victory and the Royal Sovereign, and attempted to carry some aid to the rear-guard, engaged with Collingwood's column The three others, the San Leandro, the San Justo, and Indomptable, suffered themselves to be carried by the expiring breezes far from the place of battle.

Still there remained the ten vessels in the van of the line, that, having exchanged some shots with the column of Nelson, remained without opponents. The signal which called them to the post of honour, had found them either already to leeward, or nearly reduced to immobility by the weakness of the breeze. The Héros, placed nearest the centre, after having sustained, as has been shown, her two neighbours, the Bucentaure and Santissima Trinidada, was carried to the leeward by the light wind which yet prevailed, and unfortunately gave her no impulsion, except to carry her afar from the battle. Blood at least had flown on the deck of that vessel; but her valiant captain, Poulain, killed at the commencement, had taken with him the spirit that animated him. The San Augustino, placed above the Héros, having lost her post early, was pursued and taken by the English who had captured the Bucentaure. The San Francisco fared no better. In proceeding with this vanguard, there came successively the Mont-Blanc, Duguay-Trouin, Formidable, Rayo, Intrepid, Scipion, and Neptune. Rear-admiral

Dumanoir had repeated the signal to go about in order to bear down to the centre. The greater number remained motionless, for want of knowing how to manœuvre, the lack of will, or of power. At least there were only four that obeyed the signal of the chief of the division, and by the help of their boats, turned their heads to wear. These were the Mont-Blanc, Scipion, Duguay-Trouin, and Formidable. Rear-admiral Dumanoir had ordered a good manœuvre to be performed. This was, in place of going about with the wind astern, which would carry them within the line, to go about with the wind a-head, which would, on the contrary, carry them without it, and give them the means, by only dropping to leeward, of joining in the fray where they might judge it most useful.

Rear-admiral Dumanoir, in the Formidable that bore his flag, and that had acquired so much glory at Algesiras, with the Scipion, Duguay-Trouin, and Mont Blanc, set sail, therefore, descending from north to south, along the line of battle. He was able, at the point to which he should be carried, to place the English between two fires. But it was then late; three o'clock at least. He perceived every where the disaster consummated, and without the resolution to bury himself in the misfortune common to the French fleet, he found good reasons not to enter irrecoverably into the battle. Arrived opposite the centre, he saw the Bucentaure a prize to the foe, the Santissima Trinidada captured, the Redoubtable taken a good while before, and the English, although roughly handled themselves, pursuing the vessels which had fallen to leeward. During his passage he received a heavy fire, which damaged his four vessels and weakened their means of engaging. Hotly received by the victorious column of Nelson, and seeing no friend whom he could aid, he continued his course and arrived at the rear, where the sixteen Spanish and French vessels were engaged with the column of Collingwood. There, by devoting himself to the object, he could have saved several vessels, or added a glorious death to those which were to console the French under their great defeat. Discouraged by the fire which had damaged his division, consulting prudence before despair, he did nothing [1]. Treated by fortune as Villeneuve had been, he was soon, from his desire to avoid a glorious disaster, to encounter elsewhere one that was utterly useless.

At this extremity of the line, which had been first engaged with the column of Collingwood, all the French vessels, one alone excepted, the Argonaute, fought with a courage worthy of imperishable renown; and in regard to the Spanish vessels, two, the Santa Anna and Prince de Asturias, seconded bravely this conduct of their friends.

After a contest of two hours, the Santa Anna, which was the first of the rear-guard, having lost all her masts, and rendered to the Royal Sovereign almost as much injury as she had received, struck her colours. Vice-admiral Alava, seriously wounded, conducted himself nobly. The Fougueux, the vessel nearest to the Santa Anna, after having made great efforts to succour that ship by hindering the Royal Sovereign from forcing the line, had been abandoned by the Monarca, the vessel astern of her. Then being turned and assailed by two English vessels, the Fougueux had disabled both the one and the other. Engaged broadside to broadside with the Téméraire, she had to repulse several attempts at being boarded, and of 700 men had lost above 400. Captain Baudouin, who commanded her, having been killed, lieutenant Bazin immediately replaced him, and resisted as valiantly as his predecessor the assaults of the English, who still returned to the charge and carried the forecastle. The brave Bazin, wounded and covered with blood, having but a few men left around him, and reduced to the possession of his quarter-deck alone, then saw himself compelled to surrender the Fougueux, after the most glorious resistance.

Astern of the Fougueux, in the place abandoned by the Monarca, was the French vessel, the Pluton, commanded by captain Cosmao, and managed with as much boldness as dexterity. He had hastened to fill up the place the Monarca had vacated; stopped short an enemy's vessel, the Mars, which had endeavoured to pass through; riddled her with his cannon, and was about to take her by boarding, when a vessel with three decks came and was about to rake him in turn. He escaped with adroitness from this new adversary, and showing his ship's broadside in place of the stern, having avoided the enemy's fire, gave him several murderous broadsides. Returning to his first enemy, and knowing how to get the advantage of the wind, he succeeded in raking him, in carrying away two of his masts, and in placing him *hors de combat*. Disembarrassed of his two assailants, the Pluton endeavoured to go to the succour of the French ships that were overborne by numbers, thanks to the retreat of the vessels unfaithful to their duty.

Abaft the Pluton the Algesiras, having the flag of rear-admiral Magon, fought in a manner worthy of that exhibited by the Redoubtable, and fully as sanguinary. Rear-admiral Magon, born in the Isle of France, of a St. Malo family, was yet young, and as handsome as he was brave. At the commencement of the action he had assembled his crew, and promised to give to the seaman who first boarded an enemy a superb belt, which had been presented to him by the Philippine company. All wished to receive from his hands such a recompense. Behaving himself as the commanders of the Redoubtable, Fougueux, and Pluton had done, rear-admiral Magon took the Algesiras at first in advance, in order to close the passage to the English, who attempted to cut through the line. In this movement he encountered the Tonnant of eighty guns, formerly a French vessel, but taken by the English at the battle of Aboukir, commanded by an officer of bravery, captain Tyler. He approached very near, and gave him his broadside, then coming about, ran his bowsprit deep into the enemy's shrouds [1]. The shrouds, as it is

[1] To the everlasting disgrace of admiral Dumanoir, while his countrymen fought with a gallantry the more heroic, because it was felt to be hopeless, and the slaughter in their ships was horrible, he had the barbarity to fire into friends and foes alike, as he passed down towards the rear—upon the Santissima Trinidada, and other unoffending prizes in particular that lay helpless, incapable of opposition, or of fighting, by which numbers on board were killed even of the wounded among his own friends. *Translator.*

[1] Rear-admiral Magon did a wild thing, to run stem on with a seventy-four to the broadside of an eighty gun ship,

well known, are the rope ladders, which, attaching the masts to the body of the vessel, serve to ascend the rigging and stiffen the masts. Thus attached to his adversary, Magon assembled the most active of his seamen in order to board. But there happened to them the same thing precisely which had occurred to the crew of the Redoubtable. Already assembled upon the deck and bowsprit, they were about to leap upon the Tonnant, when they received from another English vessel placed athwart them several discharges of grape shot, which struck down a great number. It was necessary therefore before considering of boarding, to repulse this new enemy which had fallen upon them, and a third which had joined itself to the two former to cannonade the sides of the Algesiras, already much shattered. While they were thus defending themselves against three vessels, Magon was boarded by captain Tyler, who in return felt inclined to make his appearance on the deck of the Algesiras. Magon received him at the head of his crew with a boarding axe in his hand, and giving the example to his men, he repulsed the English. Three times they came to the charge, and three times they were driven from the deck of the Algesiras. Magon's flag captain, Letourneur, was killed at his side; lieutenant Plassan, who took the command, was also immediately wounded. Magon, whose brilliant uniform pointed him out to the enemy, received a ball in the arm, by which he lost a great quantity of blood. He took no notice of this wound, and still continued at his post. But a second shot struck him in the thigh. His strength now began to fail him. As he supported himself with pain on the deck of his vessel, covered with bodies and wreck, the officer who, after the death of all the others, was become flag captain, M. de la Bretonnière, requested him to descend for a moment to the surgeon, in order at least to have his wounds dressed, that he might not lose his strength by bleeding. The hope of being able to return to the combat made Magon listen to the request of M. de la Bretonnière. He accordingly descended between decks supported by two seamen. But the torn sides of his vessel gave a free passage to the shot. He received a grape-shot in the breast and fell dead, under his third wound. The news spread consternation through the vessel. His crew would have fought with added fury to avenge a commander who had as much of their love as admiration: but the three masts of the Algesiras had fallen, and her batteries were dismounted or obstructed by their wreck. Of 641 men, 150 were killed, and 180 wounded. The crew, crowded upon the quarter-deck, possessed no more than a part of the vessel. They were without hope or resource; they made one more discharge upon the enemy, and struck the flag of the rear-admiral thus gallantly defended.

Other vessels still carried on the contest astern of the Algesiras, although the battle was far advanced. The Bahama was at a distance, but the Aigle fought with bravery, and did not yield until after dreadful loss and the death of her commander, captain Gourrège. The Swiftsure, that the enemy wished to re-conquer, because it had once been English, bore itself as bravely, and only yielded to numbers, having already seven feet of water in the hold. Behind the Swiftsure, the French vessel, the Argonaute, after having received damage, withdrew from the contest. The Berwick combated honourably in her place. The Spanish vessels, the Montanez, the Argonauta, the San Nepomuceno, and the San Ildefonso, had abandoned the place of combat [1]. On the contrary, admiral Gravina, with his flag in the Prince of Asturias, enveloped by the English vessels, that had doubled the extremity of the line, defended himself against them alone with astonishing courage. Encompassed on all sides, and crippled, he still remained firm, and had succumbed if he had not been aided by the Neptune, which had before endeavoured to regain the wind in order to render herself of service, and by the Pluton, which having succeeded in disembarrassing herself from her enemies, had come to meet fresh dangers. Unhappily, in this part of the combat, Gravina received a mortal wound [2].

Finally, at the extreme of this long line, marked by flames, by floating wrecks of vessels, and by thousands of mutilated corpses, a closing scene suddenly appeared, striking the combatants with horror, and with admiration even the enemy himself. The Achille, assaulted on all sides, defended itself with obstinacy. In the midst of the cannonade a fire broke out in the hull of the vessel. It was necessary to abandon the guns to attend to the dangerous invader which extended itself with frightful rapidity. But the sailors of the Achille, fearing that during the time they were occupied in endeavouring to extinguish the flames, the enemy would profit by the inaction of their artillery to get the advantage, preferred suffering themselves to become victims to the fury of the flames rather than abandon their guns. Soon thick volumes of smoke arising from the body of the ship alarmed the English, and made them withdraw from near the volcano which threatened momentarily to explode and engulph alike the assailants and defenders. They left the vessel alone, isolated in the midst of the deep, and only looked on at the object which a few moments sooner or later would be exterminated by a horrible catastrophe. The French crew, already decimated by the grape shot, seeing themselves free of their enemies, set about endeavouring to extinguish the flames which were consuming their vessel. But there was no longer time; it was necessary to think of saving their own lives. They threw overboard every thing that could support them in the water, barrels, masts, and yards, endeavouring upon these to find a floating refuge against the explosion expected every instant. Scarcely had some of the crew thrown themselves into the sea, than the fire reached the powder, the Achille blew up with a frightful explosion, which terrified the victors themselves. The English hastened with their boats to gather up the

not disabled, for the purpose of boarding over the bowsprit. M. Thiers is ill informed on naval affairs. *Translator.*

[1] On the contrary, some of these vessels fought well; the Argonauta and Bahama, had each of them 400 men killed and wounded; the San Juan Nepomuceno fought with the utmost gallantry; her captain, and 350 of her men, were killed and wounded; these are facts beyond contradiction. *Translator.*

[2] He was wounded in the arm only. *Translator.*

unfortunate men who had so nobly defended themselves. A small number only succeeded in escaping death [1]. The larger part remaining on board were blown into the air, together with the wounded that encumbered the vessel.

It was now five o'clock, and the battle had nearly terminated every where. The line, divided at first in two places, and soon in three or four by the absence of the vessels which had not kept the order of battle, was shattered from one extremity to the other. At the sight of the fleet either destroyed or flying, admiral Gravina, disengaged by the Neptune and Pluton, and become commander-in-chief, gave the signal of retreat. Besides the two French vessels which came to Gravina's aid, and his own ship the Prince of Asturias, he was able to rally around him eight more, three French, the Héros, Indomptable, and Argonaute, and five Spaniards, the Rayo [2], San Francisco de Asis, San Justo, Montanez, and Leandro. These last, it must be stated, had preserved their existence better than their honour. There were eleven thus escaped from the disaster, independently of four under rear-admiral Dumanoir, which made a separate retreat, in all fifteen. There must be added to these a number of frigates, that placed to leeward had not done all that might have been expected of them to succour the fleet. Seventeen French and Spanish vessels remained in possession of the English; one had blown up. The combined squadron had lost 6000 or 7000 men killed, wounded, drowned, or prisoners. Never had a greater scene of horror been seen upon the ocean.

The English had obtained a complete victory, but a sanguinary one dearly bought. Of twenty-seven vessels which composed their fleet, nearly all had lost masts; some were rendered unserviceable, either for ever, or until they had undergone considerable repair. They had to regret the loss of about 3000 men, a great number of their officers, and the illustrious Nelson, more regretted by them than a whole army [3]. They towed after them seventeen vessels, nearly all dismasted or ready to founder and an admiral prisoner. They had the glory of ability, and of experience, united with incontestable bravery. The French had the glory of an heroic defeat, without equal perhaps in history for the devoted courage of the vanquished.

At the close of day Gravina sailed towards Cadiz with eleven vessels and five frigates. Rear-admiral Dumanoir, fearing to meet the enemy between himself and the French, directed his course towards the straits.

Admiral Collingwood showed symptoms of deep sorrow for the loss of his superior; but he did not believe it his duty to follow the counsel of his dying chief, and resolved, in place of mooring his squadron, to pass the night under sail. The coast was in sight, and, on the left, the Cape of Trafalgar, which gave its name to the battle. A dangerous wind began to blow, the night to darken in, and the English vessels, manœuvring with difficulty in consequence of their damages, were obliged to tow or escort seventeen captured ships. Very soon the wind blew with greater violence, and to the horrors of a sanguinary battle succeeded those of a frightful tempest, as if Heaven had wished to punish the two most civilized nations of the globe, the most worthy to rule it usefully if united, for the fury to which they had mutually given themselves up. Admiral Gravina and his eleven vessels had, in the harbour of Cadiz, a near and assured retreat for safety. But, too far from Gibraltar, admiral Collingwood had only the expanse of the ocean to repose upon, after the fatigues and sufferings of victory. For a short time the night, more cruel than the day, mingled together victors and vanquished, and made them both tremble under a hand more powerful than that of the most vic-

[1] About 160 were saved by the English boats. *Translator.*

[2] Afterwards taken, but wrecked. *Translator.*

[3] It is sufficient to exhibit the inaccuracy of M. Thiers, to quote his statement of the losses of the combined fleet. They were much more than double his statement in killed, wounded, and drowned. His own statements indirectly contradict the total he gives. The French seventy-fours carry 700 men; eighties 800; ships of one hundred guns 1000 men. Now, of seventy-fours, there were four taken to Gibraltar, making 2800 men. The Fougueux wrecked, Achille blown up, Intrépide and Augustino burned, 2800 more. Redoubtable sunk, 700. Santissima Trinidada sunk, 1000. Indomptable, Bucentaure, wrecked, and Argonauta sunk, all of eighty guns, 2400 men. Total, 7700. The Algesiras lost in the action, according to M. Thiers, killed and wounded, 230. The Santa Anna had nearly 400 men killed and wounded, say but 350. The Prince of Asturias lost, above 250. The Monarca was lost, with all on board, 700 more. The Francisco, Neptuno, Berwick, and Aigle, of seventy-four guns, were all lost, with nearly all their crews; but place the men saved at one-third, the number lost would be 1900. The Rayo, one hundred guns, was also lost, and only a part of her crew saved; the number is not known, probably several hundreds more, but taking the above number, it is 11,290, exclusive of the Rayo.

To the above wrecks and losses in battle, the Pluton, 74, M. Cosmao (stated by M. Thiers to have lost half her crew), must be added her killed and wounded, those of the Montanez, Justo, Leandro (the two last were dismasted), the Neptune, and Héros, whose losses, at the rate of the others, must have been some hundreds in addition. Then there were 4000 soldiers on board, besides the crews, commanded by general Contamin, whose loss is not known, but the whole, as set down by the English, at above 14,000, must have been under the mark. Admiral Collingwood returned the Spanish prisoners to the marquis of Solano, governor-general of Andalusia; they alone were 3000 men.

To the above may be added, a few days afterwards, the losses of the Formidable, 80, Mont Blanc, Scipion, and Duguay Trouin, of 74 guns, that escaped, making 2900 more of this combined fleet, in all twenty-three sail, and nearly 17,000 men, with five admirals, killed or prisoners, and one general!

Again, M. Thiers states the English loss to have been 3000 men. It is well known that there can be no falsification of returns of this nature on board an English ship, from the unavoidable publicity of the fraud that would follow. The total loss of the English in the action, was 1637 killed and wounded. Nor was the loss of officers at all more than usual, except in that of Nelson, an admiral. Two captains, and eight lieutenants of the navy fell. At the Nile, where the English had just half the force at Trafalgar, they lost one captain and four lieutenants, in all 895, a remarkable proportion. The slaughter on board the French ships was the greater, in that they always contained so many more men than the English, who, from the scarcity of hands, had seldom more than 590 in a seventy-four, which ought to have had 600. The French had 700. In action, too, the English always fired into the hull, the French at the rigging. *Translator.*

torious of mankind, under that of nature in its wrath. The English were obliged to abandon the vessels which they had in tow, or to resign the care of those which they convoyed. Singular vicissitudes of naval warfare! Some of the vanquished, full of joy at the terrific aspect of the storm, concurred in the hope of reconquering their vessels and their liberty. The English, who were keeping guard in the Bucentaure, seeing themselves without help, gave up the admiral's vessel to the French crew. These, delighted to be delivered, even by fearful peril, got up some jury-masts upon their dismasted ship, and attaching to them some pieces of sails, steered toward Cadiz, driven on before the storm. The Algesiras, worthy of the unfortunate Magon, of whom it bore the body, also endeavoured to secure its deliverance by the tempest. Seventy English officers and seamen guarded the noble ship that had been just vanquished. All damaged as it was, the Algesiras, recently constructed, kept itself afloat in spite of its extensive injuries. It had its three masts shot away, yet still there were left above deck fifteen feet of the mainmast, nine of the foremast, and five of the mizen. The vessel which towed it, considering its own safety endangered, had cast loose the cable which attached her to the prize. The English, who were on board her as a guard, fired a cannon to demand help, and obtained no reply. Then, addressing M. de la Bretonnière, they besought him to aid them with his men, to save the ship, and with the ship the lives of all together. M. de la Bretonnière took this proposition as a gleam of hope, and requested to confer upon the subject with his countrymen detained in the hold. He went to find the French officers, and made them partakers in the common hope to snatch the Algesiras from the hands of their conquerors. They all agreed to accept the proposition which was thus communicated to them, and then, once in possession of the ship, to throw themselves upon the English, to take from them their arms, to combat them to the last in the midst of the nocturnal darkness, and to provide afterwards as well as they might be able for their common safety. There remained 250 Frenchmen, disarmed, but ready to do any thing in order to get their vessel out of the hands of the enemy. The officers went among them to communicate the plan, which they received with delight. It was agreed that M. de la Bretonnière should first summon the English, and that if they refused to surrender, the French, at a given signal, should attack them. The dread of the storm, the fear of the coast, all were forgotten; they only thought now of the new contest they were going to undertake, a species of civil war in presence of the raging elements.

M. de la Bretonnière returned to the English, and told them that the abandonment in which the vessel was left, in the midst of so great a danger, dissolved all their engagements; from that moment the French should consider themselves free, and that if, finally, their guard believed their honour interested in combating, they would be able to do so; that the French, though unarmed, would attack them at the first signal given. Two French seamen, in fact, in their ardent impatience attacked the English on duty, and received serious wounds. M. de la Bretonnière suppressed the tumult, and gave the English officers time for reflection. These, having deliberated for a moment, gave way on the consideration of their small number, the cruelty of their countrymen, and the common danger threatening victors and vanquished. They gave themselves up to the French, on condition that they should return free as soon as they should have touched the shore of France. M. de la Bretonnière promised to request their liberty of his government, if they succeeded in reaching Cadiz. Then the cry of joy resounded through the vessel; they set themselves at work; they searched for top-masts among the stores in reserve; they hoisted them, fixed them on the stumps of the masts, fastened some sails to them, and directed their course for Cadiz.

Day appeared, but far from dissipating the bad weather, it appeared to make it yet worse than it had been before. Admiral Gravina had entered Cadiz with the wrecks of the combined fleets. The English fleet was within view of the port, followed by some of its prisoners, whom it kept under the muzzles of its cannon. After a contest all day against the tempest, the commander, M. de la Bretonnière, although without a pilot, but by the aid of a seaman to whom the road of Cadiz was familiar, arrived at the entrance. There only remained one bower anchor and a large cable to resist the wind that blew violently towards land. He cast this only anchor overboard, full of fearful anxiety, because, if it parted, the Algesiras must be dashed to pieces on the rocks. Not knowing the road, he had cast anchor near a formidable shoal, called the Diamond Point. The night passed in the most dreadful anxiety. At last day appeared, and cast a fearful light upon that desolate shore. The Bucentaure, ever unfortunate, had gone to pieces there. They had saved a part of the crew on board the Indomptable, moored not far off from the same place. This last, which had received small damage, in consequence of having been but little engaged in the action, was moored with good anchors and cables. During the day the Algesiras fired guns of distress to demand her assistance. Some boats perished before they could reach her. One only succeeded in conveying to her a weak anchor. The Algesiras remained moored near the Indomptable, requesting a tow rope, which was promised as soon as it should be possible to enter Cadiz. Night came again upon the sea, and upon the two vessels moored side by side; it was the second night after the unfortunate battle. The crew of the Algesiras regarded with affright the two feeble anchors upon which their security rested, and with envy those of the Indomptable. The tempest redoubled in violence. On a sudden a fearful cry was heard. The Indomptable, whose powerful anchors had given way, approached suddenly, covered with her lanterns, having her crew upon the deck in despair. She passed but a few feet away from the Algesiras, struck, and went to pieces on the Diamond Point. The lanterns which lit her up, and the cries which had just before resounded, all disappeared, and were hushed in the waves. Fifteen hundred men perished at once, because the Indomptable carried her own crew nearly entire, and also that of the Bucentaure, both the wounded and well, with a part of the troops embarked in the admiral.

After this miserable spectacle, and the melancholy reflections which it caused, the Algesiras saw the day dawn and the tempest over. The ship finally entered the road of Cadiz, and ran, at some hazard, upon a bed of mud, where it was secure from danger. Just recompense of the most admirable heroism!

While these tragical circumstances signalized the miraculous return of the Algesiras, the Redoubtable, the vessel which had so gloriously contested with the Victory, and from whence the shot was fired that killed Nelson, had gone to the bottom. Her stern, riddled by bullets, suddenly gave way. There was scarcely time to take out of her a hundred and nineteen French. The Fougueux was wrecked on the coast of Spain, and all on board were lost.

The Monarca, abandoned to the same fate, went to pieces on the rocks of San Lucar.

There only remained to the English a few of their prizes; and with their least injured vessels they kept at sea, in sight of Cadiz, owing to contrary winds, which did not permit them to set sail for Gibraltar. The gallant commander of the Pluton, captain Cosmao, at this aspect of affairs, could not repress the zeal which animated him. His vessel was crippled, his crew reduced one-half; but none of these reasons could stay him. He borrowed some seamen from the Hermione frigate; he repaired his rigging in haste; and availing himself of the new command which now came to him, because all the admirals and rear-admirals were dead, wounded, or prisoners, he made the signal of sailing to the vessels capable of standing out to sea, in order to snatch from the fleet of Collingwood the prizes which it was carrying away. The intrepid Cosmao went out, accompanied by the Neptune, which during the battle had done its best to enter into the heat of the action, and with three other vessels, French and Spanish, which had not the honour of combating on the day of the battle of Trafalgar. They were five in all, followed by five frigates, which had now to compensate for their recent conduct. In spite of the bad weather, these ten vessels approached the English fleet. Collingwood taking them for so many vessels of the line, made ten of his least injured ships immediately advance to meet them. During this movement a part of the prizes was abandoned. The frigates availed themselves of the opportunity to seize and tow away the Santa Anna and Neptuno.

The commandant Cosmao, who had not strength sufficient, and who had against him the wind blowing towards Cadiz, re-entered it, taking with him the two re-conquered vessels, the sole trophy which he was able to regain on the sequel of such disasters. This was not the only result of the sally. Admiral Collingwood, fearing that he should not have it in his power to preserve his prizes, burned or sank the Santissima Trinidada, Argonauta, San Antonio, and Intrepid.

The Aigle escaped from the English vessel the Defiance, and went on shore before the port of St. Mary. The Berwick was lost by an act of devotion resembling that which had saved the Algesiras.

Among the vessels which had followed the commander Cosmao, there was one which was not able to enter, this was the Spanish ship the Rota, which perished between Rota and San Lucar [1].

Finally, the English admiral returning to Gibraltar, took with him but four of his prizes out of seventeen, of which one was the Swiftsure, and three Spanish vessels. He afterwards sent the Swiftsure to the bottom [2].

Such was the fatal battle of Trafalgar. Seamen inexperienced, allies yet more inexperienced; a state of discipline too relaxed; *matériel* neglected; everywhere precipitation, and its natural consequences; a commander too keenly feeling the disadvantages under which he laboured, conceiving from them presentiments of evil, always carrying them to sea, causing from that influence the great designs of his sovereign to miscarry; that sovereign irritated, not taking a sufficient account of material obstacles, less difficult to surmount on land than water, filling with despair, by the bitterness of his reproaches, an admiral who must be pitied rather than blamed; this admiral engaging in battle from despair, and fortune, ever cruel to the unhappy, refusing him even the favour of a propitious wind; one-half a fleet paralyzed by ignorance and by the elements, the other half fighting with fury; on one part a calculating and skilful courage, on the other heroic inexperience, noble deaths, a frightful carnage, and unequalled destruction; after the ravages of men those of a tempestuous ocean, its abyss swallowing up the trophies of the conqueror: finally the triumphant commander inhumed in his triumph, and the vanquished chief contemplating suicide as the sole refuge from his misery—such was, to repeat it, the fatal battle of Trafalgar, with its causes, tragical aspects, and results.

It is possible to extract from this great disaster useful consequences for the French navy. It is proper, therefore, to relate to the world all that passed. The combats of the Redoubtable, the Algesiras, and Achille, deserve to be cited with pride in contact with the triumphs of Ulm. Unfortunate bravery is not less admirable than fortunate courage; and is more affecting. The favour of fortune to the French being already sufficiently great, they may openly avow all her severities. It was proper to load with honour those who had so worthily fulfilled their duty, and to call before a council of war those who, appalled at the horrors of the scene, kept themselves afar from the point of danger. Should they have conducted themselves well on other occasions, it was necessary to make them terrible examples to the necessity of establishing discipline. It is necessary above all, that the government itself should find a lesson in this sanguinary defeat; it is proper it should be

[1] Much of this is wholly erroneous. The Santa Anna had already drifted in the storm towards the entrance of Cadiz, and was towed in by a frigate. The Neptuno was wrecked between Rota and Catalina. Nor does M. Thiers state, as he ought to have done, that of Cosmao's squadron, one, the Rayo, 100, was actually taken by Collingwood's covering vessels. She bore the broad pendant of Don Enrique McDonnel, who himself told admiral Collingwood, that the Santa Anna had been driven close to Cadiz, and been towed in by a frigate. Of the capture of the Rayo, which went on shore at San Lucar, and was afterwards lost, M. Thiers says nothing. *Translator.*

[2] This is not correct; the Swiftsure reached Gibraltar in perfect safety.

thoroughly convinced that nothing ought to be hurried, particularly where it concerns a navy; it is requisite that it renounce offering fleets in line of battle, which have not been well experienced at sea; and that in the meantime it apply itself to form such fleets by frequent distant and long-continued cruises.

The excellent king of Spain, without giving himself up to such considerations, meted out in the same measure the recompenses bestowed upon the coward and the brave, not wishing to exhibit to the light anything but the honour done to his flag by the conduct of some of his seamen. It was a weakness natural to an old court, but a weakness inspired by kindness. The French sailors, a little relieved from their sufferings, mingled with those of Spain in the port of Cadiz, when it was announced to them that the king of Spain had given a step in rank to every Spaniard who was present in the battle of Trafalgar, independently of distinctions granted particularly to those who had conducted themselves best. The Spaniards, ashamed to be recompensed when the French were not, said to them, that probably they were soon going to receive on their side also the reward of their courage. It was not so; the brave and the coward among the French were confounded in a like treatment, and the result of that treatment was—to be forgotten.

When the news of the disaster of Trafalgar reached admiral Decrès, he was struck with deep sorrow. This minister, despite his superior intellect, in spite of his thorough knowledge of naval affairs, had never anything but reverses to announce to a sovereign who, in everything else, obtained nothing but success. He remitted the sad details to Napoleon, who had already flown upon Vienna with the swoop of an eagle. Although a new misfortune might with difficulty find way to a mind intoxicated with triumph, the news from Trafalgar gave Napoleon much mortification, causing him to exhibit great displeasure. Still he was less severe than he was accustomed to be towards admiral Villeneuve, because that unfortunate officer had fought bravely, though very imprudently. Napoleon acted here as men often do, of the strongest as well as the most feeble souls; he set himself to forget the mortification, and to force others to forget it also. He would have Trafalgar spoken little about in the French journals, and that it should be mentioned only as an imprudent battle, in which they had suffered more by the tempest than the enemy. He would neither reward nor punish any one engaged in the action, which was a cruel piece of injustice, unworthy of himself and the intelligence of his government. Something came into his mind at that time, which contributed powerfully to inspire this niggardly conduct; for he began to despair of the French navy. He had found, he believed, a manner more certain and more practicable than the navy afforded for his object, and this was, to beat England in the allies she paid; to exclude her from the continent, and expel thence altogether her trade and influence. He would naturally prefer this mode of acting, employing the profession in which he excelled; a mode, well managed, that would certainly have conducted to the consummation of his efforts. From that day Napoleon thought less of the navy, and wished every body to think as little of it as he did himself.

Europe, in regard to the battle of Trafalgar, lent itself voluntarily to the silence which he desired to observe in its regard. The loud tramp of his footsteps upon the continent prevented the echos of the cannon of Trafalgar from being heard there. The powers which had at their breast the sword of Napoleon were little encouraged by a naval victory, profitable alone to England, without any other result than a fresh extension of her commercial dominion—a dominion which they little liked, and only tolerated through a jealousy of France. Besides, the glory of England could not console them for their own humiliation. Trafalgar could not efface, therefore, the eclat of Ulm, and, as will be soon seen, did not lessen any of its consequences.

BOOK XXIII.

AUSTERLITZ.

EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE NEWS FROM THE ARMY.—FINANCIAL CRISIS.—THE CONSOLIDATION CHEST SUSPENDS ITS PAYMENTS IN SPAIN, AND CONTRIBUTES TO INCREASE THE EMBARRASSMENT OF THE COMPANY OF UNITED MERCHANTS.—AID FURNISHED TO THE COMPANY BY THE BANK OF FRANCE.—TOO GREAT AN ISSUE OF NOTES BY THE BANK OF FRANCE, AND SUSPENSION OF ITS PAYMENTS.—NUMEROUS FAILURES.—THE PUBLIC ALARMED, PUTS ITS TRUST IN NAPOLEON, AND AWAITS SOME SPLENDID ACHIEVEMENT FROM HIM, WHICH SHALL ESTABLISH PEACE AND CREDIT.—CONTINUATION OF THE EVENTS OF THE WAR.—SITUATION OF AFFAIRS IN PRUSSIA.—THE ASSERTED VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORY OF ANSPACH FURNISHES PRETEXTS FOR THE WAR PARTY.—THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER PROFITS BY THESE TO VISIT BERLIN.—HE DRAWS IN THE COURT OF PRUSSIA TO MAKE EVENTUAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE COALITION.—TREATY OF POTSDAM.—DEPARTURE OF M. HAUGWITZ FOR THE FRENCH HEAD-QUARTERS.—GRAND RESOLUTION OF NAPOLEON, UPON LEARNING THE NEW DANGERS WHICH THREATEN HIM.—HE HASTENS HIS MOVEMENT UPON VIENNA.—BATTLE OF CALDIERO IN ITALY.—MARCH OF THE GRAND ARMY ALONG THE VALLEY OF THE DANUBE.—PASSAGE OF THE INN, THE TRAUN, AND THE ENS.—NAPOLEON AT LINTZ.—MOVEMENT WHICH THE ARCHDUKES CHARLES AND JOHN ARE ABLE TO

MAKE TO STOP THE MARCH OF NAPOLEON.—PRECAUTIONS OF THE LATTER ON APPROACHING VIENNA.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE CORPS OF THE ARMY ON BOTH BANKS OF THE DANUBE, AND IN THE ALPS.—THE RUSSIANS PASS THE DANUBE AT KREMS.—DANGER OF MORTIER'S CORPS.—COMBAT OF DIRNSTEIN.—COMBAT OF DAVOUT AT MARIAZELL.—ENTRY INTO VIENNA.—SURPRISE OF THE BRIDGES ON THE DANUBE.—NAPOLEON WISHES TO AVAIL HIMSELF OF THIS SURPRISE, TO CUT OFF THE RETREAT OF GENERAL KUTUSOF.—MURAT AND LANNES MARCH TO HOLLABRUNN.—MURAT SUFFERS HIMSELF TO BE DECEIVED BY THE PROPOSITION OF AN ARMISTICE, AND THUS GIVES THE RUSSIAN ARMY TIME TO ESCAPE.—NAPOLEON REJECTS THE ARMISTICE.—SANGUINARY COMBAT OF HOLLABRUNN.—ARRIVAL OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT BRÜNN.—NAPOLEON'S FINE DISPOSITIONS TO OCCUPY VIENNA, TO GUARD THE SIDE OF THE ALPS AND OF HUNGARY AGAINST THE ARCHDUKES, AND TO SHOW A FRONT TO THE RUSSIANS, ON THE SIDE OF MORAVIA.—NEY OCCUPIES THE TYROL AUGEREAU, SUABIA.—CAPTURE OF THE CORPS OF JELLACHICH AND OF ROHAN.—DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON FOR BRÜNN.—ATTEMPT AT NEGOTIATION.—FOOLISH PRIDE OF THE RUSSIAN STAFF.—NEW CIRCLE FORMED ROUND ALEXANDER.—IT INSPIRES HIM WITH THE IMPRUDENT RESOLUTION TO GIVE BATTLE.—GROUND CHOSEN BEFOREHAND BY NAPOLEON.—BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ, FOUGHT ON THE 2ND OF DECEMBER, 1805.—DESTRUCTION OF THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ARMY.—THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA AT THE NIGHT QUARTERS OF NAPOLEON.—ARMISTICE GRANTED, UNDER THE PROMISE OF A SPEEDY PEACE.—COMMENCEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATION AT BRÜNN.—CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY NAPOLEON.—HE DESIRES THE VENETIAN STATES TO COMPLETE THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, THE TYROL AND AUSTRIAN SUABIA TO AGGRANDIZE BAVARIA, THE DUCHIES OF BADEN, AND WÜRTEMBURG.—FAMILY ALLIANCES WITH THESE THREE GERMAN HOUSES.—RESISTANCE OF THE AUSTRIAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES.—NAPOLEON, ON RETURNING TO VIENNA, HAS A LONG INTERVIEW WITH M. HAUGWITZ.—HE RENEWS HIS DESIGN OF A UNION WITH PRUSSIA, AND GIVES HER HANOVER, ON CONDITION THAT SHE ALLIES HERSELF DEFINITIVELY WITH FRANCE.—TREATY OF VIENNA WITH PRUSSIA.—DEPARTURE OF M. HAUGWITZ FOR BERLIN.—NAPOLEON FREED FROM PRUSSIA, BECOMES MORE HEAVY IN HIS DEMANDS FROM AUSTRIA.—THE NEGOTIATION TRANSFERRED TO PRESBURG.—ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONDITIONS OF FRANCE, AND PEACE OF PRESBURG.—DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON FOR MUNICH.—MARRIAGE OF EUGENE BEAUHARNOIS, WITH THE PRINCESS AUGUSTA OF BAVARIA.—RETURN OF NAPOLEON TO PARIS.—HIS TRIUMPHANT RECEPTION.

THE intelligence received from the banks of the Danube had filled France with satisfaction; that which came from Cadiz saddened the public feeling; but neither the one nor the other caused surprise. Every thing was hoped and expected of the army, constantly victorious from the commencement of the revolution; but nearly nothing from the navy, so unfortunate for fifteen preceding years. But there was nothing in these naval events of more than ordinary consequence; while, on the contrary, the prodigious success of the French arms on the continent was regarded as altogether decisive of events. The French people saw there hostilities carried on far from the frontiers; the coalition defeated at its beginning; the duration of the war greatly abridged, and continental peace very near, bringing with it the hope of a maritime one. Still the army, pushing forward towards Austria to encounter the Russians, raised the expectation of new and great events, which were awaited with the strongest impatience. As to the rest, confidence in the genius of Napoleon tempered every anxiety.

It demanded such a confidence in events to sustain public credit, which was deeply shaken. The embarrassed situation of the finances has already been shown. An arrear, owing to the determination of Napoleon to meet the expenses of the war without a loan; the embarrassment of the Spanish treasury made common also to that of France, by the speculations of the company of united merchants; the portfolio of the treasury delivered over entirely to this company, through the error of an honest but deluded minister; all these were causes of the existing situation of monetary affairs. They had terminated by bringing about the crisis long ago foreseen. One particular incident contributed to hasten it. The court of Madrid was debtor to the company of united merchants, in the amount of the subsidy of which this last body had taken upon itself to acquit the amount; also for the cargoes of corn sent to different parts of the peninsula, and provisions furnished to the Spanish fleets and armies. This court, in consequence of its distress, had just then a recourse to a very disastrous measure. It was obliged to suspend the payments due to the consolidation fund—a species of bank, devoted to the service of the public debt; it then gave a forced money currency to the notes of this fund. Such a measure made the specie disappear. M. Ouvrard, who, in waiting for the return of the Mexican dollars made over to him by the court of Madrid, had no other mode of meeting the necessities of his partners than through the money he drew from the consolidation fund, suddenly found himself stopped in his operations. He had promised to M. Desprez in particular 4,000,000 of dollars, which he in his turn had promised to the bank of France, in order to obtain the help which at that moment he found necessary. He was not able to reckon upon that 4,000,000 of receipt any longer. On the sums to be obtained by way of Mexico, a loan of 10,000,000 of dollars had been negotiated in Holland through the house of Hope, of which they could not calculate upon receiving more than 2,000,000 in time to be useful. These vexatious circumstances had increased beyond measure the difficulties of M. Desprez, who had the operations of the treasury to manage, and those of M. Vanlerberghe, who had contracted to furnish army provisions, and the embarrassments of both the one and the other had fallen upon the bank. It has been explained already how these individuals discounted at the bank, either their own paper or the "obligations of the receivers-general." The bank gave them the value in notes of which the issue had thus augmented in an immoderate degree. This had not even then been an evil beyond an early repair, if the promised dollars had arrived sufficiently early to take back an adequate portion to the metallic reserve of the bank. But things were come to such a point, that the bank had not more than 1,500,000f. in its chest against 72,000,000f.

of notes issued, and 20,000,000f. of accounts current, in other words, against 92,000,000f. immediately payable. A singular circumstance recently revealed, much aggravated this situation. M. de Marbois, amid his unbounded confidence in the company, had granted to it a power altogether exceptionable, in which he had seen at first only a facility rendered to the public service, but which had become the origin of a serious abuse. The company having in its possession a great part of the "obligations of the receivers-general," that it discounted for the government, having itself to pay for the duties of all kinds which it executed upon different parts of the national territory, found itself forced to draw unceasingly upon the treasury; and now to accommodate it, M. de Marbois had ordered the receivers-general to hand over to M. Desprez the funds that remained in their hands upon his simple receipt. The company immediately availed itself of this favour. Whilst on one side it endeavoured to procure money at Paris by making the bank discount the "obligations of the receivers-general" of which it was possessed, on the other it took out of the funds of the receivers-general the money intended to pay off these very obligations; and the bank at the expiration of those obligations on sending them to the receivers-general, found nothing return in payment but the receipt of M. Desprez. The bank, therefore, received this paper in payment of other paper of the same description. It was thus that there happened at once so great an issue of notes with so small a reserve. A dishonest clerk, abusing the confidence of M. de Marbois, was the principal author of those compliances of which so deplorable an abuse had taken place.

This situation of things, unknown to the minister, ill appreciated even by the company, that, in its course onward, measured neither the extent of the operations in which it had engaged, nor the serious nature of its own actions, was revealed little and little by a general money pressure. The public above all, eager for specie, finding the scarcity at the bank, went in crowds to its counters in order to turn the notes into money. The ill disposed joined their clamour to that of those operated upon by fear, and the crisis soon became general.

Circumstances thus aggravated, could not fail to bring avowals too long deferred, together with a distressing perspicuity as to facts. M. Vanlerberghe, to whom could not be imputed any of that blame which attached to the conduct of the company, because he was solely employed in the corn trade, without being aware to what embarrassments he was exposed by his partners, went to M. de Marbois, and declared to him that it was impossible for him to satisfy at the same time the services of the treasury and those of the contractor for provisions; that it was the utmost if he could continue to perform the last. He did not conceal from the minister, that the provisions furnished to Spain remaining up to that moment unpaid had been the principal cause of his difficulties. M. de Marbois, fearing to see the victualling service fail, encouraged besides by some words of the emperor, which satisfied M. Vanlerberghe, expressed the intention of supporting him. Granting him an aid of 20,000,000f. he placed this money to the account of former contracts, that the administrations of war and of the navy had not yet paid off, and he gave it to M. Vanlerberghe as 20,000,000f. to cover his personal engagements contracted in the service of the treasury. But scarcely was this aid afforded to M. Vanlerberghe, than he came to request another. The chief contractor had about him a multitude of sub-contractors, who ordinarily gave him credit, but who were unable, not longer having the confidence of capitalists, to prolong their advances. He was thus reduced to the last extremity. M. de Marbois, startled at these avowals, soon became in possession of others of a much more serious character. The bank sent him a deputation, in order to unfold to the government the situation in which it stood. M. Desprez had not sent in the dollars which had been promised, and nevertheless he demanded more discounts; the treasury demanded them upon its own side, and the bank had not 2,000,000 of crowns in its hand to meet 92,000,000 in value payable on demand. How should it conduct itself under such unlucky circumstances? M. Desprez stated on his own part, that he was utterly destitute of all resource if the bank refused him its assistance. He avowed also, that it was the counter-check given by the state of Spanish affairs that had thrown him into embarrassment. It became unfortunately but too evident to the minister, that M. Vanlerberghe relied upon M. Desprez, M. Desprez upon the treasury, and that the bank bore all the burthen of the pecuniary state of affairs with Spain, which were thus flung upon France herself through the heedless operations of M. Ouvrard.

It was too late to retrace their steps, and utterly useless to make complaints. It was necessary that the state should disentangle itself from the existing peril, and for that purpose extricate those who had so imprudently exposed themselves, because abandoning them to ruin, was running the risk of being ruined with them. M. de Marbois therefore did not hesitate in his resolution of sustaining M. Vanlerberghe and M. Desprez; and he acted rightly. But he could not longer venture to act upon his own sole responsibility; and he therefore called a meeting of the council of government, which immediately assembled under the presidency of prince Joseph; prince Louis, the archchancellor of the empire Cambacérès, and all the ministers attended. Some of the superior individuals employed in the department of the finances were called before the council, and among others, M. Mollien, manager of the sinking fund. The council deliberated for a great while upon the situation of things. After much general and idle discussion, it became of urgent importance to come to some conclusion, but each member hesitated before a responsibility equally onerous, because it was as serious a step to abandon the contractors as it was to support them. The archchancellor, Cambacérès, who had penetration enough to comprehend all the exigency of the situation, and influence sufficient to prevail upon the emperor to admit it, supported and carried the opinion, that immediate aid should be granted to M. Vanlerberghe to the extent of ten millions at first, and ten more afterwards, when an approving reply should be received from the head quarters of the army. In regard to M. Desprez, his was a question to be settled with the bank, because that alone was able to give him aid by continuing to discount for him. But the

means were debated, that the bank had to propose to ward off the effect of the diminution of its funds and to maintain the credit of its notes, without which it must fail. No one thought it was possible to give the notes the currency of specie, because of the impossibility of re-establishing paper money in France, and also of getting the consent of the emperor to such a resolution. But certain measures were admitted, which tended to render the payments of the bank slower, and the consequent outgoing of specie less rapid. They left to the minister of the treasury and to the prefect of police the task of coming to an understanding with the bank upon the nature and detail of the measures themselves.

M. de Marbois had very warm altercations with the council of the bank. He complained of the manner in which it had governed its affairs, a very unjust reproach; since, if embarrassed, it was wholly through the fault of the treasury. Its portfolio contained none but excellent commercial paper, the receipts for which were at that moment its sole effective resource. It had even diminished the discounts to private individuals, so as to reduce its portfolio below the ordinary proportions. It had possession of no paper in a disproportionate growth, except that of M. Desprez and of the "obligations of the receiver-general," which returned no specie. It therefore suffered itself on no other than the government account. But the bankers who managed it were in general so devoted to the emperor, in whom they loved, if not the glorious soldier, at least the restorer of order, that they suffered themselves to be treated by the agents of the government with a severity which would not in the present day be permitted by the most vulgar company of speculators. So far it was on their part patriotism more than servility. To sustain the emperor's government was in their eyes an imperious duty which they owed to France, that he alone had preserved from anarchy. They could not either feel very highly irritated at reproaches which they were conscious they did not merit, and they exhibited on behalf of the treasury a devotion of purpose well worthy to serve as an example in similar circumstances. They adopted the following measures as those most likely to alleviate the pressure of the crisis.

M. de Marbois was to send away post haste into the departments nearest to the capital, orders to the paymasters to hand over all the funds in their possession which were not indispensably needful for the current monies of paying the funds, the military pay, and the salaries of functionaries, and to pay these funds into the bank as soon as possible. It was hoped that five or six millions in specie would be obtained in this mode. An order was given to the receivers-general who had handed to M. Desprez all the sums paid in to them, to pay them over at once into the bank. The clerks sent for this purpose were also commanded to discover whether some of these accountable officers had not employed the funds of the treasury for their own personal benefit. To these means of getting specie paid in were added others, in order to prevent its being paid out too rapidly. The notes becoming depreciated in value, the public went in a hurry to the bank, in order to turn them into cash. When brokerage and jobbing did not interfere, it had before been sufficient to suffer a loss of one or two per cent. on the notes, in order for the majority of the holders to turn them into specie. The bank was now authorized not to turn its notes into metallic currency at a rate beyond 500,000f. or 600,000f. value daily. This was all the specie required when confidence existed. Another precaution was taken to retard the cash payments, and that was to count the money handed over. The holders of the notes would have willingly dispensed with that formality, because they did not imagine the bank would cheat the public, by putting a crown less in a bag of a thousand francs than should be put there. Still the clerks affected to be so careful as to reckon them. They also decided that they would reimburse only a single note from the same person, and that each should be admitted in turn. At last, the crowd increasing daily, they thought of a last mode, namely, that of distributing numbers to the holders of notes in the proportion of 500,000f. or 600,000f. which they only wished to be paid per day. These numbers, deposited at the different mayors' houses in Paris, were to be distributed by the mayors to the individuals well known to be strangers to money dealing, and who therefore had no recourse to reimbursement for their notes, but to satisfy real necessities.

These measures put an end at least to the trouble given at the bank offices, and reduced the issue of specie so as to meet the more urgent wants of the population. The jobbers who endeavoured to obtain the bank crowns, in order to pay them over to the public at a profit of six or seven per cent. were defeated in their manœuvres. Still this was really a suspension of payments under the garb of a retardation only. Unfortunately it was inevitable. In such a situation it is not the measures thus taken which should be blamed, it is the anterior conduct which rendered them necessary.

The clerks sent out procured the payment into the bank of 2,000,000f., or thereabouts. The daily expiration of commercial bills due brought in more notes than crowns; because commercial men, only when they had to pay in less sums than 500f., paid in specie. The bank therefore resolved to purchase dollars in Holland at any price, and thus to charge to its own account a part of the expenses of the crisis. Thanks to these united means, the embarrassment would soon have been surmounted, if M. Desprez had not come suddenly to declare his great necessities, and to solicit more aid.

This banker, charged by the company to furnish the treasury with the funds necessary for its service, and in order to do that, to discount the "obligations of the receivers-general," the "bills at sight," and the like, had engaged to discount them at a half per cent. per month, or six per cent. per annum. The capitalists would no longer discount them for him than at one per cent. per month, or twelve per cent. per annum. He was thus exposed to ruinous loss. In order to avoid this loss, he thought of the mode of giving in pledge to the lenders, the "obligations" and "bills at sight," and to borrow money upon their value, in place of making them be sub-discounted. The speculators, in their desire to turn this circumstance to their own profit, had terminated by refusing to renew operations of this character any more, for the ob-

ject of obliging him to give the treasury securities at a very low rate.

"The embarrassments of the place," M. de Marbois wrote to the emperor, "serve many persons for a pretext to use them like corsairs towards the united merchants; and I know great patriots who have drawn 1,200,000f. or 1,300,000f. from the agent of the treasury, in order to be able to gain more by their bargains." (Letter of 28th of September—Depôt of Secretary of State's Office.)

M. Desprez, who had already received fourteen millions in aid from the bank, wished to obtain thirty more immediately, and seventy millions in the month of Brumaire. There was, in consequence, a sum of 100,000,000f. which he needed. This situation, openly stated at the bank, caused real affright there, on the part of those who were not much disposed to support the fortunes of the government whatever they might turn out to be. They demanded who M. Desprez was, and under what title such great sacrifices were claimed for him. The commercial men were ignorant of the partnership between him and the company of contractors, who were labouring at the same time for France and Spain. But in ignorance of his true situation as they might be, they were desirous of obliging the minister to identify him as the agent of the treasury, if only that they might have one more security. The minister, having notice of their desire, sent a note, in his own hand, to the president of the bank regency, to say that M. Desprez acted in the interest of the treasury. From inattention, M. de Marbois neglected to sign the note. He was requested to sign it. He consented; and it was thus impossible to say they were not virtually in presence of the emperor himself, the creator of the bank, the master and saviour of France, demanding that they should not reduce his government to a stand-still by refusing him the resources of which he had the most urgent need.

The voice of patriotism prevailed; and the result was more particularly due to M. Perrigaux, the celebrated banker, whose influence was always employed to the advantage of the state. They decided that all the aid required should be given to M. Desprez; that the "obligations" which served him for the purpose of borrowing upon pledge, and which they avoided discounting to prevent too great losses, should be discounted, no matter at what rate of expense, whether they belonged to M. Desprez or to the bank; that he should take this operation upon himself, as more capable than any other individual to execute it; that the loss should be borne, half by the company and half by the bank; that specie should be purchased at Amsterdam and at Hamburg, at their joint expense; and that M. Desprez should be requested formally not to renew his engagements, in order to put an end to such a situation of affairs. They resolved, finally, to contract their commercial discounts, to devote all the existing resources to the treasury, and to issue no notes but on its account. The daily payments of the commercial paper had brought in a considerable quantity of notes, which they were at first about to destroy; but they were soon sent into circulation again, to meet the wants of M. Desprez. They now surpassed by much even the first issue in magnitude, carrying it up to 80,000,000f., independently of 20,000,000f. of accounts current. But the extraordinary purchases of dollars, and the effective discount of the "obligations," procured the 500,000f. or 600,000f. per day which were indispensable to satisfy the public; and they were able to flatter themselves with a hope of getting over this crisis without compromising the services, and without bringing bankruptcy upon the contractors, which must have led the treasury itself to the same fate.

It was not possible to prevent the bankruptcy of individuals, which succeeded each other with a rapidity contributing greatly to the universal dejection. The failure of M. Récamier—a banker much regarded for his integrity, the extent of his business, and the style of his living, and who became the victim of existing circumstances, much more than of any conduct connected with his business as a banker—produced a very painful sensation. The malevolent attributed it to a connexion of his business with the treasury, which did not exist. Many failures of less moment followed that of M. Récamier, as well in Paris as in the country, and caused a species of panic-terror. Under a government less firm than that of Napoleon, this crisis would have been followed by very serious consequences. But every one calculated upon his good fortune and upon the resources of his genius; nobody felt any uneasiness about the maintenance of public order; all awaited momentarily some great blow that, being struck, would restore public credit; while that detestable species of speculators, who increase the difficulties of every similar situation, did not base their calculations of gain upon the fall of prices—not venturing to play that game, through fear of the victories of Napoleon.

All eyes were fixed upon the Danube, where the destinies of Europe were about to be decided. It was from that quarter that events were to arrive, which would put an end both to the financial and political crisis. They were expected with a justifiable confidence, more than all, after having seen, in the space of a few days, an entire army taken, nearly without striking a blow, by the sole effect of a manœuvre. Still one circumstance, even in that manœuvre, had produced a vexatious complication of relations with Prussia; France had to dread an additional enemy. This circumstance was the march of the corps of marshal Bernadotte across the Prussian province of Anspach.

Napoleon, in directing the march of his columns on the flank of the Austrian army, had not for a moment considered as a difficulty in his way the passage across the provinces that Prussia possessed in Franconia. In fact, after the convention of neutrality, stipulated for by Prussia with the belligerent powers during the preceding war, the provinces of Anspach and Bareuth had not been included in the neutrality of the north of Germany. The reason of this was plain and simple; it was because the provinces were situated on the route that the Austrian and French armies were obliged to take, and it was almost impossible to prevent their using that passage. All that could therefore be expected was, that these provinces should not be made the field of active hostility, that the belligerents should pass through them rapidly, and that they should pay for all which they took within their limits. If Prussia had desired that it should have been otherwise on this occasion, she should

have explained herself to that effect. Besides, when she had but recently been negotiating an alliance with France, and when she had gone so far on the way as to listen to and agree to the offer made her of Hanover, she had little right to alter the former stipulations of her neutrality, in order to render them more strict towards France than they were in 1796. This it would have been scarcely possible to conceive: she had kept in this respect a silence which she could not with decency venture to break, above all, for the purpose of declaring that, in full negotiation for an alliance, she wished to be less condescending to France than in times of extreme coolness. However that might be, Napoleon, grounding his conduct upon the former agreement and on the apparent amity which he was led to believe existed between them, had not considered the passage across the province of Anspach as any violation of territory. What proved his sincerity in this respect is, that, in strictness, he might have dispensed with borrowing the road through that province, and, by drawing his columns closer together, have made it very easy to avoid the Prussian territory, without losing much of his chance of enveloping general Mack.

But the situation of Prussia had become daily more embarrassing between the emperors Napoleon and Alexander. The first offered him Hanover and his alliance; the second demanded from him a passage through Silesia for one of his armies, and put on the appearance of declaring to him that he must join the coalition either out of his own free will or by force. As soon as he came to comprehend the real state of the position in which he was placed, Frederick-William became extremely agitated. This monarch, ruled sometimes by the greediness natural to the Prussian government that inclined him towards Napoleon, sometimes by the influences of his court which drew him towards the coalition, had made promises to every one, and had thus reached an embarrassment of position from which he could perceive no other mode of escape than by a war either with Russia or France. He was exasperated to the utmost, because he was at once discontented with others as well as himself, and he could not think of war at all without great apprehensions. Nevertheless, indignant at the violence with which he had been threatened by Russia, he had ordered that 80,000 men should be placed on the war footing. In this state of things it was that intelligence of the asserted violation of the Prussian territory reached Berlin. This was a new source of vexation to king Frederick-William, more particularly as it diminished the force of the arguments which he had used to meet the urgent intreaties of Alexander. There existed reasons, no doubt, in behalf of permitting a passage to the French through Anspach, which had no existence as causes for opening Silesia to the Russians. But in moments of the effervescence of feeling, the justice of sound reason is not the prevalent argument, and in hearing at Berlin the passage of the French over the territory of Anspach, the court exclaimed, that Napoleon had outraged Prussian dignity, treating her as he had been accustomed to treat Naples or Baden; that it was impossible to put up with such treatment without dishonouring herself; that for the rest, if they had not war with Napoleon, they must have it with Alexander, because that prince would not permit them to act in so partial a manner towards him, as to refuse him that which they had granted to his enemy; and, finally, if Prussia must declare herself, it would be very singular, and very unworthy of the king to take up the cause of the oppressors of Europe against its defenders. Frederick-William, it was added, whether at Memel or elsewhere since, had ever professed different sentiments in the confidential outpourings of his heart to his young friend Alexander.

It was thus they talked loudly and openly at Berlin, at Potsdam, and, above all, in the royal family, where an affectionate, beautiful, and passion-stirring queen governed with absolute sway.

Frederick-William, athough really irritated at the violation of the territory of Anspach, which deprived him of his best argument against the entreaties of Russia, carried himself as those are accustomed to do who are false through feebleness of mind. He availed himself of his anger as a resource, and affected to exhibit more irritation than he really experienced. His conduct towards the two French representatives was ridiculously affected. Not alone did he refuse to receive them, but M. Hardenberg would not admit them to his cabinet to hear their explanation. M. Laforest and Duroc were astonished at a sort of interdict upon them, being deprived of all communication, even with the private secretary, M. Lombard, through whom had been carried on the confidential communications when the German indemnities or Hanover were subjects of discussion. The secret intermediate agents ordinarily employed, declared, that in the state of mind in which the king was as regarded the French, they dared not see any of that nation. Their anger was evidently assumed. Their desire was to draw out of it a solution of the embarrassments in which they found themselves, being desirous to say to France that the engagements entered into with her had been violated through her own conduct. These engagements, so frequently renewed and substituted for different plans of alliance which had come to nothing, had consisted in a formal promise that the Prussian territory should never, as a territory, be made to serve aggressively against France, and that Hanover itself should be guaranteed against invasion. The French, having by violence passed through the Prussian territory, it was proposed to conclude from that circumstance that they had a right to open it to whomsoever they pleased. This was a miraculous issue, discovered to escape from the difficulties of every kind accumulating around them. In consequence they resolved to declare, that by the violations of her territory Prussia was released from every engagement, and that she granted a passage to the Russians through Silesia in compensation for the passage through Anspach, taken by the French. They wished here for something more than to relieve themselves from an embarrassment, they desired out of the affair to secure some profit to themselves. It was decided upon to seize Hanover, where there remained no more than 6000 French, shut up in the strong fortress of Hameln, and to colour over this invasion under the specious pretext of securing themselves against fresh violations of territory, as an Anglo-Russian army was march-

ing upon Hanover, and by such an occupation, Prussia would prevent her own territory from becoming the field of hostile operations, Hanover being on every side enclosed by it.

The king called an extraordinary council, to which the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf were summoned. M. Haugwitz, brought out of his retreat by these serious circumstances, was among those present. There they drew up resolutions, the purport of which has been just recapitulated, and which were agreed to, but were left for some days enveloped in a species of cloud, to alarm yet more the two representatives of France. Although they did not believe it was very easy to intimidate them or their master, they thought that at the moment when Napoleon had so many enemies on his hands, the fear of adding Prussia to the number, which would have rendered the coalition universal as in 1792, would act powerfully upon his mind.

M. Laforest and Duroc had for a good while fruitlessly requested an interview with M. Hardenberg. They saw him at last in the studied attitude of a man who was making an effort to conceal his indignation, and only obtained from him, after numerous bitter complaints, the declaration, that the engagements of Prussia were broken, and that she should hereafter be guided only by the interest of her own security. The cabinet suffered to come successively to the knowledge of the two French negotiators, the resolutions to open Silesia to the Russians, and to occupy Hanover with a Prussian army, under the pretext of preventing the flame of war introducing itself into the centre of the kingdom itself. They seemed to wish the French to understand that they must esteem themselves lucky to be quits at such a cost. All this was very little worthy of the integrity of the king and of the power of Prussia. Nevertheless, after this first explosion, the forms of intercourse began to soften down a little, not only because it was a part of the Prussian plan to become more moderate, but also because the surprising success of Napoleon had inspired in all courts very serious reflections.

All that had passed at Berlin had been carried to Pulawi with the rapidity of lightning. Alexander, who had desired much to see Frederick-William before the grievances took place which France had afforded to Prussia, wished much more to see him afterwards. He was in hopes to find the king disposed to be swayed by any species of influence. Therefore, far from fixing a place of meeting in such a mode that each should travel the same distance, Alexander made the whole journey, and proceeded immediately to Berlin.

Frederick-William, learning the arrival of the czar, was sorry he had made so much noise about the matter, and thus drawn upon himself a visit which, however flattering, might compromise him. Napoleon had commenced the war in a fashion so decisive, that there was little encouragement to support his enemies. At the same time, it was impossible for the king to deny himself to the attentions of a prince to whom every one said he was so affectionately attached. Orders were given for the reception with all appropriate ceremony. Alexander entered the Prussian capital on the 25th of October, amidst the thunder of cannon, between the ranks of the royal Prussian guards. The young king ran to meet him, and embraced him with cordiality, amid the applauses of the people of Berlin, who, after having been in the first place favourable to the French, now began to suffer themselves to be drawn in by the example of the court, and by the allegation, a thousand times repeated, that Napoleon had violated the territory of Anspach, out of contempt for Prussia. Alexander promised himself he should employ, under existing circumstances, every means of seduction he possessed to secure the court of Berlin in his interests. He did not fail in making the attempt, and he commenced his task with the beautiful queen of Prussia, whom it was very easy to gain over, because, being of the house of Mecklenburg, she partook in all the passions of the German nobility against the French revolution. Alexander paid her a sort of chivalrous and respectful worship, which might be taken at will for a simple homage rendered to her merits, or for a sentiment of a much warmer character. Although greatly taken up at that time with a distinguished lady of the Russian nobility, Alexander was the man and prince to simulate at a proper time a sentiment adapted to be useful to his objects. There was nothing, besides, in those attentions capable of offending decorum, or the mistrustful susceptibility of Frederick-William. He had not been two days at Berlin before the court was full of him, continually boasting of his courtesy, his understanding, and generous ardour in the common cause of Europe. He overwhelmed with his attentions all the relations of the great Frederick; he visited the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf, in them honouring the chiefs of the Prussian army. The young prince Louis, the king's nephew, who had made himself notorious for his violent hatred of the French, and an ardent passion for glory, already attached to the cause of Russia, showed more of this strong feeling than was usual. A species of general enchantment seemed to bind the court to Alexander. Frederick-William perceived the effect which was thus produced around him, and began to take alarm. He waited with painful anxiety the propositions to which all this enthusiasm would not fail to give birth, and he was silent out of fear of accelerating the moment of explanation. It has been already said that, in his extreme of embarrassment, he had sent for his former councillor, M. Haugwitz, whose mind, too subtle for his own, sometimes made him uneasy from its very superiority; but whose policy, adroit, evasive, ever tending to neutrality, was perfectly suitable to his views. They both deplored the fatal course of things, which, under the ambitious and unequal management of M. Hardenberg, had conducted Prussia to a real standstill. M. Hardenberg, at first the friend and creature of M. Haugwitz, and soon the rival, jealous of that statesman, had commenced by following his line of policy, which consisted in keeping Prussia neuter between the two European parties, and in getting the most out of them that was possible; but he had done this with his ambitious character, turning sometimes to one side, sometimes to another, favourable to the French when Hanover was the subject agitated, so far as to give himself up wholly to the French; and since the event of Anspach, so

drawn in by the general predisposition, that he was ready to go halves with Russia in making war upon France. M. Haugwitz, censuring, but with tenderness, an ungrateful follower of his own, said that he had been too French a few months before, and that he was now too Russian. But how was he to escape from his embarrassment, how escape from the shackles of the young emperor! The difficulty become greater hour by hour, its solution would be impossible by incessantly eluding it. Time was precious with the young emperor, because every day that passed saw a further step of Napoleon upon the Danube, and a new danger for Alexander, as well as for the Russian armies arrived on the Inn. He therefore addressed the king of Prussia immediately, as well as through his minister for foreign affairs, the able and astute count Haugwitz. The subject which they developed, both one and the other, is easy to be deduced from what has preceded. Prussia, they said, could not separate herself from the cause of Europe. She could not contribute by her inactivity to the triumph of the common enemy; she was spared by him for the moment, and even that very little, to judge after what had passed at Anspach; but she would be soon crushed, when, delivered from Austria and Russia, he should have nobody else with whom to settle accounts. It was true that Prussia was placed in a position much exposed to the blows of Napoleon; but then 80,000 men were marching to her assistance, and they would not have approached so near to her but for that object. This army united at Pulawi on the frontier of Silesia was not a threat to Prussia, but a generous attention on the part of Alexander, who would not voluntarily draw a friend into a serious war without putting the means into his hands of daring its perils. Besides, Napoleon had plenty of enemies on his hands; he would be in great danger on the Danube, if, whilst the Austrians and Russians in union should oppose a solid barrier to him, Prussia should throw herself on his rear by Franconia; he would then be placed between two fires and infallibly succumb. In this case, which was very probable, the common deliverance would be owing to Prussia, and then every thing should be done for her that had been promised her by Napoleon; all that he never intended to perform should then be given to her, even Hanover, that complement of territory, with which he had flattered the ambition of the house of Brandenburg. Letters had, in fact, been already written to London to decide England to make that sacrifice. It would be much better to receive so fine a gift from the hands of the legitimate possessor, as the price of the general safety, than to receive it from a usurper, who would be giving away the property of another as the reward of treason.

To these entreaties were joined a new influence in the presence of the archduke Antony, sent in all haste from Vienna to Berlin. This prince arrived to relate the rapid progress of the French, the fall of Ulm, and to state the perils which endangered the Austrian monarchy, too great not to be common to all Germany; he solicited earnestly, and at any cost, the reconciliation of the two principal German powers.

This diplomatic machination was too well interwoven for the unhappy king of Prussia to escape it. Still both the king and M. Haugwitz resisted it obstinately, as if they had some presentiment of the reverses which were soon to overtake the Prussian monarchy. There were many discussions, many disputations, and many bitter complaints. The king and his minister declared that they would bring about the ruin of Prussia; that they would to a certainty undo her, because entire Europe, were it united, would be incapable of resistance to Napoleon; that if they yielded it would be doing violence to their reason, their prudence, and their patriotism, and they would not fail to recriminate against a scheme which had been projected to draw them in, either by their own good will or by force, a scheme of which the Russian army then united on the frontier of Silesia was to be the instrument.

To this the emperor Alexander replied by giving up his minister, prince Czartoryski. Yielding to his natural inconstancy of character, he had already begun to listen much to the counsels of the Dolgoroukis, who went about every where declaring that prince Czartoryski was a perfidious minister, treacherous to his emperor on account of Poland, of which he wished to become king himself, and only on that account endeavouring to place Russia against Prussia. Alexander, who had not sufficient firmness of character for the plan which had been proposed to him, was himself affrighted at the idea of marching upon France by passing over the body of Prussia, if the crown of Poland were to be the price of the temerity. M. Alopeus enlightening his mind, and excited by the Dolgoroukis, he said that they had tried to make him commit a great fault, and he even warmly reproached prince Czartoryski, whose grave and austere character began to be disagreeable to him, because, with the freedom of a friend and of an independent minister, he sometimes blamed his sovereign for his weaknesses and fickleness.

By application, disavowals, but above all by accessory influences, such as the entreaties of the queen, the words of prince Louis, and the exclamations of the young Prussian staff, they finished by quieting the king, overcoming M. Haugwitz, and by making both enter into the designs of the coalition. But persuaded as Frederick-William had been, he reserved to himself a last resource to escape from his new engagement, and under the counsels of M. Haugwitz, he adopted a plan, which appeared to hold out something illusive to his deluded probity. This consisted in a design for a mediation, a grand piece of hypocrisy then employed by all the powers to disguise a coalition against France. It was the form which Prussia had thought of employing three months before, when she agitated the question of an alliance with Napoleon at the price of Hanover. It was the form which she employed at this time when she was considering of an alliance with Alexander, and unfortunately for her honour, again at the price of Hanover.

It was agreed that Prussia, alleging the impossibility of living in peace between adversaries so obstinately bent against each other, who did not even respect her territory, should decide to offer an intervention, in order to bring about a peace by force. So far there was nothing but what was good; but then what were the conditions of this peace to be? That involved the whole question.

If Prussia conformed herself to the treaties she had signed with Napoleon, by which she had guaranteed the existing state of the French empire, in exchange for what she had received in Germany, there was nothing to be said. But she was not firm enough to stay herself at this limit, which was that of good faith. She agreed to propose as the conditions of the peace, a new line of demarcation for the Austrian possessions in Lombardy, which must carry back that of the Adige to the Mincio (a step that must lead to the dismemberment of the kingdom of Italy), an indemnity for the king of Sardinia; and besides these, the conditions commonly admitted by Napoleon himself, that in case of a general pacification, Naples, Switzerland, and Holland, should be independent. This was a formal violation of the reciprocal guarantees that Prussia had stipulated with France, not in plans of alliance unfulfilled, but in authentic conventions, signed on the occasion of the Prussian indemnities.

The Russians and Austrians would have desired more; but as they knew that Napoleon would never consent to these conditions, they were sure, even with what they had so far obtained, to draw Prussia into the war.

There was another difficulty which they passed over, in order to throw over all obstacles. Frederick-William would not present himself to Napoleon in the name of all his enemies, particularly that of England, after having exchanged with him against that power so much of overflowing confidence. He expressed the desire therefore that not a single word relative to Great Britain should be pronounced in the declaration of mediation, not having the intention, he said, to mingle himself with any question but the peace of the continent. They consented here again, always estimating that there had been enough done in that which had been agreed upon to plunge Prussia into war. Finally, he exacted a last precaution, the most captious and the most important, that was the postponement for one month of the term at which Prussia should be compelled to act. On one part, the duke of Brunswick, always consulted and always heard without appeal from him, when the discussion was upon military affairs, declared that the Prussian army would not be ready before the first days of December; on the other, M. Haugwitz counselled delay, in order to see how things would pass on the Danube, between the French and Russians. With such a leader as Napoleon, events could not be long protracted, and in gaining only a month, they had the chance to escape the embarrassment they were in, by some sudden and decisive circumstance in that quarter. It was agreed, that at the expiration of a month, to be dated from the day when M. Haugwitz, charged with the task of proposing the mediation, should have quitted Berlin, Prussia was to be understood as expected to take the field if Napoleon should not have given a satisfactory reply. It was easy to add some days to the month, by retarding the departure of M. Haugwitz under different pretexts, and moreover Frederick-William relied upon his negotiator, upon his prudence and his address, that the first words exchanged with Napoleon should not be such as to render a rupture inevitable and immediate.

These conditions, unworthy of Prussian good faith, for they were contrary, it may be repeated, to formal stipulations of which Prussia had received the price in five territorial accessions, contrary above all to an intimacy which Napoleon had no doubt believed sincere—these conditions were inserted in a double declaration signed at Potsdam on the 3rd of November, 1805. The text has never been published, but Napoleon contrived at a subsequent period to become acquainted with the contents. This declaration preserved the title of the treaty of Potsdam. Undoubtedly Napoleon had committed errors in regard to Prussia; while flattering her and doing much for her advantage, he had suffered to pass away more than one opportunity of binding her irrevocably. But he had heaped upon her solid favours, and had always been honourable in his relations with her.

Alexander and Frederick-William inhabited Potsdam. It was in that fine retreat of the great Frederick, that they reciprocally raised themselves to a high pitch of exaltation, and concluded a treaty so contrary to the interests of Prussia. The able count Haugwitz was inconsolable, and could not excuse himself in his own eyes for having signed it in the hope to elude the consequences. The king, surprised and confounded, knew not where he was proceeding. To ease his troubled mind, Alexander, it is said, under an understanding with the queen, and most probably in pursuance of her taste for scenes of effect, expressed a wish to see the little vault which contained the remains of the great Frederick, in the centre of the Protestant church of Potsdam. There, in this vault, excavated in one of the pillars of the church, narrow, simple almost to negligence—there stood two coffins of wood; one enclosing the remains of Frederick-William I., the other that of the great Frederick. Alexander visited it with the young king, bathed in tears; and taking his friend in his arms, made himself, and demanded on his part, an oath of eternal friendship upon the coffin of the great Frederick! Never would they separate their cause or their fortunes. Tilsit soon exhibited the inviolable character of this oath, very probably sincere for the moment when it was taken.

This scene, related at Berlin, and published over all Europe, confirmed the opinion that existed, of a close alliance between those two young monarchs.

England received due notice of the change of things in Prussia, and of the negotiations so fortunately conducted with that court, and believed that she saw in it a capital event which might decide the fate of Europe. She immediately dispatched lord Harrowby himself, the minister for foreign affairs, in order to negotiate. The cabinet of London was not particular with the court of Berlin; it accepted its accession, no matter at what cost. It consented that England should not itself be named in the negotiations which M. Haugwitz had undertaken to the camp of Napoleon, and it kept the subsidies ready for the use of the Prussian army, not doubting that it would take a part in the war at the close of three months. In regard to the aggrandizement of territory announced to the house of Brandenburg, England was disposed to concede much. It did not depend upon the cabinet to give up Hanover, the cherished patrimony of George III. Mr. Pitt would have wil-

lingly sacrificed it, because it had always been in the minds of the English ministers to regard Hanover as a dead weight upon England. But it would have been easier to make George III. renounce the three kingdoms than Hanover. In return, an offer was made of something not quite as near to the Prussian monarchy, it is true; but more considerable, being no less than Holland itself[1]. That Holland, which all the courts asserted to be the slave of France, and of which they reclaimed the independence with so much energy, they flung down at the feet of Prussia, to attach her to the coalition and to disengage Hanover! It is for the illustrious Dutch nation to judge from that circumstance of the sincerity of the affection which the European states feel in its regard.

There were many subjects besides to be settled, at an ultimate period, between Prussia and England. In the mean while, it is necessary to draw from the treaty of Potsdam the essential result; that is to say, the accession of Prussia to the coalition. The Austrians and Russians then pressed the departure of M. Haugwitz; and while he was getting ready, the emperor Alexander set out, on the 5th of November, after ten days passed at Berlin. He proceeded towards Weimar, to visit there his sister, the grand duchess, a princess of great merit, who lived in that city, surrounded by individuals of the finest genius in Germany, happy in that noble community of feeling which she was worthy to taste. The separation of the two monarchs was, as their first encounter at the gates of Berlin had been, marked by embraces and testimonies of friendship that, on the side of one of the parties, there was an evident desire to render very ostentatious. Alexander set off for the army, surrounded by the attention which ordinarily attaches to such departures. In him they saluted a young hero, ready to meet the greatest dangers to procure the triumph of the common cause of kings.

During this time, M. de Laforest, minister of France, and Duroc, grand marshal of the imperial palace, were totally left alone. The court continued to treat them with the most offensive coolness. Although the most profound secrecy had been promised between the Russians and Prussians, relative to the stipulations of Potsdam, the Russians, not being able to contain their satisfaction, had suffered it to be understood by every body that Prussia was irrevocably engaged with them. Their joy, indeed, told this plainly enough; and, joined to the military preparations which were making, and the trouble, little in unison with his age, which the preparations gave the old duke of Brunswick, all attested the success which the presence of Alexander had obtained at Potsdam. M. Hardenberg, who shared with M. Haugwitz the direction of foreign affairs, did not show himself but seldom to the French negotiators; but M. Haugwitz received them more frequently. Interrogated by them on the importance which must be attached to the indiscretions of the Russians, he defended himself from all the suppositions which were spread abroad among the public. He avowed a project, that he said had no novelty for them—that of a mediation. When they wished to know whether such a mediation would be an armed one—which signified one imposed by force—he eluded the question, saying that the entreaties of his court to Napoleon would be in proportion to the urgency of the moment. When, lastly, they demanded what the conditions of such a mediation would be, he answered, that they would be just, wise, conformable to the glory of France, and that he could give them no better proof of this, than that he was himself ordered to be the bearer of them to Napoleon. He should not, the very first time that he should be in the presence of that great man, expose himself to be roughly treated.

Such were the explanations obtained from the cabinet of Berlin. The only thing evident was, that Silesia was open to the Russians, in punishment for the passage of the French troops over the territory of Anspach, and that Hanover was about to be occupied by a Prussian army. As France had a garrison of 6000 men in the strong fortress of Hameln, M. Haugwitz, without saying if the siege of that place would be ordered or not, made promises of the greatest courtesy towards the French, and added, that he hoped for the same from them in return.

The grand marshal, Duroc, not seeing any thing more to do at Berlin, set out for the head quarters of Napoleon. At this period—the end of October and beginning of November—Napoleon, having finished with the first Austrian army, was preparing to fall upon the Russians, in pursuance of the plan which he had formed.

When he became acquainted with what had passed at Berlin, he was confounded with astonishment; for it was in perfect good faith, and in the belief of the existence of the old usage, that he had ordered his troops to cross the provinces of Anspach. He did not believe that the irritation of Prussia could be sincere; and he was convinced that it was only made use of to serve the weakness of the court in its relations with the coalition. But nothing that he was able to imagine upon the subject was capable of shaking him; and he exhibited on this occasion all the greatness of his character.

The general plan of his operations has already been made known. In the presence of four attacks directed against the French empire, the first on the north of Hanover, the second on the south by lower Italy, the two others on the east by Lombardy and Bavaria; he had taken account of the two last alone. Leaving to Massena the care of warding off that of Lombardy and the occupation of the archdukes for a few weeks, he had reserved to himself that which was most important, the attack upon Bavaria. Availing himself, as has been seen, of the distance which separated the Austrians from the Russians, he had succeeded, after an unparalleled march, in surrounding the army of the first, and sending them prisoners to France: now he was going to march upon the second, and fling them back upon Vienna. By that movement Italy would be disengaged, and the attacks prepared in the north and south of Europe become mere insignificant diversions.

Still Prussia was able to cause serious disturbances to such a plan, by marching into Bohemia

[1] It is upon authentic documents that I found this assertion. *Author's Note.*

or Franconia upon the rear of Napoleon, while he should be marching upon Vienna. An ordinary general, upon hearing all that had passed at Berlin, would have halted all of a sudden and retrograded, in order to occupy a position nearer to the Rhine, in such a manner as not to be turned, and would have awaited in that position at the head of all his united forces the consequences of the treaty of Potsdam. But in conducting himself thus, he would render certain those dangers which were only probable events; he would give to the two Russian armies of Kutusof and Alexander sufficient time to effect a junction; he would give the archduke Charles time to march from Lombardy into Bavaria, to join the Russians, and to the Prussians time and courage to make to him propositions that were unacceptable, and to enter the lists with the rest. He might have upon him in a month 120,000 Austrians, 100,000 Russians, and 150,000 Prussians, assembled in the upper Palatinate or in Bavaria, and thus he might be borne down by a mass of force just double his own. To persist in his plan more than ever, that is to say, to march forward, to throw back to one extremity of Germany the principal armies of the coalition; to listen in Vienna to the complaints of Prussia, and to give it his triumphs for a reply: such was the wisest determination, although in appearance the most full of temerity. It must be added, that such grand resolutions are made for great men, that ordinary men give way under them: that more, they demand not only superior genius, but absolute authority; because to possess the power to advance or fall back, in accordance with the state of circumstances, it is requisite to be the centre of all movements, of all information, of all will; it is needful to be general and head of the empire, it is necessary to be Napoleon and emperor.

The language of Napoleon to Prussia was in conformity to the resolution which he had taken. Far from offering his excuses for the violation of the territory of Anspach, he contented himself by referring her to anterior conventions, saying, that if these conventions existed no longer, it would have been proper to have made him acquainted with it; that in other respects they were pure pretexts; that his enemies, he could well see, had become uppermost at Berlin; that it was not convenient to him from that time to enter upon amicable explanations with a prince with whom his friendship seemed to have no value; that he should abandon to time and events the business of answering for him, but that upon one point alone he should be inflexible, that of honour; that his eagles had never suffered an insult; that they were in one of the strong fortresses of Hanover, that of Hameln; that if they attempted to snatch them from it, general Barbou would defend them to the very last extremity, and should have succour before he could be forced to surrender; that to have all Europe upon her hands was not any very new or fearful thing to France; that he himself, Napoleon, would soon come if his presence were called for from the banks of the Danube to the shores of the Elbe, and make his new enemies repent, as he had made his old ones, having insulted the dignity of his empire. The following order was given to general Barbou, and communicated to the Prussian government.

"To the general of division Barbou.

"Augsburg, 24th October, 1805.

"I am ignorant what is preparing; but whatever be the power, the armies of which shall enter Hanover, should it even be a power which has not declared war against me, you will oppose it. Not having sufficient strength to resist an army, shut yourself up in the fortresses, and suffer nobody to approach within cannon range of such fortresses. I shall come to the aid of the troops shut up in Hameln. My eagles have never suffered affront. I hope that the soldiers which you command will be worthy of their comrades, and above all that they will know how to preserve honour, the first and most precious property of nations.

"You are not to surrender the place but by an order from me, which shall be carried to you by one of my aides-de-camp. NAPOLEON."

Napoleon went from Ulm to Augsburgh, and from Augsburg to Munich, to make his dispositions for the march. Before following him in the long and immense valley of the Danube, overpassing all the obstacles that opposed him from winter and the enemy, it is necessary to cast the eyes for a moment upon Lombardy, where Massena had been charged with the task of keeping the Austrians employed while Napoleon overturned their position on the Adige by advancing upon Vienna.

Napoleon and Massena were perfectly well acquainted with Italy, because both had there acquired their glory. The instructions given for the conduct of this campaign were alike worthy both of the one and the other. Napoleon had at first made it a principle that 50,000 French supported upon a river, had nothing to fear from 80,000 enemies, be they whom they might; that in any case he should only demand of them one thing, which was to guard the Adige until, entering into Bavaria (which forms the northern slope of the Alps, as Lombardy forms the reverse on the south), he should have turned the Austrian position and obliged them to retrograde; that in order to do this it would be necessary to hold together on the upper part of that river, the left wing towards the Alps, according to the example which he had always given, to drive back the Austrians if they should present themselves by the gorges of the Tyrol; or should they pass the lower Adige, to suffer them to do so, only to concentrate, and thus while they would be entangled in the marshy country of the lower Adige and the Po, from Legnago to Venice, to throw himself on their right flank and drown them in the lagunes; that by resting then in a mass at the foot of the Alps, there was nothing to be feared, let the attack be from on high or from below; but that if the enemy appeared to abandon the offensive, it would be necessary to take it against him, carry by night attack the bridge of Verona upon the Adige, and afterwards proceed to the attack of the heights of Caldiero. The campaigns of Napoleon would furnish models for every mode of conduct on that part of the theatre of war.

Massena was not a man to hesitate between the offensive and defensive. The first of these systems of carrying on war alone suited his mind

and character. He had arrived at that degree of confidence, that, with 50,000 French, he did not consider himself bound to keep to the defensive before 80,000 Austrians, although they were commanded by the archduke Charles. In consequence, in the night of the 17th and 18th of October, after having received intelligence of the first movements of the grand army, he advanced in silence towards the bridge of Château Vieux, situated in the interior of Verona. This city, as is well known, is divided by the Adige into two parts; the one belonged to the French, the other to the Austrians. The bridges were severed and their ends defended by palisades and walls. After having blown up the wall which stopped an approach to the bridge of Château Vieux, Massena arrived at the river bank, sent a party of brave voltigeurs, in boats, some to examine whether the piles of the bridge were undermined, others to land on the opposite bank. Certain that the piles were not undermined, he established a sort of passage across with planks; then having crossed the Adige he fought all day on the 18th against the Austrians. The secrecy, the vigour, and the promptitude of the attack, were worthy of the first lieutenant of Napoleon in the campaigns of Italy. By this operation Massena found he was master of the course of the Adige, and enabled in case of necessity to operate on both banks; he had little to fear from a surprise through a passage achieved by main force, because he was in a state to interrupt such an attempt on whatever point it might be tried. Before taking avowedly offensive operations, and advancing definitively upon the Austrian territory, he wished to receive from the banks of the Danube some decisive information.

This desired news arrived on the 28th of October, and filled the army of Italy with joy and emulation. Massena announced it to his troops by the thunder of artillery, and at once resolved to march forward. The next day, being the 29th, he carried three of his divisions over the Adige, those of Gardanne, Duhesme, and Molitor, overthrew the Austrians, and extended himself over the plains of St. Michel, between the fortress of Verona and the entrenched camp of Caldiero. His design was to attack this formidable camp, although he had before him an army much superior in number, supported on positions that both nature and art had rendered extremely strong. On the other side, the archduke, informed of the wonderful success of the grand French army, presuming that he would be soon constrained to retrograde in order to carry succour to Vienna, still thought he ought not to give up the ground as if he were vanquished. He was desirous of gaining a decided advantage which would allow him to retire unmolested, and to take the route which was best suited to the situation of a general connected with the coalition.

The two antagonists went to attack each other with the greater fury, that they had both taken a similar resolution to fight to the very last extremity.

Massena had before him the last scarps of the Alps of the Tyrol, which descend until their declination is gradually lost in the plain of Verona, near the village of Caldiero. On his left the heights of Colognola were covered with entrenchments regularly constructed, and defended by a numerous artillery. At the centre and in the plain was situated the village of Caldiero, crossed by the great road through Lombardy which conducts by Friuli into Austria. At this point an obstacle appeared in the form of grounds crossed by enclosures and buildings, occupied by a great part of the Austrian infantry. Finally, on his right Massena saw extended the flat and marshy banks of the Adige, every where crossed by ditches and dikes bristled with cannon. Thus on the left the mountains entrenched, at the centre a great road bordered with works of defence, on the right the marshes of the Adige, every where covered with works appropriate to the ground, lined with artillery and 80,000 men to defend them—such was the entrenched camp that Massena was about to attack with 50,000 men. Nothing could intimidate the hero of Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa. On the 30th in the morning he advanced in columns on the great road. On his left he commanded general Molitor to carry with his divisions the formidable heights of Colognola; he himself undertook to attack the centre with the divisions of Duhesme and Gardanne along the great road; and as he judged that in order to dislodge the enemy, so superior in number and position, it would be necessary to make him perceive one of his wings to be endangered, he ordered general Verdier to proceed to the extreme right of the French army, to pass the Adige there with 10,000 men, to turn the left wing of the archduke, and then to fall upon his rear. If this operation had been well executed, it was worth the value of such a detachment; but it was running a hazard to confide the passage of the river to a lieutenant, and these 10,000 men, if they were not very well employed on the right, would be sadly missed at the centre.

At the break of day Massena, attacking the enemy with vigour, overturned him at every point. General Molitor, one of the most able and firm of the officers of the army, advanced coolly as far as the foot of the heights of Colognola, and stormed the first steeps in spite of a terrible fire. While colonel Teste, arriving at the head of the 5th regiment of the line, was ready to ascend them, count Bellegarde, sallying from the redoubts with all his force, came in to overwhelm that regiment. General Molitor, immediately appreciating the serious danger impending, without numbering his enemies, fell on the column of general Bellegarde with the 6th of the line, the only regiment he had at that moment at hand. He attacked that column so violently that it was taken by surprise and compelled to halt. During this time colonel Teste had entered one of the redoubts, and had planted there the colours of the 5th regiment, of which a ball had carried away the eagle. But the Austrians, ashamed to see themselves driven from such positions by so small a number of men, returned to the charge and retook the redoubt. The French on that point, therefore, remained in front of the enemies' entrenchments, without the power to take them. It was a miracle to have dared so much with so few men, without sustaining a complete defeat.

At the centre, prince Charles had placed the

main body of his forces. He had put at its head a reserve of grenadiers, in the ranks of which three archdukes themselves fought. Already generals Duhesme and Gardanne had swept the high road and captured one after another the enclosures which bordered it, and they had now arrived near Caldiero. The archduke Charles chose this moment to take upon himself the offensive. He repulsed the assailants, and marched on the road in a dense column at the head of the best Austrian infantry. This column continually advancing, as of old time did that of Fontenoy, had already passed the detachments of French troops scattered to the right and left in the enclosures, and would have been enabled to possess themselves of Vago, which was to the French that which Caldiero was for the Austrians, the support of their centre. But Massena hastened to the place. He rallied his divisions placed on the road, in front of the enemy with all his disposable artillery, and poured grape shot within point blank range upon the brave Austrian grenadiers; then he charged them with the bayonet upon the flanks, and after an obstinate resistance, in which he was in the midst of the fire like a common soldier, he forced the column to retreat. He drove it beyond Caldiero, and gained ground so far as to penetrate within the first Austrian entrenchments. If at this moment general Verdier had crossed the Adige, or even if Massena had possession of the 10,000 men, uselessly sent to his extreme right, he would have captured the formidable entrenched camp of Caldiero. But general Verdier carrying on his operations badly, had thrown one of his regiments beyond the river without the means of supporting it, and completely failed in his design of effecting a passage. Night alone separated the combatants, and covered with its shadow one of the bloodiest fields of battle of the age.

It required a character like that of Massena to undertake and sustain such a conflict without a check. The Austrians lost 3000 men killed and wounded; and 4000 of them were made prisoners. The French, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, had not lost more than 3000. They slept on the field of battle, mingled one with the other in frightful confusion. But in the night the archduke sent away his baggage and artillery, and the next day, occupying the French by means of a rear-guard, he commenced his retrograde march. A corps of 5000 men, commanded by general Hillinger, was sacrificed to the interest of the retreat. He had been ordered to descend the heights for the purpose of alarming Verona in the rear of the French army, while the archduke was getting ready to march. General Hillinger had not time to return from the demonstration he had thus made, perhaps he had pushed it too far, and was taken prisoner with his entire corps. Thus in three days Massena had lessened the number of the enemy 11,000 or 12,000 men, of whom 8000 were prisoners, and 3000 killed and wounded.

He immediately set out to pursue the archduke at the sword's point. But the Austrian prince had with him the best soldiers of Austria, to the number of 70,000 men, experience, talent, winter, and rivers overflown, the bridges of which he demolished as he retreated. Massena could not therefore flatter himself with the hope of making him sustain any great catastrophe; nevertheless, he occupied him sufficiently by his pursuit, so as not to permit him to possess any facility of manœuvring against the grand army at his own will.

This other part of the plan of Napoleon had therefore been accomplished as exactly as that which preceded it, because the archduke Charles, retiring towards Austria, was obliged to fight as he retreated, in order to go to the aid of a menaced capital.

Napoleon had not lost a moment at Munich in making his dispositions. He was desirous to cross the Inn, to beat the Russians, and to disconcert the intrigues at Berlin by new successes as prompt and astounding as those at Ulm. The corps of general Kutusof, which he had before him, was scarcely 50,000 strong, upon its entering on the campaign, although according to the promises of Russia, it should have been much more numerous. From Moravia to Bavaria this army had left on the way from 5000 to 6000 sick or stragglers, but it had been joined by the Austrian detachment of Kienmayer, who had escaped the disaster at Ulm before that place was invested. M. Meerfeld had added some other troops to this detachment, of which he had taken the command. The whole of the allied strength, Russian and Austrian, might be reckoned at about 65,000 men. This was a very small force to save the Austrian monarchy from 150,000 French, of whom 100,000 at least marched in one body. General Kutusof commanded this army. He was advanced in life, deprived of the sight of one eye in consequence of a wound in the head, very fat, idle, dissolute, greedy, but intelligent; active in mind as he was heavy of body; fortunate in war; an able courtier, and capable enough of commanding in a situation that demanded prudence and good fortune. His lieutenants were very middling men, except three, prince Bagration, and generals Doctorow and Miloradovich. Prince Bagration was a Georgian, possessed of heroic courage, who supplied by experience the want of early instruction; to him was always committed, whether the advanced or the rear-guard, still the post of the most difficult duty. General Doctorow was a wise, modest, firm, and intelligent officer. General Miloradovich was a Servian, of shining courage, but wholly destitute of military knowledge; of dissolute manners, and uniting in himself all the vices of civilization with the vices of barbarism. The character of the Russian soldiers answered well enough to that of their generals. They were possessed of a savage, ill-directed bravery. Their artillery was unwieldy; their cavalry indifferent. As a whole, generals, officers, and soldiers composed an uninstructed army, but singularly formidable from their devotedness. The Russian troops subsequently acquired the art of war by making it upon the French, and soon after began to join knowledge with courage.

General Kutusof was ignorant to the last moment of the disaster at Ulm, because the archduke Ferdinand and general Mack, up to the very eve of this misfortune, had announced to him nothing but success. The truth was only known by the arrival of general Mack, who came in person to announce the destruction of the principal Austrian army. Kutusof, despairing then, and with very

good reason, of saving Vienna, did not dissimulate to the emperor Francis, who had come to the Russian head-quarters, that it was necessary to make a sacrifice of that capital. He would have taken himself as soon as possible out of the way of the danger which threatened him, by passing over to the left bank of the Danube, in order to form a junction with the reserves which were coming by way of Bohemia and Moravia, had not the emperor Francis and his council been adverse to sacrificing Vienna until the last extremity. They flattered themselves, that by retarding the progress of Napoleon by all the means that a defensive warfare could offer, they would thus give time to the archduke Charles to pass the Danube, and to effect a general junction of the allied forces, in order to give a battle, that would perhaps prove the safety of the capital and the monarchy. General Kutusof, in conformity to the wishes of his master's principal ally, promised to oppose to the French every resistance which might not go so far as to engage him in a general battle, and resolved, in order to slacken their movement, to make use of all the rivers feeding the Danube, that, flowing from the side of the Alps, mingle their currents in that great river. It was sufficient for that purpose to destroy the bridges, and to hinder by strong rearguards and main force the passages which the French might attempt—passages difficult enough at a season when all the waters were high, the torrents rapid, and full of ice.

Napoleon had disposed his order of march in the following manner. He was obliged to take his route between the Danube and the chain of the Alps, over a road narrowed and confined between the river and the mountains. To advance with a numerous army upon this narrow road rendered it difficult to find provisions, and was even dangerous in the march; because, besides the archduke Charles, who was able to pass from Lombardy into Bavaria, and throw himself on the French flank, there were in the Tyrol 25,000 men, under the archduke John. Napoleon therefore took the wise precaution to confide the conquest of the Tyrol to the corps of Ney. He directed that marshal to leave the Inn, to ascend by Kempten, to penetrate into the Tyrol in such a manner as to cut in two the troops dispersed in that long territory. Those which were on the right of marshal Ney would be thrown back on the Vorarlberg and the lake of Constance, where the corps of Augereau would arrive, after crossing the entire of France from Brest to Huningen. Ney, deprived of the division of Dupont, which had gone with Murat in pursuit of the archduke Ferdinand, found his force reduced to about 10,000 men. But Napoleon, trusting to his activity and courage, and to the 14,000 men whom Augereau was bringing up, believed that it would be found force enough for the task which he had to fulfil. The Tyrol thus occupied, he designed that Bernadotte should penetrate into the country of Salzburg. He enjoined upon him to set out from Munich toward the Inn, and to pass over the river either at Wasserburg or at Rosenheim. General Marmont was to support Bernadotte. Thus Napoleon secured to himself two advantages—one, of entirely covering the side of the Alps, and the other, of getting possession of the course of the upper Inn, which would prevent the Austro-Russians from defending the lower part of the river against the main body of the French army. In regard to himself, with the corps of marshals Davout, Lannes, and Soult, with the reserve of cavalry and the guard, he would take in front the great barrier of the Inn, with the intention of passing from Mühldorf to Braunau. Murat had orders to set out on the 26th of October, with the dragoons of generals Walther and Beaumont, the heavy cavalry of general Hautpoul, and a bridge equipage, to go directly to Mühldorf, following the great road from Munich by Hohenlinden, traversing thus the fields made memorable by Moreau. Marshal Soult was to support him one march behind. Marshal Davout to take the route to the left by Freisingen, Dorfen, and Neu-Œttingen. Lannes who had, aided with Murat, the pursuit of the archduke Ferdinand, was to march yet more to the left than Davout, by Landshut, Wilsburg, and Braunau. Finally, the division of Dupont, which was to proceed far in the same direction, descended the Danube, in order that it might go and take Passau. Napoleon with the guard followed Murat and Soult on the great road to Munich.

Before quitting Augsburg, Napoleon ordained there a system of precautions with which he will be seen more and more occupied in proportion as the range of his operations increased, and in which he has ever been without an equal, both in extent of foresight, and the activity of his care. This system of precautions had for its object to create upon his line of operations points of support, which should serve him equally well in advancing or retiring, in case he should be reduced to this last necessity. These points of support, besides the advantage of offering a certain proportion of force, would have that of containing immense stores of all kinds very useful to an army which is marching forward, but indispensable to one that is retiring. He chose for this purpose in Bavaria the city of Augsburg on the Lech, which afforded certain means of defence and resources adapted to a great population. He ordered the requisite works there to place the city beyond the reach of a sudden attack, and that there should be collected within them, corn, cattle, cloth, shoes, ammunition, and, above all, hospitals. He ordered contracts for cloth and shoes, to be made at Nuremberg, Ratisbon, and Munich, paying for them, and requiring their rapid execution, with an order that they should, when completed, be collected there. Thus Augsburg becoming the principal point in the route of the army, the different detachments were to pass through that place, that they might provide themselves with all of which they stood in need. These precautions adopted, Napoleon set out to follow his forces, which had advanced before him one or two marches.

The movements of his army were executed as he had traced them out. The 26th of October it advanced in a body towards the Inn. The Austro-Russians had not left a single bridge standing. But the soldiers every where, embarking in boats, passed over in strong detachments under a fire of musketry and grape-shot, obliged the enemy to evacuate the opposite bank, and prepare for the re-establishment of the bridges, rarely destroyed wholly by the enemy, owing to the great precipi-

tation of their retreat. Bernadotte encountered very few obstacles, and passed the Inn on the 28th of October, at Wasserburg. Marshals Soult, Murat, and Davout passed over at Mühlsdorf and at Neu-Œttingen. Lannes proceeded towards Braunau, and on finding the bridge destroyed, sent a detachment to the other bank by means of some boats they had taken. The detachment passed the river, and appeared at the gates of Braunau. What was the astonishment of the French soldiers to find a place open which was in a perfect state of defence, completely armed and provided with considerable resources. They took possession of it immediately, and naturally concluded from so strange a circumstance that the enemy had retired with a precipitation which indicated disorder.

Napoleon, delighted with an acquisition thus important, went himself to Braunau that he might learn the strength of the place, and the benefit which it was possible he might derive from it. After having seen it, he ordered the transference thither of a large part of the stores which he had at first wished to place at Augsburg, judging it preferable for the object to which he destined it. He left a garrison there, and named his aide-de-camp Lauriston its commander-in-chief, he having returned from the naval campaign he had made with admiral Villeneuve. It was not the simple government of the place alone which he thus committed to him; it was a command which comprehended all the rear of the army. The wounded, the ammunition, the provisions, the recruits which arrived from France, the prisoners which were sent there, all were to pass through Braunau under the eye of general Lauriston. From the 29th to the 30th of October, the army had passed the Inn, quitted Bavaria, and invaded Upper Austria. It was no longer a burden to its allies, but upon the hereditary states of the imperial house. It marched onwards, covered against a movement of the archdukes by Bernadotte and Marmont at Salzburg, and by Ney in the Tyrol. Napoleon did not lose a moment, wishing from the line of the Inn to reach that of the Traun. From the line of the Inn and the Traun, they have, as is always the case in this country, the Danube to the left, and the Alps on the right. It is a magnificent country, resembling Lombardy, only more rough in climate, because it is on the north of the Alps in place of being to the south, and would be as level as a plain, if a great mountain, called the Hausrück, did not arise abruptly in the midst of it. This mountain is peaked, detached altogether from the Alps, and would form an island if the country were covered with water. But the Hausrück passed, there is nothing in front but a plain undulating and woody, extending to the bank of the Traun, and named the plain of Wels. The Traun runs over gravel and among fine trees, falling into the Danube near Lintz, the capital city of the province, in a military point of view as important as the city of Ulm, and on this account, since the great French wars, bristled with fortifications constructed on a new system.

Napoleon directed Lannes to march by Efferding upon Lintz, marshals Soult and Davout, by the road from Ried and Lambach, upon Wels, along the foot of the Hausrück. Murat always preceded with his cavalry. The guard followed with the headquarters. Still fearing that the plain of Wels was not selected by the enemy as a field of battle, Napoleon desired Marmont to quit Bernadotte at Salzburg, and to join again the main body of the army, by passing behind the Hausrück, on the road from Straswalchen and Wocklabruck on Wels, in such a way as to attack the Austro-Russians in flank, if they should halt to fight.

The 1st chasseurs came up to them in advance of Ried, charged them boldly and routed them. They marched upon Lambach, which the enemy made a show of defending, but merely in order to get time to preserve their baggage. Davout succeeded in overtaking them, and had a brilliant combat with their rear-guard; but no preparations for an intended battle could be discovered. The enemy covered himself with the Traun on passing at Wels. The French entered Lintz without firing a shot. Although the Austrians had made the Danube serve for carrying away the contents of their principal magazines, they left to the French many valuable resources. Napoleon came and established his head-quarters at Lintz on the 5th of November.

Established in that city, Napoleon carried the corps of his army from the Traun to the Ens, which it was easy to do; because the country between these two feeders of the Danube, offered no position of which the enemy was tempted to make use. The country presented a plain a little elevated, crossed by ravines, and covered with wood, having two steep declivities, one in front that must be climbed after passing, the other in the rear which it is necessary to descend in passing the Ens. Not having defended the side next the Traun, the Austro-Russians would not think of defending it on the side of the Ens, because they would have been every where commanded. The Ens was therefore passed without an obstacle.

Having his head-quarters at Lintz, and his advanced guard on the Ens, Napoleon made his new dispositions for the continuance of this offensive march, executed, as already said, on a narrow road between the Danube and Alps. The difficulty of advancing thus in a long column, of which the rear would scarcely be able to go to the succour of the van, if it had been surprised by the enemy,—with the danger always to be feared of an attack on the flank, if the archdukes should suddenly quit Italy to enter Austria,—increased yet more by the scarcity of provisions, already devoured or destroyed by the Russians; all these things demanded the utmost precautions to be taken before arriving at Vienna.

The most serious inconvenience of this march would be, most assuredly, the sudden appearance of the grand-dukes. The two belligerent masses, which were acting in Austria and in Lombardy, proceeded from west to east; the one under Napoleon and Kutusof, north of the Alps; the other to the south of those mountains, under Massena and the archduke Charles. Was it not possible that the archduke Charles might all of a sudden escape from Massena, and leave before him a rear-guard as a deception, march across the Alps, joining in his way his brother John and the corps of the Tyrol, and penetrating into Bavaria, whether to unite his army to the Austro-Russians behind one of the defensive positions that are met with on the

Danube, or whether to throw himself simply on the flank of the grand French army? Though possible, this was not at all likely. The archduke Charles had two roads to take. The first which, by the Tyrol, Verona, Trent, and Inspruck, would have conducted him behind the Inn; the second, the furthest—that through Carinthia and Styria, by Tarvis, Leoben, and Lilienfeld—would have conducted him to the position known as that of St. Pölten, in advance of Vienna. In regard to the first—supposing that the archduke had decided at the moment even of Mack's capitulation, which took place on the 20th, and that was not known at Verona to the French until the 28th, which could not have been known by the Austrians before the 25th or 26th—supposing that, before quitting Italy, the archduke had not seen proper to give battle in order to restrain the French army, he would have had from the 25th to the 28th only, to traverse the Tyrol and arrive on the Inn, that Napoleon had passed on the 28th and 29th. He had evidently too little time for such a march. As to the route through Styria, that he would have been able to take after the battle of Caldiero; he would have had to cross Friuli, Carinthia, Styria, and to make a hundred leagues in the Alps, from the 30th of October, the day of the battle of Caldiero, to the 6th or 7th of November, the day on which Napoleon had passed the Ens to march forward. The time would have been wanting to the archduke for such an operation. If the archduke Charles was not able to advance before Napoleon on one of the defensive positions of the Danube, in order to oppose to him 150,000 Austrians and Prussians united, he was able, without taking the lead, by simply advancing on the other hand and traversing the chain of the Alps, to attempt an attack upon the flank of the grand army. Doubtless, with soldiers habituated to conquer, prepared for hardy enterprises, capable of opening a way any where, he would have been able to make such an attempt, and to effect a sudden and serious derangement in the march of Napoleon, even, perhaps, to change the character of events: but he would run himself the chance of being shut in between two armies—that of Massena and that of Napoleon—as had once happened to Suvarrow in the St. Gothard. It would have been a most hazardous attempt; and such attempts are not to be made, when there depends upon them the army which is the last resource of a monarchy.

Napoleon, however, conducted himself as if such an attempt had been probable. The only position that the enemy was able to occupy to cover Vienna, whether the army of Kutusof were alone, or whether the archdukes should be with him, was that of St. Pölten. This position is very well known. The Styrian Alps turn the Danube to the northward, from Mölk to Krems, throwing out a spur which is called the Kahlenberg, and which subsides only at the very verge of the river, leaving scarcely space for a road. The Kahlenberg covering with its mass the city of Vienna, it is necessary to traverse across its whole breadth to arrive in that capital. In front of this spur, half way up the side, is found a wide spread position, which has received the name of a large village that stands near it, called St. Pölten, on which an Austrian army in retreat would be able to deliver a defensive battle with great advantage. From the great road of Italy to Vienna, a branch is detached, which, by Lilienfeld, terminates near St. Pölten, and might bring the archdukes there. A vast wooden bridge over the Danube, that of Krems, places this position in communication with both banks of the river, and would have allowed the Russian and Austrian reserves to arrive there through Bohemia. It was there, in consequence, that Napoleon would encounter a general union of the coalesced forces, that is, if such a union of forces was possible in advance of Vienna. On approaching this point, therefore, he took the precautions of a general who united in himself calculation and audacity beyond any soldier ever before known.

Having upon his right the corps of general Marmont, he resolved to send it to Leoben by a road which was passable for wheel carriages, that runs from Lintz, crossing Styria. General Marmont, if he heard of the approach of the archdukes, was to fall back upon the grand army and become its extreme right, or if the archdukes passed directly from Friuli into Hungary, to establish himself at Leoben in order to unite with Massena. There was between this road that Marmont had taken, and the great road of the Danube which was followed by the main body of the army, a mountain route, that by Waidhofen and St. Gaming, falling upon Lilienfeld beyond the position of St. Pölten, and thus furnishing the means of turning it. There it was that Napoleon ordered the corps of marshal Davout. The corps of Bernadotte was no longer necessary at Salzburg, now they had set off to occupy the Tyrol. Napoleon ordered him to approach the centre of the army, marching the Bavarians towards the corps of Ney, which was very agreeable intelligence for them, as they had always a great ambition to be in possession of the Tyrol. He reserved to himself, in order to attack more directly the position of St. Pölten, the corps of marshals Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte, with Murat's cavalry and the guard; these were sufficient, the corps of Davout being sent to turn that position.

Napoleon did not stop here, but wished to take certain precautions on the left bank of the Danube. Thus far he had only marched by the right bank, entirely neglecting the left. There was some rumour of an assemblage of troops in Bohemia, formed by the archduke Ferdinand, who had sallied out of Ulm with several thousand horse. The approach of the second Russian army was also reported, led into Bohemia by Alexander himself. It was needful, therefore, for him to guard himself equally on that side. Napoleon, who had carried to Passau the division of Dupont, ordered him to advance by the left bank of the Danube, keeping himself always at the same height as the army, and sending reconnoitring parties on the roads into Bohemia, in order to place himself in possession of all that passed. The Dutch, who had quitted Marmont, were to be united with Dupont's division, it not being thought strong enough. Napoleon detached the division of Gazan of the corps of Lannes, and ordered it to march with Dupont's division on the left bank. He placed them, both one and the other, under the command of marshal Mortier, and in order not to leave them isolated from the grand

army that continued to occupy the right bank, he managed to form out of the boats collected on the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, and the Danube, a numerous flotilla, which he loaded with provisions, ammunition, and those soldiers whom fatigue had overcome; and who, descending the Danube with the army, in a single hour might be thrown on the right or left bank to the number of 10,000, thus connecting the two banks together, and securing at the same time a means of communication and of transport. He placed captain Lostanges at the head of this flotilla, an officer belonging to the seamen of the guard.

It was by such an assemblage of precautions that Napoleon provided for the difficulties and obstacles of this offensive march, executed in a long and narrow road between the Alps and the Danube. He had thus, on the summit of the Alps, the corps of Marmont; at half their elevation that of Davout; at their foot along the Danube, the corps of Soult, Lannes, Bernadotte, the guard, the cavalry of Murat; on the other side of the Danube the corps of Mortier; and, finally, the flotilla to connect all marching on both sides of the river; and to transport all by water which it was difficult to convey after him on land. It was in this imposing mode that he approached Vienna.

At the moment when he was about to quit Lintz, an emissary from the emperor of Austria arrived at the French head-quarters. This emissary was general Giulay, one of the officers taken at Ulm, afterwards released, and who, having heard Napoleon speak of his pacific disposition, had informed his master of it in such a way as to make some impression upon him. In consequence, the emperor Francis sent him to propose an armistice. General Giulay did not explain himself clearly; but it was evident that he wished Napoleon should halt before entering Vienna, and still he did not offer in return any guarantee of an approaching or acceptable peace. Napoleon consented to treat of peace immediately, with a plenipotentiary properly accredited and duly authorized to consent to the sacrifices necessary for that purpose; but to grant an armistice without a guarantee obtained for what was due to France as an indemnification for the war, was to give the second Russian army time to join the first, and to the archdukes time to unite with the Russians under the walls of Vienna. Napoleon was not the man to commit such an error. He therefore declared, that he would stop at the very gates of Vienna, and not pass them, if they came to him with sincere propositions of peace; but that, otherwise, he would march right on to his object, which was the capital of the empire. M. Giulay alleged the necessity there was of having an understanding on the subject with the emperor Alexander, before conditions could be fixed which should be acceptable to all the belligerent powers. Napoleon hereupon replied, that the emperor Francis, who was in danger, would be wrong to make his resolutions depend upon the emperor Alexander, who was not there; that he was bound to consider the safety of his own monarchy, and on that account to come to terms with France, and leave to the French army the business of sending back the Russians to their own country. Napoleon did not enter into any explanation of the conditions which he should deem satisfactory, but every body understood that he wished to have possession of the Venetian states. These states completed the complement of Italy; he had not sought the war for their acquirement, but the war having been got up by Austria, it was natural that he should require the legitimate price of his victories. He gave into the hands of M. Giulay a polite mild letter for the emperor Francis, sufficiently clear, at the same time, to make known the terms of a peace.

Before setting off, Napoleon received a visit from the elector of Bavaria, who, not having been able to join him at Munich, came to Lintz to express to him his acknowledgments, admiration, and joy, but before all his hopes of aggrandizement.

Napoleon remained only three days at Lintz, that is to say, the time alone necessary to issue his orders; but his corps had not stopped their march, because, having passed the Inn on the 28th and 29th of October, the Traun on the 31st, the Ens on the 4th and 5th of November, they had advanced the same day upon Amstetten and St. Pölten. At Amstetten the Russians determined to give battle with their rear-guard, in order to gain time to save their baggage. The great road to Vienna leads though a forest of fir-trees. The Russians took up a position in a cleared spot of this forest, which left a certain space open on the right and left of the road. In the midst of this space, and in front, the artillery of the Russians was found supported by their cavalry; in the rear, and backed by the wood, their best infantry. Murat and Lannes, on opening upon them with the dragoons and grenadiers of Oudinot, perceived their dispositions. It was the first time they had ever encountered the Russians, and they much desired to teach them how the French fought. They dispatched the dragoons and chasseurs along the main road to attack the artillery and cavalry of the enemy. The brave French cavalry, in spite of the grape-shot, had soon captured the guns, sabred the Russian cavalry, and swept the ground. But it was requisite to rout the infantry, drawn up with their backs to the wood. The grenadiers of Oudinot undertook this task. After a very heavy fire of musketry, they marched upon the Russians with fixed bayonets. These, displaying uncommon courage, fought man to man, and availed themselves of the density of the wood to offer resistance for a long time. At length the French grenadiers forced them from the position, and put them to flight, after killing, wounding, and taking a thousand men.

Murat and Lannes, advancing together, the first with his cavalry, continually in march although wearied out with fatigue, the second with his formidable grenadiers, continued in pursuit of the enemy on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of November, without being able to attack any part of them.

"The Russians," Lannes wrote to Napoleon, "fly yet faster than we are able to pursue them; these miserable beings will not stop a moment even to fight."

Being arrived on the 8th before St. Pölten, Lannes and Murat found them in order of battle, making a determined front, as if they were inclined to engage in a serious affair. In spite of their ardour, the two leaders of the French advanced guard dared not venture to run the risk of a battle, without the emperor being present; moreover they

had not means sufficient to give it. They remained in presence of each other the whole day of the 8th. They were near the fine abbey of the Mölk. This rich abbey, standing on the scarped bank of the Danube, and predominant over the wide stream of the river, with its magnificent domes, appeared one of the finest prospects in the world. They reserved it for the head-quarters of the emperor. It had within its walls abundant accommodations, especially for the sick and wounded.

Murat was quartered in the castle of Mittrau with a count Montecuculli. There he found from different accounts that the Russians had no intention of making a resistance at St. Pölten. They had, it appeared, taken a very important resolution. After having delayed the march of the French, either by breaking down the bridges, or combating with their rear-guard, and having thus acceded to the wishes of the emperor of Austria, that they should as long as possible dispute the great road to Vienna, they thought they had done enough, and began to consider their own security. They repassed the Danube at Krems, at the place where that river, terminating its bend to the north, retakes its eastern direction. The motive which thus decided them more than all to this determination, was the intelligence that a part of the French army had passed to the left bank of the Danube. They had in fact good ground to apprehend that Napoleon, by some sudden manœuvre, carrying over the main body of his forces to the left bank of the river, might cut them off from Bohemia and Moravia. In consequence they passed the Danube at Krems, and burned the bridge after they had passed. The works which would have served for its defence, and which would have secured them its exclusive possession, were scarcely commenced, and they had therefore no other resource than to destroy it. They crossed over on the 9th, leaving throughout the archduchy of Austria terrible traces of their presence. They pillaged, ravaged, even murdered, conducting themselves in fact like real barbarians, and that to such a degree that the French were almost considered as the liberators of the country. Their conduct towards the Austrian troops was any thing but amiable. They treated them with extreme arrogance, affecting to lay upon them all the reverses of the campaign. The language of the Russian generals and officers was in this respect highly insulting, and not at all merited, because if the Austrian infantry exhibited less firmness than the Russian, they were in all other respects far superior.

The Austrians thus living on very ill terms with the Russians, separated from them, and went to defend the bridges of Vienna. M. Meerfeld with his corps retired by the route of Steyer upon Leoben. He marched, followed by general Marmont, on the road from Waidhofen to Leoben, and by marshal Davout, on that from St. Gaming to Lilienfeld. The direct road to Vienna was therefore open to the French; and they had no more than two marches to make in order to be at the gates of that capital, without having before them any hostile force which was able to dispute their entrance.

The temptation was great for Murat. It was with difficulty that he resisted the desire to go in advance, and to exhibit his person to the capital of Austria, always the most conspicuous in reviews as well as in dangers. Never before had an army coming from the west penetrated to this metropolis of the Germanic empire. Moreau, in 1800, and general Bonaparte in 1797, had both set their signatures to armistices when they were on the point of reaching it. The Turks alone had come to the foot of its walls without being able to pass them. Murat could not resist the temptation; and on the 10th and 11th marched upon Vienna, urging marshals Soult and Lannes to follow him. At the same time he took care not to enter, and stopped short at Burkersdorf, in the mountain defile of the Kahlenberg, about two leagues from Vienna.

This was useless haste, and even dangerous. A change so unforeseen as that which had thus been revealed in the march of the enemy, made it worth the trouble of stopping to await the orders of the emperor. Besides, it was outstripping too much the corps of marshal Mortier, which was on the left bank as well as the flotilla, designed to keep this corps in communication with the army, and running blindly on between the Russians crossed to the other side of the Danube, and the Austrians thrown upon the mountains.

In fact, at this moment danger was lowering around marshal Mortier, placed on the left bank of the Danube, and arriving near Stein, in presence of the Russians who had crossed the Danube at Krems. The danger of marshal Mortier was not exactly imputable to Murat, although he had contributed to bring it about, and to aggravate it by his precipitous movement upon Vienna, but to a piece of negligence that was seldom or never encountered in the operations directed by Napoleon, which, however, did occur on this occasion, because there are lapses even in the most unwearied and indefatigable vigilance.

Swallowed up in a thousand cares, Napoleon had omitted one of his most invariable customs, which consisted in always making himself certain that the orders he had given were afterwards executed. He had laid down in a general way the junction in a single corps of the divisions of Gazan, Dupont, and Dumonceau, the formation of a flotilla under captain Lostanges, to unite the columns that were marching on the left bank with those marching on the right; and he had calculated too much upon his lieutenants, making all move together in concord. Murat had advanced too quick; Mortier, either that he was drawn on by the movement of Murat, or that he had not traced with sufficient preciseness his instructions to general Dupont, had left an interval of one march between the division of Gazan, which he had with himself, and the divisions of Dupont and Dumonceau, which were to join him. The flotilla, difficult to keep together, remained far in the rear.

Still Napoleon, quick in discovering inexactnesses, went to Mölk, and guessing, without yet knowing it, the danger marshal Mortier was in, stopped the corps of marshal Soult, that Murat had wished to draw after him, and sent aides-de-camp to Murat and Lannes, to order them to slacken their movements. He feared not only what might happen to the corps thrown on the left side of the Danube, but what might happen to the advanced guard itself, imprudently entangled in the defiles of the Kahlenberg.

Faults are punished no where so quickly as in war, because no where do causes and their effects enchain each other so rapidly. The Russians, guided upon Austrian ground by an officer of the Austrian staff of the highest merit, colonel Schmidt, very quickly perceived the fact of a French division's being isolated on the left bank of the Danube, and they resolved to overwhelm it. Encouraged by the destruction of the bridge of Krems, that hindered the French army from coming to the aid of the division thus compromised, not discovering a number of boats which might supply the place of the bridge, they halted to procure for themselves a triumph which seemed very easily obtained. The division of Gazan numbered scarcely 5000 men; the Russians were still near 40,000 since the separation of the Austrians. The ground was favourable to their design. The Danube at that point runs between steep banks, contracted by the mountains of Bohemia on the one side, and by the Alps of Styria on the other. From Dirnstein to Stein and Krems, the road of the left bank, narrow, often cut out of the rock, is shut in between the river and the mountains that overlook it. The road too is difficult for carriages. In consequence marshal Mortier, who passed over it with Gazan's division, had placed in the boats the only battery of artillery he had at his disposal. The horses, led by hand, followed the division.

On the 11th of November, while Murat on the right bank of the river went forward almost to the gates of Vienna, Mortier on the left bank had passed Dirnstein, the place where the ruins of the castle are met with in which Richard Cœur de Lion was kept a prisoner. At this point of Dirnstein, the heights withdraw a little, and leave a space between their foot and the river. The road led over this space; sometimes excavated in the soil, at others raised above the level by a causeway. The French division, passing this part of the road, perceived the smoke ascending from the bridge of Krems which was still burning. It soon recognized the Russians, and guessed that they had passed the Danube over that bridge. Without taking a sufficient account of what might be before them, led away by the common ardour which prevailed throughout the army, they thought of nothing but pushing forward to meet the enemy.

Mortier gave the order, which was instantly carried into effect. An officer of artillery, since become general Fabvier, who commanded the battery attached to the divisions of Gazan, disembarked the guns, and got them into position. The Russians came on in a dense mass upon the French division. The fire of the artillery made the most fearful ravages in their ranks. They then threw themselves upon the guns in order to take them. The 100th and 103rd regiments of infantry of the line defended them with the greatest courage. They fought in this narrow strait a battle the most obstinate possible, hand to hand. The guns were taken and then immediately retaken. Scarcely were they out of the hands of the Russians than they were fired upon them when nearly close to their muzzles with a horrible carnage. The French, posted upon the slightest elevations of the ground, opened a fire of musketry which was not less formidable than their artillery. Thus they continued the combat on the same ground for nearly half a day, and judging from the wounded found the next day, the enemy must have sustained a great loss. Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken. The French at length remained masters of the ground, and trusted that they might be able to rest there.

They had advanced fighting as far as Stein. The 4th light, spread over the heights which impend above the river, had opened from thence a fire of tirailleurs well kept up, and which moment by moment became warmer. The cause was soon explained, which had been at first difficult to discover. The Russians had turned the heights. With two columns, forming a body of from twelve to fifteen thousand men, they had descended in the rear of Gazan's division, and had entered Dirnstein, which that division had passed in the morning. It was thus surrounded and separated from the divisions of Dupont, which had been left one march behind. There was no part of the flotilla on the Danube to be seen, and in consequence there remained very little hope of saving it. Night came on; the situation was a most fearful one, and there was little doubt of the division having soon upon it the whole of the enemy's army. In this extremity, clear to the eyes of every soldier present, it never came into the mind of any body, officer or soldier, to think of a capitulation. To die all of them to the last man sooner than surrender was the sole alternative which presented itself to these brave men, so much did the spirit of real heroism animate that army. Marshal Mortier thought as the soldiers did, and with them had resolved to die sooner than deliver up his marshal's sword to the Russians. He ordered them to march in close column, and to make their way with the bayonet in retiring back upon Dirnstein, where they would be rejoined by Dupont. It was now night. They recommenced in the midst of obscurity the combat which they had with the Russians in the morning, but in a contrary direction. They fought man to man in that narrow road, the soldiers so close that they often seized each other by the throat. They gained ground towards Dirnstein, combating in this fashion. Still, after having forced their way through several bodies of the enemy, they despaired of gaining their object, or of re-opening a road which they continually found closed against them again. Some of Mortier's officers, seeing no further chance of safety, proposed to him to embark alone, and at least withdraw his own person from the Russians, that such a fine trophy as a marshal of France should not fall into their hands.

"No," answered the marshal, "we must not separate from these brave fellows; we must be saved or perish together."

And there he remained sword in hand fighting at the head of his grenadiers, and making repeated attacks in order to get back to Dirnstein, when on a sudden a most violent firing was heard in the rear of Dirnstein. Hope was reawakened, because, in all probability, it must be the division of Dupont that had come up. In fact that brave division, which had marched the whole day, had learned on advancing the dangerous position of marshal Mortier, and had hastened to his aid. General Marchand, with the 9th light, supported by the

96th and 32nd regiments, the same which had distinguished themselves at Haslach, plunged into that gorge. Some pushed forward directly to Dirnstein, following the high road; others mounted the ravines which descend from the mountains to force back the Russians. A battle altogether as obstinate as that which was at the same moment fighting by the division of Gazan began in those defiles. At length the 9th light penetrated as far as Dirnstein, while marshal Mortier entered it on the opposite side. The two columns met, and recognized each other by the light of a fire. The soldiers embraced one another, full of delight at escaping such a disaster.

The losses were cruel on both sides, but the glory was unequally shared, because 5000 French had resisted more than 30,000 Russians, and had saved their colours in extricating themselves. These are examples worthy of being for ever commended to a nation. Soldiers who are resolved to die, will always have it in their power to save their honour, and often succeed in saving their liberty and life.

Marshal Mortier found again in Dirnstein the 1500 prisoners which he had made in the morning. The Russians had lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about 4000 men. In that number was colonel Schmidt. The enemy could not have sustained a severer loss, and they had soon to regret it bitterly. The French had 3000 men killed and wounded. The division of Gazan had lost half its effective force.

When Napoleon, who was at Mölk, learned the issue of this encounter, he felt less anxious, because he feared the total destruction of Gazan's division had happened. He was delighted with the conduct of marshal Mortier and of the soldiers, and sent the most signal recompenses to the divisions of Gazan and Dupont. He recalled them to the right bank of the Danube, in order to give time for the recovery of their wounds, and designated Bernadotte to succeed them on the left bank. He blamed Murat for the want of connexion which had marked in their march the different corps of the army. The character of Napoleon was indulgent, but his mind severe. He gave the preference to simple, reflecting, solid bravery over that which was brilliant and dashing; although he employed every kind, such as nature presented them in his armies. He was commonly rigorous towards Murat, whose ostentation, levity, and restless ambition, he did not like, while he did justice to the excellence of his heart and unrivalled courage. He wrote him a cruel letter, which he hardly deserved.

"My Cousin,—I cannot approve of your mode of marching. You go on like a hot-headed fellow, and do not weigh well the orders which I give you. The Russians, in place of covering Vienna, have recrossed the Danube at Krems. This extraordinary circumstance ought to have made you feel that you should not act without fresh instructions. Without the knowledge what plans the enemy may have, and without knowing what were my wishes under this new order of things, you go and draw away my army upon Vienna. You have consulted nothing but the vanity of entering Vienna. There is no glory but where there is danger. There is none in entering a capital which is defenceless."

Murat was here made to expiate the faults of all. He had marched too fast without doubt; but if he had continued before Krems, without bridges and without boats, he could not have been of any great help to Mortier, who had above all been compromised by the distance between the divisions of Dupont and Gazan, and by the flotilla not being present. Murat was deeply hurt. Napoleon, made acquainted by his aide-de-camp, Bertrand, with the mortification of his brother-in-law, corrected by some kind expressions the effect of this severe reprimand.

Napoleon, willing at the moment to gain something even by the fault of Murat, enjoined it upon him, as he was in sight of the walls of Vienna, not to enter, but to pass along by the walls of the city, and seize upon the great bridge of the Danube, thrown over that river beyond the suburbs. That bridge occupied, Napoleon ordered him, besides, to advance with all speed on the road to Bohemia, in order to arrive before the Russians at the point where the road of Krems comes to join the high road to Olmütz. If they took that bridge, and if they marched on rapidly, it was possible to intercept the retreat of general Kutusof towards Moravia, and to force him to submit to a disaster nearly equal to that of general Mack. Murat had here the means of repairing his errors, and he eagerly sought to avail himself of the opportunity.

Still it was little credible that the Austrians should have been guilty of the fault of suffering the bridges of Vienna to remain entire, which would render the French masters of both banks of that river; or that if they suffered them to remain, they should not have made every preparation for destroying them at the first signal. Nothing, therefore, could be more full of uncertainty than the operation desired or wished, rather than ordered by Napoleon.

The Austrians had renounced the design of defending Vienna. That fine and great capital had around it a regular rampart, being that which resisted the Turks in 1683. As in time the city extended itself too much to be confined within that old limit, and as vast suburbs arose around it, the whole had been surrounded with a low wall formed in *redans*, circumscribing all the ground built upon. All this would make but a poor defence, because the wall that covered the suburbs was easily forced; and once masters of the suburbs, it was very possible, with a few mortars, to oblige the body of the place to surrender. The emperor Francis had commanded the count de Würbna, a clever and conciliatory personage, to receive the French, and concert with them the peaceable possession of the capital. But it was decided that the passage of the river should be disputed. Vienna is situated at some distance from the Danube, which flows to the left of the city, between wooded islands. A great wooden bridge crosses the different arms of the river, serving as a communication from one bank to the other. The Austrians had placed incendiary materials under the flooring of the bridge, and were ready to blow it up the moment that the French should show themselves. They kept themselves in readiness on the left bank, with their artillery pointed, and a corps of 7000 or 8000 men, commanded by count Auersberg.

Murat had drawn very near the bridge without entering the city, which the situation rendered it very easy to do. At this moment the rumour of an armistice was circulated on every hand. Napoleon arrived at the palace of Schönbrunn by the high road. It is in advance of Vienna; and he had received a deputation of the inhabitants of that capital there, who had come to implore his kindness. He had received them with the attention due to an excellent people, and the civility which civilized nations owe to each other. He had received also, and seemed to attend to, M. Giulay, who had come to reiterate the overtures before made at Lintz. The idea of an armistice that was likely to lead to peace had thus been rapidly propagated. Napoelon, in the meanwhile, had sent general Bertrand to repeat the order to Murat and Lannes to take the bridge, if it was practicable. Murat and Lannes had no need to be quickened. They had placed the grenadiers of Oudinot behind the shady plantations which border the Danube, and had themselves advanced with some aides-de-camp as far as the head of the bridge. General Bertrand and an officer of engineers, colonel Dode de la Brunerie, had gone thither as well.

A barrier of wood closed the head of the bridge. Orders were given to lower it. Behind it, at some distance, was posted an hussar vidette, who fired his carbine and galloped away. They followed him along the long and sinuous line of small bridges thrown over the different branches of the river, and arrived at the great bridge placed over the principal branch. In the room of planks they saw only a bed of fascines laid upon the flooring. At that moment an Austrian subaltern of artillery came forward with a match in his hand. Colonel Dode seized and stopped him, just as he was about to set fire to the train communicating with the materials placed under the arches. Then they proceeded as far as the other side, where they addressed the Austrian cannoneers, telling them that an armistice was signed, or about to be; that peace was negotiating; and then demanded to see the general commanding the troops.

The Austrians were surprised, hesitated, and conducted general Bertrand to count Auersberg. Meanwhile a column of grenadiers advanced, by order of Murat. They were not seen, owing to the large trees that grew by the river, and to the sinuosities of the way, which led by turns along the bridges and through woody islets. While awaiting their arrival, those who preceded did not fail to continue in conversation with the Austrians under the muzzles of their cannon. Suddenly the column of grenadiers came in view. The Austrians, now beginning to see the trick put upon them, were preparing to fire. Lannes and Murat, with the officers who accompanied them, rushed towards the gunners, spoke to them, made them hesitate anew, and thus gave the column time to come up. The grenadiers threw themselves on the guns, seized them, and disarmed the Austrian artillerymen. In the mean time, Count Auersberg came to the spot, accompanied by general Bertrand and Colonel Dode. He was surprised and pained to find the bridge in the hands of the French, and a number of them thus united on the left bank of the Danube. There remained still some thousand infantry to dispute the possession of what had thus been taken from him. But they repeated to him all the recitals by the aid of which they had already quieted the guards of the bridge, and persuaded him that he ought to retire with his soldiers to a distance from the river. Besides, every moment fresh troops were arriving from the French side, and he had no longer time to have recourse to force. Count Auersberg withdrew to a distance, therefore; troubled, confounded, and appearing scarcely to comprehend all that had just happened.

It was through this audacious ruse, backed by the unequalled courage of those who used it and made it so successful, that the bridges of Vienna fell into the hands of the French. Four years afterwards, for the want of those bridges, the passage of the Danube cost the French sanguinary encounters, which were very near proving fatal to them.

The joy of Napoleon was very great on hearing this piece of success. He no longer thought of chiding Murat; but immediately dispatched him with the reserve of cavalry and the corps of Lannes and Soult, to go by the route of Stockerau and Hollabrünn, to cut off the retreat of general Kutusof.

These orders issued, he devoted all his attention to the police of Vienna and the military occupation of that capital. It was a noble triumph to enter thus into the old metropolis of the German empire, in the bosom of which an enemy had never been seen as a master. During the last two centuries considerable wars had been undertaken, and memorable battles won or lost; but no victorious general had ever yet been seen to plant his colours in the capitals of mighty states. It was necessary to go back to the times of the conquerors, to find examples of such great results.

Napoleon himself took up his residence in the imperial palace of Schönbrunn. He gave the command of the city of Vienna to general Clarke, and left the care of the police to the city militia. He ordered and made the most rigorous discipline to be observed, and permitted nothing to be touched except the public property, such as the chests of the government and the arsenals. The great arsenal of Vienna contained immense quantities of stores of all kinds. There were in it 100,000 muskets, 2000 pieces of cannon, and ammunition of all sorts. It seemed wonderful that the emperor Francis had not emptied it by means of the Danube. Possession was taken of all it contained for the use of the French army.

Napoleon so distributed his forces as to take good care of the capital, and at the same time to observe the route from the Alps, by which the archdukes might soon be able to arrive; that of Hungary, by which they might arrive later; and finally, that of Moravia, upon which the Russians were in force.

It has been seen that he had ordered general Marmont to proceed on the high road of Leoben, to occupy the passage of the Alps; and marshal Davout on the road of St. Gaming, to turn the position of St. Pölten. M. Meerfeld, with the principal Austrian detachment, had taken the high road to Leoben. Finding himself pursued by general Marmont, he had thrown himself by an elevated mountain defile on the road of St. Gaming,

which was followed by marshal Davout. The latter clambered painfully the steepest mountains, across the snows and ice of an early winter, and, thanks to the devotedness of his soldiers and the zeal of his officers, he had overcome every obstacle, when, arriving near Mariazell on the great road from Leoben to St. Pölten by Lilienfeld, he encountered the corps of general Meerfeld flying from general Marmont. A combat of the same kind as those in which Massena had formerly engaged in the Alps, soon took place between the French and Austrians. Marshal Davout overturned the latter, took from them 4000 men, and drove the rest in disorder into the mountains. He afterwards descended upon Vienna. General Marmont, after having reached Leoben, almost without firing a shot, halted there to await new orders from the emperor.

Events were not less favourable in the Tyrol and Italy. Marshal Ney, commanded to invade the Tyrol after the occupation of Ulm, had fortunately chosen the opening of Scharnitz—the *Porta Claudia* of the ancients—by which to penetrate into the country. It was one of the most difficult of access; but it had the advantage of leading directly upon Inspruck, in the midst of the troops of the Austrians, dispersed about from the lake of Constance as far as the sources of the Drave, who were little in expectation of such an attack. Marshal Ney had only nine or ten thousand men—soldiers as intrepid as their leader, and with whom he was able to undertake any thing. He made them scale, in the month of November, the most elevated passages of the Alps, in spite of the rocks that the inhabitants hurled down upon their heads; because the Tyroleans, strongly devoted to the house of Austria, would not, as they had been threatened they should, pass under the dominion of Bavaria. Ney passed the intrenchments of Scharnitz, entered Inspruck, dispersed before him the surprised Austrians, and threw the one upon the Vorarlberg and the others upon the Italian Tyrol. General Jellachich and the prince de Rohan were driven back towards the Vorarlberg, and from the Vorarlberg towards the lake of Constance, on the same road by which Augereau was expected to arrive. As if it had been decided by fate that none of the wrecks of the army of Ulm should escape the French, general Jellachich, who, after the fall of Memmingen, had made his escape from marshal Soult, only went to encounter the corps of Augereau. Not seeing any chance of saving himself, he laid down his arms with a detachment of 6000 men. The prince de Rohan, not so far advanced towards the Vorarlberg, had time to retreat. He made a very bold march; crossed the cantonments of the French troops, that, after the taking of Inspruck, guarded the Brenner too negligently; eluded the watchfulness of Loison, one of the generals of division of Ney's corps; passed near Botzen, almost under his eyes, and went to attack Verona and Venice, while Massena was following up the rear of the archduke Charles. Massena had ordered general St. Cyr, with the troops arrived from Naples, to blockade Venice, in which the archduke Charles had left a strong garrison. General St. Cyr, astonished at the presence of an enemy's corps in the rear of Massena, when he was already arrived at the foot of the Julian Alps, went with all speed, and surrounded the prince de Rohan, who was then obliged, as general Jellachich had been, to lay down his arms. General St. Cyr took on this occasion about 5000 men.

During this time the archduke Charles continued his laborious retreat the whole length of Friuli and beyond the Julian Alps. His brother, the archduke John, passed the Italian Tyrol in Carinthia, and followed in the anterior of the Alps a line altogether parallel with his own. The two archdukes, with reason despairing of a timely arrival upon any one of the defensive positions of the Danube, and thinking it too bold a measure to fling themselves upon Napoleon's flank, had decided to form a junction at Laybach, the one by Villach, the other by Udine, in order to proceed afterwards to Hungary. There they would be able to join with perfect safety the Russians occupying Bohemia; and a junction thus effected, they might re-take the offensive if no error had compromised the safety of the coalesced armies, and if there remained with the two emperors of Austria and Russia courage sufficient to prolong the contest.

General Marmont, placed in advance at Leoben, on the crested heights that separate the valley of the Danube from that of the Drave, saw with vexation the troops of the archduke John file away nearly under his eyes, and burned with impatience to combat them[1]. But a precise order restrained his ardour, enjoining it upon him to limit himself to guarding the defiles of the Alps.

Massena, after having pursued the archduke Charles as far as to the Julian Alps, had stopped at their foot, not believing it his duty to enter into Hungary at the heels of the archdukes. He put himself in connexion with general Marmont, and then awaited the orders of the emperor.

All these movements were completed towards the middle of November, nearly about the same time that the grand army executed its march upon Vienna. Certainly if one had conceived a plan in the tranquillity of a closet, with the facilities which are so abundant for tracing out plans upon maps, nothing could have been more easily arranged. In six weeks this army, passing the Rhine and the Danube, interposed itself between the Austrians posted in Suabia, and the Russians arrived on the Inn, had enveloped the one and thrown back the others towards the Danube, surprised the Tyrol by a detachment, then occupied Vienna, and turned the position of the archdukes in Italy, which had reduced the last to seek shelter in Hungary! History no where offers a similar spectacle: in twenty days from the ocean to the Rhine, and in forty from the Rhine to Vienna. Thus while the separation of forces so dangerous in war, is for the most part attended only with reverses, corps were seen here detached to a great distance, that without danger had attained their object; because at the

[1] This does not seem clear. If the archdukes John and Charles met by Villach and Udine at Laybach, and united there to proceed to Hungary, they must, if they went near Leoben, have been in support of each other when they arrived there, and too strong for Marmont to think of fighting without certain defeat. Perhaps only the corps of the archduke John was visible, or known to be near at the time. *Translator.*

centre there was a powerful body that struck at opportune moments decisive blows upon the principal forces assembled by the enemy. Thus too had been imparted an impulse to which every thing had given way, and the army had not left upon its rear or its wings any consequences but such as it was easy to gather: in such a way that the apparent dispersion was in reality no more than an able distribution of accessories at the side of the principal action, arranged with astonishing precision. But after having admired the profound and incomparable art which astonishes even by its simplicity alone, it is impossible also not to admire in this mode of action another condition, destitute of which every combination, even the most able, would be involved in peril; that condition is a vigorous character, of such a nature both in soldiers and officers, that when they are surprised by any sudden accident, they know how, by their energy, to give to the chief mind which directs them time to come to their aid, and to repair errors inevitable in operations the best conducted. Thus it was with the soldiers of Dupont at Haslach, of marshal Mortier at Dirnstein, and of marshal Ney at Elchingen. Repeating, that which has been before said, "there must be a great leader to brave soldiers, and brave soldiers must have a great leader." The glory must be common between them, as well as the merit due for the great things they accomplish.

Napoleon in Vienna would not banquet himself upon the empty glory of occupying the capital of the Germanic empire. He was desirous of terminating the war. If to be reproached in his career with having abused fortune, he can never be reproached as Hannibal was with not having known how to profit by it, and with having gone to sleep amidst the luxuries of Capua. He therefore prepared to pursue the Russians, in order to fight them in Moravia, before they had time to effect a junction with the archdukes. Besides, these were at Laybach on the 15th of November. It was requisite for them that they should make a great circuit in order to reach Hungary, to traverse that country, and then reach Moravia near Olmütz. This was a march yet to be executed of a hundred and fifty leagues. Twenty days would not be sufficient to compass it. Napoleon, at this period already in Vienna, had only forty leagues to march to be at Brünn, the capital of Moravia.

He now brought general Marmont nearer, who was too distant at Leoben, and gave him a position a little in the rear, on the summit of the Styrian Alps, in order to guard the great road from Italy to Vienna. He enjoined it upon him, in case either of the archdukes should take that route, to break down the bridges and tear up the roads, which, in a mountain country, permits a small corps to delay for some time an enemy superior in force. He forbade him to allow himself to be led away by the desire of fighting, unless he was forced to do so. He brought Massena near general Marmont, placing one in immediate communication with the other. The troops commanded by Massena took from that time the title of the eighth corps of the grand army. Napoleon disposed the corps of marshal Davout all around Vienna, that of general Gudin in rear of Vienna, towards Neustadt, able in a little time to be in communication with Marmont; another corps, that of general Friant, was placed in the direction of Presburg, to observe the openings towards Hungary; the third, that of general Bisson, now become the division of Caffarelli, was in advance of Vienna, on the route to Moravia. The divisions of Dupont and Gazan were placed in Vienna itself, in order to recover from their fatigues and wounds. Finally, marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat, marched towards Bavaria, while marshal Bernadotte, having passed the Danube at Krems, followed the steps of general Kutusof, and was ready to rejoin by the same road taken by that general the three French corps that were going to fight the Russians.

Thus Napoleon at Vienna, placed in the midst of a web spread around him with skill, was enabled to go wherever the least agitation marked the presence of an enemy. If the archdukes attempted any thing on the side of Italy, Massena and Marmont connected one with the other, having the Styrian Alps at their back, and Napoleon sending the corps of Davout towards Neustadt, was in sufficient strength to sustain them. If the archdukes showed themselves by Presburg and Hungary, Napoleon would be able to send them the entire corps of Davout and Marmont a little later, as Neustadt was not far off, and in case of need could march himself with the main strength of the army. Lastly, if it was necessary to make head against the Russians in Moravia, he was able in three days to unite to the corps of Soult, Lannes, and Murat, which were already there, that of Davout, easily withdrawn from Vienna, and that of Bernadotte, equally as easy to be brought out of Bohemia. He was therefore every where prepared, and thus fulfilled in the fullest degree the conditions of the art of war, that, one day conversing with his lieutenants, he defined in these terms:—"*The art of dividing to subsist, and of concentrating to fight.*" Never have been better defined or practised the precepts of that redoubtable art which founds and destroys empires.

Napoleon hastened to profit by the acquirement of the bridges of Vienna, to carry across the Danube marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat, with the hope of cutting off the retreat of general Kutusof, and to arrive before him at Hollabrunn, where that general, who had passed the Danube at Krems, would rejoin the road into Moravia. General Kutusof took a direction towards Moravia and not Bohemia; because it was on Olmütz, on the frontier of Moravia and Gallicia, that the second Russian army had itself turned its steps. Whilst he advanced upon Hollabrunn, having prince Bagration in the van, he was all of a sudden surprised and alarmed in learning the presence of the French upon the same high road that he wished to march over, thus having the certainty of being cut off. He therefore spread for Murat the same snare which Murat himself had spread for the Austrians, in order to get possession of the bridges of the Danube. He had with him general Vintzingerode, the same officer who had negotiated all the arrangements for the plan of the campaign. He dispatched him to Murat to put off upon him the trick by means of which he had duped count Auersberg, and which had consisted in telling him that negotiations were at Schönbrunn ready to sign a peace. In consequence, the Russians proposed

to Murat an armistice, of which the principal conditions should be that each should halt upon the ground which he occupied, in such a manner that nothing should be changed by the suspension of operations. If they were to be renewed, six hours' notice should be given. Murat, adroitly flattered by M. Vintzingerode, sensible besides of the honour he would receive to be the first intermediate agent in making a peace, accepted the armistice, with the reservation of the emperor's approbation. It must be added here, in order to be just to Murat, that one consideration, which was not without weight, contributed greatly to engage him in this wrong step. The corps of marshal Soult was not yet come up; and he feared that with his cavalry and Oudinot's grenadiers, he did not possess strength enough to bar the road against the Russians. He therefore dispatched an aide-de-camp to head-quarters with a draft of the armistice.

On the following day the commanders visited each other. Prince Bagration came to see Murat, and exhibited much interest and curiosity regarding the French generals, and, above all, for the illustrious marshal Lannes. This marshal, perfectly simple in his manner, without, on that account, showing any want of military courtesy, told prince Bagration that, if he had been there alone, they should have been actively occupied in fighting in place of exchanging compliments. At that moment, in fact, the Russian army, covering its movement with the rear-guard under Bagration, that appeared to remain immoveable, marched rapidly concealed behind it, as behind a curtain, and regained the road to Moravia. Thus Murat became, in his turn, the dupe, having suffered the enemy to get his revenge for the affair of the bridge of Vienna.

There soon arrived an aide-de-camp of the emperor, general Lemarrois, who brought with him a severe reprimand to Murat for the fault which he had committed[1]; and gave an order to him, and to marshal Lannes, to attack immediately, whatever might be the hour at which they received the communication. Lannes, however, took care to send an officer to prince Bagration to acquaint him with the order which he had received. The proper dispositions were immediately made for an attack. Prince Bagration had seven or eight thousand men. Wishing to cover the movement of Kutusof, he adopted the noble resolution of suffering himself to be destroyed rather than move from his position. Lannes pushed his grenadiers upon him. The only disposition possible to make was that of two lines of infantry, one deployed in front of the other, and attacking on ground very level. For some time a heavy and murderous fire of musketry alone was exchanged; then they charged each other with the bayonet, and that which is seldom seen in war, the two bodies of infantry marched resolutely one against the other, without either giving way until they met. They then came to combat man to man, and the grenadiers of Oudinot broke Bagration's infantry, and cut them in pieces. They then disputed by the light of the flames, at midnight, for the burning village of Schöngraben, which terminated by its remaining in the hands of the French. The Russians bore themselves valiantly. They lost upon this occasion nearly the half of their rear-guard, about 3000 men, of whom more than 1500 lay extended on the field of battle. Prince Bagration, by his resolution on this occasion, showed that he was worthy of rivalling marshal Mortier at Dirnstein. This sanguinary combat occurred on the 16th of November.

The French continued to advance on the following days, taking prisoners at every step, and, on the 19th, they entered at length the town of Brünn, the capital of Moravia. They found the place fortified and provided with abundant resources. The enemy had not even dreamed of defending it. Thus they left to Napoleon an important position, from whence he commanded all Moravia, and was able, at his ease, to observe and attend the movements of the Russians.

Napoleon, on learning this last conflict, determined to go himself to Brünn, because intelligence from Italy announced to him the long retreat that the archdukes were making in Hungary, and he now very well guessed that it was with the Russians he should principally have to do. He made some slight changes in the distribution of the corps of marshal Davout around Vienna. He ordered upon Presburg the division of Gudin, which no longer seemed necessary on the route to Styria, since the archdukes had retreated. He established the division of Friant, of the same corps, in advance of Vienna, on the Moravian road. The division of Bisson, become, for a moment, Caffarelli's, was detached from the corps of Davout, and sent upon Brünn, to replace, in the corps of Lannes, the division of Gazan remaining at Vienna.

Napoleon, having arrived at Brünn, fixed his head-quarters there on the 20th of November. General Giulay, accompanied this time by M. Stadion, came again to visit him, and to speak more seriously of peace than on his preceding visits. Napoleon expressed, both to one and the other, his desire to lay down his arms, and return to France, but would not leave them ignorant of the conditions to which he would agree. He would no longer admit, he said, that Italy, divided between France and Austria, should continue to be between them a subject of jealousy and war. He would have it entirely, as far as Isonzo; that is to say, he would demand the Venetian states, the only part of Italy which remained for him to conquer. He gave no explanations, as to what his demands might

[1] "TO PRINCE MURAT.

"*Schönbrunn, 25 Brumaire, an* XIV. (*16th November*, 1805), *8 o'clock in the morning.*

"It is impossible for me to find terms to express my displeasure. You only command my advanced guard, and you have no right to conclude an armistice without my order. You have made me lose the fruit of a campaign. Break the armistice instantly, and march upon the enemy. You will declare to him, that the general who signed the convention had not the right to do it; that no one but the emperor of Russia possesses such a right.

"Still, however, if the emperor of Russia would ratify this convention, I would ratify it: but it is only a trick. March! destroy the Russian army; you are in a position to take its baggage and artillery. The aide-de-camp of the emperor of Russia is a . . . Officers are nothing without powers; this one had none. The Austrians suffered themselves to be duped out of the passage of the bridge of Vienna; you have let yourself be duped by an aide-de-camp of the emperor!"

be on account of his allies, the electors of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Baden: but he declared, in general terms, that it would be requisite to secure their situation in Germany, and put an end to all questions dependent with the emperor regarding them, since the new Germanic constitution of 1803. M. Stadion, as well as M. Giulay, exclaimed much against the hardship of these conditions; but Napoleon showed no disposition to depart from the terms: and he then gave them to comprehend that, occupied without ceasing in the duties of war, he did not wish to have near himself any negotiators, who were in reality military spies, sent to overlook his movements. He therefore recommended that they should go to Vienna to M. de Talleyrand, who had just arrived there. Napoleon, taking little account of the tastes of his minister, who was neither fond of labour nor of the fatigues of head-quarters, had first ordered him to Strasburg, then to Munich, and now to Vienna. He shifted upon his shoulders those endless conferences which in negotiations always precede serious results.

During the conference that Napoleon thus had with the Austrian negotiators, one of them, not able to contain himself, suffered an imprudent word to escape him, from which it evidently resulted that Prussia was bound up in a treaty with Russia and Austria. They had made known to him something of the same nature direct from Berlin; but nothing so precise as that with which he had just become acquainted. This discovery inspired new reflections, and disposed him still more towards peace, without at the same time causing him to desist from his more essential demands. To follow the Russians beyond Moravia, that is to say, into Poland, would not suit him; because that would be to expose himself to the risk of the archduke cutting off his communications with Vienna. He in consequence resolved to await the arrival of M. Haugwitz, and the future development of the military plans of the Russians. He was equally ready either to treat, if the proposed conditions were acceptable, or by a great battle to sever the Gordian knot of the coalition, if his enemies should offer him a favourable opportunity for doing so. He, therefore, suffered some days to pass away, employing his time in studying with the greatest care, and making be studied by his generals, the nature of the ground upon which he then was, and upon which a secret presentiment intimated to him that he would be called upon to give a decisive battle. In the meanwhile, he allowed his troops to take rest, worn down as they were with fatigue, suffering from cold, and sometimes from hunger, and having marched in three months nearly five hundred leagues. From these causes the ranks of his army had been much reduced, although there were seen among them fewer stragglers than would be found in the train of any other army. Nearly a fifth of his effective force was wanting since the campaign opened. All military men well know that this is very little after such fatigues. In other respects, whenever the army halted any where, the ranks were soon filled up, owing to the anxiety of the men who had been left behind to rejoin their corps.

The two emperors of Russia and Germany on their side, in company at Olmütz, employed their time in considering what line of conduct they should pursue. General Kutusof, after a retreat in which he had only sustained defeats of his rear-guard, brought back with him no more than thirty and a few odd thousand men, already habituated to combat, but worn down with fatigue. He had therefore lost 12,000 or 13,000 men in killed, wounded, prisoners, or lamed. Alexander, with the corps of Buxhöwden and the imperial Russian guard, had brought with him about 40,000, which made about 75,000 Russians. Fifteen thousand Austrians, formed of the wrecks of the corps of Kienmayer and Meerfeld, and a fine division of cavalry, completed the Austro-Russian army at Olmütz, and carried it up to a total force of 90,000 men [1].

This is the proper place to remark how much the pretensions of Russia in Europe were at that time exaggerated, in a comparison with the real state of her forces. She assumed to hold the balance between the European powers: and here are the real numbers of the soldiers which she brought into the field of battle, where the destinies of the world were to be decided.—She had marched 45,000 or 50,000 men under Kutusof; she brought 40,000 under Buxhöwden and the grand-duke Constantine; 10,000 under general Essen. If those acting in the north, with the Swedes and English, be reckoned at 15,000, adding to them 10,000 that were preparing to act against Naples, these carry up the total to 125,000 men, in reality appearing in the field during this war; and only 100,000 men at the utmost, if the accounts of the Russians are to be credited, after their defeat. Austria had assembled more than 200,000; Prussia could bring into line 150,000; France 300,000 by herself. The soldiers borne as effective on the list are not here spoken of (which would make a difference nearly of one-half), but soldiers present and in fire on the day of battle. Although the Russian infantry was steady, it was not with 100,000 men, brave and ignorant, that any one could then pretend to domineer over Europe.

The Russians, always speaking very contemptuously of their Austrian allies, whom they accused of being cowardly soldiers, with incapable officers, continued to commit horrible ravages in that country. There was a scarcity of food in the eastern provinces of the Austrian monarchy. In Olmütz, necessaries being wanting, the Russians procured provisions, not with the address of the French soldier (who is an intelligent, but very rarely a cruel marauder), but with the brutalities of a savage horde. They extended their system of plunder for many leagues round, and completely laid waste the country which they occupied. The discipline, commonly so severe among them, was very visibly affected by it, and they showed themselves little satisfied with their emperor.

In the Austro-Russian camp, therefore, they were not likely to be well disposed towards wise determinations. The levity of youth, conjoined with the feeling of being ill at ease, made them urgent to

[1] The Russians made the number much less the day following their defeat; Napoleon, in his bulletin, much more. After the comparison of a great number of testimonies and authentic statements, we believe, that the most accurate account is that here given. *Note of Author.*

act, no matter in what way, for a change of place, if it were only for the sake of the change. It has been said already, that the emperor Alexander had begun to give himself up to new influences. He was not content with the direction given to his affairs; because this war, in spite of the flatteries with which a certain circle at Berlin had encircled him, did not seem to turn out well; and according to the custom of princes, he threw with a good will upon his ministers the results of a line of policy, which he had himself commanded, but had not known how to sustain with a perseverance that could alone correct its faults. That which had taken place at Berlin, had confirmed him still more in his dispositions. He should have committed many more errors, he said, if he had listened to his friends. In persisting in violence to Prussia, he should have thrown her into the arms of Napoleon, whilst he had, on the contrary, by his own personal address, brought that court to enter into engagements equivalent to a declaration of war against France. Thus the young emperor would no more listen to advice, because he deemed himself much more able than his counsellors. Prince Adam Czartoryski, honourable, grave, passionate under a cold exterior, become, as before shown, an inconvenient censor of the weakness and inconstancy of his master, supported an opinion which could not but alienate him completely. According to this minister, the emperor had nothing to do with the army. That was not his post. He had never seen service, and did not know how to command. His presence at headquarters, in the midst of young men, ignorant, presumptuous, and thoughtless, would destroy the authority of the generals, and at the same time their responsibility. In a war that they entered upon with a certain degree of apprehension, their officers desired nothing better than to have no opinion of their own, and to leave the command to hot-brained youth, in order not to be themselves responsible for the defeats which they expected. There would thus be only the worst of commanders for an army—a court. The war would be fruitful in lost battles. In order to sustain it perseverance would be needful, and perseverance would depend upon the magnitude of the means which they had prepared. It was requisite, therefore, to the generals, for the fulfilment of the character which properly belonged to them at the head of the troops; for the emperor himself to fulfil his own at the centre of the government, by sustaining the public spirit, and administering the government with energy and application, in such a manner as to furnish the armies with the resources necessary for a prolongation of the contest—the sole means, if not to conquer, at least to balance fortune.

It was not possible to express an opinion more wise in itself nor less agreeable to the emperor Alexander. He had been attempting to play a political character in Europe, and had not yet succeeded to his mind. He saw himself drawn into a contest, which would have filled him with affright, if the distance of his empire had not reassured him: he had need to stun his ears with the tumult of camps; he had need for the purpose of silencing the whisperings of his reason to hear himself styled at Berlin, Dresden, Weimar, and Vienna, "the saviour of kings." This monarch, too, asked himself whether he had not the ability in his turn to cut a brilliant figure in fields of battle; if, with his intellect, he might not have loftier inspirations than the old generals, whose experience an imprudent youth encouraged him to view with too much disdain; if, finally, he should not be able to bear a part of that glory arising from arms, which is so dear to princes, at that time exclusively bestowed by fortune upon one man and one nation.

Alexander was encouraged in these notions by the military circle which already encompassed him, at the head of which appeared prince Dolgorouki. This personage, in order the better to secure the emperor to himself, wished to draw him away to the army. He endeavoured to persuade him that he had talents for command, and that he had only to show himself to alter the fortunes of the war; that his presence would redouble the courage of the soldiers by filling them with enthusiasm; that his generals were mere men of routine, destitute of ability; that Napoleon had triumphed through their timidity, and their worn-out knowledge: but that he would not thus easily triumph over the young Russian nobility, intelligent and devoted, and led by an emperor they adored. These warriors, so new to the profession of arms, ventured to assert that at Dirnstein, as well as at Hollabrunn, they had beaten the French; that the Austrians were cowards; that there were no brave men but the Russians; and that if Alexander went to cheer them with his presence, they should stop the arrogant and ill-merited prosperity of Napoleon.

The cunning Kutusof ventured to say with some timidity that this was not altogether correct; but too servile to sustain his opinion with courage, he kept himself carefully from contradicting the new possessors of the imperial favour, and had the meanness to let them insult his hoary experience. The intrepid Bagration, the vicious but brave Miloradovich, the sensible Doctorow, were officers whose advice at least merited some attention. None of these personages were reckoned as of any account. A German, the counsellor of the archduke John at Hohenlinden, general Weirother, had alone some real authority over the military youth that surrounded Alexander.

In the last century, after Frederick the Great had beaten the Austrian army at the battle of Leuthen, by attacking one of its wings, the theory of the oblique order had been invented, of which Frederick had never thought, and they had attributed to this theory all the success of that great man. Since general Bonaparte had shown himself so superior in the higher combinations of war, since he had been seen so many times to surprise and envelope the generals who were opposed to him, other commentators made the whole art of war to consist in a certain manœuvre, and talked about nothing but "turning the enemy." They had invented, if they were to be believed, a new science, and for that science a word then new, that of *stratégie*; and they made haste to offer it to such princes as were willing to be led by them. The German, Weirother, had persuaded the friends of Alexander that he had a fine plan, certain to destroy Napoleon. This was a grand manœuvre, by means of which they would turn the emperor of the

French, cut him off from the road to Vienna, throw him upon Bohemia, beaten, and for ever separated from the troops which he had in Italy and Germany.

The impressible mind of Alexander was given up to these ideas, was entirely influenced by the Dolgoroukis, and exhibited no inclination to listen to prince Czartoryski, when this last advised him to return to Petersburgh, in order to govern there, in place of coming to fight battles in Moravia.

In the midst of this agitation of mind in the young court of Russia, they did not occupy their attention much with the emperor of Germany. They seemed to make nothing of his army or his person. His army, they said, had compromised at Ulm the fate of the war there. As to himself, they were coming to his help. He ought to esteem himself happy to be thus succoured, and to interfere in nothing. He did not intermeddle, it is true, in many things, and made no effort to resist such a torrent of presumption. He expected more lost battles, reckoning only upon time, if he reckoned then upon any thing, and he perfectly appreciated, without saying so, the value of the foolish arrogance of his allies. This prince, simple and plain of appearance, had two great qualities of his government, subtlety and perseverance.

It is easy to divine in what manner, among such vain minds, the serious question which was then stirring would be treated, that of knowing whether it was requisite or not to give battle to Napoleon. Those immortal pictures which antiquity has left us as a legacy, and which represent the young Roman aristocracy violating by its foolish presumption the wisdom of Pompey, and obliging him to give the battle of Pharsalia,—those pictures have nothing grander, nor more instructive, than that which passed at Olmütz in 1805, around the emperor Alexander. Every one had an opinion on the question of the battle, to avoid or seek it, and every body expressed his opinion. The coterie, of which the Dolgoroukis were the chiefs, did not hesitate. Not to give battle would be cowardice and a signal blunder. First, there was no more living at Olmütz; the army was expiring of want, becoming demoralized. In remaining at Olmütz, they should abandon to Napoleon, besides the honour of their arms, three-quarters of the Austrian monarchy, and all the resources in which it abounded. On the contrary, in advancing, they would recover at a single blow the means of subsistence, confidence, and that ascendancy, always so powerful on the offensive side. Then was it not evident that the moment for exchanging characters had come?—that Napoleon, ordinarily so prompt, so pressing when he pursued his enemies, had stopped all at once? that he hesitated, that he was intimidated? become fixed at Brünn, and dared not come to Olmütz to encounter the Russian army? It was that which he thought at Dirnstein and at Hollabrunn; he thought that his army as well as himself was shaken. They knew and did not doubt that it was worn down with fatigue, reduced one-half, a prey to discontent and given to murmuring.

Such was the discourse of these youthful courtiers, held with incredible assurance. Some wiser persons, the prince Czartoryski more especially, equally as young but much more reflecting than the Dolgoroukis, opposed to them a few simple reasons which would have been decisive in minds that the strongest blindness had not come upon. In holding as of no account the soldiers who after all remained masters of the ground at Dirnstein as at Hollabrunn, before whom they had always retired from Munich to Olmütz,—in holding as of no account the general who had conquered all the generals of Europe, the most experienced at least of all living captains, if he was not the greatest, because he had commanded in a hundred battles, and his present adversaries had never commanded in one,—in holding as of no account neither the soldiers nor the general, there were two peremptory reasons for not being in haste. The first and most striking was, that by waiting some few days more, the month stipulated with Prussia would have passed away, and then she would be obliged to declare herself. Who knows in fact whether in losing a great battle beforehand, she might not be furnished with an occasion to escape from her bargain? By leaving, on the other hand, the month's delay to expire, 150,000 Prussians might enter Bohemia, Napoleon would be obliged to retreat, without their having run the risk of a battle with him. The second, for deferring the battle, was, that thus time would be given to the two archdukes, who would arrive with 80,000 Austrians from Hungary, and they would then be able to fight against Napoleon in the proportions of two to one, perhaps of three to one. It was without doubt very difficult to sustain themselves at Olmütz; but if it was true that they could not pass many days more there, they had only to march into Hungary and meet the archdukes. They would find bread there and 80,000 men to reinforce them. In adding thus to the distance that Napoleon would have to pass over, they would oppose to him the most formidable of all obstacles. They had a proof of this fact in his immobility since he had occupied Brünn. If he had not advanced, it was not that he was afraid to do so. Military men destitute of experience would alone affect to believe that such a man was afraid. If he did not advance it was because he deemed the distance already very great. He was in fact forty leagues beyond, not his own capital, but that which he had conquered, and removing from it to a distance he felt it tremble under his hand.

What answer can be given to these reasons? Most assuredly none at all. But upon minds full of prejudice the quality of reasons has no influence: evidence irritates, in place of persuading. They therefore decided around Alexander, that it was necessary to give battle. The emperor Francis on his side agreed to it. He had every thing to gain by the prompt decision of the question; because his country suffered dreadfully by the war, and he was not grieved to see the Russians arrayed against the French, and thus in their turn form an opinion of them. It was then settled to quit the position of Olmütz, which was very good, and where it would have been easy to repulse an attacking army, however superior in numbers, for the purpose of going to attack Napoleon in his position of Brünn, which he had for some days been carefully studying.

They marched in five columns, on the road from Olmütz to Brünn, in order to approach the French

army. Having reached Wischau on the 18th of November, one day's march from Brünn, they surprised an advanced guard of cavalry and a weak detachment of infantry, placed in that village by marshal Soult. They employed 3000 horse to surround them, and then, with a battalion of infantry, they penetrated into Wischau itself. They took there a hundred French prisoners. The aide-de-camp Dolgorouki performed the greater part of this exploit. They had persuaded the emperor Alexander to be present, and that this skirmish was war, and that his presence had doubled the courage of his soldiers. This slight advantage completely turned the young heads of the Russian staff, and the resolution to fight became from that moment irrevocable. Some fresh remarks of prince Czartoryski were received very ill. General Kutusof, under whose name the battle was to be fought, no more commanded, and yet had the culpable weakness to accept resolutions of which he disapproved. It was then agreed that they should attack Napoleon in his position of Brünn, following the plan traced for them by general Weirother. They made another march, and then established themselves in advance of the castle of Austerlitz.

Napoleon, who possessed rare sagacity in guessing at the designs of an enemy, saw well enough that the coalesced armies were endeavouring to bring him to an engagement, and was highly satisfied at it. Still he was pre-occupied with the designs of Prussia, that the recent news from Berlin represented as definitively hostile; as well as with the movements of the Prussian army that advanced towards Bohemia. He had no time to lose: it was necessary either to fight an overwhelming battle, or to conclude a peace. He had no doubt of the result of a battle; but still peace would be the most secure of the two. The Austrians proposed it with a certain air of sincerity; but they always made a reference to the Russians as regarded the conditions. Napoleon was desirous of knowing the mind of Alexander, and he sent to the Russian head-quarters general Savary, his aide-de-camp, to compliment that prince, enter into conversation with him, and discover exactly what it was he desired.

General Savary set out immediately, presented a flag of truce to the advanced posts of the Russians, but had some trouble to arrive in the presence of the emperor Alexander. While he awaited the moment of introduction, he was enabled to judge of the dispositions of the young Muscovite aristocracy, of the blindness of its folly, and of its desire to take a part in a great battle. It pretended to nothing less than beating the French, and sending them back beaten to the frontiers of France. General Savary listened to this kind of conversation with much calmness; at last, he penetrated to the emperor's presence, and repeated to him the words of his master; he found him mild and polished in manner, but evasive, and not at all in a state to appreciate the chances of actual warfare. On the reiterated assurance that Napoleon was animated by the most pacific dispositions, Alexander demanded upon what conditions peace would be possible. General Savary was not in a position to answer that question, and wished to persuade the emperor to dispatch one of his aides-de-camp to the French head-quarters, to have a conference with Napoleon. He asserted that the result of such a proceeding would be most satisfactory. After much conversation, in which general Savary, in the excess of his zeal, said more than he was authorized to say, Alexander sent with him prince Dolgorouki himself, the principal personage of that new coterie which disputed the favour of the czar with Czartoryski, Strogonoff, and Nowosiltzoff. Prince Dolgorouki, although one of the most violent declaimers of the Russian staff, was still flattered in an extraordinary manner to be charged with a commission from his master to the emperor of the French. He set out with general Savary, and was presented to Napoleon at the moment when he had achieved a visit to his advanced posts, not having in his costume or attendants any thing imposing for a vulgar mind. Napoleon listened to this young man, wanting as he was in discretion and tact, who, having gathered here and there some of the ideas with which the Russian cabinet fed itself, and which have been before stated in explaining the project for a new European equilibrium, expressed them without relation to each other, and out of season. It was requisite that France, if she desired immediate peace, should give up Italy; and if she continued the war unsuccessfully, she would be required to restore Belgium, Savoy, and Piedmont, in order to constitute defensive barriers around and against her. These ideas, awkwardly explained, appeared to Napoleon the formal demand of an immediate restitution of Belgium, ceded to France by so many treaties—provoking in his mind a deep irritation, which, however, he repressed, not believing that his dignity would permit him to let it forth in presence of such a negotiator. He therefore sent him away, drily remarking that they should arrange otherwise than in diplomatic conferences, the differences that existed in the policy of the two empires. Napoleon was exasperated, and had only one thought, which was that of giving battle to the utmost extremity.

Since the surprise at Wischau, he kept back his army in the rear, in a position marvellously well selected for a field of battle. He exhibited in his movements a kind of hesitation, which strongly contrasted with the accustomed boldness of his measures. This circumstance, joined to the mission of general Savary, contributed yet further to excite the weak understandings which governed the Russian staff. There was soon only one general cry for war around Alexander. "Napoleon draws back," they said; "he is in full retreat; it is necessary to fall upon and crush him."

The French soldiers on their side, who were not wanting in intelligence, saw very plainly that they should have to do with the Russians; and their delight was great. On both sides they began to make preparations for a decisive battle.

Napoleon, with that military tact which he had received from nature, and which he had so much improved by experience, had adopted, among all the positions which he was able to occupy near Brünn, that which should assure him the most important results, under the notion that he should be attacked—a notion that had now become a certainty.

The mountains of Moravia, which join the mountains of Bohemia to those of Hungary, drop lower in succession towards the Danube to such an extent that, near that river, Moravia appears only as one extensive plain. In the environs of Brünn, the capital of the province, these mountains have no more than the height of lofty hills, and are covered with sombre firs. Their waters, retained for want of channels to drain them, form there numerous pools, and these empty themselves by different streams in the Morava, or March, and by the Morava into the Danube.

These characteristics of the country are all united in the position between Brünn and Austerlitz, that Napoleon has rendered for ever so celebrated. The high road of Moravia, in taking its course from Vienna to Brünn, rises in a straight line towards the north; then, to go from Brünn to Olmütz, drops abruptly to the right, or east, describing a right angle with its first direction. It is in that angle that the position now spoken of is found. It commences on the left, towards the Olmütz road, having heights studded with fir trees; it is afterwards prolonged to the right in an oblique direction towards the Vienna road, and after sinking by little and little, it terminates in pools of water, which in winter are very deep. Along this position, and in front, runs a rivulet, which bears no name in the maps, but which in one part of its course is called the Goldbach by the people of the country. It flows through the little villages of Girzikowitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz; sometimes confined in channels, it finishes its course in the pools already mentioned, that are called the pools of Satschau and Menitz.

"Concentrated with all his forces on this ground —resting on one side upon the woody hills of Moravia, and more particularly upon a rounded eminence that the Egyptian soldiers denominated the *Santon*; resting on the other side upon the pools of Satschau and of Menitz; covering also, with the left the road to Olmütz, and with the right the road to Vienna—Napoleon was ready to receive with advantage to himself a decisive battle. Still he did not intend to limit himself to merely defending his position; because he had been in the habit of calculating upon most important results. He had penetrated, as if he had read them, into the designs planned at great length by general Weirother. The Austro-Russians, having no chance to take from him the point of support which he had found for his left in the high wooded hills, would therefore be tempted to turn his right, which did not exactly connect itself with the pools, and thus to take from him the Vienna road. They had enough to tempt them to this step, because, that road taken from him, he would have no other resource than to retire into Bohemia. The rest of his forces in front towards Vienna would be obliged to ascend isolated along the valley of the Danube. The French army, thus fractured, would find itself forced to make an eccentric retreat, dangerous, and even disastrous, if it encountered the Prussians on its way.

Napoleon comprehended perfectly that such was the plan of the enemy. Thus, after having concentrated his army towards the left and the heights, he abandoned towards his right, in other words, towards Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and the pools, a space that was scarcely guarded at all. He thus seemed to invite the Russians to carry out their plans. But it was not exactly there that he prepared for them the mortal blow. On his front the ground offered an inequality from which he hoped to draw a decided advantage.

Beyond the rivulet that ran along the front of the French position, the ground at first presented, opposite the left, a plain slightly undulating, which crossed the Olmütz road, next opposite to the centre, it arose successively, and formed in face of the right an elevated plain, called that of Pratzen, from the name of a village situated about midway up, in the hollow of a ravine. This elevated plain terminated on the right in rapid slopes towards the ponds, and opposite it subsided gently on the side of Austerlitz, of which the castle was seen at some distance.

There considerable forces were to be seen, and there, at night, there was observed the blaze of numerous fires, while by day there was discovered a great movement of men and horses. Napoleon, upon seeing this, had no longer any doubt about the designs of the Austro-Russians [1]. They had an evident intention of descending from the height which they occupied, and of crossing the rivulet of Goldbach, between the pools and the French right, cutting them off from the Vienna road. For this reason he resolved to take the offensive, in return to cross the rivulet by the village of Girzikowitz, and of Puntowitz, climb to the summit of the table land of Pratzen, while the Russians should be quitting it, and take possession of the ground himself. If he succeeded, the enemy's army would be cut in two parts. One portion would be thrown to the left, on the plain, crossed by the Olmütz road, another part to the right, in the pools. The battle could not, in that case, fail to be disastrous for the Russians. But in order to that end, it would be necessary that they should not half commit the fault. The prudent, apparently timid attitude of Napoleon exciting their foolish confidence, would lead them, no doubt, to commit the whole blunder.

In accordance with these ideas Napoleon made his dispositions. Expecting for two days to be attacked, he had ordered Bernadotte to quit Iglau, on the frontier of Bohemia, to leave there the Bavarian division which he had taken with him,

[1] There has appeared recently a work by M. Léon Narischkine, translated from the Russian, containing a great number of incorrect assertions, although published by an author in a position to have had better information. In that work it is stated, that Napoleon had received a communication of the plan of general Weirother, before the battle of Austerlitz. This allegation is wholly erroneous. Such a communication would evidently imply, that the plan communicated a long time before to the commanders of the different corps was liable to be divulged. It will be seen, hereafter, from the report of an eye-witness, that it was only in the night preceding the battle that the plan was communicated to the commanders of the different corps. For the rest, all the details of orders and correspondence prove, that Napoleon foresaw, and did not know in any other mode what was the enemy's plan. Our resolution being to avoid all disputes with contemporary authors, we limit ourselves to the redress of this error, without noticing many others contained in the work in question, of which, besides, we acknowledge the real merits, and up to a certain point, the impartiality. *Note of the Author.*

and to set out by forced marches for Brünn. He had ordered marshal Davout to carry the division of Friant, and, if possible, the division of Gudin, towards the abbey of Gross-Raigern, placed on the Vienna road to Brünn, as far as the ponds. In consequence of these orders, Bernadotte had set out on his march, and had arrived there on the 1st of December. General Friant alone appeared in time, because general Gudin was placed further off towards Presburg; he had marched immediately, and in forty-eight hours had gone over thirty-six leagues which separate Vienna from Gross-Raigern. The soldiers sometimes fell on the road overcome with fatigue; but, at the least noise, believing they heard the sound of cannon, they rose with ardour to run to support their comrades, engaged, they said, in a bloody battle. On the eve of the 1st of December, they halted for the night at Gross-Raigern, one league and a half from the field of battle. Never did troops on foot perform a march so wonderful, since it was a march of eighteen leagues a day for two successive days.

On the 1st of December, Napoleon, reinforced by the corps of Bernadotte, and the division of Friant, was able to reckon upon 65,000 or 70,000 men present under arms, against 90,000 Russians and Austrians likewise under arms.

Upon his left he placed Lannes, in whose corps the division of Caffarelli had replaced that of Gazan. Lannes, with the two divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli, were to occupy the road to Olmütz, and to combat in the undulating plain which extended on both sides of the road. Napoleon gave him, besides the cavalry of Murat, comprising the cuirassiers of generals Hautpoul and Nansouty, the dragoons of generals Walther and Beaumont, and the chasseurs of generals Milhaud and Kellermann. The level configuration of the ground led him to foresee, on that spot, a prodigious engagement of cavalry. On the mound or *Santon* which overlooked this portion of the ground, and that was surmounted by a chapel, called the chapel of Bosenitz, he placed the 17th light, commanded by general Claparède, with eighteen pieces of cannon, and made him swear to defend the position to the last moment of life. This mound was, in fact, the point of support to the left of the army.

At the centre, behind the rivulet of Goldbach, he arranged the divisions of Vandamme and St. Hilaire, belonging to the corps of marshal Soult. These he designed should pass the rivulet by the villages of Girzikowitz and Puntowitz, and take possession of the table ground, or elevated plain of Pratzen, when the proper moment should arrive. A little further off, behind the marsh of Kobelnitz and the castle of Sokolnitz, he placed the third division of marshal Soult, commanded by general Legrand. He reinforced it with two battalions of tirailleurs, known under the denomination of the chasseurs of the Po, and of the Corsican chasseurs, and with a detachment of light cavalry, under general Margaron. This division was only to have the 3rd of the line, and the Corsican chasseurs at Telnitz, the point nearest to the pools, where Napoleon wished to attract the Russians. Far in the rear, about a league and a half distant, was stationed the division of Friant, at Gross-Raigern.

Having ten divisions of infantry, Napoleon did not therefore place more than six in line. Behind marshals Soult and Lannes, he kept in reserve Oudinot's grenadiers, separated on this particular occasion from the corps of Lannes, the corps of Bernadotte, composed of the divisions of Drouet and Rivaud, and, lastly, the imperial guard. He thus kept under his own hand a mass of 25,000 men, to lead wherever they might be wanted, more particularly on the heights of Pratzen, in order to carry those heights at any cost, if the Russians should not have sufficiently cleared them. ,He himself passed the night in the middle of this reserve.

These dispositions terminated, he was so full of confidence, as to announce them to the army in a proclamation full of the greatness of the events which were preparing. This is the document, as it was read to the troops on the evening preceding the battle.

"Soldiers,—The Russian army is before you, come to avenge the Austrian army of Ulm. These are the same battalions that you have beaten at Hollabrunn, and that since then you have constantly pursued to this place.

"The positions that we occupy are formidable; and while they are marching to turn my right, they will present to me their flank.

"Soldiers, I will myself direct your battalions. I shall keep out of the fire, if with your accustomed bravery you carry confusion and disorder into the ranks of the enemy. But if the victory be for one moment uncertain, you will see your emperor expose himself the foremost to danger; because victory must not hesitate an instant today, when, above all, the honour of the French infantry is concerned, which bears with it the honour of the whole nation.

"Under the pretext of carrying off the wounded, do not weaken the ranks; but let every one be well impressed with the thought that we are bound to vanquish these hirelings of England, who are animated with such a bitter hatred against our nation.

"This victory will finish the campaign, and we shall be able to take up our winter quarters, where we shall be joined by the new armies which are forming in France; and then the peace which I shall make will be worthy of my people, of you, and of myself. NAPOLEON."

The same day he received M. Haugwitz, who had at last reached the French head-quarters. He discovered from his flattering conversation all the duplicity of Prussia, and felt more than ever the importance of gaining a brilliant victory. He received the envoy of Prussia in the most gracious manner, told him that he was going to fight the next day, that he would see him after the battle was over, if he was not taken off by a cannon-shot, and there would be time enough then to arrange with the cabinet of Berlin. He advised him to set out that same night for Vienna, and gave him an introduction to M. Talleyrand, having taken care that he should be conducted across the field of battle at Hollabrunn, which presented a horrible spectacle. "It is well," he wrote to M. de Talleyrand, "that this Prussian should learn through his own eyes in what manner we make war."

Having passed the evening at the bivouac with his marshals, he determined to visit the soldiers, and judge himself of their moral disposition. It

was the evening of the 1st of December; the evening of the anniversary of his coronation. The coincidence of the dates was singular. Napoleon had not sought it; because he received and did not offer battle. The night was cold and gloomy.

The soldiers who first saw him wished to light him along his way, and taking up the straw of their bivouac, they formed with it lighted torches, which they placed in the ends of their muskets. In a few minutes the example was followed by the whole army, and over the vast front of the French position, this singular illumination was seen to blaze along. The soldiers accompanied the steps of Napoleon with shouts of "Long live the emperor!" promising on the morrow to show him they were both worthy of him and of themselves. Enthusiasm filled every rank. They went, as it is necessary to go to meet danger, with hearts full of satisfaction and confidence.

Napoleon retired in order to oblige his soldiers to take rest, and awaited in his tent until the dawn of a morning, the day of which was to be one of the greatest in his life—one of the greatest in history.

The fire and shouts had been very easily distinguished from the heights occupied by the Russian army, and had produced there, among a small number of intelligent officers, a sinister presentiment. They asked each other whether such were symptoms of a crestfallen and retreating army.

During these proceedings, the commanders of the Russian corps, assembled at general Kutusof's, in the village of Kreznowitz, received their instructions for the next day. Old Kutusof was sound asleep, and general Weirother, having opened a map of the country before the eyes of those who listened, read with emphasis a memoir containing all the plan for the battle [1]. This has been explained beforehand, in relating the dispositions of Napoleon. The right of the Russians, under prince Bagration, faced the French left, and would advance against Lannes, from both sides of the Olmütz road, take the *Santon*, and march directly on Brünn. The cavalry, assembled in one solid mass, between the corps of Bagration and the centre of the Russian army, was to occupy the same plain where Napoleon had placed Murat, and connect the left of the Russians with their centre. The main body of the army, composed of four columns, commanded by generals Doctorow, Langeron, Pribyschewski, and Kollowrath, established at the moment on the table level of Pratzen, were to descend, cross the marshy rivulet of which mention has already been made, take Telnitz, Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, turn the French right, and advance in their rear to take from them the possession of the Vienna road. The union of all the corps was fixed under the walls of Brünn. The grand-duke Constantine, with the Russian guard, 9000 or 10,000 strong, would leave Austerlitz at daybreak, to come and place himself in reserve behind the centre of the combined army.

When general Weirother had finished his reading in presence of the commandants of the Russian corps, of whom only one paid attention, general Doctorow, and one was inclined to contradict, general Langeron, this last ventured to make some objections. General Langeron, a French emigrant, who served against his country, was a good officer, but a grumbler; and he asked general Weirother, if he believed that all would occur as he had written it, showing that for his own part he was much inclined to doubt it. General Weirother would admit of no other idea than that believed by the Russian staff, which was, that Napoleon would retreat, and that in such a case the instructions were excellent. But general Kutusof put an end to all further discussion upon the subject, by sending the commanders of the corps to their quarters, and ordering that copies of the instructions should be sent to them. This experienced officer knew how to consider such a mode of imagining and ordering plans of battle; and still he suffered it to be done, although it was under his own name that the whole affair took place.

At four in the morning Napoleon left his tent, in order to judge, by his own observation, if the

[1] We think it will be of use here to quote a fragment of the manuscript memoir of general Langeron, an ocular witness, since he commanded one of the corps of the Russian army. The following is the recital of that officer.

"We have seen that on the 19th of November (the 1st of December) our columns did not arrive at this destination until nearly ten o'clock at night.

"Towards eleven o'clock all the commanders of the columns, except prince Bagration, who was too far away, received an order to assemble at Kreznowitz, at the house of general Kutusof, in order to hear read the dispositions for the battle of the following day.

"At one o'clock in the morning, when we were all assembled, general Weirother arrived. He displayed on a large table an immense map, exactly drawn, of the environs of Brünn and Austerlitz, and he read to us the dispositions in an elevated tone of voice, and with an air of self-sufficiency which spoke his intimate persuasion of his own merit, and that of the incapacity of his hearers. He resembled the professor of a college, reading a lesson to his young students. We were, perhaps, effectively his scholars, but he was far from being a good professor. Kutusof sitting, and half asleep when we arrived at his house, finished by falling entirely asleep before our departure. Buxhöwden, in a standing position, listened, but evidently did not comprehend a single word; Miloradovich held his tongue; Pribyschewski kept in the rear, and Doctorow alone examined the map with attention. When Weirother had finished his lesson, I was the only one who spoke. I said to him, 'My general, all this is very well; but if the enemy take the lead, and attack us near the Pratzen, what are we then to do?' 'The case is not foreseen,' he replied; 'you well know the boldness of Bonaparte. If he had been able to attack us, he would have done it to-day.' 'You do not believe him strong then,' I remarked. 'It is much if he has 40,000 men.' 'In this case he goes to his own destruction, by awaiting our attack; but I believe him too skilful to be imprudent; because, if as you wish and believe, we cut him off from Vienna, he will have no other retreat than the mountains of Bohemia; but I consider that he has another object. He has extinguished his fires; much noise is heard in his camp.' 'That means he is retiring, or that he is making a change of position; and even supposing he takes that of Turas, he spares us much trouble, and the dispositions remain the same.'"

Kutusof having then awoke, dismissed us, ordering us to leave an adjutant to copy out the dispositions that lieutenant-colonel Toll, of the staff, was going to translate from German into Russian. It was then near three o'clock in the morning; and we did not receive the copies of these famous dispositions until it was near eight o'clock, when we were already on the march. *Note of Author.*

Russians had committed the fault in which he had so adroitly encouraged them. He descended as far as the village of Puntowitz, situated on the border of the rivulet which separated the two armies, when he perceived the Russian fires to be nearly extinguished on the heights of Pratzen. A very evident noise of cannon and horses indicated a march from left to right, towards the pools, the very place where he wished the Russians should march. He was overjoyed to find his foresight so well borne out in fact; he returned to place himself on the elevated ground where he had passed the night, and from whence his sight embraced the whole extent of the field of battle. His marshals were on horseback at his side. The day began to dawn. A wintry fog covered the face of the country to a great distance, and only permitted the view of the loftier points of ground, which arose above the mist like islands out of the sea. The different corps of the French army were all in movement, descending from the position they had occupied during the night, in order to cross the rivulet which separated them from the Russians. But they were halted at the bottom, where they were hidden by the fog, and retained by the order of the emperor until the opportune moment for the attack.

Already a very heavy fire was heard at the extremity of the line towards the pools. The movement of the Russians against the French right was now declared. Marshal Davout went off in all haste to direct the march of Friant's division from Gross-Raigern upon Telnitz, to support the 3rd of the line and the Corsican chasseurs, who were about to have upon their hands a considerable portion of the enemy's army. Marshal Lannes, Murat, and Soult, with their aides-de-camp, surrounded the emperor, awaiting the orders to commence the battle at the centre and left. Napoleon moderated their ardour, willing to leave the Russians on the French right sufficient time to complete the error they had committed, in so far as that they should not be able to return back any more from the bottoms into which they were now seen entering. At length the sun broke forth, and, dissipating the fog, illuminated in full splendour that vast field of battle. It was the sun of Austerlitz—that sun of which the remembrance has been so often recalled in the present generation, and that will never be forgotten by the generations which are to come. The table elevation of Pratzen was seen denuded of troops. The Russians, executing the plan agreed upon, had descended into the bed of the Goldbach, in order to carry the villages of Telnitz and Sokolnitz, situated on the edge of that stream. Napoleon then gave the signal for the attack, and his marshals set off at a gallop to place themselves each at the head of his respective corps.

The three Russian columns ordered to attack Telnitz and Sokolnitz, had moved at seven o'clock in the morning. They were under the immediate command of generals Doctorow, Langeron, and Pribyschewski, and under the superior orders of general Buxhöwden, an inactive and indifferent officer, inflated with favours for which he was indebted to a court marriage, commanding as little the left of the Russian army as Kutusof commanded the whole together. He marched in person with the column of general Doctorow forming the extreme left of the Russian line, and the first to be in the conflict. He seemed to care nothing about the other columns, nor the concert which should have governed all their motions: this was very fortunate for the French, as, if they had acted together and assaulted in one body the positions of Telnitz and Sokolnitz, the division of Friant not having yet arrived at that point, they would have gained much ground on the French right, much more indeed than it would have been convenient to give up to them.

The column of Doctorow had passed the night with the others on the table grounds of Pratzen. At the foot of these heights, in the low bottoms which separated them from the French right, is a village called Augezd, and in that village was an advanced guard under the orders of general Kienmayer, composed of five Austrian battalions, and fourteen Austrian squadrons. This advanced guard was to clear the plain between Augezd and Telnitz, while the column of Doctorow descended from the heights. The Austrians, anxious to show the Russians that they could fight as well as themselves, assaulted the village of Telnitz with great resolution. It was necessary to pass at the same time the rivulet running here in ditches, and then a height covered with vineyards and houses. The French had here besides the 3rd of the line, the battalion of Corsican chasseurs, covered behind the inequalities of the ground. These clever tirailleurs, taking cool aim at the hussars that had been sent forward in advance, brought down a great number of them. They welcomed in the same mode the infantry regiment of Szeckler, and in one half hour stretched a part of that regiment on the earth. The Austrians, tired of a murderous conflict productive of no result, assaulted the village of Telnitz in a body of five united battalions which did not succeed in penetrating into it owing to the firmness of the 3rd of the line, which received them with the courage of well-tried troops. While the advanced guard of Kienmayer wasted its strength in these fruitless efforts, the column of Doctorow, twenty-four battalions strong, appeared, conducted by general Buxhöwden an hour after the time expected, and came up to aid the Austrians in taking Telnitz, that the 3rd line was no longer sufficient to defend. The bed of the rivulet was passed, and general Kienmayer sent his fourteen squadrons upon the plain beyond Telnitz, against the light cavalry of general Margaron. The French general bravely sustained several charges, but could not hold out against such a mass of cavalry. The division of Friant conducted by marshal Davout, not having yet arrived from Gross-Raigern, the French right found itself entirely overpowered. But general Buxhöwden, after having long waited for by the Austrians, was himself obliged to wait for the second column commanded by general Langeron. The last had been delayed by a singular accident. The main body of the cavalry designed to occupy the plain which was on the right of the Russians and upon the French left, had mistaken the order which directed them to take that position; it had come to place itself at Pratzen, in the midst of the bivouacs of Langeron's column. Having recognized their error, this cavalry, in order to occupy its intended posi-

tion, had cut across and retarded for a long time the columns of Langeron and of Pribyschewski. General Langeron arrived at last before Sokelnitz, and commenced an attack upon it. In the meanwhile general Friant had arrived in haste with his division, composed of five regiments of infantry and six of dragoons. The 1st regiment of dragoons, attached for this occasion to the division of Bourcier, was sent in full trot to Telnitz. Already the Austro-Russians, victorious at this point, had commenced to cross the Goldbach, and to press upon the 3rd of the line as well as upon the light cavalry of Margaron. The dragoons of the 1st regiment, approaching the enemy at a gallop, drove back upon Telnitz all who had attempted to issue from it. Generals Friant and Heudelet arriving with the first brigade composed of the 108th of the line, and the voltigeurs of the 15th light, entered Telnitz with the bayonet at the charge, and drove out the Austrians and Russians, pushing them pell-mell beyond the ditches that form the bed of the Goldbach, and thus remained masters of the ground, having covered it with killed and wounded. Unfortunately the fog, although dissipated nearly every where else, still covered the low bottoms. It enveloped Telnitz, where all was wrapped in a sort of cloud. The 26th light of Legrand's division, coming to the succour of the 3rd of the line, perceiving but indistinctly bodies of troops beyond the rivulet, and not distinguishing the colour of their uniform, fired on the 108th believing it was firing on the enemy. This unexpected attack alarmed the 108th, that fell back under the fear of being turned. Profiting by this incident, the Russians and Austrians who were twenty-nine battalions strong on this point retook the offensive, and drove out of Telnitz the brigade of Heudelet, while general Langeron, attacking with twelve Russian battalions the village of Sokolnitz, situated on the Goldbach a little above Telnitz, succeeded in penetrating into it. The two enemies' columns of Doctorow and Langeron commenced next to come out, the one from Telnitz, the other from Sokolnitz. At the same time the column of general Pribyschewski had attacked and taken the castle of Sokolnitz, placed above the village which bears its name. At the sight of this, general Friant, who in this battle as in every other, conducted himself heroically, threw general Bourcier with his six regiments of dragoons on the column of Doctorow at the moment when this last was deploying beyond Telnitz. The Russians presented their bayonets to the French dragoons; but the charges of their horsemen, repeated with extreme vigour, prevented them extending themselves, and supported the brigade of general Heudelet which was opposed to them. General Friant placed himself afterwards at the head of the brigade of Lochet, composed of the 48th and 111th of the line, and fell upon Langeron's, which had already passed the village of Sokolnitz, repulsed it, entered, expelled it from thence, and drove it beyond the Goldbach. Sokolnitz being occupied, general Friant committed it to the keeping of the 48th, and marched with his third brigade, that of Kister composed of the 33rd of the line and of the 17th light, to dispute with the column of Pribyschewski for the castle of Sokolnitz. He succeeded again in forcing it to fall back. But while he was engaged with the troops of Pribyschewski before the castle of Sokolnitz, the column of Langeron re-attacking the village dependent on the castle, was nearly overwhelming the 48th, that retired into the houses of the village and defended itself with admirable courage. General Friant returned and disengaged the 48th. This brave general and his illustrious chief marshal Davout went incessantly from one point to another on the line of the Goldbach, thus warmly disputed and fought with 7000 or 8000 infantry and 2800 horse, against 35,000 Russians. In effect, the division of Friant, owing to the march of the thirty-six leagues which it had performed, was reduced to 6000 men at most, and with the 3rd of the line did not make more than 7000 or 8000 combatants. But the men remained in the rear, arriving every moment at the sound of the cannon, filling successively the void spaces which the enemy's fire made in the ranks.

During this obstinate combat towards the French right, marshal Soult in the centre had attacked the position upon which the issue of the battle depended. At a signal given by Napoleon, the two divisions of Vandamme and St. Hilaire, formed in close columns, had marched with a rapid step up the declivities to the table ground of Pratzen. The division of Vandamme had taken the left, that of St. Hilaire the right of the village of Pratzen, which is deeply sunk in a ravine that terminates at the rivulet of Goldbach, near to Puntowitz. While the French proceeded in advance, the centre of the enemies' army, composed of the Austrian infantry of Kollowrath, and the Russian infantry of Miloradovich, twenty-seven battalions strong, commanded by general Kutusof and the two emperors, had come and deployed on the level of Pratzen, in order to take the place of the three columns of Buxhöwden descended into the bottoms. The French soldiers, without returning the fire which was directed upon them, continued to climb the heights, surprising by their firm and active step the enemies' generals, who expected to find them in retreat [1].

Arrived at the village of Pratzen, they passed it without halting. General Morand at the head of the 10th light, went and formed upon the summit. General Thiébault [2] followed him with a brigade, composed of the 14th and 36th of the line, and while he advanced received suddenly from the rear a discharge of musketry, which proceeded from two Russian battalions, concealed in the ravine, at the bottom of which the village of Pratzen is situated. General Thiébault then halted for a moment, returned within half musket shot the volley which he had received, and entered the village with one of his battalions. He dispersed or took the Russians who held it; then returned to sustain general Morand, already formed upon the table ground. The brigade of Varé, the second of the division of St. Hilaire, passing to the left of

[1] Prince Czartoryski, placed between the two emperors, remarked to the emperor Alexander the decided and active step of the French, as they climbed the plateau, without returning the Russian fire. The prince, at the sight, felt the confidence fail him, which he had before indulged up to that moment, and conceived a sinister presentiment, which did not leave him throughout the action. *Author's Note.*

[2] The same who is recently dead.

the village, had come and ranged itself in face of the enemy, while Vandamme with the whole of his division, extending himself yet more to the left, took up a position near a small mound called Stari-Winobradi, that overlooked the elevated level of Pratzen. The Russians had placed on this mound five battalions and a numerous artillery.

The Austrian infantry of Kollowrath, and the Russian infantry of Miloradovich, were disposed in two lines. Marshal Soult, without losing time, carried in advance the divisions of St. Hilaire and Vandamme. General Thiébault, forming with his brigade the right of the division of St. Hilaire, had a battery of twelve guns. He charged them with ball and grape-shot, and commenced a ruinous fire upon the infantry which was opposed to him. This fire, directed with precision and rapidity, soon spread disorder through the Austrian ranks; they at first retrograded, then threw themselves confusedly on the reverse of the high level of Pratzen. Vandamme at once assailed the enemy in his front. His brave infantry advanced with coolness, halted, gave several destructive discharges, and then marched upon the Russians with the bayonet. It overturned their first line upon the second, and obliged them to take flight, both one and the other, upon the reverse of the elevation of Pratzen, abandoning their artillery. In this movement Vandamme had in the rear upon his left the mound of Stari-Winobradi, defended by several Russian battalions and bristling with artillery. He went back there, and ordered it to be turned by general Schiner with the 24th light, he mounting it himself with the 4th of the line. Despite a plunging fire, he climbed the mound, overthrew the Russians who guarded it, and took their cannon.

Thus in less than an hour the two divisions of the corps of marshal Soult had rendered themselves masters of the level of Pratzen, and pursued the Russians and Austrians who were flying pell-mell down those slopes of the table land, which incline towards the castle of Austerlitz.

The two emperors of Austria and Russia, witnesses of this rapid action, endeavoured in vain to rally their soldiers. They were little heard or regarded in the middle of the confusion, and Alexander was already able to perceive that the presence of a sovereign was not of equal value in such circumstances with that of a good general. Miloradovich, always brilliant amid the fire, rode over the field of battle ploughed with bullets, and attempted to rally the fugitives. General Kutusof, wounded by a ball in the cheek, saw realized the disaster which he had foreseen, but which he had not the firmness to prevent. He hastened to call around him the imperial guard, which had passed the night in advance of Austerlitz, in order to rally behind it the centre in a state of rout. If the chief of the Austro-Russian army, whose merit was limited to much astuteness concealed under great indolence, had been capable of correct and prompt resolutions, he would in that case have hastened to his left, engaged at that moment with the French right, extricated the three columns of Buxhöwden from the low bottoms in which they were engulphed, brought them back to the level of Pratzen, and, with 50,000 men reunited, attempted by a decided effort to re-take a position where his army was cut in two. If even he had not succeeded, he would at least have been enabled to retire upon Austerlitz by a safe road, and not have abandoned his left, backed into an abyss. But content to ward off the only evil of which he was an eye-witness, he limited himself to rallying upon his centre the imperial Russian guard, 9000 or 10,000 strong; while Napoleon, on the contrary, his eyes ever fixed upon the level of Pratzen, brought up to sustain marshal Soult, already victorious, the corps of Bernadotte, the guard and the grenadiers of Oudinot, 25.000 chosen men.

While the French right thus disputed the line of the Goldbach with the Russians, and their centre took from them the level of Pratzen, Lannes and Murat on the left were fighting with prince Bagration, and with all the cavalry of the Austro-Russians.

Lannes, with the divisions of Suchet and of Caffarelli, deployed on both sides of the road to Olmütz, was to march straight before him. On the left of the road, the same where the *Santon* arose, the ground approaching the woody heights of Moravia, was very unequal, sometimes hilly, sometimes hollowed into deep ravines. It was there that the division of marshal Suchet was placed. To the right, the ground more level was connected by gentle ascents with the level summits of the Pratzen. Caffarelli marched on that side, protected by the horse of Murat, against the mass of the Austro-Russian cavalry.

They expected on that point a sort of Egyptian battle, because there were seen here eighty-two squadrons, Russian and Austrian, ranged in two lines, and commanded by prince John of Lichtenstein. For this reason, the divisions of Suchet and of Caffarelli were drawn up in several deployed battalions; and behind the intervals of these battalions other battalions were in close column, to support and flank the first. The artillery was spread over the front of the two divisions. The light cavalry of general Kellermann, as also the divisions of dragoons, were placed on the right upon the plain; the heavy cavalry of Nansouty and Hautpoul in reserve in the rear.

In that imposing order, Lannes moved as soon as he heard the cannon on the Pratzen, and marched at a foot pace, as if he had been on a review ground, over that plain, lighted up by a brilliant winter's sun.

Prince John of Lichtenstein had arrived very late in consequence of the mistake which had caused the Austro-Russian cavalry to pass uselessly from the right to the left of the field of battle. The imperial guard of Alexander had supplied the void space, which his absence had left between the centre and right of the combined army. When he at last arrived, he perceived the movement of the corps of marshal Lannes, and sent the Uhlans of the grand-duke Constantine upon the division of Caffarelli. These hardy horsemen dashed upon that division before which Kellermann was placed with his brigade of light horse. General Kellermann, one of the most able of the French cavalry officers, foreseeing that he might be flung upon the French infantry in his rear, and that he might, in such a case, throw it into disorder, if he received in an immoveable position this formidable charge, drew back his squadrons, making

them pass through the intervals of Caffarelli's infantry and go to re-form on the left, in order to seize a favourable opportunity for a charge. The Uhlans, arriving at a gallop, met none of the light cavalry, but encountered in their place a line of impregnable infantry, that, without even forming in a square, received them with a murderous fire of musketry. Four hundred of those horsemen were soon stretched on the earth in front of the division. The Russian general, Essen, was mortally wounded fighting at their head. The rest scattered themselves in disorder on the right and left. Seizing the exact moment, Kellermann, who had re-formed his squadrons on the left of Caffarelli, charged the Uhlans, and sabred a great number. Prince John of Lichtenstein sent a fresh number of his squadrons to the succour of the Uhlans. The French line of dragoons, moving in their turn, for some moments nothing was perceived but a frightful affray, in which every man engaged fought hand to hand.

This cloud of horse finally dispersed, each party rejoined its line of battle, leaving the ground covered with dead and wounded, the greater part Austrians and Russians. The two masses of French infantry then advanced with a firm and measured step up the ground which the cavalry had abandoned. The Russians opposed them with forty pieces of cannon, which launched forth a hail-shower of projectiles. One discharge took off the entire group of drummers of Caffarelli's regiment. This furious cannonade was answered by the fire of the French artillery. In this battle with cannon, general Valhubert had his thigh broken by a ball. Some soldiers wished to carry him to the rear. "Remain at your post," cried the general, "I shall know how to die by myself. It will not do for the sake of one man to take away six." The French marched immediately upon the village of Blaziowitz, which was on the right of the plain, just there where the ground begins to elevate itself towards Pratzen. This village, as with all those of that country, was situated deep in a ravine, and was only rendered visible by the flames that were consuming it. A detachment of the Russian imperial guard had occupied it in the morning, awaiting there the cavalry of prince John of Lichtenstein. Lannes ordered the 13th light to take it. Colonel Castex, who commanded the 13th, advanced with the 1st battalion in a column of attack, and when he arrived at the village was struck with a ball in the forehead. The battalion dashed forward, and avenged the death of its colonel with the bayonet. They took Blaziowitz, and gathered up there a number of prisoners whom they sent to the rear.

At the other wing of the corps of Lannes, the Russians, led by prince Bagration, endeavoured to take the little eminence, called the *Santon*. They had descended into the valley which is along the foot of that mound, and had taken there the village of Bosenitz, exchanging their shot to no purpose against the numerous artillery that was planted on the heights. But they did not feel inclined to brave the musketry of the 17th of the line, too well situated for them to venture a very close approach.

Prince Bagration had formed the rest of his infantry on the road to Olmütz, in front of the division of Suchet. Forced to fall back, it retired slowly before the corps of Lannes that marched without precipitation, but with an imposing condensation, and continually gained ground.

Blaziowitz taken, Lannes ordered the villages of Holubitz and Kruch, situated along the Olmütz road, to be carried as well, and then he arrived close to the infantry of prince Bagration. At the same moment, he broke the line formed by his two divisions. He sent the division of Suchet obliquely to the left, and that of Caffarelli obliquely to the right. By this diverging manœuvre, he separated the infantry of Bagration from the cavalry of prince Lichtenstein, threw back the first to the left of the Olmütz road, and the second to the right, towards the slopes of the table land of Pratzen.

The cavalry now resolved to make a last attempt, and flung itself, in one entire mass, upon the division of Caffarelli, which received the charge with its ordinary firmness, and stopped it by its musketry. The numerous squadrons of Lichtenstein, at first dispersed, were then rallied by their officer, and brought back upon the French battalions. Then, by the order of Lannes, the cuirassiers of generals Hautpoul and Nansouty, which followed Caffarelli's infantry, filed at full trot behind the ranks of their infantry, formed upon its right, deployed, and put itself to the gallop. The ground trembled beneath the feet of those 4000 horsemen, clad in steel. They flung themselves, sabre in hand, upon the re-formed men of the Austro-Russian squadrons, overturned them by the shock, dispersed them, and obliged them to take flight upon Austerlitz, where they retreated to appear no more during the battle.

In the mean while the division of Suchet had attacked the infantry of prince Bagration. After having directed upon the Russians those cool-aimed and sure vollies that the French troops, equally intelligent and accustomed to war, execute with the utmost precision, the division of Suchet marched upon them with the bayonet. The Russians, giving way before the impetuosity of the French battalion, were retiring, but without breaking their order, and without surrendering. Lannes, now no longer embarrassed by the eighty-two squadrons of prince Lichtenstein, had hastened to recall the heavy cavalry of general Hautpoul from the right to the left of the plain, and had thrown it upon the Russians to decide their retreat. The cuirassiers charging on every side upon that obstinate infantry, which retreated in large platoons, obliged some thousands of them to lay down their arms.

Thus, on the left, Lannes had given a real battle himself, and had taken 4000 prisoners. The ground around him was covered with 2000 dead or wounded Russians and Austrians.

But on the table ground of Pratzen, the contest was renewed between the enemy's centre and the corps of marshal Soult, reinforced with all the resources which Napoleon had brought up in person. General Kutusof, in place of considering, as has been already said, about bringing up the three columns of Doctorow, Langeron, and Pribyschewski engaged in the bottoms, had only thought of rallying his centre upon the Russian imperial guard. The sole brigade of Kamenski, belonging to Langeron's corps, hearing in its rear a very

brisk firing, had halted, and then fallen back spontaneously, in order to remount to the table-ground of Pratzen. General Langeron, being apprised of this, had come and put himself at the head of the brigade, leaving in Sokolnitz the rest of his column.

The French, on the renewal of the battle in the centre, were on the point of finding themselves engaged with the brigade of Kamenski, the infantry of Kollowrath and of Miloradovich, and with the imperial guard. The brigade of Thiébault, occupying the extreme right of marshal Soult, and separated from the brigade of Varé by the village of Pratzen, found itself in the centre of a square of fire; since it had in front the re-formed Austrian line, and in return, on its right, a part of the troops of Langeron. This brigade, composed of the 10th light, the 14th and 36th of the line, was for a moment exposed to the most serious peril. As it deployed and formed itself into a square to face the enemy, adjutant Labadie, fearing that his battalion might be shaken in its movements under a fire of musketry and grape-shot at thirty paces' distance, seized the colours, and placing himself at the staff, cried, "Soldiers, here is your line of battle!" The soldiers deployed with perfect coolness. The others, imitating the example, the brigade took up its position, and during some moments exchanged, at half-musket shot, a very destructive fire. Still these three regiments would have very soon sunk under the mass of cross-fire, if the combat had been prolonged. General St. Hilaire, much admired in the army for his chivalrous bravery, was in conversation with generals Thiébault and Morand on what was best to be done, when colonel Pouzet, of the 10th, said to him, "We must advance with the bayonet, or we are lost." "Yes—forward!" replied general St. Hilaire. They quickly crossed bayonets, and throwing themselves to the right upon the Russians of Kamenski's division, and in front upon the Austrians of Kollowrath, they overthrew the first into the low bottoms of Sokolnitz and Telnitz, the second on the reverse of the plain of Pratzen towards the Austerlitz road.

While the brigade of Thiébault, left for some time alone, extricated itself with such good fortune and courage, Varé's brigade and the division of Vandamme, placed on the other side of the village of Pratzen, had not near the same trouble to repulse the offensive attack of the Austro-Russians, and had very soon driven them to the foot of the ascent to the plain, which they endeavoured in vain to climb. In the ardour which inspired the French troops, the 1st battalion of the 4th of the line, belonging to the division of Vandamme, had been carried away by the desire to pursue the Russians over inclined grounds covered with vineyards. The grand-duke Constantine had immediately sent a detachment of cavalry of the guard, which, surprising the battalion in the midst of the vineyards, had overwhelmed it before it could form itself into a square. In this confusion the colour-bearer of the regiment had been killed. A sub-officer, wishing to recover the eagle, had been killed in his turn. A soldier had taken it from the hands of the sub-officer, and was himself struck down, not having been able to prevent the horse of Constantine from carrying off their trophy.

Napoleon, who had arrived to reinforce the centre with the infantry of the guard, the whole of Bernadotte's corps, and the grenadiers of Oudinot, perceived, from the high ground where he had placed himself, the rashness of the battalion. "There is disorder there," he said to Rapp; "it must be repaired!" Rapp, guiding at the head of the Mamelucks and horse-chasseurs of the guard, flew to the aid of the battalion that had been compromised. Marshal Bessières followed Rapp with his horse-grenadiers. The division of Drouet, of the corps of Bernadotte, formed of the 94th and 95th regiments, and of the 27th light, advanced in a second line, led by colonel Gerard, aide-de-camp of Bernadotte, an officer of great energy, in order to oppose the infantry of the Russian guard.

Rapp, as soon as he had shown himself, drew upon him the enemies' cavalry, who were sabring the French infantry as it lay on the ground. This cavalry then turned upon him with four unharnessed guns. Despite a discharge of grape-shot, Rapp dashed on and broke the imperial cavalry. He then pushed forward, and passed beyond the ground covered with the wrecks of the 4th battalion. At once the soldiers of that battalion got up, and formed in order to avenge the check they had received. Rapp, on arriving as far as the lines of the Russian guard, was attacked by a second charge of cavalry. These were the horse-guards of Alexander, who, under the command of their colonel, prince Repnin, there fell upon him. The brave Morland, colonel of the chasseurs of the French imperial guard, was killed, and the chasseurs were driven back. But at that moment the French horse-grenadiers arrived at full gallop, led on by marshal Bessières, to the succour of Rapp. These superb horsemen, mounted upon lofty horses, were eager to measure their strength with the horse-guards of Alexander. An intermingled affray of some minutes took place. The infantry of the Russian guard, who were witnesses of this desperate combat, dared not fire lest they should kill their countrymen. Finally, the horse-grenadiers of Napoleon, who were old soldiers tried in a hundred engagements, triumphed over Alexander's young horsemen, dispersed them after having extended a number of them on the earth, and returned victors to their master.

Napoleon, who saw this engagement, was much pleased to see the Russian youth thus punished for their boasting. Surrounded by his staff, he received Rapp, who returned wounded and covered with blood, followed by prince Repnin, a prisoner, and gave him high testimonials of his satisfaction. In the interim, the three regiments of Drouet's division, brought back by colonel Gerard, pushed the infantry of the Russian guard upon the village of Kreznowitz, took it, and made a good many prisoners. It was now an hour after noon; the victory was no more doubtful, because Lannes and Murat were masters of the plain on the left; marshal Soult, supported by all the reserve, was master of the table-plain of Pratzen. No more remained to be done but to go and attack on the right, and fling into the pools the three Russian columns of Buxhöwden, which with so much vain obstinacy attempted to cut off the French from the road to Vienna. Napoleon, leaving therefore the corps of Bernadotte upon the level of Pratzen, and turning to the right with the corps of

marshal Soult, the guard, and the grenadiers of Oudinot, desired to gather up himself the fruit of his profound combinations, and went by the road which had been followed by the three columns of Buxhöwden in descending from the table-level of Pratzen, to attack them in the rear. It was full time he arrived there, because marshal Davout and his lieutenant, general Friant, marching without ceasing from Kobelnitz to Telnitz, to prevent the Russians from crossing the Goldbach, would have ended by succumbing. The brave Friant had had four horses killed under him during the contest. But while he was making his last efforts, Napoleon suddenly appeared at the head of an overwhelming force. A fearful confusion then took place among the astounded and despairing Russians. Pribyschewski's whole column and one half of the column of Langeron remained before Sokolnitz, and saw themselves surrounded and without any hope of safety, because the French had arrived by the rear on the road which they themselves had gone over in the morning. These two columns then dispersed; a part were taken prisoners in Sokolnitz; another part fled towards Kobelnitz, and got entangled among the marshes of the same name; a third, lastly, going off towards Brünn, was forced to lay down its arms near the Vienna road, where the Russians had fixed their rendezvous when they promised themselves the victory.

General Langeron, with the wrecks of the Kamenski brigade and some battalions which he had drawn from Sokolnitz before the disaster, had sought a refuge towards Telnitz and the pools, near the place where Buxhöwden was with the column of Doctorow. The inexpert commander of the Russian left wing, proud of having twenty-nine battalions and twenty-two squadrons to dispute with them for the village of Telnitz against five or six French battalions, continued immoveable, awaiting the success of the columns of Langeron and Pribyschewski. He bore on his visage —so testified an eye-witness—the signs of excess to which he habitually delivered himself up. Langeron, proceeding to that place, recounted to him, with some warmth of tone, what had taken place. "You see enemies every where," Buxhöwden brutally answered him. "And you," replied Langeron, "are not in a fit state to see them any where." At this moment the corps of marshal Soult appeared on the turning of the slope from the plain towards the pools, advancing upon the column of Doctorow for the purpose of pushing it into the pools. It was not longer possible to doubt the danger. Buxhöwden, with four regiments which he had from his unskilfulness left inactive near him, endeavoured to regain the road by which he had come, which passed by the village Augezd, between the foot of the table-land of Pratzen and the pool of Satschau. He marched there in all haste, ordering Doctorow to save himself as he could. Langeron joined him with the remainder of his column. Buxhöwden went through Augezd at the same moment that Vandamme's division, descending from the heights, arrived there on his side. He encountered in his flight the fire of the French, and succeeded in placing himself in safety with a part of his troops. The larger part followed the wrecks of Langeron's corps, and was cut short in its flight by the division of Vandamme, now master of Augezd. Then altogether they flew towards the frozen pools, and attempted to make themselves a road there. The ice which covered them, weakened by the heat of a fine day, was unable to resist the weight of men, horses, and cannon. It broke, in some places, under the Russians, who were thus engulfed beneath it; in others it kept firm, and formed a retreat for the fugitives who crowded across it.

Napoleon, arrived on the slopes from the level of Pratzen on one side of these pools, perceived the disaster happen for which he had been so well prepared. He ordered a battery of the guard to fire ball on those parts of the ice that were strong enough to resist the weight upon them, and thus completed the destruction of those who had taken refuge there. Nearly 2000 found their deaths under the broken ice.

Between the French army and these inaccessible pools yet remained the unfortunate column of Doctorow, of which one detachment had saved itself with Buxhöwden, and another had perished under the ice. General Doctorow, abandoned in this cruel situation, conducted himself with the noblest courage. The ground on approaching these pools arose in such a manner as to offer a point of support. The general placed his back to this elevation of the ground and formed his troops in three lines; he placed his cavalry in the first, his artillery in the second, and his infantry in the third. Thus deployed, he opposed to the French a firm countenance, during which he sent some squadrons to find out a road between the pond of Satschau and that of Menitz.

A last and very severe struggle took place on this ground. The dragoons of the division of Beaumont, borrowed from Murat, and brought from the left to the right, charged the Austrian cavalry of Kienmayer, that, after having done its duty, withdrew under the protection of the Russian artillery. These remaining unmoved at their guns, poured grape-shot upon the dragoons, who in vain endeavoured to take them. The infantry of marshal Soult marched upon this artillery in turn, despite of a fire close to the muzzles, took it, and pushed the Russian infantry upon Telnitz. On that side, marshal Davout with the division of Friant entered Telnitz. From this circumstance the Russians had no place to escape but by a narrow passage between Telnitz and the pools. Some rushed pell-mell upon them, and met with their deaths like those who preceded them. Others found a mode of escape by a road which had been discovered between the pools of Satschau and Menitz. The French cavalry followed them in this causeway, and harassed them in their retreat. The sun had thawed the clayey soil of that part of the country, converting the ice into a thick mud, which sank under the feet of men and horses. The artillery of the Russians stuck fast. Their horses better made for the saddle than to draw, could not disengage the guns, and they were obliged to abandon them. The French cavalry made amidst this confusion 3000 prisoners, and took a number of cannon. "I had already seen," said one of the actors in this frightful scene, general Langeron, "some battles lost; but I never had an idea of such a defeat."

In fact, from one wing of the Russian army to the other, no part of it was in order, except the corps of prince Bagration, which Lannes had not dared to pursue, being in ignorance of what was passing on the right of the army. All the rest was in fearful disorder, uttering wild cries, and pillaging the villages upon their route to procure provisions. The two sovereigns of Russia and Austria fled from the field of battle, over which they heard the shouts resound, "Long live the emperor!" Alexander was deeply despondent. The emperor Francis, more calm, supported the disaster with much composure. In the common misfortune he had one consolation at least: the Russians were no longer able to pretend that the cowardice of the Austrians conferred upon Napoleon all his glory. The two princes retreated in great haste over the plains of Moravia, amid the deep obscurity of the night, separated from their households, and exposed to be insulted through the barbarity of their own soldiers. The emperor of Austria, seeing all was lost, took upon himself to send prince John of Lichtenstein to Napoleon, to ask an armistice, with the promise that in a few days he would sign a peace. He ordered him to say besides to Napoleon, that he requested to have an interview with him at the advanced posts.

Prince John, who had on that day well fulfilled his duty, was thus enabled to appear with honour before the victor. He proceeded in all haste to the French head-quarters. Napoleon, now victorious, was employed in going over the field of battle, in order to have the wounded carried away. He would not take rest before he had seen given to the soldiers that attention to which they had so much right. Obedient to his orders, none of them had quitted the ranks to carry the wounded to the rear. Thus it was that the ground was strewn with them for a space of more than three leagues. Above all it was covered with Russian carcases. The field of battle was frightful to behold. But this touching spectacle did not at all affect the old soldiers of the revolution. Habituated to the horrors of war, they regarded wounds and death as the natural consequences of battles, and as things of little moment in the bosom of victory. They were intoxicated with delight, and raised loud acclamations when they perceived the group of officers which indicated the presence of Napoleon. His return to the head-quarters, which had been fixed at the post-house of Posoritz, offered to the sight the appearance of a triumphal procession.

The soul in which such bitter sorrow was one day to succeed joy so exquisite, tasted at that moment the delights of the most magnificent and well-merited success, because if victory is often obtained by pure hazard, it was here the result of admirable combinations. Napoleon, in effect, divining with the penetration of genius that the Russians had the intention of cutting him off from the Vienna road, and that they would then place themselves between him and the pools, had even by his attitude encouraged them to make the attempt; then weakening his right and reinforcing his centre, he had gone with the main body of his army upon the table-land of Pratzen abandoned by the Russians themselves; he had cut them in two, and precipitated them into a gulf, out of which they were never more able to extricate themselves. The larger part of his troops, kept in reserve, had scarcely been brought at all into action, so much did a single just conception make his position strong, as well also as that the valour of his soldiers allowed him to present them in a number inferior to the enemy. It may be asserted, that out of 65,000 French, 40,000 or 45,000, no more, had been engaged, because the corps of Bernadotte, the grenadiers, and the infantry of the guard, had exchanged no more than a few musket-shots. Thus 45,000 French had been victorious over 90,000 Austro-Russians.

The consequences of the battle were immense: 15,000 dead, wounded, or drowned; about 20,000 prisoners, among whom were ten colonels and eight generals. An immense number of horses were taken, with 180 pieces of cannon, artillery-carriages and baggage. Such were the losses of the enemy and the trophies of the French. These last had to lament a loss of about 7000 men killed and wounded.

Napoleon, being at his head-quarters of Posoritz, received there prince John of Lichtenstein. He received him as a conqueror, full of courtesy, and agreed to an interview with the emperor of Austria at the advanced posts of both armies for the next day but one: but an armistice was not to take place, until after the two emperors of France and Austria had seen each other, and had entered into explanations.

On the following day Napoleon transferred his head-quarters to Austerlitz, a seat of the family of Kaunitz. He there established himself, and from the name of the seat gave that of the battle, which his soldiers had already denominated that of the three emperors. It has since borne the name of Austerlitz, and will bear to future ages the name that it received from the immortal captain who gained it. He then addressed to his soldiers this proclamation.

"Austerlitz, 12th Primaire.

"Soldiers,—I am satisfied with you: you have in the battle of Austerlitz justified all that I expected from your intrepidity. You have decorated your eagles with immortal glory. An army of 100,000 men, commanded by the emperors of Russia and Austria, has in less than four hours been cut in two and dispersed. That part which escaped your sword is drowned in the lakes.

"Forty colours, the standards of the Russian imperial guard, 120 pieces of cannon, twenty generals, more than 30,000 prisoners [1], are the result of this ever celebrated battle. That infantry so boasted, and in numbers so superior, has not been able to resist your shock, and henceforth you have no rivals to encounter. Thus in two months this third coalition has been vanquished and dissolved. Peace cannot now be far off; but, as I promised my people before I passed the Rhine, I will only make it a peace that shall give us guarantees, and secure recompenses to our allies.

"Soldiers, when all which is necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country shall be accomplished, I will carry you back to France; there you will be the object of my warmest solici-

[1] The exact numbers were not, as yet, accurately known.

tude. My people will see you return with joy; and it will be sufficient for you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for them to answer, 'There is a valiant man!' NAPOLEON."

It was necessary to pursue the enemy, whom all the reports represented as in a state of complete disorder. In this confusion, Napoleon, deceived by Murat, had believed that the fugitive army had retreated towards Olmütz; and he had dispatched on that point the cavalry with the corps of Lannes. But on the following day, the 3rd of December, information more correct, gathered by general Thiard, made it known that the enemy had gone by the Hungary road towards the Morava. Napoleon upon this hastened to call back his columns upon Nasiedlowitz and Göding. Marshal Davout, reinforced with the whole of the division of Friant and by the arrival in line of Gudin's division, had lost no time, by favour of his position nearer to the Hungarian road. He set out in pursuit of the Russians, and pressed them close. He wished to come up with them before they made the passage of the Morava, and thus cut off a part of their army. After having marched on the 3rd he found himself on the 4th in the morning in sight of Göding, ready for the attack. The greatest confusion reigned in Göding. Beyond this place was a château of the emperor of Austria, that of Holitsch, where the two allied sovereigns had sought an asylum. The trouble there was as great as it was in Göding. The Russian officers continued to hold their unbecoming language against the Austrians. They laid the blame of their common defeat upon others, as if they ought not to have attributed it to their own presumption, the incapacity of their generals, and the thoughtlessness of their government. The Austrians also bore themselves fully as well as the Russians on the field of battle.

The two vanquished monarchs showed towards each other great coolness. The emperor Francis wished to confer with the emperor Alexander before he attended the interview agreed upon with Napoleon. They both settled that it was necessary to demand an armistice and peace, because it was impossible to fight any longer. Alexander, without avowing it, was anxious to save himself and his army as soon as possible from the consequences of an impetuous pursuit such as there was reason to fear from Napoleon. In regard to the conditions, he suffered his ally to regulate them as he might see fit. The emperor Francis having to bear solely the costs of the war, the conditions upon which they should agree to a peace belonged to him exclusively. Some time before, Alexander pretending to be arbitrator for Europe, would have said that the conditions of the peace concerned him as well. His pride was less exacting after the battle of the 2nd of December.

The emperor Francis left, therefore, for Nasiedlowitz, a village about midway to the castle of Austerlitz, and there near the mill of Paleny between Nasiedlowitz and Urschitz, among the French and Austrian advanced posts, he found Napoleon who awaited him before a bivouac fire lighted by his soldiers. Napoleon had the politeness to be first on the spot. He went to meet the emperor Francis, received him as he descended from his carriage, and embraced him. The Austrian monarch, encouraged by the welcome of his powerful enemy, held with him a long conversation. The principal officers of the two armies stood at a distance, regarding with no small degree of curiosity the extraordinary spectacle, of a successor of the Cæsars vanquished and asking for peace of a crowned soldier that the French revolution had raised to the summit of human greatness.

Napoleon made his excuse to the emperor Francis for receiving him in such a spot. "These are the kind of palaces," said Napoleon, "that your majesty has forced me to inhabit for these three months past." "You have done so well in your dwelling," replied the Austrian monarch, "that you have no ground to bear me ill-will on account of it." The conversation then turned upon the existing situation of affairs, Napoleon asserting that he had been driven into the war in spite of himself, and at the moment when he least expected it, and when he was exclusively occupied with England. The emperor of Austria asserted that he should not have been brought to take up arms except on account of the designs of France upon Italy. Napoleon declared that upon the conditions already stated to M. Giulay, and that he might dispense with repeating anew, he was ready to sign a treaty of peace. The emperor Francis, without any explanations upon this part of the subject, wished to know what Napoleon was disposed to do in relation to the Russian army. Napoleon at first demanded that the emperor Francis should separate his cause from that of the emperor Alexander; that the Russian army should retire by stated marches out of the Austrian states; and he promised on this condition to grant an armistice. In respect to a peace with Russia, he added, that they could regulate that afterwards, because the peace regarded him alone. "Believe me," said Napoleon to the emperor Francis, "Russia alone can now only make imaginary war in Europe. Vanquished she retires into her deserts, and you—you pay with your provinces the cost of war."

The pointed expressions of Napoleon but too well delineated the true situation of things in Europe between that great power and the rest of the continent. The emperor Francis gave his word of honour as a man and a sovereign no more to recommence the war, and, above all, no more to yield to the suggestions of powers who had nothing to lose in the contest. He agreed to an armistice for himself and Alexander, an armistice the condition of which was, that the Russians should retire by daily and fixed marches, and that the Austrian cabinet should send to Brünn immediately negotiators empowered duly to sign a separate peace with France.

The two emperors quitted each other with repeated marks of cordiality. Napoleon handed into his carriage the monarch whom he had styled his brother, and mounted his own horse to return to Austerlitz.

General Savary was sent to suspend the march of Davout's corps. He went first to Holitsch, in the suite of the emperor Francis, in order to know whether Alexander acceded to the proposed conditions. He saw the last emperor, about whom all appeared much changed since the mission which he had fulfilled to him a few days before. "Your master," said Alexander to him, "has

shown himself a very great man. I acknowledge all the power of his genius. As for myself, I shall retire, since my ally is satisfied."

General Savary conversed some time with the young czar about the last battle; explained to him how the French army, inferior in number to the Russian, had still appeared upon all points superior, in consequence of the art of manœuvring which Napoleon possessed in so high a degree. He courteously added, that, with experience, Alexander would become in his turn a man skilled in war; but that an art so difficult could not be acquired in a day. After this flattery to a vanquished monarch, he set out for Göding, in order to stop the march of marshal Davout, who had refused all the propositions for a suspension of arms, and was ready to attack the rest of the Russian army. They had vainly asserted to this marshal, in the name of the emperor of Russia himself, that an armistice was then negotiating between Napoleon and the emperor of Austria. He would on no consideration abandon his prey. But general Savary stopped him with the formal order of Napoleon. These were the last shots fired in this immortal campaign. The troops of each nation then separated to take up their winter quarters, and await the decisions of the negotiations between the belligerent powers.

Napoleon went from the castle of Austerlitz to Brünn, where he had ordered M. de Talleyrand to regulate the conditions of the peace, which could not henceforward be doubtful, since Austria was exhausted of resources, and Russia, eager to obtain an armistice, was withdrawing her army in all haste into Poland. Whilst the war of the first coalition had lasted for five years, and that of the second two, the war which had been raised by the third had endured three months, so irresistible had become the power of revolutionary France, concentrated in a single hand, and so prompt and able was it to strike those whom it wished to reach. The run of events had been such precisely as Napoleon had traced out in advance in his cabinet at Boulogne. He had taken the Austrians at Ulm almost without striking a blow; he crushed the Russians at Austerlitz; disengaged Italy by the offensive march alone of his troops upon Vienna, and reduced to acts of mere imprudence the attacks upon Hanover and Naples. This last, particularly after the battle of Austerlitz, became only a piece of folly disastrous for the house of Bourbon. Europe was at the feet of Napoleon; and Prussia, drawn in for a moment by the coalition, now found herself at the mercy of the captain whom she had offended and betrayed.

It still demanded great skill to negotiate: because if his enemies recovered from their present terror, and abusing the engagements into which they wished Prussia to enter, obliged her to intervene in the negotiations, they would be able still, three to one, to dispute the conditions of the peace, and take from the conqueror a part of the advantages of his victory. Thus it was that Napoleon would have the negotiations to take place at Brünn, far from M. Haugwitz, whom he had sent to Vienna, and obliged to remain there, by promising to give him a meeting in that capital.

While they had been engaged in fighting at Austerlitz, M. Giulay and M. Stadion had had conferences at Vienna with M. de Talleyrand, and had requested to negotiate in common for Russia and Austria under the mediation of Prussia. Since the arrival of M. Haugwitz, they had summoned him politely, but with earnestness, to execute the treaty of Potsdam; judging, if Prussia were comprised in the negotiation, she would be obliged either to establish the conditions of peace made at Potsdam, or to become an associate in the war. M. Haugwitz refused to treat in that manner, founding his refusal upon the nature of his mission, which made it obligatory upon him not to sit in a congress, but to treat directly with Napoleon, to bring him over to the views adopted by the Prussian cabinet. Moreover, M. de Talleyrand cut short these pretensions, by declaring that Austria alone would be admitted to the negotiation. He made known this resolution at Vienna, on the 2nd of December, the day the battle of Austerlitz was fought.

The battle being gained, and the armistice requested and granted at the bivouac of the victor, the separate negotiation was a condition accepted in advance. Napoleon demanded that it should, as already said, commence immediately at Brünn, with M. de Talleyrand. He made known that he had no objection that M. Giulay be admitted to treat, but not M. Stadion, formerly ambassador from Austria to Russia, filled with the prejudices of the coalition, and raising, even from the nature of his mind, difficulties continually renewed. He indicated as a negotiator prince John of Lichtenstein, who had much pleased him by his frank and military manners. The last was instantly sent to Brünn with M. Giulay. The emperor Francis being at Holitsch, they were able in a few hours to communicate with him, and to understand him with sufficient promptness of reply upon any contested points referred to him. The negotiation, therefore, was opened at Brünn between M. de Talleyrand, M. Giulay, and prince John of Lichtenstein. Napoleon having settled the bases, determined to go immediately to Vienna, to extract from M. Haugwitz an avowal of the weakness and falseness of Prussia, and make him bear the pain of them.

But what were to be the bases of the peace? It was these which were to be discussed at Brünn by Napoleon and M. de Talleyrand, and that became there the subject of frequent and profound conversations between them.

The moment was a dangerous one for the sagacity of Napoleon. Victorious in three months over a powerful coalition, having seen fly before his soldiers, inferior in numbers, the most renowned of the soldiers of the continent, was it not probable he would acquire, from the knowledge of this power, an exaggerated sentiment, and view with contempt all European resistances? Under the consulate, when he wished to reconcile France and Europe, he had been seen, within France, indulgent to the different parties; without, for bringing Austria round by his victories, Russia by his flatteries and caresses, Prussia by the adroit use of the German indemnities employed as a bait, England by the state of isolation to which he had brought her,—thus pacifying the world in a manner almost miraculous; and to display the most admirable of all ability, that of strength

which knew how to restrain itself. But he had been seen, as has been already shown, irritated by party ingratitude, no longer keeping terms with parties, and inflicting a cruel blow upon them by the death of the duke d'Enghien. He has been seen irritated against the provoking jealousy of England, to throw her the gauntlet, which she had taken up, and collecting every human means of overwhelming her. Now, the powers of the continent having, without a sufficient motive, turned him away from his contest with England, and drawn defeats upon themselves, which were real disasters, would he not, with those as with his other enemies, put aside that circumspection and management indispensable even to force, which composes the whole art of politics? A man who is able to draw from his genius and the bravery of his soldiers such an event as the battle of Marengo or Austerlitz—need he render an account to any one upon earth?

M. de Talleyrand, of whom the character and the part he played in this reign have been before traced, attempted again, under the present circumstances, to moderate Napoleon, but without much success. More attached to pleasing than contradicting, having on the part of European politics inclinations rather than opinions; incessantly given to the support of Austria, rendering Prussia ill offices, through an old tradition of the cabinet of Versailles, he rendered himself suspected of complaisance towards the one and of aversion towards the other, he had not with his sovereign the credit that a mind convinced and firm would have obtained. For the rest, if, in the present as on other occasions, he had not the merit of making moderation prevail, he had that of counselling it.

M. de Talleyrand, the day after the battle of Austerlitz, gave that advice to the intoxicated conqueror of Europe.

It was necessary to show, according to him, moderation and generosity towards Austria. This power considerably diminished within the two last centuries, must be much less than formerly an object of French jealousy. A new power should take her place in French prepossessions — that power was Russia: and against this new country, Austria, far from being dangerous, was a useful barrier. Austria was a vast assemblage of people unknown to each other, such as Austrians, Sclavonians, Hungarians, Bohemians, and Italians. She might easily fall to pieces of herself. If the tie were enfeebled, already so weak, that enchained the heterogeneous elements of which it was formed, the wrecks would have a stronger tendency to attach themselves to Russia than to France. It was proper, therefore, to forbear striking such blows at Austria; she should even be indemnified for the losses which she underwent—indemnified in a manner useful to Europe, a thing not only possible, but easy of fulfilment.

M. de Talleyrand proposed an ingenious combination, premature, however, in the existing state of Europe. This was to give to Austria the banks of the Danube, that is to say, Wallachia and Moldavia. These provinces, he said, worth more than Italy itself, would console Austria for her losses, alienate her from Russia, and render her in this respect the safeguard of the Ottoman empire, as she was already that of Europe. These provinces, after having embroiled her with Russia, would embroil her with England, and from that circumstance constitute her the ally of France.

In regard to Prussia, it was not requisite to be troubled much, and France was at liberty to treat her as she pleased. It was decidedly a false, fearful-hearted court, on which it was impossible ever to rely. In order to please it, France ought not again to make an enemy of Austria, the only ally of whom she could think in future.

Such were the opinions of M. de Talleyrand on the present occasion. The advice to humour Austria, to console her, even to indemnify her with equivalents, well chosen, was excellent; because the true policy of Napoleon should have been to conquer, and then to be moderate towards the conquered, the day following the victory. But the advice to treat Prussia lightly was unhappy, and partook of a false system of policy, which has already been designated. It had certainly been desirable for France to have had it in her power to give the provinces of the Danube to Austria, and to make her consider them as an indemnification sufficient for her losses in Italy; but it is doubtful whether she should have lent herself to such a combination, because Wallachia and Moldavia, in alienating Austria from Russia and England, would have placed her in dependence upon France. It is, besides, very doubtful if it was at that moment as possible to distribute the European territory as freely as it was done at Tilsit two years subsequently. But, however that may be, it was necessary to resign herself, in wishing to be dominant in Italy, to the encounter of an enemy in Austria, in whatever way it might be attempted to deal with her; and then what ally would there be to choose? It has been said already, more than once, that embroiled with England through the desire of equality on the seas, with Russia from the desire to be predominant on the continent, unable to draw any benefit from Spain so completely disorganized, what remained but Prussia—Prussia, vacillating it is true, but more through the scruples of its sovereign than the natural falseness of its cabinet; Prussia having no interest against France, when she had not yet obtained the Rhenish provinces, already compromised in the French system, having her hands full of the spoils of the church received from France, not asking any thing better than to receive more, and ready to accept that conquest which would for ever bind her to the policy of France.

It was a serious error, therefore, not to treat Austria with lenity, and also to think that it would be possible to attach her surely and strongly, so much so that there would have been no danger in ill-treating or neglecting Prussia.

Napoleon did not share in the errors of M. de Talleyrand, but he committed others from that passion for domineering, which the hatred of his enemies and the prodigious success of his armies began to excite in him beyond all reasonable limits.

He had not sought a continental quarrel; they had, on the contrary, to divert him from his great enterprise against England, declared war against him. Those who had commenced this war, and had sustained the worst of it, ought, according to

him, to suffer the consequences. He determined, therefore, by this peace to obtain the complement of Italy, that is to say, the Venetian states actually in the possession of Austria, and further the definitive settlement of the Germanic questions for the advantage of his allies, Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg.

Upon these two points Napoleon was absolute in his determination, and he was not wrong to be so. Venice was necessary to him, Friuli, Istria, and Dalmatia, in a word, as far as the Julian Alps and the Adriatic, with its two shores, which secured to him an influence upon the Ottoman empire. In regard to Germany, he wished to confine Austria to her natural frontier, the Inn and Salza, taking from her the territories which she possessed in Suabia, and which had been qualified under the title of "Exterior Austria"—territories which were, on her part, only a means of annoying the German allies of France, and enabling her to make, when she pleased, her military preparations upon the Upper Danube. He would take from her the communications of the Tyrol with the lake of Constance and Switzerland, or, in other words, the Vorarlberg. He even wished, if it were possible, to take from her the Tyrol, which gave her possession of the Alps, and always a free passage into Italy. But this last point was difficult to obtain, because the Tyrol was an old possession of Austria, as dear to her affections as useful to her interests. It was making Austria submit to the loss of 4,000,000 of her subjects out of 24,000,000, and of 15,000,000 out of 103,000,000 of revenue. These, therefore, were cruel sacrifices to demand of her.

With all which he took from Austria in Germany, Napoleon prepared to complete the patrimony of the three German states which had been his auxiliaries, Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. His intention was to manage by these three states, so as to have an influence on the diet, a road to the Danube, and to exhibit, in a declared manner, that his alliance was beneficial to those who had embraced it.

He thus intended to settle favourably for those allied princes the question of the immediate nobility, and to abolish that nobility which created them enemies in their own dominions. He equally wished to settle all the questions of sovereignty, and to suppress by that means a number of these of a feudal character, very slavish and very burdensome for the Germanic states.

Napoleon prepared finally to attach to himself the three princes of southern Germany, and to add to a bond of benefit that arising from the tie of matrimony. Princes and princesses were necessary, in order to unite with the members of his dynasty. He reckoned upon finding them in Germany, and on thus uniting to princely establishments the influence of family alliances.

Prince Eugène Beauharnois was dear to his heart. He had made him viceroy of Italy; he wished to find him a wife. He cast his eyes upon the daughter of the elector of Bavaria, a remarkable princess, and worthy of him for whom she was destined. As he reserved the larger part of the spoils of Austria for Bavaria, which the situation and the dangers of that electorate fully justified, he wished that this part of the spoils should be the settlement of the French prince.

But the princess Augusta was promised to the heir of Baden, and her mother, the electress of Bavaria, the violent enemy of France, alleged this engagement in order to repel an alliance which was repugnant to her prejudices. General Thiard having contracted intimacies with several petty German courts, when he served in the army of Condé, had been sent to Munich and Baden, in order to remove the obstacles which opposed the projected unions. This officer, a clever negotiator, had made the countess of Hochberg of service to him; she had been united by a left-handed marriage with the reigning elector of Baden, and she therefore had need of the services of France in getting her children acknowledged. By the influence of this personage, he had obtained of the court of Baden a very delicate proceeding, which consisted in getting it to refrain from all further designs on the hand of the princess Augusta of Bavaria. This being done, the elector and electress of Bavaria remained without a pretext for refusing an alliance, which brought them a settlement in value so great as that of the Tyrol and a part of Suabia.

This was not the only German union contemplated by Napoleon. The heir of Baden, from whom the princess Augusta of Bavaria had been taken, now remained to be married elsewhere. Napoleon designed Stephanie de Beauharnois for him, a lady gifted with grace and intellect, and whom he was about to create an imperial princess. He ordered general Thiard to conclude this second marriage. Finally, the old duke of Wurtemberg had a daughter, the princess Catherine, of whom since that time misfortune has displayed the noble qualities. Napoleon wished to obtain her for his brother Jerome. But the tie contracted by him in America, without the authority of his family, was an obstacle which it had not yet been possible to remove. It was needful therefore to wait some time longer before this last establishment could be formed. To all these aggrandizements of territory that he prepared for the houses of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, Napoleon designed to add the title of king, leaving to these houses the places they possessed in the Germanic confederation.

These were the advantages which Napoleon wished to draw from his last victories. To exact the whole of Italy was on his part a natural consequence. To seek in the Austrian possessions in Suabia the means of aggrandizing the princes his allies was well arranged; because in keeping back Austria behind the Inn, the alliance of France was manifestly rendered useful. To take the Vorarlberg from Austria to give it to Bavaria was still wise, because it was thus separated from Switzerland. But to take from it the Tyrol, although in regard to Italy this was a good combination, it was but to accumulate in the heart of Austria implacable resentments; it was to reduce her to despair, concealed at the moment only to burst forth sooner or later; it was from that to condemn oneself more than ever to a cautious policy, skilful in finding and keeping alliances, since the principal power of the continent had been thus made an irreconcileable enemy. To settle the question of the immediate nobility, and several other feudal questions, might have been a useful

simplification relative to the interior organization of Germany; but to aggrandize in an extraordinary manner the princes of Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, to ally them with France to such a point as to make them be regarded with suspicion in Germany, was to create for them a false position, from which they would one day be tempted to break away, by becoming unfaithful to their protector. It was to make enemies of all the German princes not so favoured; it was to wound Austria in a new mode, already wounded in so many places, and what was still more vexatious, to disoblige Prussia herself; finally, it was to mingle much more than was suitable, or becoming, in the affairs of Germany, and to prepare for oneself great jealousies and petty ingratitudes. Napoleon ought not to have forgotten that he had pointed cannon against the gates of Stuttgard in order to get them opened; that it was requisite for him to obtain the aid nearly at the same moment of a strange woman to obtain a marriage with Baden; and almost to snatch his daughter from the elector of Bavaria, who had been only obtained by presenting him the keys of the Tyrol in one hand, and the sword of France in the other.

Napoleon therefore overstepped the true measure of French policy in Germany, by creating allies too far detached from the German system, and unsafe, because their position was false. But it is difficult to be moderate in victory; and then he was a new monarch. He was an excellent head of a family, and he wanted alliances and marriages.

Such were the ideas that served for the foundation of the instructions left for M. de Talleyrand for the negotiation carrying on with M. Giulay and prince Lichtenstein. Napoleon added one condition to the advantage of the army, which to him was not less dear than his brothers and nieces; he demanded 100,000,000f., for the purpose of forming a provision, not only for the officers of all ranks, but also for the widows and children of those who had fallen in battle. Without loss of time he signed three treaties of alliance with Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria. He gave to the house of Baden the Ortenau and a part of the Brisgau, several towns on the shore of the lake of Constance, that is to say, 113,000 inhabitants, which increased one-fourth the territories of that house. He gave to the house of Wurtemberg the rest of Brisgau and considerable portions of Suabia, in other words, 183,000 inhabitants, which formed an augmentation of one-fourth, and carried up the principality to nearly a million of inhabitants. He gave lastly to Bavaria, the Vorarlberg, the bishoprics of Eichstädt and of Passau, recently attributed to the elector of Salzburg, all Austrian Suabia, the city and bishopric of Augsburg, or in other words, 1,000,000 of inhabitants, which raised Bavaria from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000, adding a third to her possessions. The march of the negotiations with Austria did not allow of any mention being yet made of the Tyrol.

To these princes was also attributed all the rights of sovereignty over the immediate nobility, and they were freed from certain servile feudal obligations to which the emperor of Germany asserted a right over portions of their territories.

The elector of Baden having the modesty to refuse the title of king, as too superior to his revenues, he retained his title of elector: but the title of king was immediately conferred upon the electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg.

In return for these advantages, these three princes engaged themselves to make war in concert with France at any time she would have to sustain it in support of her actual state, and in any that might result from the treaty about to be concluded with Austria. France on her side engaged herself, whenever found needful, to take up arms to support these princes in their newly-acquired position.

These treaties were signed on the 10th, 12th, and 20th of December. General Thiard took them when he took his departure to negotiate the projected marriages.

A portion of the territories of Austria had thus been disposed of in advance, without any agreement with Austria. But the disposer of them gave himself no great concern about the consequences to which the act might expose him.

Napoleon, after attending to his wounded, and after sending off to Vienna those at least who were capable of being removed there, after having sent off to France the prisoners and the cannon taken from the enemy, quitted Brünn, leaving to M. de Talleyrand there the task of debating the conditions agreed upon with M. Giulay and prince Lichtenstein. He was impatient to reach Vienna, in order to have a long conversation with M. Haugwitz, and to penetrate wholly into the secret of Prussia.

M. de Talleyrand entered immediately into conferences with the two Austrian negotiators. They loudly remonstrated when they became acquainted with the pretensions of the French minister; and he had not yet explained himself in regard to the Tyrol. He had said nothing, but of the desire to keep Austria from Switzerland and Italy, in order to cut short all causes of rivalry and war.

The prince of Lichtenstein and M. de Giulay made known, on their side, the conditions upon which Austria was ready to consent. She clearly saw she must relinquish the states of Venice, the possessions which she had in Suabia, and the litigious pretensions between the empire and the German princes. She consented, therefore, to cede Venice and the *terra firma* as far as the Izonzo; but she wished to keep Istria, Albania, and to gain Ragusa, as outlets necessary to Hungary. They were, besides, the last remains of the acquisitions obtained by the reigning emperor, and he made it a point of honour to hold them.

As to the Tyrol, she was almost disposed to give that up, by the transference of it to the actual elector of Salzburg, the archduke Ferdinand, who had been indemnified for Tuscany in 1803, by the bishopric of Salzburg and the provostship of Berchtolsgaden. She wanted Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden in exchange; and she further required that the Vorarlberg, Lindau, and the borders of the lake of Constance, should belong to the same duke, as appendages of the Tyrol.

By this arrangement Austria would have acquired the Tyrol with the Vorarlberg in the person of one of the archdukes.

For the rest she consented to cede her possessions in Suabia with the Ortenau, the Brisgau, and the bishopries of Eichstädt and Passau.

But she demanded for the princes of her house, that thus lost their possessions, a great indemnification, which will appear singular enough in its conception, and sufficiently proves what were the sentiments which animated one towards the other, the members of the European coalition. She demanded Hanover!

Thus the patrimony of the king of England, that they had blamed Napoleon for offering to Prussia, and Prussia for accepting of Napoleon,—that Russia herself had offered to Prussia to detach her from France,—Austria, in her turn, demanded for an archduke.

M. de Talleyrand, overjoyed at hearing such demands made, uttered no remonstrance when they were spoken, but promised to communicate them to Napoleon.

Lastly, as to the 100,000,000f. of contribution, Austria declared the impossibility of her paying 10,000,000f., so much was she reduced. She offered as a compensation for that sum, to deliver over the immense *matériel* in arms and ammunition of every kind which were in the Venetian states, and which she would have a right to bring away, if she had not stipulated to leave them.

After warm discussions, which lasted only three or four days, seeing on all sides that it was very desirable to conclude the negotiation, it was agreed that the prince of Lichtenstein should proceed to the château of Holitsch, in order to receive fresh instructions, those of which he was the holder not authorizing him to subscribe to the sacrifices demanded by Napoleon.

M. de Talleyrand was to remain at Brünn until his return. It was a great fault in the Austrians thus to lose time, because that which passed at Vienna between Napoleon and M. Haugwitz, went to render their situation still worse.

M. de Talleyrand, who corresponded daily with Vienna, had made known to Napoleon, that he was not near the conclusion of the Austrian negotiations. This resistance, which would have merited serious attention if it had been combined with the resistance of Prussia, annoyed Napoleon. The archdukes were drawing near Vienna with 100,000 men. The Prussian troops were assembling in Saxony and Franconia; the Anglo-Russians advancing on Hanover. These united circumstances did not dismay the victor of Austerlitz. He was ready, if it was necessary, to fight the archdukes at Presburg, and then to throw himself upon Prussia by Bohemia. But this would be to recommence war with coalesced Europe, this time entire, and would in itself be a very dangerous game; and it would not be wise to expose himself thus for a few square leagues of territory, more or less. Although the situation of Napoleon was that of a conqueror all powerful, it did not the less behove him to conduct himself like an able politician. It was Prussia that his political skill was most interested to keep in view, because by profiting from the terror with which he had inspired her by the later events of the war, he would be able to detach her from the coalition, bind her again to France, and add to the victory of Austerlitz a diplomatic victory not less decisive. He was thus naturally impatient to see and confer with M. Haugwitz.

M. Haugwitz, who had come to propose terms to Napoleon, under the false appearance of an officious mediation, found him triumphant and nearly master of Europe. Without doubt, with character, union, and constancy, it had been possible still to make head against the French emperor. But the Russians had passed from the delirium of their pride to despondency at their defeat; Austria, struck down, was under the feet of her vanquisher; Prussia trembled only at the idea of war. And then all the coalesced powers were in distrust of the others, and communicated little together. M. Haugwitz visited without ceasing and exclusively the French legation, pushing his flattery so far as to wear every day in Vienna the grand cordon of the legion of honour[1]. He never spoke of Austerlitz but with admiration, as well as of the genius of Napoleon, and was not without feeling all this time a strong degree of anxiety about the welcome he should receive.

Napoleon arrived at Vienna on the 13th of December, and the same evening sent for M. Haugwitz to Schönbrunn, and gave him an audience in the cabinet of Maria Theresa. He did not yet know of all which had taken place at Potsdam; he knew more, however, than when he last saw M. Haugwitz at Brünn, the evening before the day of Austerlitz. He had been informed of a treaty signed on the 3rd of November, by which Prussia engaged herself to take ultimately a part in the coalition. He showed warmth, and was quickly irritated, but he often affected more anger than he really felt. Trying on this occasion to intimidate his visitor, he reproached M. Haugwitz that he had—he, the minister and friend of peace, he who placed his glory upon the system of neutrality, who had even wished to convert that system of neutrality into a scheme for an alliance with France—he reproached him for having the weakness to ally himself at Potsdam with Russia and Austria, and with having contracted with these powers engagements that could do no other than lead to war. He complained bitterly of the duplicity of the Prussian cabinet, of the hesitation of the king, of the influence of women in his court; and gave M. Haugwitz to understand, that now being disembarrassed of the enemies he had upon his hands, he was able to do what he liked with Prussia. Then, with vehemence, he demanded what the Prussian cabinet desired, which system it reckoned upon following? and appeared to require upon all these questions, explanations complete, categorical, and immediate.

M. Haugwitz, at first agitated, soon recovered himself, because he possessed as much coolness as intelligence. In the midst of all this rude passion, he thought he could perceive that Napoleon, at the bottom, wished for an accommodation, and that if he broke very quickly the engagements entered into with the coalition, this victor, in appearance so angry, would consent to be appeased.

M. Haugwitz then gave adroit, specious, fawning explanations, in relation to the circumstances which had governed and drawn away Prussia; spoke of those who had the weakness to be mastered by pure accident, so far as to abandon the system which was most convenient for their country; and finished by insinuating clearly enough, that if Napoleon wished it, all could be quickly repaired,

[1] It was M. de Talleyrand who recounted these details in his letters to Napoleon. *Author's Note.*

and that even the alliance which had so frequently failed, it was possible might become the instantaneous price of an immediate reconciliation.

Napoleon, looking into the soul of M. Haugwitz with one of his penetrating glances, recognized that the Prussians demanded nothing better than to turn round and come back to him. To all the blows he had already struck Europe, he was delighted to add a stroke of clever maliciousness. He instantly offered to M. Haugwitz the proposal which Duroc had been ordered to make at Berlin, that is to say, the formal alliance of France with Prussia, on the condition so many times renewed of the territory of Hanover. This was most assuredly to trespass deeply upon the honour of the Prussian cabinet, because Napoleon proposed to it, for the sake of money it may be said, to abandon the ties recently contracted at the tomb of the great Frederick; he made the proposal, after Prussia had at Potsdam deserted France for the advantage of Europe, that at Vienna she should desert Europe for France. Napoleon did not hesitate; and while announcing the proposition, he kept his eyes a long while fixed upon the countenance of M. Haugwitz.

The Prussian minister showed himself neither indignant nor surprised. He, on the contrary, appeared enchanted to make his report of a French alliance and Hanover, which was the system for which he had a predilection. It is proper to remark, as an excuse for M. Haugwitz, that leaving Berlin at the moment when he flattered himself that Napoleon had not arrived as far as Vienna, he had seen, even under this supposition, the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf uneasy at the consequences of a war against France, and insisted that it should not be declared before the end of December. But Napoleon had conquered Vienna, crushed the coalesced powers at Austerlitz, and it was then only the 13th of December. M. Haugwitz had good ground to fear that Napoleon might, being a conqueror, fling himself upon Bohemia, and fall like a thunderbolt upon Berlin. He was therefore fortunate in his own mind to terminate by a conquest a situation which threatened to end in a disaster. As to his fidelity towards his colleagues, he had only treated them as they had treated one another. It is requisite too, above all, to attribute the conduct which he held at Vienna less to him than to those who in his absence had led the Prussians into a strait without an outlet. He accepted, therefore, the tender of Napoleon without taking any further time for consideration.

Napoleon, satisfied to find his idea realized so fully, said to M. Haugwitz, "Very well; it is a thing decided — you shall have Hanover. You hand over to me in return a few points of territory of which I have need, and you will sign with France a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. But on your arrival at Berlin you will impose silence on the court circles; you will treat them with the contempt they merit—you will make the policy of the minister predominate over that of the court."

These allusions of Napoleon were in reference to the queen, prince Louis, and those around them. He enjoined it upon Duroc to confer with M. Haugwitz, and to get ready immediately the draft of the treaty.

This arrangement was scarcely concluded, when Napoleon delighted with his own work, wrote to M. de Talleyrand to enjoin him to settle nothing yet finally at Brünn, to draw out the negotiation at least for some days longer, because he was certain of finishing with Prussia, which he had overcome at the price of Hanover, and he had nothing more to make him thenceforward uneasy, neither the menaces of the Anglo-Russians against Holland, nor the movements of the archdukes on the side of Hungary. He added that he would now retain the Tyrol peremptorily, the war contribution more resolutely than ever; and that for the rest he, Talleyrand, must leave Brünn and come to Vienna. The negotiation was too far off from him at Brünn, he wished it to be nearer, as for instance at Presburg.

It was on the 13th of December that Napoleon saw M. Haugwitz. The treaty was ready drawn out on the 14th, and on the 15th signed at Schönbrunn. The following are the principal conditions:

France, considering Hanover as her own conquest, ceded it to Prussia. Prussia, in return, ceded to Bavaria the marquisate of Anspach, that same province which it was so difficult not to pass over when there was war with Austria. She ceded to France, further, the principality of Neufchâtel, and the duchy of Cleves containing the fortress of Wesel. The two powers guaranteed to each other all their possessions, which signified that Prussia guaranteed to France its existing limits, with the new acquisitions made in Italy and the new arrangements concluded in Germany; and that France guaranteed to Prussia her actual state, with the additions of 1803 and the new addition of Hanover.

It was a true treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, which also bore the formal title—a title repudiated in all the anterior treaties.

Napoleon had wanted Neufchâtel, Cleves, and, above all, Anspach, which he intended to exchange for the grand-duchy of Berg, in order to have some endowments to distribute amongst his most meritorious servants. These were small sacrifices for Prussia, and to him valuable means of recompense; because, in his vast designs, he wished not to be great without making all around him great—his ministers and generals, as well as his relations. This negotiation was a master-stroke of policy; it covered the coalesced powers with confusion; it placed Austria at the discretion of Napoleon; and, above all, it secured to France the sole desirable and possible alliance, the alliance of Prussia. But it contained a serious engagement—that of separating Hanover from England—an engagement which, some day, might prove very burdensome; because it might be apprehended that, at some future time, it would prevent a maritime peace, if, in any time, more or less distant, circumstances rendered such a peace possible.

Napoleon wrote soon after to M. de Talleyrand, that the treaty with Prussia was signed, and that he must quit Brünn if the Austrians did not accept the conditions which he intended to impose upon them.

M. de Talleyrand, who wished the peace had been already concluded, and who before all things was repugnant to the ill-treatment of Austria, was very deeply mortified. As to the Austrian negotiators, they were struck down. They brought

from Holitsch fresh concessions, but not so extensive as those which were demanded. They knew that Prussia, in order to secure Hanover, exposed them to the loss of the Tyrol; and, despite the danger of still further delay, and of seeing Napoleon make new demands—a danger of which M. de Talleyrand endeavoured to make them sensible—they were obliged to refer to their sovereign.

They separated, therefore, at Brünn, to give each other the meeting again at Presburg. An abode at Brünn was become unhealthy, from the exhalations arising from the ground filled with bodies, and a town crowded with hospitals.

M. de Talleyrand returned to Vienna, and found Napoleon inclined to renew the war if the Austrians did not yield. He had in fact commanded general Songis to repair the *matériel* of the artillery, and to increase it at the expense of the arsenal of Vienna. He had even sent a severe reprimand to Fouché, the minister of police, for having prematurely announced peace as certain.

One circumstance of very recent occurrence had contributed to make him yet more angry. He had been informed of the events that had passed at Naples. That insensate court, after having stipulated a treaty of neutrality—it is true, by the advice of Russia—had on a sudden thrown off the mask, and taken up arms. In learning the battle of Trafalgar and the engagements contracted by Prussia, queen Caroline had believed that Napoleon was lost, and decided to call in the Russians. On the 19th of November, a naval squadron had landed on the coast of Naples 12,000 Russians and 6000 English. The court of Naples engaged itself to join 40,000 Neapolitans to the Anglo-Russian army. The design was to raise up Italy in the French rear, while Massena was at the foot of the Julian Alps and Napoleon near the frontiers of ancient Poland. This court of emigrants had yielded to the ordinary weakness of emigrants, which is, to believe all they wish to be true, and to conduct themselves accordingly.

Napoleon, when he became acquainted with this scandalous breach of a solemn pledge, was at once irritated and satisfied. His determination was taken: the queen of Naples should pay with her realm for the conduct she had pursued, and leave a crown vacant which would be very well placed on one of the Bonaparte family. No one in Europe would be able to charge with injustice the sovereign act which struck at this branch of the house of Bourbon; and as to its natural protectors, Russia and Austria, there was very little need to care about a reckoning with them.

Still at Brünn, the Austrian negotiators had attempted to get inserted in the treaty of peace some article which should shield the court of Naples, of which it held the secret, but of which Napoleon was then ignorant. But he, being once informed of it, gave an order to M. de Talleyrand to listen to nothing upon the subject. "I shall be too easy," said he, "if I bear the outrages of this miserable court of Naples. You know with what generosity I conducted myself towards it; but that is now over. Queen Caroline ceases to reign in Italy. Whatever may happen you will not speak of it in the treaty. It is my absolute will."

The negotiators awaited M. de Talleyrand at Presburg. He proceeded there. They negotiated at the advanced posts of two armies. The archdukes had approached Presburg. They were two marches from Vienna. Napoleon had united the larger part of his troops. He had brought up Massena by the route of Styria. Near 200,000 French were concentrated around the capital of Austria; Napoleon, extremely angry, had determined to commence hostilities. But to suffer this would have been too great a folly on the part of the court of Vienna, before all, after the defection of Prussia, and in the existing state of despondency of the Russian cabinet. However great were the sacrifices exacted, the Austrian cabinet, although at first affecting to repel the idea, was resigned to submit to them.

It was then agreed, that Austria should abandon the states of Venice, with the provinces of the *terra firma*, such as Friuli, Istria, and Dalmatia. Thus Trieste and the mouths of the Cattaro would pass to France. These territories were to be united to the kingdom of Italy. The separation of the crowns of France and Italy was stipulated anew, but with a vague mode of expression, which left the faculty of deferring that separation until a general peace, or as long as to the death of Napoleon.

Bavaria obtained the Tyrol, the object of its incessant wishes, the German Tyrol as well as that of Italy. Austria, in return, received the principalities of Salzburg and of Berchtolsgaden, given in 1803 to the archduke Ferdinand, the former duke of Tuscany. Bavaria indemnified the archduke with the ecclesiastical principality of Würzburg, which she had equally received in 1803, in consequence of the secularizations.

The territory of Austria was thus better marked out; but she lost with the Tyrol every influence over Switzerland and Italy, while the archduke Ferdinand, transferred to the midst of Franconia, ceased to be under her immediate influence. The state, which was granted to that prince, was no more as before a complete annexation to the Russian monarchy.

To this indemnity, found in the county of Salzburg, was added, for Austria, the secularization of the possessions of the Teutonic order, and their conversion into hereditary property, in behalf of any of the archdukes whom she might designate. The importance of these possessions consisted in a population of 120,000 inhabitants, and a revenue of 150,000 florins.

The electoral title of the archduke Ferdinand, with his vote in the college of electors, was maintained, and transferred from the principality of Salzburg to the principality of Würzburg.

Austria, recognizing the royalty of the electors of Wurtemberg and Bavaria, consented that the prerogatives of the sovereigns of Baden, of Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, over the immediate nobility of their states, should be the same as those of the emperor over the immediate nobility of his. This was, in fact, the suppression of this nobility in those states in question; because the powers of the emperor over that nobility being complete, those of the three princes became so in an equal degree.

Finally, the imperial chancery renounced all rights of feudal origin over the three states favoured by France.

The approbation of the diet, however, was formally reserved. France effected in this way a social revolution in a large part of Germany; since she centralized power there for the advantage of the territorial sovereign, and made to cease all dependence upon external feudality. She continued also the system of secularization; because with the Teutonic order there disappeared one of the two last ecclesiastical principalities then subsisting, and there remained none but that of the prince-archchancellor, the ecclesiastical elector of Ratisbon. Conformably to that which had been done before, this secularization was also effected for the advantage of one of the principal German courts.

Austria, definitively excluded from Italy, despoiled, by losing the Tyrol, of the dominant position which she had in the Alps, thrown behind the Inn, deprived of all her advanced posts in Suabia, and of the feudal ties which held the southern states of Germany in subjection to her, had, at the same time, sustained an enormous loss both materially and politically. She lost, as before mentioned, 4,000,000 of subjects out of 24,000.000, and 15,000,000 florins in revenue out of 103,000,000 [1].

The treaty was well calculated for the repose of Italy and Germany. There was but one objection which could be made against it, and this was, that the vanquished, too severely treated in it, would not submit sincerely to its conditions. It remained for Napoleon, by great skill and well-managed alliances, to leave Austria without hope or means of revolt against the decisions of the victor.

At the moment for signing such a treaty, the hands of the plenipotentiaries hesitated. They resisted upon the questions, the war contribution of 100,000,000f., and Naples. Napoleon had reduced the contribution to 50,0000,000f., on account of the sums which had already been taken from the Austrian chests. In regard to Naples, he would not hear it mentioned.

They conceived, in order to overcome him, a measure full of courtesy, and that was, to send to him the archduke Charles, a prince whose character and talents he admired, and whom he had never met. They requested him to receive the archduke at Vienna, and he consented readily, but was resolved to give up nothing. They expected that this prince, one of the first generals in Europe, laying open to Napoleon the state of the resources of which the Austrian monarchy was possessed, expressing to him the opinions of the army, ready to sacrifice itself to repel a humiliating peace, adding to such generous protestations adroit remonstrances, he might perchance move Napoleon. Thus when M. de Talleyrand urged the negotiators to complete the treaty, they replied that they should be charged with having betrayed their country, if they put their signatures to the treaty before the archduke had seen Napoleon.

M. de Talleyrand, however, having taken upon himself to give up 10,000,000f. of the war contribution, they signed, on the 26th of December, the treaty of Presburg, one of the most glorious that Napoleon ever concluded, and certainly the best conceived; because, if France subsequently obtained more territory, it was at the expense of arrangements less agreeable to Europe, and on that account less durable. The Austrian negotiators limited themselves to recommend, by a letter signed in common, the reigning house of Naples to the generosity of the conqueror. The archduke saw Napoleon on the 27th, in one of the emperor's residences, and was received with the respect due to his rank and his renown. They conversed upon the art of war, which was natural between two captains of such high merit; and the archduke retired without saying a word about the affairs of their respective empires.

Napoleon disposed every thing immediately afterwards for quitting Vienna. He commanded that the 2000 cannons and 100,000 muskets taken in the arsenal of Vienna should be embarked on the Danube; he sent 150 pieces of cannon to Palma-Nova, for the defence of that important fortress. He regulated the retirement of his troops in such a manner that it should be performed by short marches, because he did not wish that they should return as they had come, at a running pace. The necessary dispositions were made upon the route, that they might have an abundance of food. He distributed 2,000,000f. in gratuities to the officers of every rank, in order that each might enjoy the fruit of his victories immediately. Berthier was ordered to watch over the return of the army to the French territory. It was to leave Vienna in five days, and to repass the Inn within twenty. It was stipulated that the fortress of Braunau should remain in the hands of the French until the completion of the payment of 40,000,000f.

This done, Napoleon set out for Munich, where he was received with transports of joy. The Bavarians, who were one day to betray him in his defeat, and reduce the French army to fight its way through them at Hanau, now lavished upon him their applauses, pursuing with ardent curiosity the conqueror who had protected them from invasion, constituted Bavaria a kingdom, and enriched them with the spoils of vanquished Austria. Napoleon, after having attended the marriage of Eugène de Beauharnois with the princess Augusta, and after having enjoyed the happiness of a son whom he loved, the admiration of a people eager to behold him, and the flatteries of an enemy in those of the electress of Bavaria, set out for Paris, where the enthusiasm of France awaited him.

A campaign of three months, in place of a war of several years, as was at first feared, the continent disarmed, the French empire carried to those limits which it never ought to have passed, a dazzling glory added to her arms, public and private credit miraculously re-established, new prospects of repose and prosperity opened to the nation, under a government powerful and respected by the world; this is what the people thanked him for, by a thousand shouts of "Long live the emperor!" He heard those shouts even at Strasburg, on crossing the Rhine, and they accompanied him to Paris, which he entered on the 26th of January, 1806. It was a return again from Marengo. Austerlitz was, in fact, that for the empire which Marengo had been for the consulate. Marengo had con-

[1] The population of Austria in 1840 was 36,000,000, and her revenue 140,000,000 florins, convention money. Her debt seven times her revenue. *Translator.*

firmed the consular power in the hand of Napoleon; Austerlitz fixed the imperial crown upon his head. Marengo had made France pass in one day from a threatened position to one which was tranquil and great; Austerlitz, in crushing in one day a formidable coalition, did not produce a less important result. For reflecting and calm minds, if there remained any in the presence of such events, there was but one subject of dread, and that was the well-known inconstancy of fortune, and what was still more formidable, the weakness of the human mind, that sometimes supports adversity without giving way, but rarely sustains prosperity without committing great errors.

BOOK XXIV.

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.

RETURN OF NAPOLEON TO PARIS.—PUBLIC JOY.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE COLOURS TAKEN FROM THE ENEMY.—DECREE OF THE SENATE ORDERING THE ERECTION OF A TRIUMPHAL MONUMENT.—NAPOLEON GIVES HIS FIRST CARE TO THE FINANCES.—THE COMPANY OF UNITED MERCHANTS IS ASCERTAINED TO BE INDEBTED TO THE TREASURY, IN THE SUM OF ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE MILLIONS.—NAPOLEON DISCONTENTED WITH M. DE MARBOIS, PLACES M. MOLLIEN IN HIS POST.—RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CREDIT.—A FUND FORMED WITH THE CONTRIBUTIONS LEVIED IN CONQUERED COUNTRIES.—ORDERS RELATIVE TO THE RETURN OF THE ARMY, TO THE OCCUPATION OF DALMATIA, AND TO THE CONQUEST OF NAPLES.—SEQUEL OF PRUSSIAN AFFAIRS.—THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF SCHÖNBRUNN GIVEN WITH RESERVATIONS.—NEW MISSION OF M. HAUGWITZ TO NAPOLEON.—THE TREATY OF SCHÖNBRUNN IS RE-DRAWN AT PARIS, WITH FURTHER OBLIGATIONS AND LESS ADVANTAGES FOR PRUSSIA.—M. DE LUCCHESINI SENT TO BERLIN TO EXPLAIN THESE FRESH CHANGES.—THE TREATY OF SCHÖNBRUNN BECOMES THE TREATY OF PARIS, IS FINALLY RATIFIED, AND M. HAUGWITZ RETURNS TO PRUSSIA.—THE ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE PREDOMINANT.—ENTRY OF JOSEPH BONAPARTE INTO NAPLES.—OCCUPATION OF VENICE.—DELAYS IN RELATION TO THE DELIVERY OF DALMATIA.—THE FRENCH ARMY HALTED ON THE INN, IN WAITING FOR THE DELIVERY OF DALMATIA, AND QUARTERED IN THE GERMAN PROVINCES MOST CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING IT.—SUFFERINGS OF THE COUNTRIES OCCUPIED.—SITUATION OF THE COURT OF PRUSSIA AFTER THE RETURN OF M. HAUGWITZ TO BERLIN.—THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK SENT TO ST. PETERSBURGH, TO EXPLAIN THE CONDUCT OF THE PRUSSIAN CABINET.—STATE OF THE RUSSIAN COURT.—DISPOSITIONS OF ALEXANDER AFTER AUSTERLITZ.—RECEPTION GIVEN TO THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.—USELESS EFFORTS OF PRUSSIA, TO MAKE THE OCCUPATION OF HANOVER APPROVED BY RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.—ENGLAND DECLARES WAR UPON PRUSSIA.—DEATH OF PITT, AND ACCESSION OF FOX TO THE MINISTRY.—HOPES OF PEACE.—COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MR. FOX AND M. DE TALLEYRAND.—LORD YARMOUTH SENT TO PARIS, IN THE CHARACTER OF A CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATOR.—BASIS OF A MARITIME PEACE.—THE AGENTS OF AUSTRIA, IN PLACE OF DELIVERING THE MOUTHS OF THE CATTARO TO FRANCE, DELIVER THEM TO THE RUSSIANS.—THREATS OF NAPOLEON TO THE COURT OF VIENNA.—THE RUSSIAN ENVOY, M. OUBRIL, SENT TO PARIS, WITH THE COMMISSION TO PREVENT A MOVEMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMY AGAINST AUSTRIA, AND TO PROPOSE PEACE.—LORD YARMOUTH AND M OUBRIL NEGOTIATE CONJOINTLY AT PARIS.—POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL PEACE.—CALCULATION OF NAPOLEON TENDING TO PROTRACT THE NEGOTIATION.—SYSTEM OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE.—VASSAL ROYALTIES, GRAND DUCHIES AND DUCHIES.—JOSEPH, KING OF NAPLES.—LOUIS, KING OF HOLLAND.—DISSOLUTION OF THE GERMANIC EMPIRE.—CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.—MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY.—INTERIOR ADMINISTRATION.—PUBLIC WORKS.—THE COLUMN OF THE PLACE VENDÔME, THE LOUVRE, THE RUE IMPERIALE, THE ARCH OF THE ETOILE.—ROADS AND CANALS.—COUNCIL OF STATE.—CREATION OF THE UNIVERSITY.—BUDGET OF 1806.—RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SALT DUTY.—NEW SYSTEM OF THE TREASURY.—REORGANIZATION OF THE BANK OF FRANCE.—CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.—TREATY OF PEACE WITH RUSSIA, SIGNED ON THE 20TH OF JULY BY M. OUBRIL.—THE SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY DECIDES LORD YARMOUTH TO PRODUCE HIS POWERS.—LORD LAUDERDALE IS JOINED WITH LORD YARMOUTH.—DIFFICULTIES OF THE NEGOTIATION WITH ENGLAND.—SOME INDISCRETIONS COMMITTED BY THE ENGLISH NEGOTIATORS, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE RESTITUTION OF HANOVER, GIVE BIRTH TO GREAT UNEASINESS AT BERLIN.—FALSE REPORTS, WHICH EXCITE THE COURT OF PRUSSIA.—NEW DELUSION OF THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE AT BERLIN, AND THE RESOLUTION TO ARM.—SURPRISE AND DISTRUST OF NAPOLEON.—RUSSIA REFUSES TO RATIFY THE TREATY SIGNED BY M. OUBRIL, AND PROPOSES FRESH CONDITIONS.—NAPOLEON REFUSES TO ADMIT THEM.—GENERAL TENDENCY TO WAR.—THE KING OF PRUSSIA DEMANDS THAT THE FRENCH ARMY BE WITHDRAWN.—NAPOLEON REPLIES, BY THE DEMAND OF A WITHDRAWAL OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.—PROLONGED SILENCE ON ONE SIDE AND THE OTHER.—THE TWO SOVEREIGNS SET OUT FOR THE ARMY.—WAR DECLARED BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND FRANCE.

While Napoleon stayed a few days at Munich, to celebrate the marriage of Eugène Beauharnois with the princess Augusta of Bavaria, while he halted one day at Stuttgard and another day at Carlsruhe, to receive the congratulations of his new allies, and to conclude family alliances there, the people of Paris awaited him impatiently in order to testify towards him their delight and admiration. France, highly satisfied with the progress of public affairs, although taking no part in them, seemed

to have found again the liveliness which it displayed on the first days of the revolution, in order to greet with applause the wonderful exploits of her armies and of its chief Napoleon, who to the genius for great things joined the art to make them taking, and had sent on before him the colours captured from the enemy. He had ordered a distribution of them very skilfully calculated. He had divided them between the senate, the tribunate, the city of Paris, and the old church of Notre Dame, the witness of his coronation. He had given eight to the tribunate, eight to the city of Paris, fifty-four to the senate, and fifty to the church of Notre Dame. During the last campaign he had constantly informed the senate of all the events of the war, and the peace being signed, he hastened to communicate to it by a message the treaty of Presburg. He thus repaid by his continual attentions the confidence of that great body, and in acting in this mode, he was in harmony with his policy, because he supported in a high rank the old authors of the revolution, that the new generation discarded willingly when it was furnished with the means of doing so through the elections. This was his own peculiar aristocracy, and he hoped to mingle it by little and little with the ancient.

These colours passed through Paris on the 1st of January 1806, and were borne triumphantly through the streets of that capital, to be placed under the roofs of the edifices which were to receive them. An immense crowd attended to view the spectacle.

The sagacious and impassive Cambacérès says himself in his grave memoirs, that the joy of the people was like intoxication,—and when should they rejoice if not under similar circumstances! 400,000 Russians, Swedes, Austrians, and English, marched from all the points of the horizon against France; 200,000 Prussians promised to join with them; suddenly 150,000 French, leaving the shores of the ocean, traverse in two months a part of the European continent, taking the first army that opposed them without fighting, striking the others with redoubled blows, entering into the astounded capital of the old Germanic empire, passing Vienna, and going to the frontiers of Poland to break in a great battle the tie of the coalition; sending back the vanquished Russians to their frozen plains, and chaining to their frontiers the disconcerted Prussians; the apprehension of a war which it was believed would be of long duration, terminated in three months; the peace of the continent suddenly re-established, maritime peace justly hoped for; all the prospects of future prosperity given to delighted France, placed at the head of the nations—wherefore should the people be sensibly moved, it is repeated, if not for such marvellous things! And as no one was able to foresee the end too nearly approaching of this greatness, and as in the fruitful genius which produced it, there was no possibility of yet discerning the too ardent genius which was to compromise it, the public happiness, it was perfectly easy to enjoy, without any mixture of sinister presentiments.

The men who are bound more particularly to the material prosperity of states, the merchants and dealers in money, were not less affected than the rest of the nation. The greater commercial men who in victory applauded the approaching return of peace—these were delighted to see terminated in a day the double crisis of public and private credit—and to have it in their power to hope again for that profound tranquillity which the consulate had enabled France to enjoy for five years. The senate, after having received the colours which were designed for them, ordered by a decree that a triumphal monument should be erected to Napoleon the Great. Conformably with the wish of the tribunate, this monument was to be a column surmounted with the statue of Napoleon. His birthday was placed among the national festivals, and it was decided moreover that a large edifice should be constructed in one of the public places of the capital, to receive with a series of sculptured works and of paintings dedicated to the glory of the French arms, the sword that Napoleon wore at the battle of Austerlitz.

The colours destined for Notre Dame were handed over to the clergy of the metropolis, by the municipal authorities. "These colours," said the venerable archbishop of Paris, "suspended from the roof of our church, will attest to our latest descendants the efforts of Europe against us, the noble deeds of our soldiers, the protection of heaven over France, the astonishing success of our invincible emperor, and the homage which he does to God of his victories!"

It was in the midst of this universal and profound satisfaction that Napoleon re-entered Paris, accompanied by the empress. The heads of the bank, willing that his presence should be the signal of public prosperity, had awaited the eve of his return to make their payments again in specie. Since the recent events renewed confidence had made specie plentiful in their chests. There remained no trace of the temporary difficulties encountered during the month of December.

With Napoleon the joy of success never interrupted labour. His indefatigable spirit knew how to enjoy and work at the same time. Arrived in Paris on the 26th of January, in the evening, he was on the 27th, in the morning, wholly occupied with the concerns of the government. The archchancellor Cambacérès was the first personage of the empire with whom he entered into conversation on that day. After a few moments given to the pleasure of receiving his felicitations, and of seeing his prudence confounded by the prodigious events of the late war, he spoke to him regarding the financial crisis so promptly and fortunately terminated. He trusted with reason to the correctness and fairness of the reports of the archchancellor Cambacérès, and wished to hear them before those of any other individual. He was much irritated against M. de Marbois, whose seriousness had always imposed upon him, and whom he had believed incapable of carelessness in business. He was very far from suspecting the high integrity of that minister; but he was unable to pardon him for having delivered over the resources of the treasury to adventurous speculators, and he was resolved to display great severity. The archchancellor succeeded in tranquillizing him, and in demonstrating to him, that in place of exercising rigor, it was much better to treat with the united merchants, and obtain the resignation of all their

effects, in order to settle this strange business with the least possible loss.

Napoleon immediately summoned a council at the Tuileries, and desired that they should lay before him a detailed report on the operations of the company, which were still a mystery to him. He summoned there all the ministers, and M. Mollien also, the director of the sinking fund, whose management satisfied him, and to whom he attributed, much more than to M. de Marbois, the skill necessary to manage extensive money affairs. He sent a command to M. Desprez, M. Vanlerberghe, and M. Ouvrard to attend at the Tuileries, and also to the clerk, who had been accused of having deceived the ministers of the treasury.

All the individuals present were intimidated by the presence of the emperor, who did not conceal his resentment. M. de Marbois began to read a report of considerable length which he had drawn up upon the subject under discussion. Scarcely had he read any of it before Napoleon, interrupting him, said, "I see how it is—it was with the treasury funds, and with those of the bank, that the company of united merchants wished to do the business of France and Spain; and as Spain had nothing but promises of dollars to give, it was with the money of France that the wants of both countries were met. Spain was indebted to me in a subsidy, and it is I who have furnished her with one. Now Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard, must give over to me all of which they are in possession. Spain must pay me what it owes to them, or I shall imprison these gentlemen in Vincennes, and send an army to Madrid."

Napoleon exhibited himself cold and austere towards M. de Marbois. "I esteem your character," he said to him, "but you have been the dupe of people against whom I gave you notice to be upon your guard. You have delivered to them all the assets in the portfolio of which you should have better overlooked the employment. I see myself, with regret, obliged to withdraw from you the administration of the treasury, because, after what has passed, I cannot any longer leave it with you."

Napoleon next ordered the members of the company, whom he had commanded to attend at the Tuileries, to be introduced. Messieurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez, although the least blameable, melted into tears. Ouvrard, who had compromised the company by his adventurous speculations, remained perfectly calm. He set himself to persuade Napoleon, that it was necessary to permit him to settle himself the very complicated operations in which he had involved his associates, and that he should draw from Mexico, by the way of England and Holland, very considerable sums, much superior to those which France had advanced.

It is probable, in fact, that he could himself have better arranged the settlement of the affair than any other person; but Napoleon was too much irritated, and too pressing to clear himself from the hands of such speculators, to put trust in the promises of Ouvrard. He placed Ouvrard and his associates between the alternative of a criminal prosecution, or the immediate abandonment of all they possessed in goods, securities, immoveables, and pledges received from Spain. They resigned themselves to this hard sacrifice.

This was certain to be a ruinous winding up for them; but they had exposed themselves to it by their abuse of the resources of the treasury. M. Vanlerberghe had most to complain of the three; for he, without mingling himself in the speculations of his associates, had limited himself to carrying on, actively and honestly, throughout all Europe, a corn trade for the service of the French armies [1].

After the dismissal of the council, Napoleon detained M. Mollien, and, without waiting for a single observation on his part, or for his assent, said to him, "You will take the oath to-day as minister of the treasury." M. Mollien, intimidated, although flattered by such a piece of confidence, hesitated to reply. "Is it that you have any dislike to be a minister?" added Napoleon; and the same day required him to take the oath.

It was requisite to get clear of the embarrassments of all kinds created by the company of united merchants. M. de Marbois had already withdrawn the service of the treasury from the hands of the company, and had consigned it for some days to M. Desprez, who had from that moment continued it on the state account. He had finally confided it to the receivers-general, on moderate but temporary conditions. It had not yet been determined what definitive resolution should be taken upon the subject; nothing had been arranged but the determination not to commit to speculators, however wise or prudent they might be, a service so vast and so important as the general negotiation of the funds of the treasury.

This service, as has been said, consisted in discounting the "obligations of the receivers-general," the "bills at sight," the "customs' bills," and those styled "*coupes de bois*;" paper which had all a term of twelve, fifteen, and eighteen months to run. Until the creation of the company of united merchants, they were limited to the making partial and fixed discounts for sums of 20,000,000f. or 30,000,000f. at one time. In exchange for the effects themselves, they received immediately the moneys proceeding from the discounts. It was by little and little, under the increasing rule of necessity, which soon supplants confidence, that this service had been successively and entirely abandoned to a single company, and the portfolio of the treasury delivered over in a certain way to its discretion; and the infatuation became so great that the chests of accountable persons were placed at its disposal. If the minister had limited himself merely to the transfer of fixed sums in paper, for sums of equivalent value in specie, leaving it to receive, at their time of payment, the amount of the effects discounted, confusion could not have happened between the affairs of the company and those of the state. But there had been handed over to the united merchants as much as 470,000,000f. at one time of "obligations of the receivers-general," "bills at sight," and "customs'

[1] This statement I borrow from the most authentic sources. First, from the memoirs of prince Cambacérès, then from the interesting and instructive memoirs of count Mollien, that are not yet published; and, lastly, from the archives of the treasury. I have held, and read myself with great attention, the papers of the proceedings, and, above all, a long and interesting report, that the minister of the treasury drew up for the emperor. I advance nothing then but upon official and incontestable evidence. *Author's Note.*

bills," of which they had obtained the discount, either by the bank or by foreign or French bankers. At the same time, for greater convenience, they had been authorized to take directly from the chests of the receivers-general all the funds which entered them, to be accounted for subsequently; in such a mode that the bank, as has been seen, when it presented the paper it had discounted, and of which payment was due, had found nothing in the chests but the receipts of M. Desprez, showing that he had already received them in payment. But it was not here that these strange facilities had stopped. When M. Desprez, acting for the united merchants, discounted the effects of the treasury, he gave the value, not in crowns, but in a paper that they had allowed him to introduce, and that was denominated "the bills of M. Desprez." In this manner the company had been enabled to fill with its own bills the chests of the state and of the bank, and to create a circulating paper, by the aid of which it had for some time kept up its speculations, as well with France as Spain.

The true error of M. de Marbois had been, the lending himself to this confusion of affairs, by which it became no longer possible to distinguish the state property from that of the company. Join to this abusive compliance the dishonesty of a clerk, who alone possessed the secret of the portfolio, and who had cheated M. de Marbois in exaggerating incessantly to him the necessities of the united merchants—and it is possible to obtain an explanation of this incredible financial adventure. The clerk had received for himself a million, which Napoleon made to be thrown into the common mass of the assets delivered over by the company. The dread imposed by Napoleon was so great, that those implicated avowed every thing and restored every thing.

Still, in order to be just towards every one concerned, it must be said, that Napoleon had himself been partly a cause of the faults committed under the circumstances, in obstinately leaving M. de Marbois under the weight of enormous pecuniary charges, and in deferring for too long a time the creation of extraordinary means. It would have been necessary, in fact, that M. de Marbois should provide for the first arrear resulting from anterior budgets and the insolvency of Spain, which country, by not liquidating his subsidy, was the cause of a new deficiency of 50,000,000f. It was under the weight of these different charges that this upright, but too inconsiderate, minister had become the tool of speculating men, who had rendered him some service, and who would have rendered him even very great ones, if their calculations had been made with more precision. Their speculations effectively reposed upon a real foundation; this was the Mexican dollars, which really existed in the chests of the captains-general of Spain. But these dollars were not to be brought to Europe with so much facility as M. Ouvrard had hoped; and it was that which had brought on the embarrassment of the treasury and the ruin of the company.

What proves the confusion which prevailed there was, the difficulty that was found even to establish the amount of the debt of the company towards the treasury. It was at first supposed to be 73,000,000f. A fresh examination raised it to 84,000,000f. Finally, M. Mollien, wishing, upon entering on his duty, to state in the most accurate manner the situation of the finances, discovered that the company had managed to possess itself of the sum of 141,000,000f., for which it remained the state's debtor. The following is the mode in which this enormous sum was made up. The united merchants had directly received from the chests of the receivers-general as much as 55,000,000f. at once; and, by their various repayments, their debt to these accountable persons was reduced to 23,000,000f. on the day of the catastrophe. They had in hand, for 73,000,000f. of bills of M. Desprez, a kind of money that M. Desprez had given in place of crowns, and which had been current as long as his credit sustained by the bank was good in the market, but that from henceforth was not of more worth than any other valueless paper. The company owed 14,000,000f. on account of the bills of the central cashier (these have been already noticed elsewhere as being effects created to facilitate the movements of the funds between Paris and the provinces). These 14,000,000f. taken from the portfolio, had not been followed by any payment, neither in the bills of M. Desprez, nor in value of any other kind. M. Desprez, for his personal management during certain days of his own particular service, remained a debtor of 17,000,000f. Lastly, among the commercial effects that the company had furnished to the treasury for different payments made at a distance, there were found 13,000,000f. or 14,000,000f. in bad paper. These five different sums, of 23,000,000f. taken directly from the accountable persons; of 73,000,000f. in bills of M. Desprez, worth nothing; of 14,000,000f. in bills of the central cashier, of which no equivalent had been given; of 17,000,000f. of personal debt of M. Desprez; and, finally, the 14,000,000f. of bills of exchange protested, composed the 141,000,000f., the total debt of the company.

However, the state was not to lose that important sum, because the operations of the company, as has just been said, had a solid foundation in the commerce in dollars, that exactness in the returns had alone made it err in its calculations. It had furnished contracts to the French army and navy to the extent of a sum of 40,000,000f. The house of Hope had bought about 10,000,000f. in these famous Mexican dollars, and was at that moment transmitting the amount to Paris. The company possessed besides in immoveable property, Spanish wool, corn, some good credits, in all to an amount of about 30,000,000f. These various sums included real property to the value of 80,000,000f. Thus there were yet 60,000,000f. to be raised to liquidate the debt. An equivalent to this sum had a *bona fide* existence in the portfolio of the company in the shape of credits upon Spain.

Napoleon, after having made the united merchants deliver up to him all which they possessed, demanded that the French treasury should be placed in regard to Spain exactly in the same place as the company. He ordered M. Mollien to treat with a particular agent of the prince of the Peace, M. Isquierdo, who had been for some time in Paris, and filled the functions of an ambassador much more than M. Azara or M. Gravina, who merely bore the title. The court of Madrid had no refu-

sal to give to the conqueror of Austerlitz; besides it was in truth a debtor to the company, and in consequence to France herself. Negotiations were therefore entered into with her to secure the repayment of the 60,000,000f., which not only represented the subsidies still unpaid, but the provisions which had been furnished to her forces, and the corn which had been supplied to her people.

The treasury was therefore about to be entirely repaid, thanks to the 40,000,000f. of anterior contracts, to the 10,000,000f. which were to come from Holland, the goods existing in the warehouses, the immoveables seized, and to the engagements that Spain had made, and of which the house of Hope offered to discount a part. But it remained still to fill up immediately a double void, providing for the old arrear of the budgets, which has been stated at from 80,000,000f. to 90,000,000f. in value, and of resources which the company had absorbed for its own use. But now all this was become easy, since the victories of Napoleon, and since the peace which had been its fruit. The capitalists, who had ruined the company by exacting one-and-a-half per cent. per month, that is to say, eighteen per cent. per annum, to discount the treasury paper, offered now to take it at three-quarters per cent., and soon came to dispute among each other at half per cent., that is to say, at six per cent. per annum. The bank, that had withdrawn from circulation a part of its notes, since it had done with M. Desprez, and that besides saw flow into its chests the metals which it had purchased all over Europe during the time of distress, the bank was in a state to discount all that was wished at a moderate rate, sufficiently advantageous to itself. Although there had been alienated in advance, for the use of the company, a certain sum of the effects of the treasury belonging to 1806, the greater part of the effects correspondent to this service remained intact, and were about to be discounted on the best terms. But victory had not only procured credit for Napoleon, it had procured for him material riches as well. He had imposed upon Austria a contribution of 40,000,000f., adding to this sum 30,000,000f. which he took directly from the chests of that power, the whole sum which the war had brought in to him amounted to 70,000,000f. Of this 20,000,000f. had been expended on the spot for the maintenance of the army, but at the expense of the treasury, with which Napoleon intended to make a regulation, whose essence and conditions will be shortly stated. There remained, therefore, 50,000,000f., which was on the way, partly in gold, partly in silver, conveyed in the artillery waggons, and a part in good bills of exchange on Frankfort, Leipsic, Hamburg, and Bremen. The garrison of Hamelin, that was about to enter France in pursuance of the cession of Hanover to Prussia, was ordered to bring with the English stores from Hanover the amount of the bills of exchange due at Hamburg and Bremen. An impost of 4,000,000f. had been laid upon the city of Frankfort, in place of the contingent which it was bound to furnish, like Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria. France was, therefore, about to receive, besides effects of considerable value, no inconsiderable quantities of the precious metals; and in respect to hard cash, as in all other things, abundance was going to succeed to the momentary distress, that the real alarms of commerce and the affected alarms of jobbers had produced.

Napoleon, whose genius for organization would leave nothing to the character of accident, and continually endeavoured to change all things into lasting institutions, had conceived a noble and benevolent project, grounded on the most legitimate benefits of his victories. He resolved to create with the contributions of the war a treasury for the army, which should never be touched from any motive in the world, not even for his own use; because his civil list, administered with exact care, was sufficient for all the expenses of so magnificent a court, and even for the creation of a particular fund. It was from this treasure, constituting an army fund, that he purposed to make endowments for his generals, his officers, and soldiers, and for their widows and children. He wished not to enjoy his victories alone, but was desirous that all those who served France and his vast designs, should not only acquire glory, but live in prosperous circumstances; and that those who had arrived, by strength of heroism, to have no care about themselves in the field of battle, should have none regarding their families. Finding in the inexhaustible fecundity of his own mind the art of increasing the utility of things, Napoleon had invented a combination which rendered this treasure as profitable to the finances as to the army itself. What had been until now wanted was a lender, to lend to the government upon good terms. The treasury of the army would become such a lender, of which Napoleon would himself regulate the demand upon the state. The army was to have 50,000,000f. in gold and silver, besides 20,000,000f. owing to it from the budget for pay in arrear; and, further, a war *materiel* of great value, which the army had taken. The artillery waggons were bringing from Vienna 100,000 muskets, and 2000 pieces of cannon. The entire of this *materiel* and contributions reached in value a sum of 80,000,000f., of which the army was the proprietor, and which it could lend to the state. Napoleon intended that all which was disposable should be paid into the sinking fund, which should keep of it a separate account, and employ this sum in discounting the "bills of the receivers-general," of the "bills at sight," and the "customs' bills," whenever the capitalists exacted more than six per cent.; or in purchasing up the national property when it was at a low price; or even in taking interest from the funds, if it was thought necessary to borrow to make up the arrear.

This combination therefore had the double utility of procuring advantageous interest for the money belonging to the army, and of supplying the government with all the capital it might require, at a rate of interest that would not be usurious.

Napoleon ordered several important measures to be immediately effected by means of the money at his disposition. One of these was the collection of a dozen millions in specie at Strasburg, in case military operations should again occur: for though Austria had signed a peace, Russia had not begun to negotiate, Prussia had not yet sent the ratification of the treaty of Schönbrunn, and England had not ceased to be active in her diplomatic intrigues. He ordered besides that some millions should be kept in reserve in the sinking fund, and that the

number of those millions should not be made known, but be employed suddenly, whenever the speculators showed themselves extortionate. He thought that the treasury should impose upon itself this sort of expense, as an individual lays up in a spare granary in seasons of abundance to guard against a dearth; and that the interest lost by this species of hoarding would be a useful sacrifice, not to be regretted. Finally, the moneys which were brought in, being required to be coined into those of France, he commanded them to be divided among the different mints, in proportion to the scarcity of money in each locality.

These primary dispositions commanded by the moment being terminated, Napoleon wished his ministers should, without delay, occupy themselves with a new organization of the treasury, and a new constitution of the bank of France; and he trusted this double duty to M. Mollien, now become the treasury minister. M. Gaudin, who had kept the portfolio of the finances, because it must be remembered that at this period the treasury and the finances formed two distinct ministries—M. Gaudin received the order to present a plan for the liquidation of the arrears, for placing the receipts and expenses definitively upon a level, under the double hypothesis of peace and war, though he should, in order to effect it, have recourse to a new creation of taxes.

After thus taking care of the finances, Napoleon employed himself in bringing back the army to France, but slowly, in such a manner as that the men should not march more than four leagues a-day. He ordered that the sick and wounded should be kept until the spring in the places where they had received the earliest medical attention, and that proper officers should remain with them to watch over their cure; and for this essential purpose he dipped into the chests of the army. He had left Berthier at Munich, with the commission to superintend all the details, and to preside over the exchanges of territory, always so difficult among the German princes. Berthier was to act in concert with M. Otto, relative to this last object, as being the French representative at the court of Bavaria.

Napoleon next considered of the steps which he should take in regard to the kingdom of Naples. Massena, taking with him 40,000 men, drawn out of the forces in Lombardy, received the order to march by Tuscany and through the southern part of the Roman states to the kingdom of Naples, without regarding any proposition for a peace or an armistice. Napoleon, uncertain whether Joseph, who had refused the viceroyalty of Italy, would accept the crown of the Two Sicilies, only gave him the appellation of lieutenant-general. Joseph was not to have the command of the army; it was Massena only who held that commission, because Napoleon, in making a sacrifice to his family of political interests, would not so easily sacrifice to them the interests of his military occupations. But Joseph being once introduced into Naples by Massena, would then take possession of the civil government of the country, and exercise there all the powers of royalty.

General Molitor was in the mean time sent towards Dalmatia. He had general Marmont to support his rear. The last was charged to receive Venice and the Venetian states from the hands of the Austrians. Prince Eugène had orders to go to Venice, and to take the government of the conquered provinces, without yet joining them to the kingdom of Italy, although that junction was to take place at a later period. Before this junction was definitively pronounced, Napoleon desired to conclude with the representatives of the kingdom of Italy, different arrangements, that an immediate union would have prevented.

Napoleon wishing, in the last place, to raise the spirits of his soldiers, and communicate the excitement to the whole of France, ordered that the grand army should be assembled at Paris, in order to be welcomed there at a magnificent festival, which should be given by the authorities of the capital. The idea of the nation giving a fête to the army could not be better exhibited, than by committing it to the citizens of Paris to receive in this mode the soldiers of Austerlitz.

While he occupied himself thus in administering the government of his vast empire, and making the cares of peace succeed those of war, Napoleon had fixed his eyes, at the same time, upon the sequel of the treaties of Presburg and Schönbrunn. Prussia, more particularly, had yet to ratify the treaty wholly unforeseen by herself, that M. Haugwitz, who went to Vienna to dictate conditions, had, on the contrary, submitted to receive; and in place of imposing a constraint upon Napoleon, had taken back with him a treaty offensive and defensive, the whole, it is true, compensated by the rich present of Hanover.

The surprise of Europe it would indeed be difficult to imagine, as well as of the different feelings and opinions, the satisfaction and mortification, the avidity gratified, and all the confusion, which were experienced in Prussia upon learning the treaty of Schönbrunn. It had frequently got out to the public at Berlin that the electorate of Hanover had been offered to Prussia, at one time by France, at another by Russia, which, besides the advantage of rounding off the ill-defined territory of Prussia, had that of securing to her the command of the Elbe and Weser, as well as a decisive influence over the Hanseatic towns of Bremen and Hamburg. This offer, so often announced, was now a realized acquisition—a perfect certainty. It was a matter of great satisfaction for one of the most ambitious countries in Europe. But to compensate for this gift, what confusion—the word must be plainly spoken—what shame would await the conduct of the court of Prussia! While in yielding against her will to the entreaties of the coalition, she had engaged to unite with it, if in a month Napoleon did not accept the mediation of Prussia, and submit himself to the conditions of peace which she offered to impose upon him, which was equivalent to a declaration of war against him. Then, on a sudden, finding Napoleon in Moravia, not at all embarrassed, but all powerful, she had turned to him, accepted his alliance, and received at his hand the fairest of the spoils of the coalition, Hanover, the ancient patrimony of the kings of England.

It must be averred that there is no longer honour in the world, if such things are not punished with the most marked reprobation. Thus it was that the Prussians, they must have that

justice done them, were sensible how much such a line of conduct was to be condemned; and notwithstanding the value of the present brought by M. Haugwitz, received it with mortification at the heart, and humiliation on the brow. However, the disgrace would have been effaced from the memory of the Prussians, and would only have given room for pleasure at the acquisition, if other feelings had not come to mingle with that of remorse, and to poison the satisfaction which they must else have experienced. Although highly jealous of the Austrians, the Prussians, in seeing them beaten, felt that they were Germans, and as the Germans are not less jealous of the French than the Russians or English, they viewed with chagrin the extraordinary triumphs of France. Their patriotism began to revive in favour of the Austrians, and this sentiment, joined to that of remorse, filled the nation with great uneasiness. The army was, of all classes, that which more openly manifested this disposition. The army in Prussia is not impassive as in Austria; it reflects the national character with extreme vividness; it represents the nation much more than the army represents it in any of the other countries of Europe, France excepted; and it thus represented a nation, the opinion of which was already very independent of its sovereigns. The Prussian army, which felt to a high degree the sentiment of German jealousy, that had hoped a moment that the career of combat would be opened before it, and that suddenly saw it closed by an act difficult of justification, blamed the cabinet without any concealment. The German aristocracy, that saw the Germanic empire ruined by the peace of Presburg, and the cause of the immediate nobility sacrificed to the sovereigns of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden,—this German aristocracy, filling all the higher military ranks, contributed much to excite discontent in the army, and carried back the exaggerated expression of this discontent either to Berlin or Potsdam. These passions broke out more than all around the queen, and converted her own circle into a scene of loud opposition. Prince Louis, who reigned supreme here, sent forth stronger than ever his chivalrous declamations. All is not effected in the alliance of two countries where their interests agree; it is necessary that the self-love of both should do so as well; and this last condition is not the easiest to realize. The Prussians were at that time the only people in Europe whose policy would have agreed with that of France; but it would have required much humouring to manage the excessive pride of the heirs of the great Frederick; and unhappily the weak, ambiguous, and sometimes dishonest conduct of this cabinet did not attract the respect that this susceptibility required.

Napoleon, after six years of unproductive intercourse with Prussia, had brought himself into a feeling of no consideration towards her. He had proved that recently, by passing through one of her provinces, authorized it is true by precedent, without even giving her notice of his intention. He had proved it yet further, by showing himself so little hurt by her wrongs, that after the convention of Potsdam, when he had just ground to feel indignant, he had given her Hanover, treating her as only fit to be purchased. She was and ought to be much mortified at such a proceeding.

The consciences of men feel all the reproaches which they merit, more especially when they are spared them. The language to which she exposed herself on the part of Napoleon, Prussia believed he had really spoken. They were certain at Berlin that he had said to the Austrian negotiators, when they expressed a strong reliance upon the support of Prussia, "Prussia! she will go to the best bidder: I will give her more than you, and she will arrange herself on my side." He had thought this perhaps, and said as much to M. de Talleyrand; but he declared he had never said so to the Austrians. However that may be, at Berlin they repeated this conversation as if it were correct. The error of Prussia was, amidst all this, not to have merited the respect that she would otherwise have obtained; that of Napoleon, not to have granted it to her, although she did not deserve it. No one can have allies, any more than friends, except by humouring their pride as well as their interest, upon the condition, in perceiving their errors, even in feeling them strongly, of not committing similar errors in regard to them.

M. Haugwitz, although he arrived with his hands full, was in consequence received with differing sentiments; with anger by the court, a mixture of content and confusion by the public, and by no one with complete satisfaction. As to M. Haugwitz himself, he appeared without embarrassment before all his judges. He had brought back from Schönbrunn that which he had invariably advised, the aggrandizement of Prussia founded upon the alliance of France. His only fault had been a momentary obedience to the empire of circumstances, which exposed him to the vexatious contrast of being now the signer of the treaty of Schönbrunn, after having been but a month before the subscriber of the treaty of Potsdam. But to these circumstances, it was his unskilful successor and ungrateful disciple, M. Hardenberg, who had given birth, and thus rendered complicated the relations of Prussia in a few months, so that she was unable to escape from her complications except by clashing contradictions. M. Haugwitz besides, if he had for a moment been drawn in, had been less so than anybody else; and, after all, he came to preserve Prussia from the abyss into which she had been very nearly precipitated. It is not to be forgotten further, that at Potsdam, seduced as they had all been by the presence of Alexander, it had been forcibly recommended to M. Haugwitz not to draw Prussia into the war with France before the end of December; and that the 2nd of December had found him victorious and irresistible whom they had wished to control or fight. He had been placed between the danger of an unfortunate war and a contrary conclusion; richly remunerated, what did they wish him to have done? For the rest, he said, nothing was compromised. Taking his ground on the unforeseen and extraordinary nature of the situation, he had only entered with Napoleon into conditional engagements, more expressly submitted than customary to the ratification of the court. Things were therefore still entire. They were able, if they were as bold as they boasted themselves, as sensitive to honour, as little awake to interest, as they pretended to be,—they were able to refuse the ratification of the treaty of Schönbrunn. He had forewarned Na-

poleon; he had told him, that treating without instructions he had treated without pledging himself. They might choose between Hanover or war with Napoleon. The position was yet the same as it had been at Schönbrunn, except that he had gained the month that they had declared to be necessary for the organization of the Prussian army.

Such was the language of M. Haugwitz, one only point exaggerated, that is, where he asserted that he had been placed between the acceptance of Hanover or war. He would in fact have been able to reconcile Prussia with Napoleon without the acceptance of Hanover. It is true that Napoleon would have seen this half-reconciliation with distrust, and that from distrust to war there was no great distance. The enemies of M. Haugwitz reproached him on another account. In keeping himself at Vienna, they said to him, less distant from the Austrian negotiators, in making common cause with them, he would have been better able to resist Napoleon, and to desert less ostensibly the European interests espoused at Potsdam, or not to desert them without the consent of all. But that implied a collective negotiation; and Napoleon was so averse to it, that it would have been only another manner of leading to war by the insisting on such a point. It was therefore war, only war, with a fearful adversary, before the term fixed, the end of December, against the known wish of the king, and against the positive well-known interests of Prussia, that M. Haugwitz asserted had faced him at Schönbrunn.

The embarrassment of this situation was therefore much greater for others than for himself; and besides, he possessed imperturbable firmness, mingled with tranquillity and mildness, which would have sufficed to sustain him in presence of his adversaries, if he had committed the errors which he had not.

Thus M. Haugwitz, without being disconcerted by the clamours which resounded on every side, without even insisting upon the adoption of the treaty, as a negotiator attached to the work of his own hands might have done, did not cease the repetition of the fact that the cabinet was free, that it was able to make its choice; but that it well knew the choice must lie between Hanover and war. He left to others the embarrassment arising out of the contradictions in the policy of Prussia, and kept for himself only the honour of having brought back his country into the path from which she ought never to have deviated. Happy had this minister been had he remained in this line, if he had not himself subsequently spoiled this situation by inconsistencies which ruined himself and did not fail to ruin his country!

The highfliers of Berlin, those sincere and affecting to be so, said that this gift of Hanover was a perfidious gift, which would keep Prussia in eternal war with England, and destroy the commerce of the nation; besides, it was purchased by the abandonment of the fine provinces for so long a time attached to the monarchy, such as Clèves, Anspach, and Neufchâtel. They maintained that Prussia, which, ceding Anspach, Clèves, and Neufchâtel, had ceded a population of 300,000 inhabitants in order to have one of 900,000, had made a bad bargain. In their view, if they had obtained without giving up any thing, without the loss either of Neufchâtel, Anspach, or Clèves, and had acquired perhaps something more, as the Hans Towns for example, then they would have had nothing to regret. The defection thus remunerated would have been worth the trouble; but Hanover, that was nothing, since they had it. In any case, they added that Prussia was dishonoured and covered with infamy in the sight of Europe. Germany, the common country, was given up to strangers. These last reproaches were specious; but it might have been answered, that worse things than that had been done in the last partition of Poland, and nearly as bad as that in the recent partition of the German indemnities; but nobody had cried out at the time that they were a scandal and shame.

The moderate persons, numerous among the rich citizens of Berlin, without the repetition of all these complaints, feared that England would make reprisals upon the commerce of Prussia, felt for the light in which Prussia would be viewed, and experienced real mortification at the triumph of the French armies over those of Germany; but they dreaded above all a war with France.

Such were the sentiments of the king at bottom, who with the heart of a good, patriotic, moderate German, hesitated between contradictory considerations. He was tormented with regret when thinking of the fault which he had committed at Potsdam, and which placed him under the necessity of being disgracefully inconsistent, the only objection which it was possible to allege against the fine present of Napoleon. Then too, though he did not want personal courage, he dreaded war as the greatest of misfortunes; he saw in that the ruin of the treasure of Frederick, prodigally wasted by his father, carefully replaced by himself, and again trenched upon by the late armament; he saw in it, above all, with the sagacity often imparted by fear, the ruin of the monarchy.

Frederick-William begged count Haugwitz to clear up this prospect by his own views of the subject, and count Haugwitz never ceased repeating to him, not knowing what to say besides, that they had the choice between Hanover and war; and that in his opinion, any war against Napoleon would be followed by disaster; that the Russian and Austrian armies were of equal worth, whatever might be said, with the armies of Prussia, which would not do better than they had done, perhaps not so well, because they were at that moment much less accustomed to active warfare.

A council was called, at which the principal personages of the monarchy were summoned—M. Hardenberg, M. Haugwitz, M. Schullemberg, and the two most illustrious representatives of the army, marshal Mollendorf and the duke of Brunswick. The discussion was very lively, although without any mixture of the passions of the court; and yielding to the infliction of the eternal argument of M. Haugwitz, that consisted in repeating that they could refuse Hanover, if they chose to make war, the council ended in adopting a middle course; in other words, that which was the worst that could have been adopted. They decided to adopt the treaty with modifications. M. Haugwitz strongly resisted this resolution. He said that he had profited by circumstances at Schönbrunn, and that he had obtained of Napoleon that which he

should be unable to obtain again; that he would see in the modifications made in the treaty, a last success of the party inimical to France; that he would finish by no longer reckoning in any way upon the Prussian alliance; that he would regulate his conduct accordingly, and that holding himself free by a ratification given with reservations, he would place Prussia between worse conditions and war.

M. Haugwitz was not attended to. It was urged that the modifications introduced, good or bad, preserved the honour of Prussia; because they proved that they did not draw up treaties under the dictation of Napoleon. This reason, of so little worth, made an impression upon those who had some need to deceive themselves; and the treaty was adopted, after several alterations had been made in it.

The first of these changes clearly indicated the notions of those who had proposed them, and the nature of their embarrassment. They suppressed in the treaty the qualification of "offensive" and "defensive," given to the alliance contracted with France, in order to be able to present it to Russia with less confusion. They explained in comments in what cases they believed themselves obliged to make a common cause with France. They demanded information regarding the latest arrangements projected in Italy, which were to be comprised in the reciprocal guarantees stipulated in the treaty of Schönbrunn; because they held themselves as not formally approving that which was about to be consummated in Naples—in other words, the dethronement of the Bourbons, the clients and protégés of Russia.

These modifications signified, that though she was obliged to enter into the policy of France, Prussia would not enter into it frankly; that she would not, above all, enter into it so far as not to be able to explain her conduct at St. Petersburgh and Vienna. This intention was too visible to be favourably interpreted at Paris. To these modifications there were added some others less honourable still. They were not written, it is true, in the new treaty; but the commission was given to M. Haugwitz to propose them verbally. It was wished, while gaining Hanover, not to cede Anspach, which was the sole concession of importance that Napoleon required, and which formed the Franconian patrimony of the house of Brandenburg. Prussia desired, too, the junction of the Hanse towns, a precious gain for her commercial importance; and in thus satiating the greediness of the Prussian nation, the government flattered itself it should stifle at home the cry of honour, and disarm public opinion.

This done, M. de Laforest, the minister of France, charged with the exchange of the ratifications, was summoned. He knew his sovereign too well to allow himself to ratify a treaty in which such changes had been made. He refused at the commencement to do so; but he was so pressed by the solicitations addressed to him, and M. Haugwitz represented to him so strongly the necessity of chaining down the court of Berlin, to prevent its continual variations, and to snatch it from the suggestions of the enemies of France, that M. de Laforest consented to ratify the modified treaty, *sub spe rati*, a precaution used in diplomacy, when it is desirable to reserve the will of the sovereign.

It was therefore necessary to return to Paris to gain the approval of these new tergiversations of the court of Prussia. M. Haugwitz having appeared to succeed best with Napoleon, they considered him the best individual to be sent to France to quiet the storm which it was foreseen would arise. M. Haugwitz for a long while declined such a mission; but the king pressed him so earnestly, that he was obliged to resign himself to go, and to brave a second time the crowned and victorious negotiator, with whom he had treated at Schönbrunn. He set out, having made the most obsequious and mild communications precede him, in order to manage a reception for himself less unfavourable than that which he had reason to dread.

Napoleon, in learning these last miserable shifts of the Prussian policy, saw in them that which it was impossible not to see, new weaknesses towards his enemies, and new efforts to remain in a good understanding with them, while at the same time, so managing to turn him to some account. He felt, in consequence of this policy, less consideration than before; and, what was a great misfortune for Prussia and for France, he despaired altogether at this period of any Prussian alliance. Joined to this, he was sorry, upon reflection, for what he had granted at Schönbrunn. The gift of Hanover had, in fact, been granted with too much precipitation; not that it could be better placed than in the hands of Prussia; but to dispose of it definitively, was rendering more obstinate the struggle with England; it was to add to irreconcileable interests at sea, irreconcileable interests on land; because the old George III. would have sacrificed the richest colonies of England sooner than his German patrimony. Doubtless, if it were known that England would for ever be implacable, and not be brought to peace but by force, there would then be grounds to act in any way towards her, and Hanover would be very well employed in cementing a powerful and sincere alliance, proper to render continental coalitions impossible. But none of these suppositions appeared to be actually correct. There were rumours of great discouragements in England: the approaching death of Mr. Pitt, the probable accession to power of Mr. Fox, and an immediate change of system. Thus in learning the last acts of Prussia, Napoleon was disposed to replace all with her upon the former footing, that is to say, to restore her Anspach, Clèves, and Neufchâtel, and to take Hanover back to be kept in reserve. At the point to which things had arrived, whether by the fault of men or that of events, the best course to be taken was, in fact, to return to good relations without close intimacy, and to take back what each had given the other. Napoleon in recovering Hanover would have in his hands a means of treating with England, and of seizing the only occasion which might offer to terminate an unhappy war, the permanent cause of one that was universal.

This was his first idea, and would to Heaven he had realized it! He issued instructions in this spirit to M. de Talleyrand. He desired that he should be represented to M. Haugwitz as more irritated than he was at the liberties taken with

France; that France should be declared to be completely free, and that she would keep herself so, either taking back Hanover in order to make it a pledge of peace with England, or placing every thing on a new basis with Prussia, to conclude with her a more enlarged and solid treaty [1].

M. Haugwitz arrived in Paris on the 1st of February. He displayed, whether towards M. de Talleyrand or the emperor, all the artfulness of which he was in possession, and his art was very considerable. He made much of the embarrassment of his government, placed between France and coalesced Europe; leaning more particularly towards the first, but drawn sometimes towards the second by the passions of the court, which it was necessary to comprehend and excuse. He showed the Prussian government obliged to go back with pain from the fault committed at Potsdam, having need on that account to be sustained and encouraged by the aspect of the French government; he depicted himself so well as the individual who was contending alone at Berlin to bring back Prussia to France, and as having a right, from this circumstance, to be aided by the kind offices of Napoleon, that Napoleon gave way, and unhappily consented to renew the treaty of Schönbrunn, but on conditions a little more onerous still than those which the king Frederick-William had decided on refusing.

"I do not wish to constrain you," said Napoleon to M. Haugwitz; "I offer you still to place things upon their former footing, that is to say, to take back Hanover, and return you Anspach, Clèves, and Neufchâtel. But if we treat, and I cede Hanover to you anew, I will no more cede it upon the same conditions; I shall exact from you besides that you promise me to become the faithful ally of France. If Prussia is frankly, publicly, with me, I shall have no more European coalitions to fear; and without a European coalition on my hands, I shall soon come to a settlement with England. But it is necessary that I have nothing less than this certainty to make you the gift of Hanover, and to have a conviction that I act wisely in giving it to you."

Napoleon was right save on one point, which was, to make Prussia pay for Hanover by new compensations, and in not, on the contrary, delivering it to her upon the most advantageous conditions; because there are no good allies but those who are fully satisfied. M. Haugwitz, who was sincere in his desire to unite France with Prussia, promised Napoleon all that he wished, and promised it too with all the appearance of the most entire good faith. He added to his promises some very adroit insinuations on the slighting conduct which Napoleon had shown towards Prussia; on the necessity there was to humour the dignity of the king; first, on account of the king himself, because his timidity did not prevent his being, at bottom, susceptible and irritable; and also on account of the nation and army, that were identified with the monarchy, and took very ill all that appeared to be wanting in respect for him. M. Haugwitz said that the violation of the territory of Anspach, particularly, had produced in that respect an effect to be greatly regretted, and placed half the nation, with the court, in the state of excitement which had brought about the deplorable treaty of Potsdam.

These observations were just and striking. But if Prussia had need to be respected, Napoleon had a right to be satisfied with her, before he respected her, and to have a proof of her esteem before he exhibited his own. There was here a double difficulty, that thus far had not been successfully surmounted—would they succeed better after this new accommodation? This was unhappily very doubtful.

They drew up a second treaty, more stringent and explicit than the former. Hanover was given to Prussia, as formally as at Schönbrunn, but on the condition of occupying it immediately, and under the title of sovereignty. A new and serious obligation was the price of the gift: it consisted in

[1] We cite the following letter, which exactly represents the idea of Napoleon under the circumstances:—

"Paris, February 4th, 1806.

"To M. DE TALLEYRAND.—The English ministry is entirely changed since the death of Mr. Pitt; Mr. Fox has the portfolio of foreign affairs. I wish you to give me this evening a note grounded on this idea:—

"'The undersigned minister for foreign affairs has received the express order of his majesty the emperor to make known to M. Haugwitz, at his first interview, that his majesty cannot regard the treaty concluded at Vienna as existing, from the defect of its ratification within the time prescribed; that his majesty cannot acknowledge in any power, and less in Prussia than in any other—because experience has proved that he must speak clearly and without circumvention—the right to modify and to interpret, according to its interest, the different articles of a treaty; that it is not to exchange ratifications to have two varying texts of the same treaty, and that the irregularity appears yet greater if the three or four pages of memoir added to the ratifications of Vienna are considered; that M. de Laforest, minister of his majesty, charged with the exchange of the ratifications, would be culpable, if he had himself observed all the irregularity of the proceedings of the court of Prussia; but that he had not accepted the exchange, but with the condition of the emperor's approbation.

"'The undersigned is therefore ordered to declare that his majesty does not approve it, from the consideration due to the faith of treaties.

"'But at the same time, the undersigned is charged to declare, that his majesty always is desirous that the differences arising out of the later circumstances between France and Prussia should be amicably terminated, and that the former friendship which existed between them should exist as before; he even desires that the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, if it be compatible with the other engagements of Prussia, should subsist between the two countries, and ensure their connexion.'

"This note which you will present to me this evening, shall be given to-morrow in the conference; and not on any pretext whatever do I leave you the choice of omitting it.

"You comprehend yourself that it has two objects: to leave me at liberty to make a peace with England, if, in a few days from this, the news which I receive is confirmed, or to conclude a treaty with Prussia on a wider basis.

"You will be stern and clear in the wording; but you will add in conversation all the modifications, all the softenings, all the illusions, which will make M. Haugwitz believe that it is a consequence of my character, that I am piqued at this form, but that at bottom I am of the same sentiment as ever towards Prussia. My opinion is, that in the present circumstances, if Mr. Fox is really at the head of foreign affairs, we shall not be able to cede Hanover to Prussia, except under a comprehensive system, which is sufficient to guarantee us against a continuation of hostilities."

closing the Elbe and Weser against the English, and closing these rivers as firmly as the French had done while they were in the occupation of Hanover. In exchange, Prussia granted the same cession of territory as at Schönbrunn; she gave up the Franconian principality of Anspach, the remainder of the duchy of Clèves situated to the right of the Rhine, and the principality of Neufchâtel, forming one of the cantons of Switzerland. One advantage promised to the king of Prussia in the treaty of Schönbrunn was here withheld, to the advantage of the king of Bavaria. According to the first treaty, the Franconian principality of Bareuth, contiguous to that of Anspach, and preserved to Prussia, was to be bounded in a more regular manner, by taking from that of Anspach a district containing a population of 20,000. There was now no further question about this district. Finally, the obligations imposed upon Prussia were extended. She was constrained to guarantee, not only the French empire as it was, with the new arrangements concluded in Germany and Italy, but she was still further bound to guarantee explicitly the future results of the war commenced against Naples, that is, the downfall of the house of Bourbon, and the establishment, as then presumed, of a branch of the Bonaparte family on the throne of the Two Sicilies. This was the most disagreeable, certainly, of the recent conditions imposed upon Prussia, since it rendered the situation of the king towards the emperor Alexander more difficult than ever, because of the avowed protectorate of Russia in regard to the Bourbons and Naples.

It is not necessary to remark that the guarantees were reciprocal, and that France promised to support the Prussian armies with its own, and to secure to Prussia all her past and present acquisitions, Hanover among them.

This second treaty was signed on the 15th of February.

Thus all that Prussia gained by wishing to modify the treaty of Schönbrunn, was to be deprived of the additions of territory which were at first to be added to Bareuth; to be compelled to a very dangerous act, the closing of the Elbe and Weser; in fine, to be obliged to avow publicly that which was about to be consummated in Naples. The only result was, in fact, more obligations and less advantages.

M. Haugwitz would not have been able to do better, unless he could have placed things in their previous state, which most assuredly would have been preferable, because he would in that case have been spared the embarrassing engagements of a re-patched and insincere alliance. It is true, Prussia would then have been deprived of the prestige of a brilliant acquirement, very useful at that moment to cover all the meanness of Prussian policy. However this may be, M. Haugwitz would not carry to Berlin himself the sad fruit of the tergiversations of his court; and he determined to send thither M. Lucchesini, the minister of Prussia in Paris. It was not convenient for him to solicit the adoption of a spoiled work, and to assume himself alone the responsibility of the resolution which he had thus proposed to be taken. He would leave to his king, to his colleagues, and to the royal family, which had intervened in so indiscreet a manner in state affairs, the business of choosing between the treaty of Schönbrunn, made much worse, or war; because it was evident this time that Napoleon, pushed to the utmost by a new rejection, if he did not kindle immediately on account of a rejected alliance, would treat Prussia in such a mode under every European arrangement, that war would soon become inevitable.

He therefore sent M. Lucchesini to Berlin, being his superior, and occupied for some days the place of minister at Paris. He charged him to carry the treaty to his court; to depict to it the exact state of things in France; to represent to it the real disposition of Napoleon, who was ready to become, according to the manner in which it conducted itself, either a powerful and sincere ally, though embarrassing through his spirit of enterprise, or a formidable enemy, if he was forced to see in Prussia a second Austria. M. Haugwitz did not give the commission to M. Lucchesini to solicit in his name the adoption of the new treaty. He wished for nothing more, because he was already disgusted with a task become too ungrateful, and the fatigue of a too vexatious responsibility.

He remained therefore in Paris, treated with perfect courtesy by Napoleon, studying with curiosity that extraordinary man, and every day persuading himself more and more of the justice of his own policy, and of that present and future which Prussia and France equally compromised by not knowing how to understand each other.

In the rest of Europe all went on according to the wish of the fortunate conqueror of Austerlitz. The army which had been sent to Naples under the apparent command of Joseph Napoleon, and under the real command of Massena, marched straight to its object. The queen of Naples again endeavouring to disperse the storm she had raised by her faults, implored all the courts, and despatched successively cardinal Ruffo, and the heir apparent to the crown, to meet Joseph, to try and conclude a treaty, whatever might be the conditions. Joseph, bound by the imperative orders of his brother, refused cardinal Ruffo, received with respect the solicitations of prince Ferdinand, but did not halt an instant in his march upon Naples. The French army, 40,000 men, passed the Garigliano on the 8th of February, and advanced, formed in three corps. One, that of the right, under general Reynier, went to blockade Gaeta; the other, that of the centre, under marshal Massena, marched upon Capua; the third, that of the left, under general St. Cyr, marched by Apulia and the Abruzzi towards the gulf of Tarentum. At this news, the English embarked with such precipitation, that they nearly brought the Russians, their allies, into danger. The former fled to Sicily; the last to Corfu. The court of Naples took refuge at Palermo, after having entirely emptied the public chests, and even those of the bank. The prince royal, with those who remained of the best troops of the Neapolitan army, marched into the Calabrias. Two Neapolitan noblemen were sent to Capua to treat for the surrender of the capital. A convention was signed, and Joseph, escorted by the corps of Massena, presented himself before Naples. He entered the city on the 15th of February, without

the public peace being disturbed, the population of the lazzaroni making no resistance.

The fortress of Gaeta, although included in the convention of Capua, was not surrendered by the prince of Hesse-Philippstadt, who was the commandant. He declared that he would defend himself to the last extremity. The strength of the place, a species of Gibraltar, only connected by an isthmus with the main land of Italy, rendered it capable of a long resistance. General Reynier carried the exterior positions with great boldness, and tried to shut up the enemy in the place quite close, until he should be able to obtain the necessary *matériel* for undertaking the siege regularly.

Joseph, master of Naples, was only at the commencement of the difficulties which he had to overcome. Although he as yet took no more than the quality of the lieutenant of Napoleon, he was not less in the sight of all there the king intended for the new kingdom. He had not a ducat in the chest; all the military stores had been carried away; the principal functionaries had gone away. It was necessary to create at once finances, and an administration. Joseph had sense, mild manners, but not any portion of that prodigious activity with which his brother Napoleon was endowed, and which was so necessary here to lay the foundation of a government.

He, nevertheless, went to work. The grandees of the kingdom, more enlightened than the rest of the nation, as generally happens in one a little civilized, had been ill-treated by the queen, who reproached them with being inclined to liberal opinions, and made them live in continual fear of the lazzaroni, ignorant and fanatical, that she unceasingly threatened to turn loose upon them; the ordinary conduct of royalty, that ever supports itself upon the people against the nobles when resistance shows itself in the last. The grandees, therefore, gave a good reception to the new government, from which they hoped to have a wisely reforming administration, decided to protect every class in the same degree. Joseph, seeing them animated with favourable sentiments, devoted himself to drawing them still more towards himself, and restrained the lazzaroni through the fear of severe executions. Moreover, the name of Massena made the public disturbers tremble. A gale of wind drove into Naples a Neapolitan frigate and corvette with several transports. There were recovered in this mode some military stores and other things of considerable value. They armed the forts, levied contributions, and a very able native of Corsica, M. Salicetti, sent by Napoleon to Naples, was placed at the head of the police. Joseph requested the assistance of his brother in money to enable him to get over his first difficulties.

Eugène, viceroy of Upper Italy, had received the Venetian states from the hands of the Austrians. He entered Venice to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants of that ancient queen of the seas, who found in their junction with an Italian kingdom a certain compensation for their ruined independence. The corps of general Marmont, descended from the Styrian Alps into Italy, had proceeded to the Izonzo, and formed a reserve ready to penetrate into Dalmatia, if such an addition of force should become needful. General Molitor with his division had marched rapidly towards Dalmatia, to take a country to which Napoleon attached so great a price, because it bordered on the empire of Turkey. That general had entered Zara, the capital of Dalmatia. But there remained still a great extent of coast to be passed over before they should arrive at the celebrated mouths of the Cattaro, the most southern and most important of the positions of the Adriatic; and he hastened, in order to restrain by the fear of his approach the Montenegrins, who had for a good while been in the pay of Russia.

For the rest, the court of Vienna, longing for the retreat of the French army, was disposed to execute faithfully the treaty of Presburg. That court, wasted by the last war, which was the third since the French revolution, terrified by the blows it had received at Ulm and Austerlitz, without doubt did not renounce the hope of retrieving itself some day, but for the present had resolved to restore some sort of order to its finances, and to let a few years pass away before again trying the fortune of war. The archduke Charles, become again minister of war, was desired to seek a new system of military organization, that should procure, without too great a reduction of force, the savings that were no longer able to be deferred. They were pressed therefore to execute in every point the last treaty of peace, to pay the contribution of 40,000,000f., either in specie or bills of exchange, and to second the removal of the cannon and muskets taken at Vienna, that the successive retreat of the French troops might be accomplished as soon as possible. This retreat was to terminate on the 1st of March, by the evacuation of Braunau.

Napoleon, who had left Berthier at Munich to watch over the return of the army, a return which he wished to make slow and easy, had prescribed to this faithful executor of his commands to stay at Braunau, and not to restore that place until after he should have received positive news of the giving up of the mouths of the Cattaro. He had established marshal Ney, with his corps, in the country of Salzburg, to live there as long as possible at the expense of a province destined to become Austrian. He had established marshal Soult's corps on the Inn, upon both banks in the archduchy of Austria and Bavaria, living upon both. The corps of marshals Lannes, Davout, and Bernadotte, being too great a burden to Bavaria, the inhabitants of which had begun to be weary of it, were marched towards the countries newly ceded to the German princes in alliance with France; and as there had been no terms fixed for the delivery of those countries, which depended yet upon litigious arrangements, there was a pretext found for their sojourning there some time. The corps of Bernadotte was therefore transferred into the province of Anspach, ceded by Prussia to Bavaria. It there had space to extend itself, and to subsist. The corps of marshal Davout was transferred into the bishopric of Aichstedt, and into the principality of Œttingen. The cavalry was divided among the different corps. Those which had not sufficient room to supply themselves with subsistence, had permission to scatter themselves among the lesser Suabian princes, of which the treaty of Presburg made the existence pro-

blematical, by causing new changes in the Germanic constitution. The troops of Lannes, divided between marshal Mortier and general Oudinot, were quartered in Suabia. The grenadiers of Oudinot were marched through Switzerland towards the principality of Neufchâtel, in order to take possession of it. Finally, the corps of Augereau, reinforced by Dupont's division and the Batavian division of general Dumonceau, was cantoned around Frankfort, ready to march on Prussia, if the last arrangements concluded with that state had not brought her back to sincere and definitive intentions.

These different corps were in the best state. They had begun to feel the effect of the rest which had been granted to them, and they were recruited by the arrival of the young conscripts that continually left the banks of the Rhine, where the depôts had been united under marshals Lefebvre and Kellermann. The soldiers were, if possible, better for active warfare than before the last campaign, and particularly proud of their recent victories. They showed themselves humane towards the people of Germany, a little noisy it is true, and given to boast of their exploits; but this passed away; they were social to the highest point, offering a singular contrast in this respect to their German auxiliaries, who were much harder in dealing with their countrymen than the French were themselves. Unhappily, Napoleon, in a spirit of economy useful to the army, but injurious to his policy, only paid the soldiers a certain proportion of their pay, retaining the remainder for their advantage, to be accounted for with them when they should re-enter France. He required that provisions should be furnished the troops by the countries in which they were encamped, in place of that portion of their pay which he retained from them; and this was a heavy grievance for the inhabitants. If the provisions had been paid for, the presence of the troops, in place of being a burden, would have been an advantage, and Germany, which knew that they had been brought upon its soil through the coalition, would have had towards them only the kindest feeling. It was therefore an ill-judged economy, and the benefit which resulted from it to the army was not worth the inconveniences which arose out of it to the countries thus occupied. Napoleon also retained the expenses of the new clothing of the soldiers, in order that they might receive it when they had repassed the Rhine, and had come to participate in the festivities which he was preparing for them. They, on their part, were of the same opinion, and gave themselves up cheerfully to wear their old garments, and to receive but little money, saying to themselves, that on their return to France, they should have new clothes, and an abundance of pay to spend.

For the rest, the people complained heavily of the prolongation of the stay of the troops: the lesser princes had, at least, invoked their presence as a benefit, because nothing could be compared to the violence and spoliation that were committed by the German governments, especially by those which were strong. The grand-duke of Baden and the king of Bavaria had laid their hands on the possessions of the immediate nobility; and although they acted without any feeling of consideration, their precipitation was humanity itself compared to the violence of the king of Wurtemberg, who pushed his rapacity to such a length as to take possession of and to pillage all the fiefs, as it was in France during the time of the cry, "War with the mansions, peace with the cottages." His troops entered upon the domains of the princes enclosed in his kingdom, under the pretext of seizing upon the goods of the immediate nobility. Not having a right but to a portion of the Brisgau, of which the larger part was destined for the house of Baden, the king of Wurtemberg had occupied it almost wholly. But for the French troops, the Wurtembergers and the troops of Baden would have come to blows.

Napoleon had made M. Otto, minister of France at Munich, and Berthier, major-general of the grand army, arbitrators of the differences, which he foresaw would arise between the German princes, great and small. These last had all made haste to Munich, where the diet of Ratisbon appeared to have transferred its seat, and there they solicited justice from France, and even the presence of the French troops, however onerous it might be. Inextricable disputes were seen to arise on all sides, which it did not seem possible to assuage but by newly recasting the German constitution. In the mean time, detachments of French soldiers kept possession of the places in dispute, and every thing was given over to the arbitration of France and its ministers. Furthermore, Napoleon did not make those disputes serve for the stay of his troops in Germany, because he was impatient for the return of the army, that it might unite at Paris around himself; and he only waited for that purpose until the entire occupation of Dalmatia, and the definitive answer of the Prussian court.

This court, obliged to declare itself for the last time upon the modified treaty of Schönbrunn, at length came to a decision. It accepted the treaty, thus become much less advantageous since its double remodelling at Berlin and Paris, and it received, with confusion on its own front, and with ungratefulness at heart, the gift of Hanover, which at any other time would have overcome it with delight. What was to be done? There was now no other course to adopt than that of finishing by an adherence to the propositions of France, or to resign itself at once to war—to a war for which the Prussian army called aloud, and that its commanders, better judging, (above all, the king himself,) mistrusted, as an unfortunate experiment.

To choose war, it was meet to have decided upon it when Napoleon had quitted Ulm to shut himself up in the long valley of the Danube, and to have fallen upon his rear, while the Austro-Russians, concentrated at Olmütz, were drawing him into Moravia. But the Prussian army was not then ready; and after the 2nd of December, when M. Haugwitz had conversed with Napoleon, it was too late.' It was much too late, now the French, united in Suabia and Franconia, had not more than a single step to make to invade Prussia; now too that the Russians were in Poland, and the Austrians completely disarmed.

To accept the gift of Hanover on the conditions which were attached to it by France was the only possible resource. But this was a singular mode

of commencing an intimate alliance. The treaty of the 15th of February was ratified on the 24th, and M. de Lucchesini immediately set out for Paris with the ratifications. M. Haugwitz, on his side, quitted Paris to return to Berlin, perfectly well pleased with the personal treatment which he had received from Napoleon, promising him again the faithful alliance of Prussia, but awaiting trials sufficiently painful, at the view of all the difficulties which swarmed in Germany,—at the sight, above all, of the lesser German princes prostrate at the feet of France, to preserve themselves from the exactions with which they were borne down by the more powerful and more favoured princes. On arriving at Berlin, M. Haugwitz found the king very melancholy at his position, and very deeply afflicted at the difficulties opposed to him by the court, now more excited and intemperate than ever. The boldness of the malcontents was pushed so far, that during the night the windows of the house of M. Haugwitz were broken by rioters, that it was generally believed belonged to the army, and that they said publicly, but falsely, were agents of prince Louis. M. Haugwitz affected to treat these manifestations of feeling with disdain, which, very insignificant in free countries, where they pass over, while despising them, the excesses of the multitude, were singular and serious in an absolute monarchy, above all, when they came to be imputed to the army. The king considered them as a serious thing, and publicly announced his intention to treat them with severity. He gave formal orders for the discovery of the offenders, whom the police, whether powerless or accomplices, did not succeed in discovering. The king, pushed to extremities, showed a firm and determined will, which awed the discontented, and particularly the queen. He gave the last to comprehend that he had taken up the ground that the safety of his monarchy had required him to take, and that it was necessary that every body around him must assume the attitude conformable to his policy. The queen, who for the rest was devoted to the interests of the king her husband, held her peace; and for a moment the court presented a becoming aspect.

M. Hardenberg quitted the ministry. This personage had become the idol of the opposition. He had been the creature of M. Haugwitz, his partisan and imitator, and the most ardent supporter of the French alliance, above all, in 1805, when Napoleon, from his camp at Boulogne, offered Hanover to Prussia. Then M. Hardenberg regarded it as the brightest of his glories, to secure this aggrandizement for his country, and complained himself to the French ministers of his king, too slow, he said, in attaching himself to France. Afterwards, having seen the failure of his design, he had thrown himself, with the impetuosity of an intemperate character, into the arms of Russia, and not having been able to recover from that error, he declaimed loudly against France. Napoleon, made acquainted with his conduct, had committed one fault respecting him, which he more than once renewed,—it was that of speaking about him in his bulletins, making an offensive allusion to a Prussian minister seduced by English gold. The imputation was unjust. M. Hardenberg had not been more seduced by the gold of the English, than M. Haugwitz was by the gold of the French. It was most indecent in an official act, and too strongly bespoke the license of the soldier-conqueror. It was this attack that had given to M. Hardenberg the vast popularity which he enjoyed. The king granted him leave to retire, with testimonies of consideration, which took away from his retirement all the character of a political disgrace.

But while he sent away M. Hardenberg, Frederick-William joined a second minister to M. Haugwitz, who was worth little more than he; this was M. Keller, whom the court regarded as one of its own creatures, and who gave himself out publicly as an inspector over his superior. This was a species of satisfaction granted to the party inimical to France; because, in absolute governments, it is as often obliged to yield to the opposition as in free governments. Frederick-William did more yet; he attempted to be on good terms with Russia, and to explain honourably the interested inconsistencies which he had committed.

Since Austerlitz they had been cautious of communications with St. Petersburg. After all the boastings of Potsdam, Russia could not but be in confusion at her defeat; and Prussia, at the manner in which she had kept the oath taken on the tomb of the great Frederick. Silence was at that moment the only convenient relation between the two courts. Russia however had broken it once, to declare that her forces were at the disposition of Prussia, if the treaty of Potsdam being divulged, should draw a war upon her. Since then she had held her tongue, and Prussia the same.

It was necessary at last to have an explanation. The king pressed the old duke of Brunswick to go to St. Petersburg, to place his glory against the reproaches that the conduct followed at Schönbrunn and continued at Paris could not fail to provoke. This respectable prince, devoted to the house of Brandenburg, set out therefore, despite his age, on a journey to Russia. He went not to declare frankly that Prussia had finally espoused the French alliance, which, difficult to do, would have been still preferable to a continuation of ambiguities, already very unfortunate; he went to say, that if Prussia had taken Hanover, it was to prevent its being left in the hands of France, and to spare herself the mortification and danger of seeing the French re-appear in the north of Germany; that if she had accepted the word "alliance," it was to avoid war, and by the use of the word it was desired that neutrality alone should be understood; that neutrality was the most valuable both for one and the other; that Russia and Prussia had nothing to gain by war; that by becoming obstinate in the system of implacable war against France, they aided the commercial monopoly of England, and it was not quite certain whether they did not also help forward the continental domination of Napoleon.

Such was the language which the duke of Brunswick was to hold at St. Petersburg.

We must now go back to the young emperor, who, drawn into the war by vanity, and against the secret promptings of his reason, had at Austerlitz served so sad an apprenticeship to arms. He had given little ground to be spoken of during the

last three months; and he hid in the distance of his far off empire the confusion arising from his defeat.

A general cry arose in Russia against the young men, who, it was said, had governed and compromised the empire. These young men, placed, one party in the cabinet, and the other in the army, disputed among each other. The party of Dolgorouki accused the party of Czartoryski, and reproached it with having lost all by its bad conduct towards Prussia. They would have done violence to her, said the Dolgorouki party; they had thus driven her away, in place of drawing her nearer, and her refusal to take a part in the coalition had prevented its success. It was in a particular interest that they had acted in this way: it was to take the Polish provinces from Prussia, and to reconstitute Poland—a mischievous dream, for which the Polish prince Czartoryski had evidently betrayed the emperor.

Prince Czartoryski and his friends maintained, with much more of reason, that it was those presumptuous soldiers, who could not wait at Olmütz for the expiration of the term fixed for the intervention of Prussia, who had wished to give a premature battle, and to oppose their twenty-five years' experience to the service of the most consummate general of modern times; that they were those presumptuous and incapable soldiers who were the true authors of the Russian reverses.

The old discontented Russians condemned both those youthful parties; and Alexander, accused of having suffered himself to be led sometimes by the one, and sometimes by the other, had become at this period an object of little consideration for his subjects.

He had been much discouraged during the first days that followed his defeat, and if prince Czartoryski had not recalled him several times to the sentiment of his own dignity, he would have too plainly exhibited the deep dejection of his mind. Prince Czartoryski, although he shared a part of the inexperience common to the young men who governed the empire, had, nevertheless, consistency and seriousness in his views. He was the principal author of that system of European arbitration which had caused Russia to take up arms against France. That system, which with Russian statesmen was at bottom only a mask thrown over the national ambition, was with the young Pole a sincere idea, frankly embraced. He wished Alexander to persevere in it; and if it was a great presumption in men so young to wish to dictate to Europe, above all, in presence of the powers which were then disputing its empire, it was a much greater levity still to abandon so quickly that which had been undertaken with so much temerity.

Prince Czartoryski had addressed to the young emperor, formerly his friend, and beginning to become his master, noble and respectful remonstrances, that would have done honour to the minister of a free country, and which must honour him much more in a country where resistance to power is an act of rare devotedness, and destined to remain unknown. Prince Czartoryski, retracing to Alexander his hesitations and weaknesses, said to him, "Austria is brought down, but she detests her conqueror; Prussia is divided between two parties, but she will terminate by yielding to the German predominating sentiment. Learn in managing these powers to let the moment arrive when one or another will be ready to act. Until then you are out of the reach of attack; you will be able to remain a certain time without peace or war; and thus wait until circumstances permit you either to take up arms or to make peace with advantage. Do not cease your alliance with England, and you will oblige Napoleon to concede to you that which is your due."

Feeling deeply the greatness of Napoleon, since he had encountered him on the field of battle at Austerlitz, Alexander replied to prince Czartoryski, "When we attempt to fight this man, we are but as children combating against a giant." He added, that without Prussia it would not be possible to renew the war, because without her there was no chance of sustaining it successfully. Alexander had imbibed a singular esteem for the Prussian army, from the sole reason that Napoleon had not yet beaten it. This army was at that time, in effect, both the illusion and hope of Europe. With that Alexander was quite ready to renew the contest, but not without it. As to England, he did not hope there for any efficacious support. He feared that after the death of Mr. Pitt, announced as certain, and that after the accession of Mr. Fox to power, announced as an approaching event, the hatred of France would be extinguished, if not in the hearts of the English, at least in their policy. Still the remonstrances of prince Czartoryski, in stimulating the pride of Alexander, had elevated his spirit, and he resolved, before he delivered his sword to Napoleon, to keep him waiting for it. But although useful, the lessons of this young censor were disagreeable to him, and reached in this respect so far as to induce him to search among the more aged personages of his empire a complaisant dependant without capacity, who, under the cover of his age, should execute with due submission his personal will. It has been already stated that his favour was fixed upon general Budberg.

The conduct advised by prince Czartoryski was not the less exactly followed. Russia placed herself anew in relations with Austria; she appeared to have forgotten the coolness of Holitsch; she testified to that court a great interest in its misfortunes, and great consideration for the power which it still possessed; she undertook even to negotiate in London for the payment to her of a year's subsidy, although the war had only lasted three months. As to Prussia, she avoided all that could possibly wound it, at the same time keeping back an approval of its acts.

The duke of Brunswick arrived in the first days of the month of March. They gave him the best reception; they covered him with their attentions, which appeared addressed to his person, to his age, and to his military glory, and not to the court of which he was the representative. He was less welcomed when he began to confer upon political affairs. They told him that Russia could not approve of the acceptance by Prussia of Hanover, from the hands of the common enemy of Europe; that for the rest, the peace which she had made with France was a false peace, little solid or durable; that Prussia would soon be

forced to adopt a resolution too long deferred, and to draw at last the sword of the great Frederick. "Then," said the emperor Alexander to the duke of Brunswick, "I shall serve under your orders, and I shall glory in learning the art of war in your school."

However, they attempted to draw the old duke into a negotiation designed to remain in profound secrecy. Under the pretext that the conditions of the alliance would not be faithfully observed by France, they proposed to him the conclusion of a sub-alliance with Russia, by means of which Prussia, if she were discontented with her French ally, would be able to have recourse to her Russian ally, and would have at her disposal all the forces of the Muscovitish empire. What was thus offered was no less than treachery towards France. The duke of Brunswick, wishing to leave at St. Petersburg dispositions that were favourable to Prussia, consented,—not to the conclusion of such an engagement, because he had not been authorized, but to make the proposition to his king. It was agreed that this negotiation should remain open, and that it should be conducted in secrecy as regarded M. Haugwitz, by the intermediate aid of M. Hardenberg, the same minister who had in appearance been disgraced, and who, underhand, continued to treat upon the most important affairs of the monarchy.

Whilst Prussia sought thus to explain her conduct to Russia, she attempted also to make her excuses in London for the occupation of Hanover. Nothing could be more singular than her manifesto to the Hanoverian people, and her despatch to the court of London. She told the Hanoverian people that it was with pain she took possession of that kingdom, a possession for which she paid a bitter sacrifice, that of the provinces of the Rhine, of Franconia, and Switzerland; but that she had thus acted to insure the peace of Germany, and to spare Hanover the presence of foreign armies [1]. After having addressed to the Hanoverian people these words, alike destitute of frankness and dignity, she said to the English cabinet, that she had not taken Hanover from England, but that she had received that country from Napoleon, whose conquest Hanover was. She received it, she added, against her will, as an exchange which was imposed upon her for provinces which were objects of her deepest regret; that it was one of the consequences of that imprudent war which Prussia had always blamed; that had been undertaken against her advice, and of which they must impute to themselves the consequences; because they had elevated that colossal power by attacking it unseasonably, that power which took from one and gave to another, and did violence to those whom it favoured with its gifts, as well as to those whom it despoiled [2].

England was not to be repaid with reasons similar to these. She replied by a manifesto in which she heaped invectives upon the court of Prussia, declared it was miserably subjugated to the yoke of Napoleon, unworthy of attention, and as contemptible for greediness as dependence. Meanwhile, the British cabinet, not wishing to appear in the sight of the nation as if it sought to bring another enemy upon its hands, for an interest exclusively connected with the royal family, said that it might have suffered this new invasion of Hanover, the inevitable result of a continental war, if Prussia had limited herself to the simple occupation of the country; but that this power, having given notice of the closing up of the rivers, had committed an hostile act, an act superlatively injurious to the commerce of England, and that in consequence she declared war against Prussia.

The ascendancy of the battle of Marengo had brought back England to Napoleon. The ascendancy of that of Austerlitz had brought her back

[1] Of this curious document the following is an extract. It is dated April 1, 1806, signed by the king of Prussia, Schulenberg, and Haugwitz. It first refers to a previous document, dated January 27, 1806, which stated that Hanover had been first occupied to keep it during the war, in order to preserve the peace of the north of Germany; but that since "in consequence of the exchange of the electorate of Hanover, in consideration of the cession of three of the provinces of our monarchy, and for the permanent tranquillity of our subjects and the neighbouring states, we have found it indispensably necessary to enter into and conclude a convention with his majesty the emperor of the French and king of Italy; and as the electoral states of the house of Brunswick situated in Germany were obtained by the emperor Napoleon by right of conquest, we hereby declare that the rightful possession of the territory of that house has passed over to us, in consideration of the cession of three of our provinces, and is now subject to our power only," &c. *Translator*

[2] Perhaps dishonesty, treachery, and meanness were never before carried so far by any crown as by that of Prussia at this time, well meriting every misfortune that afterwards befell her: the history of no modern state affords a parallel to her greedy and unprincipled conduct. England replied with a spirit that, if Frederick-William and his ministry could feel shame, must have made them blush deeply. The replicatory declaration was signed by George III., and dated Windsor, April 20, 1806. It first noticed all the hollow and lying declarations that Prussia had put forth in excuse; protested against such an annexation by a friendly power; showed whence arose its eagerness to occupy the country in 1801, and its subsequent conduct after the French evacuated the electorate; the violated treaty of Potsdam; the request she made of a subsidy from England, intending to act contrary to the interests for which it was required; the secret treaty signed, in violation of all principle, with Duroc, by M. Haugwitz, on the 15th day of December, 1805; that when Prussia was to declare against France in a month, in case the French rejected the propositions taken by M. Haugwitz to Vienna, M. Haugwitz signed the acceptance of Hanover as an annexation. As late as the 27th of January, the king of Prussia hoped that the "administration I have taken upon me will turn out to the happiness of the country and its inhabitants; and be by that means satisfactory to his Britannic majesty, to whom I desire nothing more than to give, in this instance as in all others, all the proofs of consideration, of deference, and of friendship, which circumstances may put in my power!" The document too well exposed Prussian greediness, duplicity, and abandonment of honour. It appealed to German connexion and family alliance, and wound up the just declaration against Prussian perfidy, by protesting, as the sovereign of Hanover, against the annexation so basely effected. "Prussia should not speak of her sacrifices at the moment when her only aim is to aggrandize herself." "All," it concludes in nearly the last paragraph, "all must agree, that the act committed against a sovereign united to his Prussian majesty by the ties of blood, and until now by those of friendship, places the safety of Europe in greater danger than any other act of hostility on the part of a power with which one might be at open war."—*English State Papers. Translator.*

a second time; because the victories of the French armies were a means full as sure for disarming her, although less direct. The first of these victories had produced the retirement of Mr. Pitt; the second caused his death. This great minister entered again into the cabinet in August, 1803, only for two years, appearing there but to drink deep of bitterness. Returning to office without Mr. Wyndham or lord Grenville, his old colleagues, without Mr. Fox, his recent ally, he had had to combat in parliament his old and his new friends, and in Europe, Napoleon, who was become emperor, and more powerful than ever. At his voice, so well known to the enemies of France, the cry of arms resounded from all sides, the third coalition was formed, and the French army had been turned from Dover upon Vienna. But this third coalition once dissolved at Austerlitz, Mr. Pitt had seen his designs miscarry, Napoleon free to return to Boulogne, and the keen anxieties of England about to be renewed.

The idea of seeing Napoleon return to the shores of the Channel had occupied all minds in England. They always reckoned, it is true, on the great difficulty of the passage; but the world began to fear that there was nothing impossible for the extraordinary man who thus shook the globe: and people inquired if it was worth while to risk such chances to acquire an island, more or less, when they had already the whole of India, when they had the Cape of Good Hope and Malta, in such a manner that they could not be dispossessed of them. They said that the battle of Trafalgar had definitively assured to England her superiority upon the ocean; but that the European continent remained to Napoleon, that he was about to shut up all its outlets, that this continent after all was the world, and that they could not live eternally separated from it; that naval victories of the most brilliant kind might not hinder Napoleon from profiting some day by an accident, from leaving the continent to invade England. The system of war to the last was therefore discredited among reasonable Englishmen; and although the system succeeded at a later period, yet they thus felt the danger, that was great, too great, for the advantages which could be gathered from a prolonged contest.

But as men are the slaves of fortune, and willingly take for eternal her caprices of momentary duration, they were cruel towards Mr. Pitt; they forgot the services of more than twenty years that the minister had rendered to his country, the degree of greatness to which he had carried it, by the energy of his patriotism, and by his parliamentary talents, through which he had subdued the house of commons. They considered him vanquished, and treated him as a conquered man. His enemies censured his policy and the results which had followed it. They imputed to him the faults of general Mack, the precipitation of the Austrians on entering upon the campaign without waiting for the Russians, and the haste of the Russians to give battle without waiting for the Prussians. They imputed all this to the impatient eagerness of Mr. Pitt; they affected to feel a great interest in behalf of Austria; they accused Mr. Pitt of having ruined it, and of having ruined in her the only real friend of England.

Mr. Pitt was, notwithstanding, a perfect stranger to the plan of the campaign. He it was who had been foremost in combining it, and by combining it, he had prevented the Boulogne expedition—but people gave him no good will even for this.

One singular circumstance rendered the effect of the last victory of Napoleon more painful. On the morrow of Austerlitz, as on the morrow of Marengo, they maintained, for an instant or two before the truth was known, that Napoleon had lost in a great battle 27,000 men and all his artillery. Soon more accurate information had arrived, and the members of the opposition had the French bulletins translated and printed, and then sent them to be distributed at the doors of Mr. Pitt and of the Russian ambassador.

In order to enjoy his full glory, Napoleon would only have had to pass the straits, and to listen to what was said of him, his genius and his fortune. Sad vicissitudes of this world! That which Mr. Pitt had to undergo at this period, Napoleon had to undergo at a later time, and with a greatness of injustice and of passion proportioned to the greatness of his genius and his destiny.

Twenty-five years of parliamentary contests—contests that consume soul and body—had ruined the health of Mr. Pitt. An hereditary malady, which his fatigues, toils, and later mortifications rendered mortal, was the cause of his premature end on the 23rd of January, 1806. He died at the age of forty-seven, after having governed his country for more than twenty years, with as much power as can be exercised under an absolute monarchy; and nevertheless he lived in a free country, he did not enjoy the favour of his sovereign, and he had to command the votes of the most independent assemblage on the earth.

If we admire those ministers who in absolute monarchies are possessed of the ability to enchain for a long time the weakness of the prince, the instability of the court, and to reign in the name of their master over an enslaved nation, what admiration ought not to be felt for a man, whose power, established over a free nation, had endured for twenty years! Courts are exceedingly capricious, without doubt; they are not more so than great deliberative assemblies. All the caprices of opinion, excited by the thousand stimulants of the daily press, and reflected in a parliament where they take upon themselves the national sovereignty, compose the moveable will, by turns servile and despotic, which is necessary to captivate in order to reign over that multitude of heads which pretends to reign! It is necessary to govern, besides the art of flattery, which procures such success in courts, to possess that very different art of public speaking, sometimes vulgar, sometimes sublime, which is indispensable to secure a hearing from an assemblage of men: it is necessary, again, to possess that which is not an art but a gift, the character that succeeds in braving and controlling the excited passions. All these qualities Mr. Pitt possessed in the highest degree. Never in modern times was there found a more able leader of a popular assembly. Exposed during a quarter of a century to the vehement impetuosity of Mr. Fox, and to the poignant sarcasms of Mr. Sheridan, he held his way with imperturbable coolness, spoke continually, with justness, temperately, and to the

purpose; and when the resounding voices of his adversaries came to unite with the still more powerful voice of events, when the French revolution incessantly disconcerted the best statesmen and generals in Europe, flinging before him in his progress, Fleurus, Zurich, or Marengo, he ever knew how to restrain, by his firmness and by the appropriateness of his replies, the excited mind in the British parliament. It was for that, above all, that Pitt was so remarkable, because he had not, as has been said elsewhere, either the genius that organizes, or the knowledge of the profound statesman. With the exception of financial institutions of contested merit, he created nothing in England; he often deceived himself about the relative strength of the European powers, and upon the progress of events, but he joined to the talents of a great political orator, an ardent love of his country, and a passionate hatred of the French revolution. It is necessary to the genius of passion, that it should possess power. Representing in England, not the titled but the commercial aristocracy, which lavished its treasures upon him in the way of loans, he resisted the greatness of France and the contagion of demagogical disorders with invincible perseverance, and maintained order in his country without diminishing liberty. He left it burdened with debt, it is true, but the quiet possessor of India. He used and abused the power of England; but she was the second country of the earth in power when he died, and the first eight years after his death. And what would the strength of nations be good for, if not to attempt to domineer over each other? Vast dominations are among the designs of Providence. That which a man of genius is to a nation, a great nation is to humanity. Great nations civilize and enlighten the world, making it advance in all ways more rapidly. It is only necessary to counsel them to unite that prudence to force, which makes force successful, as well as the justice which confers honour upon it.

Mr. Pitt, so fortunate during eighteen years, was unfortunate in the last days of his life. They were avenged, the French, upon that cruel enemy; since he had reason to believe they would ever be victorious, and, doubting the excellence of his own policy, to tremble for his country in the future. It was one of the most mediocre of his successors, lord Castlereagh, who was destined to enjoy the disasters of France.

Amidst the most varied and most violent accusations, Mr. Pitt had the good fortune not to see his integrity assailed. He lived upon his emoluments, which were considerable; and without being poor, he was reported to be so [1]. When his death was announced, one of the members of the old ministerial majority proposed the payment of his debts. This proposition, presented to parliament, and received with respect, was resisted by his old friends, become his enemies, and particularly by Mr. Wyndham, who had been for so long a time the minister's colleague. His noble antagonist, Mr. Fox, refused to support the motion, but with sorrow: "I honour," he said, in accents that moved the assembled house of commons; "I honour my illustrious adversary, and I regard it as the glory of my life, to have been sometimes called his rival. But I have for twenty years fought against his system of policy; and what would the present generation say of me, if it saw me welcome what was intended to be the best and most distinguished homage to that policy, which I have believed and still believe to be prejudicial to England?" Every body understood the character of Mr. Fox's vote, and applauded the nobleness of his language.

Some days afterwards, the proposition having taken another character, parliament voted unanimously 50,000*l.* sterling (1,250,000f.) for the payment of Mr. Pitt's debts. It was decided that he should be buried at Westminster.

Mr. Pitt left vacant the offices of first lord of the treasury, of chancellor of the exchequer, of lord-warden of the cinque ports, of chancellor of the university of Cambridge, and some others less important.

It was very difficult to replace him, not in those different offices, for which numerous ambitious persons were ready to dispute, but in that of prime minister, which had something awful in presence of Napoleon, the conqueror of the European coalition. One idea had engrossed all minds from the renewal of the war in 1803, and at the sight of the feeble minister, Addington, who then ruled: it was to unite all the men of great talents and even of contrary opinions, such as Pitt and Fox, to meet the difficulties of the contest which had commenced with Napoleon. The concerted opposition of Pitt and Fox against the cabinet of Addington rendered this union of talents both more easy and more natural. Pitt wished for it, but not strongly enough to overcome George III. He entered into his ministry without Fox, and by a sort of compensation he entered upon it equally without his more decided friends under the old tory system Grenville and Wyndham, whom he had found too ardent to associate again with himself.

Those thus omitted by Pitt had drawn nearer and nearer to Fox in the path of opposition, although by the nature of their opinions they were more distant from him than they had been from Pitt himself. A common struggle of two years had contributed to unite them, and few differences divided them when Pitt died. A general opinion called them to the ministry together, to replace by the union of their talents the great minister whom they had lost; to endeavour to make peace by

[1] This is very incorrect: Pitt died on the 23rd of January; on the 27th Mr. Lascelles proposed that he should be buried at the public expense, and that a monument should be erected to his memory in Westminster Abbey. This motion was opposed by the leaders of the opposition, and by Mr. Fox, on the ground that one whose measures had been so unfortunate for his country, was not entitled to public honours; but when the motion for paying his debts, amounting to 40,000*l.*, was made on the following 3rd of February, that motion was supported by the opposition, indeed, carried *nem. con.*; because every one who knew Pitt, admitted that he was most disinterested as a man, and notoriously destitute of private fortune. M. Thiers might have known, further, that the new ministry had not yet come into office. Mr. Fox did not take the oaths of office and his seat until fourteen days afterwards; the tories being in office when both motions, that respecting the funeral and the debts of Mr. Pitt, were made.—*Translator.*

means of the amicable relations between Fox and Napoleon; and to carry on the contest with all the known energy of Grenville and Wyndham, if they should not succeed in coming to an understanding with France.

If, in 1803, George III. had taken Pitt, whom he did not like, in order to pass Fox by, whom he liked still less, he was constrained, after the death of Pitt, to yield to the empire of opinion, and to assemble together, in the same cabinet, Fox, Grenville, Wyndham, and their friends. Grenville held the office of first lord of the treasury,—that is to say, of prime minister; Wyndham, that which he had ever occupied, the war-ministry; Fox, the office of foreign affairs, and Grey the admiralty. The other departments were distributed among the friends of these political personages, but in such a manner that Fox numbered the largest body of supporters in the new ministry.

The cabinet thus formed obtained a large majority, despite the attacks of the expelled colleagues of Pitt, Castlereagh and Canning. It immediately employed itself with two essential objects,—the organization of the army, and the relations of the country with France.

As to the army, it was not possible to leave it in the state in which it had been since 1803,—that is to say, composed of an insufficiency of regular forces, and of 300,000 volunteers as expensive as ill-disciplined. This was an organization of urgency, devised at a moment of danger. Wyndham, who had incessantly railed at the volunteers, and had maintained that nothing efficient could be done without regular armies, which had given him an opportunity of speaking of the French armies in magnificent terms, could less than any other support the existing organization. He therefore proposed a sort of disguised disbanding of the volunteers, and certain changes in the troops of the line, which would facilitate the recruiting of these last. It has been already seen, that the English army, as with all mercenary armies, had been recruited by spontaneous enlistments. These enlistments were for life, and this rendered the recruiting difficult. Wyndham proposed to convert these into limited terms of enlistment, from seven to twenty years, and to add to them very considerable advantages in the way of pay. He thus contributed to procure a much more powerful organization for the English army; but he had to fight against the prejudice that permanent armies raise in all free nations, against the favour the volunteers had acquired, and, above all, against the interests created by their institution, because it had been requisite to form a corps of officers for the volunteers, that the government was now obliged to dissolve. They attempted to place Wyndham at variance with his new colleague Fox, who, partaking in the popular prejudices of his party, had formerly shown a greater leaning towards the institution of the volunteers than the extension of the regular army. In spite of these obstacles, the ministerial plan was adopted. A large augmentation was voted to the regular army, that, until the entire development of the new system, was to consist of 267,000 men, 75,000 of which were home militia, and 192,000 troops of the line, distributed through the three kingdoms and the colonies. The total expenses of the budget amounted for that year to 83,000,000*l.* sterling,—that is to say, to more than two thousand millions of francs (2,000,000,000f.), made up by taxes to the amount of 1,500,000,000f., and a loan of 500,000,000f. to be contracted for during the course of the year.

It was with these powerful resources that England desired to present itself to Napoleon for the purpose of negotiation. There were expected from Fox, his situation, his friendly relations with the emperor, facilities which no one besides could possess for holding out pacific overtures. A fortunate chance, for which that honest man was indebted to providence, furnished him with an honourable and very natural opportunity. A miserable man, judging of the new English administration by that which preceded it, introduced himself to Fox, with the offer to assassinate Napoleon. Fox ordered him, with indignation, to be taken into custody by the proper persons, and handed over to the English police. He wrote immediately to M. de Talleyrand a very noble letter, denouncing the odious proposal which he had just received, and offering to place at his disposition every means for the prosecution of the author, if the man's design appeared to have in it any thing serious.

Napoleon was touched, as he should be, upon a proceeding so generous, and ordered M. de Talleyrand to give Mr. Fox such a reply as he merited. "I have laid," wrote M. de Talleyrand, "your excellency's letter before his majesty. He said, 'There I recognize the principles of honour and virtue which have always distinguished Mr. Fox. Thank him, on my part,' he added, 'and tell him, that whether the policy of his sovereign makes us continue at war for a long time yet, or whether a quarrel useless to humanity shall terminate as speedily as the two nations can desire, I rejoice at the new character that, from this proceeding, the war has already taken, and which is the best presage of that which may be expected from a cabinet, of the principles of which I am pleased to judge by those of Mr. Fox, who is one of those best fitted to feel, in every thing which is excellent, what is truly great.'"

M. de Talleyrand said no more, but that was enough to cause a continuation of communications so nobly begun. Mr. Fox answered immediately in a frank and cordial letter, in which he offered peace, without circumlocution or diplomatic shuffle, upon safe and honourable conditions, and by means as simple as they were prompt. The bases of the treaty of Amiens were much changed according to Mr. Fox; they were so changed through the very advantages that France and England had obtained on the two elements which were the ordinary theatres of their successes. It was, therefore, necessary to seek new conditions, which should not hurt the pride of either nation, and which should procure for Europe guarantees of a tranquil and safe future. These conditions were not difficult to be found, if they chose to be reasonable both one side and the other. In accordance with anterior treaties, England was unable to negotiate separately from Russia; but in waiting until this last power could be consulted, it might be permitted for each to consign to chosen agents the business of discussing the interests of the belligerent powers, and of preparing matters for adjustment. Mr. Fox offered to appoint at once the persons

who should be charged with this commission, and the place where they should meet.

This proposal delighted Napoleon, who in reality wished for a reconcilement with England, since from her every war proceeded like water from its source; and he had few direct means of overcoming her, one alone excepted, very decisive, but very hazardous, and practicable for him alone,—invasion. He felt great pleasure at this frank overture, and embraced it with the greatest goodwill.

Without explaining the conditions in any way, he gave it to be understood in his reply, that the conquests made by England, France would not dispute much (she had retained Malta, as may be remembered, and had taken the Cape); that France, on her side, had spoken her last word at the treaty of Presburg, and that she claimed nothing beyond that; that the bases would, therefore, be easy to lay down, if England had not particular and inadmissible views relative to commercial interests. "The emperor is persuaded," said M. Talleyrand, "that the true cause of the rupture of the peace of Amiens, was nothing more than the refusal to conclude a treaty of commerce. Be well assured that the emperor, without refusing certain commercial arrangements, if they are possible, will not admit of any treaty that can be injurious to French industry, which he means to protect by all the duties or prohibitions which may tend to their development. He insists on having liberty to do at home all that he wishes, all that he believes useful, without any rival nation having a right to censure him."

As to the intervention of Russia in the treaty, Napoleon declared positively that he would not permit it. The principle of his diplomacy was that of separate peace, and this principle was as just as it was ably conceived. Europe had always employed against France the means of coalitions; it would have been showing them favour to admit of collective negotiations, because that would be lending one's self to the essential principle of every coalition which forbids its members to treat separately. Napoleon, who in war endeavoured to encounter his enemies separately, the one from the other, in order to beat them in detail, wished in his diplomacy to seek his encounters with them in the same position. Thus he had opposed decided refusals to every offer of a collective negotiation, and he was right, save in departing from this principle of conduct, in case Mr. Fox should have been tied down by engagements which did not permit him to treat without Russia. Napoleon, after having laid down the principle of separate negotiations, desired it to be intimated besides, that he was ready to choose for the place of negotiation, not Amiens, which recalled the bases of the peace formerly abandoned, but Lisle, and to send there immediately a minister plenipotentiary.

Mr. Fox replied immediately, that the first condition which had been agreed upon at the commencement of their communications was, that the peace should be equally honourable for both nations; and that it would not be so for England if she treated without Russia, because she had formally agreed by an article of the treaty (that which constituted the coalition of 1805) not to conclude a separate peace. This obligation was absolute according to Mr. Fox, and could not be evaded. He said, that if France had a principle, that of not authorizing coalitions in her manner of negotiating, England had another,—that of not suffering herself to be excluded from the continent, by lending herself to the dissolution of her continental alliances; that in England, people were as jealous upon this point as they could well be in France upon the article of coalitions.

Mr. Fox, who to each of his official despatches added a private letter, full of frankness and honour, an example followed by M. de Talleyrand on his own side, terminated by saying, that perhaps the negotiation would be stayed by an absolute obstacle that he most sincerely regretted, but that the war would at least be honourable, and worthy of the two great nations which waged it. He added these remarkable words: "I am in the fullest degree sensible, as I ought to be, to the obliging expressions which the great man whom you serve has used in relation to myself. Regrets are useless; but if he could see with the same eye that I do the true glory which he would have a right to claim by a moderate and just peace, what happiness would not result from it for France and for all Europe! C. J. Fox.

"*London, April* 22, 1806."

In the midst of this obstinate, it may be almost said ferocious contest, when the sanguinary scenes which signalized it are recalled to recollection, the mind gratefully reposes upon that noble and benevolent intercourse which a man as generous as he was eloquent, originated for an instant between two of the greatest nations of the globe, and the soul is filled with sorrowful inconsolable regret.

Napoleon was himself deeply affected at the language of Mr. Fox, and he was sincerely desirous of peace. M. de Talleyrand, though deceiving himself in regard to the system of French alliances, never erred on the point of the policy essential to the time; and he never for one day ceased to believe that peace, in the degree of greatness to which France had arrived, was her first interest. He found the courage which he had not ordinarily found to say this; he warmly pressed Napoleon to seize the unique occasion offered by the presence of Mr. Fox at the head of affairs to negotiate with Great Britain. He had no trouble for the rest in gaining a hearing, because Napoleon was not less disposed than himself to profit by this occasion, equally fortunate and unexpected.

Moreover, circumstances lent themselves to overcome the obstacle which seemed to stay the negotiation at the outset. There was more than one reason to believe, from reports arising from the duke of Brunswick and the consul of France at St. Petersburg, that Alexander, disquieted about the consequences of the war, mistrusting the silence of the British cabinet in his regard, and the personal dispositions of Mr. Fox, wished for the re-establishment of peace. The consul of France had sent the chancellor of the consulate to relate what he had learned, and every thing seemed to give birth to the hope of opening a direct negotiation with Russia. In such a case, Mr. Fox would no longer insist upon the principle of a collective negotiation, when Russia had herself set the example of its renunciation.

It was, therefore, resolved to continue the nego-

tiations commenced by Mr. Fox, and to serve this object through an intermediate agent: a fortunate chance presented itself. To the generous words exchanged with Mr. Fox were joined proceedings not less generous. Ever since the arrests of the English ordered by Napoleon, at the period of the rupture of the peace of Amiens, in reprisal for the seizure of French vessels, many members of the highest English families were detained at Verdun. Mr. Fox had requested the release of several of them upon parole. The request had been met in the most friendly way; and, though not daring to insist upon all to the same extent, he had classed them according to the interest with which they inspired him. Napoleon resolved to grant him all, and the English designated by him had been, without exception, released. In return for this noble act, Mr. Fox had chosen, for the purpose of returning them, the most distinguished prisoners taken in the battle of Trafalgar, the unfortunate Villeneuve, the heroic commander of the Redoubtable, captain Lucas, and many others, equal in number to the released English.

Among the prisoners returned to Mr. Fox, was one of the richest and cleverest of the English nobles, lord Yarmouth, afterwards marquis of Hertford, a decided Tory; but, though a Tory, an intimate friend of Mr. Fox, and a decided partizan of peace, which would permit him to enjoy the life and pleasures of the continent, of which the war had deprived him. This young lord, well known to the more brilliant of the Paris youth, in whose dissipation he was a partaker, was also well known to M. de Talleyrand, who was fond of the English nobility; above all, of those who had mind, elegance, and dissoluteness. Lord Yarmouth was designated to him as in intimate connexion with Mr. Fox, and as well worthy the confidence of both governments. He sent for him, declared to him that the emperor sincerely desired peace; that they would set on one side the ceremonies of diplomacy, and come to a frank understanding upon the conditions acceptable on both sides; that the conditions would not be very difficult to find, when they could no more dispute with England about what she had conquered, that is to say, about Malta and the Cape; that the question after that was reduced to a few islands of little importance; that in what regarded France, she declared herself directly and clearly; she desired, besides her natural territory of the Rhine and the Alps, that no one would ever think more of contesting with her the entire of Italy, the kingdom of Naples included, and her alliances in Germany, on the condition of granting their independence to Switzerland and Holland as soon as the peace should be signed; that there was, consequently, no serious obstacle to an immediate reconciliation between the two countries, when on one part and the other they must be disposed to concede the things that were thus announced; that in regard to the difficulty arising out of the form of the negotiation, collectively or separately, they would soon find a solution, thanks to the inclination which Russia showed to treat directly with France.

There was one capital object upon which no explanation was given, but regarding which France gave it to be understood that she would, in the end, tell the secret, and that it should be told in a manner which would satisfy the royal family of England, and that was Hanover.

Napoleon had actually determined to restore it to George III., and it was the recent conduct of Prussia which had provoked him to this serious resolution. The hypocritical language of this court in its manifestoes, tending to represent itself to the Hanoverians and to the English as an oppressed power, which had been made to accept a fine kingdom by the sword at its throat, had filled him with rage. He wished at the moment to tear the treaty of the 15th of February, and to oblige Prussia to replace every thing in its former state. But for the reflections that time and M. Talleyrand had impressed upon him, he would have made a noise. Another more recent circumstance contributed to detach him wholly from Prussia; that was, the publication of the negotiations of 1805, by lord Castlereagh and the colleagues of Mr. Pitt, who had retired from office. They were bent on avenging the memory of their illustrious leader, by showing that he had remained a stranger to the military operations, while he had taken the largest share in the formation of the coalition of 1805, which had saved England by causing the breaking up of the camp of Boulogne. But in order to defend the memory of their leader, they had compromised most of the courts. Mr. Fox had reproached them for it in the house of commons with great vehemence, and had attributed to them the alteration of all the relations of England with the European powers. There was in effect a universal outcry against English diplomacy in the cabinets which saw themselves denounced to France by this imprudent publication. The conduct of Prussia had received from this circumstance a most vexatious clearness. Her hypocritical and recent declarations to England on the subject of Hanover, the hopes which she had held out to the coalition, before and after the events at Potsdam, all were divulged. Napoleon, without complaining, had these documents inserted in the *Moniteur*, leaving to every one the care of guessing that which he ought to think respecting them.

But the opinion of Napoleon respecting Prussia was formed. He no longer deemed her worth the trouble of a prolonged contest with England; he had decided to restore Hanover to England, and in offering Prussia one of two things, either an equivalent for Hanover taken in Germany, or the restitution of what he had received from her, Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchâtel. The cabinet of Berlin would reap that which it had sown, and meet with no more fidelity than it had itself exhibited. Napoleon was still ignorant of the hidden negotiations carrying on with Russia through the intermediate agency of the duke of Brunswick and M. Hardenberg!

Without explaining fully, it was given to lord Yarmouth to understand, that peace would not be withheld on account of Hanover, and he departed from Paris promising to return soon with the secret of the intentions of Mr. Fox.

A singular event, which for some days gave to the aspect of things a strong appearance of the renewal of war, contributed, on the contrary, to make things turn towards peace, and to hasten the resolutions of the Russian cabinet. The French

troops ordered to occupy Dalmatia, had hastened their march towards the mouths of the Cattaro, in order to guaranty them from the danger which threatened. The Montenegrins, of whom the bishop and the principal chiefs supported themselves on the largesses of Russia, were much troubled at learning the approach of the French, and had called admiral Siniavin to their aid, the same officer who had carried from Corfu to Naples, and from Naples to Corfu, the Russians intended for the invasion of the south of Italy. This admiral, informed of the opportunity that offered itself to secure the mouths of the Cattaro, hastily embarked some hundreds of Russians, joined them to a troop of Montenegrins, descended from the mountains, and presented himself before the forts. An Austrian officer who occupied them, and a commissary, charged by Austria to deliver them over to the French, declaring themselves constrained by a superior force, gave them up to the Russians. This allegation of a superior force had no foundation, because in the forts of Cattero there were found two Austrian battalions, very capable of defending them, even against a regular army, which should have the means of besieging them, but of which the Russians were destitute. This perfidy was principally the act of the Austrian commissary, the marquis of Ghisilieri, a very cunning Italian, afterwards blamed by his government, and put upon his trial for this dishonourable action.

When this fact, transmitted to Paris by an extraordinary courier, became known to Napoleon, he became very angry, because he held the mouths of the Cattaro of infinite importance, less on account of their own advantages, in themselves real, from their maritime position, than as a place of vicinity to Turkey, over which they furnished a means to make his actions felt either protectively or repressively. But he was angry alone with the cabinet of Vienna, because it was that cabinet which should deliver over to him the Dalmatian territory, and which was, in his regard, the only debtor. The corps of marshal Soult was on the point of repassing the Inn, and of evacuating Braunau. Napoleon ordered him to halt upon the Inn, to arm Braunau again, to establish himself there, and to create it a real *place d'armes*. At the same time, he declared to Austria that the French troops should retrace their route, that the Austrian prisoners, already on the march home, should be retained, and that, if it were necessary, things should be pushed to the renewal of hostilities; at least, until one of these two satisfactions was given him,—either the immediate restoration of the mouths of the Cattaro, or the despatch of an Austrian military force to retake them from the Russians in conjunction with France. This second alternative was not that which would have been the least displeasing to him, because it would set Austria at differences with Russia.

When these declarations, made in the peremptory tone which was common to Napoleon, reached Vienna, they caused real consternation there. The Austrian cabinet had no share in the unfaithfulness of an inferior agent. The last had acted without orders, thinking to please his own government by his treachery toward the French. Instantly despatches were sent from Vienna to St. Petersburg, to make Alexander acquainted with the new dangers to which Austria found herself exposed, and to declare that, not willing to see, at any cost, the return of the French to Vienna, they should sooner submit to the painful necessity of attacking the Russians in the forts of Cattaro.

Admiral Siniavin, who had thus taken possession of the mouths of the Cattaro, had acted without orders, as well as the marquis Ghisilieri, who had delivered them up. Alexander was grieved at the position in which they had placed his ally the emperor Francis; he was grieved too at the position in which he was placed himself, between the embarrassment of restoring and of giving up. He was always more and more annoyed at the solicitations of his young friends, who spoke unceasingly to him about perseverance of conduct; he was disquieted about the negotiations carrying on with Napoleon by England; and although this last country had finally broken the silence which she had observed during the ministerial crisis, he mistrusted his allies, and was inclined to follow the general example, and to approximate towards France. In consequence, he seized the occasion of the mouths of the Cattaro being taken, that seemed in itself sooner an occasion for war than peace, to enter upon a pacific negotiation. He had at hand the former secretary of the Russian legation at Paris, M. Oubril, who had conducted himself there to the satisfaction of the two governments, and who had the still further advantage of knowing France well. They ordered him to proceed to Vienna, and there to demand passports for Paris. The ostensible pretext was to be matters relating to the Russian prisoners; but the real mission was, to treat of the affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, and to comprehend in one general settlement all the questions which had caused the difference between the two empires. M. Oubril had an order to retard as long as possible the restitution of the mouths of the Cattaro; but, still, to give them up, if there were no other means of hindering the renewal of hostilities against Austria; and to manage, above all, the re-establishment of an honourable peace between Russia and France. It would be deemed honourable, they informed him, if something, no matter what, were obtained, for the two usual protégés of the Russian cabinet, Naples and Piedmont; because, for the rest, the two empires had nothing to contest one with the other, and were only making a war of influence. Before leaving, M. Oubril had a conversation with the emperor Alexander, and it was manifest to him, that this prince inclined very visibly towards peace, much more so than the Russian ministry, which was besides in a tottering state, and about to be dismissed. He set out, therefore, inclining to that side of the question to which he saw his master inclined. He carried double powers, the one limited, the other complete, and embracing all the questions which it was possible could arise to be resolved. He had orders to concert with the negotiators of England, relative to the conditions of the peace, but without exacting a collective negotiation, which removed, in fact, the difficulties that had arisen between France and England.

M. Oubril departed for Vienna, and by his presence restored calmness to the emperor Fran-

cis, who feared either the return of the French upon him, or that he should have to combat the Russians. The second alternative frightened him much less than the first. That prince had directed an Austrian corps towards the mouths of the Cattaro, with an order to second the French troops if necessary. M. Oubril encouraged him, by showing his powers, and applied for passports through count Rausmousky, in order to arrive as soon as possible at Paris.

Napoleon wished that without delay, and favourably, a reply should be given to the demand of M. Oubril; but in the mean while he had taken care to distinguish the affair of the mouths of the Cattaro from that of the re-establishment of peace. The affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, according to what was said on his part, could not be the subject of any negotiation, when it related to an engagement of Austria that remained unexecuted, and in regard to which France had nothing to do with Russia. As to the re-establishment of peace, the French government was ready to hear with the utmost good will the propositions of M. Oubril, because, in frankness, it wished to terminate a war without an end, as without an interest, for the two countries. The passports for M. Oubril were immediately forwarded from Paris to Vienna.

Napoleon saw that Austria, exhausted by three wars, endeavoured to avoid all new cause of hostility with France; Russia, disgusted by an enterprise too lightly undertaken, was decided to prolong it no further; England, satisfied with her naval successes, did not believe it was worth while to expose herself anew to any formidable expedition; Prussia, in fine, no longer regarded, not having the slightest respect in the sight of any one;—in this state of circumstances, the whole were desirous to keep or to obtain peace, on conditions, it is true, which were not yet clearly defined, but which, whatever they might be, would leave France the rank of the first power in the universe.

Napoleon deeply enjoyed this situation of things, and had no desire to compromise it, even to obtain new victories. But he contemplated vast designs, which he believed he was able to work out naturally and immediately from the treaty of Presburg. These designs seemed to him so generally foreseen, that upon the sole condition of accomplishing them instantly, he hoped to get them comprehended in the double peace which he was negotiating with England and Russia. Then his empire, such as he had conceived it in his vast mind, would find itself definitively constituted and accepted by Europe. These results obtained, he regarded peace as the achievement and ratification of his work, as the price of his labours and those of his people, and as the accomplishment of his dearest wishes. He was, in fact, a man, as he had already said to Mr. Fox, far from being insensible to the charms of repose. With the powerful mobility of his mind, he was as well disposed to taste the sweets of peace and the glory of the useful arts, as to betake himself again to fields of battle, and to bivouac in the midst of his soldiers upon the snow.

Lord Yarmouth had returned from London with a private letter from Mr. Fox, which attested that he enjoyed the entire confidence of that minister, and that he might be spoken to without reserve. This letter added, that lord Yarmouth would receive powers as soon as there should be some well-founded hope of coming to an arrangement. M. de Talleyrand had then informed him of the communications opened with Russia, and had thus proved to him the uselessness of demanding a collective negotiation, when Russia lent herself to a separate one. As to the pretension of England not to be excluded from the affairs of the continent, M. de Talleyrand offered lord Yarmouth an official recognition of *an equal right for both powers of intervention and guarantee in continental and maritime affairs*[1].

Thus the question of a separate negotiation seemed to be one no longer, and the conditions of the peace no more appeared to present of themselves any insoluble difficulties. England wished to preserve Malta and the Cape; she also showed a desire to keep the French establishments in India, such as Chandernagore and Pondicherry, the French islands of Tobago and St. Lucia, and, above all, the Dutch colony of Surinam, situated on the American continent. Between these different possessions, that of Surinam was alone of any importance, because Pondicherry was only a vain wreck of the old French power in India; Tobago and St. Lucia had not sufficient value to cause a refusal. Relative to Surinam, England did not show herself as positively insisting. As to the continental conquests of France, much more important than those maritime conquests, she was ready to concede all without reserve, not excepting Genoa, Venice, Dalmatia, or Naples. Sicily alone appeared to create a difficulty. Lord Yarmouth, explaining himself confidentially, said that they were tired of protecting the Bourbons of Naples, —that imbecile king and mad queen; but still, since they possessed Sicily in fact, as Joseph had not yet conquered it, they should be obliged to demand it for them, but that this would become a question dependent upon the result of the military operations actually undertaken. In case Sicily should be taken from them, lord Yarmouth added, that an indemnity must be found for them somewhere. It was secretly understood, that as the price of these various concessions, Hanover would be restored to England; but both on one side and the other it was a thing reserved from formal mention.

Sicily was then the sole serious difficulty; and yet the immediate conquest of the island, save as to an indemnity, however insignificant it might be, would enable all to be arranged. Passports were sent to M. Oubril; it was not known what the pretensions were he might put forward, but they could not be very different from those of England.

Napoleon saw clearly that by not precipitating the negotiations, and, on the contrary, accelerating his own designs, he should attain his double object, of constituting his empire according to his wishes, and of confirming what he established by the general peace.

Originally, in preferring the title of emperor to that of king, he had conceived a vast system of empire, upon which vassal royalties should depend, in imitation of the Germanic empire, an

[1] The text of the despatch.

empire so weakened that it only existed in name, and which gave birth to the temptation of replacing it in Europe. The later victories of Napoleon had excited his imagination, and he dreamed of nothing less than up-raising the empire of the West, of placing the crown on his head, and of thus re-establishing it to the advantage of France. The new vassal royalties were all formed, and they were to be distributed between the members of the family of Bonaparte. Eugène de Beauharnois, adopted as his son, become the husband of the princess of Bavaria, was already viceroy of Italy, comprehending the most important half of the Italian peninsula, since it extended from Tuscany to the Julian Alps. Joseph, the elder brother of Napoleon, was designed to be king of Naples. It only remained for him to procure Sicily in order to possess one of the finest kingdoms of the second order. Holland, which governed itself with difficulty as a republic, was under an absolute dependence upon Napoleon, and he believed himself able to attach it to his system, by constituting it a kingdom under his brother Louis. That made three kingdoms, those of Italy, Naples, and Holland, to place under the sovereignty of his empire. Sometimes when he extended yet more the dream of his greatness, he thought of Spain and Portugal, which every day gave him symptoms, Spain of concealed hostility, Portugal of open animosity. But this was yet placed afar in the vast horizon of his imagination. It was necessary that Europe should force him to some new and brilliant act like Austerlitz, to decide him upon the complete expulsion of the house of Bourbon from the continent. It is nevertheless certain that this expulsion commenced to be with him a systematic idea. Since he had been brought to proclaim the downfall of the Bourbons of Naples, he had considered the family of Bonaparte as destined to replace the house of Bourbon on all the thrones in the south of Europe.

In this vast hierarchy of vassal states dependent on the French empire, he designed a second and a third rank, composed of great and petty duchies, on the model of the fiefs of the Germanic empire. He had already constituted, in favour of his elder sister, the duchy of Lucca; that he proposed to aggrandize by adding to it the principality of Massa, detached from the kingdom of Italy. He projected the creation of another, that of Guastella, by detaching it also from the kingdom of Italy. These two dismemberments were very insignificant, in comparison with the magnificent addition of the Venetian states. Napoleon had obtained from Prussia, Neufchâtel, Anspach, and the remainder of the duchy of Clèves. He had given Anspach to Bavaria, to procure for himself the duchy of Berg, a pleasant country, situated on the right of the Rhine, below Cologne, and comprehending the important fortress of Wesel. "Strasburg, Mayence, and Wesel," said Napoleon, "are *the three bridles* of the Rhine."

He had got in Upper Italy Parma and Placentia; in the kingdom of Naples Ponte-Corvo and Benevento, fiefs disputed between Naples and the pope, which at the moment gave him the most serious grounds of discontent. Pius VII. had not gone from Paris with the satisfaction he expected. Flattered by the attentions of Napoleon, he had been deceived in his hopes of territorial indemnity. Further, the invasion of the whole of Italy by the French, now that they had extended themselves from the Julian Alps to the Straits of Messina, had appeared to complete the dependence of the Roman states. He was in despair, and exhibited it in all manner of ways. He would not organize the German Church, which remained without prelates and without chapters since the secularizations. He admitted none of the religious arrangements adopted for Italy. On the occasion of the marriage of Jerome Bonaparte, contracted in the United States with a protestant, and that Napoleon wished to have abrogated, the pope opposed an insincere resistance, but obstinate, thus employing spiritual arms in default of temporal ones. Napoleon had signified to him that he held himself to be the master of Italy, Rome included, and that he would not suffer a concealed enemy there; that he should follow the example of those princes who, while remaining in the faith of the Church, had known how to rule it; that he had been to the Church a real Charlemagne, since he had re-established it, and that he expected to be treated as such. In the interim he expressed his displeasure by taking possession of Ponte-Corvo and Benevento. This was the lamentable commencement of an unhappy misunderstanding, to which Napoleon then believed he should be able to assign the limits which he pleased to impose, for the interest of religion and the empire.

Then, besides several thrones to distribute, he had Lucca, Guastella, Benevento, Ponte-Corvo, Placentia, Parma, Neufchâtel, and Berg, to divide among his sisters and his more faithful servants, under the title of principalities and duchies. In giving kingdoms, as Naples to Joseph; augmentations, as the Venetian states to Eugène; he thought of creating further a score of minor duchies, destined as well for his generals as for his best servants in civil life, to form a third rank in the imperial hierarchy, and recompense in a signal way the men to whom he owed his throne, and to whom France owed her greatness.

Since in placing the imperial crown upon his head, he had adjudged to himself the prize of the marvellous exploits accomplished by the present generation, he had raised ambitious desires in the minds of the companions of his glory, and they also aspired to obtain the reward of their labours. Unhappily, they did not any longer imitate the sober wishes of the generals of the republic, and often took that which he did not hasten to bestow. In Italy, and more particularly in the states of Venice, they had committed grievous exactions, which Napoleon determined to repress with the utmost severity. He had, with almost incredible watchfulness, discovered the clue to these secret exactions, called before him those who had been guilty of them, torn from them the secret of the sums thus misused, and exacted the immediate restoration of their value, commencing with the general-in-chief, who was obliged to pay a considerable amount of money into the chest of the army.

But he intended not to impose rigorous integrity upon his generals, without recompensing their heroism. "Tell them," he had written to

Eugène and to Joseph, about whom were then employed several officers whose bad conduct he had corrected; "tell them that I will give them all much more than they can ever take themselves; that what they would take will cover them with shame, that what I shall give will do them honour, and will be an immortal testimony to their glory; that in paying themselves by their own hands they will aggrieve my subjects, making France the object of the maledictions of the conquered, and that, on the contrary, what I shall give them, accumulated through my foresight, will not be from the spoliation of any one. Let them wait," he added, "and they will be rich and honoured, without having to blush for any acts of extortion."

Profound ideas, as is seen, mingled themselves, in appearance, with his vainest conceptions. He was therefore resolved to satisfy among his generals the desire of enjoyment, but to direct it towards noble recompences, legitimately acquired. Under the consulate, when all things had still the republican form, he had devised the legion of honour. Now that all took around him the monarchical form, and that he was visibly growing greater, he wished that all around him should grow great as well as himself. He meditated the creation of kings, of grand dukes, of counts, and the like. M. de Talleyrand, a staunch advocate for creations of this nature, laboured much with Napoleon during the last campaign, and had conversed with him on the subject as well as upon the arrangements of Europe, that he was ordered to negotiate at Presburg. They had both conceived an extension of vassalage, comprehending dukes, grand dukes, kings, under the sovereignty of the emperor, and possessing not empty titles, but real principalities, either in territorial domains or in rich revenues.

The new kings, the more to conform with the Germanic empire, were to preserve, on the thrones which they should occupy, their rank of grand dignitaries of the French empire. Joseph was to remain grand elector; Louis, constable; Eugene, archchancellor of state; Murat, grand-admiral, when they should become kings or grand-dukes. Supplementary dignitaries,—such as a vice-constable, a vice grand elector, and the like,—taken from among the principal personages of the state, filled their functions during their absence, and would, in this way, multiply the offices for distribution. The kings, remaining dignitaries of the French empire, were to reside frequently in France, and to have a royal establishment in the Louvre appropriated for their usage. They were to form the council of the imperial family, and there to fulfil certain special functions during their minorities, and even to elect the emperor, in case the male line should become extinct, which sometimes occurred among reigning families.

The assimilation with the Germanic empire was complete; and that empire, fallen into ruins on all sides, ever exposed to disappear at any time by a simple effort of the will of Napoleon, the French empire would be found in Europe ready to replace it. The empire of the Franks would again, it was possible, return to what it had been under Charlemagne, the empire of the west, and even take the same title. It was the last desire of that immense ambition, the only one that it did not realize, that for which it tormented the world, and for which, perhaps, it perished. M. de Talleyrand, who, in even advising peace sometimes flattered the passions which led to war, often presented this idea to Napoleon, knowing the profound emotion which it excited in his mind. Every time he spoke of it to him, he saw in the flash of his eyes, radiant with genius, all the fire of ambition. Influenced, however, by a species of modesty, on the eve of the day when he took the supreme power, Napoleon dared not avow the whole extent of his wishes. The archchancellor, Cambacérès, with whom he was more open, because he was more secure of his perfect discretion, had been made acquainted, in half confidence, with his secret desires, and had kept himself from encouraging them, because with him his devotedness did not silence his prudence. But it was evident that, having arrived at the summit of human greatness, at a point Alexander, Cæsar, and Charlemagne, had not overpassed, the uneasy and insatiable soul of Napoleon wished for something more, and that was the title of Emperor of the West, that for a thousand years had not been borne in the world.

There exists between the people of the south and west, with the French, Italians, and Spaniards, all children of Roman civilization, a certain conformity in genius, manners, interests, sometimes of territory, that is not found beyond the Channel, the Rhine, and the circle of the Alps, among the English and the Germans. This conformity is the indication of a natural alliance, that the house of Bourbon, by uniting under its royal sceptre Paris, Madrid, and Naples, sometimes Milan, Parma, and Florence, had partly realized. If it was that Napoleon intended, when master of France,—of that France which terminated at the mouths of the Meuse and of the Rhine, and at the summit of the Alps,—if master of entire Italy, having it in his power to become soon master of Spain, he wished for nothing but to reconstitute the alliance of nations of Latin origin, and giving them the symbolical form, sublime from its recollections of the empire of the west, the nature of things, however forced, would still not have been outraged. The family of Bonaparte replaced the house of Bourbon, to reign in a more perfect manner over that extent of the countries that their ancient house had aspired to govern, for the purpose of attaching them, by a simple bond of sovereignty, to the head of the family,—a bond which left to each of these southern countries its independence, by rendering more strong the useful bond of their alliance. With the genius of Napoleon, by transferring to his policy the prudence which he displayed in war, and with a very long reign, this conception it would not, perhaps, have been impossible to realize. But the very nature of things, that always cruelly avenges itself on those who treat it with slight, was foolishly violated, when, amid his ambition, Napoleon ceased to respect the limit of the Rhine, when he wished to unite the Germans with the Gauls, to subject the people of the north to the people of the south, to place French princes in Germany, despite the invincible antipathies in manners; and he then made appear, before all eyes, the phantom of that universal monarchy that Europe feared and detested,—that she had combated, and will do well to combat

incessantly, but to which she will, perhaps, be some day subjected by the nations of the north, having refused it from the hands of those of the west.

A chain of unforeseen events, even by the vast and foreseeing ambition of Napoleon, led, at this moment, to the dissolution of the Germanic empire, and was about to make vacant the noble title of the emperor of Germany,—that had replaced, with the successors of Charlemagne, the title of emperor of the west. This was a new and fatal encouragement for the projects which Napoleon nourished in his mind, without yet venturing to produce them.

In considering, in his last treaties with Austria, how to recompense his three allies of Southern Germany, the princes of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, and to put an end to every ground for collision between them and the head of the empire, by the solution of certain questions remaining undecided in 1803, Napoleon had pronounced, unawares, the approaching dissolution of the old Germanic empire. A providential instrument, sometimes involuntary, almost always misinterpreted, of that French revolution which should change the face of the world, he had prepared, without knowing it, one of the greatest of European reforms.

It will be remembered how, in 1803, France had been called to mingle herself up with the internal government of Germany; how the princes who had lost all or part of their estates by the cession on the left bank of the Rhine, had resolved to indemnify themselves for their losses by secularising the ecclesiastical principalities. Not able to agree about the partition of the principalities, they had called Napoleon in to aid them, in order to apportion in the divisions that equity and decision without which it was impossible to be effected. Prussia and Austria had received the possessions of the Church with only one dissatisfaction, that they did not obtain more. The suppression of the ecclesiastical principalities had caused the modification of the three colleges composing the diet. They had come to an understanding about the college of electors, but not about that of the princes, in which Austria claimed a greater number of catholic votes than had been granted to her. They had come to an agreement also in regard to the college of cities, reducing their number to six, and destroying nearly all their influence. They had settled nothing in relation to a new organization of the circles charged with maintaining due respect for the laws in each great German province; nothing respecting a new religious organization, become needful since the suppression of a crowd of sees, and postponed indefinitely, owing to the ill will of the pope. Finally, other serious questions, respecting the immediate nobility, had not been arranged, because it interested the whole of the German aristocracy, and, above all, Austria, that had in that nobility vassals, dependents of the empire, besides territorial princes, rendering her much service, of which the recruiting upon their estates was not the least.

The mediating powers, France and Russia, tired of this long mediation, drawn off elsewhere by other events, had scarcely withdrawn their hands, leaving Germany half reformed, when anarchy invaded that unhappy country. Austria, under the pretext of claiming a right of fiefs, had usurped the dependencies of the ecclesiastical property given as indemnities, and had deprived the indemnified princes of a considerable part of what was due to them. These princes, on their side, wished to seize upon the property of the immediate nobility, and had availed themselves of the uncertainties of the last recess for that purpose.

The war of 1805 having brought back Napoleon beyond the Rhine, he had availed himself of the occasion to turn to the advantage of the princes, his allies, the questions remaining undecided,—and he had thus created in the countries of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, a species of dissonance with the rest of Germany. But the greediness of these same allies had given birth to difficulties which affected the whole of Germany. The king of Wurtemberg, keeping within no bounds, had usurped the lands of the immediate nobility, as well those who had that quality as those who had not. He arrogated to himself more than the rights of a territorial sovereign, and he had seized many of the mansions of the nobility, as if he had been the true proprietor. All the rights of feudal origin that Austria had wished to exercise in Suabia, and of which the practice was dangerously arbitrary, he declared himself the new possessor of, in the right of possession of certain feudal places that the partition of Austrian Suabia had procured for him, and he commenced this exercise with more rigour than the chancellery of Austria itself. The houses of Baden and Bavaria, molested by him, and authorized by his example, committed the same excesses in their own territories. This contempt of right had been pushed so far as to penetrate into the sovereign principalities inclosed in the territories of the three princes, under the pretext of searching for the domains belonging to the immediate nobility, which could not, in any case, appertain to them; because if these domains belonged to any others than that nobility themselves, it must be to the sovereign prince, on whom they were immediately dependent.

Napoleon had ordered M. Otto, his minister at Munich, as arbitrator, and Berthier as head of the executive force, to settle all the differences between Wurtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, arising out of the division of the Austrian territories in Suabia. These difficulties becoming more involved, Napoleon added general Clarke to aid them in clearing the chaos. Both the one and the other despaired of coming to any end. The princes, who had been wronged, first presented themselves at Ratisbon; but the ministers at the diet, neither having courage nor authority, since Austria no longer conferred it upon them, avowed themselves powerless to repress the disorder increasing on every side. Austria herself had nearly reduced them to this state of feebleness, of which they complained, by refusing, the preceding year, to authorize any serious deliberation, as long as the college of princes was not reconstituted agreeably to her will, and the number of catholic votes which she claimed was not added to it. Now definitively vanquished, occupied only with her own safety, she achieved the annihilation of the diet, by showing that she was not to be relied on further for any efficient help. The diet was, therefore, a body completely destroyed, merely receiving the communications made to it, scarcely giving an ac-

knowledgment of their reception, but never deliberating upon any subject.

At this view, the petty sovereign princes, and the immediate nobles, exposed to all kinds of usurpations, the free cities reduced from six to five by the gift of Augsburg to Bavaria, the ecclesiastical princes secularised, whose pensions were no longer paid, all hastened to Munich, to M. Otto and generals Berthier and Clarke, in order to request the protection of France. These agents, indignant at the spectacles of oppression of which they were the witnesses, had at first formed a species of congress that should conciliate all interests, and prevent, under the shadow of France, the committal of such iniquitous actions. M. Otto conceived a plan of arrangement that France might submit to the principal oppressors, the sovereigns of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. But he had soon discovered that he had made a new plan for a Germanic constitution; and further, the agents of the king of Wurtemberg, when he had presented his plan to them, had warmly spoke against it, and had declared that their master would never consent to the concessions proposed. It might have been said, that this prince, who had just been made a king by France, his estates augmented, his sovereign prerogatives doubled, had been plundered by her, because she demanded of him some respect for the rights of property, and some regard as a neighbour for the more feeble of his neighbours. Not knowing what more to do, M. Otto sent all together to Paris, those who complained and those complained against, together with the plans of arrangement which he had devised with the intention of doing justice. This reference took place at the end of March.

From this period the oppressed and oppressors were at the foot of the throne of Napoleon. It became plain that the sceptre of Charlemagne had passed from the Germans to the Franks.

It was this which had been said and written under all forms by the prince archchancellor, the last ecclesiastical elector preserved by Napoleon, and transferred, as it will be remembered, from Mayence to Ratisbon. This prince, of whom the amiable, unsteady character has been elsewhere traced, with his sumptuous inclinations, seeking strength where it was to be found, never ceased to beseech Napoleon to take in his hand the sceptre of Germany; and if any one had made the dangerous name of Charlemagne resound in the ears of Napoleon, it was certainly him. "You are Charlemagne," he said to him; "be then the master, the regulator, the saviour of Germany." If this name, which was not that which most pleased the pride of Napoleon, because he had in Alexander and Cæsar rivals more worthy of his genius, but which was particularly pleasing to his ambition, because it established further the relations with his designs upon Europe,—if that name was always found mingled with his own, it was less his own deed than through the act of those who sought for his protective power. When the Church wished to obtain any thing of him, she said to him, "You are Charlemagne: give us that which he would have bestowed upon us." When the German princes of all the states were oppressed, they said to him, "You are Charlemagne: protect us as he would have done!"

They had thus, therefore, inspired him with the ideas which his ambition might not have so quickly conceived if it had been slow in its desires. But the necessities of nations and his ambition then marched together.

At all periods, the princes of Germany, besides the Germanic confederation, a legal authority, and acknowledged by them, had formed particular leagues to defend such rights or interests as had been before common to some of them. All that remained belonging to those leagues addressed themselves to Napoleon, and besought him to intervene for their advantage, as well in the character of author as guarantee of the act of mediation of 1803, and as executor and signer of the treaty of Presburg. The one proposed to him to form new leagues under his protection; the others to form a new Germanic confederation under his imperial sceptre. The princes whose possessions had been usurped, the immediate nobles whose estates had been seized, the free towns menaced with suppression, proposed different plans, but were ready, provided they were protected, to adopt that plan which should be approved by the larger part.

The prince archchancellor, who feared that his ecclesiastical electorate, the last escape of the weak, might perish in this new tempest, conceived a scheme to preserve it; this was, to form a new German confederation, summoned to deliberate under his presidency, and to comprehend all the German estates except Prussia and Austria. Finally, with a view to interest Napoleon in such a creation, he devised two means. The first consisted in creating an electorate attached to the duchy of Berg, that it was known was designed for Murat; and the second, to appoint immediately a coadjutor for the archbishopric of Ratisbon, and to choose him out of the imperial family. This coadjutor, being designed for the future archbishop of Ratisbon, and future archchancellor of the confederation, would place the new diet in the hands of Napoleon. The member of the Bonaparte family designed for this post of coadjutor was clearly pointed out by his ecclesiastical profession, and was cardinal Fesch, archbishop of Lyons, ambassador at Rome [1].

[1] The curious document addressed to Napoleon is here cited.

"*Ratisbon, April* 19, 1806.

"SIRE,

"The genius of Napoleon does not limit itself to creating the happiness of France; Providence gives the superior man for the universe. The estimable German nation suffers under the miseries of political and religious anarchy; be you, sire, the regenerator of its constitution! Here are certain desires dictated by the state of circumstances; let the duke of Cleves become an elector; let him obtain the dues of the Rhine on all the right bank; let cardinal Fesch be my coadjutor; let the incomes settled on twelve states of the empire be realized from some other foundation. Your imperial and royal majesty will judge, in your sublimity, if it be advantageous to the general good to realize these ideas. If some idealogical error deceive me upon this matter, my heart at least attests to me the purity of my intentions.

"I am, with inviolable attachment and most profound respect, sire, of your imperial and royal majesty, the very humble and all devoted admirer,

"CHARLES, elector and archchancellor.

"The Germanic nation needs that its constitutions should

Without waiting the proposal of such a plan, its discussion and acceptation, the archchancellor, eager to assure himself of the preservation of his see by an adoption that rendered its destruction impossible, unless Napoleon wished to injure the interests of his own family, which that family would not peaceably allow, and he was not fond of doing, the archchancellor, without consulting any body, to the great astonishment of his co-estates, chose cardinal Fesch for the coadjutor of the archbishopric of Ratisbon, and wrote a letter to Napoleon, in order to acquaint him with his choice.

Napoleon had no ground to be fond of cardinal Fesch, a vain, obstinate personage, who was not the least troublesome to him among his relations, and he had no very great desire to place him at the head of the Germanic empire. He permitted, however, this singular appointment, without explanation. It was a striking symptom of the disposition of the oppressed German princes to place in his hands the new imperial sceptre.

be regenerated: the major part of its laws show words alone, divested of meaning,—since the tribunal, the circles, the diet of the empire, no longer have the means needful to support the rights of property and the personal security of the individuals that compose the nation, and since those institutions are no longer able to protect the oppressed against the assaults of arbitrary power and cupidity. Such a state is one of anarchy; the people support the civil expenses of the state, without enjoying the principal advantages,—a disastrous position for a nation thoroughly estimable for its loyalty, industry, and primitive energy. The Germanic constitution cannot be regenerated but by a head of the empire of great character, who will restore vigour to the laws by concentrating in his hands the executive power. The states of the empire will the better enjoy their domains, when the wishes of the people shall be expressed and discussed in the diet, the tribunals better organized, and justice administered in a more efficacious manner. His majesty, the emperor of Austria, Francis II., would be an individual much to be respected for his personal qualities; but in real fact the sceptre of Germany is escaping from him, because he has now the majority of the diet against him; because he has failed in his capitulations by occupying Bavaria, and introducing the Russians into Germany; because he has dismembered parts of the empire to remunerate the faults committed in the private quarrels of his house. *Let him be emperor of the east to resist the Russians, and let the empire of the west be revived in the empire of Napoleon, such as it was under Charlemagne, composed of Italy, France, and Germany!* It does not appear to be impossible that the evils of anarchy may make the majority of the electors feel the necessity of such a regeneration: it was for that they chose Rodolph of Hapsburg, after the troubles of a long interregnum. The means of the archchancellor are very limited; but it is at least with a pure intention that he calculates upon the intelligence of the emperor Napoleon, particularly in respect to the subjects which it is likely may agitate the south of Germany more peculiarly devoted to that monarch. The regeneration of the Germanic constitution has at all times been the object of the wishes of the archchancellor elector: he neither asks nor would accept any thing for himself; he thinks, that if his majesty, the emperor Napoleon, could meet personally the princes who are attached to him, for a few weeks yearly at Mayence, or elsewhere, the germs of the Germanic regeneration would soon develop themselves. M. Hedouville has inspired the perfect confidence of the archchancellor elector, who would be delighted if he would be pleased to submit these ideas, in all their purity, to his majesty the emperor of the French, and to his minister, M. de Talleyrand.

"CHARLES, elector archchancellor."

Napoleon had no desire to take that sceptre directly from the house of Austria. It was an enterprise which appeared to him too great for the moment, although there was little since Austerlitz that would have put him in fear. But he was clear as to how far he would be able to venture in Germany, and fixed about what it was convenient to do. For the present he wished to dislocate and to enfeeble the German empire in such a manner that the French empire should alone shine in the west. In consequence, he resolved to unite the princes of southern Germany, situated on the banks of the Rhine, in Franconia, Suabia, and Bavaria, and to form them into a confederation under his avowed protectorate. This confederation declared its ties broken with the Germanic empire. As to the other princes of Germany, either they might rest under the old confederation and under the authority of Austria, or, as was most probable, leave it, and group themselves at will, some round Prussia, others around Austria. Then the French empire having under its formal sovereignty Italy, Naples, and Holland, perhaps one day the Spanish peninsula, and under its protectorship the south of Germany, would comprehend very nearly the states which had belonged to Charlemagne, and would hold the peace of the empire of the west. To give him this title was no more than an affair of words, serious, however, because of the jealousies of Europe, but to be realized on some day of victory or of successful negotiation.

To accomplish such an object there was but little to be done, because Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, were at this time treating in Paris, for the purpose of arriving at some sort of regulation of their situation, aggrandized, but uncertain. All the other princes applied to be included, no matter under what title, or under what condition, in the new feudal system, which was foreseen and felt to be inevitable. To be designated in it was to live; to be omitted to perish. It was not, therefore, necessary to negotiate with others, but only with the sovereigns of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, and care was had to consult them only to a certain extent, and to exclude all but them from the negotiation. It was proposed to present the treaty, drawn out, to those of the princes they were desirous of retaining, and to admit them to sign purely and simply. The new confederation was to carry the title of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Napoleon that of Protector.

M. de Talleyrand was charged, together with the very able first clerk, M. de Labesnardière, to draw up the scheme of the new confederation, and afterwards to submit it to the emperor[1]. Such was, as is seen, the chain of circumstances that twice led France to intermeddle in German affairs. The first time the inevitable partition of the ecclesiastical properties threatening Germany with being overturned, the princes came to ask Napoleon himself to make the division, and to add the changes to the German constitution that were to be its result. The second time Napoleon, called from the borders of the ocean to the banks of the Danube by the irruption of the Austrians into

[1] It was from M. de Labesnardière himself, the sole confidant of this important creation, that all these details were derived, supported, besides, upon a numerous mass of authentic documents.

Bavaria, obliged to create allies for himself in the south of Germany, to recompense, aggrandize, and restrain them at the same time when they desired to abuse his alliance, was again obliged to intervene to regulate the situation of the German princes, who, in a geographical sense, were interesting to France.

If he had in all that he did on this occasion any personal view, it was to render vacant an august title by the dissolution of the Germanic empire, and not to suffer to exist in the sight of nations any other empire than that of France. Nevertheless, the essential causes of his intervention were no other than the violence of the strong, the cry of the feeble, and the double desire, perfectly allowable, to repress injustice committed in his name, and to reform Germany in a manner more commensurate with the views of his own good sense, when he could no longer refrain from interfering.

It was not less a serious fault on the part of Napoleon, that this intervention in the affairs of Germany was pushed beyond certain limits. Wishing to exercise a predominant influence over the south of Europe, over Italy, even over Spain, was consistent with the policy of France at all times, and, however extended this ambition might be, great victories might justify its magnitude. But to attempt the extension of his power in the north of Europe, that is to say, in Germany, was to push to the extremest point the secret despair of Austria; it was to instil into Prussia a kind of jealousy with which France had not yet inspired it. It was to take on his own shoulders the difficulties arising out of the divisions of all the petty princes between themselves; to pass for the supporter and accomplice of oppressors when he was the defender of the oppressed; to set against himself those who were not favoured, without securing to himself those who were; since these expressed themselves already in a manner to cause it to be foreseen, that after they had been enriched by France, they were capable of turning against her, in order to purchase the preservation of what they had acquired. As to the assistance which he believed he should derive from their troops, it was a dangerous deception to rely as auxiliaries upon soldiers ever ready, when occasion offered, to turn traitors. It was a fault yet greater still to alter the old combinations of Germany, which made Prussia ever the jealous rival of Austria, and consequently the ally of France, and to make of all the princes of Germany rivals, envious of each other, and, in future, clients of the French policy, from which they would seek support. If France had added something to the influence of Prussia, and retrenched something from that of Austria, this would have been doing sufficient for a century; in fact, it was all that Germany required. Beyond this, there was nothing but an oversetting of the European policy, more injurious than useful. If these changes had been pushed so far as to render Prussia all-powerful, it was only displacing the danger, to transfer to Berlin the enemy whom France always had at Vienna. If they had gone so far as to destroy Prussia and Austria, this would be to arouse all Germany; and as to the petty states, all that was carried beyond a just protection for certain princes of the second order, as Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, ordinarily allies of France, all that went beyond a reasonable price given after the war for their alliance, was a dangerous intervention in the affairs of others, a gratuitous acceptance of difficulties which did not belong to France, and, under an apparent violation of foreign independence, a signal of dupery. There only remained one greater fault to be committed, and that was to found French kingdoms in Germany. Napoleon had not yet arrived at that degree of power and of error. The old Germanic constitution, modified by the recess of 1803, with some aditional solutions, neglected thus by the recess, with the old influences modified only in their due proportion, was that which was most fitting for France, Europe, and Germany. France undertook more for the benefit of Germany than for her own; and Germany nurtured in return for her a deep rancor, and she awaited the moment of the French retreat to fire upon the rear of the soldiers borne down by numbers. Such is the price paid for errors.

Napoleon leaving M. de Talleyrand and M. de Labesnardière to regulate in secret the details of the new plan for the Germanic confederation, with the ministers of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, had begun to proceed to the execution of his general plan, above all, in relation to Italy and Holland, in order than the English and Russian negotiators, treating each on his own side, should find consummated and irrevocable the resolutions relative to the new royalties which he wished to create.

The crown of Naples had been designed for Joseph, that of Holland for Louis. The institution of these royalties was for Napoleon, at the same time a political calculation and a heartfelt satisfaction. He was not only great, he was good, and sensible of the affections of blood, sometimes even to weakness. He did not always gather the reward of his excellent feelings, because there is nothing so exacting as an upstart family. There was not a single one of his relations who, acknowledging that it was the conqueror of Rivoli, of the Pyramids, and of Austerlitz, that had founded the greatness of the Bonapartes, still would not believe but that he himself was something, and did not think himself treated in an unjust manner, hardly, and disproportionately to his merits. His mother repeating incessantly, that she had given him to the light of day, complained that she was not surrounded with a sufficiency of homage and respect; and she was, of the whole of the females of the family, the most moderate and the least intoxicated. Lucien Bonaparte having placed, as he said, the crown upon the head of his brother, because he alone had been unshaken on the 18th of Brumaire, for the reward of this service lived in exile. Joseph, the meekest and most sensible of all, said in his turn, that he was the eldest, and that the deference due to that title was not shown towards him. He was not without a certain inclination to believe that the treaties of Luneville, Amiens, and the Concordat, that Napoleon had complaisantly charged him with the duty of signing, to the disadvantage of M. de Talleyrand, were the work of his own personal ability, rather than the high exploits of his brother. Louis, with ill health, mistrustful, full of pride, affecting virtue, pre-

tended himself sacrificed to an infamous office, that of covering, by marrying her, the weaknesses of Hortense de Beauharnois for Napoleon, an odious calumny invented by the emigrants, repeated in a thousand pamphlets, and regarding which Louis did the wrong of showing himself prepossessed, for the purpose of having it supposed that he gave it credit. Each of these believed himself, therefore, the victim of something, and ill paid for the part which he had contributed to his brother's greatness. The sisters of Napoleon, not venturing to put forth such pretensions, were restless around him, and caused trouble to his spirit by their rivalries, sometimes by their discontent, while he was a prey to so many other uneasinesses and cares. Caroline solicited him without ceasing in behalf of Murat, who, with all his thoughtlessness, at least paid for the benefits of his brother-in-law with a devotedness that did not permit his future conduct to be thus augured, though, it is true, any thing may be expected from thoughtlessness. Eliza, the eldest, transferred to Lucca, where she endeavoured to acquire personal glory by well managing her little state, and who, in fact, conducted it with great ability, wished for an augmentation of her duchy.

In all this family Jerome, as the youngest, and Pauline, as the most dissipated, were exempt from those exactions, rancours, and jealousies which troubled the interior of the imperial family. Jerome, whose youthful irregularities had frequently provoked the severity of Napoleon, saw in him more a father than a brother, and received his kindnesses with a heart full of unalloyed gratitude. Pauline, given up to her pleasures, like a princess of the family of the Cæsars, beautiful as an antique Venus, sought in the greatness of her brother only the means to satisfy her dissipated tastes, and desired no higher title than that of Borghese, of which she bore the name, and was disposed to prefer fortune, the source of enjoyments, to greatness, the satisfaction of pride. She so loved her brother, that when he was at war, the archchancellor Cambacérès, charged with the government of the reigning family of the state, was obliged to send to this princess news of him the moment when he received it, because the least delay threw her into the most painful anxieties.

It was the dread of seeing the children of the Beauharnois family preferred to themselves, that pushed on the Bonapartes to be enemies to Josephine. In this they did not spare even the heart of Napoleon, but in a hundred ways tormented him. The precocious greatness of Eugene, become viceroy, and the designated heir to the fine kingdom of Italy, singularly obscured their glory, and nevertheless the crown had been offered to Joseph, who had refused it, because it placed him too immediately under the power of the French emperor. He wished, he said, to reign in an independent manner. It will be seen, at a later period, that the taste for independence, common to all the members of the imperial family, combined with the tendencies of the people over whom they were called to reign, was destined to bring difficulties on the government of Napoleon, and add new causes of misfortune to the misfortunes of France.

It was among all the members of this family that he was to distribute the kingdoms and duchies newly created. The crown of Naples insured to Joseph a situation notoriously independent, and was, besides, sufficiently noble to be accepted. Some surprise must be felt at such language being employed for characterizing the sentiments with which these fine kingdoms were received by princes born so far from a throne, and so far even from that greatness which particular persons sometimes owe to birth or fortune. But it was one of the singularities of the fantastic spectacle afforded by the French revolution, and by the extraordinary man that it had set at its head, that these refusals, these hesitations, nearly these disdainings of anticipated satiety, should be testified before the finest crowns, by personages who, in their youth, never could have expected to wear them. Napoleon, who had seen Joseph disdain at one time the presidency of the senate, at another the vice-royalty of Italy, was not sure whether he would accept the throne of Naples, and had at first only conferred upon him the rank of his lieutenant [1]. Assuring himself afterwards of his acceptance, he inscribed his name in the decrees destined for presentation to the senate.

In regard to Holland, he had designed Louis, who has since stated to all Europe in an accusing book against his brother, how much he was offend-

[1] The following letters show how Napoleon gave crowns away, and how they were received:—

"Munich, January 5th, 1806.

"To the Minister at War.

"Send off general Berthier, your brother, with the decree which nominates prince Joseph commandant of the army of Naples. He will keep it a profound secret, and he will not deliver the decree until the prince shall arrive. I say, he must observe the most profound secresy, because I am not certain that prince Joseph will go there, and on this account I desire that nothing may be known."

"Stuttgard, January 12th, 1806.

"To Prince Joseph.

"My intention is, that during the first days of February you should enter into the kingdom of Naples, and that I be informed that in the course of February my eagles float over the capital. You will make no suspension of arms, no capitulation. My intention is, that the Bourbons shall cease to reign in Naples, and I desire to seat on the throne a prince of my house; you, in the first instance, if it suits you; another if it suits you not.

"I reiterate to you, not to divide your forces; that all your army pass the Apennines; and that your three *corps d'armée* be directed right upon Naples, in such a manner as to be able to reunite in one day upon the same field of battle.

"Leave a general, depôts, provisions, and some artillery at Ancona to defend that fortress. When Naples is taken, the extremities will fall of themselves; all that shall be in the Abruzzi must be taken in reverse; and you will send a division to Tarentum, and one on the side of Sicily, to complete the conquest of the kingdom.

"My intention is to leave under your orders in the kingdom of Naples, during the year, until I have made new dispositions, fourteen regiments of French infantry, complete to the war complement, and twelve regiments of French cavalry, also complete.

"The country will furnish you with provisions, clothing, re-mounting, and all which is needful, in such a manner that it shall not cost me a sous. My troops of the kingdom of Italy will only remain as long as you shall judge necessary, after which they shall return home.

"You will levy a Neapolitan legion, into which you will only permit Neapolitan officers and soldiers to enter, who are willing to attach themselves to my cause."

ed, because he was scarcely consulted in the matter. In fact, Napoleon, without giving himself any concern about Louis, whose will did not appear to him to be any obstacle to foresee and overcome, had intimated to some of the principal Dutch citizens, more especially to admiral Verhuel, the brave and able commandant of the flotilla, to dispose Holland to renounce, finally, its ancient republican government, and constitute itself a monarchy. This is another trait of the picture that is here sketching forth, that the French revolution, having commenced by wishing to convert all monarchies into republics, applied itself now to convert all the older republics into monarchies. The republics of Venice and of Genoa became provinces of different kingdoms; the free towns of Germany, absorbed in different principalities, had already marked this singular tendency. The royalty of Holland was the last and most striking phenomenon. Holland, after having thrown itself into the arms of France, to escape the stadtholder, was discontented to see itself condemned to continual war, and failed in gratitude to Napoleon, who had made at Amiens, and who renewed daily, the greatest efforts to secure to it the restitution of its colonies. The Dutch, half-English in religion, manners, and mercantile spirit, although enemies of England, in consequence of their maritime interests, had no sympathy either with the government of Napoleon, or his greatness, exclusively continental as it was. The least victory at sea would have been more seducing than the most brilliant victory on the land. They exhibited enough of disdain for the semi-monarchical government of the grand pensionary, that Napoleon had induced them to receive, when he instituted a sort of first-consul in all the countries that had submitted to the influence of France. The grand pensionary, who was M. Schimmelpenninck, a good citizen and an honourable man, was only in this view a French prefect, charged with extorting money, because he demanded imposts and loans, in order to meet the expenses of a state of warfare. The distaste inspired by this government of a grand pensionary, was the sole facility that the situation of Holland offered to make a king acceptable. Although affected by that lassitude, that at the end of revolutions renders every thing indifferent, the Dutch experienced a painful feeling in seeing their republican system taken away from them. Still the assurance, that their laws would be left to them, —above all, their municipal laws,—the favourable accounts they had heard of Louis Bonaparte, of the regularity of his manners, of his love of economy, of the independence of his character, and, finally, the ordinary resignation to things long seen beforehand, decided the principal representatives of Holland to adopt the institution of royalty. A treaty was to convert the new situation of Holland, in its relations with France, into an alliance between state and state.

The Venetian provinces that Napoleon had not united immediately to the kingdom of Italy, in order to be more free to study their resources, and to employ them in consonance with his designs,—the Venetian provinces, comprising Dalmatia, were added to the kingdom of Italy, under the condition of granting Massa to the Princess Eliza, that it might be added to the duchy of Lucca, and the duchy of Guastalla to the Princess Pauline Borghese, who had not as yet received any thing through the munificence of her brother. She would not retain the duchy, but sold it back to the kingdom of Italy for some millions of francs.

It was now time, perhaps, to think of the pope, and of the real cause of his discontents. In the moment when Italy was a twelfth-cake divided by a cut of the sabre, it would have been an easy thing to reserve a share for St. Peter, and to endeavour to gain by some temporal advantages this spiritual power, with which disputes have been so vexatious, even in the present days of doubting faith, that is more indeed to be dreaded when it is oppressed than when it oppresses. These new monarchs should have been very happy to receive their estates even with a province the less; and Pius VII., indemnified, would have been content to suffer with more patience his complete investiture by French power, as was the case since the establishment of Joseph at Naples. In every case, Napoleon had yet Parma and Placentia to give, and he could not have made a better use of those territories than by employing them in consoling the Roman court. But Napoleon began to feel less uneasiness at physical or moral resistances after the battle of Austerlitz. He was extremely discontented with the pope for his hostile practices against the new king of Naples; and he felt himself more disposed to reduce than augment the patrimony of St. Peter. Besides, he reserved Parma and Placentia for an object which also had its merit; he thought to make them an indemnity for some of the princes protected by Russia or England, such as the sovereigns of Naples and Piedmont, old dethroned kings, to whom he intended to throw some mites from the rich feast around which the new kings were seated. This idea was assuredly good; but the fault remained of leaving the pope discontented, ready to make a noise, whom it would have been easy to satisfy, without any great damage to the kingdoms recently instituted.

It was necessary to provide for Murat, the husband of Caroline Bonaparte, and who had at least deserved in war that which was done for him on the score of relationship. But he also had his demands, which were rather his wife's than his own. Napoleon had thought of giving them the principality of Neufchâtel, which neither the wife nor the husband would accept. The archchancellor Cambacérès, who ordinarily interposed between Napoleon and his family, with that conciliating patience which appeases reciprocal irritations, who heard all, but did not repeat aught but that which was good to be told,—the archchancellor Cambacérès had in confidence the knowledge of their great displeasure. They deemed themselves treated with an inequality that hurt them. Napoleon then thought of the duchy of Berg for them, ceded to France by Bavaria in exchange for Anspach, yet increased by the remainder of the duchy of Cleves, a fine country, and happily situated on the right of the Rhine, containing 320,000 inhabitants, producing 400,000 florins of revenue, all the expenses of the government paid, allowing an establishment of two regiments, and calculated to procure for its possessor a certain importance in the new confederation. The fertile imaginations of Murat and his wife did not, in fact, fail to dream of some very

considerable character, externally decorated with a revived grand title of the Holy Empire.

The provision for the reigning family was made. But the brothers and sisters of Napoleon were not all whom he loved. There remained his companions in arms and his fellow-labourers in his civil labours. His natural benevolence here agreed with his policy, pleased to pay the blood of the one and the watchings of the others. He wished them to be brave, laborious, and upright, and for this he thought it was requisite to recompense them fully. To see the smile on the countenances of his servants, the smile not of gratefulness, upon which he in general reckoned but little, but of content, was one of the greatest pleasures of his noble heart.

He consulted the archchancellor Cambacérès upon the distribution of the new favours, and he, seeing that however great might be the booty to be divided, the extent of the services and of the ambitions was greater still, guessed the embarrassment of Napoleon, and began to put an end to any embarrassment as far as he was himself concerned. He prayed Napoleon not to consider him for any of the new duchies. No man knew so well, that when he is arrived at a certain degree of good fortune, to preserve is better than to acquire; and an empire of which he directed the policy, and Napoleon directed the administration and the armies, would remain the greatest of all things after it had become so. The archchancellor wished only for one thing, that was to retain his actual greatness, and the certainty of keeping that which appeared to him preferable to the finest duchies. The certainty he obtained upon this occasion. At one time he feared seeing Napoleon exact that the new kings should preserve their French dignities; that his intention was to have kings exclusively for dignitaries of the empire, and that the title of archchancellor which was his own, and of archtreasurer which was enjoyed by prince Lebrun, would soon pass to one of the monarchs newly created, or to be created. Wishing to discover the ideas of Napoleon upon this point, he said to him, "When you have a king quite ready to receive the title of archchancellor, you will let me know, and I will give in my resignation." "Be tranquil," replied Napoleon, "I must have a man of law for that office, and you will keep it." In fact, in the midst of the crowned heads formerly composing the German empire, he had three places for simple prelates, the electors of Mayence, Trèves, and Cologne. In the same manner, in the midst of the kings, dignitaries of his empire, it pleased Napoleon to reserve a place for the first and gravest magistrate of his time, called upon to introduce into his councils that knowledge which could not always enter them with kings.

There was nothing more requisite fully to content the prudent archchancellor. From that time neither desiring nor asking any thing for himself, he very usefully helped Napoleon in the difficult partition which he had to make. They were both in agreement about the first individual who should be highly recompensed; this was Berthier, the most laborious, exact, and enlightened perhaps of all the lieutenants of Napoleon, who was always near him, amidst the fire, and who supported, without any appearance of displeasure, a life, the dangers of which were not above his great courage, but the fatigues of which began to grow distasteful to him. Napoleon felt a real satisfaction in being able to reward him for his services. He granted to him the principality of Neufchâtel, which constituted him a sovereign prince.

He had one servant, who in Europe occupied a rank more elevated than any other, M. de Talleyrand, who served him much more by his skill in treating with the foreign ministers, and by the elegance of his manners, than by his wisdom in the council; however, he had still the merit of always leaning towards a moderate policy. Napoleon did not like him, and regarded him with distrust; but it was painful to him to see the foreign minister discontented, and M. de Talleyrand was discontented because he had not been comprised in the number of grand dignitaries. Napoleon, to indemnify him, conferred upon him the fine principality of Benevento, one of the two which had been taken from the pope, as being inclosed in the kingdom of Naples.

Napoleon had still that of Ponte Corvo, also inclosed in the kingdom of Naples, and, as the preceding, taken from the pope. He wished to give this to a personage who had not rendered him any considerable service, who had treason in his heart, but was brother in law of Joseph; that was marshal Bernadotte. Napoleon was forced to do violence to himself in granting that dignity. He decided upon it through expediency, family feeling, and forgetfulness of injuries [1].

It was doing little to give recompenses to three or four only of his servants, if Napoleon had not considered others numerous and better meriting reward, Berthier excepted, that he had around him, and who awaited their share of the fruits of victory. He provided for what related to them by means of an institution very cleverly imagined. In giving kingdoms away, he granted them to the new kings on one condition, which was to institute duchies, with rich revenues, and to deliver to them a certain part of the national domains. Thus, in adding the Venetian states to the kingdom of Italy, he reserved the creation of twelve duchies, under the following titles, Dalmatia, Istria, Friuli, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo. These duchies conferred no power, but they insured an annual income, which would be taken from the reserved fifteenth of the revenue of the country. He gave the kingdom of Naples to Joseph, on condition of the reserve of six fiefs, of which the two principalities already mentioned, of Benevento and Ponte Corvo, made a part, and that were completed in number by the four duchies of Gaëta, Otranto, Tarentum, and Reggio. In adding to the principality of Lucca that of Massa, Napoleon stipulated for the creation of the duchy of Massa. He instituted three others in the counties of Parma and Placentia. One of the three was given to the archtreasurer Lebrun. Among all the titles just cited, there are seen figuring those which were soon borne

[1] This was in 1806; our author has not stated any previous injuries inflicted by Bernadotte on Napoleon. In February this year, the corps of Bernadotte, after serving on the Danube and Austerlitz, was quartered at Anspach, waiting orders to return home. It served afterwards in Prussia. The defection of Bernadotte was subsequent. If so, to what injuries does the author refer?—is he not anticipating?—*Translator.*

by the most illustrious servants of the empire, and that are borne to-day by their children, the latest and living testimony of the past greatness of France. All these duchies were instituted upon the same conditions with the twelve which had been created in the Venetian states, without any power, but with a fifteenth of the revenues. Napoleon intended that there should be rewards for all ranks, and he had secured to himself, in each of these countries, national goods and funds, in order to create endowments. Thus he secured 30,000,000f. of national property in the state of Venice, and an inscription of stock giving 1,200,000f. in the great book of the kingdom of Italy. He reserved to himself, for the same purpose, national property in Parma and Placentia; stock giving a million in the kingdom of Naples, four millions of national property in the principalities of Lucca and Massa. The whole formed twenty-two duchies, 34,000,000f. in national property, and 2,400,000f. from stock, and joined to the treasure of the army, which a first new contribution had already raised to 70,000,000f., and that new victories were about to increase indefinitely, would serve to distribute endowments to every rank, from the private to the marshal. The civil functionaries were to have their part of these endowments; Napoleon had already discussed with M. de Talleyrand a plan for the reconstitution of a nobility, because he found that the Legion of Honour and the duchies did not suffice. He proposed to create counts and barons, believing in the necessity of social distinctions, and wishing that with him each should be great in proportion to his merits. But he intended to correct the deep vanity of titles in two modes, by making them the price of great services, and by attaching to them revenues which should be secured in future to their families.

These different resolutions were successively presented to the senate, to be converted into constitutional articles of the empire, in the months of April, May, and June.

The 15th of March this year, 1806, Murat was proclaimed grand duke of Cleves and of Berg. On the 30th of March, Joseph was proclaimed king of Naples and of Sicily; Pauline Borghese, duchess of Guastella; and Berthier, prince of Neufchâtel. It was only on the 5th of June that Louis was proclaimed king of Holland, the negotiations with Holland having caused a delay; M. de Talleyrand, prince of Benevento; and Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo. People might have imagined they had returned to the times of the Roman empire, when a simple decree of the senate took away or conferred crowns.

This series of extraordinary acts was terminated by the definitive creation of a new confederation of the Rhine. The negotiation secretly passed between M. de Talleyrand and the ministers of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. From the agitation visible among the German princes, no one doubted but that another new constitution was preparing for Germany. Those who by the geographical situation of their states could be included in the new constitution, requested that they might be admitted into it, in order to preserve their existence. Those who were in all probability to be limited by it, endeavoured to penetrate into the secret of this constitution, in order to know what would be their relations with this new power, and asked nothing better than to enter it under certain advantages. Austria, regarding for some time before the empire as dissolved, and in future useless to herself, saw the spectacle with apparent indifference. Prussia, on the contrary, that saw in the fall of the old Germanic confederation an immense revolution, that would at least have wished to partake with France the imperial power, of which the house of Austria was deprived, and to have the clientry of the north of Germany, while France arrogated to herself that of the south—Prussia listened to know what was going forward. The manner in which she had taken possession of Hanover, and the despatches published in London, had made Napoleon so cool in her regard, that he did not even give himself the trouble to acquaint her with affairs that ought not to have been transacted but in concert with her. Independently of being excluded from the affairs of Germany, which were her own, there were a thousand reports circulated of changes of territory, changes according to which provinces were taken from her, in order to bestow them upon others, always less in extent than those which were taken away.

Two German princes, the one as old as the other was new, gave origin to these reports, through their impatient ambition. The first was the elector of Hesse Cassel, a cunning prince, avaricious, rich from the product of his mines, and the blood of his subjects sold to foreigners, endeavouring to humour England, with whom he had placed a great amount of capital, and Prussia, of which he was a neighbour and one of the generals, and lastly, France, which built up or overturned at the moment the fortunes of all the sovereign houses. There was no cunning device he did not use with M. de Talleyrand to be comprised in, and derive advantage from, the new arrangements. Thus he offered to join himself to the projected confederation, and to place, in consequence, under French influence one of the most important portions of Germany, that is to say, Hesse, but on one condition, which was that of delivering over to him a great part of the territory of the house of Hesse Darmstadt, which he detested with that hatred of the direct branch of a collateral house so frequent with the German families. He dwelt strongly upon this point, and he proposed a very extended and very detailed plan for the purpose. At the same time he wrote to the king of Prussia to denounce to him what was scheming in Paris, and to tell him that a confederation was preparing which would ruin as much the influence of Prussia as that of Austria, and that they were employing every kind of means to induce him to enter into it.

The new German prince, Murat, acted differently. Not content with the fine duchy of Berg, which included, as already stated, a population of 320,000 inhabitants, and produced 400,000 florins in revenue, which furnished him with the means of supporting two regiments, and placed in his hands the important fortress of Wesel, he wished to become the agent at least to the sovereigns of Wurtemberg and Baden; and he desired that to become so, there should be created for him in Westphalia, a state with a million of inhabitants. With this view he besieged M. de Talleyrand, who was always very anxious to please the members of the

imperial family, and he devised plan upon plan in order to make a territory for him. Prussia naturally furnished the materials out of Munster, Osnabruck, and East Friesland. It was meditated, it is true, to give this power in exchange for the Hanseatic towns, which would be a fine indemnification, if not in territory, at least in riches and importance.

All these plans, prepared without the knowledge of Napoleon, were disapproved of by him as soon as he had a knowledge of them. He had not so much the wish to satisfy the ambition of Murat as to effect new dismemberments in Germany; he was decided, above all things, not to incorporate the Hanseatic towns in any great European state. His last combinations had made Augsburg disappear, and was about to make Nuremberg, cities through which the commerce of France passed with the centre and south of Germany. The French commerce with the north passed by Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck. Napoleon took care to prevent the sacrifice of cities, the independence of which interested France and Europe. The wines and cloths of France penetrated into Germany and Russia, under the neutral flag of the Hanseatic towns, and under the same flag the naval stores, and sometimes grain, when the state of the crops in France demanded it. To enclose these cities within the customs of a great state, had been to enchain both their own and French trade. It was full enough to be deprived of Nuremberg and Augsburg, which sent in their merceries and hardware to France, and took back wines, stuffs, and colonial produce, which they distributed afterwards over the whole south of Germany.

Napoleon determined not to sacrifice the Hanseatic towns, and repelled every combination which should tend to bestow them upon any state whatever, great or small. He therefore showed no favour to any of Murat's schemes. As to the elector of Hesse, he detested that false greedy prince, who concealed under a species of exterior indifference, an implacable enmity to France, and intended to repay him when occasion offered for the sentiments which he bore towards that country. Napoleon would not, therefore, bind himself to any thing in his regard, by introducing him into the confederation which he was organizing, because it would have rendered impossible a future plan for bringing about the approaching and well-merited ruin of that prince. If France were brought to restore Hanover to England, it would be needful to find an indemnification for Prussia, and Napoleon had determined to offer her Hesse, which she would most assuredly have accepted, as she had accepted the ecclesiastical principalities and Hanover, and as she would have accepted the Hanseatic cities, for which she every day applied. This design, which remained a secret from European diplomacy, and which was the price of the continual intrigues of the house of Hesse Cassel with the enemies of France, was the cause, the inexplicable cause, of the refusal, in opposition to the requests of the elector, to be admitted into the new confederation, and of the false fidelity towards Prussia of which he soon made a boast.

Every thing being agreed upon with the princes of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, the only ones who were consulted, the treaty was given to the other princes who were comprised, at their own request, in the new confederation, but without consulting their opinion on the nature of the act which constituted it. This treaty was dated the 12th of July, and contained the dispositions which follow.

The new confederation was to carry a title restricted, but well chosen, that of the "Confederation of the Rhine," a title which excluded any pretension of including Germany in it entirely, and which applied exclusively to the states that were neighbours of France, having incontestable interests in relation with her. The title corrected, therefore, a little the fault of the institution. The princes who signed it formed a confederation under the presidency of the archchancellor, and under the protectorate of the French emperor. Every dispute among them was to be settled in a diet sitting at Frankfort, and composed only of two colleges, the one called the college of kings, the other of princes. The first answered to the old college of electors, that had no meaning now, when there was no longer an emperor to elect; the second, by the title and its own nature, was the old college of princes. There was no longer a college answering to the former college of cities.

The confederated princes were to be in a state of perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. Every war in which France or the confederation should be engaged, was to become common to both. France would furnish 200,000 men, and the confederation 63,000, thus divided: Bavaria 30,000, Wurtemberg 12,000, the grand duchy of Baden 8000, the grand duchy of Berg 5000, that of Hesse Darmstadt 4000, leaving the petty states 4000 among them all. At the death of the prince archchancellor, the emperor of France would have the right to nominate his successor.

The confederates declared themselves for ever separated from the German empire, and were to make an immediate and solemn declaration to that effect to the diet of Ratisbon. They were to govern themselves in their relations with each other, and in relation to German affairs, by the laws that the diet of Frankfort would be speedily called to deliberate upon.

By a special article, all the German houses had the faculty of adhering, in the sequel, to the treaty, upon the condition of a pure and simple adhesion.

For the present, the confederation of the Rhine comprehended the kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the prince archchancellor, the archbishop of Ratisbon, the grand dukes of Baden, Berg, and Hesse Darmstadt, the dukes of Nassau-Usingen and Nassau-Weilberg, the princes of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, of Salm-Salm, and Salm-Kirburg, of Isemburg, Aremburg, Lichtenstein, and Leyen.

The Hohenzollerns and Salms were admitted into the new confederation on account of the long residence of many members of the family in France, and of the attachment they professed for its interests. The prince of Lichtenstein obtained his admission, and thus preserved his quality of a reigning prince, although an Austrian prince, on account of the treaty of Presburg, which he had signed. To his principality, and to several others which were maintained, covetous demands had been made and rejected by France.

The geographical circumscription of the Confe-

deration of the Rhine embraced the territories situated between the Sieg, Lahn, Mein, Necker, Higher Danube, Isar, and Inn; that is to say, the countries of Nassau, Baden, Franconia, Suabia, the Upper Palatinate, and Bavaria. Every prince within this circumscription, if he was not named in the constituent act, took the quality of reigning prince. He was "mediatized," an expression borrowed from the ancient law of Germany, which signified that a prince ceased to depend "immediately" on the chief of the empire, and depended only "mediately;" so that he fell, in consequence, under the authority of the territorial sovereign in the states in which he was enclosed, and thus saw his own sovereignty disappear.

The princes and courts "mediatized" preserved certain princely rights, and only lost those of sovereignty, which were thereby transferred to the prince of whom they became the subjects. The rights transferred to the sovereigns, were those of legislation, of supreme jurisdiction, of the high police, of taxation, and of recruiting. The lower and middle justice, the forest police, the rights of fishery, the chase, pasturage, the working of mines, and all the dues of a feudal character, without reckoning personal property, composed the prerogatives left to the "mediatized."

They preserved the right to be judged by their peers, named *Austrégues* in the ancient German constitution. The immediate nobility was incorporated definitively. The "mediatized," reduced from the state of reigning princes to that of privileged subjects, were very numerous; and would have been more so, but for the intervention of France. There were counted in the number, the princes of Wurtemberg devoted to the house of Austria, of Hohenlohe to that of Prussia, the prince of Tour and Taxis, who was despoiled of the monopoly of the German posts, the princes of Löwenstein-Wertheim, of Linange, of Loos, of Schwartzenberg, of Solms, of Wittgenstein-Perlebourg, and certain others. The house of Nassau-Fulda, that of the former stadtholder, lost some portion of its domains in consequence of the contiguity of its territory with the new confederation. The court of Berlin, independently of the serious uneasiness that a similar confederation could not fail to excite, found in it two causes for personal mortification, in the losses undergone by the houses of Nassau-Fulda and of Tour and Taxis, whose near relationship to the Prussian royal family has been before explained.

To these fundamental dispositions, the treaty added the regulations of the territory that were necessary to place it in agreement with the sovereigns of Wurtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, copartakers irreconcilable in Austrian Suabia, in the domains of the immediate nobility, and the domains belonging to the "mediatized" princes.

The free city of Nuremberg, the state of which it was not known how to regulate, between an uneasy population of citizens that agitated it, and a patrician nobility that ruined it by a most expensive administration, was given to Bavaria, as well as the city of Ratisbon, being the price paid for some cessions made in the Tyrol to the kingdom of Italy. The prince archchancellor found in the city and the territory of Frankfort a rich indemnity. It was in Frankfort that the new diet was to be held.

The celebrated treaty of the confederation of the Rhine put an end to the old Germanic empire, after an existence of 1006 years, from Charlemagne, crowned in 800, down to Francis II., dispossessed in 1806. It furnished the new model on which modern Germany was to be constituted; it was for this reason its social reform, and for the present placed under the temporary influence of France the estates of the south of Germany, leaving those of the north to wander among those protectors whom they might be pleased to choose.

This treaty, published on the 12th of July with great form, did not occasion any surprise, but completed in all eyes the European system of Napoleon. Holding all the south of Europe under his imperial sovereignty through the royalties of his family, having the princes of the Rhine under his protection, he wanted nothing more of the empire of the west than the title.

It was necessary to announce the result to those who were interested, that is to say, to the diet of Ratisbon, to the emperor of Austria, and to Prussia. The declaration to the diet was simple, merely notifying to it that it was no longer acknowledged by the confederation. To the emperor of Austria a note was addressed, in which, without dictating the conduct which he had to pursue and which was foreseen, the German empire was spoken of as an institution as much used up as the republic of Venice, falling into ruin on all sides, and no more giving protection to the feeble states, nor influence to those that were strong; neither answering the necessities of the time, nor the relative proportions of the German estates with each other; nor, finally, procuring more for the house of Austria itself than a vain title, that of emperor of Germany, a title of which the actual head of the house had foreseen the decay in proclaiming himself the emperor of Austria, which had freed the court of Vienna from all dependence in regard to the electoral houses. The confederation, therefore, appeared to hope, without demanding it, that the emperor Francis would abdicate a title which would cease in fact over a large portion of Germany, or in all that comprising the confederation of the Rhine, and which would no more be recognized by France.

As to Prussia, she was congratulated on being disengaged from the ties of that German empire commonly under the controul of Austria; and in order to indemnify her, France having taken the south of Germany under its dependence, she was invited to place the north under the like dependence. "The emperor Napoleon," wrote the French cabinet, "will see without dislike, and even with pleasure, Prussia range under her influence, by means of a similar confederation to that of the Rhine, all the states of the north of Germany." The princes were not designated, in consequence none were excluded; but the number could not be great, and their importance was not greater. They were, Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, with its different branches, the two houses of Mecklenburg, and finally, the petty princes of the north, useless to enumerate. A promise was given not to throw any impediment in the way of a confederation of that nature.

Napoleon had not ventured on such things without taking energetic and extensive precautions. Surveying, with his ordinary activity, what passed at Naples, Venice, and Dalmatia, without relaxing

in the cares given to the interior administration of the empire, he had applied himself to put the grand army on a formidable footing. This, spread out, as has been seen, in Bavaria, Franconia, and Suabia, lived in good cantonments, had rested, and was ready to march again, whether it must return by Bavaria, towards Austria, or whether it must throw itself, by Franconia and Saxony, upon Prussia. Napoleon had turned into the ranks the two reserves formed at Strasburg and Mayence, under the marshal senators, Kellerman and Lefebvre. This was an increase of 40,000 men, levied a year, perfectly disciplined, instructed, and prepared for fatigue. Some of the men even, who belonged to the reserves of former years, had acquired the age of full strength, that is to say, twenty-four or twenty-five years. The army, weakened in consequence of the last campaign 20,000 men, of which a fourth part had re-entered the ranks, found itself, therefore, thanks to this reinforcement, augmented and invigorated. Napoleon, profiting by the circumstance that a part of his soldiers were supported in a foreign country, had carried up the total force of France to 450,000 men, of which 152,000 were in the interior (the gendarmes, veterans, invalids, and depôts, were comprised in this number), 40,000 at Naples [1], 50,000 in Lombardy, 20,000 in Dalmatia, 6000 in Holland, 12,000 in the camp at Boulogne, and 170,000 in the grand army. These last, united in one mass on the complete war footing, counted 30,000 cavalry, 10,000 artillery, and 130,000 infantry; and were arrived at the highest degree of perfection that it was possible to attain through discipline and the practice of war, under the conduct of one of the greatest captains. It is necessary to observe, that of this army had been detached,—General Marmont into Dalmatia, the Dutch into Holland, and that it no longer numbered the Bavarians in its ranks, which explains why it was not more numerous after the junction of the reserves.

In this imposing situation, Napoleon was able to await the effect produced at Berlin, and in Vienna, by the result of his plans, and the sequel of the negotiations opened at Paris with England and Russia.

For the rest, he had no inclination to prolong the war, if he were not obliged to do so for the execution of his designs. He was impatient, on the contrary, to unite his soldiers around him at the magnificent fête that the city of Paris was to give to the grand army. It was a happy and fine idea, to let that heroic army be fêted by that noble capital which so sensibly feels all the emotions of France, and which, if it does not feel them in a warmer manner, at least gives them out more rapidly and energetically, thanks to the power of number and the habit of taking the lead in all things, and of speaking on all occasions for the country.

Carried on to greatness by nature, and also by the success which exalted his imagination, Napoleon, in the midst of negotiations so vast and so varied, and of these military cares extending from Naples to Illyria, from Illyria to Germany, from Germany to Holland, gave himself with ardour to immortal creations of art and public utility. Having visited, during the short times of leisure that were left him by the war, nearly all the places of the capital, he did not see one of them without being seized at the same instant with some great thought, moral or useful, of which the result is observed this day realized upon the soil of Paris. He had been at St. Denis, and finding that ancient church in an afflicting state of dilapidation, above all, since the violation of the royal tombs, he ordered, by a decree, the repairs of that venerable monument. He decided that five sepulchral chapels should be built; three for the kings of the first races, and one for the princes of his own dynasty. Marbles carrying the names of the kings once entombed there were to replace these dispersed remains. He instituted a chapter of ten old bishops, to pray perpetually in that funeral asylum of the royal races.

After having visited St. Genevieve, he ordered that fine temple to be finished, and opened for worship; but preserving the destination that the constituent assembly had assigned it, that of receiving the illustrious men of France. The chapter of the metropolitan cathedral, increased, was to chant the service there daily.

A triumphal monument had been ordained by the senate on the proposition of the tribunate. After many rejected plans, Napoleon fixed upon the idea of elevating on the finest place in Paris, a column of bronze, resembling in form and dimensions the column of Trajan, consecrated to the grand army, to trace in a bas-relief, spirally encircling its magnificent shaft, the exploits of the campaign of 1805. It was decided, that the cannon taken from the enemy should supply the material. The statue of Napoleon, in imperial costume, was to surmount the capital. It is that same column in the Place Vendôme, at the foot of which pass, and will pass, the present and future generations, the subject of a generous emulation for them so long as they shall preserve the love of national glory; the subject of eternal reproach if they should be ever capable of losing that noble sentiment.

Napoleon subsequently settled upon the place of a triumphal arch on the Place Carrousel, the same which this day exists. This arch enters into the plan for the completion of the Louvre and the Tuileries. He proposed to unite these two palaces, and to form but one of them, which would be the most extensive that had ever been seen in any country. Placing himself one day under the portal of the Louvre, and looking towards the Hotel de Ville, he conceived the idea of an immense street, which should be uniformly constructed, as broad as the Rue de la Paix, to be prolonged as far as the Barrier du Trône, in such

[1] It was on the 4th of this month of July, that this force was nearly one-fourth annihilated by the British under General Stuart. The French general, Regnier, who commanded one of the corps of the army of Joseph Bonaparte at Reggio, having previously taken Gäeta, heard of a disembarkation of the English at St. Euphemia, and marching to meet them, they met at Maida. The British force was 4795 men, the French in the province numbered 9000, of whom 7000 were in the action. The loss of the French in the battle, in the surrender of Crotona, and by the armed peasantry who cut off the stragglers, was nearly 6000 men: 700 French were buried on the field of Maida, and above 1000 taken prisoners there. The loss of the British was only about 400 killed and wounded.

a manner that the eye might be able to penetrate one way as far as the Champs-Elisées, on the other as far as the first trees of Vincennes. The name of this street was to be the "Rue Impériale." A monument had long ago been decreed on the Place of the old Bastile. Napoleon wished that it should be a triumphal arch large enough to afford a passage through the centre portal, to the great projected street, placed at the intersection of that street and of the canal of St. Martin. The architects having declared the impossibility of such a construction upon a parallel base, Napoleon resolved to transfer the arch to the Place de l'Etoile, that it should face the Tuileries, and become one of the extremities of the immense line which he would trace through the bosom of his capital. The present generation has finished the greater part of the monuments that Napoleon had not time to complete. It has, however, not finished the Louvre, nor created the magnificent street of which he conceived the plan.

He did not limit to these works his cares for the embellishment of the city of Paris. He esteemed it not worthy the prosperity of the empire, that the capital should want water, while in its very bosom ran a fine and clear river. The fountains were only opened in the day-time: he ordered works to be commenced immediately at the pumps of Notre Dame, of the Pont Neuf, of Chaillot, and of Gros-Chaillot, in order that the water might run day and night. He ordered, besides these, the erection of fifteen new fountains. That of the "Château d'Eau" was comprised in this creation. In two months a part of these orders were executed, and the water thrown up, night and day, from the sixty-five old fountains. On the site of those recently decreed, limited channels distributed the water, until the fountains themselves could be erected. The public treasury found the money necessary to meet the expense.

Napoleon ordered the continuation of the quays of the Seine, and decided that the bridge of the Jardin des Plantes, then constructing, should bear the glorious name of Austerlitz. Lastly, having perceived, in visiting the "Champ de Mars," to settle the plan of the fêtes which were preparing there, that a communication was indispensable on the point between the two banks of the Seine, he ordered the establishment there of a bridge of stone, which should be the finest in the capital, and which has since borne the name of the bridge of Jena.

The departments of the empire the most distant also shared in his munificence. He this year decreed the canal of the Rhone and Rhine, and of the Scheldt and Rhine, and ordered the surveys for the canal from Nantes to Brest. He devoted funds for the continuation of the canals of Ourq, of St. Quentin, and of Burgundy. He prescribed the construction of a great road, of the length of sixty leagues, from Metz to Mayence, passing through the valley of the Moselle. He had the road begun from Roanne to Lyons, where there is the fine descent of Tarare, nearly worthy of the Simplon; and the celebrated road of the Corniche, going from Nice to Genoa, attached to the flanks of the Apennines, between the summits of the mountains and the sea. He had that of the Simplon continued, already nearly finished; that of Mont Cenis, of Mont Genèvre, and finally, that along the banks of the Rhine. Napoleon ordered, besides, new works in the arsenal at Antwerp.

It seemed as if victory had made his mind fruitful, since the larger part of his great creations date from this memorable year, placed between the first half of his career that was so glorious, when wisdom nearly always guided his steps, and that second half, so extraordinary and so melancholy, when his genius, excited by success, leaped over all the limits of the possible to terminate in an abyss.

The legislative body, which had assembled peaceably, adopted the plans desired by Napoleon, and discussed in the council of state. The stormy scenes of the revolution were no more witnessed, nor yet the scenes of a free parliament. The assembly was seen adopting with confidence that which it knew to be as well devised as it had been explained. A new code was presented this year, the result of long conferences between the tribunes and the councillors of state, under the direction of the archchancellor Cambacérès. This was the code of civil procedure, regulating the manner to proceed before the tribunals, by reason of their new forms and the simplification of the laws. This code was adopted without difficulty; the questions to which it might have given rise having been arranged in advance, in the preparatory discussions of the council of state and of the tribunate.

A remarkable improvement was made in the organization of the council of state. Until now that body examined the intended laws, discussed great measures of the government, such as the concordat, the coronation, the journey of the pope to Paris, and the serious diplomatic question of St. Julien's preliminaries not ratified by Austria. Initiated into all the affairs of state, it was more a council of the government than a council of administration. But every day these high questions became rarer in its bosom, and gave place to questions purely administrative, that the progress of the time, and the enlarged extent of the empire, unceasingly multiplied. The councillors of state, important personages, almost equal to the ministers, were too elevated in rank, and too few in number, to charge themselves with the burden of all the reports. While the quantity of business increased, and they took a character exclusively administrative, another necessity became manifest, that of forming individuals for the council of state, creating a ladder for them to climb up to it, and, above all, for employing the youth of high rank, that Napoleon wished to draw towards him by every mode at once, of war and civil functions. After having conferred with the archchancellor, he created masters of requests, occupying an intermediate rank between the auditors and the councillors of state, charged with the greater number of the reports, having the faculty of deliberating on the questions on which they had reported, and enjoying a salary in proportion to the importance of their attributions. M. Portalis, jun., M. Molé and M. Pasquier, young also, and immediately nominated masters of requests, indicated the utility and intention of the place. Napoleon loved the merit to which recollections were attached, without excluding the merit that did not recall any.

To this wise innovation, which has created a

nursery of able administrators, Napoleon at once added another. There was no jurisdiction for the contractors who treated with the state, whether they executed public works, furnished stores, or contracted financial engagements. It was the affair of the "United Merchants" which had revealed this want, because Napoleon, not knowing to whom to defer it, had considered a moment about sending it before the legislative body. This jurisdiction could not be attributed to the tribunals, as much on account of the special knowledge which it required, as the nature of the mind which it demands—a mind that should be administrative rather than judicial. It was from this knowledge that all the bargains which the government made were referred to the council of state. This was the principal origin of its contentious attributions. Hence there were created at the same time "advocates to the council," whose duty was to defend in written memorials the interests of those who were to be called before this new jurisdiction.

To all these creations Napoleon added yet another, the finest perhaps of all his reign, the University. It has been seen what system of education was adopted in 1802, when he laid the foundations of the new French society. In the midst of the old generations that the revolution had made enemies, of which some regretted the old system of things, and some were disgusted with the new, without wishing to go back to the old, he proposed to form, through education, a young generation, made for and by the new institutions of France. In place of the central schools, that were public courses of lectures, to which the young persons brought up in their families or in private boarding schools might attend, and in which they heard professors teach at the beck of their own caprice, or according to the caprice of the time, the physical sciences much more than letters, Napoleon instituted, as has been seen, houses where youths, lodged and fed, received from the hands of the state instruction and education, and where letters had taken the place, which they ought never to have lost, without the sciences losing the place which they had acquired. Napoleon, well foreseeing that prejudice and malevolence would be raised against these establishments that he had thus instituted, had founded six thousand bursaries, and had thus composed by authority (but by the authority of benefit) the population of the new colleges denominated Lyceums. Some were newly opened, others were only old houses transferred, presenting already in 1806 the spectacle of order, of good manners, and of sound studies. There were twenty-nine of these. Napoleon wished to extend the number, and to carry it up to a hundred. Three hundred and ten secondary schools established by the communes, an equal number of secondary schools opened by private persons—the former bound to follow the regulations of the lyceums, the others to send their scholars there,—completed together the whole of the new establishments. This system had succeeded perfectly. The masters of private schools, the parents full of the old prejudices, the priests dreaming of the conquest of the public system of education, calumniated the lyceums. They said that nothing was taught in them but mathematics, because the government only wished to bring up soldiers in them; that religion was neglected there; that the manners there were corrupt. Nothing was less true, since the government had the express intention to make letters honourable again, and had gained the end proposed. Religion was taught there by the chaplains as seriously as the wish of the author of the Concordat had been able to procure it should be taught, and with the full success that the spirit of the age admitted. Finally, a hard life, almost a military one, and continual exercises, secured youth from precocious passions; and, under the head of manners, the lyceums were certainly preferable to the private houses.

For the rest, despite the slanders of the interested and the partisans of the past, these establishments had made a rapid progress. The youth, attracted by the benefit of the bursaries, and by the confidence of parents, began to attend them in great numbers.

But, in the idea of Napoleon, the work was yet scarcely begun. It was not all to attract scholars, it was requisite to give them professors; it was necessary to create a body of teachers. This was a great question upon which Napoleon was fixed with that firmness of mind which he displayed in every thing. To hand over education to the priests was, in his eyes, inadmissible. He had re-established public worship; and he had done so with the deep conviction, that in every society religion is necessary, not as an additional means of policy, but as a satisfaction due to the more noble wants of the human soul. Still he would not abandon the care of forming the new state of society to the clergy, that in their obstinate prejudices, in their love of the past, and hatred of the present, and their terror of the future, could only prolong in youth the sad passions of the generations that were departing for ever. It was necessary that youth should be formed on the model of the society in which it was destined to live; it was needful that it find in the college the family spirit, in the family the spirit of society, with purer morals, habits more regular, and more sustained labours. It was requisite, in one word, that the college be society itself ameliorated. If there be any difference whatever between one and the other; if youth hear masters and relations speak differently; if it hear one praise what the other blames—a vexatious contrast is created which troubles his mind, and makes him dispraise his masters if he has more confidence in his relatives, and his relatives if he has more confidence in his masters. The second stage of life is then employed in crediting nothing of that which has been taught in the first: religion itself, if it be imposed with affectation, in place of being professed with respect in presence of youth, is no more than a yoke, from which the young man, once become free, hastens to escape as from all the yokes of the college. Such were the considerations which removed from the mind of Napoleon all idea of delivering the youth over to the clergy. A last reason completed this decision. Was the clergy a proper body to educate Jews or Protestants? Most assuredly not. Then it was not possible to educate Jews, Protestants, and Catholics together, in order to compose of them an enlightened, tolerant youth, loving their country, fit for every career

in life—one, in fine, that was needful for new France.

Still if the clergy had not the qualities necessary for this task, they had some that were very valuable, and which should, if possible, be borrowed of them. A regular, laborious, sober, modest life, was a condition indispensable for the education of youth, because it was not proper to be content, for such a change, with the first comers, formed by the chances of the times, and in a dissipated society. But was it impossible to give to laymen particular qualities belonging to the clergy? Napoleon did not so think; and experience has proved that he was right. A studious has more than one analogy with a religious life: it is compatible with regularity of manners and mediocrity of fortune. Napoleon believed himself able, by regulations, to create a body of teachers, that, without observing celibacy, might carry into the education of youth the same application, the same perseverance, and the same constancy of vocation as the clergy. There is annually, in the generations that arrive at an adult estate, like the harvests growing on the land arriving at maturity, a portion of the young minds that have a natural taste for study, who belong to families destitute of fortune. To collect together these minds, to submit them to the preparatory proofs, to one common discipline, to draw and retain them by the attraction of a moderate but certain provision,—such was the problem to be resolved; and Napoleon did not regard it as insolvable. He had faith in the *esprit de corps*, and loved it. One of the phrases which he most commonly repeated, because it expressed one of the ideas with which he was most frequently struck, was, that "society was in the dust." It was natural that he should experience this sentiment at the view of a country which had no longer either a nobility, clergy, parliament, or corporations. He said unceasingly to the men of the revolutions: "Know how to constitute if you would defend yourselves; for see how the priests and emigrants defend themselves, animated by the last breath of the great bodies destroyed!" He wished therefore to remit to a body that lived and would defend itself, the care of educating the future generations. He resolved, acted, and succeeded.

Napoleon established the university on the following principles. A special education for the men designed to fill professorships; preparatory examinations before becoming professors; the entry after such examinations into a vast body, without the judgment of which their career could neither be interrupted nor terminated, and in which they should rise by time and merit; at the head of their corps a superior council, composed of professors who should be distinguished by their talents, applying the rules and directing the instruction; finally, the privilege of public education attributed exclusively to the new institution, with an endowment in the state funds, which would add to the energy of the *esprit de corps* the energy of the spirit of property; such were the ideas under which Napoleon wished that the university should be organized. But he was too experienced to insert all these dispositions in one law, making use of the public confidence with that deep intelligence which allowed him to present very general laws, which he completed, subsequently, by decrees to the extent that the necessity of the case demanded; he charged M. Fourcroy, the administrator of public education under the ministry of the interior, to draw up the outline of a law that should be included in three articles only. By the first it was stated, that he would form under the name of the "*Imperial University*" a body of teachers, charged with public education throughout the whole empire. By the second, that the members of the corps of teachers should contract "obligations civil, special, and temporary" (this word was employed to exclude the idea of monastic vows). By the third, that the organization of the corps of teachers, altered according to experience, should be converted into a law in the session of 1810. It is only with this latitude of action that great things are achieved.

This outline of a law, presented on the 6th of May, was adopted, like all the others, in silence and confidence. The adoption, in this manner, of laws is not advisable, but when there shall be such a man, similar acts, and, what is yet more determinate, such a situation.

This short and fruitful session was terminated by the financial laws. Napoleon regarded the finances, with reason, as a foundation as indispensable as the army to the greatness of an empire. The last crisis, although past, was a serious notice to decree finally a complete system of finance, to elevate the resources to the level of the necessities, and to establish a service of the treasury which should dispense with any recurrence to money-making capitalists.

As to the creation of the necessary resources to suffice for the expenses of the war, Napoleon persisted in not contracting a loan. In effect, even in the midst of the prosperity which he made France enjoy, the five per cent. stock had never risen above sixty. If a loan had been announced, it would have descended lower yet, probably to fifty, and there would have been a perpetual interest at ten per cent. to support. Napoleon had no care to recur to such means. Still it was necessary to cover the deficiency of the last outlay, and to place the resources definitively in relation with a state of war, that for fifteen years seemed to have become the ordinary state of France. It was a bold essay, which had never been realized, to defray the expenditure of an obstinate contest with permanent taxes. Napoleon had not renounced it, and he had the courage to propose it to the country, and soon to impose upon it the charges which would furnish the means of attaining that result.

The arrear of the last budgets might be liquidated with 60,000,000f.; the debt to the sinking fund being still deficient. This debt consisted, as will be remembered, in securities which had been disposed of, and in the products of the sale of national properties that the treasury had absorbed for its use, although they appertained to the chest of the sinking fund. It was needful, therefore, to provide for this 60,000,000f., for the debt contracted with the sinking fund, and for an annual budget, that, after the experience of 1806, had not arisen to less than 700,000,000f. during the war (820,000,000f. with the expenses of collection). Here are the means devised for the purpose.

It was perceived that the chest of the sinking fund had sold very advantageously the property, the alienation of which had been entrusted to it as

an experiment. Then, in place of selling for itself the 70,000,000f. that the law of Ventose, year IX, had attributed with the view of indemnifying it for the stock created at that period, and for which it was to be paid at the reasonable rate of 10,000,000f. per annum, those properties had themselves been delivered over to them. As to the securities for reimbursement, it was decided to pay them to the same amount of value, in proportion, upon the condition that it should alienate them with the same necessary precautions as had before so happily succeeded. This same observation had led Napoleon, who was the inventor of this system of liquidation, to find the means of covering the 60,000,000f. of arrear.

He had endowed the senate, the legion of honour, public instruction, and certain other establishments, with the remainder of the national domains. In thus acting, his intention had been to preserve them from the waste of bad alienations. But on one part it had been perceived, that the alienations could be effected in an advantageous manner by entrusting them to the sinking fund; and, on the other, there had been found in that system of endowments the vice attached to property in mortmain, of which the condition is to be ill cultivated and produce but little. Napoleon resolved to retake the property of the senate and of the legion of honour, and to furnish them with an equivalent, by creating 3,000,000f. of stock at five per cent. for the capital of 60,000,000f. If stock delivered to the public should be threatened with immediate depreciation, assigned as endowments to permanent public bodies, that would not alienate it, this would be unattended by any of the disadvantages of loans; it would not have any fall in the market, and would even procure an advantage to the public establishments which received it, as it would insure them a revenue of five, in place of two and a half or three per cent., which were yielded by the national domains. These last, transferred to the sinking fund, which would alienate them by little and little, would procure the 60,000,000f. required.

These 60,000,000f., it is true, would be immediately necessary to pay off the arrears of the anterior budgets. They imagined the creation of temporary effects, carrying six or seven per cent. according to the time of their reimbursement, to be paid at a fixed term payable to the sinking fund, at the rate of a million per month, from the first of July, 1806, to the first of July, 1811, mortgaged upon the capital of the fund, which would have, with that which it already possessed and that it was about to acquire, nearly 130,000,000f. of national properties, which joined to this immoveable property a well-established credit.

These effects carrying an advantageous interest, but not an usurious one, and repayable at fixed and short terms, could not fall like stock, because their monthly and certain expiration at the end of five years would tend to elevate them, by the certainty of recovering the capital entire from month to month. This was a combination which has since succeeded several times, and which was excellent.

The process for liquidating the arrears consisted, therefore, in taking back the property assigned to the great bodies, and in giving them stock in its place, which for them had the advantage of an immediate augmentation of revenue; to cause this property to be sold by the sinking fund, which it could execute with success in five years, and in realizing the value in advance by means of the effect of paper at a fixed term of liquidation, which could not be depreciated,—thanks to a reimbursement certain and not distant,—thanks, in fine, to an interest of six or seven per cent.

The sole and not very serious difficulty in this combination was, that the sum of the stock, composing the public debt, would be increased to 51,000,000f. in place of 50,000,000f. as anterior laws had prescribed. But the infraction here was of little importance, and the law was satisfied by establishing a more rapid extinction of the extra million.

There still remained to provide for the future budgets by the creation of sufficient resources, whether for peace or war. Napoleon made to the legislative body and to Europe a bold, and at the same time a very wise declaration in a financial point of view. He wished for peace, because he said proudly, that he had "exhausted military glory;" he wished for peace, for he had given it to Austria. He was ready at that moment to conclude one with Russia, and he was occupied in negotiating with England. But the powers had become accustomed to consider treaties merely as truces, that they would be able to break at the first signal from London. It was needful, until they were brought to respect their engagements, and to resign themselves to the greatness of France,—it was needful to be ready to meet the expenses of the war, for as long a time as it might be necessary. Great Britain claimed to meet the war by loans; she was free to do it while she had that resource in her hands. France was bound to provide otherwise, with the means that were adapted to herself, that is to say, by taxes,—a resource very different, durable, and that left no charge behind it. In consequence, he declared that it was necessary to have 600,000,000f. in time of peace, and 700,000,000f. in time of war; or 720,000,000f. and 820,000,000f. including the expenses of collection. The budget of France in the most peaceful year of the existing government, that of 1802, had been comprised in an expenditure of 500,000,000f. But since 1802, the increase of the debt, the development given to works of public utility, the endowment of the clergy, which followed the Concordat, the re-establishment of the monarchy, which had caused the creation of the civil list, carried up to 600,000,000f. the expenses fixed for the peace establishment. The ordinary resources arose much beyond that sum. As to the expenses of a state of war, that it was resolved to sustain as long as it should be needful, they made the amount of the budget rise to 700,000,000f. At this rate 130,000,000f. could be devoted to the navy; about 300,000,000f. to the army, to have fifty sail of the line armed, and 450,000 men always ready to march. France, on this footing, was in a state to face all dangers; she was able now, without injuring herself, to impose this weight, because her ordinary revenues already returned more than 600,000,000f. The kingdom of Italy furnished about 30,000,000f. for the French army which guarded it, and it was easy to obtain 60,000,000f. or 70,000,000f. more, through the ordinary imposts.

After this bold declaration, Napoleon had the

courage to develope the great resource of the indirect contributions, which he had already restored to the country, and to create a new resource, not less useful, not less productive, and which had no other inconvenience than that of affecting the generality of the people, but of affecting them slightly,—the tax on salt. In consequence, he proposed, besides the impost upon liquors, (a duty levied upon the maker and original proprietor at the moment of removal, called the *droit d'inventaire*,) another duty on the trade by wholesale, and on that by retail, and for that object the exercise, that is to say, the superintendence of liquors upon the roads, and the admission of the agents of the excise into the cellars of wine-dealers. The indirect taxes, which already produced 25,000,000f., would produce more than 50,000,000f. in consequence of this extension.

As to the duty upon salt, its re-establishment was caused by the removal of another tax which had become insupportable,—the turnpike toll on roads. This tax was so little in harmony with French habits and feelings, and so much incommoded agriculture, that all the councils-general had requested its abolition. It brought in no more than 15,000,000f., which was insufficient for the maintenance of the roads of the empire, and which cost the state an additional or supplementary sum of 10,000,000f. per annum, and still without the roads being kept in the state that was desirable; for it was estimated that 35,000,000f. at least would be the sum necessary to keep them in a proper condition. By imposing a very light tax, that of two decimes per kilometre, or two sous per pound on salt, to be levied at the salt marshes, by the officers of the customs who were placed around them, nearly all being situated near the frontier, it was hoped that a return of 35,000,000f. would be realized, that is to say, enough to keep the roads in a good state of repair, and to relieve the treasury of an expense of 10,000,000f. This tax was of a totally different nature from the ancient *Gabelles*, that were unequally levied, aggravated in the burthen by the collection, and sometimes making the price of salt rise to fourteen sous the pound; a price which was exorbitant for the poorer people.

With the product of these new taxes annually increasing, and with some accidental resources that permitted the waiting for their complete developement, France would find herself in a situation to support a state of war, however long it might endure, and, as soon as it was concluded, to make the benefits of peace be felt by the people of the empire, in the diminution of the land tax—the only impost that was truly burdensome.

Napoleon by this creation completed the re-establishment of the French finances, that the suppression of the indirect contributions in 1789 had ruined; and he showed Europe a discouraging picture for his enemies, that is to say, fifty sail of the line, and 450,000 men, supported without a loan, and that during a time of war.

The budget of 1806 was therefore fixed at 700,000,000f. of receipts and expenses, or 820,000,000f. with the expenses of collection. An accidental circumstance, that of the re-establishment of the Gregorian calendar, from January 1st, 1806, raised the budget to a supply for fifteen months in place of twelve, and to 900,000,000f. in place of 700,000,000f. In effect, the preceding budget, that of the year XIII, being stopped on the 21st of September, 1805, it was requisite, in order to reach January 1st, 1806, to add about three months' supply, which would carry the budget of 1806 to fifteen months, and to 900,000 000f.

There remained yet one task to fulfil, that was to organize the treasury and the bank of France. Enlightened by recent events, Napoleon wished to reform both the one and the other.

It has already been repeated several times in the course of this history, that the value of the taxes had been returned into the treasury in the form of "obligations" at a certain date, or of "bills at sight," signed by the receivers-general, and paid monthly at their offices. The discount of this paper procured money when there was a necessity for the anticipation of the advances. The abandonment of this discount to a company had succeeded very badly. They had then entrusted it anew to an agency of the receivers-general, which acted at Paris for the entire body. Since the restoration of credit, capital was abundant, and the receivers-general could procure for the state, by the discount of their own engagements, all the funds of which it had need. Still it was a good while discussed before Napoleon, in the council of finance, whether this service should not be assigned to the bank, which was much more powerful than the agency of the receivers-general could ever be. At first Napoleon thought, that whether for this service and for others the bank was not constituted with sufficient strength. He resolved, therefore, to double its capital, and to raise the shares from 45,000 to 90,000, which at 1000f. a share would make a capital of 90,000,000f. He determined, besides, to give to it a monarchical organization, by converting the elected president, who was at its head, into a governor nominated by the emperor, who would direct it for the double interest both of commerce and the treasury; to place three receivers-general in its council, in order to bind it more to the government, and, finally, to suppress the disposition according to which it proportioned its discounts to the number of shares possessed by the presenters of effects, and to replace it by another and a wiser regulation, consisting in proportioning the discounts to the acknowledged credit of the commercial men who demanded them. These changes, framed into a law, were adopted by the legislative body; and under this strong and clever constitution, the bank of France is become one of the most solid establishments in the world; for it has been seen, in recent times, helping the bank of England itself, and getting through the greatest political difficulties without shrinking.

Even after having thus extended it, Napoleon would not confine, in a constant and definitive manner, the service of the treasury to the bank of France. He intended to make it serve in case of need and incidentally that new power which he had thus insured to it, to discount such or such a sum of the "obligations of the receivers-general," or of "bills at sight," but he could not bring himself to decide upon handing over to it definitively the portfolio of the treasury. It was a company of commercial men deliberating; it was, too, under a president named by himself but placed out of his

government; and he would not, he said, deliver up to them the secret of his military by committing to them the secret of his financial operations. "I wish," he observed, "to be able to move a body of troops without the bank knowing it, and it must know it if it has a knowledge of my pecuniary wants."

For the rest, he made an attempt, but an attempt only, at a new system for the payment of the public money, by those who were accountable for its returns. Although the system of "obligations" had rendered important services, it was not the final term towards perfection in the way of paying in. It happened that the receivers-general had often considerable sums in hand, of which they made a profit while awaiting the term for the discharge of their obligations. Furthermore, these obligations gave origin to very active jobbing. A simple account-current established between the state and those who were accountable, by means of which every sum that entered their hands belonging to the treasury, bore interest in its favour, and every sum paid out carried interest to the advantage of the accountable party who had issued it,—an account-current thus regulated was a much more simple system, more correct, and did not hinder the receivers-general from having conceded to them those advantages which it was believed necessary they should enjoy. But beforehand a system of keeping the accounts was required which did not admit of error; it was requisite, in the accountability of the treasury, to admit the introduction of the double entry used in commerce. M. Mollien proposed the account-current and double entry. Napoleon consented at once, but he wished the system should be first tried with some of the receivers-general, to judge of its merits by experiment.

Such were the civil labours of Napoleon in the memorable year 1806, the finest year of the empire, as that of 1802 was the finest of the consulate,—years made fruitful, the one by the other, under which France was constituted a dictatorial republic in 1802, and a vast federal empire in 1806. In this last year Napoleon founded at once vassal crowns for the heads of his brothers, duchies for his generals and servants, rich endowments for his soldiers, suppressed the Germanic empire, and left the French empire to fill the west by itself. He continued making roads, bridges, canals, the works already begun, and undertook the most important, such as the canals of the Rhone and the Rhine, of the Rhine and the Scheldt, the roads of the Corniche, of Tarare, and of Metz to Mayence. He projected the great monuments of the capital, the column in the Place Vendôme, the arch of the Etoile, the completion of the Louvre, the street to be called the Rue Impériale, and the principal fountains of Paris. He commenced the restoration of St. Denis; he ordered the completion of the Pantheon; he promulgated the code of civil proceeding, completed the organization of the council of state, created the university, liquidated the financial arrears, completed the system of taxes, re-organized the bank of France, and prepared the new system of the French treasury. All this, undertaken in January 1806, was terminated in July the same year. What mind ever devised more objects, vaster, profounder, and realized in so little time? It is true that this approaches the height of that prodigious reign, a height of elevation without equal, and of which it may be said, while contemplating the whole picture of human greatness, that none surpasses if any has equalled it.

Unfortunately this incomparable year, in place of terminating in peace, as there was reason to hope, finished in the midst of war, half by the fault of Europe, and half by that of Napoleon himself; and further, through the cruel stroke of death, which carried off Mr. Fox in the same year that had already carried off Mr. Pitt.

The negotiations proceeding with Russia and England had continued during the works of all kinds of which the features have just been traced. Lord Yarmouth, with whom the conferences had been voluntarily prolonged, had held to the same proposals. England intended to keep the larger part of her maritime conquests, and therefore conceded her continental ones to France, Hanover always excepted; and she confined herself to an inquiry about what should be done to indemnify the king of Naples. As to the new royalties, or the confederation of the Rhine, she did not appear to care about them. Napoleon, who had no more any reason for differing about the terms of the negotiation, his principal objects being accomplished, pressed Lord Yarmouth to procure his powers in order to bring matters to a conclusion. Lord Yarmouth had at last received them, but with the order not to produce them until he should perceive the possibility of coming to an agreement with France, and after he should have come to an understanding with the Russian negotiator.

M. Oubril had arrived in June with powers in due form, and with the double instruction, just to gain time about the mouths of the Cattaro, and thus to spare Austria the military execution with which she was threatened; secondly, to terminate all the existing differences by a treaty of peace, if France would accede to conditions which should preserve the dignity of the Russian empire. One circumstance had confirmed M. Oubril in the idea of finishing by a treaty of peace. During the time he was upon his journey the Russian ministry had been changed. Prince Czartoryski and his friends having wished that they should ally themselves more closely to England, not precisely for the purpose of continuing the war, but in order to treat with more advantage; Alexander, tired of these remonstrances, and fearing engagements too deep with the British cabinet, had, finally, accepted the resignations offered him, and had replaced Prince Czartoryski by General Budberg. This last had been formerly the emperor's governor, the friend of the empress mother, and had neither the power nor inclination to oppose his master. M. Oubril, who had seen the emperor more inclined to peace than his ministers, thought he was authorized by this change to incline more towards a pacific conclusion.

M. de Talleyrand had no trouble in persuading M. Oubril, when he maintained that there was nothing of serious interest between the two empires to dispute upon, that it was neither less nor more than a question of influence to consider about, on account of the two or three petty powers that Russia had taken under its protection. But

as to those last, Russia beaten at Austerlitz, and little disposed to re-commence since Austria had given up the sword, since Prussia was dependent, and England seemed tired,—Russia had nothing of any moment to require. She wished alone to preserve her pride from any rude shock. Thus she was ready to pass by all the new arrangements made in Germany, and all relative to the union of Genoa and the Venetian states; she was even decided to be silent about the conquest of Naples, because the taking up of arms by the Neapolitans, after a convention of neutrality, justified all the severity shown by Napoleon. Still, in regard to Piedmont and the Bourbons of Naples, Russia had written engagements, and she was unable to do less than to demand something for them, however little it might be. The engagements in regard to Piedmont began to be old, but those which had been contracted in regard to queen Caroline, by pushing her into an abyss, were too recent and too authentic for abstaining from interference in her favour.

Thus this was the essential and difficult question to resolve between M. de Talleyrand and M. Oubril. This last had wished to preserve some indemnification, however little it might be, for the king of Piedmont, to insure Sicily to the Bourbons of Naples, and to introduce into the treaty certain points of expression which would manage to give Russia the appearance of an intervention useful and honourable in the affairs of Europe. Although Napoleon had wished at first to have a dry and empty treaty, which purely and simply re-established peace between the two empires, in order the better to show that he did not recognize in Russia that influence which she claimed to arrogate, this rigorous idea had fallen before the possibility of an immediate peace, which, by a counter-blow, would bring England to treat upon reasonable conditions. Napoleon therefore permitted M. de Talleyrand to concede all the semblance possible of influence that would save the dignity of the Russian cabinet. Thus this minister was authorized, in the patent treaty, to guaranty the evacuation of Germany, the integrity of the Ottoman empire, the independence of the republic of Ragusa, to promise the good offices of France to reconcile Prussia and Sweden, and finally to accept the good offices of Russia for the re-establishment of peace between France and England. There was sufficient in this to form a treaty, less insignificant than that which Napoleon had at first wished, and consequently more flattering to the pride of Russia. But it was necessary to have some sort of compensation for the kings of Piedmont and Naples. As to the king of Piedmont, Napoleon gave an absolute refusal, and that was obliged to be given up. In regard to Naples, he would not consent even to cede Sicily, and he exacted that this island should be restored to the kingdom of Naples, actually in possession of Joseph. By the labour of searching out a combination to conciliate opposite interests, a middle term was found, which consisted in giving the Balearic Islands to the prince royal of Naples, and a pecuniary indemnity to the dethroned king and queen. The Balearic Islands belonged to Spain, it was true; but Napoleon had wherewith to furnish her with an equivalent, by aggrandizing the little kingdom of Etruria with some fragments of the duchies of Parma and Placentia. He had, further, a good and highly moral lesson to urge upon the court of Madrid, which was, that the prince royal of Naples had become the son-in-law of Charles IV. the same day that the princess of Naples had espoused the prince of Asturias. To complete his excellent reasons, Napoleon held power: he had it therefore in view to enter into a serious engagement in respect to the Balearic Islands.

This combination conceived, it became necessary to finish the affair. M. Oubril had placed himself in communication with lord Yarmouth, who, while professing very kind sentiments towards France, found still, he imagined, that it would betray weakness to concede to M. de Talleyrand all that he demanded. Good Englishman as he was, he would have wished that Sicily should have been left to queen Caroline; for all that was preserved to this queen was given to England. He did not, therefore, fail to insist, with M. Oubril, that he must prolong the resistance of Russia.

But M. de Talleyrand had a means that Napoleon suggested to him, and of which he cleverly availed himself, that was, to threaten Austria with an immediate movement unless the mouths of the Cattaro were given up. Napoleon, as has been observed, coveted the mouths of the Cattaro, in consequence of their happy situation in the Adriatic, and, above all, on account of their vicinity to the Turkish frontiers; it was, therefore, determined to insist upon their being restored, and it was the easier for him to threaten because he had the resolution to act. He had, besides, only a single step to take, because his troops were upon the Inn, occupying Braunau. In consequence, M. de Talleyrand declared to M. Oubril, that it was needful to conclude and to sign the peace which included the remission of the mouths of the Cattaro, or to quit Paris; after which Austria would be attacked, unless she united her efforts to those of France to retake the position so faithlessly delivered up to the Russians.

M. Oubril, intimidated by this peremptory declaration, communicated his embarrassment to lord Yarmouth, stating that he had instructions to preserve Austria from immediate constraint, and that he was obliged to conform himself to them; that for the rest, in the actual situation of things, nothing would be gained by waiting with such a character as that of Napoleon; because every day he committed some new act, that he would afterwards hold fast as a decided thing, if one did not wish to break with him; that if the negotiation had been begun before the month of April, Joseph Bonaparte would not have been proclaimed king of Naples; that if he had been treated with before the month of June, Louis Bonaparte would not have become king of Holland; that, finally, if he had been negotiated with before the month of July, the Germanic empire would not have been dissolved. M. Oubril, therefore, decided upon his own part, and signed on July 20th, in spite of the remonstrances of lord Yarmouth, a treaty of peace with France.

In the patent articles were stipulated, as has been already indicated, the evacuation of Germany, the independence of the Ragusan republic, and the integrity of the Turkish empire. In the same

articles, the good offices of both contracting parties were promised to terminate the differences which had arisen between Prussia and Sweden; and France formally accepted the good offices of Russia towards the establishment of peace with England, —all things which preserved to Russia the semblance of the influence which she had no wish to lose. The independence of the Seven Islands, and the immediate evacuation of the mouths of the Cattaro, were promised anew. In the secret articles, the Balearic Isles were given to the prince royal of Naples, but on the condition that the English were not to be admitted there in time of war; a pension was insured to his mother and father, and the preservation of Swedish Pomerania to Sweden, in the arrangements which were to be negotiated between Prussia and Sweden.

This treaty, in the situation of Europe, was acceptable on the part of Russia; unless, for the sake of the queen of Naples, she preferred war, which could only bring her reverses.

M. Oubril, after having concluded the treaty, set out for St. Petersburg, in order to obtain the ratification by his government. He believed he had fulfilled his task satisfactorily; for if the peace which he had concluded were rejected by his own cabinet, he would have delayed, at least for six weeks, the execution with which Austria was menaced. Under this head, there is reason for thinking, that the peace was not signed with perfect sincerity.

M. de Talleyrand had now no other affair upon his hands than that with lord Yarmouth, who was much weakened since the departure of M. Oubril. The French minister knew how to avail himself of his advantages, and to draw from the advantage of the Russian treaty the obligation of lord Yarmouth to produce his powers, which he had always refused doing. M. de Talleyrand told him that it was impossible to prolong such a species of comedy as that of a negotiator who was accredited and yet would not exhibit his powers; that if he deferred this exhibition much longer, he should be justified in thinking that he did not possess them, and that his presence in Paris had only a delusive object,—that of gaining the bad season, to hinder France from acting either against England or against her other enemies. These enemies were not designated, but some movements of troops towards Bayonne might give ground to fear that Portugal was of the number. M. de Talleyrand added, that he must immediately take his choice, to quit Paris, or give the negotiation a serious character by producing his powers, because they had awakened at length the mistrust of Prussia, which had requested some satisfactory declaration respecting Hanover; that, unwilling to lose such an alliance, they were ready to make the declaration demanded, and that, once made, it would be impossible to go back from it; that the war would then be eternal, or that the peace must be concluded without the restoration of Hanover; that, for the rest, nothing could be gained by new delays, and that two or three months later it would be requisite for England, perhaps, to consent to the conquest of Portugal, as she had consented to the conquest of Naples.

Overcome by these reasons, by the signature which had been given by M. Oubril, by the love of peace, and also by the very natural ambition of inscribing his name at the foot of a similar treaty, lord Yarmouth determined to exhibit his powers. This was the first advantage that M. de Talleyrand wished to gain, and he made haste to render the act irrevocable, by naming a French plenipotentiary to negotiate openly with lord Yarmouth. Napoleon selected general Clarke, and conferred upon him the patents and formal powers. From this moment, the 22nd of July, the negotiation was officially opened.

General Clarke and lord Yarmouth met in conference, and, except in regard to Sicily, the two negotiators were in accordance. France granted Malta, the Cape, the conquest of India; she insisted that the factories of Pondicherry and of Chandernagore should be returned to her, consenting to limit the number of troops which she would keep there; she equally demanded that St. Lucia and Tobago should be given up to her, but she did not absolutely hold to the restitution of any colony save the Dutch colony of Surinam,—a point on which the instructions of the English negotiator were not peremptory. The only serious difficulty still consisted in Sicily; that lord Yarmouth was not authorized formally to give up, above all, for an indemnity so insignificant as the Balearic Isles. Napoleon wished to procure Sicily for his brother Joseph, for reasons of great weight. According to him, while queen Caroline resided at Palermo, Joseph would be but weakly established at Naples; the war would be continual between the two portions of the former kingdom of the two Sicilies; the Calabrias would be always liable to secret excitement; and, what was more serious, queen Caroline, confined to Palermo, not being able to support herself in the island but by means of the English, would deliver herself up to them entirely. This would be to insure the enjoyment of Sicily to the English rather than giving it to the Bourbons,—a consequence infinitely pernicious to the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, lord Yarmouth, in spite of his wish to conclude, dared not venture. But soon a new obstacle arose to chain up his good will.

The British cabinet, on hearing of the conduct of M. Oubril, was much irritated, and sent off couriers in a hurry to St. Petersburg, to complain that the Russian had abandoned the English negotiator. It did not restrain itself here, but blamed lord Yarmouth, its own negotiator, for having produced his powers. Fearing even influences, to which lord Yarmouth was exposed by his personal intimacies with the French diplomatists, it made choice of a whig, lord Lauderdale, a personage of a difficult character to please, to be joined in the negotiation. They made this second plenipotentiary set off immediately with precise instructions, but still with certain facilities relative to Sicily, with which lord Yarmouth had not been furnished. Lord Lauderdale was an exact and formal diplomatist. He had an order to request the fixing of a base of negotiation the *uti possidetis* which covered the maritime conquests of England, and more especially Sicily, which had not yet been conquered by Joseph Bonaparte. It is true that this base also excluded the restitution of the kingdom of Hanover; but that kingdom was out of the dis-

cussion, the English having always declared that they could not suffer that to become even a contested point. The basis being admitted, lord Lauderdale was to argue that the *uti possidetis* should be applied in an absolute manner, and more particularly as regarded Sicily; but that this isle might be abandoned for a compensation. Thus a sacrifice of Dalmatia, added to the Balearic Isles, might furnish a mode of accommodation.

Lord Lauderdale arrived without delay at Paris. He was a whig, and, consequently, more a friend than an enemy to peace; but he had been cautioned to guard himself against the seductions of M. de Talleyrand, which it was feared that lord Yarmouth was not capable of resisting.

Lord Lauderdale was received with politeness and coolness, because it was guessed in Paris that he was sent to serve as a corrective for the temper of lord Yarmouth, thought to be too easy. Napoleon, in reply to the mission of lord Lauderdale, named M. de Champagny as the second French negotiator. There were from that moment two against two, general Clarke and M. de Champagny against lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale.

As soon as the conference had begun, lord Lauderdale presented a long absolute note, in which he recapitulated the confidential and official negotiations, and demanded the admission, before going further, of the principle of the *uti possidetis*. Napoleon wished frankly for peace, and believed he had it secure, since he had guided the hand of M. Oubril to the signature of the treaty of July 20th. But it was not right to provoke his susceptible and impatient character. He had the reply delayed, as the first sign of his discontent. Lord Lauderdale did not consider himself worsted, and repeated his declaration. Then he obtained a reply in an energetic and dignified despatch, in which he was told, that so far the negotiation had proceeded with frankness and cordiality, and without all those pedantic forms which the new negotiator desired to introduce into it; that if the intentions were changed, that if all this diplomatic pageantry concealed the secret intention to break off the treaty after having obtained a few documents to produce to the parliament, lord Lauderdale had only to take his departure, because the French court was not disposed to lend itself to the parliamentary calculations of the British cabinet. Lord Lauderdale had no wish to occasion a rupture; he was only a little awkward, and that was all. Matters were explained. It was understood that the production of the note of lord Lauderdale was a mere formal thing, which, at the bottom, excluded none of the preceding conditions admitted by lord Yarmouth; that even the abandonment of Sicily, providing an indemnity more extensive than the Balearic Isles, had become clearer since the arrival of lord Lauderdale; and they then set themselves to confer upon Pondicherry, Surinam, Tobago, and St. Lucia.

The English negotiators seemed to be persuaded that Russia, affected by the representations of the British cabinet, would not ratify the treaty of M. Oubril. Napoleon, on the contrary, could not believe that M. Oubril would have advanced to the conclusion of a similar treaty, if his instructions had not authorized him to do as much; and he was still less able to believe that Russia would venture to destroy an act which she had authorized her representative to sign. He thought, therefore, that it would be for his advantage to await the news of the Russian ratifications, which appeared to him so certain, and that then England would be reduced to submit to the conditions which he had it so much at heart that she should accept. In consequence, he ordered the two French negotiators to gain time, in order to await the day when the answer from St. Petersburg should arrive in Paris. M. Oubril had left on the 22nd of July; the answer might be expected towards the end of August.

Napoleon deceived himself; and this was one of those very rare occasions in which he had not penetrated to the thoughts of his adversaries. Nothing, in effect, was more doubtful than the Russian ratifications; and, besides, the health of Mr. Fox was then greatly threatened,—a new danger for the negotiation. If that generous friend of humanity should succumb under the cares of government, to which he had been for a long while unaccustomed, the war party might overcome the party for peace in the British ministry.

But at this moment a serious circumstance placed the peace in peril much more than the temporizings that Napoleon had ordered. Prussia had fallen into a moral state extremely despondent. Since the occupation of Hanover, and the communications with England published in London, Napoleon, as already stated, had finished by not holding her of any further consideration, and by treating her as an ally from whom he had nothing to hope. Thus every body knew in Europe that he was occupied in organizing the new Germanic body, and that Prussia was as little informed about the matter as the smaller German powers. All the world knew that he was negotiating with England; that, in consequence, Hanover must become a question for discussion, and she had not received upon the subject a single communication capable of relieving her anxiety. King Frederic William was obliged to appear acquainted with that of which he was ignorant, in order not to make too visible the state of isolation in which he was left. Although keeping up secret and not honest relations with Russia, he was treated by that power with no great consideration; and he was well able to perceive that she considered less of him every day, in proportion as she returned towards peace with France. In a state of coolness with Austria, which never pardoned him for abandoning her on the day after the battle of Austerlitz; at war with England, that had seized three hundred of the commercial vessels of Prussia; he saw himself alone in Europe, and so little regarded, that the king of Sweden himself had not feared to give him the most serious offence. When the Prussian troops had presented themselves for the occupation of the dependencies of Hanover bordering upon Pomerania, the king of Sweden, who kept them, he said, on account of the king of England, his ally, had defended himself there, and had fired upon the troops sent. This was the last degree of humiliation to be thus treated by a prince, who had no other strength than his insanity, protected by his alliances.

This situation inspired the Prussian cabinet with reflections equally painful and alarming: Russia,

England itself, all taking steps towards France at that moment, the coalition would soon find itself dissolved, and, as Prussia had only been consulted because she formed the necessary complement to such a coalition, what would become of her under the general disarming? Would she not be delivered over, without defence, to Napoleon, who, highly discontented at her conduct, would treat her in that respect as he thought proper, either to purchase a peace with England and Russia, or to aggrandize such states as it pleased him to constitute? However it might happen, too, he was certain to have no one in Europe who would disapprove of his conduct, because nobody existing took the least interest in behalf of Prussia.

The strongest rumours confirmed these despondings reflections. The idea of giving up Hanover to England, in order to procure a maritime peace, was so simple and natural, that it arose in every mind at the same moment. Prussia was so slightly esteemed in spite of the virtues of her king, that it was not deemed amiss if Napoleon should act in this way towards a court that neither knew how to be the friend or enemy of any one. The allies of France, Spain before all, that had suffered cruelly by the war, loudly said, that Prussia did not deserve to have the evils of war prolonged upon her account for a single day. General Pardo, ambassador of Spain at the court of Berlin, repeated this so publicly, that on all sides people asked what could be the cause of such bold language being used. Thus, without being in possession of information upon the subject, every one related circumstances as they were passing in Paris between lord Yarmouth and M. de Talleyrand.

Then came the malevolent, who to the semblance of truth added the improbable, and were pleased to publish the most mischievous inventions. Some pretended that France would reconcile herself with Russia, and reconstitute the kingdom of Poland for the grand-duke Constantine, and that for this object they would retake the Polish provinces ceded to Prussia under the last partition. Others asserted that they were going to proclaim Murat king of Westphalia, and that it was in agitation to give him Munster, Osnaburg, and East Friesland. All rumours are usually composed of a mixture of truth and falsehood, and there always mingles in the medley a sufficiency of truth to obtain credit for the falsehood. This may be perceived on the present occasion, where correct but disfigured facts had served for the foundation of the falsest rumours. Napoleon considered in reality about giving up Hanover to England, since Prussia no longer appeared to him an ally upon whom he could place any dependence, but only on insuring to her an indemnity, or in restoring to her all that he had received from her. The design to take from her the Polish provinces, had existed for a moment, but only among the Russians, not the French. Finally, the pretended kingdom of Murat had been an invention of the officials of M. de Talleyrand, from endeavouring to flatter the imperial family; and Napoleon had only thought of this upon the condition of giving Prussia the Hanseatic cities which she eagerly desired. In fact, Napoleon had never wished to hear such a design spoken about.

But it is not with such scrupulous accuracy that newsmakers concoct their inventions. To rail at those whom they suppose to be cheated, and to play an indignant part in respect to those whom they suppose the cheats, are sufficient for their malevolent idleness: these are a species of individuals not more rare in the diplomatic circles than in the curious and ignorant public of great capitals.

Military imprudence added to all these reports a certain degree of probability. Murat kept in his duchy of Berg a sort of soldiers' court, where the strangest conversation was in use. Berg was, said his soldier comrades, metamorphosed into courtiers, a very small state for a brother-in-law of the emperor. Without doubt, he would soon be king of Westphalia, and they might compose him a fine kingdom at the expense of that wicked court of Prussia, which betrayed all the world. Those who surrounded Murat were not all who spoke in this way. The French troops, returned into the country of Darmstadt, into Franconia and Suabia, had but a step to take for the invasion of Saxony and Prussia. All the military who were desirous of continuing the war, and who lent the same desire to their master, flattered themselves that it would soon recommence, and that they should enter Berlin as they had entered Vienna. The new prince of Ponte-Corvo, Bernadotte, established at Anspach, conceived schemes ridiculous enough, which he openly promulgated, and that were attributed to Napoleon. Augereau, considering still less what he said, drank at table, with his staff, to the success of the approaching war against Prussia.

These extravagances of idle soldiers, related at Berlin, naturally caused there the most mischievous feelings. Repeated at court, they were afterwards transmitted to the whole population, and they excited the pride, always ready to kindle, of the Prussian nation. The king, more especially, felt their effect on account of the operation they must produce upon public opinion. The queen, affected deeply at what had occurred to the princess of Tour and Taxis, her sister, who had been obliged to submit to the "mediation," was silent, having for some time before taken upon herself to be so, and feeling besides well enough, that she had no claim upon Napoleon to interfere in favour of her family. But her silence was significant. M. Haugwitz was more discouraged than he dared avow to his master. The faults committed in his absence, and contrary to his advice, had in fact produced their irresistible consequences. Nevertheless, he was censured for all the events that occurred, as if he had been their true cause. The seizure of three hundred vessels, so injurious to the commerce of Prussia, was a fault laid upon his shoulders. The minister of finance had reproached him for it in a full council and with the greatest bitterness. A noted general in the army, general Ruchel, had pushed his unpoliteness so far as to insult him. Prussian opinion arose higher against M. Haugwitz hour by hour, who had done nothing wrong but having entered again into public business at the request of the king, at a time when his system of alliance with France was so committed, that it was become impossible. The sentiment of German patriotism was joined to all the other causes to hasten a crisis. Certain booksellers of Nuremberg having published pamphlets against France, Napoleon had ordered that they

should be arrested, and applying to one of them the rigour of the military laws, that treat as an enemy any one whatever who endeavours to raise up the people of a country against the army which occupies it, had caused him to be shot. This deplorable act had animated general opinion against the French and their partisans.

King Frederick William and M. Haugwitz had reckoned upon a successful movement for tranquillizing the public mind; they hoped that a confederation of the German powers in the north, under the protection of Prussia, would serve as a counterbalance to the confederation of the Rhine. Napoleon himself had suggested the idea to them. An aid-de-camp of the king had been sent to Dresden with a view of deciding the king of Saxony to enter into the confederation; and the chief minister of the elector of Hesse Cassel had himself come to Berlin to confer on the same subject. But these two courts exhibited extreme coldness in regard to the proposition Saxony, the more honest of the German powers, had an instinctive distrust of Prussia; and if it resolved to join any confederacy, it would have been more inclined to choose Austria, which had never desired to possess its territory, than Prussia, which surrounded it on every side, and was still visibly coveting it. Saxony, therefore, was not disposed to accede to what was thus demanded, and made her conduct subject to that of the other powers of the north of Germany. Hesse—discontented with Prussia, which in 1803 had occasioned the territory of Fulda to be given to the house of Nassau-Orange,—dissatisfied with France, that had excluded her from the confederation of the Rhine, and at the same time refused her aggrandisement, deceiving besides all those with whom she had treated,—would not decide for Prussia any more than France, because the danger seemed to her equal. To excuse herself with Prussia, to whom she was indebted at least in a seeming attachment, she had invented an odious falsehood, and pretended that France had thrown out, in a secret way, the greatest threats if she joined the northern confederation. This was not true; for the most secret despatches of the French government [1] ordered its agents, on the contrary, not to throw any obstacle in the way of such a confederation, but to be silent on the matter, and, if consulted, to state that France would see it without the slightest displeasure. It was the Hanseatic cities alone that France wished to interdict upon this point, out of purely commercial reasons; and this she had not concealed.

The Hessian minister, therefore, carried the falsest statements to Berlin; and all his sovereign had demanded of France, when offering to join the confederation of the Rhine, he asserted that France had offered, to draw him away from the confederation of the north. He even accused M. Bignon, the French minister at Cassel, of language that he had never held, and that he most energetically denied using. It was possible, that M. Bignon, before the confederation of the north was meditated, and when all the German diplomatists were making the confederation of the Rhine a matter of conversation, had spoken highly, in general terms, of the advantages of being allied to France; that even in his language he might have exceeded his instructions, out of an indiscreet zeal. A proof that he acted without orders was, that Napoleon had prescribed it to M. de Talleyrand, by letter, to refuse the adhesion of the elector of Hesse [2].

Nevertheless, the minister of the elector of Hesse was sent extraordinarily to Berlin, wishing to justify an unexpected refusal, and also sent to report in the fullest manner the pretended threats and pretended offers, between which France had placed the little court of Cassel.

At this false relation of matters, the king of Prussia believed he saw in the conduct of Napoleon the blackest treachery towards himself; he held himself played with, trampled on, and gave way to violent irritation. While these reports of the court of Cassel were coming to his ear, a despatch from M. de Lucchesini was received from France. This ambassador, a man of intellect, but insincere and unsteady, living in Paris with all who were enemies of the government, and yet being one of the most assiduous courtiers of M. de Talleyrand, had heard for some days rumours circulated regarding the fate reserved for Prussia. A hint in confidence gained from the English negotiators in relation to Hanover, of which the restitution had been tacitly promised, appeared to him to complete all the threatening circumstances of the moment; and as in his ambiguous conduct, by turns the adversary or partisan of the system of M. Haugwitz, he had, quite recently, supported the system of the 15th of February, which he had even carried to Berlin, he believed his own responsibility seriously involved if the last attempt at an alliance with France should turn out badly. He therefore exaggerated in his reports in a mode the most imprudent possible. An agent ought not to conceal any thing from his government, but he ought to weigh his assertions, to add nothing to the truth, to retrench nothing from it,—above all, when mischievous resolutions may result from it.

The courier, leaving Paris on the 29th of July, arrived at Berlin on the 5th or 6th of August. He caused an extraordinary sensation there. A second, carrying despatches dated the 2nd of August, who arrived on the 9th, only added to the effect produced by the first. The explosion was instant. Like a heart, full of feelings a long while restrained, bursts all of a sudden if a last impression comes to increase the pressure it has sustained, the king and his ministers broke out into a sudden passion against France. Both equalled in their exterior demonstrations the most violent members of the war party. M. Haugwitz, ordinarily so calm, could certainly, in returning to and examining the past, and in recalling the faults committed by the court of Berlin, account to himself for the consequences of those faults upon the irritable mind of Napoleon—understand from that time the neglect with which he repaid an unfaithful alliance—reduce thus to their real value the pretended schemes with which Prussia was threatened, and await more accurate accounts before the Prussian cabinet formed an opinion or settled

[1] I have read all these despatches with the greatest attention; and as I tell the truth in regard to all the courts, great and small, I should say it in regard to Hesse, were that truth favourable to Hesse and unfavourable to France.—*Note of Author.*

[2] This letter exists in the depôt of the secretary of state in the Louvre.

upon a line of conduct. Here it was that the true faults of M. Haugwitz commenced. Crediting only a part of what was related to him, but wishing to cover his responsibility, and, above all, flattering himself that he could control the violent party by placing himself at the head of the military demonstrations, he assented to all proposed in that moment of agitation. His system being thus reversed, he should have retired and abandoned to others the chances of a rupture with France, which he foresaw would be disastrous. But he yielded to the general movement of the popular mind; and all the partisans that he had about the king, M. Lombard in particular, laboriously imitated him. It will be seen, that there is no need of a free government for nations to offer the spectacle of the most inconceivable popular excitements.

A council was called at Potsdam. The old generals, such as the duke of Brunswick and Marshal Mollendorf, were part of it. When these men, who had so far shown themselves discreet, saw the king and M. Haugwitz himself consider the treachery as possible and even true, which was attributed to France, they showed hesitation no more; and proposing to place the whole Prussian army upon the war footing, as it had been six months before, the resolution was adopted unanimously. The majority of the council, the king in the number, regarded this as a measure of safety, M. Haugwitz as the reply to all those who asserted that Prussia was delivered up to Napoleon.

All on a sudden the rumour was spread through Berlin, that the king had determined to arm, that great difficulties had arisen between Prussia and France, that they had even discovered concealed danger—a sort of premeditated treachery, that explained well enough the presence of the French troops in Suabia, Franconia, and Westphalia. The opinion often agitated, but always restrained by the example of the king, in whom the people had placed confidence, was now violently pronounced. The hearts of the subjects overflowed like that of their prince. We have good grounds for saying, they cried on all sides that France would not be more sparing to Prussia than Austria; that she wished to invade and ravage all Germany; that the partisans of the French alliance were either dupes or traitors; that it was not M. Hardenberg who was sold to England, but M. Haugwitz to France; that it was well to discover it at last, only that the discovery was too late; that it was not to-day, but six months before, on the eve or the morrow of Austerlitz, that it was their duty to have taken arms; that, besides, it was of little moment; that, though late, they must defend themselves or perish; that England and Russia would, no doubt, hasten to the help of any one who would make head against Napoleon; that, after all, the French had vanquished the Austrians, who were without energy, and the Russians, who were without instruction, but that they would not find it such an easy task to rout the soldiers of the great Frederick.

Those who saw Berlin at this period have said, that they never witnessed such an example of excitement and popular ferment. Already had M. Haugwitz perceived with fear, that he had been pushed far beyond the end which he had proposed to attain, since he had only wished for simple demonstrations, and the country demanded war. The army called for it aloud. The queen, prince Louis, the court, recently restrained by the express desire of the king, broke out beyond all bounds. According to them, they were not Germans, they were not Prussians, until that day; they heard at last the call of interest and of honour; they had escaped the illusions of a perfidious and dishonourable alliance; they were worthy of themselves, of the founder of the Prussian monarchy, of the grand Frederick! Never had there been a similar infatuation, save where the multitude leads the wise, or where courts rule feeble monarchs. Yet what was it that had passed to justify such an outbreak? Prussia, on the point of signing a treaty of close alliance with France in 1805, under the false pretext of a violation of the territory of Anspach, had given way to the solicitations of the European coalition, to the call of the German aristocracy, and to the caresses of Alexander; and had signed the treaty of Potsdam, which was a species of treachery. Finding France victorious at Austerlitz, she had suddenly changed sides, and accepted Hanover of Napoleon, having but a few days before accepted it of Alexander. Napoleon had wished in sincerity to attach her to himself by such a gift, and he awaited this last proof, to see if he could place faith in her. But this gift, accepted with confusion, Prussia had not ventured to own to the world; she had almost made an excuse to the English for the occupation of Hanover; she had not taken between Napoleon and his enemies that frank position which she should have taken, to inspire confidence. Disgusted with the connexion, Napoleon had formed the secret design to take back Hanover, in order to obtain from England a peace which he had no more the hope to impose upon it through the means of a Prussian alliance. But he had thought of an indemnification, he had prepared it in his mind; only he had remained silent, hesitating to open the subject with a court for which he had no longer the slightest esteem. Was that a proceeding comparable to the conduct of Prussia, remaining in secret relations with Russia through M. Hardenberg, in the face of the treaty of alliance signed at Schönbrunn, and renewed at Paris on the 15th of February? Most assuredly not. The fault of Napoleon was confined to a want of respect in regard to Prussia that he should not have permitted himself to show, but that the equivocal conduct of Prussia excused, if it did not justify.

In reality, Prussia was humiliated at the character she had played, was fearful of the state of isolation in which she must find herself if England and Russia were reconciled with France, and was confounded and troubled at the treatment she would then be liable to be forced to bear from Napoleon, without having an individual to whom she could complain; and in this state she was disposed to take for true reports of the falsest and most improbable nature. There was only one thing in all that passed at Berlin that was correct and honourable; that was, the German patriotism, humiliated at the success of France, breaking out on the first pretext, whether well or ill founded. But this feeling broke out at a wrong time. It ought to have appeared in 1805, when Napoleon quitted Boulogne. Prussia ought then to have declared

openly for France, and told the motives upon which she acted, and engaging Prussian honour in this sense, or to have pronounced herself at that time against France, and fought against her when Russia and Austria were under arms. Now she was going to her ruin by a route that was not even honourable.

The despatches of M. de Lucchesini had been intercepted by the police of Napoleon, and he was acquainted with their nature. Indignant at them, he immediately ordered M. de Laforest to be written to, that he might be apprised of the sending of such despatches, to desire him to give a contradiction to all the allegations of the Prussian minister, and to demand that he be recalled. Unfortunately it was too late, for the impulse already given to Prussian public opinion, could not then be controlled. M. Haugwitz, besides, embarrassed by the different parts that for above a year he had been forced to play, had no longer the courage of good resolutions. He neither dared venture to see the minister of France, nor to declare to the fools whose folly he had flattered, that he should quit them once more, to join himself to the wise, who were then so rare in Berlin.

M. de Laforest found him under constraint, avoiding explanation. Nevertheless, after several attempts, he saw him at last, and asked him how he could be wanting upon the present point in his customary self-possession; how he could possibly believe the false tales invented at the court of Hesse, the thoughtless conversations gathered up by M. de Lucchesini; how he did not wait or seek for more correct information before taking resolutions so serious as those which were publicly announced. M. Haugwitz, troubled in proportion as the light, an instant obscured by the darkness that overshadowed his mind, began to shine anew, appeared deeply sorry for his conduct, candidly avowed the rapidity of the torrent which had borne along the king, the court, and himself, and declared, finally, that if no one came to their aid, they should be thrown, perhaps to perish, upon the rock of war; that nothing was lost yet, if Napoleon would make any kind of satisfaction to the pride of the multitude, to be to the prudence of the cabinet a ground of encouragement; that the removal of the French army, for some time accumulated on the roads leading to Prussia, would fulfil this double object; that they would be able then to countermand the armaments, alleging, as a reason for having armed, the re-union of the French troops, and, as a reason for disarming, their retreat beyond the Rhine. M. Haugwitz added, that to facilitate the explanations, they had recalled M. de Lucchesini, and sent to Paris a discreet and safe man, M. de Knobelsdorf.

Napoleon would have been enabled to consent to the step demanded without compromising his glory, because he had never thought of invading Prussia. He had only taken certain precautions when they had refused to ratify the treaty of Schönbrunn. But since then he had only thought of Austria and the mouths of the Cattaro, he had thought only of getting them restored by some menace; he had even, since the treaty signed with M. Oubril, disposed every thing for bringing his troops into France. He had ordered a vast camp to be made at Meudon, there to unite the grand army; and in September to celebrate magnificent fêtes. The orders for this purpose were already sent. But a serious and unforeseen event happened, to render this step difficult upon his part. Against his expectations, the emperor Alexander had refused to ratify the treaty of peace signed by M. Oubril. He had adopted this resolution at the warm remonstrances of England, who had set a value upon the fidelity of Russia, and recalled her recent refusal to treat without that power, demanding, as the price of that fidelity, that a treaty should be rejected thus hurriedly concluded, and upon conditions evidently disadvantageous. The emperor Alexander, although he much dreaded the consequences of a war with Napoleon, dreaded it somewhat less on seeing England much slower than he had believed she would be in throwing herself into the arms of France. It appeared, too, as if something had already transpired relating to the agitations of the court of Prussia, and the possibility of drawing that court into a war. Finally, the knowledge recently acquired of the dissolution of the Germanic empire, added to the jealousy of Russia, as well as that of all the other powers, making a redoubled hatred against Napoleon foreseen, Alexander decided not to ratify the treaty of M. Oubril. Still he answered, that he was ready to resume the negotiations, but in concert with England; that he even charged the latter with powers for treating, on condition that there should be left to the royal family of Naples, not only Sicily, but the entire of Dalmatia, and that the Balearic Isles should be given to the king of Piedmont.

The courier-bearer of this intelligence arrived in Paris on the 3rd of September, at the same moment when the armaments of Prussia occupied the attention of all Europe, and when it was requested of Napoleon to draw M. Haugwitz and the king Frederick William out of their embarrassment, by marching back the French troops. Napoleon now in his turn felt the deepest mistrust, and imagined he was betrayed. The remembrance of the conduct of Austria the preceding year, the recollection of her armament, so often and obstinately denied, when even the troops were on the march,—this recollection returning to his mind, persuaded him that it would be the same thing this time; that the sudden armaments of Prussia were only a perfidy, and that he ran the danger of being surprised in September, 1806, as he had very nearly been in September, 1805. He was, therefore, little disposed to draw his troops out of Franconia, a very important military position, as will be soon seen, for a war against Prussia. Another circumstance led him to think there was a coalition. Mr. Fox had died after an illness of two months. Thus, in the same year, the fatigues of long official power had killed Mr. Pitt; and the first trials of Mr. Fox, in an office that had become a novelty to him, had hastened his end. Mr. Fox bore with him the peace of the world, and the possibility of a fertile alliance between France and England. If England had sustained a great loss in Mr. Pitt, Europe and humanity had sustained an immense loss in Mr. Fox. This minister dead, the war party might triumph over the party of peace in the heart of the British cabinet.

Still this cabinet could not venture upon making

any important change in the conditions of peace already sent to Paris. Lord Yarmouth had given up the negotiation through disgust. Lord Lauderdale remained alone. He was ordered from the court of London to present the demands of Russia, consisting in a claim to Sicily and Dalmatia for the court of Naples, and the Balearic Isles for the king of Piedmont. Lord Lauderdale, in presenting these new conditions, acted in the name of the two courts, and as having powers both from one and the other. Thus, by waiting for the effect of the ratifications of St. Petersburg, Napoleon had missed the decisive moment for peace. These mistakes happen to the greatest minds in the field of politics, as well as in the field of war.

Napoleon, on this account, felt a species of irritation, that led him the more to suppose the existence of a European conspiracy. He was, therefore, much more inclined to appeal to arms again than to give way. He at this moment received M. Knobelsdorf, who, in all haste, had come to replace M. de Lucchesini. He gave him an obliging personal reception; assured him most positively that he had had no design against Prussia; that he could not understand what it was they would have of him, since he desired nothing of her but the fulfilment of treaties; that he had no thoughts of taking any thing from her, all that had been published in this respect being utterly false; and he alluded in these words to the reports of M. Lucchesini, who had that same day presented his letters of recall. Then, with a candour worthy of his greatness, he added, that there had been, in these false rumours that were circulated, one only thing that was true,—it was what had been said about Hanover; that, in effect, he had listened to England upon the subject; that, seeing the peace of the world hanging upon the question, he had had the design of addressing himself to Prussia, of laying before her the situation of things in their full truth, of giving her the choice between a general peace, purchased by the restitution of Hanover, with an indemnification, or the continuance of the war against England; but a war to the full extreme, after an explanation, nevertheless, on the degree of energy which Frederick William intended to exert in carrying it on. He, besides, affirmed, that in no case should he have taken any resolution without explaining himself openly and frankly with Prussia.

So candid an explanation should have banished every doubt. But more was necessary for Prussia; she required some act of deference, which should save her dignity. Napoleon would, perhaps, have lent himself to this, if he had not been at the moment full of distrust, and if he had not believed in the existence of a new coalition, which did not yet exist, but which was very soon to do so. But in the excitement of mind, provoked by events, it is not always possible to judge correctly of that which passes among adversaries. In consequence, he enjoined it upon M. de Laforest to hold himself reserved, to tell M. Haugwitz, that Prussia would not have any other explanations than those which he had given to M. Knobelsdorf and M. Lucchesini; that as to the demand made relative to the armies, he replied by a demand exactly similar; and that if Prussia countermanded her armaments, he would engage to make the French troops repass the Rhine immediately. He ordered M. de Laforest, afterwards, to be silent and await events. "In a similar situation," he wrote him, "we ought not to believe protestations, however sincere they may appear. We have been deceived too often. Facts are necessary; let Prussia disarm, and the French shall repass the Rhine, but not before."

M. de Laforest faithfully executed the orders of his sovereign, and had no trouble in convincing M. de Haugwitz, who had been already convinced, but overruled by events, and then he was silent. It was not enough for the Prussian cabinet to be clear upon the intentions of Napoleon; a palpable explanation was wanted to satisfy public opinion, and facts also were required, but facts clear and positive, as the retirement of the French, for example. But even then the excited imaginations of the Prussians would have been with difficulty appeased even under such an act of assurance. Prussian pride claimed some satisfaction. There is as much, even more, need of satisfaction with those who are wrong, than with those who have right on their side.

The king and M. Haugwitz suffered some days more to pass over, in order to see if Napoleon would come to any explanation more explicit or satisfactory. "This silence loses all," M. Haugwitz repeated to M. de Laforest. But the die was cast: Prussia, by tergiversations which had alienated from her the confidence of Napoleon; France, by proceedings too slighting towards her, were led, the one and the other, into an unfortunate war, the more to be regretted, because in the existing state of the world, they were the only two powers of which the interests were reconcileable. The silence ordered to be kept by M. de Laforest was invariably observed by him; but the sadness in his countenance, an expressive sadness, was sufficiently significant, if the court of Prussia had desired to understand it and to guide its conduct by what it indicated. But it was not thus either with King Frederick William or his minister. Every day regiments marched through Berlin, singing patriotic airs, that were repeated by the people, who gathered in crowds in the streets. From all parts it was asked when the king would depart for the army, and if it was true that he would remain at Potsdam, with the intention of returning to his original determination. The outcry became so great, that it was necessary to obey the public opinion. The unfortunate Frederick William departed on the 21st of September for Magdeburg. This was the signal of the war that was expected in Germany, and which Napoleon awaited in Paris. From that day it was inevitable. In the next book will be seen the terrible vicissitudes, and the disastrous consequences for Prussia, and the glorious results for Napoleon—results which would inspire satisfaction without alloy, if the policy had been in agreement with the victory.

BOOK XXV.

JENA.

SITUATION OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE AT THE MOMENT OF THE PRUSSIAN WAR.—AFFAIRS OF NAPLES—OF DALMATIA AND HOLLAND.—MEANS OF DEFENCE PREPARED BY NAPOLEON IN CASE OF A GENERAL COALITION.—PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.—NAPOLEON QUITS PARIS AND GOES TO WURTZBURG.—THE COURT OF PRUSSIA ALSO PROCEEDS TO THE ARMY.—THE KING, QUEEN, PRINCE LOUIS, DUKE OF BRUNSWICK, AND PRINCE OF HOHENLOHE.—FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS.—COMBATS OF SCHLEITZ AND SAALFIELD.—DEATH OF PRINCE LOUIS.—CONFUSION OF MIND OF THE PRUSSIAN STAFF.—THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK DECIDES TO RETIRE TO THE ELBE AND COVER HIMSELF WITH THE SAALE.—PROMPTITUDE OF NAPOLEON IN OCCUPYING THE DEFILES OF THE SAALE.—MEMORABLE BATTLES OF JENA AND AWERSTÄDT.—ROUT AND DISORGANIZATION OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.—CAPITULATION OF ERFURT.—THE CORPS DE RESERVE OF THE PRINCE OF WIRTEMBERG SURPRIZED AND BEATEN AT HALLE.—DIVERGENT AND PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE DUKE OF WEIMAR, OF GENERAL BLUCHER, OF THE PRINCE OF HOHENLOHE, AND MARSHAL KALKREUTH.—OFFENSIVE MARCH OF NAPOLEON.—OCCUPATION OF LEIPSIC, WITTENBERG, AND DESSAU.—PASSAGE OF THE ELBE.—INVESTMENT OF MAGDEBURG.—TRIUMPHAL ENTRY OF NAPOLEON INTO BERLIN.—HIS DISPOSITIONS RESPECTING THE PRUSSIANS.—PARDON GRANTED TO THE PRINCE OF HATZFIELD.—OCCUPATION OF THE LINE OF THE ODER.—PURSUIT OF THE WRECKS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY BY THE CAVALRY OF MURAT AND THE INFANTRY OF MARSHALS LANNES, SOULT, AND BERNADOTTE.—CAPITULATION OF PRENZLOW AND LUBEC.—REDUCTION OF THE FORTRESSES OF MAGDEBURG, STETTIN, AND CUSTRIN.—NAPOLEON IN ONE MONTH MASTER OF ALL THE PRUSSIAN MONARCHY.

It was a great imprudence on the part of Prussia to enter into a contest with Napoleon at the moment when the French army, returning from Austerlitz, was still in the heart of Germany, and better capable than any army had ever been of immediate action. It was above all a great piece of rashness to precipitate herself alone into war, after not venturing to engage in it the preceding year, when she would have had for allies Austria, Russia, England, Sweden, and Naples. Now, on the contrary, Austria, weakened by her last efforts, irritated at the indifference which had been shown towards her, was in her turn resolved to remain a peaceable spectator of the misfortunes of others. Russia found itself replaced at its natural distance by the retreat of its troops on the Vistula. England, provoked at the occupation of Hanover, had declared war against Prussia. Sweden had followed the example of England. Naples no longer existed. It is true that every friend of France, become her enemy, might certainly count upon the prompt return of England and the auxiliaries it held in pay. But it was necessary to enter into explanations with the British cabinet, and to commence first by the restoration of Hanover, which, without being compensated, could have no result for the bad understanding that would follow with France. Russia, although awakened from her first dreams of glory, was still disposed to attempt again the fortune of war in companionship with the Prussian troops, the only soldiers that inspired Europe with confidence. But some months were yet to pass away before her troops could enter the field; and besides, it was necessary that she should move them as great a distance as in 1805. Prussia was therefore for some time exposed alone before Napoleon. She had to encounter him in October, 1806, in the midst of Saxony, as Austria had encountered him in October, 1805, in the midst of Bavaria, with this very disadvantageous difference for herself, that he had no longer to overcome the obstacle of distance, when, in place of being encamped on the borders of the ocean, he was in the bosom of Germany, having only two or three marches to make to reach the Prussian frontiers.

It could only be the most fatal illusion that could explain the conduct of Prussia; but such is party spirit, such are its incurable self-deceptions, that on every side this war was regarded as offering unforeseen chances, and opening to vanquished Europe a new futurity. Napoleon had triumphed, it was said, through Austrian feebleness and Russian ignorance; but he would this time be seen in presence of the scholars of the Great Frederick, the sole heirs of real military tradition; and perhaps, in place of Austerlitz, a Rosbach would be disclosed! On the strength of repeating similar sentiments, people had almost concluded with that belief, and the Prussians had themselves assumed the most singular confidence. Wiser minds still knew what was to be thought of such foolish hopes, and at Vienna there was felt a mixture of surprise and satisfaction on seeing the Prussians, so boastful, in their turn put to the proof, and opposed to that captain who had only obtained his glory, they were assured, from the degeneracy of the Austrian army. It was therefore a moment of joy with the enemies of France, who believed that the time of her greatness was concluded. This time was unhappily to arrive, but not so soon, and only after faults of which none had at this time been committed.

Napoleon had not himself the least anxiety on the subject of the approaching war. He did not know the Prussians, because he had not encountered them on the field of battle. But he said to himself that these Prussians, to whom all the merit was attributed since they had become his adversaries, had obtained against the inexperienced French, in 1792, still less success than the Aus-

trians, and that if they had not been able to prevail over volunteers levied in haste, they would not prevail more over an experienced army of which he was the general. He wrote to his brothers at Naples and in Holland, that they need not feel any anxiety; that the contest would be yet more promptly terminated than that which preceded it had been; that Prussia and its allies, whatever they might be, would be crushed; that this time he would finish with Europe, *and reduce his enemies to such a state of feebleness that they should not be able to stir for ten years.* These expressions are verbally contained in the letters to the kings of Holland and Naples.

A commander as prudent as he was bold, he took as much pains to secure success as if he had to contend with soldiers and generals equal or superior to his own. Although he did not think of the Prussians all that he affected to publish regarding them, he adopted towards them the truly prudential precept that advises to value at a just price the known enemy, but to value higher still the merits of the enemy unknown. To this consideration there was added another to stimulate his active foresight: he was resolved to push the contest against the continent to the utmost, and despairing of maritime means, to vanquish England through her allies, by pursuing them until he had made their arms drop from their hands. Without being certain of the extent and duration of this new war, he conjectured that he would have to advance far towards the north, and that perhaps he should have to go and seek the Russians as far as upon their own territory. Astonished at the later acts of Prussia,—not having been able, at the distance of Paris from Berlin, to disentangle the various and complicated causes which had caused her to act,—he believed that in September, 1806, as in September, 1805, a great coalition, secretly prepared, was ready to explode; that the unaccustomed audacity of king Frederick William was no other than the first symptom; and he expected to see all Europe fall upon him, comprising Austria, in spite of her pacific protestations. The very natural mistrust with which the aggression of the preceding year had inspired him, nevertheless deceived him. A new coalition would certainly result from the resolution that Prussia had taken; but it would be the effect in place of being the cause. Every body in Europe was as surprised as Napoleon at what passed in the court of Berlin, because they will only believe calculation to be the moving principle of cabinets, and never passion. They have passions notwithstanding; and those sudden irritations, that in private life often come upon a couple of men and place them opposite sword in hand, are fully as often, much oftener than an interest which reflects, the cause which precipitates two nations one upon the other. The moral uneasiness of Prussia, having birth from her faults, and the treatment those faults had occasioned on the part of Napoleon, was much more than any meditated treachery the real cause of her sudden, unintelligible fits of anger, for which nobody was able to account.

Believing then in a new coalition, and willing to pursue it this time to the bottom of the frozen regions of the north, Napoleon proportioned his preparations to the circumstances that he had foreseen. He provided not only the means of attack against his adversaries,—means which he found all prepared in the grand army reunited in the heart of Germany,—but the means of defence for the vast states that he must leave behind him, during the time that he transported himself upon the Elbe, the Oder, perhaps upon the Vistula and the Niemen. In proportion as his dominion extended, it was necessary that his care should also extend with the increasing limit of his empire. He had to occupy Italy, from the strait of Messina to Izonzo, and even beyond, when Dalmatia belonged to him. He had to take care of Holland, because it was a state allied to the family royalty. It was needful to provide and to guard these numerous countries, and yet more their governments, since his brothers reigned in them.

It must not be disguised, that in placing in his family the crown of the Two Sicilies, Napoleon had added as much to his difficulties as to his power. In examining closely the cares, the expenses of men and money that the new establishment of his brother Joseph at Naples cost him, one is led to believe, that in place of pursuing the Bourbons from Southern Italy, he had perhaps done better to leave them there submissive, trembling, punished for their last treachery by heavy war contributions, by reductions of territory, and by the hard obligation of excluding the English from the ports of Calabria and Sicily. It is true that he would not thus achieve the regeneration of Italy, to snatch that noble and fine country from the barbarous system under which it was oppressed, to associate it completely with the social and political system of France; it is true that he would always have had in the courts of Naples and Rome two concealed enemies ready to call in the English and the Russians. But those reasons which were assuredly powerful, and which justified Napoleon to undertake the conquest of the Italian peninsula, from Izonzo to Tarento, became therefore decisive reasons not to limit his undertakings in the south of Europe, but to limit them in the north, because Dalmatia demanded 20,000 men, Lombardy 50,000, Naples 50,000, in other words, 120,000 men for Italy alone; and if he needed still 200,000 or 300,000 on the Danube and Elbe, he had to fear that he would not be able to support such charges for any long time, and that he would succumb in the north from having extended too far in the south, or in the south from having attempted too much in the north. On this point there may be repeated what has already been said, that to limit himself in some part, it was better worth to limit himself in the north, because the family of Bonaparte endeavoured to extend itself in Italy or in Spain, as had been done by the ancient house of Bourbon, acting in the true sense of French policy, much better than in labouring to create for itself establishments in Germany.

Joseph, heartily welcomed by the enlightened and rich part of the population that queen Carolina had ill used, even applauded a moment by the people as a novelty, above all in the Calabrias, that he had gone over,—Joseph had soon been able to perceive the enormous difficulty of the task he had to perform. Having neither *materiel* in the magazines and arsenals, nor funds in the public chests, because the last government had not left a

ducat behind, obliged to create all he wanted, and fearing to burden with taxes a people for whose attachment he sought, Joseph was thrown into a terrible perplexity. To demand its money of a country when he had demanded of it its affections, was perhaps to make it refuse both the one and the other. It was necessary, however, to administer to the wants of the French army that Napoleon had not been in the habit of paying when it was employed out of France, and Joseph drew drafts on the imperial treasury which he beseeched his brother to honour. Incessantly he requested subsidies and troops, and Napoleon replied, that he had all Europe upon his hands, secretly or openly conspired; that he was not able to pay, besides the army of the empire, the armies of the allied kingdoms; that it was full enough to lend his soldiers to his brothers, but that he was not yet able to lend them his finances; nevertheless, the events occurring in the kingdom of Naples had obliged Napoleon to refuse no longer that which was solicited of him.

Gaëta, the strongest fortress of the Neapolitan continent, was the sole place of the kingdom which had not surrendered to the French army. This fortress, constructed at the extremity of a promontory, bathed by the sea on three sides, was only connected to the land by one, and that side commanded the surrounding ground; defended besides by regular works, with three tiers of guns, it was very difficult to besiege. It retained before its walls a part of the French army, occupied in making the approaches that it was often necessary to execute in the rock. Another part of the army guarded Naples; the rest were dispersed in the Calabrias to restrain the revolt ready to break out, thus presenting every where only a scattered strength. The end of summer, so fatal in Italy to strangers, had decimated the French troops, and they were not able to unite 6000 men upon the same point.

Napoleon, whose correspondence with his brothers become monarchs, merits to be studied as a series of profound lessons in the art of ruling, sometimes rebuked Joseph with a severity which his reason not his heart prompted. He reproached him with being feeble, inactive, given over to all the illusions of a benevolent, vain character. Joseph dared not venture to levy taxes, and yet wished to compose an army of Neapolitans; he aspired to form a royal guard; he retained around him, for his own personal security, a great part of the troops placed at his disposition; he directed the siege of Gaëta badly, and finally, he made no preparations for the invasion of Sicily.

That which you owe to your people, Napoleon wrote him, is order in the finances; but you are unable to spare them the charges of the war; there must be taxes to pay the public force. Naples ought to furnish 100,000,000f., and of this 100,000,000f. 30,000,000f. would suffice to pay 40,000 men. (Letter, March 6th, 1806.) Hope not to make yourself beloved through your weakness, above all by Neapolitans. They tell you that queen Caroline is odious, and that already your mildness renders you popular—a chimera of your flatterers! If to-morrow I lost a battle on the Izonzo, you would learn what would be thought of your popularity, and of the pretended unpopularity of queen Caroline. Those men are low, cringing, submissive only to strength. Suppose a reverse (which is always possible to happen to me), and you will see the people rise in an entire body to cry "Death to the French! Death to Joseph! Long live Caroline!" You would come to my camp! (Letter of the 9th August, 1806.) "*He is but a sot of a personage, a king exiled, and a vagabond.*" It is needful to rule with justice and severity; to suppress the abuses of the former rule, to establish order every where, to prevent the dilapidations of the French as well as of the Neapolitans, to create finances, and to pay my army properly by which you exist. (Letter of 22nd April, 1806.) As to the royal guard, it is a luxury, worthy at the utmost the large empire which I govern; and this appears to me even too costly, if I was not bound to make sacrifices to the majesty of that empire and to the interests of my old soldiers, who find a means of well-being in the institutions of a chosen body of troops. As to composing a Neapolitan army, take care to think about that. It would abandon you on the first moment of danger, and betray you for another master. Form, if you will, three or four regiments, and send them to me. I will make them acquire that which is only to be acquired in war, discipline, bravery, the sentiment of honour, fidelity, and I will send them back worthy to form the kernel of a Neapolitan army. For the interim take Swiss, for I shall not long be able to leave you 50,000 French, were you in a condition to pay them. The Swiss are the only foreign soldiers who are faithful and brave. (Letter, August 9th.) Have in the Calabrias some moveable columns composed of Corsicans. They are excellent at that kind of warfare, and will be full of devotion for our family. (Letter, 22nd April, 1806.) Do not disperse your forces. You have 50,000 men; it is much more than is necessary if you know how to manage. I would with 25,000 only guard every part of your kingdom, and on the day of battle be stronger than the enemy on the field of battle. The first care of a general should consist in distributing his forces in such a manner as to be every where ready. But, added Napoleon, it is the real secret of the art, that no one possesses, no one, not even Massena, so great when in peril.

Napoleon wished that Joseph should confine himself to guard Naples with two regiments of cavalry and some batteries of light artillery; that he should then dispose the army in *échelons* from Naples as far as the bottom of the Calabrias, with a strong detachment placed in face of Sicily, from whence it was possible for an English army to arrive, and that he should hold himself in such a manner as to be able to unite a considerable corps in three marches, whether at Naples or in the Calabrias, or on the presumed point of disembarkation. He wished, above all, that the siege of Gaëta should be pushed; which siege absorbed a part of the disposable force; that after the termination of the siege, the king should occupy himself with the construction of a strong place, that should serve as a point of support to the new kingdom, that should be situated even in the centre of the kingdom, in which the king of Naples should be able to throw himself with his treasure, his archives, the Neapolitans faithful to his cause, and the wreck of his

armies, and to resist six months a besieging force of 60,000 Anglo-Russians. (Letter 2nd September, 1806.) Napoleon did not think that the position of Naples was proper for such a disposition of things; besides, according to him, a strange king was not able, without danger, to place himself in the midst of a numerous population necessarily inimical. He wished that such a strong place should have an action upon the capital, upon the sea, and upon the interior of the kingdom. After an examination, after having discussed different points, particularly Capua and Naples, he preferred Castellamare, because of its vicinity to Naples, its maritime site, and its central position. The choice made upon the map, he ordered studies upon the ground to decide the nature of the works. You ought, he added in his letters, to devote 5,000,000f. or 6,000,000f. per annum to this great work; to continue this during ten years, but in such a manner that, at each expenditure of six millions, there should be some degree of strength obtained, and that, at the second or third year, you should already be able to shut yourself up in this large fortress, because neither you nor I know what may come to pass in two, three, or four years. "*The future is not ours!*" and if you are energetic, you will be able, in such an asylum, to hold out a sufficient period to brave the rigours of fortune, and to await the return!

Napoleon wished, finally, that they should prepare, by little and little, the means to pass the strait of Messina with 10,000 men, a force in his opinion sufficient to conquer Sicily, and most easily transportable in feluccas, in which the Italian sea abounds. In consequence he had recommended the undertaking at once at Scylla or at Messina, of defensive works to unite there in security the small naval force which would be needful. But before all he urged the siege of Gaëta, which would render disposable half of the army. He conjured his brother to divide his forces in another manner, "because," he repeated to him without ceasing, "you will have before long a descent and an insurrection, and you will not be more in a situation to repulse the one than repress the other."

Joseph comprehended this profound advice, complained sometimes of the language in which it was given, and followed it to the extent of his talents, surrounded by several of the French, his personal friends, M. Roederer, who was actively employed in administrative and financial reforms, and general Dumas, who applied himself with ability to the organization of the public force, and did his best to form a government and to regenerate the fine country committed to his care. The Corsican Salicetti, a man sensible and courageous, directed the police with the vigour demanded by the circumstances. But while Joseph attempted to fulfil the royal duties, the English, justifying the foresight of Napoleon, had profited by the length of the siege of Gaëta, that divided the army, and the fevers that decimated it, to disembark in the gulf of St. Euphemia, and appeared there to the number of 8000 men, under the orders of general Stuart. General Reynier, placed at Cosenza, was scarcely able to assemble 4000 French, and march boldly to the place of disembarkation. This officer,—clever and brave, but unfortunate,—that Napoleon had consented to employ at Naples, despite the recollection of the faults he had committed in Egypt, was not more favoured by fortune upon this occasion than he had formerly been in the fields of Alexandria. Attacking general Stuart in the midst of marshy ground, where it was impossible to make his 4000 men act with that union which should compensate for their numerical inferiority, he was repulsed and constrained to retire into the interior of the Calabrias. This want of success, although it could not be considered as a lost battle, still had the same consequences, and occasioned the rising of the Calabrias in the rear of the French [1]. General Reynier had obstinate combats to sustain, to reunite his scattered detachments, saw his wounded basely assassinated without the power of succouring them, and was obliged, in order to make his way, to burn the villages and to put the insurgent population to the sword. For the rest he conducted himself with energy and celerity, and knew how to maintain himself in the midst of a frightful combustion. General Stuart on this occasion supported a conduct which merits to be cited with honour. The assassination of the French was so general and so horrible, that he was revolted. Endeavouring to supplant by the love of money the humanity wanting to those ferocious mountaineers, he promised six ducats for each soldier, and fifteen for each officer, brought to him alive; and he treated those whom he succeeded in saving with the respect which is due among civilized nations to each other, when condemned to make war.

These events, which so well proved the wisdom of Napoleon's counsels, became an active stimulus for the new Neapolitan government. Joseph accelerated the siege of Gaëta, in order to be able to carry back the entire army into the Calabrias. He had Massena with him, whose name alone made the Neapolitan population tremble. He had confided to him the task of taking Gaëta; but in deferring to send him until the day when the works approached their completion, he would display greater vigour. The generals of engineers, Campredon and Vallongue, were charged to direct the operations of the siege. They followed the plans prescribed by Napoleon, who wished that they should reserve the use of the heavy artillery for the moment when they should arrive near the body of the place. Obliged to open the trenches in a soil where stone was continually encountered, they made their approaches slowly, and supported without answering it the fire of an enormous quantity of cannon and mortars. The besiegers received 120,000 balls and 21,000 bombs, without having once replied to this mass of projectiles. Having at last arrived at a convenient distance to establish the breaching batteries, they commenced a destructive fire. The strong walls of Gaëta, founded on the rock, after having at first resisted, finished by falling all at once, and presented two large and practicable breaches. The soldiers demanded to be led to the assault, with entreaties, as the price of their long labours; and Massena having formed two columns of attack, was about to grant their request, when the besieged offered to capitulate. The fortress was delivered up on the 18th of July, with all the *materiel* which it

[1] See page 128, note.

contained. The garrison embarked for Sicily, after having engaged to serve no more against king Joseph. The siege cost 1000 men to the besiegers, and as many to the besieged. General Vallongue of the engineers, one of the most distinguished officers of the corps, lost his life; the prince of Hesse Phillipstadt, governor of the place, was seriously wounded.

Massena immediately departed with the troops which the siege of Gaëta had rendered disposable, passed through Naples on the 1st of August, and hastened to the succour of general Reynier, who maintained himself at Cosenza in the midst of the revolted Calabrians. The reinforcement Massena brought amounted to 12,000 or 14,000 men, the principal body. It was more than was necessary, without counting on the presence of Massena, to drive the English into the sea. They so much expected him, that, at the news of the approach of the illustrious marshal, they embarked on the 5th of September. Massena had only the insurgents to fight. He found them more numerous and more obstinate than he had at first supposed. He was reduced to the necessity of burning several towns, and of destroying with the sword the troops of brigands that assassinated the French. He employed on this occasion his accustomed vigour, and succeeded in a few weeks in sensibly reducing the flame of insurrection. At the time when the grand events commenced in Prussia that are about to be recounted, tranquillity was restored in southern Italy, and king Joseph was enabled to believe himself established, for some time at least, in his new kingdom.

At the same epoch serious events took place in Dalmatia. The Russians continued to hold the mouths of the Cattaro. Napoleon, certifying himself as to their conduct upon this point, and above all as to their manner of obtaining possession of Corfu, had resolved to take the little republic of Ragusa, which separated Cattaro from the rest of Dalmatia. His sent his aide-de-camp, Lauriston, with a brigade of infantry, that he might establish himself there. Lauriston soon saw himself surrounded by the revolted Montenegrins and by a Russian corps of some thousand men. Blocked up by the English on the side of the sea, besieged on the land side by the ferocious mountaineers and by a regular Russian force, he found himself in real danger, to which, however, he showed a bold front. Fortunately general Molitor, his comrade in arms, as true as he was a firm and able officer in presence of an enemy, flew to his aid. This general, not following the example too frequent in the army of the Rhine,—to leave in peril a neighbour whom he did not like,—moved upon Ragusa spontaneously, by forced marches, with a corps of 4000 men, resolutely attacked the camp of the Russians and Montenegrins, carried it although it was strongly entrenched, and thus disengaged the French who were in the place. He put to the sword a great number of Montenegrins, and for a long time discouraged them from making incursions into Dalmatia.

It was not without trouble, as has been seen, that the French domination was established over these distant countries. It had required great battles to obtain them of Europe; it required daily combats to secure the inhabitants. At the other extremity of the empire, the foundation of a second royal family, that of Holland, offered difficulties of another kind, but fully as serious. The grave and peaceable Dutchmen were not a people to rise in insurrection, like the mountaineers of Calabria and Illyria; but they opposed their inertia to king Louis, and caused him no less embarrassment than the Calabrians caused Joseph. The government of the stadtholder had left many debts in Holland; the governments that succeeded had in their turn contracted very considerable ones, in order to meet the charges of the war, to such an extent that king Louis, on his arrival in Holland, had found a budget composed of 78,000,000 of florins and a revenue of 35,000,000. In this 78,000,000 of expenses the interest of the debt alone figured for 35,000,000 of florins. The rest had been expended in the service of the army, the navy, and the dikes. In spite of this situation of things, the Dutch would neither hear of new taxes nor of any reduction in the interest of the debt; because these money lenders by profession, accustomed to lend their capital to every government, foreign or national, regarded the debt as the most sacred of all property. The idea of a contribution levied upon the interest of stock,—which they had been brought to consider because that interest was in Holland the most extensive and most important of property, and consequently the largest basis for taxation,—the very idea made them revolt. It had been necessary to renounce it. They were therefore threatened, not with an insurrection, as at Naples, but with an interruption of all the public payments. The Hollanders were not hostile to the new sovereignty through hatred of monarchy or attachment to the house of Orange; but they ardently wished for a maritime peace, regretting the loss of that which was the source of their wealth still more than the republic or the stadtholderate. Having connexions of great interest with the English, and a conformity of manners not less considerable, they would have leaned towards them, had not the English notoriously coveted their colonies. Vainly was it said to them that, without the difficulty arising out of these same colonies, peace would be more easily made by one half; that their participation in the expenses of the war was the just price of the efforts made by France in all the negotiations to recover their maritime possessions; and that it would be right to abandon them if they would not contribute to support the contest;—vainly was all this said to them: they replied that they were ready to renounce their colonies to obtain peace. They spoke thus, while ready to raise a just clamour if France had treated on such a basis. It is possible to judge of the question to-day by the wealth of Java, whether it was a common interest that France defended in defending their colonies. King Louis acted the part that he thought easiest, which was to enter into the views of the Dutch people, and to attach them to him by acceding to their wishes. Without doubt, on accepting the government of a country, one is bound to espouse its interests; but it is necessary to distinguish between durable and fluctuating interests, it is necessary to serve the one to place oneself above the others; and if any one becomes king of a foreign country through the means of the arms of his own, it is necessary to renounce a character that obliges him to betray

either the one or the other. King Louis was not under this hard necessity, because the true policy of the Dutch would have consisted in uniting strongly with France against the maritime supremacy of England. To the triumph of that supremacy they owed the loss of the liberty of the seas, upon which they passed their lives, and of their colonies, without which they were unable to subsist. Endeavouring sooner to please them than to serve them, king Louis accepted a system of finance conformable to their monetary views. To the 35,000,000fl. of revenue there were added about 15,000,000fl. of new contributions, which carried up the total revenue to 50,000,000fl.; and to bring back the expense of 78,000,000fl. to 50,000,000fl. they reduced the army and navy proportionably. The king of Holland wrote to Paris, that he would abdicate the crown if these reductions were not assented to. Napoleon thus found with his own brothers the spirit of resistance of the allied people, that he had believed he should attach more strongly to himself by the institution of royalty in his family. He was deeply hurt at it, because, under this spirit of resistance, much ingratitude was concealed, as much on the part of the people that France had emancipated as on the part of the kings she had crowned. However, he did not let these sentiments escape; he replied, that he consented to the proposed reductions, but that Holland must not be astonished if, in the present or future negotiations, it were abandoned to its own means. Holland had truly, he said, the right to refuse its resources; but France had as well the right to refuse her support.

The closest secrets are soon penetrated by the malice of enemies. By a certain attitude of king Louis, they guessed his resistance to Napoleon, and he became extremely popular. This monarch affected further a severity of manner, which was to the taste of a wise and economical government, and thence he became yet more agreeable to the Dutch people. Still, while affecting simplicity, this same king wished for the expenses of a coronation and of a royal guard, hoping by this double means the better to assure to himself the possession of the throne of Holland, to which he clung more than he was willing to avow. Napoleon censured the institution of a royal guard, for the reasons already given to Joseph, and opposed himself peremptorily to the ceremony of a coronation at the instant when Europe was to be encircled by the flames of a general war. Thus, in these early days, the difficulties inherent in the family royalties were seen to discover themselves, the royalties that Napoleon, from affection and from system, had thought to establish. Independent allies would have certainly been worth more to his affection and to his power.

Such was the general progress of things throughout the vast extent of the French empire, at the same moment as the rupture took place with Prussia. Independently of the troops of the confederation of the Rhine and of the kingdom of Italy, Napoleon had about 500,000 men, among which must be comprehended the Swiss serving in virtue of agreements; in addition some Valaisins, Poles, and Germans, entered into the French service. After the ordinary deduction of the gendarmes, veterans, and invalids, there remained 450,000 efficient men. In this number there were comprized 130,000 beyond the Alps, including depôts; 170,000 in the grand army, quartered in the high palatinate and in Franconia; 5000 left in Holland; 5000 on board the vessels, and finally, 140,000 spread over the interior. These last comprehended the imperial guard, the regiments not employed without the country, and the depôts. Except some regiments of infantry, which were four battalions, all the others had only three, of which two were for service destined for the field, and one in depôt, generally placed on the frontier. The battalions of depôt of the grand army were ranged along the Rhine, from Huninguen as far as Wesel, some were in the camp at Boulogne. Those of the army of Italy were in Piedmont and Lombardy. Napoleon carried the extreme of care into the organization of the depôts. He wished the conscripts to be there a year in advance, in order that during the year they might be instructed, disciplined, habituated to fatigue, and become capable of replacing the old soldiers, that time or war had removed. The conscription of 1805, called out entire at the end of 1805, and half of that of 1806, called out at the commencement of 1806, had filled up the squares with men fit for service, of which a good number already trained had been sent into Italy and Germany. Napoleon, besides, had the second half of the class of 1806 called out, qualified with the title of Reserve in the laws of that day. The annual contingent furnished those 60,000 men, really proper to be incorporated; and a thing worthy of remark, they avoided yet to apply the conscription law in seven or eight departments of Britany and La Vendée. There were then 30,000 men more that might go to fill up the squares. The departure of men already trained produced a sufficient vacancy in which to place the newcomers. Napoleon, besides, wished to direct a great part of these last towards Italy. He took in regard to the conscripts destined to pass the Alps very particular precautions. Even before their incorporation, he made them depart in large detachments, conducted by officers, and clothed in uniform, in order not to show beyond the borders of the empire, isolated men marching in peasants' clothing.

After having provided for the increase of the army, Napoleon divided with consummate ability the entire of his forces.

Austria protested her pacific intentions. Napoleon replied by similar protestations; but he had nevertheless resolved to take measures, lest profiting by his own distance, she should think of throwing herself upon Italy. General Marmont occupied Dalmatia with 20,000 men. Napoleon enjoined it upon him, after having placed some detachments *en échelon*, from the centre of that province, as far as Ragusa, to keep the strength of his forces at Zara itself, a fortified city and capital of that country, to collect there provisions, arms, ammunition, and to make it, in fine, the pivot of all his operations, defensive or offensive. If he were attacked, Zara would serve him for a point of support, and allow him to make a long resistance. If, on the contrary, he should be obliged to concur in the operations of the army of Italy, he would have in that fortress a safe place to deposit his *materiel*, his wounded, all, in short, that was not

wanted in active warfare, and all that he could not take with him.

Eugene, viceroy of Italy, and the confidant of Napoleon's ideas, had an order to leave nothing in Dalmatia that was not absolutely necessary there, in men and *materiel*, and to unite all the rest in the strong fortresses. These fortresses since the conquest of the Venetian states had been the object of a new classification, ably calculated, and they were covered with labourers who constructed the works proposed by general Chasseloup, and ordered by Napoleon. The principal among them, and that most advanced towards Austria, was Palma Nova. It was, after the famous citadel of Alexandria, that of which Napoleon pushed the works most actively because it commanded the plain of Friuli. Then came in order, a little to the left, Osopo; next on the Adige, Legnago; on the Mincio, Mantua; and, finally, Alexandria on the Tanaro, the essential base of the French power in Italy. The order had been given to shut up in these places the artillery, which amounted to more than 800 pieces of cannon, and not to leave beyond their walls any thing whatever, cannon, musket, or projectile, that was possible to be taken by the enemy under a surprise. Venice, of which the defences were not yet perfected, but having the lagunes on her side, was added to this classification. Napoleon chose for the commander an officer of rare energy, general Miollis. He had left it to him to execute in all haste the works necessary to take advantage of the site, while awaiting the construction of regular works that would render the place impregnable. It was in these redoubts of Osopo, Palma Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, and Alexandria that Napoleon distributed his depôts. Those which belonged to the armies of Dalmatia and of Lombardy were divided in the fortresses, from Palma Nova to Alexandria, finally, to keep garrison there, and to be trained. Those which belonged to the army of Naples were united in the legations. It was towards those depôts that they were to direct the 15,000 or 20,000 conscripts destined for Italy. Napoleon repeating incessantly, that on the care bestowed upon the battalions in depôt depended the quality and the durability of an army, had dictated the necessary measures by which the health and the instruction of the men would be equally taken care of. The battalions would always be able to furnish, besides the regular recruiting of the war battalions, the garrisons of the fortresses; and more than that, one or two divisions of reinforcement ready to direct themselves on points where there might occur an unforeseen necessity. The defence of the fortresses being thus insured, the active army became entirely disposable. It consisted for Lombardy of 16,000 men spread over Friuli, and of 24,000 in *échelon* from Milan to Turin, the one and the other ready to march. There remained the army of Naples about 50,000 strong, of which a great part were in a state to act immediately. Massena was over these positions; if the war broke out with Austria, he was instructed to proceed to Upper Italy with 30,000 men, and to join them to the 40,000 that occupied Piedmont and Lombardy. There was no Austrian army capable of forcing the obstinate Massena, disposing of 70,000 French, having besides such points of support as Palma Nova, Osopo, Venice, Mantua, and Alexandria. Finally, in that case, general Marmont himself would play a useful character, because if he were blockaded in Mantua, he was certain of retaining before him 30,000 Austrians at least; and if he were not blockaded, he would be able to throw himself on the flank or the rear of the enemy.

Such were the instructions addressed to prince Eugene for the defence of Italy. They terminated in the following recommendation: "Read these instructions every day, and deliver an account in the evening of that which you would have executed in the morning, but without bustle, without effervescence of head, and without imparting alarm any where." (St. Cloud, 18th September, 1806.)

Napoleon, always preoccupied with what might tempt Austria while he should be in Prussia, ordered similar precautions on the side of Bavaria. He had enjoined it upon marshal Soult to leave a strong garrison in Braunau, a fortress of some importance because of its situation on the Inn. He had recommended the execution there of the most urgent works, and the accumulation of the wood that descended from the Alps by the Inn, saying, that "with arms and timber it was possible to make a place strong, where before there was nothing existing." He placed in garrison at Braunau, the 3rd of the line, a fine regiment of four battalions, of which three were of war, 500 artillery men, 500 cavalry, a Bavarian detachment, numerous officers of artillery, the whole composing a force of about 5000 men. He had collected provisions for eight months, a large quantity of ammunition, and a considerable sum of money; he added to those precautions the choice of an energetic commandant, giving him instructions worthy to serve as a lesson for all the governors of besieged cities. These instructions contained an order to defend himself to the utmost, not to surrender, except in case of absolute necessity, and after having supported three repeated assaults upon the body of the place.

Napoleon decided, besides, that a part of the Bavarian army, which was at his own disposal in virtue of the treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine, should be united on the borders of the Inn. He had ordered the formation of a division of 15,000 men of all arms, and to place them under the cannon of Braunau; with such forces, if they were not able to support a campaign, they were still a prime obstacle opposed to an enemy opening of a sudden, and a point of support ready prepared for the army that would come to the succour of Bavaria. Napoleon, in effect, however advanced he was in Germany, would always be able, after having distanced the Russians and Prussians by a victory, to face about, and throw himself by Silesia, or by Saxony, upon Bohemia, and to punish Austria severely if she dared to venture upon a fresh aggression. After having put himself on his guard against Austria, he considered those parts of the empire that the English threatened with a disembarkation.

He prescribed to his brother Louis to form a camp at Utrecht, composed of 12,000 or 15,000 Dutch, and of 5000 French remaining in Holland. He united about the fortress of Wesel, a new French acquirement, since the Duchy of Berg had been conferred upon Murat, a French division

of 10,000 or 12,000 men. King Louis would move upon Wesel, take the command of this division, and joining the troops of the camp of Utrecht to it, feign with 30,000 men an attack upon Westphalia. He even recommended him to spread the report of a union of 80,000 men, and to make some preparations of *materiel* proper to give belief to the report. Napoleon, for reasons soon to be understood, much desired to draw the attention of the Prussians to that side, but in reality he wished that king Louis should not withdraw himself too far from Holland, and should always hold himself ready either to defend his kingdom against the English, or to ally his movements with the French corps placed on the Rhine or at Boulogne. Besides these seven corps of the grand army, of which the duty was to make war at a distance, Napoleon resolved to form an eighth, under marshal Mortier, that should have for its duty to pivot about Mayence, to watch Hesse, to encourage by its presence the confederated Germans, in fine, to give the hand to king Louis towards Wesel. This corps, taken from the troops of the interior, would be 20,000 strong. It demanded all the industry of Napoleon to bring it to that number, because, of 140,000 men stationed in the interior of France, retrenching the depôts and the imperial guard, there remained very few that were disposable. Independently of the eighth corps, marshal Brune was this year charged, as he had been the preceding, to guard the flotilla of Boulogne, employing there the seamen and some battalions of depôt that amounted to about 18,000 men. Napoleon would not use the national guards but with extreme circumspection, because he feared to agitate the country, and to lay, above all, on too great a part of the population the weight of the war. Calculating, nevertheless, upon the warlike spirit of certain frontier provinces, he was not repugnant to levying in Lorraine, Alsace, and Flanders some detachments, not numerous but well selected, united with the companies *d'élite*, that is to say, with the grenadiers and voltigeurs, and paid up to the moment of their being displaced. He fixed the number for the north at 6000, and 6000 for the east. The 6000 national guards of the north, assembled under general Rampon, stationed at St. Omer, organized with care, but at a small distance from their homes, presented a useful reserve, always ready to proceed to marshal Brune, and to furnish him the aid of their patriotism. The 6000 national guards of the east were to assemble at Mayence, to form the garrison of that fortress, and thus to render more disposable the troops of marshal Mortier.

Marshal Kellerman, one of the veterans whom Napoleon was in the habit of placing at the head of reserves, commanded the depôts stationed along the Rhine, and while watching over their instruction, would be able, by using the soldiers already trained, to form a corps of some value, and if any danger threatened the Upper Rhine, to transfer himself rapidly thither.

Thanks to this union of means, there was wherewith to face all chances. If Hesse, for example, excited by the Prussians, created uneasiness, marshal Mortier, departing from Mayence, was in a state to move there with the eighth corps. King Louis, placed *en échelon*, would bring him a part of the corps of Utrecht and Wesel. If danger threatened Holland, king Louis and marshal Mortier had orders to unite. Marshal Brune himself would come there on his side. If, on the contrary, it was Boulogne that was in danger, marshal Brune would have recourse to king Louis for succour, his instructions commanding him to go, in case of need, towards that part of the frontiers of the empire. By this system of *échelons*, calculated with rigorous precision, all the points exposed to any accident whatever from the Upper Rhine as far as Holland, and from Holland to Boulogne, it would be possible to succour in proportion, and as rapidly as might be needed by the march of the most expeditious enemy.

There remained to protect the coasts of France from Normandy to Britany. Napoleon had left several regiments in these provinces, and, following his custom, he had assembled the companies *d'élite* in a flying camp at Pontivy to the number of 2400 grenadiers and voltigeurs. General Boyer had charge of their command. He had at his disposal secret funds, spies, and detachments of gendarmes. He was to patrol suspected places, and if a disembarkation threatened Cherberg or Brest, to throw himself there with the 2400 men that he had under his orders. Napoleon only kept at Paris a corps of 8000 men, composed of three regiments of infantry and some squadrons of cavalry. These regiments had received their contingent of conscripts. Junot, governor of Paris, had special orders to watch their instruction without ceasing, and to consider this as the first of his duties. These 8000 men were a last reserve ready to go every where that their presence might be required. Napoleon had conceived a means to make troops travel post, and he had employed it to transport the imperial guard in six days from Paris to the Rhine. The troops designed to travel in this mode, executed on the day of their departure a forced march on foot, then they were placed in cars or charrettes[1] that carried ten men, and that were ranged in *échelons* of ten in ten leagues, in such a manner as to go over twenty leagues a day. These cars were paid five francs the collar, and the farmers required to perform the service were far from complaining. Napoleon had this arrangement prepared for the roads of Picardy, Normandy, and Britany, with the object of transporting in four, five, or six days to Boulogne, Cherberg, or Brest the 8000 men left in Paris. The capital would in that case have been left to itself. "It is requisite," said Napoleon to prince Cambacérès, who expressed uneasiness upon the subject, "it is requisite that Paris should no longer be used to see such a great number of sentinels at every corner of a street." There would only remain in Paris the municipal guard, then amounting to 3000 men. The name of Napoleon, and the tranquillity of the time, dispensed with the necessity of a larger amount of force to be the guard of the capital.

As to the ports of Toulon and Genoa, Napoleon had left in them sufficient garrisons. But he well knew that the English were not ill-advised enough to make an attempt upon places so strong. He had no serious fears except in relation to Boulogne.

[1] *Charrettes* are carts having only two wheels. *Translator.*

Thus in the great circle which his foresight embraced, he had warded off all possible danger. If Austria, carrying to Prussia that aid which she had not herself received, took a part in the war, the army of Italy, concentrated under Massena, and supported upon fortresses of the first order, such as Palma Nova, Mantua, Venice, and Alexandria, was able to oppose 70,000 men to the Austrians, whilst, with 12,000 or 15,000, general Marmont threw himself on their flank by way of Dalmatia. The Inn, Braunau, and the Bavarians would suffice in the first moment for the defence of Bavaria; marshal Kellerman had the depôts with which to cover the Upper Rhine; marshal Mortier, king Louis, and marshal Brune, by a movement one on the others, were in a state to unite 50,000 men on any point threatened, from Mayence as far as the Helder, and from the Helder to Boulogne. Finally, Paris, in a pressing moment of peril, would be able to reduce itself to the troops of the police, and to send a corps of reserve to the coasts of Normandy and Britany.

These different combinations, reduced to a striking lucidness, with the care of the most minute details, had been communicated to prince Eugene, to king Joseph, to marshals Kellerman, Mortier, and Brune, in a word, to all those who were to concur in their execution. Each of them knew what was necessary to acquit himself of his task. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, placed in the centre, and charged to give orders in the name of the emperor, had alone received a communication of the entire plan.

Twenty-four or forty-eight hours sufficed Napoleon to arrange his plans and order the details when he had resolved to act. He then dictated, during one or two days, almost without stopping, as many as one or two hundred letters, which have all been preserved, and all of which remain everlasting models of the art of administration to armies and empires. Prince Berthier, the habitual interpreter of his will, having remained at Munich on account of the affairs of the Confederation of the Rhine, he sent for general Clark, and devoted the 18th and 19th of September to dictating his orders to him. Napoleon foresaw that twenty days would still pass away in vain explanations with Prussia, after which war would inevitably commence, because explanations were thenceforth powerless in terminating such a quarrel. He would, therefore, employ those twenty days in perfecting the grand army, and in providing all that yet seemed necessary for that purpose.

It is not in twenty days that it is possible to place a numerous army on a war footing, if the regiments that composed it should each be on its own side completely organized. The distribution into brigades and divisions, forming its staff, procuring parks, equipages, and *materiel* of all kinds, still demands a sequel of long and complicated operations. But Napoleon, surprised the preceding year by Austria, at the moment he was about to pass over to England, and this year by Prussia on his return from Austerlitz, had his army all ready, and at this time entirely transported to the theatre of war when it was in the Upper Palatinate and Franconia. It had nothing wanting under any head. Discipline, training, the habit of warfare recently renewed in an immortal campaign, forces refreshed by a rest of some months, perfect health, ardour for combat, love of glory, devotion to its chief beyond limit, it lacked nothing. If it had lost something of that regularity in manœuvring which distinguished it on quitting Boulogne, it had replaced that quality more apparent than solid, by a confidence and freedom of movement which cannot be acquired but upon fields of battle. Its clothing worn, but suitable, added to its martial appearance. As has been said elsewhere, it had not wished to draw from the depôts either pay or new clothing, reserving to itself the enjoyment of all this during the fêtes that Napoleon had prepared for it in September; fêtes superb, but, alas! chimerical! as the million of promises made formerly by the convention! This heroic army, devoted henceforth to continental war, was to know no more any other fêtes than battles, entries into conquered capitals, and the admiration of the vanquished. It was much if any of those brave men that composed it were destined to regain their homes and to die amid the calm of peace! Even if such there were, in growing old they were condemned to see their country invaded, dismembered, and deprived of the greatness that it owed to the effusion of their generous blood!

Still, however well an army may be prepared, it is never so to such a point that it has no need of any thing more. Napoleon, to his great experience in the organization of troops, joined a personal knowledge of his army truly extraordinary. He knew the sojourn, state, and strength of all his regiments. He knew what was wanting to each in men or in *materiel*, and if they had left some detachment which weakened it, he knew where to find it. His first care always was to warm the soldier, and to protect him from cold. He immediately sent off shoes and great coats. He would have every man with a pair of shoes on his feet and two pair in his knapsack. One of the two pairs was given as a present to all the corps: the pay of the soldier is so moderate that the smallest gift is not without its value. He ordered the purchase in France and in foreign countries of all the saddle and draft horses that could be procured. The army had not actually need of them; but in his solicitude about the depôts, he wished that horses should not be wanting any more than men. He afterwards ordered three or four hundred men per regiment to leave the depôts, which could be refilled with conscripts, in order to carry up the war battalions to an effective force of eight or nine hundred men each, knowing that after two months in the field they would be reduced to that of six or seven hundred. The strength of the grand army would be augmented 20,000 men, and it then became possible to discharge the soldiers worn out with fatigue; since for this army of the revolution there had not until now been any term to its devotedness, save wounds or death. There were seen in the ranks old soldiers, attached to their regiments as to a family; free of every service, but always ready in danger to display their former bravery; profiting by their leisure to recount to their young successors the marvellous exploits in which they had borne a part. There were, more than all, in the rank of captain, officers who were no longer in a state to serve. Napoleon ordered that there should be taken from the mili-

tary schools all the young men that by their age were fit for active warfare, in order to form them into officers. He appreciated highly the subjects furnished by these schools: he found them not only instructed, but brave; because education elevates the courage as well as the mind.

After having thus taken means to perfect the army, he directed himself to the organization of the equipages. He wished them to be increased in expedition and to be little encumbered with baggage. Experience did not permit him to pass by the magazines, as has sometimes been pretended; for he did not overlook any kind of provision, and not more the necessary provision than the fortresses. But the offensive system of war, which he preferred to every other, did not permit him to create magazines to any extent; because it would have been necessary to do this upon the enemy's territory, which he had been accustomed to invade at the commencement of operations. His system of supplying provisions consisted in living every day upon the country occupied; to extend himself sufficiently to acquire food, but not enough to be dispersed; and then to bring along after him bread for several days' consumption. This last provision, managed with care and renewed when he halted, served in case of extraordinary concentrations which preceded or followed battles. In order to carry it out, Napoleon had calculated that two caissons would be wanted for a battalion, and one for a squadron. In adding to them the carriages necessary for the wounded and sick, four or five hundred would suffice for the entire wants of the army. He expressly forbade that any officer or any general should use for his own purposes the conveyances belonging to the army. The conveyances of the army were then executed by a company, which let out to the state the caissons ready harnessed. Having discovered that one of the marshals, favoured by the company, had several carriages at his own disposal, Napoleon reproved this infraction of the regulations with the utmost severity, and made prince Berthier responsible for the fulfilment of his orders. The army was then exempt from the abuses that time and the increasing wealth of its chiefs soon introduced.

Napoleon afterwards commanded great collections of corn to be made along the Rhine, and an immense supply of biscuit. These provisions were to be united at Mayence, and from Mayence forwarded by the navigation of the Mein to Wurtzburg. Situated in Upper Franconia, quite near the defiles that open in Saxony, and commanded by an excellent citadel, Wurtzburg was to be the base of operations. Napoleon therefore endeavoured to discover if, in the neighbourhood, there might be yet other fortified posts. The officers sent to reconnoitre secretly, having designated Kronach and Forcheim, he ordered them to be armed, and that there should be placed in those places the provisions, ammunition, and tools, of which he had ordered the collection.

Wurtzburg had belonged for some months to the archduke Ferdinand, who had been successively grand duke of Tuscany, elector of Salzburg, and finally, since the last peace with Austria, duke of Wurtzburg. This prince solicited his junction with the Confederation of the Rhine, in the midst of which his new states were enclosed. He was mild, intellectual, and as well disposed towards the French as it was possible for an Austrian prince to be; and they were certain to obtain from him all the facilities that could be desired for the preparations that they wished to make. Wurtzburg therefore became the centre of the assemblages of men and *materiel* ordered by Napoleon.

Money had no more been wanting since the financial crisis of the preceding winter. Napoleon besides had in the treasury of the army a precious resource. Without expending this treasure, exclusively dedicated to endowments for his soldiers, he made loans from it, which were reimbursed by the state afterwards, that paying the interest and capital of the sums borrowed. Napoleon had sent much money to Strasburgh, and confided these funds to prince Berthier, to overcome by the influence of ready money the obstacles that might be encountered in the execution of his desires.

The imperial guard had travelled post, as has been seen—thanks to the relays of cars prepared on the road. They had thus forwarded 3000 grenadiers and foot chasseurs. Not being able to use this mode of transport for the cavalry and artillery, they were sent by the ordinary way, the grenadiers and horse chasseurs forming nearly 3000 men, as well as the park of artillery of the guard, consisting of forty pieces of cannon. This was a reserve of 7000 men, proper to ward off all unforeseen accidents. Napoleon, as prudent in the execution as hardy in the conception of his plans, made a great point of reserves, and it was before all other objects for creating one that he had instituted the imperial guard. But prompt to discover the inconveniences attached to the best things, he found the support of this guard too expensive, and in recruiting that it impoverished the army of its select men. The Velites, a species of troops voluntarily engaged, of which he had conceived the creation, to augment the guard without weakening the army, had appeared to him as too costly and not sufficiently numerous. He ordered therefore the composition, under the title of fusileers of the guard, of a new regiment of infantry, of which all the men should be selected in the annual contingent, the officers and sub-officers of which should be taken into the guard, wear its uniform, serve with it, and only be treated as a young body of troops; that is to say, be less spared under fire, enjoy a slight augmentation of pay, and soon acquire all the qualities of the guard itself, without costing as much and without depriving the army of its best soldiers. In awaiting the result of this ingenious combination, Napoleon had recourse to the means used to extract from the corps and to unite in battalions the companies of grenadiers and of voltigeurs. It was thus that he formed, in 1804, the grenadiers of Arras, that afterwards became the grenadiers of Oudinot. He had taken at that moment the companies of grenadiers of all the regiments which were designed to make a part in the expedition from Boulogne. After the battle of Austerlitz, several of those companies had been sent to their regiments. Napoleon ordered to be joined to those which remained together, the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the depôts and regiments stationed in the 25th and 26th military divisions, the country comprised between the Rhine, the

Meuse, and the Sambre; to organize them into battalions of six companies each, and to march them to Mayence. This was a new corps of 7000 men, that joined to the imperial guard would carry the reserves of the army to 14,000 men. He added to them 2400 chosen dragoons, formed into battalions of four companies or squadrons, which serve, whether on foot or on horseback, always at the side of the guard. These dragoons, drawn from Champaign, Burgundy, Lorraine, and Alsace, were able to be transported to the Mein in twenty days.

Those reserves of which the composition is thus described, added to the conscripts taken from the depôts, went to augment considerably the force ready to march against Prussia. The grand army was composed of seven corps, of which six only were in Germany, the second being in Dalmatia under the orders of marshal Marmont. The commanders of these corps remained the same. Marshal Bernadotte commanded the first corps, 20,000 men strong; marshal Davout commanded the third, 27,000 strong; marshal Soult was at the head of the fourth, of 32,000 men; marshal Lannes, always devoted, but always sensitive and irritable, had for a moment quitted the fifth corps, in consequence of some passing discontent. He now came to retake the command, on the first rumour of the war. His corps amounted to 22,000 men, even after the grenadiers of Oudinot no longer made a part of it. Marshal Ney continued to command the sixth, of which there remained an effective force of 20,000 men under colours. The seventh, under marshal Augereau, reckoned 17,000. The reserve of cavalry dispersed to forage in a fertile country was able to muster 28,000 horsemen. Murat, always charged with this command, had received orders to quit the duchy of Berg. He hastened with delight to recommence a species of war which he conducted so well, and to get a glimpse, as the price of his exploits, no more of a duchy, but of a kingdom.

These six corps, with the reserve of cavalry, did not present less than 170,000 combatants. In adding to it the guard, the picked troops, the staff, and the park of reserve, it might be said that the grand army amounted to about 190,000 men. It was to be presumed that in the first days of the campaign they would not be entirely assembled, because of the guard and the chosen companies there had only arrived the foot guards. But 170,000 men sufficed, and beyond, for the commencement of the war. The corps were composed of the same divisions, of the same brigades, and of the same regiments, as in the last campaign; a wise disposition, because soldiers and officers had learned to know each other, and were proud each of the other. As to the general organization it continued to be the same. It was that which Napoleon had substituted for the organization of the army of the Rhine, and of which he had proved the excellence in the Austrian campaign, the first of all where 200,000 men had been seen marching under only one chief. The army was always divided into corps which were complete in infantry and artillery, but which had not in fact any cavalry, except some chasseurs and hussars to guard them. The great mass of the cavalry was always concentrated under Murat, and placed directly under the hand of Napoleon, from motives which have been explained elsewhere. The guard and the chosen companies formed a general reserve of every arm, never quitting Napoleon, and marching near him, not to watch over his person, but to carry out his ideas more rapidly.

The orders for movement were given in such a manner as to be executed during the first days of October. Napoleon enjoined it upon marshals Ney and Soult to meet in the country of Bareuth, in order to form the right of the army. He ordered marshals Davout and Bernadotte to unite around Bamberg, to form the centre; and marshals Lannes and Augereau to join in the environs of Coburg, to form the left. He thus concentrated his forces upon the frontiers of Saxony, in a military view of which the extent and profundity will soon be appreciated. Murat had ordered the cavalry to assemble at Wurtzburg. The foot guard, in six days transported to the Rhine, marched towards the same point. The different corps were to be at their posts on the 3rd or 4th of October. He expressly recommended them not to pass the frontiers of Saxony.

All being prepared, whether for the security of the empire or for the active state of warfare he was going to undertake, Napoleon resolved to quit Paris. He looked for nothing new in his relations with Prussia. The minister M. de Laforest had kept the silence prescribed to him by Napoleon; but he sent word that the king, governed by the passions of the court and of the young aristocracy, being gone to the army, he had no more hope of preventing war, except the two monarchs, present at their head quarters, should exchange some direct explanations, which should cause such a deplorable misunderstanding to be put an end to, and thus satisfy the pride of the two governments. Unhappily such explanations were ground for little hope. M. de Knobelsdorf, remaining at Paris, protested the pacific intentions of his cabinet. Little initiated in the secret of affairs, not partaking nor comprehending the passions which carried away his court, he played near Napoleon the character of a respected but useless personage. The intelligence from the north represented Russia as pressed to respond to the wishes of Prussia, and to be entirely occupied with its armies. The news from Austria represented her as enfeebled, full of rancour in regard to Prussia, and as not giving France any ground for fear, unless in case of a great reverse. As to England, Mr. Fox once dead, the war party, thenceforth triumphant, had resumed its pretensions and unacceptable propositions; such as the concession of the Balearic isles, Sicily, and Dalmatia, to the Bourbons of Naples—that is to say, to the English themselves—propositions that Lord Lauderdale, himself a friend to peace, supported methodically, and with a simple ignorance of the real intentions of his cabinet. Napoleon would not dismiss him huffingly; but he addressed a reply to him which was equivalent to the mission of his passports. He afterwards prescribed a communication to the senate, which should expose the long negotiations of France with Prussia, and the sad conclusion to which they had been brought. He ordered the communication to be deferred until the war was irrevocably declared between the two courts. Still,

as it was necessary to ascribe a motive for his departure from Paris, he caused it to be announced, that, at the moment when the powers of the north took a threatening attitude, he believed it necessary to place himself at the head of his army, in order to be in a state to meet all chances. He held a last council, to explain to the dignitaries of the empire their character and duties under the different aspect of affairs which might present itself. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, the man for whom he reserved all his confidence, even when he left at Paris his two brothers, Joseph and Louis, would possess much more when he left there none of the princes of his family. Napoleon intrusted to him the most extensive powers, under the different titles of president of the senate, president of the council of state, and president of the council of the empire. Junot, one of the men most devoted to the emperor, had the command of the troops quartered in the capital. There only remained in Paris the women of the imperial family. Yet Josephine, fearful to see Napoleon exposed to new dangers, demanded and obtained permission to follow him to the banks of the Rhine. She hoped, by establishing herself at Mayence, to be sooner and more frequently informed of what might occur to him. Besides the government of the empire, the arch-chancellor had that of the imperial family. It was committed to him to advise and to restrain the individuals of that family, who were wanting in any thing, or in that propriety and in those regulations traced by the emperor himself.

Napoleon departed in the night of the 24th and 25th of September, accompanied by the empress and M. de Talleyrand, stopped some hours at Metz to inspect the fortress, and then proceeded straight to Mayence, where he arrived on the 28th. He was apprised there that a courier from Berlin, who would deliver him the last explanations of the court of Prussia, had crossed him on the road, and continued his journey to Paris. He was not, therefore, able to obtain, except by advancing into Germany, the definitive explanations which he awaited. He saw at Mayence marshal Kellerman, spoke about the organizations of the depôts, and marshal Mortier charged with the command of the eighth corps. He explained to them anew how he wished them to conduct themselves, in case of any unforeseen event. He caused the provisioning of Mayence to be completed ; some modifications to be made in the armament of the fortress ; pressed the departure of the young soldiers drawn from the depôts ; the transportation of the provisions and ammunition designed to pass from the Rhine into the Mein, then to remount by the Mein as far as Wurtzburg. A troop of officers under orders went in all directions, one presenting himself every instant to render an account of the messages which he had fulfilled, habituated to affirm nothing that he had not seen with his own eyes ; thus they went and came without cessation, in order to make Napoleon acquainted with the true state of things, and the point to which the execution of his orders had arrived. At Mayence, Napoleon sent back his civil household, in order to keep with him his military household alone. He was not able to restrain himself from a momentary emotion on seeing the tears of the empress flow. Although he was full of confidence, he finished by giving way to the general uneasiness, that gave birth around him to the prospect of a long war in the north, in regions far away, against new nations : he therefore separated with some pain from Josephine and M. de Talleyrand, and advanced beyond the Rhine, soon distracted by his own vast thoughts, and by the spectacle of immense preparations, from a kind of emotion that he willingly expelled from his heart, more willingly still from his imperious and calm countenance.

A great influx of generals and German princes waited at Wurtzburg to offer him their homage. The new duke of Wurtzburg, proprietor and sovereign of the place, had preceded all the others. This prince, whom he had known in Italy, recalled to Napoleon the first days of his glory, as well as the most amicable relations, because he was the only one of the Italian sovereigns that he had not found employed in doing mischief to the French army. Thus he had not been brought, without pain, to oblige him to submit to his share of the general vicissitude. Napoleon was received in the palace of the ancient bishops of Wurtzburg, a magnificent palace, little inferior to that of Versailles, a pompous monument of the riches of the German church, formerly so powerful, and so largely endowed, now so poor and shattered. He had with the archduke Ferdinand a long conference on the general situation of things, and particularly on the disposition of the court of Austria, of which this prince was a near relative, when he was brother of the emperor Francis, and of which he had a perfect knowledge. The duke de Wurtzburg, the friend of peace, having the intelligence of the Austrian princes educated in Tuscany, wished, for the interest of his own repose, for a good understanding between Austria and France. He took occasion of the last events to speak to Napoleon upon the serious questions of alliances, to decry to him that of Prussia, and praise that of Austria. He suggested to him some of the ideas that had prevailed in the last century, when the two cabinets of Versailles and Vienna united against that of Berlin, were, at the same time, allied by marriage and a war in common. He reminded him that this alliance had been the brilliant epoch of the French navy, and endeavoured to demonstrate to him that France, powerful on the continent more than she had any need to be, actually wanted the maritime power necessary to re-establish and protect her commerce, ruined during the preceding twenty years. This discourse was nothing novel to Napoleon, because M. de Talleyrand had daily made it resound in his ears. The duke of Wurtzburg appeared to believe that the court of Vienna would voluntarily seize this opportunity to draw towards France, and to create in her a point of support, in place of an enemy that unceasingly threatened her. Napoleon, disposed under *present* circumstances to welcome similar ideas, was so much touched by them that he wrote himself to M. de la Rochefoucauld, his ambassador, and ordered him to make amicable overtures at Vienna, overtures sufficiently reserved that his dignity should not be hurt by them, but sufficiently significative for Austria to know, that it depended upon herself to form closer relations with France [1].

[1] The following letter is quoted, written by Napoleon to

However powerful and confident Napoleon might be, he began to believe that without a great continental alliance, he should be always exposed to the renewal of coalitions, turned away from his contest with England, and obliged to expend upon land the resources that it would have been needful to expend exclusively upon the sea. The alliance of Prussia, which he had cultivated unhappily with too little care, had now escaped from him, and he was naturally conducted to the idea of an alliance with Austria. But this idea, very recent with him, was the illusion of a moment, little worthy his former clear-sightedness. Undoubtedly, if he had desired all at once to pay the sacrifice of his new alliance, and to return to Austria some of the spoils which he had taken from her, the accordance might have been possible and sincere; God knows it! But how demand of Austria, deprived in ten years of the Low Countries, of Lombardy, of the duchies of Modena and Tuscany, of Suabia, the Tyrol, and the Germanic crown—how ask her to ally herself to the conqueror who had taken away so much of her territory and power? It was well to be able to hope for neutrality, after the promise given at the bivouac of Urschitz, and under the influence of the recollections of Rivoli, Marengo, and Austerlitz; but to bring about an alliance was a chimera of M. de Talleyrand and the duke of Wurtzburg, one yielding to his personal tastes, the other governed by the interests of his new position. This tendency to seek out a now impossible alliance, well showed what fault had been committed in so slightly treating the alliance of Prussia, which was at the time possible, easy, and founded upon great common interests. Furthermore, this approach towards Austria was an essay, which Napoleon attempted in a passing way, in order not to neglect a useful idea, but of which he did not regard the success as indispensable, in the high state of power to which he was carried. He hoped, in effect, in spite of all that had been said of the Prussians, to beat them so quickly and completely, that he would soon have Europe at his feet, and in place of an ally, the exhaustion of his enemies in default of their good will.

The king of Wirtemberg, an important member of the confederation of the Rhine, was seen again arriving at Wurtzburg, formerly a simple elector, now actually a king by the hand of Napoleon, a prince known by his passionate character and by his mental penetration. Napoleon had to regulate with him the details of a marriage already agreed upon, between prince Jerome Bonaparte and the princess Catherine of Wirtemberg. After employing himself in this family affair, Napoleon came to an understanding with the king of Wirtemberg on the concurrence of the confederation of the Rhine, that, altogether, would furnish about 40,000 men, independently of 15,000 Bavarians concentrated around Braunau. The German auxiliaries were found ill inclined to serve under marshal Bernadotte, during the Austrian campaign. The Bavarians, above all the rest, requested as a special favour not to be any more in obedience to that marshal. It was decided that all the German auxiliaries should be united into one body, and that it should be placed after the grand army, under the orders of prince Jerome, who had quitted the naval service for that of the land. This prince being designed to marry a German princess, and probably to receive his dowry in Germany, it was wise to familiarize him with the Germans and the Germans with him.

The conversation of the French emperor and the German monarch afterwards turned upon the court of Prussia. The king of Wirtemberg was able to give Napoleon useful information, because he had his hands full of letters written from Berlin, which painted with vivacity the excitement that had carried away all heads, even those that might have been supposed the most sane. The duke of Brunswick, whom his age and his sound reason should have preserved from the general impulse, had himself ceded to it; and he had written to the

M. de la Rochefoucauld as a proof of the dispositions that are ascribed to him at that moment. It is not needful to attribute the violent expressions of which he makes use in regard to Prussia to any thing but the irritation which at that moment inspired him at the unexpected conduct of this court in his regard. It was not in these terms that he ordinarily expressed himself, above all towards the king of Prussia, for whom he never ceased to feel and to profess a real esteem:—

"To M. de la Rochefoucauld, my embassador with the emperor of Austria.

"*Wurtzburg, October* 3, 1806.

"I have been at Wurtzburg since yesterday, which has caused me a long conference with his royal highness. I have made him acquainted with my firm resolution to break all the bonds of alliance which attach me to Prussia, whatever may be the result of existing affairs. According to my last intelligence from Berlin, it is possible that war may not take place; but I am resolved not to be the ally of a power so versatile and so despicable. I shall doubtless remain at peace with her, because I have not the right to shed the blood of my people upon vain pretexts. Nevertheless, the necessity of turning my efforts towards my navy renders an alliance on the continent necessary for me. Circumstances have led me to an alliance with Prussia; but this power is to-day that which it was in 1740, and at all times, contemptible and destitute of honour. I have esteemed the emperor of Austria, even in the midst of his reverses, and of the events which have separated us. I believe him constant and faithful to his word. You will explain yourself in this sense, still without giving to it too much of a misplaced earnestness. My position and my strength are such that I need have no apprehension of any one; but, in fact, all these efforts are a weight upon my people; of the three powers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, one is requisite to me as an ally. In any case one cannot trust Prussia; there only remains Russia and Austria. The navy formerly flourished in France, through the benefit we received from an alliance with Austria. This power, besides, has need of remaining in a state of tranquillity, a sentiment in which I share with all my heart. An alliance founded on the independence of the Ottoman empire, on the guarantee of our states, and on the reconcilements which will consolidate the repose of Europe, and enable me, at the same time, to direct my efforts on the side of my navy, would be convenient to me. The house of Austria having often made me insinuations, the actual moment, if she knows how to profit by it, is the most favourable of all. I need not say more to you. I have made my sentiments known more in detail to the prince of Benevento, who will not be wanting to give you instructions. For the rest your duty is fulfilled, the moment you have made known, in the slightest way possible, that I am not far distant from an adherence to a system which may strengthen my ties with Austria. Do not fail to have an eye upon Moldavia and Wallachia, in order to make me acquainted with the movements of Russia against the Ottoman empire. NAPOLEON."

king of Wirtemberg, threatening him soon to place the Prussian eagles in Stutgard, if that prince did not abandon the confederation of the Rhine. The king of Wirtemberg, little intimidated by such kind of threats, showed all these letters to Napoleon, who turned them to purpose, and conceived against the court of Prussia a double degree of irritation. Napoleon obtained much information respecting the Prussian army and its real merits. The king of Wirtemberg praised to him beyond measure the Prussian cavalry, and represented it as so formidable, that Napoleon, struck by what he thus came to understand, in speaking himself to all his officers, took care to prepare them for this kind of encounter. Recalling to their recollection the manner of manœuvring in Egypt, he said to them, with that vivacity of expression which was his own, that it would be needful to march upon Berlin "in a square of 200,000 men."

Although Napoleon had not received from the court of Prussia any definitive declaration, he decided, on the sole fact of the invasion of Saxony by the Prussian army, to consider war as declared. The preceding year he had qualified as an act of hostility the invasion of Bavaria by Austria; this year he qualified equally as an act of hostility the invasion of Saxony by Prussia. This manner of placing the question was able, because he did not appear to intervene in Germany but for the protection of the German princes of the second order against those of the first. On these grounds the war was completely declared that moment, because the Prussians had passed the Elbe, on the bridge of Dresden, and already bordered on the extreme frontier of Saxony, as the French bordered upon it on their side in occupying the Franconian territory.

It is not possible to comprehend the plan of the campaign of Napoleon against Prussia, one of the finest and greatest that was ever conceived and executed, if a regard is not had to the general configuration of Germany.

Austria and Prussia divide between them the territory of Germany, as they divide its riches, domination, and policy, leaving between them a certain number of small states, that their geographical situation, the laws of the empire, and French influence have maintained to this time in their independence. Austria is at the east of Germany, and Prussia on the north. Austria occupies and fills nearly in entirety that fine valley of the Danube, long, sinuous, at first bound in between the Alps and the mountains of Bohemia, then opening below Vienna, and becoming wide to the extent of a hundred leagues between the Carpathian mountains and those of Illyria, embracing in those vast tracts the kingdom of Hungary. It is at the bottom of this valley that it is requisite to go to find Austria, in passing from the Upper Rhine between Strasburg and Basle, in traversing afterwards the defiles of Suabia, and in descending by a perilous march the course of the Danube, as far as the basin in the midst of which Vienna rises and domineers. Prussia, on the contrary, is established in the vast plains of the north, of which she occupies the entrance. It is for that reason Prussia was formerly called the "March of Brandenburg." To reach her it is not necessary to mount the Upper Rhine to Basle, but to pass it towards the middle of its course at Mayence, or to descend it as far as Wesel, and also pass over it, or turn the mountainous centre of Germany. Scarcely is one arrived beyond the mountains, little elevated, of Franconia, of Thuringia, and of Hesse, when an immense plain opens, where successively flow the Weser, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, and Niemen, that terminate to the north in the Northern Ocean, and to the east in the Oural mountains. It is this plain which is styled Westphalia, Hanover, Prussia for the whole length of the North Sea, Poland in the interior of the continent, and Russia as far as the Oural mountains. On the slope of the mountains of Germany by which it is reached,—that is to say, in Saxony, in Thuringia, and Hesse,—it is covered with solid vegetable earth, and along the borders of the rivers with a rich alluvial soil. But in the intervals which separate the rivers, and, above all, along the sea, it is constantly sandy: the waters, without drainage, form there an innumerable quantity of lakes and marshes. For land it only offers sandy downs; for the sole vegetation, pines, birches, and some oaks. It is serious and melancholy as the sea, of which it often recalls the image; as the vegetation, pointed and sombre, with which it is covered; as the sky of the north. It is very fertile on the banks of the rivers, but in the interior cultivation is thin, developing itself here and there in the midst of cleared spaces in pine forests; and if sometimes it offers the spectacle of abundance, it is where numerous cattle have fertilized the soil. But such is the power of economy, perseverance, and courage, that in these sands a state of the first order has been formed, if not rich, at least easy in circumstances,—Prussia, the hardy and patient labour of a great man, Frederick II., and of a succession of princes, who, before and after Frederick II., without having his genius, were animated with the same feeling. Such is also the power of civilization, that from the bosom of these marshes, surrounded with sandy hillocks, shady with pines and birches, the great Frederick made the royal house of Potsdam proceed, the Versailles of the north, where the genius of the arts has known how to stamp with grace and elegance the melancholy of these sombre and cold regions.

The Elbe, the first great river that is encountered in this plain when we descend from the mountains in the centre of Germany, is the principal seat of the Prussian power, the bulwark that covers it, and the vehicle that carries its produce. In its upper course it waters the fields of Saxony, traverses Dresden, and bathes the foot of the fortress of Torgau, formerly Saxon. Afterwards it passes through the midst of Prussia; surrounds Magdeburg, its principal fortress; protects Berlin, its capital, beyond which it is placed, at an equal distance from the Elbe and the Oder, between lakes, sandy downs, and canals. Lastly, before falling into the North Sea, it forms the port of the rich city of Hamburg, which introduces into Germany, by the waters of that river, the productions of the universe. The ambition of Prussia to possess its entire course will be comprehended by this simple trace of the course of the Elbe; and its desire to absorb Saxony on one side, and on the other the Hanseatic towns and Hanover,—an ambition which at this day only slumbers, because all the European powers, glutted at the expense of

France in 1815, appear to slumber for the time. But at the period of which the history is now retraced, the movement among the different states had set all their desires in a flame, and in open day Prussia had demanded the Hanseatic towns of France. As to Saxony, she had never dared to demand other than dependence under the title of the northern confederation; and it is natural that Napoleon should experience on the occasion of Saxony all the jealousy that he had experienced about Bavaria, when he committed the fault to be jealous of Prussia.

The Elbe, therefore, is the river that it was needful to reach and pass when making war upon Prussia, as the Danube was that of which it was necessary to descend the course when making war upon Austria. As soon as the passage of the Elbe was forced, the defences of Prussia fell, because Saxony was taken, Magdeburg was annihilated, and Berlin was no longer protected. Even the roads of traffic were occupied by the assailants, which would be a serious thing if the war should be prolonged. Thus, while obliged, in regard to the Danube, after having arrived towards its source, to descend it towards Vienna, in regard to the Elbe it sufficed to pass it to attain the principal object; and to conceive the vast designs of Napoleon, it thus became necessary to march to the Oder, to interpose between Prussia and Russia for the purpose of intercepting the aid of one to the other. It was requisite to advance even as far as to the Vistula to beat Russia in Poland; and, having so much resentment against her, to follow the example of Hannibal, which went to establish the war in the enemy's Italian provinces, groaning under the ill-fixed yoke of ancient Rome. Such is the scale of this immense march towards the north, that only a single man has until now attempted — Napoleon. Will this march ever be attempted again? Of that the universe remains ignorant,—ignorant if it is the intention of Providence that there shall be at least one serious attempt for the advantage of the liberty and independence of the West.

But to attempt this northern plain, at the entrance of which Prussia is situated, it is needful to traverse the mountainous country which forms the centre of Germany; or to turn it in proceeding to gain the even country, that under the name of Westphalia extends between the mountains and the North Sea.

This country, which closes the entrance of Prussia, is composed of a group of woody heights, long and broad, which on one side join Bohemia, and on the other ascend north, as far as the plains of Westphalia, in the midst of which it terminates, rising again for a moment to form the summits of the Hartz, so rich in metals. This mountainous group, which separates the waters of the Rhine from those of the Elbe, covered in its upper part with forests, throws into the Rhine the waters of the Mein, the Lahn, the Sieg, the Ruhr, and the Lippe; and into the Elbe, the Elster, the Saale, the Unstruct, and, in fact, directly into the North Sea, the Ems and the Weser.

Different routes offer themselves to be traversed towards Prussia. First, it is possible in leaving Mayence, to go to the right, remount the sinuous valley of the Mein, as far as above Wurtzburg, and even as far as its sources. There, in the environs of Coburg, the wooded summits are encountered, that, under the name of the forest of Thuringia, separates Franconia from Saxony, and from which the Mein escapes on one side, and the Saale on the other. They are traversed by three defiles: those of Bayreuth to Hof, of Kronach to Schleitz, of Coburg to Saalfield, there descending into Saxony by the valley of the Saale. This is the first route. To the left of the wooded summits that form the forest of Thuringia, the second route is found. To follow it, the Mein is remounted from Mayence as far as Hanau; there it is left to plunge into the valley of the Werra, or the Fulda country; the forest of Thuringia is left to the right; it descends by Eisenach, Gotha, and Weimar, into the plains of Thuringia and Saxony, and arrives on the borders of the Elbe. This last road has always been the great German road, that of Frankfort to Leipsic.

The third road, finally, consists in turning the mountainous centre of Germany, and ascending towards the north, so far as to attain the plain of Westphalia, which is done by following the course of the Rhine as far as Wesel; in passing Wesel, in proceeding afterwards to traverse Westphalia and Hanover, the mountains to the right, the sea to the left. This way the Ems, the Weser, and finally the Elbe, are found in the track; the last, at this extremity of its course, becomes one of the most considerable rivers of Europe.

Of these different modes of penetrating into the plains of the north, Napoleon had chosen the first, or that which led from the sources of the Mein to those of the Saale, in traversing the defiles of Franconia.

The reasons of his selection were deep. First, he had his troops in Upper Franconia; and if he had transported them northward to gain Westphalia, he would be exposed to travel doubly or triply as much road, and to unmask his movement by the length of his march alone. Independently of the length, and of the disclosure of his designs, he would have to encounter the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, and would be obliged to cross those rivers in the lower part of their course, when they had become formidable obstacles. These reasons left no choice but between two things; either he must take the central road of Germany which went by Frankfort, Hanau, Fulda, Gotha, and Weimar to Leipsic, and pass to the left of the forest of Thuringia, or remount the Mein as far as its source, and throw himself from the valley of the Mein into that of the Saale, which consisted in passing to the right of the forest of Thuringia. Still, between these two routes the second was the most to be preferred, for the reason that it kept to the general plan of Napoleon and his system of warfare. The more he passed to the right, he had the chance of turning the Prussians by their left, to gain upon them, by quickness, on the Elbe, by separating them from Saxony, taking from them resources and soldiers, passing the Elbe in the part of its course most easy to cross, to render himself master of Berlin; and finally, having outstripped the Prussians on the Elbe, to cut them off from the Oder, by which way the Russians would arrive to their aid. If Napoleon gained this object, he would do something like that which he had accomplished

the preceding year, in turning the Austrian general Mack, in isolating the Russian succours, and cutting in two the forces of the coalition, in such a manner as to beat one portion after the other. To be the first on the Elbe and the Oder, was, therefore, the grand problem to resolve in this war. In order to that, the defiles conducting from Franconia into Saxony, passing to the right of the forest of Thuringia, were the true route that Napoleon would prefer, without reckoning that his troops were already transported there, and that he had only to depart from the point where they then found themselves, to enter into action.

But that to which it was above all necessary he should apply himself to succeed, was to place the Prussians in doubt of his real object, and to persuade them that he should take the road to Fulda, Eisenach, and Weimar, that is to say, the central road of Germany, that which passed to the left of the forest of Thuringia. With this end, he had placed a part of his left wing, composed of the fifth and seventh corps, under the orders of marshal Lannes and Augereau, towards Hildburghausen, on the Werra, giving it out to be believed, that he would move into Upper Hesse. And, in fact, he had there, in this respect, what would place them in error. Napoleon had not held by this demonstration alone; he had wished to increase their uncertainty, by ordering other demonstrations towards Westphalia. The march of the king of Holland, preceded by false rumours, had had this object. Still it had not deceived the Prussians, as far as regarded their belief that Napoleon would attack by Westphalia. Besides the presence of the French army in Franconia, an accessory circumstance had sufficed to enlighten them. The division of Dupont, always separately employed as in the combats of Haslach and of Albeck, had been sent upon the Lower Rhine in order to occupy the grand duchy of Berg. The war approaching, he had been recalled upon Mayence and Frankfort. This movement of the left to the right carried a real resemblance of an offensive operation on the side of Westphalia, and led to the belief that the attack would be made, either by the territory of Fulda or by Franconia, whether to the right or left of the forest of Thuringia. But which of these two passages Napoleon would prefer, that was the doubt which this profound calculator kept up with infinite ease in the minds of the Prussian generals.

Nothing can convey an idea of the agitation that existed among those unhappy Prussian officers. They were all assembled at Erfurt, in the rear of the forest of Thuringia, with the ministers, the king, the queen, and the court, deliberating in a species of confusion difficult to describe. The Prussian forces, re-assembled at first in each military circumscription, had been afterwards concentrated in two masses, the one in the environs of Magdeburg, under the duke of Brunswick, the other in those of Dresden, under prince Hohenlohe. The principal army, transferred from Magdeburg to Nuremburg on the Saale, then to Weimar and Erfurt, was at that moment around the last city, ranged behind the forest of Thuringia, its front covered by the length of the forest, and its left by the scarped banks of the Saale. The duke of Weimar, with a strong detachment of light troops, occupied the interior of the forest, and pushed his reconnoitring parties beyond. General Ruchel formed the right of that army with the troops of Westphalia.

The force of this principal army might be estimated at about 93,000 men, comprehending the corps of general Ruchel. The second army, organized in Silesia, had been directed towards Saxony, to draw in, half by persuasion, half by fear, the unhappy elector, who had neither taste for, nor interest in, the war. Yielding, finally, after many hesitations, he promised 20,000 Saxons, sufficiently good troops, and to deliver up the bridge of Dresden to the Prussians, on condition that they should cover Saxony, and place there one of the two acting armies. The 20,000 Saxons were not ready, and made the prince of Hohenlohe wait, who remounted the Saale slowly, to take up a position over against the defiles which lead from Franconia into Saxony, in front of the assemblage of French troops. The Prussian contingent of the country of Bayreuth, under the command of general Tanenzien, had retired upon Schleitz at the approach of the French, and thus formed the advance-guard of the prince of Hohenlohe. The prince, with the 20,000 Saxons who awaited him, and the 30,000 and some odd Prussians of Silesia, would have under hand a corps of more than 50,000 men.

Such were the two Prussian armies. For every reserve, they had at Magdeburg a corps of about 15,000 men, placed under the orders of the prince of Wirtemberg, at variance with his family. It is requisite to add to this enumeration, the garrison of the fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula, that amounted to about 25,000 men. Thus the Prussians, comprising 20,000 Saxons, had not more than 180,000 or 190,000 soldiers at their disposal, not properly counting more than 160,000 or 165,000 men [1].

They were, therefore, about to oppose 180,000 Germans to 190,000 French, that 100,000 more were soon to follow from France, equally well trained, and capable of being presented against them in the proportion of one against two, or even one against three to them or the best European troops. Nothing is said of the weight cast into the balance by the genius and presence of Napoleon. The folly of such a contest on the part of the Prussians was, in consequence, very great; without reckoning the political fault of a war between Prussia and France—a fault, it is true, equal on both sides. For the rest, the Prussians were brave as the Germans always were; but since the end of the war of seven years, that is to say, since

[1] Here is a statement of the Prussian forces, the most correct:

Advance-guard under the duke of Weimar	10,000 men.
Principal corps under the duke of Brunswick	66,000
Westphalian troops forming, under general Ruchel, the right of the duke of Brunswick	17,000
Total of the principal army	93,000
Corps of prince Hohenlohe, comprising Saxons	50,000
Reserve under the prince of Wirtemberg	15,000
Garrisons of the Oder and the Vistula	25,000
Total	183,000

They may still be reckoned at 185,000, because the corps of the prince Hohenlohe was in general estimated at above 50,000 men.

1763, they had not made a figure in any serious war, because their intervention in 1792, in the contest of Europe against the French revolution, had neither been very long nor very obstinate. Thus they had not participated in any of the changes made for fifteen years in the organization of the European troops. They made the art of war consist in the regularity of their movements, which serve better for field-days manœuvring than for fields of battle; they were followed by a quantity of baggage, sufficient of itself alone to destroy an army by the obstacles it opposed to marching. Furthermore, pride, which is a great moral strength, was extensive among the Prussians,—above all, among the officers; and it was accompanied in them with a yet more noble sentiment, an ardent though unreflecting patriotism.

This army did not err less in the confusion of its counsels than in the quality of the troops. The king had confided the direction of the war to the duke of Brunswick, out of deference for the old renown of that nephew and scholar of the great Frederick. There are established reputations that are sometimes destined to ruin empires. It is not possible to refuse them the command; and when deference is paid to them, the public, that perceives the deficiency under the glory, censures the choice it has imposed, and renders it more vexatious and more infirm by criticizing the moral authority of the command, without which the physical authority is nothing. So it came to pass with the duke of Brunswick. The choice was generally lamented among the Prussians, and they expressed themselves upon it with a hardihood of which it was impossible to find another example; it even seemed as if in this nation freedom of thought and language would have their birth in the heart of the army. The duke of Brunswick, gifted with an extensive intelligence, an advantage which is not always possessed by men of whom renown exaggerates the merits, judged himself that he was not adapted for wars so active and so terrible as those of that time. He accepted the command through the weakness of an old man, in order not to sustain the chagrin of abandoning it to rivals; and he felt crushed under the burden. Judging others as well as he judged himself, he appreciated as it merited the folly of the court, and that of the young military nobility; and he was not less fearful of his own insufficiency. By the side of the duke of Brunswick was found another remnant of the reign of Frederick: this was the old field-marshal Mollendorf, also weighed down with years, but modest, devoted, exercising no authority; and alone called to give his advice, because the king, unsettled in all things, dared not venture to take the command; and not able to resolve upon confiding it entirely to anybody, wished to take counsel on the subject of each of the resolutions of his staff, and to judge every order before permitting its execution. To the weakness of old men they joined the presumption of the young, convinced that to them alone belonged the talent and the right to make war. The principal among them was the prince of Hohenlohe, the commander of the second army, and one of the German sovereigns despoiled of their estates by the new confederation of the Rhine. Full of pride and passion, he owed to some fortunate boldnesses in the wars of 1792 the reputation of an able and enterprising general. This reputation, little merited, had been sufficient for him, having ambition, to make himself independent of the generalissimo, and to act upon his own personal inspirations. He had made the demand of the king, who, not venturing either to accede to or resist his wishes, had suffered by the side of the commander-in-chief a secondary command, ill defined, tending to make officers stand alone, and to promote insubordination. Wishing to attract the war towards himself, the prince of Hohenlohe established the theatre of the principal operations upon the Upper Saale, where he then was; while the duke of Brunswick wished to fix it behind the forest of Thuringia, where he had placed himself. From this sad difference the most vexatious consequences were soon produced. Then came the declaimers like general Ruchel, who had permitted himself to insult M. Haugwitz, and prince Louis, who had so much contributed to urge on the court, deciding the one and the other only to favour the plan, which rested upon taking the offensive immediately, through the fear of a return towards pacific ideas, and an accommodation between Frederick-William and Napoleon. Among these generals, and contrasted with them, marshal Kalkreuth made himself remarked; less advanced in years than one, less young than the others; superior to all by his talents; still able to bear the fatigue, although he had taken a glorious part in the campaigns of the great Frederick; enjoying the confidence of the army, and meriting it; pronouncing the war extravagant, the chief who had its direction incapable; speaking his opinion with a boldness that contributed to shake deeply the authority of the generalissimo,—it was by him that the army would have wished to be commanded; although in the presence of the soldiers of Napoleon he had not done better than the duke of Brunswick himself. To these military men were to be added divers civil personages, M. Haugwitz, first minister; M. Lombard, secretary of the king; M. Lucchesini, minister of Prussia in Paris; and further, a number of German princes, among others the elector of Hesse, whom they vainly endeavoured to draw into the war. Finally, completing the medley, the queen, with several of her ladies, mounted on horseback, and showing themselves to the troops, who saluted them with their acclamations. When sensible people asked what that august personage did there, who by her rank and sex seemed so out of place at the head-quarters, they were answered that her energy was useful; that she alone sustained the king, prevented him from showing weakness; and thus they alleged to excuse her presence a reason not less unseemly than that presence itself.

M. Haugwitz, M. Lombard, and all the old partizans of French alliance, endeavoured to obtain their pardon by a disavowal little honourable to their anterior conduct. M. Haugwitz and M. Lombard—who had intellect enough to judge of what was passing under their own eyes, and should have retired when the policy of peace was become impossible, to leave to M. Hardenburg the consequences of the war policy—affected, on the contrary, the greatest warmth of sentiment, in order that the sincerity of their return to it might be credited. They pushed their weakness so far as to calum-

niate themselves, by insinuating that their attachment to the French alliance had been on their part no more than a feint to deceive Napoleon, and to defer a rupture that they foresaw, but of which the king, always the friend of peace, had imperiously commanded them to delay the term. They gave themselves the character of being cheats before, for the purpose of passing for sincere men now, which was not very clever, nor very honourable conduct. All that M. Haugwitz gained by conducting himself in such a manner was to lose in a day the merit of the wise policy which had attached to him, in order to assume the responsibility of a policy as disastrous as it was singular.

There was then in Germany a pamphleteer, witty and eloquent, the ardent enemy of France, and whose patriotic passion, although sincere, was not entirely disinterested, because he received from the cabinets of Vienna and London the price of his diatribes. This pamphleteer was M. Gentz. It was he who for many years wrote the manifestoes of the coalition, and filled the journals of Europe with virulent declamations against France. M. Haugwitz and M. Lombard had sent for him to the Prussian head-quarters, that he might draw up the Prussian manifesto. They made to this writer of libels, prayers, caresses, and excuses, loading him with civilities and marks of distinction so far as to present him to the queen herself, and manage interviews for him with that princess. After having denounced him to France as an incendiary sold to England, they supplicated him at this moment to inflame against this same France all the German courts. They charged him besides to show to Austria the caution of their sincerity, excusing themselves for combating the common enemy at so late a period by the assurance that they had ever detested him.

It was in the midst of this strange union of military men, princes, ministers, men, and women,—all mingling and wishing to give advice, to approve or blame,—that they discussed politics and war. M. Haugwitz, who endeavoured to prolong his illusions, as he had endeavoured to prolong his power, tried to persuade every one that all would go on well, very well, much better than they could have been able to hope. He boasted that they had found in Austria dispositions exceedingly friendly, and even spoke of secret communications which presaged the approaching concurrence of that power. He celebrated the generosity of the emperor Alexander, and published as certain the news of the immediate arrival of Russian troops upon the Elbe. He gave out as an acquisition the adhesion of the elector of Hesse, and the addition to the Prussian army of 30,000 Hessians, the best soldiers of the confederation. Finally, he announced the sudden reconciliation of Prussia with England, and the departure of a British plenipotentiary for the Prussian head-quarters. M. Haugwitz could not himself believe the truth of this news notwithstanding, because he knew that Austria, keeping the recollection of the conduct shown in her own regard, would only join Prussia on the day that Napoleon was vanquished, that is to say, when she had no more need of her; that the Russian troops would arrive upon the Elbe in three or four months, that is to say, when the question would be decided; that the elector of Hesse, always shrewd, awaited the result of the first battle before he would pronounce his decision; that England, of which the reconcilement with Prussia was in effect certain, was only able to furnish money, while soldiers would have been necessary to oppose to the terrible soldiers of Napoleon. He knew that the question consisted always in vanquishing with a Prussian army, reduced to its own strength, enervated by a long peace, commanded by an aged man, the French army, constantly victorious for fifteen years, and commanded by Napoleon. But to endeavour to deceive others, and to cheat himself, one day, one hour more, he disseminated rumours which he did not believe, and tried to cover in shadow the precipice close to which he trod.

They were not in the best disposition for discussing the plans of the campaign. All that they had concluded from the grand lessons in the military art given by Napoleon to Europe was, that it was necessary to adopt the offensive—beat the French with their own arms; that is to say, by boldness and celerity; and as Prussia was not capable of supporting for a long while the expenses of so great an armament, to hasten and finish, by delivering a decisive battle with all the united forces of the monarchy. They persuaded themselves seriously, even after Austerlitz, even after Hohenlinden, and a hundred other regular battles, that the French, quick and adroit, were adapted before all things for a war of posts, but that in a general action, where grand masses would be engaged, the solid and skilful tactic of the Prussian army would have the advantage over their inconsistent agility. That which was above all pleasing to this agitated people, to be heard with favour, was to speak of offensive war. Whoever proposed a plan of defensive warfare, however well founded in reason such a plan might be—whoever appealed to the eternal maxims of prudence—would have ventured to say that, to an enemy of deep experience, singularly impetuous, until then invincible, it was necessary to oppose time, space, natural obstacles well chosen, and knowing how to wait upon that occasion which fortune does not concede to those who have not the temerity to advance, nor to the timid who fly, but to the able who seize it when it presents itself,—whoever had given this advice would have been treated as a poltroon, or as a traitor sold to Napoleon. Whilst the Prussian army was not then able to face the French army, the plainest good sense counselled the presentation to Napoleon of other obstacles than the breasts of the soldiers. These obstacles—such as they were already able to foresee, and such as experience soon revealed—were the distance, the climate, the junction of the Russians and Germans in the deep ice of the north. It was not necessary then to proceed in advance, to spare Napoleon half the distance, to carry the war into a temperate climate, and to give him the advantage of fighting the Prussians before the arrival of the Russians. It was not necessary, above all, before an enemy so prompt, so adroit, so well able to profit by a false movement, to expose oneself by taking a position too far in advance, and to have the line of operation cut, separated from the Elbe or the Oder, and enveloped, annihilated, at the very commencement of the war. The Austrians, who had been so much to blame the preceding year, should have served

as a lesson, and hindered, by the remembrance of this misfortune, the giving for a second time a spectacle of Germans surprised, beaten, disarmed, before the arrival of their northern auxiliaries.

Thus prudence taught that it was necessary, in place of advancing as far as the woody mountains that separate the valley of the Elbe from that of the Rhine, to keep themselves simply in a mass behind the Elbe, the sole barrier which could stop the French, disputing the passage the best way they were able; then, on their passing the Elbe, to retire upon the Oder, and from the Oder upon the Vistula, until they should have been joined by the Russians: attempting only to engage in partial actions, without compromising any thing, this would have made the Prussians accustomed to warfare—a habit they had for a long time lost. It was when they should be able to unite 150,000 Prussians and 150,000 Austrians in the plains of Poland, by turns miry and frozen, that serious difficulties would have commenced for Napoleon.

It was not genius, it must be repeated, but simple good sense only that was required to conceive such a plan. Besides a Frenchman, a great general, Dumouriez, who had formerly saved France from the same duke of Brunswick, and who since, depraved by exile, set himself to advise the enemies of France, without being listened to,—Dumouriez sent memoirs on memoirs to the European cabinets, to teach them that they should retire, opposing distance to Napoleon, climate, hunger, and a ruined country, as the certain means of combating him. Napoleon himself believed this so firmly, that when he was informed the Prussians had advanced beyond the Elbe, he at first refused to credit it [1].

It is true that, by the adoption of such a plan, the concurrence of Hesse and Saxony would have been lost; the finest provinces of the monarchy abandoned, without a struggle, to the enemy; the resources in which those provinces abounded, the capital, in fact the honour of arms, compromised by a retreat so hasty. But these objections, without doubt serious enough, were more specious than solid. Hesse, in effect, would not give herself up to those who already wore the stamp of defeat on their forehead. Twenty thousand Saxons were not worth the sacrifice of a good war system. The provinces, that they thus made a scruple of abandoning, would be lost, either by will or force, by an offensive movement of Napoleon; and when they had seen him go over Austria at a giant's pace, without being stopped by mountains or rivers, it was puerile to reckon upon space with him. The lines of the forest of Thuringia, of the Elbe, and of the Oder, that they feared to deliver up, they were certain to see taken by a single manœuvre of Napoleon, without the power to make the successive steps of a well-calculated retreat; losing, besides the provinces contained between those lines and the army itself, in other words, the monarchy. Lastly, in regard to the honour of arms, it was requisite to make little of appearances: a retreat that could be placed to the account of a calculation would never commit the reputation of an army.

Furthermore, none of these ideas had been discussed in the tumultuous council where king, princes, generals, and ministers deliberated upon the operations of the approaching war. There reigned there such ardour, that there was no discussion but upon offensive plans; and these plans all tended to carry the Prussian army into Franconia, into the midst of the cantonments of the French army, to surprise it, and throw it on the Rhine, before it had time to concentrate itself.

The plan which had best agreed with the prudence of the duke of Brunswick had been, to remain squat down behind the forest of Thuringia, and to await in that position until Napoleon opened out on one or the other sides of that forest by the defiles of Franconia in Saxony, or by the central road of Germany which goes from Frankfort to Weimar. In the first case the Prussians—their right on the forest of Thuringia, their front covered by the Saale—had only to suffer Napoleon to advance. If he wished to attack them before going further, they might oppose him on the banks of the Saale, nearly impossible to cross in presence of an army of 140,000 men. If he went to the Elbe, they would follow him, always covered by the same banks of the Saale. If, on the contrary,—that which was less probable, seeing the place chosen for the assemblage of his troops,—Napoleon traversed all Franconia and gained the central road of Germany, the march was so long, that they would have had time to unite in a mass and to choose the ground most convenient for them to give him battle at the moment when he issued from the mountains. Certainly, by not originally adopting the line of the Elbe for the first theatre of a defensive war, they had no better to do than to place themselves behind the forest of Thuringia, as the duke of Brunswick had disposed of himself there.

But though this was his advice, he did not venture to propose it. Yielding to the general rage, he conceived a plan for offensive war. The prince of Hohenlohe, his ordinary contradictor, had conceived another. To take the position that they occupied, the duke of Brunswick had left Magdeburg, and the prince of Hohenlohe Dresden; the first ascending the left bank, the second the right bank of the Saale. It was possible, in the system of offensive warfare, to pass, as has been already

[1] Here is the fragment of a letter which explains the mode of feeling of Napoleon in this respect:

"To M. the marshal, prince of Neufchatel.

"*St. Cloud, September 24th*, 1806.

"My cousin,—I send you the copy of the order of movement of the army, which I had addressed to you the 20th current, in the morning; and that I was vexed not to have sent twelve hours after the departure of my courier of the 20th of September, because it might have been intercepted. Now I have no ground to fear it. You will have received on the 24th, at noon, my first courier of the 20th, when the present shall arrive, which, without doubt, will take place on the 27th. Orders will have been given to marshal Soult; they will be sent on the 26th; and as he will require three or four days' march to reach Amberg, he will be able to be there on the 30th, although he has not the order to be there until the 3rd. You receive the present courier on the 27th, in order that you may accelerate the movement of marshal Soult. *It imports that he arrive quickly at Amberg, seeing that the enemy is at Hof, an extravagance of which I did not believe him capable, thinking that he would remain on the defensive along the Elbe.*

"Signed, NAPOLEON.'

said, by the one or the other side of the forest of Thuringia, or to ascend the Upper Saale and traverse the defiles which connect Saxony with Franconia, before which the French army was then assembled; or, as well, to carry themselves to the opposite side, to traverse Upper Hesse, and march by Eisenach upon Fulda, Schweinfurt, and Wurtzburg. The prince of Hohenlohe, wishing to play the principal character, proposed leaving the duke of Brunswick where he was, to ascend the Upper Saale, to pass the defiles of Franconia, to throw himself upon the Upper Mein, to surprise the French scarcely assembled, and to drive them back upon the Mein, Wurtzburg, Frankfort, and Mayence. Once a retreat commenced, the duke of Brunswick would join him, no matter by what road, to achieve the route of the French with the whole mass of the Prussian forces.

The duke of Brunswick had the idea of acting on the opposite side; to go in advance by Eisenach, Fulda, Schweinfurt, and Wurtzburg, that is to say, by the central road of Germany; to fall upon Wurtzburg itself, and thus cut off from Mayence all the French who were in Franconia. This project was assuredly much better; because, while the prince of Hohenlohe, in proposing to open on the Upper Mein, would have thrown back the French on the Lower Mein, from Coburg upon Wurtzburg, and would have tended to rally them as they fell back, the duke of Brunswick, on the contrary, in marching upon Wurtzburg itself, would have separated the French who were on the Upper Mein from those who were on the Lower Mein; would interpose himself between Wurtzburg, which was the centre of their assembling, and Mayence, which was the base of their operations. Furthermore, he would have acted with 140,000 men together, and have attempted the offensive with the mass of the forces which it was needful to devote to the purpose when he ventured to undertake it. But whatever was the plan he adopted, and that it had chances of success, it was necessary first, that the Prussian army should be, if not equal in quality to the French army, at least capable to support an encounter with it; secondly, that it should advance before Napoleon, and surprise him before he had concentrated all his forces upon Wurtzburg. But the duke of Brunswick had given his orders of movement for the 10th of October, and Napoleon was at Wurtzburg on the 3rd, at the head of his assembled forces, and in a measure to show a front to every event.

While they disputed thus about offensive plans, all founded in the ridiculous idea of surprising the French on the 10th of October, when Napoleon was already, on the 3rd, in the midst of his united troops, they were apprised of his arrival at Wurtzburg, and began to have a glimpse of his dispositions. They understood from this that they had ill calculated in measuring his activity by that which they themselves possessed; and the duke of Brunswick, who, without possessing the glance, the resolution, or the activity of a great general, was still endowed with an experienced judgment, felt in a most sensible manner the danger of going to encounter the French army already formed and having Napoleon at its head. He from that moment renounced offensive plans, conceived out of condescension to others, and attached himself more and more to the defensive position taken behind the forest of Thuringia. He obliged himself to demonstrate to all those who were around him the advantages of that position, because he repeated to them without cessation, if Napoleon passes by Kœnigshofen, Eisenach, Gotha, and Erfurt, which would but bring him into Germany by the grand central road, it was possible to take him in flank at the moment when he issued from among the mountains. If, on the contrary, he presented himself by the defiles bordering upon Franconia in Saxony, on the Upper Saale, occupying the course of that river, they might await him with a firm footing on the scarped banks. Other reasons that the duke of Brunswick had not avowed inspired him with a decided preference for this position. At bottom he censured the war, and looked with pleasure upon any chance to avoid it. If the reports of spies were to be believed, Napoleon had caused defensive works to be executed towards Schweinfurt, on the same road from Wurtzburg to Kœnigshofen and Eisenach. It was true that Napoleon, in order to cheat the Prussians, had ordered works in different directions, principally in those of Schweinfurt, Kœnigshofen, Hildburghausen, and Eisenach. The duke of Brunswick concluded, not that Napoleon considered about presenting himself by the great central road from Frankfort to Weimar, but that he would establish himself about Wurtzburg, and then take up a defensive position. His conferences with M. Lucchesini contributed equally to this persuasion. That ambassador, who had so unfortunately irritated his cabinet two months before by exaggerated reports, mingling now a little truth with much that was false, affirmed that Napoleon at bottom did not wish for a war; that he had without doubt treated Prussia slightingly, but that he had never nourished against her any aggressive design; and that it was very possible he had placed himself at Wurtzburg, to await there, behind good entrenchments, the last word of king Frederick-William.

It was full late to venture to produce this truth, and the instant was chosen to produce it, when it ceased to be correct. If Napoleon, in effect, before quitting Paris, had been little inclined for war, and well disposed to finish affairs with Prussia by means of some amicable explanations; now that he found himself at the head of his army, and that his sword was half out of the scabbard, he would draw it out entirely, and act with that promptitude which was natural to him. Nothing was less in agreement with his character, than the plan to establish himself in a defensive position before Wurtzburg. But from this project, falsely ascribed to Napoleon, and the reports of M. Lucchesini, the duke of Brunswick concluded with secret pleasure, that it was possible to avoid war,—above all, if they had the precaution to remain behind the forest of Thuringia, and to have between the two armies this obstacle to their encountering.

The king without saying so partook in this sentiment. There was a last council of war convoked, therefore, on the 5th of October at Erfurt, which was attended by the duke of Brunswick, the prince of Hohenlohe, and marshal Mollendorf, many officers of the staff, the heads of corps, the ministers, and the king himself. The council lasted for two

entire hours. The duke proposed the following query: "Is it prudent to go and seek Napoleon in an unattackable position, where we have not, as in the first project for the offensive, the hope of taking him by surprise?" They disputed long and with violence on this point. The prince of Hohenlohe raised again, by means of the chief of his staff, the idea of operating upon the Upper Saale, and of passing the defiles, at the opening of which Napoleon had assembled his troops. On the side of the duke of Brunswick they combated this idea, and made to be felt anew the advantages of the position taken behind the forest of Thuringia. The two generals-in-chief thus sustaining an obstinate contest through the intermediate agency of their staff officers; for the rest, there was an agreement in nothing. While the duke of Brunswick was in lively dispute with the prince of Hohenlohe, M. Haugwitz sustained with M. Lucchesini a discourse on the pacific dispositions given to Napoleon, upon which there was no longer time to reckon. To the shock of ideas succeeded the shock of passions, and general Ruchel allowed himself to be guilty of a fresh insult to M. Haugwitz. Each party carried away from this discussion only greater confusedness of mind and deeper bitterness of heart. The king alone, who sought in good faith to enlighten himself, who dared not trust to his own knowledge, and who felt the imminence of the danger, had his spirit wounded. In the impossibility of deciding itself, the council, finding the necessity there was now for knowing better the real resolutions of Napoleon, proposed the design of a general reconnoitring, executed simultaneously by the three principal corps of the army—of the prince of Hohenlohe, of the duke of Brunswick, and of general Ruchel. The king had this singular resolution modified, and reduced the three to a single reconnoitring, which should be directed by a colonel, an officer of the staff of the duke of Brunswick, on this same road from Eisenach to Schweinfurt, towards which Napoleon seemed to make some preparations for defence. An order was given for the prince of Hohenlohe to continue the concentration of the army of Silesia on the Upper Saale, leaving general Tauenzien with the detachment of Bareuth, in observation towards the defiles of Franconia. To this military measure was added a political one, which was to send to Napoleon a definitive note, to signify to him the irrevocable resolutions of the court of Prussia. They stated in this note the kind relations which had existed between the two courts, the bad returns with which France had paid the good offices of Prussia, the obligation that existed in the cabinet of Berlin to exact an explanation of what placed all its interests at strife. This was to be preceded by a step giving assurance to all Germany, that is to say, the immediate retreat of the French troops beyond the Rhine. This retreat was demanded for a fixed day, and they desired it should commence on the 8th of October.

Most assuredly if they had wished for peace still, the projected note was a means very ill conceived to maintain it, because it was to misconceive strangely the character of Napoleon, to address him a summons to retire by a fixed day. But whilst the duke of Brunswick and the king endeavoured to manage so as to preserve a last chance of peace, in remaining behind the forest of Thuringia, they were forced to content those who were furious for pushing on the war, and make some apparent demonstrations of haughtiness, submitting themselves thus to the caprices of an army which had transformed itself into a popular multitude, and which shouted, demanded, decreed, as a multitude does when it holds the reins.

This is the mode in which the Prussians had disposed of the time that Napoleon employed on his side in preparations so active and well conceived. Not stopping at Wurtzburg, he had gone to Bamberg, where he deferred his entry into Saxony until the last words of Prussia should press upon her, and not upon him, the wrong of the aggression. His right, composed of the corps of marshals Soult and Ney, was in advance of Bayreuth, ready to open by the road from Bayreuth to Hof, on the Upper Saale. His centre, formed of the corps of marshals Bernadotte and Davout, preceded by the cavalry reserve, and followed by the foot-guard, was at Kronach, only waiting to advance by Leberstein on Saalburg and Schleitz. His left, consisting of the corps of marshals Lannes and Augereau, making towards Hildeburghausen deceptive demonstrations, was at the first signal to proceed from left to right, from Coburg towards Neustadt, in order to open by Grafenthal upon Saalfield. These two columns had to march through the narrow defiles, bordered with wood and rocks, which place Franconia in communication with Saxony, and abut on the Upper Saale. Thus far the frontier of Saxony had not been passed, and they kept themselves on the Franconian territory, the foot ready lifted to step out. The imperial guard had not, it is true, as yet wholly joined; it wanted the cavalry and artillery of the guard, that had not been able to travel by post as the infantry had done; it wanted also the companies *d'élite*, and the grand park. But Napoleon had under hand 170,000 men, and this was more than he needed to crush the Prussian army.

On receiving the note of Prussia on the 7th, he was extremely angry. Major-general Berthier was with him. "Prince," said he to him, "we shall be exact to the rendezvous; on the 8th, in place of being in France, we will be in Saxony." He immediately addressed the following proclamation to his army:—

"Soldiers:

"The order for your re-entrance into France had departed; you had already approached it several marches; triumphant fêtes awaited you there! But when we abandoned ourselves to this too confident security, new plots were woven under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war were heard in Berlin. The same vertiginous spirit, that by favour of our intestine dissensions conducted fourteen years ago the Prussians into the middle of the plains of Champagne, still domineers in their councils. If it is no more Paris that they wish to overturn to its foundations, to-day they vaunt themselves to plant their colours in the capitals of our allies; our laurels they would tear from our brows. They desire that we should evacuate Germany at the sight of their army! Soldiers, there is not one of you will return to France by any other road than that of honour. We owe to ourselves not to enter there except under trium-

phal arches. Have we then braved the seasons, the seas, the deserts, vanquished Europe, several times coalesced against us, carried our glory from the East to the West, to return to-day to our country, as deserters, after having abandoned our allies, and to have it understood and said, that the French eagle had fled terror-stricken at the aspect of the eagles of Prussia? Evil then to those who provoke us! Let the Prussians suffer the same fate that they experienced fourteen years ago! Let them learn that, if it be an easy thing to acquire an increase of territory and power with the friendship of a great people, its animosity is more terrible than the ocean tempest!"

The following day, the 8th of October, Napoleon gave the order for the whole army to pass the frontier of Saxony. The three columns of which it was composed moved at once. Murat, who preceded the centre, entered first at the head of the light cavalry and 27th light, and sent out his squadrons by the middle defile, that of Kronach to Lebenheim. Scarcely arrived beyond the woody heights which separate Franconia from Saxony, he sent on the right towards Hof, and on the left towards Saalfield, several detachments, in order to clear the mouths of the openings by which the other columns of the army would penetrate. Afterwards, he marched right from Lebenstein on Saalburg. There he found posted on the Saale a troop of infantry and cavalry belonging to the corps of general Tauenzien. The enemy made a face at first, as if he would defend the Saale, which is a feeble obstacle in that part of its course, and fired several rounds of cannon at the cavalry. He was answered with some pieces of light artillery ordinarily attached to the reserve of cavalry; then several companies of the 27th light infantry were exhibited. He defended neither the passage of the Saale nor Saalburg, and retired towards Schleitz at some distance from the place of the first encounter. On the side of Hof, on the right, the cavalry discovered nothing that could annoy the march of marshals Soult and Ney, sufficiently strong of themselves to make their way. At the left, on the contrary, towards Saalfield, there was perceived at a distance a strong body commanded by prince Louis. The two corps of general Tauenzien and prince Louis made a part of the army of prince Hohenlohe, who, in spite of the formal order he had received to pass to the left bank of the Saale, and to go and support the duke of Brunswick, deferred obedience, and remained dispersed in the mountainous country which the Saale traverses from its source.

The three columns of the French army continued to advance simultaneously by the defiles indicated; those of the left, however, remaining a little in the rear, because they had to carry themselves from Coburg upon Grafenthal, which obliged them to pass over twelve leagues by roads scarcely practicable for artillery. For the rest, no serious obstacle stopped the march of the French troops. The spirit of the army was excellent; the soldiers manifested the utmost gaiety, and did not appear to hold as of any account some degree of suffering inevitable in a sterile and difficult country. The victory which they did not doubt was with them an indemnity for every evil.

On the following day, the 9th of October, the centre quitted Saalburg, and advanced upon Schleitz, after having passed the Saale. Murat, with two regiments of light cavalry, and Bernadotte, with Drouet's division, marched at the head. They arrived before Schleitz about the middle of the day. Schleitz is a little village or burgh, situated on a small watercourse called the Wiesenthal, which falls into the Saale. At the foot of a height beyond Schleitz and Wiesenthal, they perceived, ranged in order of battle, the corps of general Tauenzien. He was backed by that height, his infantry formed, his cavalry disposed on his wings, the artillery in his front. He appeared to possess a strength of 8000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. Napoleon, who had slept in the environs of Saalburg, and had gone over the ground from the morning, at the sight of the enemy ordered an attack. Marshal Bernadotte directed some companies of the 27th light, commanded by general Maison, upon Schleitz. General Tauenzien, aware that the main body of the French army followed this advance-guard, did not dream of defending the ground which he occupied. He contented himself with reinforcing the detachment which guarded Schleitz, in order to gain, by a slight combat of his rear-guard, the time to withdraw himself. General Maison entered Schleitz with the 27th light, and repulsed the Prussians. At the same moment the 94th and 95th regiments of the line, of Drouet's division, passed the Wiesenthal, one below Schleitz, the other at Schleitz itself, and contributed to hasten the retreat of the enemy, who betook himself towards the heights behind Schleitz. He was pursued rapidly on the heights, upon arriving at their summits, and in descending on the reverse side afterwards. Murat, accompanied by the 4th hussars and the 3rd chasseurs, (this last remained a little in the rear,) pressed hard upon the enemy's infantry, which was escorted by 2000 horse. On seeing the small strength which Murat possessed, some Prussian squadrons threw themselves upon him. Murat, foreseeing it, charged them, sabre in hand, at the head of the 4th hussars, and repulsed them. But falling back soon before a more numerous body of cavalry, he ordered up in all haste the 5th chasseurs, as well as the light infantry of general Maison, that had not yet been able to join. He had in the interval to sustain several charges, and sustained them with his accustomed courage. Happily the 5th chasseurs arrived at a gallop, rallied the 4th hussars, and gave in its turn a vigorous charge. But general Tauenzien, wishing to get rid of these two regiments of light cavalry, sent upon them the red Saxon dragoons, as well as the Prussian hussars. At that moment there arrived five companies of the 27th light, conducted by general Maison. That general, not having time to form a square, halted on the spot in such a manner as to cover the flank of the French cavalry, and then made his men give so effective a fire, almost at musket-end distance, that he overturned two hundred red dragoons on the spot. Then all the Prussian cavalry fled. Murat, with the 4th hussars and 5th chasseurs, pursued them, and drove intermingled into the woods the cavalry and infantry of general Tauenzien. The enemy retired with all haste, throwing down on the roads many muskets and hats, and leaving in the hands of the French 400 prisoners, inde-

pendently of 300 killed or wounded. But the moral effect of this combat was far greater than the physical; and the Prussians were able to see from that with what soldiers they were engaged. If Murat, as Napoleon, who himself made the remark, had had under hand but a few more cavalry, he would not have been obliged to expose his own person so much, and the results would have been more considerable [1].

Napoleon was extremely well satisfied with this first combat, which proved how little the Prussian cavalry, although well mounted, and able in the management of their horses, was to be feared by solid infantry and his own hardy cavaliers. He established his head-quarters at Schleitz, in order to await the rest of the column of the centre, and, above all, to give to his right, conducted by marshals Ney and Soult, and his left, led by marshals Lannes and Augereau, time to pass the defiles, and to come and take on his wings a position for battle. After what he had seen, and after what the spies had reported, who had found the country covered with detached columns, he judged that he had surprised the enemy in a movement of concentration, and that he was causing him much trouble. By reports from the right wing, sent by marshals Soult and Ney, he learned that they had nothing before them, and that they had seen scarcely more than a few detachments of cavalry, that withdrew afar at their approach. On the contrary, news from the left spoke of a corps at Saalfield, before which marshal Lannes would arrive the following day, the 10th. Napoleon concluded, therefore, that the enemy had retired towards the Saale, and left open the great road to Dresden. He was resolved not to engage himself there before he had beaten the Prussians, but to fight them without delay, whether they came to the encounter to bar the road against him, or whether it was requisite to go and search for them behind the scarped banks of the Saale [2].

[1] "To the grand duke of Berg and of Cleves at Schleitz, at the imperial and royal head-quarters.

"*October* 10, 1806; 5 *o'clock in the morning.*

"General Rapp has made known to me the fortunate result of last evening. It appears to me that you have not sufficient cavalry united under hand. By scattering them about, not enough have remained with you. You have six regiments. I have recommended you to have at least four in hand. I did not see more than two with you yesterday. The reconnoitring on the right becomes to-day of much less importance. Marshal Soult arriving at Plauen, it is on Posneck and on Saalfield that it is necessary to make strong reconnoitrings, to know what passes there. Marshal Lannes arrived on the 9th at Grafenthal, in the evening. He will attack Saalfield to-morrow. You know of how much importance it is to me to know, during the day, of the movement upon Saalfield, to the end that if the enemy have united more than 25,000 men, I may be able to move reinforcements there by Possheim, and take them *en queue*. I have given an order to the divisions of Dupont and Beaumont to march upon Schleitz. It is necessary in all events to reconnoitre a fine position in advance of Schleitz, that will serve for a field of battle for more than 80,000 men. That need not prevent you from profiting at the break of day to push strong reconnoitring parties upon Auma and Posneck, and to make them be supported by the division of Drouet. The first division of marshal Davout will be at Saalburg, the two other divisions will be in advance near Obersdorf, and his light cavalry in front. I have given the order to marshal Ney to go to Tanna. Your great business to-day should be, at first, to take advantage of the combat of yesterday, to collect more prisoners, and to gather all the intelligence possible; 2ndly, to reconnoitre Auma and Saalfield in order to know positively what are the movements of the enemy. NAPOLEON."

[2] The following letter is cited, to show what the idea of Napoleon was at that moment:—

"To marshal Soult at Plauen.

"*Obersdorf, October* 10, 1806; 8 *o'clock in the morning.*

"We routed yesterday the 8000 men who from Hof had retired to Schleitz, where they expected reinforcements during the night. The cavalry has been cut down, and a colonel has been taken. More than 2000 muskets and caps have been found on the field of battle. The Prussian infantry did not stand. We have not taken more than 200 or 300 prisoners, because it was night and they were scattered in the wood. I reckon on a good number in the morning.

"This seems to me very clear: that it appears the Prussians have the design to attack; that their left will open to-morrow by Jena, Saalfield, and Coburg; that the prince of Hohenlohe has his head-quarters at Jena, and prince Louis at Saalfield. The other column opens by Meinengen upon Fulda. In this way I am led to think that you have nobody before you, perhaps not a thousand men, as far as Dresden. If you are able to crush a corps, do it: the following are my designs for to day. I am not able to march; I have too many things left in arrear. I shall push my advance-guard to Auma. I shall recognize a good field of battle in advance of Schleitz for 80,000 or 100,000 men. I shall march marshal Ney to Tanna; he will find himself two leagues from Schleitz. Yourself from Plauen are not so far as not to be able to come up in twenty-four hours.

"The 5th; the Prussian army made again a movement on Thuringia, of such a sort that I believe will cause the delay of a great number of days. My junction with my left is not yet made, except by cavalry posts, which signify nothing.

"Marshal Lannes only arrives to-day at Saalfield, at least if the enemy be not there in considerable strength. Thus the days of the 10th and 11th will be lost for marching forward. If my junction is made, I shall push as far as Neustadt and Triplitz. After that the enemy will do something: if he attacks me, I shall be enchanted; if he lets himself be attacked, I shall not be wanting. If he files by Magdeburg, you will be before him at Dresden. I much desire a battle. If the enemy has determined to attack me, it is that he has great confidence in his forces. It is not impossible then that he attacks, and thus he will do that which is most agreeable to me. After the battle I shall be before him in Dresden and in Berlin.

"I wait impatiently my horseguard, forty pieces of artillery, and 3000 horse, as these are not to be slighted. You see actually my designs for to-day and to-morrow. You are master of yourself to do as you intend, but procure yourself bread, so that, if you come to join me, you may have enough for some days.

"If you find any thing to do against the enemy a march from you, do it boldly. Establish small posts of cavalry to correspond rapidly from Schleitz to Plauen. Up to this hour it seems to me the campaign commences under the happiest auspices.

"I imagine you are at Plauen. It is very convenient that you possess it.

"Let me know what you believe you have in front of you. Nothing of what was at Hof has retired by Dresden.

"P.S. I have received this instant your despatch of the 9th, at six in the evening. I approve of the dispositions you have made. The intelligence that the 1000 horse that were at Plauen have retired to Gera, leaves me no doubt that Gera is not the point of union of the enemy's army. I doubt that he will be able to unite himself entirely before I shall be united. For the rest, during the day, I shall

The prince of Hohenlohe, always of opinion that he alone divined the projects of Napoleon,—that he alone knew the true means to beat him at his own game, by proposing to advance before him in the defiles of Franconia,—floated among a thousand different ideas. Now he was inclined to execute the orders of the duke of Brunswick, and repass the Saale; now he formed the foolish resolution to proceed towards Mittel-Pollnitz, to give battle there; and he thus gave to his troops, little prepared to march, loaded with baggage, orders and counter-orders, so that they were in despair. Upon these doings Prince Louis, impatient to meet the French, and wishing at any price to become the advance-guard of the Prussian army, obtained leave to be left at Saalfield, where he yet was on the 10th of October in the morning.

It was towards this point that the French column of the left was to march as soon as it issued from Grafenthal. Arrived on the 9th at Grafenthal, Lannes, who formed the head of that column, directed himself on Saalfield on the morning of the 10th. He reached it at an early hour. The woody slopes which commonly border the Saale separate at this place from its bed, and leave a marshy plain, in the midst of which stands the little town of Saalfield, surrounded with walls, and built on the edge itself of the river. Arrived at the summit of the heights where they plunged down towards Saalfield, Lannes perceived in advance of the town the corps of prince Louis, that consisted of 7000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The prince had taken a very unmilitary position. His left, composed of infantry, rested upon the town and the river; his right, composed of cavalry, extended itself on the plain. Commanded in his front by the circle of heights, from whence the French artillery was able to pour down grape-shot, he had in his rear a little marshy brook, the Schwartza, which falls into the Saale below Saalfield. His retreat, therefore, was very ill secured. If he had been capable of showing wisdom, and less obliged by his anterior bravado to show his temerity, he would have retired as soon as possible, and descended the Saale as far as Rudolstadt or Jena. Unhappily it was not in his character, nor in the part he played, to retire at the first encounter with the French. Lannes had not under hand either the corps of Augereau, forming with his own the column of the left, nor even his own corps entire. He was reduced to the simple division of Suchet, and to two regiments of light cavalry, the 9th and 10th hussars. He did not the less commence the attack immediately. He disposed at first of his artillery on the heights which commanded the line of battle of prince Louis, and opened a vigorous cannonade. Then he threw on his left a part of Suchet's division, with the order to file along the woods which crowned the heights, and to turn the right of prince Louis by descending on the banks of the little stream of the Schwartza. In a few moments the movement was executed. Whilst the artillery, placed in battery in the front of the Prussians, occupied itself in killing their men, the French marksmen, gliding across the wood, commenced in their rear an unforeseen fire with murderous exactness. Lannes then made his infantry descend in a mass upon the plain to overturn the enemy's infantry. Prince Louis, even if he had had the experience in war which he wanted, had not in such a position any safe part to take. He commenced by betaking himself towards his infantry, in order to sustain the shock of Suchet's division. But, after efforts of bravery worthy of being better employed, he saw his battalions broken, and pushed confusedly under the walls of Saalfield. Not knowing where to give his attention, he hastened to his cavalry to charge the two regiments of hussars which had followed the movement of the French *tirailleurs*. He charged them with impetuosity, and succeeded at first in repulsing them. But these two regiments rallied, and returned vigorously to the attack, breaking his numerous cavalry, and pursuing them with such ardour as reduced them to the impossibility of reforming, when he threw them in disorder into the marshes of the Schwartza. The prince, dressed in a brilliant uniform, decked with all his orders, conducted himself in the fray with the valour that belonged to his birth and his character. Two of his aides-de-camp were killed by his side. Soon surrounded, he wished to save himself; but his horse got entangled in a hedge, and he was obliged to stop. A mareschal of the 10th hussars, believing he had an affair with an officer of elevated rank, but not with a prince of royal blood, rode up to him, saying, "General, surrender!" The prince answered this summons by a blow of the sabre. The mareschal then gave him a thrust in the centre of the breast, and he fell dead from his horse. They surrounded the body of the prince, who was recognized, and deposited, with all the respect due to his rank and misfortunes, in the town of Saalfield. The troops, Prussian and Saxon, because there were at this point both the one and the other, deprived of their commander, enclosed in a cut-throat place, escaped as they were best able, abandoning to the French 20 cannon, 400 killed and wounded, and 1000 prisoners.

Such was the commencement of the campaign. The first blows of the war, as Napoleon said the next day in the bulletin of this battle, caused the death of one of its authors. They were so near the one to the other, that Napoleon at Schleitz heard the cannon at Saalfield, that the prince of Hohenlohe heard it on his side on the heights of Mittel-Pollnitz, and that towards Jena, on the side occupied by the grand Prussian army, they distinctly perceived the distant detonations. All the men of sense in the Prussian army trembled at it as a signal which announced tragical events. Napoleon, discovering the point from whence these detonations proceeded, sent a reinforcement to Lannes, and a crowd of officers to learn the news. On his own side the prince of Hohenlohe rode up and down without giving any orders, questioning the comers and goers upon what was passing. A sad spectacle to see so much incapacity and imprudence in a contest with vigilance and genius.

Some hours afterwards the fugitives taught the two armies the result of the first encounter, and the tragic end of prince Louis,—an end little worthy of his life, in the double relation of imprudence and courage. The Prussians were able to judge

receive other intelligence and shall have more precise ideas. Yourself at Plauen, the intercepted letters by the post will furnish you with the same."

of what would necessarily attend their learned tactics, opposed to the manner of acting, simple, practical, and rapid, of the French generals.

Consternation spread from Saalfield to Jena and Weimar. The prince of Hohenlohe, already informed by his own eyes of the discouragement that had taken hold of the troops of general Tauenzien, his spirit struck by the rash enterprise of Saalfield, went to Jena, and gave the order in every sense to retrace the road towards the Saale, in order to cover that river; as if, however, after so many contradictory movements, he could flatter himself to arrive there in time! It was the third counter-order given to his unhappy men, who knew not what was wanted of them, and were not in the habit, as the French were, of making many marches in a day, and of living upon what they procured on their march. Some fugitives of the corps beaten at Saalfield flew towards Jena, and firing without any reason, as soldiers straggling at random, were taken for French *tirailleurs*. At their appearance an unspeakable terror spread itself among the troops that were marching upon Jena, and among the numerous conductors of the baggage. All set themselves to flight in disorder, flew towards the bridges of the Saale, and from the bridges into the streets of Jena. In a few moments all was frightful confusion—an unhappy presage of the events which were to follow.

Napoleon, made acquainted with the combat at Saalfield, and pressed to recal his wings towards his centre in such a manner that he could pass out of the defiles by which he had entered Saxony, ordered Lannes not to descend the Saale, which would have been at too great a distance from himself and too near the enemy, but to make a movement to the right, and to go by Posneck and Neustadt towards Auma, where he fixed his headquarters. Augereau was to fill the void left between the Saale and the corps of Lannes. Ordering on his right the same movement of concentration, Napoleon had directed marshal Soult upon Weida and Gera, along the Elster; and he ordered marshal Ney to occupy Auma when the headquarters should have departed. In that way he had 170,000 men under his hand, at the distance of seven or eight leagues, with the power of uniting 100,000 in a few hours, and all the while concentrating himself as he advanced, ready to pass the Saale if it was necessary to force there the position of the enemy, or to march upon the Elbe if it was requisite to outstrip him there. For the rest he had made but little more than four or five leagues a-day, in order to give to his corps the time to rejoin him; because his reserves were yet behind, particularly the artillery and cavalry of the guard, as well as the battalions *d'élite*. Although he knew, since the two combats of the preceding days, what he ought to think of the Prussian troops, he marched with all the prudence of the greatest captains in presence of an army which could oppose to him 130,000 or 140,000 men united in one mass. On the 12th, in the evening, he quitted Auma for Gera.

The cavalry, moving about in every sense in the midst of the baggage of the unfortunate Saxons, made a great and rich booty. They took at one blow 500 carriages. The cavalry, thus Napoleon wrote, was "sewn up in gold." In fine, the intercepted letters and the reports of spies began to correspond, and to represent the grand Prussian army as changing its position, and advancing through Erfurt upon Weimar, in order to approach the banks of the Saale. It was possible it would go there under one of the two intentions following; either to occupy the bridge of the Saale at Nuremberg, over which passes the grand central road of Germany, in order to retire on the Elbe, covering Leipsic and Dresden; or to approach the course of the Saale, to defend the banks against the French. In the face of this double event, Napoleon took a first precaution, and that was, to march marshal Davout on Naumburg with an order to bar the bridge with 26,000 men of the 3rd corps. He sent Murat with the cavalry along the banks of the Saale, to examine its course and push his reconnoitring as far as Leipsic. He directed marshal Bernadotte upon Nuremberg, with the order to support marshal Davout. He sent marshals Lannes and Augereau upon Jena itself. His object was to take possession immediately of the two principal passages of the Saale,—those of Naumburg and Jena,—whether to stop the Prussian army if it wished to pass over and retire upon the Elbe, or to go and examine on the heights which border the river whether it would remain on the defensive. As to himself, he kept with marshals Ney and Soult within reach of Naumburg and Jena, ready to march upon one or the other point according to circumstances.

On the 13th, in the morning, more circumstantial intelligence apprised him that the enemy approached definitively to the Saale, with the resolution yet uncertain to give upon its banks a defensive battle, or to pass and proceed upon the Elbe. It was in the direction of Weimar to Jena that he exhibited the largest assemblages of troops. Without losing a moment, Napoleon mounted his horse to go to Jena. He himself gave his instructions to the marshals Soult and Ney, and ordered them to be at Jena in the evening, or at the latest in the night. He ordered Murat to draw back his cavalry towards Jena, and marshal Bernadotte to take at Dornberg an intermediate position between Jena and Naumburg. He set out immediately, sending officers to stop all that were in march towards Gera, and to make them march upon Jena. The day before, in the evening, marshal Davout had entered Naumburg, having occupied the bridge of the Saale, and taken considerable magazines with a fine bridge equipage. Marshal Bernadotte was ready to join him. Murat had sent the light cavalry as far as Leipsic, and surprised the gates of that great commercial city. Lannes had gone upon Jena, a small city and university, situated on the same banks of the Saale, and there had repelled in confusion the enemy's troops remaining on that side of the river, as well as the baggage that encumbered the road. He possessed himself of Jena, and soon pushed his advanced posts to the heights which command it. From these heights he saw the army of prince Hohenlohe, that, after having repassed the Saale, encamped between Jena and Weimar; and he had ground to suspect that a grand assemblage was in preparation at that place.

In effect, the Prussian army was there united, and ready to take its final determinations. The

prince of Hohenlohe had decided to obey the orders of the duke of Brunswick, and to repass the Saale, to join the great Prussian army. He had attained the position in the best order, and without losing his baggage, if he had obeyed it sooner. His troops were confusedly assembled there, and, destitute of provisions, knew not where to procure them, vainly demanding them of the main army, which only possessed just enough for itself. The Saxons, whose conduct had been honourable, but whom the chance of events caused to appear in the two first encounters, and who saw their country delivered without defence to the French, complained bitterly of being little regarded, ill fed, and drawn into a war that commenced in the worst manner. They did their best to quiet them, and this time they were established in the second line behind the Prussians.

Still, in spite of these sad commencements, they had assembled along the forest of Thuringia, having the Saale to stop the French if they wished to pass, or to descend in security towards the Elbe if they hastened to march there. It was proper in such a case, when such a value was attached to this position, to persevere in the idea that had been promulgated, and to profit by the advantages it offered. The Saale in fact, though fordable, ran in a bed which presented a continual strait. The left bank, on which the Prussians were encamped, was covered with abrupt heights, the foot of which the river bathed, while a succession of wood clothed the summit. Beyond were found undulating levels, very proper to receive an army. In descending from Jena to Naumburg, the obstacles to a passage became greater than any where besides. There were between Jena and Naumburg only three openings by which it was possible to penetrate,—those of Lobstadt, Dornberg, and Camberg,—distant two leagues from each other, and difficult to defend. If, in place of establishing themselves behind the Elbe, they had wished to go and encounter the French and fight in a body, there was not any site more advantageous than the left bank of the Saale to engage in a general action. They were deprived, it is true, of 10,000 men composing the advance-guard of the duke of Saxe Weimar, sent to reconnoitre beyond the forest of Thuringia; they had lost 5000 or 6000 in killed, wounded, and fugitives, in the combats of Schleitz and Saalfield; but there yet remained 50,000 men to the prince of Hohenlohe, 66,000 to the duke of Brunswick, and 17,000 or 18,000 to general Ruchel; that is to say, 134,000 men—very formidable behind a position like that of the Saale from Jena to Naumburg. Placing strong detachments before the principal openings, and the mass a little in the rear, in a central position, in such a manner as to be able to run in force to the point attacked, they would be in a state to give the French army a dangerous battle for itself, and if not to snatch the victory, at least to dispute it, so that retreat would become easy and the issue of the war uncertain.

But the disorder of mind only increased among the Prussian staff. The duke of Brunswick, who had shown until then a sufficient justness of reason, and who had appeared to appreciate the advantages of the situation he occupied, in the different cases that were possible; the duke of Brunswick, now that one of these cases, that most to be foreseen, was realizing itself, seemed to have suddenly lost his mind, and wished to decamp in all haste. The movement of marshal Davout upon Naumburg had let in upon his mind a ray of light. He concluded from the appearance of the marshal at Naumburg, that Napoleon wished not to give battle, but to hasten his march towards the Elbe, and cut off the Prussians from Saxony, and even from Prussia, as he had cut off general Mack from Bavaria and Austria. The fear to be enveloped, as general Mack had been, and reduced like him to the necessity of laying down his arms, troubled the commonly right mind of this unhappy old man. He therefore wished to depart at that moment to gain the Elbe. In Prussia they had railed with so little justice and so little pity against the unfortunate Mack, that he lost his reason at the mere idea of finding himself in the same position, and to avoid it exposed himself to other situations which were not better. Still the actual position of things was far from resembling that of the Austrian general. The duke of Brunswick could be passed separated from Saxony, by a rapid movement of Napoleon upon the Elbe, perhaps outstripped upon Berlin, but it was impossible that he could be enveloped and obliged to capitulate: whether he lost a battle on the Saale, or whether he was cut off from the Elbe, he had a certain retreat towards Magdeburg and the Lower Elbe, although he was exposed to arrive there in a bad state. He could not be taken in the vast plains of the north, as the Austrians had been in the dangerous valley of the Danube. Besides, the army of general Mack counted at the utmost 70,000 men, that of the duke of Brunswick counted 144,000 on recalling the duke of Weimar; and it is not easy to envelope such an army, at least to reduce it to the point of laying down its arms. But when they had wanted to combat so much, had so much desired to encounter the French, thinking even of passing the mountains in order to go and seek them in Franconia, wherefore, when they encountered them finally upon their own territories, excellent for themselves, very difficult for the French, wherefore not establish themselves in a body, in order to precipitate them into the deep and rocky bed of the Saale, at the instant when they attempted to ascend the heights! But all this coolness was gone, since the enemy they had braved from afar was so near, since at Schleitz and Saalfield the quality of the Prussian army had shown itself so superior to that of the Russians and Austrians!

The duke of Brunswick, impatient to escape the fate of general Mack, took the precaution of immediately decamping, to carry himself to the Elbe by forced marches, covering himself with the Saale, which drew on the abandonment of Leipsic, Dresden, and all Saxony to the French. The prince of Hohenlohe, after having so tardily decided to repass the Saale, encamped on the height of Jena. The duke of Brunswick enjoined it upon him to remain there to close the opening, while the principal army, filing behind the army of Silesia, went to join the Saale at Naumburg, and then descended as far as the Elbe.

The duke of Brunswick ordered general Ruchel to remain at Weimar the time required to rally the advance-guard, engaged in a useless reconnoitring beyond, in the forest of Thuringia; and as to him-

self, taking the five divisions of the principal army, he resolved to decamp on the 13th, to follow the great road from Weimar to Leipsic, as far as the bridge of Naumburg, to leave at this bridge three divisions to guard it, while with two others he went to assure himself of the passage of the Unstrut, one of the tributaries of the Saale; then, this obstacle cleared, to recal the three divisions posted at Naumburg, to call in to himself the prince of Hohenlohe and general Ruchel left in the rear, and thus to proceed along the banks of the Saale as far as the junction of that river with the Elbe, to the environs of Magdeburg.

Such was the plan of retreat adopted by the duke of Brunswick, and such was the trouble he took to quit the defensive line of the Elbe, from which he ought never to have gone away, to rejoin it so soon and amidst such great dangers.

In consequence, the principal army received the order to set itself in movement on the same day, the 13th of October. The prince of Hohenlohe received orders to occupy the heights of Jena, and to close the passage, while the five divisions of the duke of Brunswick, quitting Weimar, went to halt in the evening at Naumburg. The five divisions were to follow at a league's distance the one from the other, and to make good six leagues in the day. It is not thus that the French march when they have an important end to obtain. Weimar evacuated, general Ruchel was immediately to occupy it. All these dispositions being arranged and communicated to those who were charged with their execution, the army of the duke of Brunswick set out on its march, having the king at its head, the princes, and the queen herself, followed by such a mass of baggage as rendered all manœuvring impossible. The cannon being heard so near, it was not possible to suffer the queen to be at head-quarters. Her presence, after having been an inconvenience, became a peril for her and a subject of uneasiness to the king. A formal injunction was necessary to decide her departure. She went away at last, her eyes filled with tears, not doubting, since the combats of Schleitz and Saalfield, of an unhappy sequel to a policy of which she was the unfortunate instigator.

While the duke of Brunswick marched thus upon Naumburg, the prince of Hohenlohe remained upon the heights of Jena with 50,000 men, having for a rear-guard general Ruchel with 18,000, employing himself in re-establishing a little order among his troops, beating up the country with his cars in order to collect provisions,—above all, to procure some sustenance for the Saxons, whose discontent was extreme. Partaking the opinion of the duke of Brunswick, that the French were gone towards Leipsic and Dresden, to be the first upon the Elbe, he concerned himself little about the town of Jena, and took little care of the heights situated in the rear of that town.

During this same afternoon of the 13th of October, Napoleon, as has been seen, rapidly transferred himself from Gera upon Jena, and ordered himself to be followed by all his forces. He arrived there in person about the middle of the day. Marshal Lannes, who had preceded him, awaited him with impatience. Without losing a moment, they both mounted their horses to go and reconnoitre the place. At Jena itself, the valley of the Saale begins to enlarge. The right bank on which they travelled is low, humid, and covered with meadows. The left bank on the contrary, that occupied by the Prussians, presented scarped heights, which commanded in a peak the town of Jena, climbed by narrow defiles, tortuous, and covered with wood. To the left of Jena, a gorge more open, and less abrupt, which they called the Mühlthal, was the passage across which the great road from Jena to Weimar had been made. This road at first followed the bottom of the Mühlthal, then arose in the form of a volute, and opened on the elevated level in the rear. A dangerous assault would have been necessary to force this passage; more open in truth, but guarded by a great part of the Prussian army. Thus this was not the point by which they were able to ascend to the elevated ground in order to give battle to the Prussians.

But another resource offered. The hardy *tirailleurs* of Lannes, engaging in the ravines that are encountered in leaving Jena, had succeeded in ascending to the principal height, and had perceived all at once the Prussian army encamped on high ground of the right bank. Soon followed by some detachments of Suchet's division, they maintained their place, repulsing the advanced posts of general Tauenzien. Thus, thanks to the boldness of the soldiers, the heights which commanded the left bank of the Saale were conquered, but unhappily by a road little accessible to artillery. It was there that Lannes conducted Napoleon, in the midst of a fire of *tirailleurs* that did not cease, and rendered reconnoitring exceedingly dangerous.

The principal of the heights which command the town of Jena, is called the Landgrafenberg, and since the memorable events of which it has been the theatre, it has received the name of Napoleonsberg. It is the most elevated of the country round. Napoleon and Lannes, on contemplating from this height the surrounding land, the back towards Jena, saw on their right the Saale running through a sinuous gulley, deep and wooded as far as Naumburg, which is six or seven leagues from Jena. They saw before them the undulating high ground extending itself far away, and inclining by an insensible slope towards the little valley of the Ilm, at the bottom of which the town of Weimar is situated. They perceived on their left the grand road from Jena to Weimar, rising by a succession of snaky windings from the gorge of Mühlthal to the plain above, and running in a right line to Weimar. These windings, which exhibit in form, as has been said, a sort of snaky winding, had received the German name, and is called *Schnecke*. On the same road from Jena to Weimar was seen in *échellon* the Prussian army of prince Hohenlohe, without their being able to judge of the precise number. As to the corps of general Ruchel posted at Weimar, the distance did not permit them to discover that. It was the same with the grand army of the duke of Brunswick, which, marching from Weimar to Nuremberg, was hid in the depths of the valley of the Ilm.

Napoleon having before him a mass of troops, of which he was not well able to judge the strength, supposed that the Prussian army had chosen that ground as the field of battle, and at once made his dispositions in such a manner as to open with his army on the Landgrafenberg, before the enemy

should come in a body to push him down the precipices of the Saale. It was necessary to hasten, and to avail himself of the space conquered by his *tirailleurs*, to establish himself on the height. They only held the summit, it is true, because at a few paces' distance only was the corps of general Tauenzien, separated from the French by a slight bend of the ground. This corps was supported on two villages: one on the French right, that of Closewitz, was surrounded by a small wood; the other on the left, that of Cospada, was surrounded equally by a wood of some extent. Napoleon wished to leave the Prussians quiet in this position until the following day, and in the meanwhile conduct a part of his army to the Landgrafenberg. The space which he held was sufficient to contain the corps of Lannes and the guard. He ordered them to be brought up immediately by the scarped ravines which serve to mount from Gera to the Landgrafenberg. To the left he placed the division of Gazan; to the right, that of Suchet; in the middle and a little in the rear, the foot guard. He made these encamp in a square of 4000 men, and established his own bivouac in the centre of the square. It is since then that the inhabitants of the country have called this height the Napoleonsberg, and mark by a heap of rough stones the place where this personage, every where popular, even in the places where he only showed himself terrible, passed that memorable night.

But it was not all to bring infantry upon the Landgrafenberg; it was necessary to transport thither artillery. Napoleon, going off at a horse pace, found a passage less steep than the rest, by which artillery, drawn by great efforts, might pass. Unhappily the way was too narrow. Napoleon commanded a detachment of soldiers of the engineers to enlarge it by cutting away the rock, he himself in his impatience directing them with a torch in his hand. He did not retire until the night was far advanced, when he had seen wheeled by the first pieces of cannon. It required twelve horses to draw each artillery carriage to the summit of the Landgrafenberg. Napoleon proposed to attack general Tauenzien at break of day, and to gain, by pushing forward briskly, the space necessary for the formation of his army. Fearing, however, to open by a single outlet; wishing also to divert the attention of the enemy, he ordered on the left, that Augereau should enter the gorge of Mühlthal, and carry on the road to Weimar one of his two divisions, and gain with another the reverse side of the Landgrafenberg, in order to fall on the rear of general Tauenzien. On the right he ordered marshal Soult, whose corps, leaving Gera, would arrive in the night, to climb the other ravines, that by Lobstadt and Dornberg, open upon Closewitz, in order to fall also upon the rear of general Tauenzien. With this double diversion, left and right, Napoleon did not doubt to force the Prussians in their position, and to procure himself the space which was necessary for his army to form. Marshals Ney and Murat were to ascend to the Landgrafenberg by the route that Lannes and the guard had taken.

The day of the 13th of October passed away, and a profound obscurity enveloped the field of battle. Napoleon had placed his tent in the centre of the square formed by his guard, and had only suffered a few fires to be lighted. But the Prussian army had lighted all theirs. The fires of the prince of Hohenlohe were seen along the whole extent of the high ground; and at the bound of the horizon, on the heights of Nuremberg that surmounted the old castle of Eckartsberge, those of the army of the duke of Brunswick became all on a sudden visible to Napoleon. He thought that, far from retiring, all the Prussian forces had come to take a part in the battle. He sent his aid-de-camp with fresh orders to marshals Davout and Bernadotte. He commanded marshal Davout to keep securely the bridge of Naumburg, and even to pass it if it was possible, to fall upon the rear of the Prussians while they should be fighting in front. He ordered marshal Bernadotte, who was placed intermediately, to concur in the projected movement, whether in joining himself to marshal Davout, if he were near him, or in throwing himself directly upon the Prussian flanks, if he had already taken up at Dornberg a situation more approximative to Jena. Finally, he enjoined it upon Murat to arrive as soon as he was able with his cavalry.

While Napoleon made his dispositions, the prince of Hohenlohe was in complete ignorance of the fate that awaited him. Always persuaded that the main body of the French army, in place of halting before Jena, had gone on Leipsic and Dresden, he supposed all he should have, more or less, would be some affair with the corps of marshals Lannes and Augereau, that, having passed the Saale after the combat of Saalfield, had in his opinion shown themselves between Jena and Weimar, as if they were descended from the heights of the forest of Thuringia. Under this idea, not dreaming of making front towards Jena, he had not disposed on that side any corps except that of general Tauenzien, and had arranged his army along the road from Weimar to Jena. His left, composed of the Saxons, guarded the summit of the Schnecke; his right extended as far as Weimar, and there connected itself with the corps of general Ruchel. Still the fire of *tirailleurs* that was heard on the Landgrafenberg caused a sort of sensation; and general Tauenzien demanding succours, the prince of Hohenlohe made the Saxon brigade of Cerrini, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, and several squadrons of cavalry, take arms and go towards the Landgrafenberg to drive away the French, that he believed scarcely established there. At the moment when he was about to execute this intention, colonel Massenbach brought him from the duke of Brunswick the reiterated order not to engage in any serious action, to confine himself to guarding securely the passages of the Saale, and, above all, that of Dornberg, which filled him with anxiety, because there had been some light troops perceived in that quarter. The prince of Hohenlohe became the most obedient of lieutenants, when he was not required to be so, and stopped all of a sudden at these injunctions from head-quarters. It was, nevertheless, singular to obey an order not to engage in a battle, and yet to abandon the inlet by which he was on the morrow to receive so disastrous a one. However that may be, renouncing the retaking of the Landgrafenberg, he contented himself with sending the Saxon brigade of Cerrini to general Tauenzien, and placing at Nerkwitz, in front of Dornberg, under the orders of general

Holzendorf, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, the fusiliers of Pelet, a battalion of Schimmelpfenig, and, in fact, several detachments of cavalry and artillery. He sent some light horse to Dornberg itself, to know what was passing. The prince of Hohenlohe kept himself to these dispositions: he returned to his head-quarters at Capellendorf, near Weimar, saying to himself that with 50,000 men, and even 70,000, counting the corps of Ruchel, guarded towards Dornberg by general Holzendorf, towards Jena by general Tauenzien, showing front towards the road from Weimar to Jena, he should punish the two marshals, Lannes and Augereau, for their audacity, if they dared to attack with 30,000 or 40,000 French, of which he was well able to dispose, and re-establish the honour of the Prussian arms, so seriously compromised at Schleitz and Saalfield.

Napoleon, stirring before daylight, gave his last instructions to his lieutenants, and made his soldiers get under arms. The night was cold, the country covered with a thick fog, like that which covered for several hours the battle-field of Austerlitz. Escorted by men carrying torches, Napoleon went down the front of the troops, spoke to the officers and soldiers, explained to them the position of the two armies, demonstrated to them that the Prussians were as much committed as the Austrians had been the preceding year; that, vanquished now, they would be cut off from the Elbe and the Oder, separated from the Russians, and reduced to the necessity of delivering over to the French the Prussian monarchy entire; that, in such a situation, the French corps that should suffer itself to be beaten would make the greatest design miscarry, and dishonour itself for ever. He strenuously engaged them to guard against the Prussian cavalry, and to receive it in square with their ordinary firmness. The cries, "Forward! Long live the Emperor!" every where welcomed his words. Although the fog was thick, even through its density the advanced posts of the enemy perceived the light of their torches, heard the cries of joy of the soldiers, and went to give general Tauenzien the alarm. The corps of Lannes moved at that moment at Napoleon's signal. The division of Suchet, divided into three brigades, advanced the first. The brigade of Claparède, composed of the 17th light and a battalion *d'élite*, marched at the head, formed in a single line. On the wings of this line, and to guard against attacks of cavalry, the 34th and 40th regiments, forming a second brigade, were disposed in a close column. The brigade of Vedel, opened out, closed this species of square. To the left of Suchet's division, but a little in the rear, came the division of Gazan, ranged in two lines, and preceded by its artillery. They advanced groping through the fog. The division of Suchet was directed towards the village of Closewitz, which was to the right. The division of Gazan went upon the village of Cospoda, which was to the left. The Saxon battalions of Frederick-Augustus and of Rechten, and the Prussian battalion of Zweifel, perceived a mass in movement crossing through the fog, and fired all together. The 17th supported itself against the fire, and immediately returned it. They were thus both engaged for several moments, seeing the light, hearing the noise of the musketry, but without being able to distinguish one another. The French, in moving onward, finished by discovering the little wood that surrounded the village of Closewitz. General Claparède threw himself forward upon it quickly, and at the sequel of a combat hand to hand very soon carried it, as well as the village of Closewitz itself. After having deprived of this support the line of general Tauenzien, the French continued to march under the balls which were projected from amidst this thick fog. The division of Gazan, on its own side, carried the village of Cospoda, and established itself there. Between these two villages, but a little further off, was found a small hamlet, that of Lutzenrode, occupied by the fusiliers of Ericsen. The division of Gazan captured that as well, and then was enabled to form with more ease. At this moment the two divisions of Lannes received fresh discharges of artillery and musketry. This was from the Saxon grenadiers of the brigade of Cerrini, which, after having received the advanced posts of general Tauenzien, carried themselves forward, and executed their battalion-firing with as much compactness as if it had been on a field-day. The 17th light, which had kept at the head of the divisions of Suchet, having expended their cartridges, went round to the rear. The 34th took its place, exchanged the fire for some time, then met the Saxon grenadiers with the bayonet, and broke them. The entire corps of general Tauenzien having been soon put to the route, the divisions of Gazan and Suchet took about twenty cannon and many of the fugitives. On parting from the Landgrafenberg, the undulating levels on which the troops had formed went, as has been said, in an inclination towards the little valley of the Ilm. They marched, therefore, quickly upon sloping ground, and at the heels of an enemy in flight. In this rapid movement they fell in with two battalions of Cerrini, as well as the fusiliers of Pelet, remaining in the environs of Closewitz. These troops were thrown back for the rest of the day towards general Holzendorf, to whom was committed the day before the guard of the outlet of Dornberg.

The action had not endured two hours. It was now nine o'clock, and Napoleon had realized the first part of his plan, which consisted in possessing himself of a space necessary for the drawing up his army. His instructions were executed at the same moment on every point with remarkable punctuality. Towards the left, marshal Augereau, after having directed the division of Heudelet, as well as his cavalry and artillery, into the bottom of the Mühlthal, on the great road to Weimar, climbed with the division of Desjardins the reverse of the Landgrafenberg, and formed upon the elevated level on the left of the division of Gazan. Towards the right, marshal Soult, only one of whose divisions had arrived,—that of general St. Hilaire,—ascended from Lobstadt in the rear of Closewitz, in the face of the positions of Nerkwitz and Alten-Gone, occupied by the wrecks of the corps of Tauenzien and by the detachment of general Holzendorf. Marshal Ney, impatient to aid in the battle, had detached from his corps a battalion of voltigeurs, a battalion of grenadiers, the 25th light, and two regiments of cavalry, and with this select body had taken the advance. He entered Jena at the same hour that the first act of

the contest had concluded. Murat, returning at a gallop with the dragoons and cuirassiers from his reconnoitrings executed at the bottom of the Saale, remounted towards Jena, out of breath. Napoleon resolved therefore to halt some moments on the conquered ground, to leave his troops time to arrive in line.

Of these proceedings the fugitives of general Tauenzien had given the alarm to the entire camp of the Prussians. At the sound of cannon prince Hohenlohe had gone to the Weimar road, where the Prussian infantry was encamped, not yet believing in a general action, and complaining of that which was thus fatiguing the troops by useless fighting. Soon undeceived, he took his measures for giving battle. Knowing that the French had passed the Saale at Saalfield, he had expected to see them appear between Jena and Weimar; and he ranged his army along the road which led from one of these towns to the other. This conjecture was not realized: it was necessary to change his dispositions, and he did this with promptitude and resolution. He sent the main body of the Prussian infantry, under the orders of general Grawert, to occupy the positions abandoned by general Tauenzien. He left towards the *Schnecke*, which formed his right, the division of Niesemeuschel, composed of the two Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, of the Prussian battalion of Boguslawski, and of a numerous artillery, with an order to defend to the last extremity the terraces or steps by which the road to Weimar ascended to the levels above. He gave, to second them, the brigade of Cerrini, rallied and reinforced by four Saxon battalions. In rear of his centre he placed a reserve of five battalions, to support general Grawert. He made rally at some distance from the field of battle, and provided with ammunition, the wrecks of the corps of general Tauenzien. As to the left, he directed general Holzendorf to go forward, if he were able, to fall upon the right of the French, while he himself endeavoured to stop them in front. He addressed to general Ruchel an account of what had passed, and beseeched him to accelerate his march. Lastly, he went personally with the Prussian cavalry and the artillery harnessed, to encounter the French, in order to restrain them, and to protect the formation of the infantry of general Grawert.

It was about ten o'clock, and the action of the morning, interrupted for an hour, commenced again with vivacity. Whilst on the right marshal Soult, issuing from Lobstadt, climbed the heights with the division of St. Hilaire,—while in the centre the divisions of Suchet and Gazan, under marshal Lannes, formed on the level conquered in the morning, and that on the left, marshal Augereau, ascending from the bottom of the Mühlthal, had gained the village of Iserstedt, Marshal Ney, in his ardour to fight, had advanced with his three thousand chosen men, concealed by the fog, and had taken his place between Lannes and Augereau in face of the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, which occupied the middle of the field of battle. He arrived at the same moment that the prince of Hohenlohe went to place himself at the head of the Prussian cavalry. Finding himself all of a sudden face to face with the enemy, he engaged before the emperor had ordered the resumption of the action. The artillery of the prince of Hohenlohe was already placed in battery; Ney sent the 10th hussars upon this artillery. This regiment, taking advantage of a small clump of wood to form, issued forth in a gallop, ascended by the right to the flank of the Prussian artillery, sabred the cannoneers, and took seven pieces of cannon, under the fire of all the enemy's line. But a mass of Prussian cuirassiers fell upon this regiment, and obliged it to retire precipitately. Ney then sent out the 3rd hussars. This regiment manœuvered as the 10th had done, profited by the clump of wood to form itself, ascended on the flank of the cuirassiers, then, breaking suddenly upon them, threw them into disorder, and forced them to retire. They were not enough, however; two regiments of light cavalry having to make head against thirty squadrons of dragoons and cuirassiers. The French chasseurs and hussars were soon obliged to seek shelter behind their infantry. Marshal Ney then carried to the front the battalion of grenadiers and that of voltigeurs which he had brought, formed into two squares, then placing himself in one of them, opposed them to the charges of the Prussian cavalry. He suffered the enemy's cuirassiers to approach as far as within twenty paces of his bayonets, and terrified them at the aspect of an immoveable infantry reserving its fire. At his signal a close discharge covered the ground with dead and wounded. Several times attacked, these two squares remained unshaken.

Napoleon, from the heights of Landgrafenberg, had been astonished to hear the fire recommence without his order. He learned with further astonishment that marshal Ney, whom he supposed still behind, was engaged with the Prussians. He hastened very discontentedly, and, arriving near Vierzehn-Heiligen, perceived from that height marshal Ney defending himself in the midst of two feeble squares against all the Prussian cavalry. This heroic countenance of things was calculated to dissipate all dissatisfaction. Napoleon sent general Bertrand with two regiments of light cavalry, all he had in the absence of Murat, to contribute to disengage marshal Ney, and ordered Lannes to advance with his infantry. The intrepid Ney, waiting until he was disengaged, did not suffer himself to be disconcerted. While he renewed with four regiments of horse the charges of cavalry, he sent the 25th light infantry to the left, in order to support itself in the wood of Iserstedt, that Augereau attempted to reach on his side; he made the battalion of grenadiers advance as far as to the little wood which had protected the chasseurs, and flung the battalion of voltigeurs on the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, to take it. But at the same instant Lannes, coming to his succour, placed in the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen the 21st regiment of light infantry; and putting himself in person at the head of the 100th, 103rd, 34th, 64th, and 88th of the line, opened and formed in face of the Prussian infantry of general Grawert. This last formed before the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, with a regularity of movement due to long practice. His troops, arranged in battle order, commenced a fire of musketry regular and terrible. The three small detachments of Ney suffered cruelly; but Lannes, ascending on the right of the infantry of general Grawert, endeavoured to break it, despite the re-

peated charges of the cavalry of prince Hohenlohe, who assisted him on his march.

Prince Hohenlohe supported his troops bravely in the middle of every danger. The regiment of Sanitz broke, and he re-formed it under the fire. He afterwards ordered the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen to be attacked by the regiment of Zastrow with the bayonet, hoping by that to decide the victory. Still they announced to him that others of the enemy's columns began to appear; that general Holzendorf, contesting with superior forces, did not find himself in a state to second him; that nevertheless general Ruchel was near joining with his corps. He judged, therefore, that it was best to await his powerful aid, and had the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen shelled, wishing to attack it by flames before attacking it with the bayonet. He in the meanwhile sent officer upon officer to general Ruchel, to press him to come up, promising him the victory if he arrived in useful time, because in his opinion the French were on the point of drawing back. Vain illusion of a boiling but blind valour! At that hour fortune had decided otherwise. Augereau opened out finally to traverse the wood of Iserstedt with the division of Desjardins, disengaged the left of Ney, and began to exchange musket-shots with the Saxons that defended the *Schnecke*, while general Heudelet attacked them in column on the great road from Jena to Weimar. On the other side of the field of battle the corps of marshal Soult, after having chased from the wood of Closewitz the remainder of the brigade of Cerrini, as well as the fusiliers of Pelet, and flung back to a distance the detachment of Holzendorf, made his cannon heard on the flank of the Prussians. Napoleon, seeing the progress of his two wings, and learning the arrival of the troops remaining in the rear, no longer feared to engage all his force present on the ground, the guard included, and gave the order to move in advance. An irresistible impulse was communicated to the whole line. They pushed before them the broken Prussians; they overturned them upon the inclosed ground that descends from Landgrafenberg towards the valley of the Ilm. The regiment of Hohenlohe, and the grenadiers of Hahn of the division of Grawert, were almost entirely destroyed by the fire or the bayonet. General Grawert himself was seriously wounded while directing his infantry. No corps held together again. The brigade of Cerrini, attacked with grape-shot, fell back on the reserve of Dyherrn, which opposed in vain its five battalions to the movements of the French. Soon uncovered, this reserve saw itself outflanked, enveloped on all sides, and obliged to disperse. The corps of Tauenzien, rallied for an instant, and brought again into fire by prince Hohenlohe, was drawn with the others into the general rout. The Prussian horse, profiting by the absence of the French heavy cavalry, charged often, to cover its broken infantry; but the French chasseurs and hussars made head against it, and, although many times driven back, returned without ceasing to the charge, sustained and intoxicated by the victory. A frightful carnage followed this disordered retreat. Prisoners were made at every step, and artillery was taken in entire batteries.

In this great peril came at last, too late, general Ruchel. He marched in two lines of infantry, having on the left the cavalry belonging to his corps, and on the right the Saxon cavalry commanded by the brave general Zeschwitz, which had spontaneously come to take that position. He ascended the slope inclining from Landgrafenberg to the Ilm. While he mounted, there descended like a torrent about him the Prussians and French, the one pursuing the other. He was thus received by a sort of tempest from the time of his appearance on the field of battle. While he advanced, his heart torn at the view of the disaster, the French threw themselves upon him with all the impetuosity of victory. The cavalry which covered his left flank was first dispersed. The unfortunate general, the unwise friend, but the ardent lover of his country, exposed his person in the first shock. He was struck by a ball in the centre of the breast, and borne off dying in the arms of his soldiers. His infantry, deprived of the cavalry that covered them, was attacked in flank by the troops of marshal Soult, and threatened in front by those of marshals Lannes and Ney. The battalions placed at the extreme left of the line, seized with fear, broke, and drew away in their flight the rest of that corps of the army. To crown their misfortunes, the French dragoons and cuirassiers arrived at a gallop, under the command of Murat, impatient to take a share in the battle. They surrounded these unfortunate broken battalions, sabred those who attempted to resist, and pursued the others as far as the banks of the Ilm, where they made a great number of prisoners.

There remained on the field of battle only the two Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and of Nehroff, which, after having honourably defended the *Schnecke* against the divisions of Heudelet and Desjardins of the corps of Augereau, had been forced from their position by the address of the French *tirailleurs*, and were effecting their retreat disposed in two squares. These squares presented three faces of infantry and artillery, this last forming the rear face. These two Saxon brigades retreated, halting by turns, firing their cannon, and then resuming their march. The artillery of Augereau followed them, and sent its balls among them. A cloud of French *tirailleurs* succeeding, harassed them with musketry. Murat, who came from overturning the remains of the corps of general Ruchel, threw himself upon these two Saxon brigades, and charged them home with his dragoons and cuirassiers. The dragoons attacked them the first time without penetrating; but they returned to the charge, penetrated, and broke them. General Hautpoul, with the cuirassiers, attacked the second brigade, broke it, and committed upon it the ravage that victorious cavalry exercises over broken infantry. These unfortunate men had no other resource than to surrender themselves prisoners. The Prussian battalion of Boguslawski was broken in turn, and treated like the rest. The brave general Zeschwitz, who had hastened with the Saxon cavalry to the succour of his infantry, made vain efforts to support them; he was driven back, and forced to yield to the general rout. Murat rallied his squadrons, and went towards Weimar, to gather fresh trophies. At some distance from that city detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery were mingled pell-mell upon the summit of the great road, on a descent long and

rapid, where it goes down to join the valley of the Ilm. These troops, confusedly accumulated, were supported on a little wood called the wood of Webicht. All on a sudden appeared the brilliant helmets of the French cavalry. Some discharges of musketry took place instinctively from this last crowd. At that signal the mass, seized with terror, threw itself on the descent which terminates in Weimar; infantry, cavalry, and artillery all flung themselves, the one upon the other, into the gulf: a new disaster, and well deserving pity. Murat sent forward a part of his dragoons, who pressed with the sword's point this frightened column, and pursued it as far as the streets of Weimar. With his other men he made a circuit, and, passing Weimar, cut off the retreat of the fugitives, who surrendered by thousands.

Of 70,000 Prussians who appeared on the field of battle, there was not a single body that remained entire, nor a single one that retreated in order. Of the 100,000 French composing the corps of marshals Soult, Lannes, Augereau, Ney, Murat, and the guard, about 50,000 had been engaged, and were sufficient to rout the Prussian army. The greater part of that army, struck by a kind of vertigo, threw away its arms, recognizing neither colours nor officers, and fled upon all the roads of Thuringia. About 12,000 Prussians and Saxons, dead or wounded, and about 4000 French, dead or wounded, also covered the ground from Jena to Weimar. There were seen extended on the plain, in a more than common number, a quantity of Prussian officers, who had nobly expiated with their lives their foolish passion. Fifteen thousand prisoners and 200 pieces of cannon were in the hands of the French soldiers, intoxicated with delight. The howitzer-shells of the Prussians had set fire to the town of Jena; and from the level where they had fought columns of flame were seen rising from amid the depth of the obscurity below. The balls of the French howitzers furrowed the city of Weimar, and threatened it with a terrible fate. The cries of the fugitives, who traversed it in flight; the noise of the cavalry of Murat, that passed through the streets at full gallop, sabring without mercy all that were not prompt in flinging down their arms, had filled with terror this charming city, the noble asylum of letters, the peaceable theatre of the finest mental communion that was then in the world. At Weimar, as at Jena, a part of the inhabitants had fled. The conquerors, as masters, disposing of the town, nearly abandoned, established their magazines and hospitals in the churches and public places. Napoleon, returned to Jena, employed himself, according to his custom, in having the wounded collected, and hearing the cries of "Long live the emperor!" mingle with the groans of the dying. Terrible scenes, of which the aspect would be intolerable, if the genius, the heroism displayed, did not redeem the horror; and if glory, that light which embellishes every thing, did not envelope it in its dazzling radiance.

But, however great were the results thus obtained, Napoleon did not yet know all the extent of his victory, nor the Prussians the entire extent of their misfortune. While the cannon resounded at Jena, it was also heard at a distance to the right in the direction of Naumburg. Napoleon had frequently regarded that side, saying to himself, the marshals Davout and Bernadotte, who had between them 50,000 men, had little to fear from the rest of the Prussian army, of which he believed he had the larger part upon his own hands. He had renewed his orders several times, to suffer themselves to be slain to the last man sooner than abandon the bridge of Naumburg. The prince of Hohenlohe, who retired, his heart filled with sorrow, had also himself heard cannon on the side of Naumburg, and felt inclined to go there himself, attracted and repelled by turns according to the news received from Awerstädt, the place where the duke of Brunswick had encamped. Some couriers asserted that his army had gained a complete victory; others, on the contrary, that it had sustained a disaster more striking than that of the army of Hohenlohe. The prince soon learned the truth. Here follows what took place on that memorable day, marked by two sanguinary battles fought five leagues the one from the other.

The royal army set out the day before in five divisions on the great road from Weimar to Naumburg, marching over the high grounds, that, undulating like the waves of the sea, mark the soil of Thuringia, and terminate its abrupt hill-sides towards the banks of the Saale. It had halted at Awerstädt, a little in advance of the defile of Kösen, a well-known military position. The division had marched five or six leagues, and that was thought a great deal for troops little inured to the fatigues of war. It had therefore passed the night of the 13th in front and rear of the village of Awerstädt, and was very badly provisioned for want of knowing how to subsist without magazines. The duke of Brunswick, like the prince of Hohenlohe, seemed to give little attention to the defiles by which it was possible the French might surprise him. Beyond Awerstädt, and towards the bridge of Naumburg on the Saale, a sort of basin is formed, tolerably large, traversed by a brook, which after several windings rejoins the Ilm and the Saale. This basin, the two slopes of which incline towards each other, seems a complete field of battle expressly formed to receive two armies, opposing nothing to their encounter beyond the slight obstacle of a brook easily overpassed. The road from Weimar to Naumburg goes entirely through it, descending first towards the brook, which it crosses by a little bridge; it then ascends the opposing slope, and traverses a village called Hassenhausen, which is the only point of support existing in this open country. Passing Hassenhausen, the road, having reached the outer ridge of the basin thus described, ceases all at once in that direction, and leads by rapid descents down to the banks of the Saale. These form the defile of Kösen. Below is a bridge known as the bridge of Kösen or of Naumburg.

Since the French were known to be on the other side of the Saale at Naumburg, it appeared natural and wise to take up a position, at least with one division, on the height above Kösen, not to open a passage, which it was only requisite to mask, but to defend its access from the French, while the other divisions, covered by the Saale, were pursuing their retreat. But there seemed no precautionary spirit in the Prussian staff. It was thought enough to send some patrols of cavalry to

reconnoitre, who retreated after exchanging a few pistol-shots with marshal Davout's advanced posts. From these patrols they learned that the French had not established themselves in the defile of Kösen, and they believed themselves in safety. The next day three divisions, on crossing the basin we have described, were to occupy the precipitous passes leading down to the banks of the Saale; and the other two divisions, under marshal Kalkreuth, marching in rear of the first three, had orders to possess themselves of the bridge of Freybourg over the Unstrut, to secure for the army the passage of that tributary of the Saale.

In war it is useless to think of many things, and not of all; for, unless all are thought of and provided for, the point forgotten is sure to be that by which the enemy may cause a surprise. To neglect the defile of Kösen at this moment was as grave a fault as to have abandoned the Landgrafenberg to Napoleon.

Marshal Davout, whom Napoleon had stationed at Naumburg, united to a most correct judgment extraordinary firmness and inflexible severity. He was stimulated to watchfulness as much by his love of duty as by the consciousness of a natural infirmity, which consisted in a very great weakness of sight. This illustrious warrior was thus indebted to a physical defect for a moral quality. Discerning objects with difficulty, he applied himself to a close observation of them: when he had himself seen them, he obliged others to examine them; he incessantly questioned those around him, took no rest, and permitted none to others, till he thought himself sufficiently informed, and would never resign himself to that state of uncertainty in which so many generals are content to slumber, trusting their own glory and the lives of their soldiers to chance. In the evening he had gone himself in person to reconnoitre what was passing in the defile of Kösen. He learned from some prisoners, made at the end of a skirmish, that the grand Prussian army, led by the king, the princes, and the duke of Brunswick, was approaching. He had immediately despatched a battalion to the bridge of Kösen, and directed that his troops should be on the march in the middle of the night, so as to occupy the heights which overlooked the Saale before the enemy could do it. Marshal Bernadotte was then posted at Naumburg, with orders to remain there, where it was thought he would be useful, and, above all, to second marshal Davout, if the latter had need of his aid. Marshal Davout then repaired to Naumburg, acquainted marshal Bernadotte with what he had just learned, and proposed that they should fight together, offering to place himself under his command, as the 46,000 men which formed their joint force were not too many to make head against the 80,000 men which report gave to the Prussian army. Marshal Davout pressed most strongly these weighty points. If marshal Lannes, or any other, had been in the place of marshal Bernadotte, no time would have been lost in fruitless explanations. The generous Lannes, on seeing the enemy in front, would have embraced even a detested rival, and would have fought with unflinching ardour. But marshal Bernadotte, putting the falsest interpretations on the emperor's orders, obstinately persisted in quitting Naumburg to throw himself upon Dornberg, where the enemy had not shown himself[1]. What could have induced so strange a resolution? It proceeded from that detestable feeling, which so often sacrifices the blood of men and the safety of states to hatred, to envy, or to vengeance. Marshal Bernadotte entertained a deep dislike to marshal Davout, conceived from the most frivolous motives. He set out, leaving marshal Davout to his own strength alone. The latter remained with three divisions of infantry and three regiments of light cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte even took with him a division of dragoons, which had been detached from the cavalry reserve to second the first and third corps, and which he had no authority to dispose of exclusively.

In the mean time marshal Davout did not hesitate as to the part he was about to take. He resolved to block up the road of the enemy, and to fall with the last man of his corps, rather than leave open a route which Napoleon fixed so great an importance on closing. In the night between the 13th and 14th he was in march towards the bridge of Kösen, with the three divisions under Gudin, Friant, and Morand, forming 26,000 men under his standard, the greater part infantry, happily the best in the whole army; for the discipline was perfectly iron under the inflexible marshal. It was with these 26,000 men that he prepared to combat 70,000, according to some—80,000, according to others—but in reality 66,000. As to his soldiers, they were not accustomed to count their enemies, however numerous they might be. Under every circumstance they felt themselves obliged and certain to conquer.

The marshal, after getting his troops under arms long before daylight, passed the bridge of Kösen, which he had taken care to occupy the evening before, clambered the steeps of Kösen with Friant's division, and opened about six o'clock in the morning upon the heights, which form one of the sides of the basin of Hassenhausen. A few instants after, the Prussians appeared on the opposite side, so that the two armies might have been perceived at the two extremities of this kind of amphitheatre, if the fog, which at that hour

[1] The following is a letter from the emperor to the prince of Ponto Corvo, written after the battle of Awerstädt, which confirms all the above assertions. It evinces the dissatisfaction which Napoleon felt still more strongly than he chose to express:—

"To the prince of Ponto Corvo.

"*Wittemberg, October* 23, 1806.

"I have your letter. I am not in the habit of recriminating on the past, since it is without remedy. Your corps was not on the field of battle, and that might have been most fatal to me. However, after a very precise order, you ought to have been at Dornberg, which is one of the principal openings of the Saale, the same day that marshal Lannes reached Jena, marshal Augereau Kala, and marshal Davout Naumburg. Having failed to fulfil the dispositions I sent during the night to direct you, if you were still at Naumburg, you were bound to march to the assistance of marshal Davout. You were at Naumburg when that order arrived; it was communicated to you, and yet you nevertheless preferred to take the false step of returning to Dornberg, by which you were not in the field of battle, and marshal Davout had to bear, and did bear, the principal efforts of the enemy. All that is certainly most unfortunate, etc. NAPOLEON."

enveloped the battle-field of Jena, had not also shrouded that of Awerstädt. The Prussian division (Schmettau's) marched in front, preceded by an advance-guard of 600 horse, under the orders of general Blucher. A little in the rear was the king, with the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf. General Blucher had descended as far as the muddy brook which traverses the basin, had passed the little bridge, and was ascending the high road, when he encountered a detachment of French cavalry, commanded by colonel Bourke and captain Hulot. Pistol-shots were fired by both parties through the fog, and on the French side a few prisoners were made. The French detachment, after this bold reconnoitring executed in the middle of a thick mist, threw itself back under cover of the 25th of the line, which marshal Davout was leading on. He immediately ordered up some pieces of artillery on the roadway itself, which, pouring in grape-shot on general Blucher's 600 horsemen, soon put them in disorder. A horse battery, which followed these 600 cavalry, was captured by two companies of the 25th, and carried to Hassenhausen. This first rencontre revealed the importance of its situation to each party. A great battle was on the eve of taking place. Nevertheless the uncertainty produced by the fog could but retard the engagement; for neither party dare attempt any serious movement in presence of an enemy that might be termed invisible. Marshal Davout, coming from Naumburg to obstruct the retreat of the Prussians, turned his back on the Elbe and on Germany. He had the Saale on his left, on his right some wooded heights: the Prussians, coming from Weimar, had the contrary position. Marshal Davout—thanks to the delay caused by the fog—had time to post advantageously Gudin's division, which arrived first, and which consisted of the 25th, 85th, 12th, and 21st of the line, and of six squadrons of chasseurs. He placed the 85th in the village of Hassenhausen, and as he found, a little in advance of the right of Hassenhausen (on the French right), a small wood of willows, he dispersed in this wood a strong force of skirmishers, who opened a murderous fire on the Prussian line, which they now began to discern. The three other regiments were disposed to the right of the village; two of them deployed, and drawn up so as to present a double line; the third in column, ready to form in square upon the flank of the division. The ground to the left of Hassenhausen was appropriated to the troops of general Morand. As for those of general Friant, their position was to be determined by the circumstances of the battle.

The king of Prussia, the duke of Brunswick, and marshal Mollendorf, who had crossed the brook with Schmettau's division, halted on discovering the dispositions which they perceived made in advance of Hassenhausen, and deliberated about attacking immediately. The duke of Brunswick wished to wait for Wartensleben's division, so as to act together; but the king and marshal Mollendorf were of opinion not to defer the battle. Besides, the firing had become so hot, that it was necessary to reply to it, and engage immediately. They formed therefore, with Schmettau's division, in front of the ground occupied by the French, having behind them Hassenhausen, which, in the middle of this open country, was thus becoming the pivot of the battle. They tried to dislodge the French skirmishers posted among the willows, but without success; for, besides their address, these skirmishers were well in cover; and then they bore a little to the right of Hassenhausen, (the right of the French, and the left of the Prussians,) so as to assure themselves of a plunging and murderous discharge. Schmettau's division approaching the lines of French infantry to pour their fire into it, and the fog beginning to clear, it discovered Gudin's division of infantry ranged to the right of Hassenhausen. General Blucher, on sight of this, rallied his numerous cavalry, and, making a circuit, came on to charge Gudin's division in flank. But the latter did not allow him time. The 25th, which was in the first line, threw its right battalion instantly into a square; the 24th, which was in the second line, followed the example; the 12th regiment, which was in the rear, formed its two battalions into one single square; and these three masses, with bayonets bristling, waited with quiet boldness the charge of general Blucher's squadrons. The generals Petit, Gudin, and Gauthier had each taken post within a square. The marshal rode from one to the other. General Blucher, distinguished by his reckless daring, executed the first charge, taking care to direct it in person. But his squadrons arrived not at the bayonets; a shower of bullets stopped their way, and forced them to a hasty retreat. General Blucher had had his horse killed under him; he mounted that of a trumpeter, and three times led his men again on to the charge; but each time without success; and he was at length himself hurried away in the rout of his cavalry. The French squadrons of chasseurs, carefully kept in reserve under the protection of a little wood, darted on the rear of this fugitive body, and compelled it to disappear still more quickly, killing some of its men.

Up to this point the third corps had kept its ground without any unsteadiness. Friant's division, which had behaved so well at Austerlitz, appeared at this instant on the place of combat. Marshal Davout, seeing that the efforts of the enemy were directed on the right of Hassenhausen, moved Friant's division towards that place, and concentrated Gudin's division around Hassenhausen, which, according to all appearance, was about to sustain a most violent attack. He sent orders at the same time to general Morand to hasten his movements, so as to place himself on the left of the village.

On the part of the Prussians, the second division, that of Wartensleben, arrived quite breathless, retarded, as it had been, by the incumbrance of the baggage, which had pressed upon its rear. The division of Orange also arrived with loss of breath, having been detained by the same cause. The want of expertness in the habits of war rendered all the movements of this army slow, unconnected, and embarrassed.

The moment was now come when the struggle was to be entered on with fury. The division of Wartensleben directed its efforts towards the left of Hassenhausen, while that of Schmettau, boldly headed by the Prussian officers, advanced even before Hassenhausen itself, and then spread its wings

around the village, so as to surround it. Fortunately three of general Gudin's regiments had thrown themselves there. The 85th, which occupied the front of it, behaved on that day with heroic valour. Forced back on the interior of the village, it defended all entrance into it with invincible firmness, replying with a continuous and well-directed fire to the frightful weight of the Prussian vollies. This regiment had already lost half its effective strength; still it held firm without tottering. In the meanwhile Wartensleben's division, profiting from Morand's division not having as yet occupied the left of Hassenhausen, threatened to turn the village, preceded by an immense force of cavalry. On the sight of this, general Gudin had formed the fourth of his regiments, the 12th, on the left of Hassenhausen, to prevent his being outflanked. It was evident to all eyes that in this open field, the village of Hassenhausen, being the only hold of the one, and the only obstacle to the others, it would be disputed with the greatest obstinacy. The brave general Schmettau, at the head of his foot soldiers, received a wound which obliged him to retire from the contest. The duke of Brunswick, seeing the obstinate resistance of the French, felt a secret despair, and believed that the catastrophe was approaching of which the presentiment had haunted his troubled soul for a month previously. This old warrior, hesitating in the council, but never in the field, would put himself at the head of the Prussian grenadiers, and conduct them on to the assault of Hassenhausen, following a bending of the ground which was beside the causeway, by which the village might be more securely reached. While he was exhorting his men and leading them on the way a shot struck him in the face, and inflicted a mortal wound. He was led off, after a handkerchief was thrown over him, that the army might not recognize the illustrious wounded. The news, however, spread, and a noble rage seized the Prussian staff. The worthy Mollendorf resolved not to survive the day: he advanced, and in his turn was mortally struck. The king and the princes shared danger with the lowest of the soldiery. The king had a horse killed, and remained under fire. The division of Orange at length arrived. It was divided into two brigades: one was directed to reinforce Wartensleben's division on the left of Hassenhausen (the French left), and endeavour to destroy that position, by turning it; the other was to fill the space on the right which Schmettau's division had left vacant, to throw itself on Hassenhausen. This second brigade was, above all things, to stop Friant's division, which was beginning to gain ground on the flank of the Prussian army.

Marshal Davout, incessantly present where danger was greatest, pushed to the right of Friant's division, which exchanged a warm fire of musketry with the brigade of the Orange division, that was opposed to it. In the centre, even at Hassenhausen, he cheered all by the announcement of Morand's arrival. On the left, where Morand at length appeared, he ran to bring into line this division, not the bravest of the three, for all three were equally so, but the most numerous. The intrepid Morand led five regiments, the 13th light infantry, and the 61st, 51st, 30th, and 17th of the line. These five regiments presented nine battalions, the tenth having been left in guard of the bridge of Kösen. They approached to occupy the level ground to the left of Hassenhausen. The Prussians had levelled along this ground a numerous artillery, ready to thunder on the troops that might show themselves. Each of the nine battalions, after having gained the steeps of Kösen, had to open out on the plain under the grape-shot of the enemy. They formed nevertheless, one following the others in succession the instant they arrived in line, in spite of the repeated discharges of the Prussian artillery. The 13th light infantry appeared first, formed, and bore rapidly forward; but, being too much in advance, it was obliged to fall back on the other regiments. The 61st, which came up after these, received as the 13th had been, was, however, not shaken. A soldier, whom his comrades had named "the emperor" on account of some resemblance to Napoleon, perceiving in his company a little wavering, ran forward, placed himself in front, and cried out, "My friends, follow your emperor!" All followed him, and closed up under this shower of grape. The nine battalions finished their formations and marched on in columns, having their artillery in the intervals between one battalion and another. Marshal Davout, leading on these battalions, received a shot in his head, which pierced his hat as high as the cockade, and carried away his hair without breaking in upon the skull.

The nine battalions placed themselves in face of the enemy's line, and forced back Wartensleben's division, as well as the brigade of Orange, which had come to its relief. They spread out on gaining the ground flanking Hassenhausen, and obliged Schmettau's division to call in its wings again, which were extended around the village. After a sufficiently long firing, Morand's division saw a fresh storm gathering on its head: this was an enormous mass of cavalry, which was collected in the rear of Wartensleben's division. The royal army led with it the best and the greatest portion of the Prussian cavalry. It could present 14,000 or 15,000 horsemen, mounted in a most superior manner, and drilled to manœuvre by long exercise. The Prussians determined, with this mass of cavalry, to make one desperate effort against Morand's division. They hoped, upon the level ground which separates Hassenhausen from the Saale, to crush them under their horses' feet, or to drive them headlong, from top to bottom, down the steeps of Kösen. If they should succeed, the left of the French army being overthrown, Hassenhausen surrounded, and Gudin taken in the village, Friant's division could only beat a hurried retreat. But general Morand, on the aspect of this collecting cavalry, disposed seven of his battalions in squares, and left two of them still in line, so as to keep up his communication with Hassenhausen. He established himself in one of the squares, marshal Davout took post in another; and they prepared to receive with firm foot the mass of enemies that was ready to thunder down upon them. All at once the ranks of Wartensleben's infantry opened, and shot forth the torrents of Prussian cavalry, which upon this point could not count less than 10,000 men, conducted by prince William. They continued making a succession of charges, that were renewed after each repulse. Each time our intrepid soldiery, waiting with perfect

coolness the orders of their officers, suffered the enemy's squadrons to approach within thirty or forty paces of their lines, then poured in their fire with such precision and deadly effect, that they brought down hundreds of men and horses, forming thus for themselves a complete rampart of dead bodies. In the intervals of their charges, general Morand and marshal Davout passed from one square to another, to give to each the encouragement of their presence. The Prussian horse repeated these rude assaults with the utmost fury, but never arrived even up to the bayonets. At last, after a frequent repetition of this tumultuous scene, the enemy, discouraged, retreated behind the ranks of its infantry. General Morand, then breaking his squares, formed them in columns of attack, and pushed down upon the division of Wartensleben. The Prussian infantry, attacked with such vigour, recoiled before the French soldiers, and retreated downwards to the bank of the brook. At the same time, general Friant, on the right, forced the first brigade of the Orange division to retire; and in consequence of this double movement, Schmettau's division, deprived of its supports, horribly decimated, was obliged to give way, and retire from the village of Hassenhausen, disputed with so much violence with Gudin's division.

The three Prussian divisions were thus withdrawn beyond the marshy brook which ran through the field of battle. The French army paused an instant to take breath; for the unequal combat had lasted from six o'clock, and the soldiers were expiring with fatigue. Gudin's division, charged with the defence of Hassenhausen, had sustained enormous loss; but Friant's division had not suffered so much; Morand's division, little ill-treated by the cavalry, as all infantry is which has not been broken, had suffered more from the artillery, but found itself notwithstanding in good fighting condition; and all three were ready to recommence, if needful, in order to make head against the two Prussian divisions of reserve that had remained spectators of the combat upon the opposite bank of the basin in which the battle had taken place. These two divisions of reserve, Kuhnheim's and d'Arnim's under marshal Kalkreuth, were awaiting the signal to enter the line in their turn, and to renew the struggle.

Meanwhile deliberations were going on around the king of Prussia. General Blucher advised reuniting the entire mass of the cavalry to the two divisions of reserve, and making one desperate onset upon the enemy. The king was inclined at first to share in this opinion; but others persuaded him that if he would put off the attack for only one day, he would be rejoined by prince Hohenlohe and by the corps of general Ruchel, and might crush the French by means of this junction of forces. The supposition was not well-founded; for if he was permitted to calculate on the accession of the corps of Hohenlohe and of Ruchel, the French, who were then in his front, might also be joined by the grand army. No chance then could be worth that which they might find in a last effort, attempted at once, and with the determination to conquer or to die, though that chance itself was not very great, in regard to the condition of Friant's and Morand's divisions. However, a retreat was ordered. The king had shown consummate bravery, but bravery is not character. Besides, those around him were most deeply depressed.

In the afternoon they commenced their movement in retreat. Marshal Kalkreuth advanced to cover it with his two fresh divisions. General Morand had profited by the accident of some ground called the Sonnenberg, which was situated to the left of the field of battle, to place there some batteries which could open a most inconvenient fire on the right of the Prussians. Marshal Davout moved up his three divisions, and led them quickly beyond the brook. They marched on notwithstanding the fire of the divisions of reserve, followed them up within gun-shot, and forced them to fight during their retreat, without disorder, it is true, but most precipitately. If marshal Davout had had the regiments of dragoons which had been carried away the evening before by marshal Bernadotte, he would have made thousands of prisoners. He took, as it was, more than three thousand, besides one hundred and fifteen pieces of cannon, an enormous capture for a corps which itself possessed but forty-four. Being arrived on the other side of the basin in which they had encountered, he caused his infantry to halt, and, perceiving in the environs of Apolda the troops of marshal Bernadotte, he invited the latter to fall upon the retreating enemy, and to pick up the vanquished, as his own corps, worn out with fatigue, could no longer follow them. The soldiers of marshal Bernadotte, who were eating their soup around Apolda, were very indignant, and asked what they should do with their courage at such a moment.

The Prussian army had lost 3000 prisoners, 9000 or 10,000 men killed or wounded, besides the duke of Brunswick, marshal Mollendorf, general Schmettau, mortally wounded, and, above all, an immense number of officers, who had bravely done their duty. The corps of marshal Davout had suffered most cruel loss. Of 26,000 men he counted 7000 killed and wounded. Generals Morand and Gudin were wounded; general de Billy was killed; half the generals of brigade and colonels were dead, or suffering dreadful wounds. No such murderous day since Marengo had stained with blood the armies of France, and never has so great an example of heroic firmness been given since by a general and his soldiers.

The royal army retreated under the protection of the two divisions of reserve in command of marshal Kalkreuth. The rendezvous appointed for all the corps disorganized by the battle was Weimar, in the rear of the prince of Hohenlohe, who was believed to be still safe. Thither the king marched, sadly no doubt, but calculating, if not on a return of fortune, at least upon a retreat in good order,—thanks to the 70,000 men under prince Hohenlohe and general Ruchel. He continued his route, accompanied by a strong detachment of cavalry, when he discovered the troops of marshal Bernadotte on the skirts of the field of battle of Jena. On thus perceiving the enemy, he no longer doubted that some misfortune had befallen prince Hohenlohe's army. He quitted precipitately the road to Weimar, to throw himself towards the right on that of Sommerda. But the truth soon became fully known; for prince

Hohenlohe, with his force, was at the same moment seeking near the king's army that support which the king's army was seeking from him. They both soon fell in with detached bands that were fleeing in all directions, and each learned from the other that he had been vanquished. The disorder which at first was not great in the king's ranks, because they were not pursued, at this news reached its height. A sudden terror seized all minds; they began to fly on every road, seeing the enemy everywhere, and taking fugitives as full of fright as themselves at the victorious French. To add to their misfortune, they found the roads blocked up with an enormous mass of baggage, which the Prussian armies, enervated by a long peace, carried in their train, and in a like mass such a quantity of royal baggage as was not consistent with the personal simplicity of Frederick-William, but which the presence of the court rendered necessary.

Pressed to escape from danger, the soldiers of the two Prussian armies regarded these obstacles to the rapidity of their flight as a calamity. The cavalry turned aside, and, flying across the country, saved itself by single squadrons alone. The infantry broke their ranks, laying every thing waste, overturning the impeding baggage, leaving the care of pillaging it to the conqueror, anxious only to secure their safety. The two divisions of marshal Kalkreuth, which last alone remained in good order, soon became infected with the general despair, and, in spite of the energy of their chief, began to disperse themselves. The ranks were deserted hourly, and the soldiers who had not shared in the ardour of their officers, found it more easy to get rid of the consequences of the defeat by throwing away their arms, and hiding themselves in the woods. The roads were strewed with pouches, muskets, and cannon. In this manner the Prussian army retreated across the plains of Thuringia, and towards the Hartz mountains, presenting a very different spectacle from that which it had offered only a few days before, when it promised to conduct itself in presence of the French quite differently from the Austrians and Russians [1].

The army of Hohenlohe fled partly to the right towards Sommerda, partly to the left towards Erfurt beyond Weimar. A moiety of the royal army, that which had first quitted the field of battle with orders to retire on Weimar, finding that town in the hands of the enemy, passed on to Erfurt, carrying with it the duke of Brunswick, marshal Mollendorf, and general Schmettau, its chiefs, mortally wounded. The rest of the royal army marched towards Sommerda; not that it had been ordered to do so, but because Sommerda and Erfurt were the towns met with in the rear of the country in which the battle had taken place. No one had been able to give directions since the madness of terror had thus seized on all ranks. The king himself, surrounded by some cavalry, marched towards Sommerda. The prince of Hohenlohe, who had drawn off 1200 or 1500 horse, had but 200 when he arrived next day on the morning of the 15th at Tennstädt. He sought intelligence of the king, who also sought for tidings of him. None of the commanders knew where the others might be found.

During this terrible night the conquerors suffered no less than the conquered. They had only the bare earth for their bed, reposing there through the coldest night, having scarcely any thing to eat at the end of a day of battle, from its character little likely to be productive of food. Many of them, more or less grievously hurt, lay on the ground by the side of their wounded enemies, mingling their groans together. The best organized means of transport could not in so short an interval suffice for 12,000 or 15,000 wounded men. Napoleon, from kindness as much as from calculation, had, during several hours, personally watched their being carried off the field, and had at length retired to Jena, where he found an accumulation of good news, in the announcement of a second victory, more glorious still than that which had just been gained under his own eyes. He at first refused to believe all that was told him, because marshal Bernadotte, to excuse his unpardonable conduct by a lie, told him that marshal Davout had scarcely 9000 or 10,000 men in his front. Captain Trobriand, an officer attached to marshal Davout, having come to acquaint him that he had had 70,000 men to fight against, he would not credit this report, and replied to him, "Your marshal saw double." But when he knew all the details, he expressed the liveliest joy, and loaded with praises, and soon after with rewards, the admirable conduct of the third corps. He was indignant against marshal Bernadotte, and greatly surprised. At the first moment he determined to punish him openly, and even thought of ordering a court martial on him. But their relationship, and a sort of foible for punishing only by severe reproaches, soon caused his resolutions of severity to degenerate into a dissatisfaction which he thenceforth took no pains to conceal. Marshal Bernadotte got over it with severe letters from prince Berthier and Napoleon himself; letters which must have rendered him deeply mortified, if he had had the heart of a citizen and a soldier.

The next day marshal Duroc was despatched to Naumburg. He was the bearer of a letter from the emperor to marshal Davout, and brilliant acknowledgments of satisfaction for all the corps of his army. "Your soldiers and yourself, marshal," said Napoleon, "have established eternal claims to my esteem and gratitude." Duroc had orders to repair to the hospitals, to visit the wounded, to convey to them the promise of splendid rewards, and to distribute money to all those who were in need of it. The letter of the emperor was read in the rooms in which the wounded were crowded; and these unfortunate men, crying, "Long live the emperor!" expressed their desire of recovering life, only that they might again devote it to him.

Napoleon, from the very next day, the 15th October, set about reaping the fruits of his victory with that activity which no captain of ancient or modern times has ever equalled. He first ordered that marshals Davout, Lannes, and Augereau, whose corps had so severely suffered in the day of the 14th, should take two or three days' rest at Naumburg, at Jena, and at Weimar. But mar-

[1] We here only reproduce the picture drawn by the Prussian officers themselves in the different recitals which they have published.

shal Bernadotte, whose soldiers had not fired a gun; marshals Soult and Ney, who had had only a part of their troops engaged; Murat, whose cavalry had had only fatigues to encounter;—these were all ordered in advance, to harass the retreating Prussians, and to gather the spoils, easy enough to capture in the state of disorganization into which the vanquished had fallen. Murat, who had slept at Weimar, had orders to march with his dragoons upon Erfurt on the morning of the 15th, and Ney to follow him immediately. Marshal Soult was to follow the enemy's army by way of Sommerda, Greussen, Sondershausen, and Nordhausen, and to pursue it across Thuringia, towards the mountains of the Hartz, where it seemed that it would in its disorder seek a refuge. Marshal Bernadotte was enjoined that very day to direct his march upon the Elbe, keeping towards the right of the army by Halle and Dessau. It is to be observed that Napoleon, so careful to concentrate his force on the eve of a great battle, the very next day, when he had defeated his enemy, spread his corps like a vast net-work, so as to intercept all who were in retreat; thus skilful in modifying the application of the principles of war according to circumstances, and always with that exactness and design which assures success.

These orders being given, Napoleon applied himself to political affairs. The direction that the Prussians were taking in their retreat was distancing them from Saxony. Napoleon, moreover, had now in his power a good portion of the Saxon troops, who, although they had fought honourably, were but little satisfied, not only with the war having been carried into their own country, but with other injurious proceedings of which they conceived they had cause of complaint against the Prussians. Napoleon therefore assembled the officers of the Saxon troops in one of the halls of the university at Jena. He addressed them in words which were immediately translated by an individual of the Foreign Office, who was placed near him. He told them he knew not why he was at war with their sovereign, who was a prince at once wise, peaceful, and worthy of respect; that he had even drawn the sword to rescue their country from the humiliating dependence in which it was held by Prussia, and that he did not see why the Saxons and the French, with so few motives for hatred between them, should persist in fighting against each other; that, for his part, he was ready to give the first proof of his friendly disposition, by restoring them to their liberty, and by respecting Saxony, provided they would promise, on their side, no longer to bear arms against France, and that the principal among them should go to Dresden, there to propose and cause peace to be made. The Saxon officers, seized with admiration at the sight of the extraordinary man who spoke to them, and moved by the generosity of his propositions, replied by unanimously swearing that neither they nor their soldiers should serve any longer during the war. Some offered immediately to start for Dresden, with an assurance that before three days should elapse they would bring him the consent of their sovereign.

By this clever proceeding Napoleon sought to undermine the spirit of German patriotism, which had been so strongly excited by the solicitude of Prussia, and, in thus treating with kindness a prince who was justly respected, to acquire for himself the right of treating with rigour a prince who was esteemed by no one. This last was the elector of Hesse, who had contributed by his falsehoods first to provoke the war, and then, when war had commenced, to bargain for his adhesion, resolving to give himself to whichever of the two powers might be favoured with victory. He was a secret enemy, devoted to the English, among whom he had deposited his wealth. Napoleon took care, in advancing on Prussia, not to leave such an enemy in his rear. While the principles of war impelled him to get rid of such, those of upright policy did not forbid his doing so; for this prince had been a faithless neighbour to both Prussia and France. Immediately, and without proceeding further, he ordered the eighth corps to quit Mayence and to repair to Cassel, though this corps did not number more than 10,000 or 12,000 men. He directed his brother Louis to march by Westphalia upon Hesse, and to join marshal Mortier with 12,000 or 15,000 men, in order to concur in carrying out the consequences of the victory. Nevertheless, not judging it politic to charge one of his brothers with so rigorous a commission, he advised king Louis to send his troops to marshal Mortier, and to give up to him the task of carrying out the expropriation of the house of Hesse with that obedience and honesty which characterized him. Marshal Mortier was to declare that the elector of Hesse had ceased to reign, (in the form already employed in regard to the house of Naples,) to possess himself of his territory in the name of France, and to disband his army, offering employment in Italy to those of the Hessian soldiery who still chose to remain on service. These were, for the most part, robust men, well disciplined, accustomed to bear arms out of their own country for the cause of those who paid them, especially for the cause of the English, who had employed them in India with great advantage[1]. The Hessian army was composed of 32,000 soldiers of all arms. It was a most important point not to leave such a formidable force behind him; above all, with the intention that Napoleon entertained of proceeding so far to the northward.

With these divers orders, Napoleon sent to the Rhine the news of his brilliant success—news which should dissipate the hopes of his enemies, the fears of his friends, and increase among the soldiers remaining in the interior the zeal for rejoining the grand army. According to his custom, he added to it a multitude of instructions for the levy of conscripts, for the organization of depôts, for the departure of detachments destined to recruit the battalions, and for the regulation of civil affairs, which, under his reign, never suffered from the more busy occupations of war.

From Jena Napoleon repaired to Weimar. He there found all the court of the grand-duke, and the grand-duchess, the sister of the emperor Alexander. The grand-duke himself was alone wanting, charged as he was with the command of a

[1] How wholly untrue! England hired them in the American war from the "shambles" of this prince, according to Lord Chatham's phrase, to destroy her own colonists, but never to serve the East India Company. *Translator.*

Prussian division. This polished and learned court had made Weimar the Athens of modern Germany; and under its protection Göthe, Schiller, and Wieland lived honoured, rich, and happy. The grand-duchess, who was accused of having contributed to the war, rushed into the presence of Napoleon, and, troubled by the tumult which reigned around her, cried as she approached him, "Sire, I recommend to you my subjects!" "Madam, you see what war is," replied Napoleon coldly to her. Beyond this he took no other vengeance. He treated this hostile but lettered court as Alexander had treated a city of Greece; he showed himself full of courtesy to the grand-duchess, expressed to her no displeasure at the conduct of her husband, ordered the city of Weimar to be respected, and that every needful care should be provided for the wounded generals, with which the town was full. From Weimar he turned to the right, and directed his course to Naumburg, that he might himself congratulate marshal Davout, whilst his lieutenants were pursuing to the utmost the Prussian army.

The indefatigable Murat had, during this interval, gone with the squadrons to Erfurt, and invested the place, which, although not of much strength, was nevertheless surrounded with tolerably good walls and provided with considerable supplies. It was over-filled with the wounded and fugitives. Marshal Mollendorf had been transported there: to him Napoleon had recommended most especial attention. Murat summoned Erfurt, and backed his summons by marshal Ney's infantry. There were none among the Prussian fugitives at all capable of making head against the French, and of replying with any energetic resistance to the impetuosity of their pursuit. Besides, 14,000 or 15,000 runaways, of whom 6000 were wounded, the greater part dying, and unheard-of disorder, could scarcely be the elements of defence. The place capitulated on the evening of the 15th. Besides the 6000 wounded Prussians, the victors captured 9000 prisoners and an immense booty. Murat and Ney set out immediately from thence, to follow the main body of the Prussian army.

Murat had sent Klein's dragoons to Weissensée to intercept the corps which was flying insulated from the rest. This town was between Sommerda, where the king had passed the first night, and Sondershausen, where he was to pass the second. General Klein there outmarched the Prussians. General Blucher, arriving with his cavalry, was greatly surprised to meet already on his road Murat's dragoons. Having demanded a parley, he entered on a sort of negotiation with general Klein; and referring to a letter written by Napoleon to the king of Prussia,—a letter containing, it is said, offers of peace,—he affirmed, on his word, that an armistice had just been signed. General Klein believed general Blucher, and placed no further obstacle to his retreat. This *ruse* saved the wreck of the Prussian army. General Blucher and marshal Kalkreuth were thus enabled to reach Greussen. But marshal Soult was still following this corps by the same route. The next day, the 16th, in the morning, he came up with marshal Kalkreuth's rear-guard at Greussen, who, willing to gain time, tried in his turn the story of the armistice. Marshal Soult would not allow himself to be taken in by it; he declared he did not credit the existence of an armistice; and, after having employed some moments in parleyings, so as to give his infantry time to rejoin him, he attacked Greussen, carried it by main force, and again picked up more prisoners, horses, and artillery. The 17th, the day following, the pursuers and pursued made their way on towards Sondershausen and Nordhausen, the latter abandoning to the former their baggage, cannon, and whole battalions. These had already taken upwards of 200 pieces of cannon upon the different roads of retreat, and several thousand prisoners.

The king of Prussia having arrived at Nordhausen, there found the prince of Hohenlohe. Confiding still in the talents of this general, who had been beaten as well as the duke of Brunswick, but who had, in the eyes of the army, the merit of having disapproved of the plans of the generalissimo, he gave him the chief command. He nevertheless left the command of the two divisions of reserve to old Kalkreuth, who had also the credit of having blamed all that had been done. This was the sole step that the king took after this great disaster. Sad, silent, with a severe countenance towards the blockheads who had so counselled for war, but sparing them those reproaches which they might have retorted on him,—for if their fault had been that of folly, his had been that of weakness,—he made his way towards Berlin at a moment when his presence with the army would not have been too much to raise their drooping, divided, exasperated spirits, and to form from these remains a corps which might retard the passage of the Elbe, might cover Berlin for some time, and, retiring upon the Oder, might obtain from the Russians a reinforcement of known valour. This departure was a grievous fault, and little conformable with the personal courage that Frederick-William had displayed during the battle. To the nomination of prince Hohenlohe this monarch added but one other act; this was to write to Napoleon to express to him his regret at being at war with France, and to propose opening immediate negotiations.

The king having quitted head-quarters without giving any military directions to his generals, the latter acted without the least concert. The prince of Hohenlohe reunited the wreck of the two armies, except the reserve confided to marshal Kalkreuth, and formed of them three detachments, two of troops maintaining some organization, a third comprising the mass of the fugitives. He directed them all three, by a movement to the right, on the Elbe, ordering their march in three different lines, but pointing in the same direction, from Nordhausen to Magdeburg. There would have been little advantage in throwing himself on the Hartz; for, besides the want of resources in provisions, this mountainous chain did not offer enough extent or depth to serve as an asylum for the fugitive army. They would have been pursued there by the French, very active in the mountains, and perhaps, the chain traversed, they might have been found still beyond, blocking up the road of the Elbe. It was therefore a well-conceived resolution to turn to his right, and to bear directly upon the Elbe and on Magdeburg. In the mean time he

carried with him a park of heavy artillery, which much impeded his march. It was suggested to entrust it to general Blucher, who, turning the mountains of the Hartz on the opposite side, by Osterode, Seesen, and Brunswick, might descend into the plains of Hanover without being followed by the French; for it was to be presumed that these would throw themselves in a mass on the retreating footsteps of the grand Prussian army, and would not leave them to run after a mere detachment across the difficult roads of Hesse. General Blucher, in consequence, with two battalions and a large body of cavalry, undertook the escort of the great park. The duke of Weimar, who had plunged with the advance-guard into the forest of Thuringia, was soon brought back by the report of the two lost battles. He skirted the foot of the mountains, keeping as far as he could from the two French and Prussian armies. He received intimation in time of the movement which general Blucher was about to execute, and he resolved to join him at Osterode or Seesen. Marshal Kalkreuth, after having sojourned some hours at Nordhausen to cover the retreat, directed his steps straight to the Elbe, below Magdeburg, preferring to march alone, and dissatisfied with having passed successively under the orders of two generals whom he thought little of, while he thought, not without reason, that he had himself deserved the chief command. Marshals Ney, Soult, and Murat set themselves to follow up the grand Prussian army, obliging it to be continually on the march, and carrying off prisoners and munitions at every step. But the road from Nordhausen to Magdeburg was not long enough to give them time to gain on the Prussians by swiftness. Still they attained their principal object, in not allowing them a day's rest, and thus depriving them of every means of organization, and of forming on the Elbe any gathering of importance.

During this time marshal Bernadotte had marched upon Halle to pass the Saale, and to gain the Elbe by Barby or Dessau. Halle is on the Lower Saale, below the point where this river receives the Elster, and above the point where it unites itself with the Elbe. At his departure from Weimar, in order to retire upon the Elbe by covering himself by the Saale, the duke of Brunswick had ordered prince Eugene of Wirtemberg to repair to Halle, and there meet the grand Prussian army. This prince had come there with a corps of about 17,000 or 18,000 men, forming the last resource of the monarchy. He had established himself in a good position there to receive the beaten army. But it did not direct its course towards him, since it had taken the road to Magdeburg, and in its stead a detachment of French troops made their appearance on the morning of the 17th October. This was Dupont's division, which was for that time attached to the corps of Bernadotte. Scarcely arrived in sight of Halle, general Dupont, who had orders to attack, hastened himself to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. The Saale divides itself into several streams in front of the town of Halle. It is passed by a very long bridge, which traverses at once inundated meadows and several branches of the river. This bridge was furnished with artillery, and in front was stationed a body of infantry. On the islands which separated the river into its several branches batteries had been disposed, so as to command the road by which the French should advance. At the extremity of the bridge the town presented itself, the gates of which were barricaded. In fine, beyond, on the heights which crown the course of the Saale, was perceived the corps of the prince of Wirtemberg ranged in order of battle. It was necessary, therefore, to clear the bridge, to force the gates of Halle, to penetrate into the town, traverse it through, and carry the heights in the rear. This was a train of almost insurmountable difficulties. At sight of this, general Dupont, who had fought so gallantly at Harlach and Dirnstein, made up his resolution instantly. He decided to overthrow the troops posted at the avenue of the bridge, then to carry the bridge itself, the town, and the heights. He returned, drew off his division from under marshal Bernadotte, which the latter had injudiciously dispersed [1], and disposed it in the following manner:—He placed the 9th light infantry in column on the road, upon the right the 32nd, (the regiment which was so famous in Italy, and which colonel Darricau had always commanded,) then the 96th in the rear to support the whole movement. That done, he gave the signal; and, leading his troops himself, darted at full charge on the infantry post established at the head of the bridge. They suffered horrible discharges of musketry and of grape; but they arrived with the rapidity of lightning, they drove back on the bridge the troops who guarded it, and pursued them on it, in spite of the fire which was kept up on all sides, and which reached French and Prussians. After a fray of some instants the other extremity of the bridge was gained, and the town was entered pell-mell with the flying enemy. There a hot firing was kept up in the middle of the streets with the Prussians; these were, however, driven from the town, and the gates shut upon them.

General Dupont had sustained loss; but he had taken nearly all the troops that defended the bridge, as well as their numerous artillery. The work was notwithstanding not finished. The corps of the prince of Wirtemberg still kept his position on the heights in the rear, on the other side of the town. Thence it was necessary to dislodge him, if it were intended to remain masters of Halle and the bridge of the Saale. General Dupont gave his troops a short time to fetch breath; then, opening the gates of the city, he led his division towards the foot of the heights. The three French regiments, consisting of not more than 5000 combatants, were received by the fire of 12,000 men advantageously posted. Nevertheless they advanced in several columns, with the vigour of troops unaccustomed to give way in presence of any obstacle. At the same time, general Dupont, placing one of his battalions on the flank of the position, turned it; and then, perceiving the effect this manœuvre had produced, ordered forward his columns of attack. His three regiments rushed on in spite of the

[1] We repeat here the assertion contained in the memoirs of general Dupont. We can affirm that in these memoirs, yet in manuscript and very interesting, general Dupont is not the detractor of marshal Bernadotte. He treats him as a friend, as all those who triumphed in 1815, when France fell.

enemy's fire, scaled the heights, and, arriving at the summit, thence dislodged the Prussians. Upon the ground beyond, a fresh combat ensued with the whole corps of the duke of Wirtemberg; but Drouet's division coming up at the moment, his presence, taking all hope from the enemy, put an end to their efforts.

This brilliant achievement cost the French 600 killed and wounded, and the Prussians about a thousand. The duke of Wirtemberg retired in disorder on the Elbe, by way of Dessau and Wittemberg, hastening to destroy all the bridges. One of his regiments, that of Trescow, which had come from Magdeburg to join him by the left bank of the Saale, was surprised and almost wholly carried off. Thus even the reserve of the Prussians was in flight, and as disorganized as the remainder of their army.

Napoleon arrived at Naumburg to see the field of the battle of Awerstädt, and to compliment marshal Davout and his corps for their brilliant conduct; but he scarcely stayed there a moment, repairing to Merseburg. On his road he found the spot celebrated for the battle of Rosbach having taken place there. Well versed in military history, he knew with precision all the details of this famous action, and he sent general Savary to seek for the monument which had been erected in memory of the battle. General Savary discovered it in a harvest-field. It was a column of only a few feet in height. The inscriptions on it were effaced. Some of Lannes' corps, who were passing the place, carried it away, and placed the fragments of it on an ammunition waggon, which was despatched on the road to France.

Napoleon then proceeded to Halle. He could not refrain from admiring the feat of arms performed by Dupont's division. On the field still lay some of the dead of this division, which there had not been time to bury, who wore the uniform of the 32nd regiment. "What! the 32nd still!" cried Napoleon. "So many of them were killed in Italy, that I thought none could have remained." He loaded the troops of general Dupont with his praises.

The movements of the enemy's army began to discover themselves. Napoleon directed the pursuit conformably to his general plan, which consisted in overwhelming the Prussians, in reaching the Elbe, and the Oder before them, and in placing himself between them and the Russians, so as to prevent their junction. He ordered marshal Bernadotte to descend the Saale down to the Elbe, and to pass this river by a bridge of boats near Barby, not far from the confluence of the Saale and Elbe. Marshals Lannes and Augereau, who had had two or three days to recruit themselves, were enjoined to pass the Saale by the bridge of Halle, and the Elbe by the bridge of Dessau, re-establishing the latter, if it were found destroyed. He had already prescribed to marshal Davout to leave all his wounded at Naumburg, and to repair with his corps to Leipsic, and from Leipsic to Wittenberg, and to possess himself of the passage of the Elbe at this latter point. Becoming master in time of the course of the Elbe, from Wittenberg as far as Barby, he had the greatest chance of being first to reach Berlin and the Oder.

In the way, as Leipsic belonged to the elector of Saxony, Napoleon ordered marshal Davout to carry out rigorous measures against the merchants of that place, who were the principal dealers in English merchandise in Germany. Napoleon, with a view of punishing Great Britain through her commerce for the war she was carrying on against France, was determined to intimidate the trading cities of the north, such as Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, Leipsic, and Dantzic, that endeavoured to open the continent to the English, while he strove to shut it against them. He therefore enjoined every merchant to declare what English merchandise he possessed, adding, that if such declaration should appear false, its statement should be verified by visits, and false allegations punished by the severest means. All the declared merchandise was to be confiscated for the benefit of the French army.

During this time the troops continued their march towards the Elbe. Marshal Bernadotte passed the river at Barby, but less promptly than he had orders to do. Napoleon, who had constrained himself after the battle of Awerstädt, gave way this time to his discontent, and caused prince Berthier to address to him a letter, in which, speaking of his tardy passage of the Elbe, he recalled most bitterly to his recollection his precipitate departure from Naumburg on the day of the two battles of Jena and Awerstädt[1]. However, as it happens when one follows the dictates of the heart more than the rules of cold justice, Napoleon, too indulgent the first time, was too severe the

[1] The following is this letter, which is still in the War Office:

"Marshal Berthier to marshal Bernadotte.

"*Halle, October* 21, 1806.

"Monsieur le Maréchal, I am charged by the emperor to acquaint you that he is very dissatisfied at your not having executed the orders you received to repair yesterday to Calbe, and throw a bridge over the mouth of the Saale at Barby. You ought to be aware that all the dispositions of the emperor are combined.

"His majesty, who is very angry at your not having executed his orders, recals, on this occasion, to your mind that you were not at the battle of Jena, which might have compromised the fate of the army, and defeated the great combinations of his majesty, which rendered that battle doubtful and very bloody, when it should have been much less so. Deeply affected as the emperor has been, he has felt unwilling to speak to you of it, because, remembering your former services, he feared it might afflict you, and the consideration in which he holds you impelled him to be silent; but in this case, where you have failed to repair to Calbe, and have not attempted the passage of the Elbe, either at Barby, or at the mouth of the Saale, the emperor is resolved to tell you his opinion, because he is not accustomed to see his operations sacrificed to the vain etiquette of command.

"The emperor, M. le Maréchal, also charges me to speak to you on a less important matter: that is, that in spite of the order you received yesterday, you have not yet sent three companies here to conduct your prisoners. There remains at Halle 3500 without any escort. The emperor, M. le Maréchal, orders you to send immediately a staff-officer at the head of three complete companies forming 300 men, to conduct all the prisoners that are at Halle to Erfurt. There remains here only the imperial guard, and the emperor will not suffer them to escort the prisoners taken by your corps.

"It is nine o'clock, and there is no appearance of the three companies which were required of you yesterday."

second; for the delay of marshal Bernadotte in crossing the Elbe was much more the fault of the elements than his own. Lannes threw himself upon Dessau, and thence on the bridge across the Elbe, which the Prussians had half-destroyed. He hastened to re-establish it. Marshal Davout, arrived at Wittenberg, found the Prussians equally occupied with destroying the bridge over the Elbe there, and ready to blow up a magazine of powder a little distance from the town. The inhabitants, who were Saxons, and already aware of Napoleon's wish to spare Saxony from the consequences of the war, hastened themselves to save the bridge of Wittenberg, to snatch away the matches, and to assist the French in preventing an explosion. It was on the 20th of October that marshals Davout, Lannes, and Bernadotte passed the Elbe, six days after the battles of Jena and Awerstädt. It will be seen that not a single hour had been lost. Two great battles, and one of the warmest conflicts at Halle, had only occupied the time of fighting them, and the march of the columns had not been suspended for an instant. The Prussians themselves, although their flight was so rapid, only reached the Elbe on the 20th October, and they passed it at Magdeburg on the same day that marshals Lannes and Davout crossed it at Dessau and Wittenberg. But they arrived in a state of increasing disorganization, incapable of defending its lower course, and not even having the hope of reaching the line of the Oder before the French, a condition on which their safety depended.

Napoleon, notwithstanding his impatience to arrive at Berlin, so as to direct his troops upon the Oder, stayed one day at Wittenberg to take precautions for their march, which it was his care to multiply in proportion to the greater distance he was carrying on the war. We have already seen him, when he penetrated into Austria, form his points of support at Augsburg, at Braunau, and at Linz. In the equally long expedition that he this time undertook, he established places of refuge for his men who were fatigued or sick, for the recruits which were sent him from France, and for the magazines in munitions of war and provisions, which he proposed to re-unite. Erfurt being taken, he had changed his line of communication, and instead of its passing through Franconia, by which province he had entered Prussia, he restored it to its natural direction, passing along the ordinary and central grand road of Germany by Mayence, Frankfort, Eisenach, Erfurt, Weimar, Naumburg, Halle, and Wittenberg. Erfurt was provided with tolerably good defences, and possessed considerable stores. Napoleon made it the first relay on the military road which he was forming across Germany. Wittenberg possessed old fortifications half-ruined. From this motive, but, above all, in consideration of the bridge crossing the Elbe, Napoleon ordered this place to be put in condition, at least so far as it could be in two or three weeks. He entrusted a large sum of money to general Chasseloup to employ and pay 6000 or 7000 workmen, who, in default of regular works, should construct field-works of great extent. He dug out the old ditches, deepened such as required it, and, where time would not admit of the use of masonry, he directed the stone to be replaced by wood, which was very plentiful in the neighbouring forests. Immense palisades were fixed, and he formed, in some measure, a Roman camp, such as the ancient conquerors of the world formed in the midst of Gaul and Germany. Napoleon, in this city of Wittenberg, built bakehouses, collected grain, and manufactured biscuit. He desired also the large park of artillery to be collected in that place, and that repairing workshops should be established.

He took possession of the public places and edifices to form hospitals capable of containing the sick and wounded of a numerous army. In short, upon the hastily constructed ramparts of this vast depôt he ordered more than a hundred pieces of cannon of great calibre, which he had gathered in his victorious march, to be placed in battery. General Clark he had appointed as governor of Erfurt; he named general Lemarrois, one of his aides-de-camp, governor of Wittenberg. The wounded, divided into those slightly, and those severely wounded, that is, those who were not so wounded but that they might be enabled to return to the ranks in a few days, and those to whom more time would be requisite to restore them, were distributed between Wittenberg and Erfurt. The slightly wounded remained at Wittenberg, so that they might join their corps immediately; the others were sent to Erfurt. Each regiment, besides the principal depôt which it had in France, had thus also a campaigning depôt at Wittenberg. In this latter, the men who were fatigued or slightly sick were to be left, so that with the care of a few days they might resume their march without encumbering the roads, and without presenting the spectacle of a sick and powerless fag-end of an army, which was the more prolonged in proportion to the rapidity of the movements and the duration of the war. The detachments of conscripts departing in bodies from France had orders to stop at Erfurt and at Wittenberg, that they might be there passed at review, furnished with whatever they were in want, become re-established, and directed to their respective regiments. In fine, to these same depôts, but particularly Wittenberg, Napoleon ordered immense numbers of fine horses, which were collected throughout Germany, to be sent. All the regiments of cavalry were to pass through these places in turn, so that they might be remounted. The dragoons, who had come from France on foot, were by the same order to have horses there. There they were to find those horses which they could not obtain in France. Thus Napoleon concentrated on these points, in an asylum well defended, all the resources of the conquered country, which he had the tact to carry off from his enemies and convert to his own use. While victorious and marching forward there were relays, abundantly furnished with provisions, with ammunition, and stores, and placed on the roads of the corps that came to reinforce the army. If obliged to retire, they were points of support and means of recruit placed upon the line of retreat.

After having seen all, and ordered all himself, Napoleon quitted Wittenberg and proceeded on the road to Berlin. Destiny had decreed that, in the space of one year, he should visit Berlin and Vienna as a conqueror. The king of Prussia, who had written to him to ask for peace, sent M. de Lucchesini to him, to negotiate an armistice. Napoleon would not receive M. de Lucchesini, and

entrusted marshal Duroc with the care of making known to the minister of king Frederick-William the reply which circumstances demanded. To grant an armistice was, in fact, only to give time to the Russians to assist the Prussians. This military reason permitted no reply, unless formal powers were presented by Russia and by Prussia, to treat immediately for peace on such terms as Napoleon, after his late victories, was in a condition to prescribe. He therefore despatched orders to all his corps to march upon Berlin. Marshal Davout was to set out from Wittenberg by the direct road from that place to Berlin, that of Jüterbock; Lannes and Augereau by that of Treuenbrietzen and Potsdam. Napoleon, with the guard, foot and horse, which were now united, and reinforced moreover by 7000 grenadiers and light horse, marched between these two columns. As a reward for the day of Awerstädt, he wished to allow marshal Davout to enter first into Berlin, and receive from the hands of the magistracy the keys of the capital. As for himself, he intended, previous to his entry into Berlin, to sojourn at Potsdam, in the retreat of the great Frederick. Marshals Soult and Ney had orders to invest Magdeburg. Murat was to remain for some days hovering around that strong place, so as to intercept the bands of stragglers who were throwing themselves into it in crowds. "It is a trap," said Napoleon, in writing to him, "in which you will, with your cavalry, catch all the detached corps that seek a safe place for crossing the Elbe." Murat was afterwards to join the grand army at Berlin, thence to march upon the Oder.

After letting his corps go on a little in advance, he himself set out on the 24th of October, and passed by Kropstadt to reach Potsdam. Marching on horseback, he was overtaken by a violent storm —the more so, as the weather had continued to be very fine from the commencement of the campaign. It was not his habit to be stayed by such a circumstance. However, he was offered shelter in a house situated in the midst of woods, and belonging to an officer of the chace of the Saxon court. He accepted the offer. Some women, who appeared, from their language and dress, to be persons of rank, received round a large fire the group of French officers, whom, from fear as much as from politeness, they were careful to receive well. They seemed to be ignorant which was the chief of these officers, around whom the others crowded with respect; when one of them, still young, seized with warm emotion, cried out, "That is the emperor!" "How do you know me?" said Napoleon drily to her. "Sire," replied she, "I was with your majesty in Egypt." "And what were you doing in Egypt?" "I was the wife of an officer who died in your service. I have since applied for a pension for myself and my son; but I was a foreigner; I could not obtain one: and I am now living with the mistress of this house, who has been kind enough to receive me and to entrust me with the education of her children." The stern look of Napoleon, displeased at first on being recognized, softened down at once. "Well, madam," said he, "you shall have a pension; and as for your son, I will take upon myself the charge of his education."

The same evening he stamped these resolutions with his own signature, and said, smiling, "I never before had an adventure in a forest at the end of a storm; here is one, and one of the best."

On the evening of the 25th of October, he arrived at Potsdam. He immediately set about visiting the retreat of the great captain and the great king, who called himself the philosopher of *Sans Souci*; and with some reason, for he seemed to carry the weight of the sword and of the sceptre with indifference and raillery, making game of all the courts of Europe, and, one might even add, of his own subjects also, if he had not displayed so much care to govern them well. Napoleon ran through the great and the little palace of Potsdam, had the works of Frederick shown to him, loaded with the notes of Voltaire, sought in the library to discover with what studies this great mind was nourished, and then went to see in the church of Potsdam the modest resting-place in which the founder of Prussia reposes. At Potsdam was kept the sword of Frederick, his belt, and his cordon of the black eagle. Napoleon seized these, exclaiming, "Here is a fine present for the Invalides,—above all, for those who have formed part of the army of Hanover! They will no doubt be glad to see in our possession the sword of him who conquered them at Rosbach." Napoleon, possessing himself of these precious relics with such respect, could not assuredly offend either Frederick or the Prussian nation. But how extraordinary, how deserving of reflection, is that mysterious chain which binds, which confounds, which separates, which draws together the things of this world! Frederick and Napoleon were here met together in a very strange manner. This philosopher king, who, though he was doubtless unconscious of it, had placed above the throne one of the promoters of the French Revolution, now lay in his coffin, receiving the visit of the general of that revolution, and who, becoming emperor, was the conqueror of Berlin and of Potsdam. The conqueror of Rosbach was receiving the visit of the conqueror of Jena! What a spectacle! Unfortunately these reverses of fortune were not the last.

While the head-quarters were at Potsdam, marshal Davout entered Berlin on the 25th of October at the head of his corps. The king Frederick-William, on retreating, had given up the government of the city to the municipality, presided over by a considerable personage, the prince of Hatzfeld. The deputies of the municipality offered marshal Davout the keys of the capital, which he returned to them, telling them that they belonged to a greater one than himself, that is to say, to Napoleon. He left a single regiment in the city to preserve order in conjunction with the city militia; he then went to establish himself at a place further on, at Friederichsfeld, in a strong position, with his right on the Sprée, and his left on the woods.

By order of Napoleon he encamped in a military manner, his artillery pointed, a portion of his soldiery kept in camp, the other portion visiting alternately with them the capital they had conquered by their exploits. Barracks of reed and willow were constructed, so that the troops might be sheltered from the rigour of the season. There was no need to recommend discipline to marshal Davout; with him it was only necessary to repress his severity. Marshal Davout promised the

magistrates of Berlin to respect person and property, as all civilized conquerors should, on condition that he obtained from the inhabitants unconditional submission and provisions during the very short time that the army had to pass within their walls, which, for such a city as Berlin, could not constitute a very heavy charge.

For the rest, on the next day after the entrance of the French into Berlin the shops were open. The inhabitants paraded the main streets of that capital peaceably, and even in greater numbers than in ordinary. They seemed at once chagrined and curious,—natural impressions among a people patriotic but quick, enlightened, struck with all that is great, and desirous of knowing the most renowned general and soldiers that the world then possessed. Moreover, they disapproved of their government for having undertaken a mad war, and this disapprobation tended to diminish the hatred they might have borne to the provoked conquerors. Marshal Lannes was sent on Potsdam and Spandau. Marshal Augereau followed marshal Davout in passing through Berlin; and Napoleon, after having sojourned at Potsdam on the 25th and 26th, and at Charlottenburg on the 27th, fixed the 28th for his entry into Berlin.

This was the first time that it had happened to him to enter a conquered capital in triumph, like an Alexander or a Cæsar. He had not thus entered Vienna, which he had scarcely visited, residing always at Schœnbrunn, far from the observation of the Viennese. But now, whether from the pride of having overthrown an army of invincible reputation, or the desire of striking Europe with a brilliant spectacle, or perhaps from the intoxication of victory mounting higher in his head than usual, he chose the morning of the 28th to make his triumphal entry into Berlin.

The whole population of the city was on the alert to give effect to this grand scene. Napoleon entered, surrounded by his guard, and followed by the fine cuirassiers of generals Hautpoul and Nansouty. The imperial guard, richly apparelled, was on this day still more imposing than ever. The grenadiers and chasseurs on foot in the van; in the rear the grenadiers and chasseurs on horseback; the marshals Berthier, Duroc, Davout, in the middle; and in the bosom of this group, isolated from respect, Napoleon himself, in the simple costume that he wore at the Tuileries and on fields of battle,—Napoleon, the main object of observation to this immense but silent crowd, overwhelmed at once with sorrow and admiration. Such was the spectacle offered in the long and wide street of Berlin, which leads from the Charlottenburg gate up to the palace of the kings of Prussia. The populace was in the streets, the rich citizens at the windows. As for the nobility, they had fled, filled with fear, and covered with confusion. The women of this Prussian city seemed eager to behold the show that was passing before them: some shed tears, but none uttered either cries of hatred or cries of flattery for the conqueror. Happily Prussia was not to be divided, but to maintain its dignity even in disaster. The entry of an enemy was not for her the ruin of one party and the triumph of another, and she had not within her bosom any unworthy faction, animated by an odious joy, applauding the presence of foreign soldiers. We Frenchmen, more unfortunate in our reverses, have seen such an execrable joy; for we, in this age, have all seen the extremes of victory and of defeat, of greatness and of humiliation, of the most noble devotion and of the blackest treason.

Napoleon received from the magistrates the keys of Berlin; he then repaired to the palace, where he gave audience to all the public authorities. He preserved a friendly and assuring language towards them; promised order on the part of his soldiers, on condition of order being kept on the part of the inhabitants; showing severity in his terms only to the German aristocracy, who, he said, were the authors of all the evils from which Germany was suffering, who had dared to provoke him to battle, and whom he was resolved to chastise, by reducing them to beg their bread in England. He established himself in the king's palace, received there the foreign ministers of the friendly powers, and sent for M. de Talleyrand to Berlin.

His bulletins, recitals of all that the army was daily accomplishing, often also forcible replies to his enemies, collections of political reflections, lessons to kings and to people, were rapidly dictated by himself, and generally corrected by M. de Talleyrand before they were published. In each he related the progress he was making in the enemy's country; he even reported in them what he learned of the political causes of the war. In those he published in Prussia, he affected to load with homage the memory of the great Frederick, and his unfortunate successor with marks of esteem, by always tinging them with pity for his weakness, and the most cutting sarcasms against queens who, meddling with state affairs, thereby exposed their husbands and their country to frightful disasters: treatment scarcely generous towards the queen of Prussia, sufficiently overcome by her faults and her misfortunes to be spared the addition of affront to calamity! These bulletins, in which the license of a conquering soldier was blazoned forth with too little restraint, cost Napoleon more than blame in the midst of the cries of admiration which his triumphs extorted from his enemies themselves.

In his anger against the Prussian party which had promoted the war, he received with austerity the envoys of the duke of Brunswick, who had been mortally wounded at the battle of Awerstädt, and who, before he expired, had recommended his family and his subjects to the conqueror's mercy. "What would those say," replied Napoleon to them, —"what would those who send you say, were I now to submit the city of Brunswick to that destruction with which it threatened, fifteen years ago, the capital of that great people whom I command! The duke of Brunswick had disavowed the senseless manifesto of 1792: it might have been thought that the age of discretion would have cooled down his passions; but nevertheless he had just lent the authority of his name anew to the follies of the giddy youth who had lost Prussia. To him it belonged to put women, courtiers, and young officers each in their proper places, and to impose upon all the authority of his age, his experience, and his position. He has not had strength to do this; the Prussian monarchy is fallen, and the states of Brunswick are in my power. Tell the duke of Brunswick that I entertain towards him the respect due to an unfortunate general, justly famous, struck

down by a blow that may reach us all, but that I cannot see a sovereign prince in a general of the Prussian army."

These words, published by the ordinary mode of bulletin, showed clearly that Napoleon would not treat the sovereignty of the duke of Brunswick any better than that of the elector of Hesse. In short, if he showed himself severe to some, he was benevolent and generous to others, taking care to vary his treatment according to the participation of each in the war. His expressions with regard to the old marshal Mollendorf were full of concern. Prince Ferdinand, the brother of the great Frederick and father of prince Louis, was at Berlin, as well as the princess his wife. There were also the widow of prince Henry, and two sisters of the king there, one in childbed, and the other ill. Napoleon went to call on these members of the royal family with all the signs of real respect, and impressed them by these attentions from so high a quarter, for there was then no sovereign whose attentions had so great a value. In the situation which he had now attained, the least proofs of his regard or of his severity were estimated accordingly. Availing himself of the right which all generals have, in time of war, of intercepting correspondence, in order to discover the intentions of the enemy, he seized a letter from the prince of Hatzfeld, in which he indicated the position of the French army around Berlin to the prince of Hohenlohe. The prince of Hatzfeld, as chief of the municipal government established at Berlin, had promised on oath not to undertake any thing against the French army, and to occupy himself only with the peace, security, and well-being of the capital. This was an engagement of fidelity towards the conqueror, who had consented, for the sake of the conquered country, to allow an authority to subsist which he might have abolished. The fault might, nevertheless, be well excused, since it sprang from the most honourable of feelings — patriotism. Napoleon feared lest other burgomasters might follow this example, and that all his movements might be thus hourly revealed to the enemy. He resolved to intimidate the Prussian authorities by an extraordinary act of rigour; and he was not sorry that this act of rigour should fall upon one of the principal members of the nobility, accused of being a warm partisan of the war,—a false accusation, for the prince of Hatzfeld was of the number of Prussian nobles who possessed moderation, because they were enlightened. Napoleon sent for prince Berthier, and charged marshal Davout, upon whose severity he could depend, to form a military commission, which should investigate the conduct of the prince of Hatzfeld according to the usages of war against spies. Prince Berthier, on learning the resolution that Napoleon had taken, tried in vain to dissuade him from it. Generals Rapp, Caulincourt, and Savary, not daring to use remonstrances, which could only well come from the mouth of the major-general, were alarmed. As they knew no other means to have recourse to, they hid the prince even in the palace, under pretext of arresting him, and they then acquainted the princess of Hatzfeld, an interesting personage, and who was with child, of the danger with which her husband was threatened. She flew to the palace. It was time to do so, for the assembled commission had already asked for the articles of charge. Napoleon, on his return from a ride in Berlin, had just dismounted from his horse; the guard had left; and he had crossed the threshold of the palace, when the princess of Hatzfeld, conducted by Duroc, presented herself, bathed in tears, before him. Thus surprised, he could not refuse to receive her; he gave her an audience in his cabinet. She was overcome with terror. Napoleon, affected, desired her to approach, and gave her the intercepted letter to read. "Well, madam," said he, "do you recognize your husband's handwriting?" The princess, trembling, knew not what to reply. But, soon removing her fear, Napoleon added, "Throw that paper into the fire, and the commission will be deprived of all proof of guilt."

This act of clemency, which Napoleon could not refuse after having seen the princess of Hatzfeld, nevertheless cost him dear, as it interfered with his intentions of intimidating the German nobility, and more particularly the magistrates of towns, who might reveal the secret of his operations to the enemy. He afterwards became acquainted with the prince of Hatzfeld, appreciated his character and his spirit, and felt pleased with himself for not having given him up to military justice. Happy those governments where wise friends are to be met with, who may delay their more rigorous measures! The delay need not be very great to extinguish the desire of acts which are at first conceived with much vehemence.

Napoleon in this interval had not ceased to direct the movements of his lieutenants against the wreck of the Prussian army. Himself at Berlin with his principal force, he cut the Prussians off from the direct road from the Elbe to the Oder, and only left them the attainment of this latter river by long roads almost impracticable, and easy to be intercepted. Berlin, in fact, is situated between the Elbe and the Oder, at equal distances from both rivers. The plains of sand, which we have already described, on approaching the Baltic towards Mecklenburg, rise into downs, and present a succession of lakes of all sizes, parallel to the sea, and to which, as they are so numerous, no names can be given. The discharge of these lakes, opposed by the chain of downs, instead of flowing directly towards the sea, runs upon the country within by an inconsiderable and slow stream of water, the Havel, which takes its course towards Berlin, where it meets with the Sprée, coming from an opposite direction, that is, from Lusatia, a province that separates Saxony from Silesia. The Havel and the Sprée, united near Berlin, spread themselves around Spandau and Potsdam, forming fresh lakes there, which the hand of the great Frederick took care to embellish, and by a movement to the left join the Elbe. They thus describe a transversal line, which on one side unites Berlin to the Elbe, and on the other, continued by the canal of Finow, joins that capital to the Oder. Across this country, intersected by natural or artificial waters, covered with lakes, forests, and sands, it was that the wandering remnant of the Prussian army had to pursue their flight.

Napoleon, established since the 25th of October at Potsdam and at Berlin, was in position to oppose them in every direction. The corps of Lannes

he kept at Spandau, the corps of Augereau and Davout at Berlin itself, Bernadotte's corps still beyond Berlin; all were ready to march on the first indication of the direction which the enemy might take. Napoleon had despatched the cavalry around Berlin, Potsdam, and on the rivers Havel and Elbe, to gather information.

Spandau had already yielded. This place, situated close to Berlin, in the midst of the waters of the Sprée and the Havel, strong from its position and its works, might have offered a long resistance. But such had been the presumption and negligence of the Prussian government, that they had not even fortified the place, although the magazines with which it was provided contained considerable stores. The 25th, the day marshal Davout entered Berlin, Lannes appeared under the walls of Spandau, and threatened the governor with the severest treatment, if he did not surrender. The guns were not upon the walls; the garrison, sharing the fear with which all hearts were possessed, insisted on capitulating. The governor was an old soldier, whom age had deprived of all energy. Lannes saw him, terrified him by the recital of the disasters that had befallen the Prussian army, and drew him into a capitulation, by virtue of which the place was immediately delivered up to the French, and the garrison declared prisoners of war. The improvidence of a government which had neglected to arm this fortress, and the demoralization which reigned around, are at once necessary to account for so strange a capitulation.

The emperor went to Spandau in person, and resolved to make it his third depôt in Germany. This new acquisition offered still more advantages, inasmuch as it was situated three or four leagues from Berlin, encompassed by water, completely fortified, and filled with an immense quantity of grain. Napoleon ordered the arming of it immediately, and that bakehouses should be constructed, stores collected, and hospitals established; in short, that similar establishments should be formed as at Wittenberg and at Erfurt. He directly sent off there all the artillery, guns, and warlike stores that he had captured at Berlin. In that capital he had found 300 pieces of cannon, a hundred thousand muskets, with quantities of powder and shot. This great armament, joined with a considerable mass of provision, was in some degree a pledge against any attempt of the population of Berlin, a people who were actually quiet and peaceable, but whose submission might be changed into revolt by a reverse, in case the French arms might meet with any.

While occupied by these measures of precaution, the uninterrupted incursions of the light cavalry had discovered the march of the Prussian army. The eleven days which had elapsed since the battle of Jena—those eleven days which had been employed by the French in gaining the Elbe, in making themselves masters of it, and in occupying Berlin,—had been equally employed by the Prussians in gaining the Elbe, there uniting their dispersed forces, and in marching thence towards Mecklenburg, in order to reach, by a detour to the northward, the line of the Oder. This movement towards Mecklenburg being unmasked, Napoleon despatched Murat upon Oranienburg and Zehdenick to follow the banks of the Havel and the canal of Finow. Along these military lines, and protected by them, it was that the prince of Hohenlohe had to direct his march. Napoleon ordered these to be skirted by Murat, so as to keep himself always between the enemy and the Oder; and when he should have outflanked the Prussians, to endeavour to surround them, so as to capture every man. Marshal Lannes was to follow on the steps of Murat, with advice to keep up with the cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte's orders were to keep in the rear of Lannes. Marshal Davout, after the three or four days' rest which he was so much in want of, was to proceed to Frankfort-on-the-Oder. Marshal Augereau and the guard were to remain at Berlin. Marshals Ney and Soult were, as we have said, entrusted with the investing of Magdeburg.

The unfortunate prince of Hohenlohe had actually taken the resolution which had been foreseen. Pursued by the French to the utmost, he had reached Magdeburg, there hoping to find rest, provisions, and stores, and, above all, time sufficient to re-organize his army. A vain hope! The want of precaution in case of a retreat, that might so easily have been provided for, was apparent every where. At Magdeburg there were no other provisions than were absolutely needful for the garrison. The old governor, M. de Kleist, after having provided for the first wants of the fugitives, and having given them a little bread, refused to maintain them any longer, from fear of diminishing his own resources, in case of his being besieged. In the interior of Magdeburg the baggage was in such confusion and quantity that the army could not be lodged there. The cavalry had been obliged to be established on the glacis, and the infantry in the covered ways. The continual harassings of the French cavalry, which carried off whole detachments under the guns of the place, soon obliged the Prussian troops to pass to the other bank of the Elbe. M. de Kleist, at length, frightened at the disorder which prevailed within and without Magdeburg, earnestly pressed the prince of Hohenlohe to continue his retreat to the Oder, and to leave him to the liberty he needed of providing for his defence. The prince of Hohenlohe thus had but two days to re-organize his army, which was so composed of wrecks that it was necessary to unite several battalions in order to form one. Marshal Kalkreuth being, moreover, recalled by the king into Eastern Prussia, the prince of Hohenlohe was charged with collecting the two divisions of reserve, and ordered to join them on the Lower Elbe, much below Magdeburg.

In the midst of these embarrassments the prince of Hohenlohe put himself in march in three columns. On the right, general Schimmelpfennig was, with a detachment of cavalry and infantry, to cover the army on the side of Potsdam, Spandau, and Berlin; coast along the banks of the Havel, and then, when he should have got up high enough to turn Berlin, along the canal of Finow, thus to flank the retreat as far as Prenzlow and Stettin; for by reason of the position of the French there was no way of joining the Oder but towards its mouth. The main body of the infantry, marching in the centre at about equal distance between general Schimmelpfennig and the Elbe, would pass by Genthin, Rathnau, Gransée, and Prenzlow. The cavalry, which was already on the banks of

the Elbe, where it enjoyed plenty of forage, was to follow that river by Jérichow and Havelberg; afterwards to quit it, bear away to the north, and open out by Wittstock, Mirow, Strelitz, and Prenzlow, to the common point of Stettin.

The corps of the duke of Weimar, and the great park of artillery led by general Blucher, had fortunately turned the Hartz by Hesse and Hanover without being disturbed by the French, who had hastened to secure the Elbe. The duke of Weimar, by means of a pretty clever manœuvre, had succeeded in deceiving marshal Soult. Feigning at first to attack the lines of investment round Magdeburg, and then suddenly stealing away, he had suddenly crossed the Elbe at Tangermunde, and thus gained the right bank. He had 12,000 or 14,000 men with him. General Blucher had passed the river further down. The prince of Hohenlohe appointed a convenient rendezvous for the duke of Weimar at Stettin, which he himself had to reach by traversing Mecklenburg; and he conferred on general Blucher the command of the troops that were beaten before Halle, which troops had passed from the hands of the duke of Wirtemburg into those of general Natzmer. General Blucher was charged to form with these troops the rear-guard of the Prussian army.

If these forces should happen to escape the French and to reach Stettin, they would be able, after they were re-organized, and joined with the contingent of Eastern Prussia, to form an army of some strength behind the Oder, and unite with the Russians to some purpose. The prince of Hohenlohe had still kept 25,000 men together at the least. The corps of Natzmer, with the other remains of Blucher's force, might reckon about 9000 or 10,000. The duke of Weimar's troops might mount up to 13,000 or 14,000. There was, consequently, altogether a total force of about 50,000 men, who, being joined to 20,000 of the troops in Eastern Prussia, might still present 70,000 combatants, and, combined with the Russians, might yet perform some important service. There remained 22,000 men to defend Magdeburg. The Saxons, hastening to take advantage of Napoleon's clemency in regard to themselves, had returned to their homes.

The prince of Hohenlohe had to effect his retreat in the midst of a poor country, difficult to traverse, and in the face of the numerous squadrons of the French cavalry. These latter, at first wary in the presence of the Prussian cavalry, whose merits had been so highly extolled, had now, intoxicated with success, become so audacious, that as simple light horse they did not fear to encounter the cuirassiers.

The prince set out on his route on the 22nd of October by the appointed roads, the flanking bodies of general Schimmelpfennig proceeding upon Plane, the infantry upon Genthin, and the cavalry upon Jérichow. Their march was slow, on account of the sands, the exhausted state of the men and horses, and their being little accustomed to fatigue. Seven or eight leagues a day was the utmost these troops could perform, while the French infantry could, in case of need, get over as many as fifteen. A very great want of discipline had, moreover, been introduced into the ranks. Misfortune, which sours men's minds, had diminished their respect for their leaders. The cavalry, in particular, marched on in confusion, without obeying orders. The prince of Hohenlohe was obliged to cause the army to halt, and to address them most severely, to bring them back to their sense of duty. He even had one horseman shot who had wounded his officer. It must be confessed, however, that this is the general effect of great reverses, and sometimes also of great successes; for victory has its disorders as well as defeat. The French, greedy of booty, ran about in all directions like the Prussians, without conforming themselves to the orders of their chiefs; and marshal Ney wrote to the emperor, that if he were not authorized to make some examples, the lives of his officers would be no longer in safety. Extraordinary consequences of the overthrow of states! The precipitate movements to which such overthrows give rise disorganize both the conquered and the conqueror. The French had reached the perfection of the most noble warfare, and had already almost trenched upon the limit, when it becomes only an immense confusion.

The 23rd the Prussian infantry was at Rathnan, and their cavalry at Havelberg. But the haste with which they had destroyed the bridges stopped the march of the right corps, that of Schimmelpfennig, and they were obliged to approach the Elbe by wheeling round to the left, in order to avoid the numerous streams of water which they met with between the Havel and the Elbe. They wheeled thus as far as Rhinow. On the 24th they were at Kiritz with the cavalry, their infantry at Neustadt, and the corps of Schimmelpfennig at Fehrbelin. Natzmer's corps, here transferred to general Blucher, replaced the principal body, of which it formed the rear-guard at Rhinow.

This point being reached, the prince of Hohenlohe had to deliberate on the march that he should henceforth pursue. They were now very far up to the northward of Berlin, Spandau, and Potsdam. The army became more and more disorganized at each step. The staff-colonel Massenbach was of opinion that they should give the troops a day's rest, so that they might be re-organized, and be at least in a condition to fight in case they might fall in with the French. The prince of Hohenlohe replied, with some reason, that one, two, or even three days would not suffice to re-organize the army, and might give the French time to cut them off from Stettin and the Oder. According to custom, they took a middle course, and fixed a common rendezvous at Gransée, where the troops might undergo a general review, and where orders might be addressed to them to recal them to their duty. They were to continue their march beyond that without intermission. This rendezvous at Gransée was fixed to take place on the 26th.

But the French were already informed of this. Murat's cavalry were marching towards Fehrbelin on one side, and towards Zehdenick on the other. Lannes, after entering Spandau on the 25th, put himself in march on the evening of the 26th, with his infantry, to support Murat. Marshal Soult was upon the track of the duke of Weimar, while marshal Ney was investing Magdeburg. Marshal Bernadotte was in the meanwhile advancing between marshals Soult and Lannes. Thus three corps of the French army, besides Murat's cavalry, excepting always the cuirassiers who were retained

at Berlin, were at this moment in pursuit of the Prussians. On the 26th, the prince of Hohenlohe's infantry were at Gransée, at the appointed rendezvous, drawn up round their general, listening to his exhortations, entertaining hopes of being soon at Stettin, and being able to take repose behind the Oder. But at the same instant Murat's dragoons were surprising Schemmilpfennig's corps at Zehdenick, overthrowing his cavalry, killing 300 horsemen, and taking 700 or 800 prisoners, and obliging the infantry of this flanking division to take refuge in the woods.

This news, brought by the peasantry and fugitives into Gransée, induced the prince of Hohenlohe to decamp immediately, and to turn once more to the left towards Furstenberg, instead of marching to Templin, which was the direct road to Stettin. He thus hoped to rally the cavalry around him, and at the same time to increase his distance from the French. But, while he was performing this detour, Murat directed his course by a shorter road upon Templin ; and Lannes, stopping neither day nor night, always kept in view of the squadrons of Murat.

The prince of Hohenlohe slept in the evening at Furstenberg, and his infantry passed the night there, while marshal Lannes was employed in marching the whole of that same night. French and Prussians continued to advance to the northward towards Templin and Prenzlow, the common point on the road to Stettin; making their way a few leagues apart, and only separated by a fringe of wood and of lakes. They had to go over a dozen leagues to reach Prenzlow (seven miles). The 27th, in the morning, the prince of Hohenlohe set out for Boitzenburg, leaving word for the cavalry to join him, and for the rear-guard, commanded by general Blucher, to quicken its march.

He marched all the day, having no sustenance for his troops but such as the patriotism of the villagers could furnish, who placed masses of bread and kettles of potatoes on the road. Boitzenburg was approached towards evening, and the seigneur of the place, M. d'Arnim, came forth to announce that he had prepared bivouacs, abundantly furnished with provisions and drink, around his castle. This was delightful news for men expiring from fatigue and hunger. But on approaching Boitzenburg, reports of musketry destroyed this hope of rest and food. The light horse of Murat, having already arrived at Boitzenburg, were devouring the provisions destined for the Prussians. Too few in number, however, to make head against these latter, they quitted Boitzenburg. The unfortunate soldiers of the prince of Hohenlohe consumed what remained ; but the presence of the French horse warned them to make haste. They started the same night, still making a turn to the left, to avoid the French, and to reach Prenzlow before them. They marched all night, hoping to gain on them by their speed. At daybreak they began to discern Prenzlow ; but upon the right, across the woods and lakes which were parallel to the road, some cavalry were seen hastening on. The mist did not permit of recognizing the colour of their uniform. Were they French, or were they Prussians ? This question was asked with anxiety. Some believed they could perceive the white plumes of a Prussian regiment ; others thought, on the contrary, they beheld the helmets of Murat's dragoons. At last, in the midst of these conjectures of hope and fear, they arrived in sight of Prenzlow, feeling assured that the French had not yet appeared. They penetrated into one of the suburbs, as far as a quarter of a league. Half the Prussian army had already thus far advanced, when all at once the cry of "To arms !" was heard. The French dragoons, coming up at the moment when part of the Prussian army had reached the town, attacked them in the rear, and drove them into the town itself. They charged them on all sides, and then rushed into the streets of the place. The dragoons of Pritwitz, pushed by the French dragoons, fell back on the Prussian infantry and overthrew them. It became a frightful confusion, the tumult and danger of which was increased by fear. The Prussian army, cut to pieces, fled beyond Prenzlow, and took up the best position it could on the road to Stettin. It was soon surrounded, and Murat sent to summon the prince of Hohenlohe to surrender. The prince, struck with grief, but rejecting with horror the idea of capitulating, refused what was proposed to him. "Well," said Murat to the officer who carried the refusal, "you will be all sabred if you do not surrender." One last hope still survived in the heart of the prince of Hohenlohe. He thought that Murat had only cavalry with him. But the infantry of Lannes, which had marched day and night from Spandau, stopping only to eat and drink, arrived at the same instant. Colonel Massenbach, of the staff, affirmed that he had seen it. From that time there was no more chance of safety remaining. Murat requested an interview with prince Hohenlohe. This soldier, now become a prince, and being as generous as he was intrepid, comforted the Prussian general, promised him an honourable capitulation, the most honourable he was able to grant, keeping within the limits of the instructions given by Napoleon. Murat demanded that all the soldiers should remain prisoners ; but he consented that the officers should have their freedom and keep their own property, on condition of not serving again during the continuance of the war. He consented also that the soldiers should be spared the humiliating spectacle of piling their arms and filing off before the French troops. Such was the difference in their misfortunes that distinguished them from the troops of the Austrian general Mack. The prince of Hohenlohe, finding he could not obtain better conditions, feeling, too, that Murat had no power to grant better, returned to his officers, made them assemble round him in a circle, and, his eyes full of tears, laid before them the real state of things. He was among those who had declaimed against any kind of capitulation ; but he now acknowledged that there was no other resource—not even that of honourable combat, because ammunition was wanting, and the spirits of the soldiers had reached the uttermost degree of despondency. No one had an expedient to propose; the conference broke up with the utterance of maledictions and the demolition of their arms.

The capitulation was then signed by the prince; and in the course of that day, the 28th of October —a year after the catastrophe of general Mack—

14,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry rendered themselves prisoners of war. The conquerors were intoxicated with delight; and what pleasure could be better founded! So much boldness of manœuvre, so much patience in supporting privations, (equal at least to those which the vanquished had supported,) so much spirit in performing marches still more rapid than theirs, merited well such a reward. There were unhappily some disorders in Prenzlow, caused by the eagerness of the soldiers to secure the booty, which they considered as the lawful fruit of their victory. But the French officers displayed the greatest firmness in protecting those of Prussia. The German writers themselves have rendered them this justice. In 1815, the departments of the north of France could not make the same admission with justice in behalf of the Prussians.

The French had still more trophies to gather: a certain number of Prussian squadrons and battalions that had not entered Prenzlow had marched further north, upon Passewalck. The light cavalry of general Milhaud overtook them. Six regiments of cavalry, several battalions of infantry, a park of horse artillery, here laid down their arms. In the mean time, general Lasalle, with his hussars and chasseurs, marched to Stettin, followed by the infantry of Lannes. Wonderful to relate, an officer of light cavalry dared to summon Stettin to surrender, a fortified place with a numerous garrison and an immense artillery. General Lasalle saw the governor, and talked to him with so much confidence of the entire ruin of the Prussian army, that the governor, surrendered the place, with all it contained, and gave up as prisoners a garrison of 6000 men! Lannes made his entry into it the next day. Nothing surely can better give an idea of the demoralization of the Prussians, and the terror that the French inspired, than this fact, as strange as it was novel in the annals of war.

Of all the Prussian army there only remained general Blucher and the duke of Weimar to be taken, accompanied by 20,000 men. This only remnant taken, they could then say that 160,000 men had been destroyed or made prisoners in fifteen days, without one having repassed the Oder. General Blucher and the corps of the duke of Weimar were pursued by marshals Soult and Bernadotte. They were almost within reach of Murat, and they found themselves cut off from the Oder, since Lannes occupied Stettin. They had therefore but little chance of succour.

Napoleon, on learning this news, evinced the most lively satisfaction. He wrote to Murat, "Since your chasseurs are capable of taking places of strength, I have nothing to do but to set at liberty my main body and melt down my heavy artillery." In the bulletin he only mentioned the cavalry, and omitted the infantry of Lannes, who had notwithstanding contributed to the capitulation of Prenzlow as much as the cavalry itself. This omission was owing to Murat, who, being anxious to render an account of the feats of arms of his cavalry, had entirely forgotten to make mention of the corps commanded by Lannes. "My devotion to your person," he wrote to Napoleon, "places me above all injustice; but my brave soldiers, whom I made to march night and day without rest, without food, what shall I say to them? What recompense can they hope for, if not to see their name published by the hundred voices of that renown which you alone can confer!" This grand emulation, this ardent jealousy of glory, which only evinced itself in this instance by a high-minded sorrow, was one of the signs not the least remarkable of that heroic enthusiasm which then animated every soul.

Napoleon, deeply touched by the representation of Lannes, answered him, "You and your soldiers are children. Do you think that I do not know all that you did to second the cavalry? There is glory for all. Another day it will be your turn to fill with your name the bulletins of the grand army." Lannes, delighted, assembled his infantry in one of the public squares of Stettin, and ordered to be read to the ranks the letter of Napoleon. As rejoiced as he, his soldiers received it with repeated cries of "Long live the emperor!" Some even made heard the strange cry of "*Long live the emperor of the west!*" This singular appellation, which responded so entirely to the secret ambition of Napoleon, arising out of the exultation of the army, proved how much he had already filled the west with his power and glory.

Lannes, in the effusion, not of flattery, but of joy,—for, satisfied himself, he wished his master to be so too,—wrote to Napoleon, "Sire, your soldiers cry, 'Long live the emperor of the west!' Ought we not henceforth to address you by this title[1]?"

[1] Some of the letters of marshal Lannes are here cited, to make known the spirit of the French troops at this epoch. They may serve to give to these prodigious events their true character.

"Marshal Lannes to H.M. the emperor.

"*Stettin, 2nd Nov.* 1806.

"Sire,—I have received the letter that your majesty has done me the honour to write; it is impossible for me to express the pleasure it has afforded me. I desire nothing in the world but to be certain that your majesty knows that I do all in my power for your glory.

"I have made known to my corps all that your majesty has kindly wished me to say to it. It would be impossible to convey to your majesty the complete satisfaction it evinced. A single word from you is sufficient to render the soldiers happy.

"Three hussars had wandered from Gartz, and found themselves in the midst of a squadron of the enemy. They ran towards it, levelling their pieces; told the commandant that they were surrounded by a regiment; that he had better surrender instantly. The commander of this squadron dismounted and gave up his arms to these three hussars, who conducted the squadron here prisoners of war. I could wish to know the intentions of your majesty, if I shall bring the division of Suchet to Hargard, and the cavalry in advance. By these means we could economize the provisions of Stettin, which however as yet I have not touched. The soldiers are quartered in the environs, and live in the houses of the inhabitants. I have made the tour of the place today with general Chasseloup; he finds it very bad; I also think that it would require great outlay to put it in a state of defence. We have been to Damm; it is a superb natural position, only reached by a causeway a league and a half long, upon which are found at least forty bridges. I think if your majesty wishes to go forward, that position could be rendered impregnable. I am told that the king has treated very ill the gentlemen by whom he was surrounded, who had advised him to make war; that he had never been seen so enraged; that he had told them they had lost him his crown, and that no hope remained for him but to go and

Napoleon made no reply; and this title, which had sprung from the enthusiasm of the soldiers, was not adopted. In the mind of Napoleon it was but deferred. Of the grandeurs of which he had dreamed it was the only one that could not be realized even for a moment. Again, if he had not the title of "Emperor of the West," he had the vast domination. Yet human pride enjoys the title of power almost as much as power itself.

The prince of Hohenlohe once taken, there remained only general Blucher, with the rear-guard and the armed force of the duke of Weimar. This last force had passed to the command of general Vinning, since the duke of Weimar, accepting the treaty granted by Napoleon to all the house of Saxony, had quitted the army. There were still 22,000 men to make prisoners; after which there would not exist a single detachment of Prussian troops from the Rhine to the Oder. Napoleon ordered that they should be pursued without intermission, in order that they might be taken to the last man. Lannes established himself at Stettin, with the intention of occupying this important place and giving his soldiers rest, of which they stood in great need. Murat, marshals Bernadotte and Soult, sufficed to achieve the destruction of 22,000 Prussians, worn out with fatigue. It only required marching, in order to take them, at least as long as they did not succeed in reaching the sea, and obtaining sufficient vessels to transport them to Eastern Prussia. Murat directed his route in great haste towards the shore, to prevent their approach to the sea. He pushed towards Stralsund; whilst marshal Bernadotte, leaving the neighbourhood of Berlin, and marshal Soult the banks of the Elbe, marched towards the north, to throw the enemy, as it were, into a net of the French cavalry. General Blucher had taken at Waren, near the lake Muritz, the command of the two Prussian corps. To take refuge in Eastern Prussia by the Oder was impossible, since the banks were guarded in every direction by the French army. Access by the shore and Stralsund was already intercepted by Murat. There remained to him no other resource than to return towards the Elbe. Blucher formed this project, hoping to be able to throw himself into Magdeburg, to augment its force with his own, and to convert the garrison into a formidable support, so as to enable this great fortress to offer a brilliant resistance. He marched accordingly towards the Elbe, with the intention of passing it near Lunenburg.

These illusions were of short duration; he soon became convinced, by the patrols of the enemy, that he was entirely hemmed in. At his right was stationed Murat, lining the shore; at his left, marshals Bernadotte and Soult closed up the access to Magdeburg. Not knowing what course to adopt, he marched straightforward for some days, or towards the Lower Elbe,—the course a French corps would have taken in returning to France by Mecklenburg and Hanover. Every moment he was weakened; for the soldiers either fled into the woods, or preferred rendering themselves prisoners to supporting any longer fatigues that had become intolerable. He lost a great number besides in the skirmishes of his rear, that, thanks to the natural difficulties of the country, were not always completely defeated, but constantly ended by the abandoning of the disputed ground, and by the sacrifice of some men, either made prisoners or disabled. He marched thus from the 30th of October to the 5th of November. At a loss where to direct his steps, he conceived an act of violence, that necessity, however, must justify. He had on his road the town of Lubeck, one of the last free cities preserved by the German constitution. Remaining neuter, it ought to have been a stranger to all hostility. Blucher resolved to throw in his forces, and possess himself of the great resources it contained in provisions and money, and, if he could not defend himself there, to seize all the vessels of commerce that he should find on the water, to embark his troops, and convey them to Eastern Prussia.

Consequently, on the 6th of November he made

seek the great Napoleon, and that he must count upon his generosity. I am, with the most profound respect, &c.

"LANNES."

"*Passewalck, 1st Nov.* 1806.

"Sire,—I had the honour yesterday to announce to your majesty thirty pieces of cannon, sixty caissons, as many waggons loaded with ammunition, all drawn by eight or ten horses each, and 1500 cannoniers of light artillery. In fact, sire, I never saw any thing more magnificent than these men. It is a superb park of artillery. I caused it to depart from here this morning, and directed it towards Spandau. Almost all the cannoniers are mounted, and march in the most perfect order. Your majesty can, if you will, have them conducted into Italy. I am persuaded that, by placing with them some officers who speak German, these men would serve well. I should wish that your majesty would see this convoy, and that would decide its being sent into Italy. The grand duke of Berg writes to me that he expects to meet the enemy, the chief corps of the duke of Weimar and of Blucher, with the prince of Monte Corvo during the day to-morrow. He has already made some prisoners in the rear of the column. Acting upon this intelligence, I recalled all the light cavalry I had sent on to Boitzenburg, and I intend to assemble the whole of my corps at Stettin.

"They found in this place more than 200 pieces of cannon mounted on the carriages, and many others to remount, a quantity of powder, supplies, and stores.

"I shall throw all my cavalry on the right bank of the Oder. I will collect all the corn and flour I can obtain, to increase our stores. I shall order ovens to be constructed, and as many biscuits baked as possible.

"The garrison of Stettin consisted of 6000 men. I had them escorted towards Spandau by a regiment of the division Gazan. There only remains one regiment with this general. The division Suchet has furnished a great number of men for the escort of the prisoners, so that my corps is reduced to a small number.

"If Stettin contains sufficient means to clothe the soldiers, I shall avail myself of them. They are perfectly destitute. An inventory being taken of all that is in the place, I shall send it to your majesty. In the mean time I pray your imperial majesty to make known to me your intentions as soon as possible. My quarter-master general will be at Stettin this evening.

"I yesterday ordered to be read the proclamation of your majesty at the head of the troops. The last words it contained sensibly touched the hearts of the soldiers. They cried unanimously, '*Long live the emperor of the West!*' It is impossible for me to tell you how much these brave men love; truly they have never loved mistress as much as they have done you. I beg of your majesty to inform me whether I may in future address my despatches to the 'Emperor of the West.' I ask it in the name of my army. I am, with the most profound respect, &c.

"LANNES."

a forced entry into Lubeck, in spite of the protestations of the magistrates. The ramparts of the town had been imprudently converted into public walks, and lost their original strength. Besides, the town had been so impoverished of its garrison, that Blucher had no difficulty to encounter. He lodged his soldiers among the inhabitants, where they took all they required, and exacted besides of the magistrates a large contribution. Lubeck, as is well known, is situated on the frontiers of Denmark. A detachment of Danish troops guarded this frontier. General Blucher signified to the Danish general that if he allowed it to be violated by the French, he would, in his turn, break through it to take refuge in Holstein. The Danish general having declared that he would suffer himself and his corps to be cut in pieces sooner than he would admit of an infringement of his territory, Blucher shut himself up in Lubeck, with the certainty of not being dislodged by the French, if the neutrality of Denmark were respected. But whilst he was hoping to enjoy some security in Lubeck, protected by what remained of the fortifications, and relieved by the abundance of a large commercial city from the privations of a difficult retreat, the French appeared. The neutrality of Lubeck no longer existed for them, for they had a right to pursue the Prussians. Arrived on the 7th, they attacked on the same day the works that protected the gates called Burg-Thor and Mühlen-Thor. The troops under the command of Bernadotte took one, and those under Soult the other, scaling the walls under a fire of grape shot with great audacity, works which, though weakened, yet presented many difficult obstacles to overcome. An obstinate combat took place in the streets. The unfortunate inhabitants of Lubeck beheld their opulent city converted into a field of carnage. The Prussians, cut to pieces or surrounded, were obliged to fly, after having left more than 1000 dead in the place, nearly 6000 prisoners, and the whole of their artillery. Blucher quitted Lubeck, and took up his position between the territory, nearly inundated, in the environs of Lubeck and the Danish frontier. He stopped there, having neither ammunition nor provisions. This time he was obliged to surrender. After having severely censured general Mack for a whole year, and prince Hohenlohe for eight days, he followed their example. Blucher capitulated on the 7th of November, with his whole force, on the same conditions as prince Hohenlohe. In capitulating he wished to add a few words. Murat permitted him to do so in consideration of his misfortunes. The words added were, that he surrendered from want of arms. This capitulation procured for the French 14,000 prisoners, that, joined to those they had already taken in Lubeck, increased the number to 20,000.

At the end of this day there was not to be found a single Prussian corps from the Rhine to the Oder. The 10,000 men who had sought to gain the Oder were dispersed, killed, or made prisoners. Whilst these events were passing in Mecklenburg, the important fortress of Custrin, on the Oder, submitted to some companies of infantry commanded by General Petit. Four thousand prisoners, considerable magazines, and the second position of the Lower Oder, were the reward of this new capitulation. Thus the French occupied on the Oder the two positions of Stettin and Custrin. Marshal Lannes was established at Stettin, and Marshal Davout at Custrin. There still remained on the Elbe the great fortress of Magdeburg, which contained 22,000 men in garrison, and vast supplies. Marshal Ney undertook its investment. Having procured some mortars in default of besieging artillery, he several times menaced the place with a bombardment, a threat he took good care to execute. Two or three bombs thrown into the air intimidated the population, which surrounded the governor's hotel, demanding with a great outcry that he would not expose them to useless ravages, since the Prussian monarchy was henceforth incapable of defending them. The moral sense among the Prussian generals was so deficient that this reasoning was admitted as good; and consequently, on the day after the capitulation of Lubeck, general Kleist delivered up Magdeburg, with 22,000 prisoners. Thus, since the opening of the campaign, the Prussians had repeated at Erfurt, Prenzlow, Lubeck, and Magdeburg, what they had so much reproached the Austrians with doing once at Ulm. This remark has not for its end the intention to reflect on their misfortune, since so well repaired; but to prove that they ought a year previously to have respected the misfortune of others, and not to have pronounced the Austrians so cowardly, from the pitiful intention to make the French appear less brave and less skilful.

Out of 160,000 men, that had composed the active force of Prussia, not a remnant was left. Discarding the exaggerations that, in the astonishment at such success, were spread over Europe, it is certain that nearly 25,000 men had been killed or wounded; 100,000 made prisoners; and of 35,000 others, not one had re-passed the Oder. Those who were Saxons had regained Saxony; those who were Prussians had thrown down their arms and fled over the country. One may say, with perfect truth, that there no longer existed a Prussian army. Napoleon was absolute master of the monarchy of the great Frederick. It was only necessary to except some places in Silesia, incapable of resistance, and Eastern Prussia, protected by distance and by the vicinity of Russia. Napoleon had carried off all the stores of Prussia, in cannon, guns, and ammunition; he had acquired stores of provisions to support his army during a campaign, 20,000 horses to mount his cavalry, and sufficient colours to fill all the edifices of his capital. All this was accomplished in one month; because, since the 8th of October, Napoleon had received the capitulation of Magdeburg, which was the last, and made on the 8th of November. It was this rapid annihilation of the Prussian power that rendered so wonderful the campaign we have just related. That 160,000 French, brought to military perfection by fifteen years' war, should have vanquished 160,000 Prussians, enervated by a long peace, the miracle was not great. But it is a surprising event, that by this oblique march of the French army, combined in such a manner that the Prussian army, constantly increased during a retreat of 200 leagues from Hoff to Stettin, should not arrive at the Oder until the very day on which that river was occupied, should then be destroyed or taken to the last man, and that in one month the king of a great monarchy, the second successor of

the great Frederick, should see himself without soldiers and without a state! It is a surprising event, when one reflects that it was not the Macedonians fighting ignorant and cowardly Persians, but one European army beating another, each well disciplined and brave.

As to the Prussians, if the secret of this unheard-of rout must be told, by which armies and places submitted themselves to a few hussars, or to some companies of light infantry, it will be found in the moral deficiency which generally follows presumptuous folly. After having denied, not the victories of the French, which were undeniable, but their military superiority, the Prussians were so struck by it at the first encounter that they never attempted a resistance, or thought it possible; they fled and threw down their arms. They were overwhelmed, and Europe along with them. It trembled after the battle of Jena, still more than after Austerlitz; for after the battle of Austerlitz, confidence at least in the Prussian army remained among the enemies of France. After Jena the entire continent appeared to belong to the French army. The soldiers of the great Frederick had been the last resource looked forward to. These soldiers vanquished, nothing remained to envy but this resource,—alas! the sole resource that never fails,—to predict the faults of a genius become irresistible, to pretend that against such success no human resource can stand; and it is unhappily but too true, that genius, after having provoked envy by its successes, affords it a consolation by its faults.

BOOK XXVI.

EYLAU.

THE EFFECT PRODUCED IN EUROPE BY THE VICTORIES OF NAPOLEON OVER PRUSSIA.—TO WHAT CAUSE THE EXPLOITS OF THE FRENCH ARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED.—ORDINANCE OF KING FREDERICK-WILLIAM TENDING TO EFFACE THE DISTINCTIONS OF BIRTH IN THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.—NAPOLEON DECREES THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TEMPLE OF THE MADELEINE, AND GIVES THE NAME OF JENA TO THE BRIDGE OVER AGAINST THE MILITARY SCHOOL.—IDEAS WHICH HE CONCEIVED AT BERLIN IN THE INTOXICATION OF HIS MILITARY TRIUMPHS.—THE IDEA OF CONQUERING THE SEA BY LAND SYSTEMATIZES ITSELF IN HIS MIND, AND HE REPLIES TO THE MARITIME BY THE CONTINENTAL BLOCKADE.—DECREES OF BERLIN.—RESOLUTION TO PUSH THE WAR TOWARDS THE NORTH UNTIL THE SUBMISSION OF THE ENTIRE CONTINENT.—DESIGN TO MARCH UPON THE VISTULA, AND TO RAISE POLAND.—THE POLES FLOCK TO NAPOLEON.—UMBRAGE TAKEN AT VIENNA BY THE IDEA OF RECONSTITUTING POLAND.—NAPOLEON OFFERS AUSTRIA SILESIA IN EXCHANGE FOR THE GALLICIAS.—REFUSAL AND CONCEALED ENMITY OF THE COURT OF VIENNA.—PRECAUTIONS OF NAPOLEON AGAINST THAT COURT.—THE EAST MINGLED UP WITH THE WEST IN THE QUARREL.—TURKEY AND SULTAN SELIM.—NAPOLEON SENDS GENERAL SEBASTIANI TO CONSTANTINOPLE TO ENGAGE THE TURKS TO MAKE WAR UPON THE RUSSIANS.—DEPOSITION OF THE HOSPODARS IPSILANTI AND MARUZZI.—THE RUSSIAN GENERAL MICHELSON MARCHES UPON THE PROVINCES OF THE DANUBE.—NAPOLEON PROPORTIONS HIS MEANS TO THE GRANDEUR OF HIS PLANS.—CALLS OUT IN 1806 THE CONSCRIPTION OF 1807.—EMPLOY OF THE NEW LEVIES.—ORGANIZATION OF THE REGIMENTS DESIGNED AS REINFORCEMENTS TO MARCH TO THE GRAND ARMY.—NEW CORPS DRAWN FROM FRANCE AND ITALY.—THE ARMY OF ITALY SET ON THE WAR FOOTING.—DEVELOPMENT GIVEN TO THE CAVALRY.—FINANCIAL MEANS CREATED WITH THE RESOURCES OF PRUSSIA.—NAPOLEON, NOT HAVING BEEN ABLE TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH KING FREDERICK-WILLIAM UPON THE CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE, MARCHES HIS ARMY UPON POLAND.—MURAT, DAVOUT, AUGEREAU, AND LANNES, MARCH UPON THE VISTULA AT THE HEAD OF 80,000 MEN.—NAPOLEON FOLLOWS THEM WITH AN ARMY OF THE SAME STRENGTH, COMPOSED OF THE CORPS OF MARSHALS SOULT, BERNADOTTE, NEY, THE GUARD, AND THE RESERVES.—ENTRY OF THE FRENCH INTO POLAND.—ASPECT OF THE COUNTRY AND SKY.—ENTHUSIASM OF THE POLES TOWARDS THE FRENCH.—CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY NAPOLEON FOR THE RE-CONSTITUTION OF POLAND.—SPIRIT OF THE HIGH POLISH NOBILITY.—ENTRY OF MURAT AND DAVOUT INTO POSEN AND WARSAW.—NAPOLEON ESTABLISHES HIMSELF AT POSEN.—OCCUPATION OF THE VISTULA FROM WARSAW AS FAR AS THORN.—THE RUSSIANS UNITE WITH THE WRECKS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY OCCUPYING THE BANKS OF THE NAREW.—NAPOLEON WISHES TO THROW THEM BACK UPON THE PREGEL, IN ORDER TO WINTER MORE TRANQUILLY ON THE VISTULA.—FINE COMBINATIONS TO OVERTHROW THE PRUSSIANS AND RUSSIANS.—COMBATS OF CZNARNOWO, GOLYMIN, AND SOLDAU.—BATTLE OF PULTUSK.—THE RUSSIANS DRIVEN BEYOND THE NAREW WITH GREAT LOSS, BUT NOT POSSIBLE TO BE PURSUED ON ACCOUNT OF THE STATE OF THE ROADS.—EMBARRASSMENT OF THE CONQUERORS AND CONQUERED AMID THE BOGS OF POLAND.—NAPOLEON ESTABLISHES HIMSELF IN ADVANCE OF THE VISTULA, BETWEEN THE BUG, THE NAREW, THE OREZYC, AND THE UKRA.—HE PLACES THE CORPS OF MARSHAL BERNADOTTE AT ELBING, IN ADVANCE OF THE LOWER VISTULA, AND FORMS A TENTH CORPS UNDER MARSHAL LEFEBVRE TO COMMENCE THE SIEGE OF DANTZICK.—ADMIRABLE FORESIGHT FOR THE PROVISIONING AND SAFETY OF HIS WINTER QUARTERS.—WORKS OF PRAGA, MODLIN, AND SIEROCK.—MORAL AND PHYSICAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY.—GAIETY OF THE SOLDIERS IN

THE MIDST OF A COUNTRY SO NEW TO THEM.—PRINCE JEROME AND GENERAL VANDAMME, AT THE HEAD OF THE GERMAN AUXILIARIES, BESIEGE THE FORTRESS OF SILESIA.—BRIEF JOY AT VIENNA ON THEIR BELIEF FOR A MOMENT OF THE RUSSIAN SUCCESSES.—A MORE EXACT APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS RESTORES THE COURT OF VIENNA TO ITS ORDINARY RESERVE.—GENERAL BENNINGSEN, BECOME GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY, WISHES TO RESUME HOSTILITIES IN THE DEPTH OF WINTER, AND MARCHES UPON THE CANTONMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN FOLLOWING THE SHORE OF THE BALTIC.—HE IS DISCOVERED BY MARSHAL NEY, WHO GIVES THE ALARM TO ALL THE CORPS.—FINE COMBAT OF MARSHAL BERNADOTTE AT MOHRUNGEN. DEEP COMBINATION OF NAPOLEON TO DRIVE THE RUSSIANS INTO THE SEA.—THIS COMBINATION IS REVEALED TO THE ENEMY THROUGH THE FAULT OF AN OFFICER, WHO SUFFERS HIM TO GET POSSESSION OF THE DESPATCHES.—THE RUSSIANS RETIRE IN TIME.—NAPOLEON PURSUES THEM TO THE UTMOST.—COMBAT OF WALTERSDORF AND OF HOFF.—THE RUSSIANS, NOT ABLE TO FLY LONGER, HALT AT EYLAU, RESOLVED TO GIVE BATTLE.—THE FRENCH ARMY, DYING OF HUNGER, AND REDUCED ONE-THIRD BY ITS MARCHES, DRAWS NEAR THE RUSSIAN ARMY, AND GIVES AT EYLAU A SANGUINARY BATTLE.—COOLNESS AND ENERGY OF NAPOLEON.—HEROIC CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH CAVALRY.—THE RUSSIAN ARMY RETIRES NEARLY DESTROYED, BUT THE FRENCH ARMY ON ITS OWN SIDE SUFFERS CRUEL LOSSES.—THE CORPS OF AUGEREAU IS SO MALTREATED THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DISSOLVE IT.—NAPOLEON PURSUES THE RUSSIANS AS FAR AS KŒNIGSBERG; AND WHEN HE IS CERTAIN OF THEIR RETREAT BEYOND THE PREGEL, RETAKES HIS POSITION ON THE VISTULA.—CHANGES EFFECTED IN THE PLACE OF HIS QUARTERS.—HE QUITS THE UPPER VISTULA TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF ON THE LOWER, AND BEHIND THE PASSARGE, IN ORDER THE BETTER TO COVER THE SIEGE OF DANTZICK.—THE CARE OF REVICTUALLING DOUBLED FOR WINTER QUARTERS.—NAPOLEON, PLACED HIMSELF AT OSTERODE IN A SPECIES OF FARM, EMPLOYS THE WINTER IN NOURISHING HIS ARMY, IN RECRUITING IT, IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE, AND IN RESTRAINING EUROPE.—TRANQUILLITY OF MIND AND INCREDIBLE VARIETY OF THE OCCUPATIONS OF NAPOLEON AT OSTERODE AND AT FINKENSTEIN.

Napoleon had in a month overturned the Prussian monarchy, destroyed its armies, and conquered the largest part of its territory. A province and 25,000 men alone remained to king Frederick-William. In truth, the Russians, called with earnestness by the court of Berlin, which had taken refuge in Kœnigsberg, came as quickly as the distance, the season, and the wilfulness of a barbarous administration permitted. But the Russians had been seen at Austerlitz; and in spite of their bravery, it was not to be expected of them that they could change the destiny of the war. The cabinets and aristocracies of Europe were plunged in the deepest consternation. The people vanquished, divided between patriotism and admiration, were not able to prevent themselves from the acknowledgment in Napoleon of the child of the French revolution, the propagator of its ideas, the glorious applier of the most popular of all things, equality. They saw a striking example of this equality in the French generals, that they no longer designated under the names formerly so well known of Berthier, Murat, and Bernadotte, but under the titles of the prince of Neufchâtel, the grand duke of Berg, the prince of Ponte Corvo! Endeavouring to explain the unparalleled triumphs that have been related over the Prussian army, they attributed them not only to their courage and to their experience in war, but to the principles on which the new French society rested. They explained the incredible spirit of the French soldiers by the extraordinary ambition that they had known was excited in their minds on the opening of the vast career, in which they might enter peasants like Sforza, and might become marshal, prince, king, emperor! It is true that the last lot stood alone of its kind in the new urn of fortune; but if they had but one emperor, become so at the price of his extraordinary and prodigious genius, there were dukes and princes, whose superiority over their companions in arms was not of a nature to make any one despair of its attainment.

The intercepted letters of the Prussian officers were in this regard full of strange reflections. One of them, writing to his family, said, "If it was only necessary to serve with one's arms against the French, we should soon be victors; they are little and mean men. One of our Germans would beat four of them. But they become, under fire, supernatural beings. They are carried forward by an irrepressible ardour, of which we see no trace among our own soldiers. What can you do with peasants led into fire by nobles, with whom they partake the dangers, without ever sharing their passions or their rewards[1]!"

Thus was found in the mouths of the vanquished, with the praise of French bravery, the praise of the principles of the French revolution. The king of Prussia, in effect, a refugee at the confines of his kingdom, prepared an ordinance to introduce equality in the ranks of his army, and to efface all distinctions of birth and class. A singular example of the propagation of liberal ideas, carried to the extremity of Europe by a conqueror that they often represented as a giant who would stifle all ideas. He had repressed many in good truth, but the most social among them have made as much way in his train as his glory itself.

Always led to give every thing the brilliancy of his own imagination, Napoleon, who had planned the column of the Place Vendôme the day after the battle of Austerlitz, the triumphal arch of the Etoile, and the grand Rue Imperiale, decreed, in the midst of his Prussian conquest, the erection of a monument which has since become one of the grandest of the capital, the Temple of the Madeleine.

On the site which this temple at present occupies, and which forms with the Place Concorde so magnificent a whole, they were about to erect the new exchange. Napoleon judged the spot too finely situated for the erection of a temple to Mammon, and resolved, in consequence, to build there the temple of glory. He determined that another quarter should be found for the construction of the new exchange, and that on one of the four points of view from the middle of the Place

[1] This is the sense copied faithfully from a quantity of letters, the originals of which are preserved among the innumerable papers of Napoleon in the Louvre.

de la Concorde there should be erected a monument dedicated to the glory of the French arms. He desired that the front of this monument should bear the following inscription: "The emperor Napoleon to the soldiers of the grand army." Upon tablets of marble there were to be inscribed the names of the officers and soldiers who had taken a part in the grand events of Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena; and on tablets of gold, the names of those who had died in these battles. Immense bas-reliefs were to represent, grouped the one by the side of the other, the superior officers and generals. Statues were to be given to those marshals who had commanded *corps d'armée*. The colours taken from the enemy were to be suspended from the roof of the edifice. Napoleon finally designed a fête every year, of a character as antique as the monument, that should be celebrated in honour of the warlike virtues. He ordered a competition of designs, reserving it to himself to choose from among those presented that which seemed to himself the most proper. But he determined beforehand the style of architecture which he wished to use in the new edifice. He desired, he said, to have a temple of Greek or Roman form. "We have churches," he wrote to the minister of the interior, "but we have no temple, like the Parthenon for example; it is requisite to have one of this kind in Paris." France then had a love for the arts of Greece, as a little while before she loved the arts of the middle ages; and it was a present altogether new to offer the capital an imitation of the Parthenon. At the present time this Greek temple, become a Christian church (which cannot be a subject of regret), offers a contrast to its new destination, and to the arts of the existing epoch. Thus pass away our tastes, passions, and ideas, as rapidly as the caprices of that fortune which had devoted this edifice to usages so different from those to which it was at first dedicated. However, it occupies majestically the place which was originally assigned to it, and the public have not forgotten that this temple should be that of glory [1].

[1] Some letters of Napoleon on this subject are here cited, which will be found worthy of being reproduced.

"To the Minister of the Interior.

"*Posen, December* 6, 1806.

"Literature has need of encouragement: you are its minister. Propose to me some means to give a forward impetus to all the different branches of the *belles lettres*, which in every age have made nations illustrious.

"You have received the decree which I have made upon the monument of the Madeleine, and that which reported the establishment of the exchange upon that spot. It is necessary, however, to have an exchange in Paris. My intention still is to have an exchange built which shall correspond with the greatness of the capital, and with the weight of business which will be transacted there. Mention to me a convenient place. It is necessary that it should be large, in order to have a walk around it. I should desire that it be isolated.

"When I assigned a sum of 3,000,000f. for the construction of the monument of the Madeleine, I only intended to speak of the building, and not of the ornaments, for which, in due time, I am willing to employ a much larger sum. I desire, in the first place, that the surrounding yards should be purchased, in order to make a large circular site, in the midst of which the monument should stand, and around which I would have houses built upon a uniform plan.

The flatterers of the day, knowing the weaknesses of Napoleon, even went beyond themselves

"It would not be out of the way to name the bridge of the military school the bridge of Jena. Prepare me an ordinance for giving the names of the generals and of the colonels who have been killed in this battle, to the different new streets. NAPOLEON."

"To the Minister of the Interior.

"*Pinkenstein, May* 30, 1807.

"After attentively examining the different plans for the monument dedicated to the grand army, I was not a moment in doubt. That of M. Vignon is the only one which fulfils my intentions. It was a temple that I required, and not a church. What can be done, in the way of churches, able to vie with St. Genevieve, even with Notre Dame, and, above all, with St. Peter's at Rome? The design of M. Vignon has, among many other advantages, that of agreeing better with the palace of the legislative body, and of not crushing the Tuileries.

"I will have nothing in wood. The spectators should be placed, as I have said before, upon steps of marble, forming the amphitheatre intended for the public. Nothing in this temple should be moveable and changing; every thing, on the contrary, should be fixed to its place. If it were possible to place at the entrance of the temple the Nile and Tiber, which have been brought from Rome, that would have a very good effect. It is requisite that M. Vignon endeavour to introduce them into his definitive design, as well as the equestrian statues that should be placed without, for they would be really bad withinside. It is necessary also he should designate the place where the armour of Francis I., taken at Vienna, should be introduced, and the four-horsed chariot from Berlin.

"It is requisite there should not be any wood in the construction of this temple. Granite and iron should be the materials of such a monument. It will be objected that the existing columns are not granite; but this objection will not hold good, since in the course of time the columns might be renewed without injuring the building. Still, if it prove that the employment of granite entails too great an expense, and a long delay, it must be renounced; because the principal condition of the design is, that it should be executed in three or four years, or at most in five. This monument, bound up in some respect with political matters, is from that circumstance among the number of those which should be speedily executed. It is, nevertheless, proper to search out granite for the other monuments which I have decreed, and which, by their nature, would permit thirty, forty, or fifty years, to be given to their construction.

"I suppose that all the interior sculptures will be in marble, and that there will not be proposed to me works of sculpture proper only for the drawing and dining-rooms of the wives of the Paris bankers. That which is frivolous is neither simple nor noble. That which is not calculated for long duration, should not be employed in this monument. I repeat it, there must not be any species of furniture, not even curtains.

"As to the design which has obtained the prize, it did not attain my object; it was the first I discarded. It is true that I gave as a basis the preservation of the building of the Madeleine that now exists; but this expression is an ellipsis. It was on the understanding that as much as possible of that building should be preserved, otherwise there would not have been need of the programme,—there would have been nothing to do but to limit all to following the original plan. My intention was not to have a church, but a temple; and I did not wish the whole to be destroyed nor the whole to be preserved. If these two propositions were incompatible, to wit, to have a temple or to preserve the existing constructions of the Madeleine, it was easy to keep to the definition of the temple: by the temple I understood a monument such as they had at Athens, and such as is not in existence in Paris. There are many churches at Paris; they have them in every village.

in their baseness; they proposed to him to change the revolutionary name of the *Place de la Concorde*, into another name more monarchical, borrowed from the imperial monarchy. He replied to M. Champagny by this very brief letter: "The name which it has must be left to the Place de la Concorde. CONCORD!—it is that which makes France invincible!" (January, 1807.) But a magnificent stone bridge, recently ordered and constructed over the Seine, opposite the military school, had not yet received a name. Napoleon desired that the fine name of Jena should be given to it, which this bridge has preserved, and which, at a later period, would have been fatal to it, if an honourable action of Louis XVIII. had not, in 1814, saved it from the brutal rage of the Prussians.

These attentions given to monuments of art, in the midst of conquered capitals, were with Napoleon no other than accessary thoughts, at the side of the vast ideas which occupied him. The glorious event of Austerlitz had already inspired an excessive feeling of his strength, and given fresh stimulants to his gigantic ambition. The battle of Jena filled the measure of his confidence and his desires. He believed every thing possible, and he desired every thing, after this complete and prompt destruction of the military power the most esteemed in Europe. His enemies, to depreciate his former triumphs, having repeated to him, without ceasing, that the Prussian army was the only one which it was necessary for him to keep in account, the sole one which it was difficult for him to vanquish, he had taken them at their word, and having vanquished it—better than vanquished, annihilated it in one month—he thenceforth perceived no limit to his power, and set no bounds to his will. Europe appeared to him a field without a master, in which he should be able to build up whatever he pleased,—all that he might find great, wise, useful, or brilliant. Where would he encounter resistance? Austria disarmed by a single manœuvre, that of Ulm, was quaking, worn out, incapable of taking arms. The Russians, although judged so brave, had been brought back, with the bayonet in their reins, from Munich to Olmutz; and if they had halted for an instant at Hollabrunn, or at Austerlitz, it was to suffer the most crushing defeats. Finally, the Prussian monarchy had been destroyed in thirty days. What obstacle, it may be repeated, could he foresee to his intentions? The wrecks of the Russian army, rallied in the north with 25,000 Prussians, could not offer a danger calculated to appal him. He wrote thus to the chancellor Cambacérès: "All this is child's play, to which it is needful to put an end, and to take my enemies this time in such a fashion, that I shall soon finish with all." He determined, therefore, to push the war so far, that he should be able to force peace upon all the powers, and to force one from them as durable as brilliant. It was not, it is true, so difficult to force from the courts of the continent, but only from England, that, defended by the ocean, had alone escaped the yoke with which Europe saw itself threatened. Napoleon had already said to himself that he would govern the sea by the land, and that if the English would close the ocean, he would close up the continent. Arrived at the Elbe and Oder, he was more than ever confirmed in this idea: he systematized it in his mind, and he wrote to his brother Louis in Holland: "I go to reconquer the colonies by land." In the fermentation of spirit, that his extraordinary success against Prussia produced, he conceived the most gigantic ideas that had ever birth in his mind. At first he proposed to himself to keep in deposit all that he had conquered, and all that he should yet conquer, until England had restored to France, Holland, and Spain, the colonies she had taken from them. The continental powers were at bottom only subsidized auxiliaries of England; he resolved to hold them all as bondsmen for the policy of England, and to place it as a principle in the negotiation, that he would not restore to any of them what he had taken from them, as long as England continued to withhold the surrender of all or a part of her maritime conquests. Two Prussian negotiators, M. de Lucchesini and M. de Zastrow, were at Charlottenburg, seeking an armistice and peace. He answered them through Duroc, who remained the friend of the court of Berlin, that as to a peace, it was not to be thought about until they should have brought England to more moderate views; and that Prussia and Germany would remain in his hands as a pledge for that of which England had deprived the maritime powers: that as to an armistice, he was ready to grant one on condition that they should deliver up to him immediately the line on which he wished to winter, and which he intended to make the point of his departure for future operations, the line of the Vistula. In consequence, he required that they should instantly abandon to him the fortresses of Silesia, such as Breslau, Glogau, Schweidnitz, Glatz; and all on the Vistula, as Dantzick, Graudenz, Thorn, and Warsaw; because if they did not deliver them, he should go and conquer them, he said, in a few days.

With this intention to conquer the sea by the land, in depriving Great Britain of all her allies, and in shutting upon her all the ports of the continent, the first thing to do was to interdict to her all access to the vast shores occupied by the French armies. Already Napoleon had by himself, or through Prussia, closed the mouths of the Ems, Weser, and Elbe. It was there a natural and legitimate right of conquest, because conquest confers all the rights of the sovereign, and particularly the right to close the ports, or occupy the roads of the conquered country, without such a rigorous measure passing for the violation of the right of any persons whatsoever. But to forbid an entrance into the Ems, Elbe, and Weser, was a very insufficient measure to attain the end that Napoleon proposed to himself; because, in spite of the most exact superintendence of the coasts, English merchandize was introduced by smuggling, not only into Hanover, but into Holland, of which the government was under the direct influence of France, and into Belgium, which had become a French province. Besides the Ems, Weser, and

I have not, most assuredly, found erroneous the architect's observation, that there was a contradiction between the idea of having a temple, and the intention to preserve the work begun for a church. The first was the principal idea, the second was the accessary. M. Vignon has, therefore, guessed that which I should wish observed.

"NAPOLEON."

Elbe closed, merchandise entered by the Oder and by the Vistula, and re-descended from the north to the south. It was rendered dearer, it is true; but the necessity of disposing of it, brought the English to deliver it at a price which compensated for the expense of smuggling and carriage. It was, therefore, necessary to employ more rigorous means against English merchandize, and Napoleon was not the man to interdict himself the use of them.

England herself had authorized every excessive proceeding against her commerce, by taking the extraordinary measure, and one of the most unjustifiable that can be imagined, that which was called a blockade upon paper. Thus, as has been several times explained, it was the principle with the greater part of the maritime nations, that every neutral, that is to say, every flag that was a stranger in a war existing between two powers, had the right to sail from the ports of one power to those of the other, to transport any kind of merchandize, even that of the enemy, except the contraband of war, that consists of arms, ammunition, and the stores especially made for the use of the military. This liberty of commerce only ceases when it has to do with a maritime place, blockaded by a naval force, so that the blockade shall be effective. In that case, the blockade being notified, the power of entering into the place blockaded is suspended as regards neutrals. But if in the restrictions imposed upon the right of navigation, they do not stop at this certain limit of the presence of an effective force, there is no more a reason why there may not be placed under interdict the entire coasts of the globe, under the pretext of a blockade. England had already endeavoured to pass beyond the limits of a real blockade, by pretending, with a few sail, insufficient in number to close the access of a maritime place, that she had a right to declare it in a state of blockade. But she had, in fine, admitted the necessity of the presence of some sort of force before the blockaded port. Now she no longer stopped at this limit, already so vague; and at the time of her momentary rupture with Prussia, occasioned by her taking possession of Hanover, she had ventured to forbid all commerce to neutrals with the coasts of France and Germany, from Brest as far as to the mouths of the Elbe. This was an abuse of strength pushed to the utmost excess; and, henceforth, a simple decree of England would suffice to lay under an interdict every part of the globe that it pleased her to deprive of commerce.

This incredible violation of the common law furnished Napoleon with a just pretext to allow himself to follow in regard to English commerce the most rigorous measures. He conceived a formidable decree, which, all excessive as it may seem, was no more than a just reprisal for the violence of England; and that had yet more the advantage of perfectly answering the views which he had adopted. This decree, dated from Berlin, on the 21st of November, applicable not only to France, but to the countries occupied by her armies, or in alliance with her, that is to say, France, Holland, Spain, Italy, and all Germany, declared the British Isles in a state of blockade. The consequences of this state of blockade were the following:—

All trade with England was absolutely forbidden.

All merchandize, proving to be of the manufacture of England, or of the English colonies, was to be confiscated, not only on the coast, but in the interior, among the merchants with whom it might be deposited.

Every letter coming from England, or going there, addressed to an Englishman, or written in English, was to be stopped at the post-office and destroyed.

Every Englishman seized in France, or in the countries subjected by its arms, was detained a prisoner of war.

Every vessel, having only touched at an English colony, or at one of the ports of the three kingdoms, was forbidden to enter the ports of France, or those subject to France; and if it made a false declaration upon this subject, it was declared to be a good prize.

One half of the confiscations were intended to indemnify the French merchants or their allies, who had suffered from English spoliation. Lastly, the English fallen into the power of France were to serve for the exchange of Frenchmen or of their allies made prisoners.

Such were the measures, assuredly inexcusable, if England had not taken care to justify them beforehand by her own excesses. Napoleon did not dissimulate about their severity; but in order to bring England to abandon the tyranny of the sea, he employed an equal tyranny upon land: above all, he wished to intimidate the agents of British commerce, and principally the men of business in the Hanseatic towns, that, enjoying the profits of the orders given on the Elbe and the Weser, circulated in all parts of the continent the prohibited merchandize. The threat of confiscation, a threat soon followed by the effect, made them tremble; and if it did not close, at least it straitened greatly the clandestine openings to British commerce.

Napoleon said that all commercial countries were interested in the resistance which he opposed to the iniquitous pretension of England, and concluded therefore that they would be resigned to the inconveniences of a contest become necessary; he thought that these inconveniences, bearing more particularly upon the speculators of Hamburg, Bremen, Leipsic, and Amsterdam, smugglers by profession, it was not worth the trouble to limit the means of reprisal, out of respect to such interests.

The effect of this decree upon European opinion was very great. Some saw in it the excess of a revolting despotism; others the deepest policy; all an extraordinary action, proportioned to a conflict that the giants, England and France, sustained against each other; the first daring to seize the empire of the seas, which had until then been the common road of nations, in order to interdict all commerce to her enemies; the second undertaking the entire occupation of the continent with armed hands, to answer the closing of the sea by that of the land! Strange spectacle! without example in the past, and probably in the future, of the unchained passions of the two greatest people of the earth.

Scarcely was this decree conceived, and drawn up by Napoleon himself, and by him alone, without

the participation of M. de Talleyrand, scarcely was this decree signed before it was sent by extraordinary couriers to the governments of Holland, Spain, and Italy, with orders to the one, and summonses to the others, to put it into immediate execution. Marshal Mortier, who had already invaded Hesse, was ordered to march in all haste upon the Hanseatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, and to take possession not only of these, but of the ports of Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania, as far as the mouths of the Oder. He was commanded to occupy the rich deposits of the Hanseatic towns, to seize the merchandize of British origin, to arrest the English merchants, and to do all this with punctuality, exactness, and probity; because he hoped, from marshal Mortier, more than from any other person, an execution equally rigorous and upright. He ordered him to bring into Germany a certain number of seamen, drawn from the Boulogne flotilla, to cause them to cruise at the places of disembarkation at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, to arm all the passes of the river with cannon, and to sink every suspected vessel that shewed an attempt to force the blockade.

Such was the continental blockade, by which Napoleon answered the paper blockade conceived by England.

But to make the continent submit to his policy, it was necessary that Napoleon should push the war much further than he had yet done. Austria had been for six months in his powerful hands; she could yet only be that which he wished she should be. Prussia was actually so. But Russia, always repelled when she appeared in the regions of the West, still escaped his blows, and withdrew herself beyond the Vistula and the Niemen. She was the sole ally that remained to England, and it was necessary to beat her as completely as he had beaten Austria and Prussia, to realize in its whole extent the policy of "vanquishing the sea on the land." Napoleon had therefore resolved to ascend towards the north, and to go and encounter the Russians, in the midst of the plains of Poland, ready to rise at his appearance. Never had a soldier departing from the Rhine yet touched the Vistula, still less the Niemen. But he who had made the tricolor float on the banks of the Adige, the Nile, the Jordan, the Po, the Danube, and the Elbe, was able, and must execute this audacious march. His presence, too, in the regions of the north, would raise up in a moment a great European question, the re-establishment of Poland. The Poles had always said, "France is our friend, but she is far away!" When France approached Poland, as far as the Oder, could the idea of a great reparation escape becoming with one a subject of the fondest hope, with the other the subject of reflected design! The unfortunate Poles, so frivolous in their conduct, so serious in their feelings, raised the cry of enthusiasm on learning the victories of France; and a crowd of emissaries came to Berlin, conjuring Napoleon to march upon the Vistula, promising him their property, their arms, their lives, to aid him in the reconstitution of Poland. This design, so seducing, so generous, if it had been practicable, was one of those enterprises with which the quick imagination of Napoleon would be smitten at that moment, and one of the imposing spectacles which it was consonant with his greatness to give to the world. In marching into the midst of Poland, he added, it is true, to the difficulties of the actual war, the graver difficulties of all, those of the climate and distance; but he took from Russia and Prussia the resources of the Polish provinces, resources very considerable in men and grain; he sapped the basis of the Russian power; he essayed rendering Europe the service the most signal that he had ever rendered her; he added new pledges to those of which he was already possessed, which would serve him to obtain from England maritime restitutions by means of continental ones. The vast countries placed on the road from the Rhine to the Vistula, the causes of weakness with an ordinary general, would become, under the greatest of soldiers, abundant resources of the things most necessary in the war: he would go to draw, thanks to an able administration, provisions, ammunition, arms, horses, and money. As to the climate, so formidable in those countries in November and December, he no doubt considered it; but he had resolved in this campaign to halt on the Vistula. If they gave it to him under the proposed armistice, he had the design to establish himself there; if, on the contrary, they contested it with him, he would conquer it in a few marches, and encamp his troops there during the winter, feed them with the corn of Poland, warm them with the wood of its forests, recruit them with the new soldiers coming from the Rhine, and, in the following spring, depart from the Vistula, to go deeper into the North than any man had before ever dared to go.

Excited by success, pushed by his genius and his fortune to a greatness of thought to which no head of an army or an empire had yet arrived, he did not hesitate a moment on the part he should take; and he disposed every thing for advancing into Poland. The idea had entered into his desires, on passing the Rhine, of an audacious march to the North, but vaguely. It was at Berlin, after his rapid and striking success obtained over Prussia, that he adopted the idea seriously.

Still there was, beyond the perils inherent in the enterprise itself, a particular danger which Napoleon did not dissimulate; the impression felt that Austria, although vanquished, and that even to weakness, might nevertheless be tempted to seize the opportunity to throw herself upon the French rear.

The existing conduct of this court was of a nature to inspire more than a single fear. To the offers of alliance that Napoleon had made to her himself, after the interview with the duke of Wurtzburg, she had replied by affected demonstrations of good feeling, feigning at first not to comprehend the overtures of the French ambassadors; and when he had explained himself in a clearer manner, alleging then, that an approach too near to France would entail on her part a rupture with Russia and Prussia, and that on the morrow of a long contest, commenced three times in fifteen years, she was no longer capable of making war for or against any power whatever.

To these evasive words she added actions more significant. She had assembled 60,000 men in Bohemia, that, placed at first along Bavaria and

Saxony, were actually sent towards Gallicia; following, in some sort, behind her own frontiers, the movements of the belligerent armies. Independently of these 60,000 men, she had directed fresh troops towards Poland, and she displayed extreme activity in forming magazines in Bohemia and Gallicia. When questioned on the subject of these armaments, she replied by commonplace reasons, relating to her personal security, saying that, exposed in all parts to the contact of the hostile armies, that were in a state of warfare, she could not permit any the violation of her territory, and that the measures, relating to which an account was required of her, were no more than measures of pure precaution.

Napoleon was not to be the dupe of language so insincere. The necessity of an alliance, since he had lost that of Prussia, had for a moment directed his mind towards the court of Vienna; but it was easy enough for him to discover that the power from which the French had, in fifteen years, taken the Netherlands, Suabia, the Milanese, the Venetian States, Tuscany, the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and, in fact, the Germanic crown, could be no otherwise than an irreconcileable enemy, dissimulating her deep resentments from policy, but ready to make them break out upon the first occasion. He perceived very clearly that the fears of Austria were feigned; because none of the belligerent parties had any interest in provoking her by a violation of territory; and he knew that if she armed, it could only be with the perfidious intention to fall upon the rear of the French army. Not attaching more importance than he need to do to the word of the man and the sovereign, by which Francis II. bound himself at the bivouac of Urchitz, no more to make war upon France, he nevertheless thought that the recollection of that word, solemnly given, ought to be an embarrassment to that sovereign, and that to break it he must have some very specious pretext: he formed two resolutions very well considered; the first was not to give Austria any pretext to interfere in the existing war, the second to take his precautions as if the interference would be certain, and to take them in an ostensible manner. His language was conformable to these resolutions. He complained, in the first place, with perfect frankness, of the armaments making in Bohemia and Gallicia; and in such a mode as to prove that he comprehended their object. Then with the same frankness, he announced the precautions which he thought himself obliged to take, and which were of a nature to discourage the cabinet of Vienna. He affirmed anew that he would not provoke a war, but that he would make it prompt and terrible, if they had the imprudence to recommence it. He declared that, not willing to give any pretext for a rupture, he would not lend himself to the rising of those parts of Poland possessed by Austria; that the rising of Prussian and Russian Poland was an act of hostility, imputable exclusively to those who had wished for the war; that he did not conceal the difficulty of restraining the Poles who were dependents of Austria, when the Poles dependent upon Russia and Prussia were in a state of agitation; but that if in Vienna they thought in this respect as he did, they must be convinced of the enormous fault that they had committed in the last century, by destroying a monarchy which was the bulwark of the West; he offered a very simple means of repairing that fault in the reconstitution of Poland, and in offering, beforehand, to the house of Austria, a rich indemnification for the provinces of which she would have to make a sacrifice. This indemnification was the restitution of Silesia, snatched from Maria Theresa by Frederick the Great. Silesia was certainly worth the Gallicias, and it would be a striking reparation of the evils and outrages that the founder of Prussia had made the house of Austria endure.

Most assuredly, in the situation in which Napoleon was placed, nothing was better calculated than a similar proposition. Brought back by the course of events to destroy the work of the great Frederick, in humbling Prussia, he was not able to do better than to destroy that work completely, by giving Austria that which Frederick had taken away from her, and in retaking that which Frederick had given. For the rest, he tendered this exchange without the pretence of imposing it. If such a proposition, which would formerly overwhelm Austria with joy, awoke her ancient feelings in regard to Silesia, he was quite ready, he said, to give it the proper conclusion; if not, he must consider it as not coming to pass; and he reserved it to himself to act in Russian and Prussian Poland as events might direct him, solely obliging himself to undertake nothing that might affect the rights of Austria. While taking every care not to furnish any pretext for complaint to the court of Vienna, Napoleon nevertheless repeated that he was entirely prepared, and if she wished for war, she would not take him unawares. Although satisfied with the services of M. de Rochefoucauld, his ambassador, he replaced him with general Andréossy, who, being a military man, and knowing Austria perfectly well, would be able to observe with a more certain eye the nature and extent of the preparations of that power.

Napoleon, in this extraordinary moment of his reign, wished to make the East serve to aid the success of his projects in the West. Turkey was, at this moment, at a crisis by which he hoped to profit. This unfortunate empire, threatened since the reign of Catherine, even by its friends, who, seeing its provinces on the point of being detached from it, hastened to seize them, that they might not be left to their rivals (witness the conduct of France in Egypt),—this unfortunate empire had been sometimes drawn towards Napoleon, by the instinct of a common interest; sometimes estranged by the intrigues of England and of Russia, that ever recalled before the divan recollections of the Pyramids and of Aboukir. Entered again into peace with France at the period of the Consulate, got cold since the creation of the empire that it had refused to acknowledge, the Sultan Selim had, by the battle of Austerlitz, been definitively led towards an approximation, that had soon become an intimacy. It had granted to Napoleon the title of Padisha, at first denied; and it had sent to Paris an extraordinary ambassador, to carry with him the act of acknowledgement, congratulations, and presents. Sultan Selim, in thus acting, had yielded to the real bias of his inclinations, which drew him towards France, despite the intrigues with which he was assailed, and of which the

increase attested the sad decadence of his empire. This prince, mild, sage, enlightened as a European, loving the civilization of the West, not from the fantasy of a despot, but through a lively feeling of the superiority of that civilization over the manners of the East, had from his youth, when he was buried in the voluptuous obscurity of the seraglio, maintained, through M. Ruffin, a personal and secret correspondence with Louis XVI. Afterwards, mounted on the throne, he had preserved for France a marked preference, and he was happy to find in her victories a decisive reason for giving it to her. The Russians and English wished to overcome this preference, even by main force. An occasion occurred to prove their influence at Constantinople; it was the choice of the two hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. The hospodars Ipsilanti and Maruzzi, devoted to England and to Russia, to whomsoever wished for the ruin of the Turkish empire, because they were the real precursors of the Greek insurrection, showed themselves in this administration the declared accomplices of the enemies of the Porte. Things had come to such a point that the Porte had seen itself obliged to recall agents so unfaithful and dangerous. Russia soon made general Michelson march towards the Dniester with an army of 60,000 men, and England had directed a flotilla on the Dardanelles, to exact, by means of this union of force, the replacement of the deposed hospodars. The young emperor Alexander, who had only come upon the world's stage to endure the memorable defeat of Austerlitz, said to himself, that in the midst of the sanguinary commingling of all the European nations, he would profit by the circumstances to advance upon Turkey, and that whatever were the chances of fortune between the Rhine and the Niemen, all that he took in the East would perhaps be left to him to recompense him for that which others might take from him in the West.

This calculation was not wanting in correctness. But having Napoleon on his hands, he acted with little prudence in depriving himself of 60,000 men, to send them on the Pruth. The proof of this fault was even in the joy itself that Napoleon exhibited when he learned that a rupture had broken out between Russia and the Porte. It was the foresight of this had made him hold on so strongly to occupy Dalmatia, which permitted him to keep an army on the frontiers of Bosnia, and gave him the facility of succouring or making the Porte uneasy, according to the demands of his policy. On seeing this crisis approach, that he desired more ardently as events became more serious, he had chosen for his ambassador at Constantinople, a military man, born, like himself, in Corsica, joining to experience in war a rare political sagacity, general Sebastiani, before employed in a mission to Turkey, where he had acquitted himself with perfect satisfaction. Napoleon had given him express instructions to excite the Turks against the Russians, and to employ all his efforts to provoke a war in the West. He had authorized him to draw from Dalmatia officers of artillery and engineers, ammunition, and even the 25,000 men of general Marmont, if the Porte, pushed to an extremity, should desire the presence of a French army. The battle of Austerlitz having reattached Sultan Selim to Napoleon, the battle of Jena would be sufficient to embolden him as far as war. Napoleon wrote to this prince to offer him an offensive and defensive alliance; to engage him to seize that occasion to raise up the crescent, and to announce to him that he would render to the Turks the greatest service which it was possible to render them, and make up for the greatest check to which they had ever been subjected by attempting the re-establishment of Poland. Orders were given to general Marmont to keep ready all the succour which might be demanded from him at Constantinople; and to general Sebastiani to neglect nothing to kindle a conflagration, which should extend from the Dardanelles to the mouths of the Danube. In setting the Russians and the Turks at odds, Napoleon proposed to himself the double end, that of dividing the forces of Russia, and of throwing Austria into terrible perplexities. Austria, there was no doubt, hated France; but, when she saw the Russians invade the shores of the Black Sea, she would suffer an uneasiness which would be a very powerful diversion of her hatred.

This immense quarrel, carried on for fifteen years between Europe and the French revolution, had thus extended itself from the Rhine to the Vistula, from Berlin to Constantinople. Engaged in a contest to the utmost, Napoleon took means proportioned to the grandeur of his designs. His first care was to levy a new conscription. He had called out, towards the end of 1805, the first half of the conscription of 1806, and had called out the second half at the moment of his entrance into Prussia. He resolved to act in the same manner with the conscription of 1807, and he called it out immediately, although it was only at the end of 1806; to give the young men of that class a year for instruction, to strengthen themselves, and to break them in to the fatigues of war. With the spirit that reigned in the regiments, they were all that was required to form excellent soldiers. This new levy of men would, besides, procure to the effective strength of the army an important augmentation. That effective strength, which was, in 1805, the period of the departure for Boulogne, 450,000 men, and that was raised, by the conscription of 1806, to 503,000, would be carried, by the conscription of 1807, to 580,000. The annual freedoms given were interdicted during the war; the army was thus augmented at each conscription, because battles or sickness did not diminish the effective force of the number of men proportioned to the amount of the levies. The campaign of Austria had not cost more than 20,000 men; that of Prussia had not cost that number yet. It is true that the war was every day found to be carried to a greater distance, and into ruder climates; and the quality of the troops lessened in proportion, while, as the recruits replaced the old soldiers of the revolution, the loss would soon become more sensible. But these were yet of small importance, and the army composed of tried soldiers, resuscitated, rather than enfeebled, by the arrival, to the war battalions, of a certain portion of conscripts, had attained its utmost state of perfection.

Napoleon wrote, therefore, to M. Lacuée, that he should call out the class of 1807. M. de Lacuée was then charged with the appeals of the war ministry. He was an accomplished functionary,

devoted to the emperor, and resolute to surmount the difficulties attached to a very ungrateful task, under a reign that caused so great a consumption of men. Although he was not minister at war, Napoleon corresponded directly with him, feeling the necessity to guide, support, and excite him by direct communications.—"You will see," he wrote him, "by a message addressed to the senate, that I call out the conscription of 1807, and that I am not willing to lay down my arms until I have peace with England and with Russia. I see by the statements, that, on the 15th of December, all the conscripts of 1806 will have marched. You will have no need to await my order for their partition among the different corps. I have not lost many men; but the design which I have formed is greater than any I have ever before conceived; and from that it is necessary that I should find myself in a position to meet every event." (Berlin, 22 November, 1806. *Depôt of the Secretary of State.*)

Napoleon, following the custom that he had adopted the preceding year, to reserve for the senate the vote of the contingent, sent a message to that body, to demand from it the conscription of 1807, and made known to it the extension given to his policy since he had crushed Prussia. In that message, in which the energy of the style equalled that of the thought, he said that thus far the monarchs of Europe were playing upon the generosity of France; that one coalition vanquished, another was soon seen to have birth; that the coalition of 1805 scarcely dissolved, he had had to combat that of 1806; that he must be less generous for the future; that the states conquered would be detained until a general peace on land and sea; that England, forgetting all the rights of nations, striking with a commercial interdict a part of the world, they should strike with the same interdict, and render it as rigorous as the nature of things permitted; that, in fine, it was better worth, when they were condemned to war, to plunge themselves into it altogether, than to engage in it half way; that it was the means to terminate it more completely, and more solidly, by a general and durable peace. His style rendered, with the utmost vigour, the thoughts of which it was full. Pride, exasperation, and confidence, equally shone out in it. He demanded, in the sequel, means proportioned to his views; these were, as has been announced, the conscription of 1807, levied at the end of 1806.

The precautions, so ably taken by Napoleon, have been before explained, on the double hypothesis of a long war in the North, and of a sudden attack on any part whatever of his vast empire. The third battalions of the regiments of the grand army, forming the depôt, were, as has been seen, ranged along the Rhine under marshal Kellermann, or in camp at Boulogne under marshal Brune. These third battalions, already fitted out with the conscripts of 1806, soon with those of 1807, carefully exercised and equipped, would be able, in case of need, to join the 8th corps, commanded by marshal Mortier, to cover the Lower Rhine; or equally well to unite under marshal Brune with the king of Holland, to cover either Holland, or the coasts of France as far as the Seine. Those regiments, which were neither in Germany nor Italy, united in the interior at St. Lô, Pontivy, and Napoleonville, formed in small camps, were designed to march upon Cherburg, Rochelle, Brest, or Bordeaux. Detachments of national guards, not numerous, but well selected, one at St. Omer, one in the Seine Inférieure, and a third in the environs of Bordeaux, would concur in the defence of the points threatened. Some corps concentrated at Paris would be able to travel by post.

The same system had been adopted, as has been seen, for the army of Italy. The third battalions of that army, spread over upper Italy, were devoted to the instruction of the conscripts, and, at the same time, furnished the garrisons of the fortresses. The war battalions were for the three acting armies of Naples, Friuli, and Dalmatia.

Napoleon resolved, at first, to draw from the depôt the reinforcements necessary for the grand army, to fill with the new conscriptions the void, which that course would produce, and, as that void would be filled and beyond, by the contingent of 1807, to profit by the surplus to carry the battalions of the depôt to 1000 or 1200 men, and the regiments of cavalry to an effective of 700 men in place of 500. He also resolved to augment the effective of the companies of artillery, having perceived that the enemy, to make up for the quality of his troops, added greatly to the number of his guns. The battalions of depôt, being carried up to 1000 or 1200 men, there would always be an extra, besides the recruiting of the active army, of 300 or 400 men, the most instructed, to send any where that might be demanded on an unforeseen emergency.

Napoleon had already sent from the depôts 12,000 men, who had been conducted in strong detachments from Alsace into Franconia, to fill up the void produced in the regiments by the war: 7000 or 8000 had arrived, 4000 or 5000 were yet on the march. This was not altogether an equivalent for what he had lost,—many more through fatigue than in battle. Pre-occupied above all by the distance to which the war was about to be carried, he planned a system profoundly conceived, to bring the conscripts from the Rhine upon the Vistula; to bring them there in such a manner that they should not run any danger during the length of the journey, that they should not scatter on the road, and that, the route completed, they should be able to perform service in the rear of the army. These detachments, drawn from each battalion in depôt, would form one or many companies, according to their number; these companies would be afterwards united into battalions, and these battalions into provisional regiments of 1200 or 1500 men. They were to have given them for the route, officers momentarily taken from the depôts, and organized as if they had been to form definitive regiments. Departing with this organization, and with their complete equipments, they had orders to halt in the places which were on the French line of operation, such as Erfurt, Halle, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Spandau, Custrin, and Frankfort on the Oder; to rest themselves there if they required it; to keep garrison if it was needful for the security of the French rear; and when they halted to proceed to military exercises, in order not to neglect the instruction of the men

during a journey of several months. They thus covered the communications of the army, disposed to become weakened by too great a number of garrisons left in the rear, and augmented in some sort its effective force before having been able to join it.

Arrived at the theatre of war, they were to be dissolved by each detachment being sent to its corps, and the officers were to return post to their depôts, in order to seek other recruits.

The same organization was applied to the cavalry, with some particular precautions demanded by the nature of that arm.

In all the places converted into grand depôts, such as Wurtzburg, Erfurt, Wittenberg, and Spandau, orders were given to collect, through the resources which the country presented, shoes, arms, and provisions in abundance. It was given in orders to the commandants of those places, to inspect every provisionary regiment that passed; to provide arms and clothes for the men that wanted them, and to retain such as had need of rest. The corps that passed at a later period, were to collect the men left on the road by those who had preceded them; and finding as many men and horses as they lost themselves, they were always sure to arrive complete at the theatre of war. Napoleon, assiduously reading the reports of the commandants of the places traversed by the provisionary regiments, compared them continually between each other, rectified the least negligence, and by that means kept all on the alert. It required no less than such combinations, supported by such vigilance, to preserve entire so great an army separated by such vast distances.

Napoleon would not only maintain the corps to the effective strength which they had when entering on the campaign; he was for drawing new corps towards the grand army. He had left, as has been seen, three regiments at Paris, in order to form a reserve, which might be transported post to the coasts of France if they were threatened. He believed he might dispose of two of those regiments, the fifty-eighth of the line and the fifteenth light, thanks to the considerable augmentation of the conscripts at the depôts. There were at Paris six third battalions, which belonged to regiments of four battalions. The conscription would carry each of them up to a strength of 1000 men each. Junot, governor of Paris, had the order to pass them in review himself several times a week, and to make them manœuvre under his own eyes. There was a reserve of 6000 men always ready to set out post for Boulogne, Cherburg, or Brest, which permitted him to dispose, without inconvenience, of the fifty-eighth of the line and the fifteenth light. These two regiments, that were accounted among the finest of the army, were sent forward on the Elbe by Wesel and Westphalia.

It will be remembered, that Napoleon had resolved to convert the vélites into fusileers of the guard. Thanks to the prompt execution of what he had ordered, a regiment of two battalions, raised to 1400 men, of which the soldiers had been selected with care from the annual contingent, and the officers and sub-officers of which had been taken from the guard, had been already completed. Napoleon ordered them to be retained exactly the time necessary for their instruction, and that then they should be sent post from Paris to Mayence.

The guard of the capital was as now entrusted to a municipal force, two regiments strong, known under the name of the "Regiments of the Guard of Paris." Napoleon had recommended the utmost possible augmentation of the effective strength of these two regiments, while enforcing the last conscription. Receiving the price of his foresight, he was able now, without too much stripping Paris, to take two battalions, which presented a regiment of 1200 or 1300 men of an excellent bearing and quality. He ordered them to march for the army, thinking that troops intended to maintain order at home, should not be deprived of the power to contribute to the greatness of their country abroad, and that they would return better and more respected.

The workmen at the ports were without employment and without food, because the naval constructions languished in the midst of the immense development given to the continental war. Napoleon found for them pay and a useful occupation. He composed of them battalions of infantry, that were charged with guarding the ports to which they belonged, with the promise that they should not be made to leave them. They were able to be relied upon, because they had an affection for the establishments committed to their vigilance, and they further partook of the warlike spirit of the navy. Napoleon was indebted to this idea for the power of taking into active service from the coasts, three fine regiments, the nineteenth, fifteenth, and thirty-first of the line, which were at Boulogne, Brest, and St. Lô. They were, as the other battalions, carried up to 2000 men for the two battalions, and sent forward to the grand army.

There were, therefore, seven new regiments of infantry, able to furnish the foundation of a fine *corps d'armée*, that Napoleon had the art to draw from France without too much weakening the interior. To these regiments was to be joined the legion of the north, full of Poles, that already was in march towards Germany.

That which before all things seemed desirable to Napoleon, and of which he fully appreciated the utility, perhaps even to exaggeration, at the moment when he went from the plains of Prussia and entered upon those of Poland, was the cavalry. He called for that force pressingly upon all the administrators of the army. He had drawn from Mayence and marched on foot, part towards Hesse and part towards Prussia, all the cavalry they had instructed in the depôts there. He desired that they should leave their horses in France, to give them those which had been collected in Germany. Marshal Mortier, on entering into the states of the elector of Hesse, had broken up the army of that prince. They had taken 4000 or 5000 excellent horses, of which a part had served to mount on the spot 1000 French horsemen, and the others had been sent forward to Potsdam. There existed at Potsdam vast stables, constructed by the great Frederick, who often amused himself by seeing a great number of squadrons manœuvre together in that fine retreat, where the king, philosopher, and soldier then lived. Napoleon created under the cannon of Spandau an immense establishment for the accommodation of his cavalry. He united

there all the horses taken from the enemy, and a great quantity more bought in the different provinces of Prussia. General Bourcier, who had left the active army after most honourable services, was placed at the head of the depôt, with the recommendation not to be absent for a moment, and to take care, under his own eyes, of the numerous horses that they had assembled there; to mount on these horses the cavalry coming on foot from France; to halt them, marching through Prussia; to pass them in review; to replace the tired horses, or those which were not in a state to serve; and to retain as well the men who might be sick, in order to send them with the regiments which should follow. The workmen of Berlin, remaining idle by the departure of the court and nobility, were to be employed for pay at this depôt, in saddlery work, harness, shoes, and carriage-making.

It was, above all, in Italy that Napoleon had recourse to procure his cavalry. In no place were they less useful. At Naples they had nothing to do, except with the Calabrese mountaineers, or the English disembarked from their vessels and destitute of horse. There were at Naples sixteen regiments of cavalry, of which some were cuirassiers, and the finest in the army. Napoleon ordered ten to march back towards Upper Italy. He left there six only, which were all light cavalry, and of which he was able to carry the effective force to 1000 men each, thanks to the great number of conscripts sent beyond the Alps. They would, therefore, present a force of 6000 men, furnishing 4000 cavalry always ready to mount on horseback, and fully sufficient for the service of observation which they had to perform in the kingdom of Naples.

The channelled plains of Lombardy, in which the canals, the rivers, and the long avenues of trees, rendered the movements of cavalry so difficult, did not constitute a country where cavalry was highly necessary. Besides ten regiments of this species of force, brought from the south to the north of Italy, permitted the detachment of some to be directed towards the grand army. Napoleon drew thence a division of cuirassiers, forming four superb regiments, that rendered themselves illustrious afterwards under the command of general Espagne. He further drew of the light cavalry, and made, successively, depart for Germany, the nineteenth, twenty-fourth, fifteenth, third, and twenty-fourth regiments of chasseurs, which made, with the four regiments of cuirassiers, nine regiments of cavalry borrowed from Italy. This was a force of 5000 cavalry at least, marching part with their horses and part on foot; these last were intended to be remounted in Germany.

Napoleon employed himself at the same time in placing the army of Italy upon the war footing. He had had the care to send it 20,000 men of the conscription of 1806, and he had recommended it to prince Eugene to give to their instruction continual attention. Ready to plunge into the north, leaving in his rear Austria, more alarmed, but more hostile since the battle of Jena, he desired that they should proceed, without retardation, in the formation of the active divisions, in such a manner that they would be in a state to enter immediately upon a campaign. Already he had in Friuli two divisions organized. He ordered the completion of the artillery to twelve pieces for each division. He ordered to be placed upon a war footing a division at Verona, one at Brescia, a third at Alexandria, each nine or ten battalions strong, to prepare their artillery, to compose their equipments, and to nominate their staff. He acted the same towards the cavalry. He enjoined it upon them to render complete, in men as well as in horses, the regiments of dragoons drawn from Naples, and to provide them besides with a division of light artillery. These five divisions counted together 45,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, in all 52,000 present under arms. This force, increased in case of need by the corps of Marmont and a part of the army of Naples, would suffice, in the hand of such a man as Massena, to stop the Austrians, above all supported on such fortresses as those of Palma-Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, and Alexandria. Napoleon ordered the establishment in Venice of eight battalions of depôt of the army of Dalmatia; in Osopo and Palma-Nova the seven corps of Friuli; in Peschiera, Legnago, and Mantua, the fourteen of the army of Naples. Each of those battalions already included more than 1000 men, since the contingent of 1806, and was about to contain 1100 or 1200 by the arrival of the contingent of 1807. It therefore became easy to draw from them companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers, and to compose with these excellent active divisions. Such was the fruit of a vigilance which never relaxed. Napoleon ordered further, that the provisioning of the fortresses should be completed without delay.

Thus in limiting himself to the development of the vast precautionary plan adopted at his departure from Paris, Napoleon placed France out of the reach of all insult on the part of the English, guaranteed Italy from any sudden hostility on the part of the Austrians, and, without disorganizing the means of defence, either of the one or the other, he drew from the first seven regiments of infantry, and from the second nine regiments of cavalry, independently of provisionary regiments, that, continually departing from the Rhine, would secure the recruiting of the grand army and the security of his rear.

The reinforcements that in one month went to increase the grand army, might be estimated at 50,000 men. With the corps which had already joined since its entrance into Prussia, and which had carried it to about 190,000 men, with those that were preparing to join with the German auxiliaries, Dutch, and Italians, it would be raised nearly to 300,000 men: but such is the inevitable dispersion of troops, even under the direction of the most able general, that in deducting from these 300,000 men the wounded and sick, become more numerous in winter and in distant climates, the detachments on the march, the garrisons left on the road, and the corps placed in observation, it was impossible to flatter himself with placing more than 150,000 under fire. So much was it necessary that the resources should surpass the necessity foreseen, in order to suffice only for the real need. And if this observation be extended to the whole of the forces of France in 1806, it will be seen, that with a total army, which would be raised for the whole empire to 580,000 men, to 650,000

with the auxiliaries, 300,000 at most could be present on the theatre of war between the Rhine and the Vistula, 150,000 on the Vistula itself, and 80,000, perhaps, on the fields of battle, where the fate of the world was to be decided. Still never had so many men and horses marched, so many cannon been wheeled along, with such a strength of aggregation, towards the same object.

It was not all to unite the soldiers, financial resources were necessary in order to provide for them all of which they stood in need. Napoleon, having succeeded, as has been seen, in carrying to 700,000,000 (820,000,000 with the expense of collection) his war-budget, had the means in his power of maintaining an army of 450,000 men. But he would soon have to pay 600,000. He resolved to draw from the conquered countries the resources which were necessary for the purpose of paying his new armaments. Possessor of Hesse, Westphalia, Hanover, the Hanseatic cities, Mecklenburg, and Prussia itself, he was able, without the charge of inhumanity, to raise contributions on these different countries. He had left the Prussian authorities every where in existence, and placed at their head General Clarke to administer the policy of the country, and M. Daru the business of the finances. The last, capable, upright, and attentive, was endowed with the financial business, and knew it as well as the best Prussian officials. The monarchy of Frederick-William, composed at this period of Eastern Prussia, that extended from Kœnigsberg to Stettin; of Prussian Poland, of Silesia, Brandenburg, the provinces to the left of the Elbe; of Westphalia, and of the territory inclosed in Franconia, was able to return to its government about 120,000,000f[1]. The expenses of collection were acquitted in the productions themselves; the greater part of the army satisfied by means of local duties; the maintenance of the roads secured by certain impresses imposed upon the farmers of the domains of the crown. In this 120,000,000f. of revenue, the forced contributions figured for 35,000,000f. or 36,000,000f.; the farming of the domains of the crown for 18,000,000f.; the produce of the excise, which consisted in duties upon liquors, and on the transit of merchandize, for 50,000,000f., and the monopoly of salt for 9,000,000f. or 10,000,000f.; different accessory imposts completed the sum of 120,000,000f. Official persons, united in provincial committees, under the name of "the Chambers of the Domains and of War," managed these imposts and revenues, watching over their assessment, their collection, and the farming of the numerous domains of the crown.

Napoleon decided that this administration should continue even with its abuses, which M. Daru soon discovered, and which he pointed out to the Prussian government itself to aid in their correction; that near each provincial administration there should be a French agent, ordered to hold in hand the collection of the revenue, and turn it over into the central chest of the French army. M. Daru would watch over these agents, and centralize their operations. Thus the finances of Prussia were to be administered on account of Napoleon and to his profit. Henceforth they foresaw that the annual produce of 120,000,000f. would fall to 70,000,000f. or 80,000,000f. in consequence of existing circumstances. Napoleon, using his right of conquest, did not content himself with the ordinary imposts; he decreed besides a war contribution; that for the whole of Prussia would amount to 200,000,000f.: it would be collected by little and little, during the time of the occupation, and above the ordinary imposts. Napoleon also levied a war contribution upon Hesse, Brunswick, Hanover, and the Hanseatic towns, independently of the seizure of English merchandize.

At this rate the army would be able to provide for itself, and consume nothing without paying for it. The numerous purchases of horses, immense orders for clothing, shoes, harness, and artillery-carriages, made in all the towns, but more particularly in Berlin, with the view of occupying the workmen, and to provide for the necessities of the French army, all were paid for out of the product of the ordinary and extraordinary contributions.

These contributions, no doubt very heavy, were still the least vexatious mode of exercising the right of war, which authorized the vanquisher to live upon the conquered country, since for the waste made by the soldiery the regular collection of taxes was substituted. For the rest, the most severe discipline, the most perfect respect for private property, save the ravage committed on fields of battle, happily reserved for a very few places, compensated these inevitable severities of war, and, most assuredly, on looking into the past, it will be seen that never did armies comport themselves with less barbarity and with so much humanity.

Napoleon, disposed from political motives to temporize with the court of Saxony, had offered it an armistice and peace after the battle of Jena. This court, timid and honest, had accepted with joy such an act of clemency, and delivered itself over to the discretion of the conqueror. Napoleon, being agreeable to admit it into the new Rhenish confederation, changed into the title of king that of elector which its sovereign had before borne, on the condition of a military contingent of 20,000 men, reduced this time to 6000, in consideration of particular circumstances. This extension of the confederation of the Rhine presented the greatest advantages, because it insured to the French army a free passage across Germany, and the possession of all the line of the Elbe. To compensate the charges of a military occupation, which were spared to Saxony by this treaty, she promised to pay a contribution of 25,000,000f. in metal, or in bills of exchange at a short date.

Napoleon was able to dispose, therefore, for the period of the war, of 300,000,000f. at least. Carrying his foresight to the longest term, he would not permit the administration of his treasury at home to rest quiet on trust of the resources found in Germany. There was due to the grand army 24,000,000f. of arrears of pay. Napoleon demanded that this sum should be deposited in specie, a part at Strasburg and a part at Paris; because he was not willing that at any pressing moment they should be obliged to run after the money which would have been locked up for a time more or less long. He thus left it in deposit

[1] The revenue of Prussia, in 1840, was about 199,000,000f., an increase of 79,000,000f.—Translator.

at Paris and on the Rhine, safe for later use; and he provisionally had the arrears of the troops paid out of the revenues of the conquered countries, in order that the soldiers might have the money owing, while they were still in the Prussian towns, and that they might be able to procure the enjoyments which they could only find in the midst of a large population.

All these dispositions terminated, General Clarke left at Berlin to administer the political government of Prussia, and M. Daru that of the finances, Napoleon moved his columns forward to enter Poland.

The king of Prussia had not accepted the armistice proposed, because the conditions were too rigorous, and also because he had been made to wait too long. Rejoined by Duroc at Osterode in Old Prussia, he replied, that in despite of his sincere desire to suspend the course of a disastrous war, he could not consent to the sacrifices demanded of him; that in requiring, besides that part of the territory already invaded, the province of Posen, and the line of the Vistula, he was left without territory and without resources, and, above all, Poland was delivered at once to inevitable insurrection; that he, therefore, was resigned to a continuance of the war; that he acted thus from necessity, and also from a fidelity to his engagements,—because, having called in the Russians, it was impossible to send them back after the appeal which had been addressed to them, and which they had answered with the utmost cordiality.

Vainly did M. Haugwitz and M. Lucchesini, who had for a moment partaken in the general vertigo of the Prussian nation, and been brought back to reason by misfortune, vainly did they unite their efforts to have the armistice accepted, such as it was, by saying, that if it was refused, Napoleon would go and conquer it in fifteen days; that they would lose the occasion to arrest the war and its ravages; that if they treated now, they should lose, beyond a doubt, the provinces situated on the left of the Elbe; but that, if they treated later, they would lose with those provinces Poland itself. Vainly did M. Haugwitz and M. Lucchesini give this advice; their tardy wisdom obtained no credit. In reaching Kœnigsberg, the court had approached Russian influence; the misfortune which had calmed the wiser heads, had, on the contrary, exalted those devoid of reason; and the war party, in place of imputing to itself the reverses of Prussia, attributed them to the pretended treasons of the party that was for peace. The queen, irritated by her grief, insisted more than ever that they should tempt the fortune of arms anew, with what remained of the Prussian forces, with the support of the Russians, and with the favour of distance, which were a great advantage for the vanquished and disadvantage for the victor. M. Haugwitz and M. Lucchesini, deprived of all influence, pursued by unjust accusations, and sometimes assailed with outrage, demanded and obtained their dismission. The king, more equitable than the court, granted it with great regret, above all for M. Haugwitz, of whom he had not ceased to appreciate the judgment and to feel the long services, and whose counsels he was sorry he had not followed.

The Russians were, in fact, arrived upon the Niemen. A first corps of 50,000 men, commanded by General Benningsen, had passed the Niemen on the first of November, and had advanced to the Vistula. A second, of equal force, conducted by General Buxhoewden, followed the first. A reserve was organized under General Essen. A part of the troops of General Michelson ascended the Dneister to enter Poland. Still the imperial guard had not yet quitted Petersburg. A cloud of cossacks moved out of the desert preceded the regular troops. Such were the forces of this vast empire, actually disposable, for the second time showing that their resources were not yet equal to their pretensions. Joined to the Prussians, and waiting the reserve of General Essen, the Russians were able to present themselves upon the Vistula only to the number of 120,000 men. There was nothing in that to embarrass Napoleon, if the climate had not given to the soldiers of the north a formidable aid. By the climate, must not be understood alone the cold, but the soil, the difficulty of marching, and of living in those immense plains, alternately muddy or sandy, and covered more with woods than cultivation.

The English, it is true, promised a powerful co-operation in money, *materiel*, and even in men. They announced disembarkations on different points of France and Germany, and more particularly an expedition into Swedish Pomerania, in the rear of the French army. They had effectively a spot of ground very commodious for such a purpose in the inundated fortress of Stralsund, situated on the last point of land of the German continent. That point was guarded by the Swedes, and quite prepared to receive the English troops in an asylum well nigh inviolable. But it was probable that the desire to seize the rich colonies of Holland and Spain, badly defended at that moment, on account of the prior occupations of the continental war, absorbed the attention and forces of the English. A last resource, much more vain still than that which was founded on the expectation of the English, formed the complement of the means of the coalition, that was the supposed intervention of Austria. They flattered themselves, that if a single success crowned the efforts of the Prussians and Russians, Austria would declare itself in their favour; and they almost counted in the effective of the belligerent troops, the 80,000 Austrians, actually united in Bohemia and Gallicia.

All this gave Napoleon little uneasiness, who had never been more full of confidence and pride. The refusal of the armistice had neither surprised nor annoyed him. "Your majesty," he wrote to the king of Prussia, "has declared to me that you have flung yourself into the arms of the Russians: the future will make known whether you have chosen the best and most efficacious side: you have taken the box and play the dice,—the dice will decide the game."

The following were the dispositions of Napoleon for penetrating into Poland. He had nothing immediate to dread on the side of the Austrians; his general preparations in France as in Italy, and his oriental diplomacy, stopped all that he had reason to dread in those directions. The disembarkations of the English and the Swedes in Pomerania, tending to raise Prussia, already humiliated and suffering, in his rear, presented more serious danger. However, he did not even attach any great im-

portance to that danger, because he wrote his brother Louis, who importuned him with his alarms, that the English had a better thing to do than to disembark in France, Holland, or Pomerania. They loved better to pillage the colonies of all nations, than to attempt descents from which they could draw no other advantage than that of being shamefully driven into the sea. Napoleon believed, more or less, one thing—that the Swedes had 12,000 or 15,000 men at Stralsund. In any case, the eighth corps, confided to Marshal Mortier, was ordered to provide for such events as might occur. This corps, which had had for its first mission to occupy Hesse, and unite the grand army with the Rhine, had, now that Hesse was disarmed, to keep down Prussia, and guard the coast of Germany. It was composed of four divisions; one Dutch, become vacant by the return of king Louis to Holland; one Italian, marching by Hesse towards Hanover; and the French, which were completing with a part of the regiments newly drawn from France. A part of these troops were to besiege the Hanoverian fortress of Hameln, remaining in the hands of the Prussians, another to occupy the Hanseatic towns. The remainder, established in the direction of Stralsund and Anklam, was designed to drive back the Swedes into Stralsund, if they came out, or to march upon Berlin, if, in an access of despair, the people of that capital should revolt.

General Clarke had orders to concert with marshal Mortier, in order to meet all these accidents. There was not a single musket left in Berlin; all the military *materiel* having been transported to Spandau. Sixteen hundred burgesses furnished the guard of Berlin with eight hundred muskets, which were transmitted to them, not having on guard but eight hundred men at a time. General Clarke, if he encountered a movement of any importance, would withdraw into Spandau, and there await marshal Mortier. The vast depôt of cavalry, established at Potsdam, could always furnish 1000 horse to serve as patrols, and to seize the solitary men that wandered up and down the country since the dispersion of the Prussian army. This foresight had been carried so far as to search the woods in order to collect the cannon that the Prussians had hidden in their flight, and to secure them in the strong fortresses. The corps of marshal Davout, which had entered Berlin before all the others, had had time to rest itself. Napoleon marched it first upon Custrin, and from Custrin upon the capital of the grand duchy of Posen. The corps of marshal Augereau, that reached Berlin second, and was also sufficiently rested, was sent by Custrin and Landsberg on the Netze, the road to the Vistula, with the order to march to the left of marshal Davout. More to the left still marshal Lannes, who had been stationed at Stettin since the capitulation of Prenzlow, having refreshed his troops a little in that place, reinforced by the 28th light, provided with great coats and shoes, had orders to carry provisions for eight days, to cross the Oder, to pass by Stargard and Schneidmühl, and to unite with Augereau on the Netze. It need not be observed that he was not to quit Stettin without having put that fortress into a state of defence. The indefatigable Murat, finally, leaving his cavalry to return by short marches from Lubeck, had orders to go in person to Berlin, and there to take command of the cuirassiers, which had been resting during the time that the dragoons had been pursuing the Prussians; to join to the cuirassiers the dragoons of Beaumont and of Klein, that had been less advanced than the others in pursuit of the enemy, and besides were remounted with fresh horses from the depôt at Potsdam. Murat, with this cavalry, was to join marshal Davout at Posen, to precede him towards Warsaw, and to place himself at the head of all the troops directed towards Poland, until Napoleon came to command them himself. The Russians were yet very far from the Vistula; Napoleon had time to forward his numerous affairs at Berlin, and thus left to his brother-in-law the task of commencing the movement in Poland, and sounding the insurrectional disposition of the Poles. No one could be more proper than Murat to excite their enthusiasm, and to partake it himself.

While the French army, passing the Oder, advanced upon the Vistula, Prince Jerome, having the Wirtemberghers and Bavarians under his command, seconded by an able and vigorous officer, general Vandamme, was to invade Silesia, and besiege the fortresses, to carry a part of the troops as far as Kalisch, and thus to cover, against Austria, the right of the corps which marched upon Posen.

The troops directed upon Poland might amount to about 80,000 men, among which the corps of marshal Davout numbered 23,000, that of marshal Augereau 17,000, that of marshal Lannes 18,000; the detachment of Prince Jerome, sent to Kalisch, 14,000; and, finally, the reserve of cavalry of Murat, 9000 or 10,000. It was more than would be needful to face the Russian and Prussian forces that they were exposed to encounter at the first moment.

In this interval, the corps of marshals Soult and Bernadotte were on the march from Lubeck upon Berlin. They were to sojourn some time in that capital to refresh themselves, and to be provided with what might be wanting. Marshal Ney was to come there after the capitulation of Magdeburg, and prepare himself to march upon the Oder. Napoleon, with the imperial guard, the division of grenadiers, and voltigeurs of general Oudinot, with the rest of the reserve of cavalry, which was at Berlin, adding the three corps of marshals Soult, Bernadotte, and Ney, would make a second army of 80,000 men, at the head of which he would himself march into Poland, to sustain the movement of the first.

Marshal Davout, first directed upon Poland, was a firm, reflecting man, from whom there was no imprudence to be apprehended. He had been instructed as to the real idea of Napoleon, relative to Poland. Napoleon had frankly resolved to repair the serious injury that the abolition of that ancient kingdom had caused to Europe; but he did not dissimulate the enormous difficulty of reconstituting a state destroyed; above all, with a people whose anarchical spirit was as notorious as their bravery. He would not therefore engage in such an enterprise, but upon conditions which should render the success, if not certain, at least sufficiently probable. It was necessary, at first, to have striking triumphs in advancing among the

plains of the North, where Charles XII. had met his ruin; it was necessary for him, afterwards, to have a unanimous feeling, on the part of the Poles, a concurrence in his triumphs, and thus an assurance of the solidity of the new state that he should found between those powerful enemies, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. "When I shall see the Poles all up," he said to marshal Davout, "then I will proclaim their independence; but not before." He had a convoy of arms of all kinds carried after the French troops, in order to arm the insurrection, if, as announced, it should become general.

Marshal Davout, advancing the *corps d'armée* which was to depart from the Oder, set himself in movement during the first days of November. It marched with that order, that severe discipline, which he had been accustomed to maintain among his troops. He had announced to his soldiers that, in entering Poland, they entered into a friendly country, and that it was necessary to treat it as such. There had got, as has been already said, a certain want of discipline into the ranks of the light cavalry, which takes the larger part and contributes most to the disorders of war. Two soldiers of this army having committed certain excesses, marshal Davout ordered them to be shot in the presence of the third corps.

He advanced upon Posen in three divisions. The country between the Oder and Vistula much resembles that which extends from the Elbe to the Oder. Generally, the road lies over sandy plains, in the midst of which wood springs up easily, above all resinous wood, and particularly the pine; and below this bed of sand, lies a soil proper for cultivation, sometimes drowned beneath the sand itself, sometimes rising to the surface. There are also encountered, in the midst of pine forests, vast places cleared, tolerably cultivated, and in these cleared places a scanty population, poor, but robust, sheltered by the wood and cottage. To this soil succeeds a clay, in which all sinks deeply where the water has penetrated, and the whole is changed, after a few days' rain, into one vast sea of mud. Men perish there, if they are not taken out, and as to horses, cannon, and baggage, they are carried into the abyss without the chance of being saved, even by the strength of a whole army. Thus war is not practicable in this portion of the northern plain, except in summer, when the ground is entirely dry, or in winter, when a frost of many degrees of cold has given to the soil the consistency of stone. But every intermediate season is fatal to military combinations, above all, to the most able ones, which, as it is well known, depend upon rapidity of movement.

These physical characters do not show themselves in union until the Vistula is approached, and, above all, beyond it, between the Vistula and the Niemen. Still they begin to be visible near the Oder. One phenomenon, peculiar to these vast plains, that has already been pointed out, and which is found here, is that the sands, elevated in downs along the sea shore, throw back the waters towards the interior of the country, where they form numerous lakes, discharging themselves in small streams, that then unite into larger ones, till these again accumulate, and become vast rivers, such as the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula, capable of opening an outlet across the sandy barriers. In Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, that is to say, between the Elbe and the Oder, the country that had been the theatre of the pursuit of the Prussians by the French army, peculiarities of this nature have been already remarked. They become more striking between the Oder and the Vistula. The sands rise, and retain the waters, that by the Netze, and the Warta, seek an outlet towards the Oder. The Netze comes to the left, the Warta to the right, in marching from Berlin to Warsaw; and after having circulated both one and the other, between the Vistula and Oder, they unite in a single bed, and join the Oder together towards Custrin. The country along the sea forms that called Prussian Pomerania, and is German in inhabitants and feelings. The interior, watered by the Netze and the Warta, is marshy, clayey, well enough cultivated, and Sclavonian, in regard to inhabitants. This is Pomerania, of which Posen is the capital, a town of some importance, situated on the Warta itself.

This was that province in which the Polish spirit displayed itself with the most ardour. The Poles, become Prussians, seemed to support more impatiently than the others the stranger's yoke. At first the German race and the Sclavonian, who encountered on this frontier of Pomerania and the duchy of Posen, had for each other an instinctive aversion, naturally more strong on the limit where they came in contact. Independently of this aversion, the common result of vicinity, the Poles never forgot that the Prussians had been, under the great Frederick, the first authors of the scheme for the partition of Poland; that since they had acted with the blackest perfidy, and completed the ruin of their country, after favouring the insurrection. In fine, the sight of Warsaw in the hands of the Prussians, rendered them the most odious of the co-partners in the iniquity. These sentiments of hatred were pushed to such a point, that the Poles would have nearly regarded it as their deliverance to escape from the king of Prussia, and belong to the emperor of Russia, who, uniting under the same sceptre all the Polish provinces, would proclaim himself king of Poland. The inclination to revolt was therefore more clearly pronounced in the duchy of Posen than in any other part of Poland.

Such was, under all relations, physical and moral, the country which the French traversed at that moment. Transported under a climate so different from that of their birth, so different, before all, from the climates of Egypt and Italy, where they had lived for so long a time; they were, as usual, gay, confident, and found, even in the novelty of the country which they overran, the subject of piquant pleasantry, more than of bitter regret. Besides, their good reception by the inhabitants indemnified them for all their troubles; since, on all the roads and in the villages, the peasants ran to encounter them, offering them the provisions and liquors of the country.

But it is not in the country, it is among the congregated population, that is to say, in the heart of the cities, that the vivacity of patriotic enthusiasm is most striking. At Posen the different moral dispositions of the Poles manifested themselves in

a more lively manner than elsewhere. This city, which contained 15,000 souls, now contained nearly double that number, by the influx of inhabitants from the neighbouring provinces, who had come in advance of those who were to render them free. It was on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of November, that the three divisions of the corps of Davout entered Posen. They were received with such transports of enthusiasm, that even the stern marshal was affected, and he himself yielded to the idea of the re-establishment of Poland ; an idea popular in the mass of the French army, but very little so among its chiefs. Then it was he wrote to the emperor letters strongly impressed with the sentiments that broke forth around him.

He told the Poles that, in order to reconstitute their country, it was needful for Napoleon to have the certainty of an immense effort on their part at first, to aid in bringing about great successes, successes without which he would not be able to impose upon Europe the re-establishment of Poland ; successes necessary, afterwards, to inspire him with some confidence in the duration of the work which he went to undertake, a work very difficult, when it concerned the restoration of a state destroyed for forty years, and degenerated for more than a century. The Poles of Posen, more enthusiastic even than those of Warsaw, promised, with full consent, all that seemed to be desired of them. Nobles, priests, and people, expressed their wish with ardour to be delivered from the German yoke, antipathetic as it was to their religion, manners, and race ; and at this price there was nothing which they were not ready to do. Marshal Davout had not yet more than 3000 muskets to give them ; he immediately distributed these among the people, who were demanding to have them by thousands, and affirming that, whatever was the number, there would be arms found to carry them. The people formed two battalions of infantry, the nobles and their vassals squadrons of cavalry. In all the towns situated between the upper Warta and the upper Oder, the population, at the approach of prince Jerome, drove away the Prussian authorities, and would not have given them even the favour of life, but that the French troops every where prevented violences and excesses. From Glogau to Kalisch, the route of prince Jerome, the insurrection was general.

There was a provisional authority established at Posen, with which measures were concerted for the sustenance of the French army during its passage. It could not become a question to impose war contributions upon Poland. It was intended that it should be held clear of the charges imposed upon conquered countries, on condition that it should join its strength to that of the French, and that it should grant them a part of the grain with which it was so abundantly provided. The new Polish authorities concerted with marshal Davout the construction of ovens, the collection of corn, forage, and cattle. The zeal of the people, and some funds seized in the Prussian coffers, sufficed for the first preparations. All was thus disposed to receive the main body of the French army, and, above all, its chief, whom they awaited with lively curiosity and ardent hopes.

About the same time marshal Augereau had marched on the border which separates Posnia from Pomerania, leaving the Warta to the right, and keeping himself to the left, the length of the Netze. He passed by Landsberg, Driesen, and Schneidmühl, across a country, melancholy, poor, very moderately peopled, and unable to give very expressive signs of liveliness. Marshal Augereau encountered nothing calculated to raise his imagination, had much trouble to march at all, and would have had yet more trouble to exist, without a convoy of caissons, which transported the bread for his men. In the environs of Nackel, the waters cease to run towards the Oder, and begin to run towards the Vistula. A canal joins the Netze with the Vistula, departing from Nackel, and ending at the town of Bromberg, which is the entrepôt of the commerce of the country. The corps of Augereau found there some comforts after their fatigues.

Marshal Lannes advanced by Stettin, Stargard, Deutsch-Krone, Schneidmühl, Nackel, and Bromberg, flanking the march of the column of Augereau, as he, in turn, flanked the march of the corps of Davout. He thus also passed along the limits of the German and Polish countries, and over difficult ground, yet more melancholy than that which had been marched over by marshal Augereau. He saw the Germans hostile, the Poles timid, and, comparing the impressions which he received from a savage and desert country, with the intelligence he gathered relating to the Poles, in a country that was not favourable to them, he was led to regard it as a work of temerity, and even folly, to attempt the re-establishment of Poland. This officer has been already spoken of, as well as his rare qualities, and his defects. He must be spoken of yet oftener, in the history of a period during which he lavished so much of his noble life. Lannes, impetuous in his feelings, on that account unequal in character, inclined to ill-humour, even towards the master he loved, was among those whom the sun, by hiding or showing himself, depressed and elevated by turns. But, never losing his heroic temperament, he found again, amid danger, that calm strength, of which suffering and contrariness had for a moment deprived him. One should not be just towards this superior soldier if it were not added here, that a grand foundation of good sense was joined in him to an inequality of temper; which made him censure in Napoleon a spirit of immoderate enterprize, and he often uttered sinister prophecies, in the midst of the most glorious triumphs of the French. After the success of the war with Prussia, he had a strong wish that they should stop upon the Oder, and he did not impose the least restraint upon the expression of his opinion. Reaching Bromberg after a painful march, he wrote to Napoleon, that he had gone over a sandy, sterile country, without inhabitants, comparable, save in the sky, to the desert that must be crossed to go to Egypt from Syria ; that the soldiery was melancholy, attacked with fever, owing to the wetness of the soil and the humidity of the season; that the Poles were little disposed to revolt, and trembled under the yoke of their masters ; that he must not judge of their dispositions by the factitious enthusiasm of some of the nobles, drawn to Posen by the love of tumult and

novelty; that at bottom they were always frivolous, divided, anarchical, and that, in wishing to reconstitute the body of the nation, the French would uselessly waste their blood in a work without solidity and without endurance.

Napoleon remained at Berlin until the last days of November, received without being astonished the contradictory reports of his lieutenants, and awaited until the result of the movement produced by the presence of the French had gone abroad into all the Polish provinces, in order to form an opinion himself in regard to the re-establishment of Poland, and resolve himself either to traverse that country as a field of battle, or to elevate upon its soil a grand political edifice. He made Murat depart, after having anew specified to him the conditions that he intended to make in the restoration of Poland, and the instructions that he desired should be followed in marching upon Warsaw.

The Russians had arrived upon the Vistula, and had taken possession of Warsaw. The last Prussian corps which remained to Frederick William, placed under the orders of general Lestocq, an officer as wise as brave, was established at Thorn, having garrisons at Graudenz and Dantzick. Napoleon desired that, in approaching Warsaw, the different corps of the French army should close up one to the other, in order that, with a mass of 80,000 men, a force greatly superior to all that the Russians were able to unite at the same point, his lieutenants should be beyond the chance of any check. He recommended them not to seek and not to accept battle, at least not unless they were very superior to the enemy; to advance with great precaution, and all to support themselves on the right, and thus cover themselves with the Austrian frontier. At this period the Pilica, on the left bank of the Vistula, and the Narew on the right bank, both emptied themselves into the Vistula near Warsaw, forming the Austrian frontier. In keeping up, therefore, to the right, departing from Posen, as they approached the Pilica and Narew, they were covered on every side by the neutrality of Austria. If the Russians wished to take the offensive, they could not do it but by passing the Vistula on the French left, in the environs of Thorn, and then, in drawing themselves back on the left, they obtained one of these three results, either to throw them on the Vistula, force them back to the sea, or push them with the bayonet upon the second French army in march towards Posen. It must be added for the rest, that if Napoleon, contrary to his custom, did not present himself this time in one sole mass before the enemy, which would have cut short all difficulties, it was because he knew that the Russians were not 50,000 together, and because the extreme fatigue of a part of his troops, having gone as far as Prenzlow and Lubeck, obliged him to form two armies, one composed of those who were able to march immediately, the other of those who had need of some days' repose before they could be sent on the march. It is thus that circumstances entail variations in the application of the most uniform principles. It is the tact of the great general to modify this application with safety and at the suitable moment.

Napoleon therefore enjoined it upon marshal Davout to carry himself to the right, as he commanded the road from Posen to Warsaw; to pass by Sempolno, Klodawa, Kutno, Sochaczew, and Blonie; and to send his dragoons directly on the Vistula to Kowal, in order to give a hand to marshals Lannes and Augereau. Lannes, after compensating himself, in the midst of the abundance of Bromberg, for the privations of a long route across the sands, had taken his steps towards Augereau. He had orders to ascend the Vistula, and by his right to carry himself from Bromberg to Inowraclaw, Brezesc, and Kowal, defiling under the cannon of Thorn, and going to join himself to the corps of marshal Davout, of which he was to form the left. Marshal Augereau followed him a little after, and taking the same road, came up to form the left of Lannes.

On the 16th of November and the following days, marshal Davout, preceded by Murat, marched from Posen, where he left every thing in complete order, upon Sempolno, Klodawa, and Kutno. Lannes, after having quitted Bromberg, defiled in view of Thorn, and covering himself with the Vistula, found himself again entangled in the sands which generally prevail in that part of the course of this river, encountering, for the second time, sterility, dearth, and the desert, not at all more favourable than before for the war which they were going to undertake. He went by Kowal and Kutno to support the corps of marshal Davout. Augereau followed his track, partaking his impressions, as often happened, because he had with Lannes more analogy of character, although inferior in talent and in energy.

Murat and Davout, little tempted to give battle without the emperor, having besides orders to avoid it, advanced with great precaution as far as the environs of Warsaw. On the 27th of November, his light cavalry drove back from Blonie a detachment of the enemy, and showed themselves as far as the gates even of the capital. Every where they found the Russians in retreat, occupied in destroying the provisions, or transporting them to the right bank of the Vistula. In retiring they passed through Warsaw, which no longer appeared to them a place of security, in consequence of the approach of the French having made every heart there alive. They therefore repassed the Vistula, to shut themselves up in the suburb of Prague, situated, as is well known, on the other bank of the river. In repassing, they destroyed the bridge of Prague, and sunk to the bottom, or took with them, all the boats which could serve to form a means of passage across.

On the following day, Murat, at the head of a regiment of chasseurs and of the dragoons of Beaumont's division, entered Warsaw. On leaving Posen the people of the country and the small towns showed fewer demonstrations than at Posen, because they were constrained by the presence of the Russians. But with a large population the emotions are proportioned to the feeling of strength. All the inhabitants of Warsaw ran out beyond the walls of the town to meet the French. For a long time the Poles, by a secret instinct, regarded the victories of France as the victories of Poland itself. They had leaped with joy at the news of the battle of Austerlitz, gained so near the frontiers of Gallicia; and that of Jena, which seemed gained

on the road to Warsaw, the entrance of the French into Berlin, and the appearance of Davout on the Oder, had filled them with hope. They saw, in fact, the French, so renowned, thus expected, and at their head that brilliant general of cavalry, to-day a prince, to-morrow a king, who conducted their advanced guard with so much boldness and eclat. They praised with transport his good bearing, his heroic countenance on horseback, and saluted him with cries a thousand times repeated, of "Long live the emperor! Long live the French!" There was a general delirium among all classes of the people. This time the resurrection of Poland might be considered a little less chimerical, on seeing appear the grand army, that, under the great captain, had vanquished all the armies of Europe. The delight was lively, deep, and without reserve, among this unhappy people, so long the victim of the ambition of the northern courts, and the faint-heartedness of those of the South; it told them that at last the hour was come when the emperor of the French would make up for the feebleness of the kings of France! The Russians had destroyed the provisions every where, but the impulse of the Poles supplied them. They disputed with each other for the lodging and feeding the French officers and soldiers.

Two days after, the infantry of marshal Davout, which had not been able to keep up with the cavalry, entered Warsaw. There were the same enthusiasm, and the same demonstrations, at the appearance of those old bands of Awerstadt, Austerlitz, and Marengo. All appeared glorious at that first moment, when every foresight of the difficulties was, as it seemed, stifled in joy and hope.

Napoleon thought with sincerity, as has been already stated, of the restoration of Poland. It was, in his idea, one of the most useful means, and the best intended, to renew that Europe of which he so desired to change the face. When in effect he created new kingdoms, to form a support to his young empire, nothing was more natural than to reinstate the most brilliant and the most regretted of the kingdoms destroyed. But besides the difficulty of exacting great sacrifices of territory from Russia and Prussia,—sacrifices it was not possible to impose upon them without beating them utterly and entirely,—there was with this another difficulty, in taking the Gallicias from Austria; and if these provinces were left out,—if he were content to renew Poland, with two-thirds of the ancient territory,—he ran still the serious risk of inspiring the cabinet of Vienna, by this reconstitution of Poland, with a redoubling of its jealousy, its hatred, and its ill will, and perhaps of bringing an Austrian army upon the rear of the French. Napoleon, therefore, would only make conditional engagements with the Poles; and it was decided not to proclaim their independence until they should have merited it by a unanimous effort,—by great zeal to second, and by an energetic resolution to defend the new country which should have been restored to them. Unhappily, the higher Polish nobility, less drawn in than the people, discouraged by the different insurrections which had been attempted, and fearing to be abandoned after compromising themselves, hesitated to throw themselves into the arms of Napoleon, and found in their actual situation something better to do than to revolt, and receive from the French an existence independent indeed, but destitute of support, exposed to all kinds of perils, between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This high nobility, fallen with Warsaw itself under the yoke of Prussia, felt for that court the aversion that was felt for all the Poles become Prussians. The larger part of the members of the Polish nobility would have regarded it as a happy change of fortune to become the subjects of Alexander, on condition of being reconstituted in a national body, and of enjoying, under the emperor of Russia, the character that the Hungarians enjoyed under the emperor of Austria. To be united in one and the same people, and transferred from a German to a Sclavonic master, seemed to them a lot much to be desired,—the only one, at least, to which they were able, in existing circumstances, to aspire. This was, in the eyes of many of them, secretly influenced by Russian intrigues, the only reconstitution of Poland that was practicable,—because Russia, they said, was near them, and in a state to sustain its own work, when once undertaken,—while an existence that should depend upon France would be precarious, ephemeral, and would vanish when the French armies should be at a distance. Doubtless there were some prudential reasons to give a value to this idea of the semi-constitution of Poland, born of a semi-patriotism; but those who framed this wish forgot, that if the existence which Poland might receive from France was exposed to peril when the French should repass the Rhine, that which the Russians would give them was exposed to another danger, certain and near at hand,—that of being absorbed into the rest of the empire,—to submit, in a word, to complete assimilation,—a result to which Russia would unceasingly tend, and which she would not fail to realize on the first opportunity, as events have subsequently proved. It was, therefore, necessary to renounce being Polish, or to devote themselves to Napoleon,—to devote themselves wholly, at any sacrifice, at all risks, with all the uncertainty attached to such an enterprize, the day when the powerful reformer of Europe appeared at Warsaw. Certain less elevated motives acted upon a portion of the nobility, that received with coldness the deliverance of Poland at the hands of the French; this was the jealousy that inspired it of the Polish generals, found in the French armies, arriving with the reputation, the pretensions, and an exaggerated feeling of their merits. These varied motives did not still hinder the generality of the nobility from feeling a lively pleasure at the sight of the French; they only rendered them more prudent, and led them to make conditions with a man to whom patriotism counselled them at that moment not to make any. But the masses, more unanimous, less restrained by reflection, in such a moment better, because it was a moment, one moment only, where reason is not so valuable as the influence of the passions; it was that moment when even a blind devotion is the necessary condition of safety to a people. Thus the masses wished to throw themselves into the arms of the French and propel all with them,—people, nobles, and priests.

Divided between these conflicting sentiments, the grandees of Warsaw pressed around Murat, coming to submit to him their wishes, not under

colour of necessity, but under that of advice, and with the end, they said, of producing among the Polish people a universal revolt. These wishes consisted in a demand that Napoleon should immediately proclaim the independence of Poland, and not limiting himself to that act, should select a king from his own family, and place him, with due solemnity, on the throne of Sobieski. This double guarantee being given to them, they added that the Poles, no longer doubting of the intentions of Napoleon, or of his firm resolution to sustain his own work, would deliver themselves to him body and goods. The king to be taken from the imperial family was already designated,—it was the valiant general of the cavalry, so well formed to be the monarch of a nation of horsemen, Murat himself, who, in fact, cherished in his heart the ardent desire of a crown, and particularly of that which, offered at such a moment, because it agreed so well with his heroic inclinations, as well as his frivolous and vain-glorious tastes. He had already accommodated his costume to this new character, and had brought from Paris a number of idle adornments which gave to his French uniform some resemblance to that of the Poles.

The passion to govern since he had espoused the sister of Napoleon, devoured Murat. This passion, which, at a later period, became fatal to his glory and his life, had redoubled under the excitement of his wife, who was yet more ambitious than he was, and capable, in order to attain the object of her wishes, to draw her husband into the most culpable actions. At the aspect of the vacant throne of Poland, Murat was no longer able to restrain his impatience. He had, therefore, no trouble to partake in the ideas of the Polish nobility, and to take upon himself to communicate them to Napoleon. The commission was, nevertheless, difficult to accomplish ; because Napoleon, without underrating the brilliant and generous qualities of his brother-in-law, had an extreme contempt notwithstanding for the frivolity of his character, and often showed himself a severe and hard master towards him.

Murat guessed truly what reception Napoleon would give to ideas that contravened his own policy, and would besides have the appearance of an interested proposition. Thus he took care about speaking of the monarch designated by the Poles: he contented himself with explaining their ideas in a general manner, and with making known their wish to see the independence of Poland immediately proclaimed, and guaranteed by a king of the Bonaparte family.

Napoleon, during the march of his *corps d'armée* upon Warsaw, had quitted Berlin, and arrived at Posen on the 25th of November. There it was he received the letters of Murat. He had only need to be told the state of things, to comprehend them. Even through the most able dissimulation, he discovered the secret minds of others, and the dissimulation of Murat was not of such a nature as to require much trouble to penetrate it. He soon discovered the ambition which possessed the heart at once so valiant and feeble. He felt as much discontent against him as against the Poles. He saw in that which they proposed to him, calculations, reservations, and conditions, a half movement, and, in what concerned him, dangerous engagements, without a powerful co-operation as an equivalent. By a singular concurrence of circumstances, he received, the very same day, dispatches from Paris, relative to the celebrated Kosciusko, whom he had wished to draw from France, to place him at the head of renewed Poland. That Polish patriot, whom a false direction of mind hindered at that period from serving his country usefully, lived in Paris in the midst of the discontented, but of small number, who had not yet pardoned Napoleon for the eighteenth of Brumaire, the concordat, and the re-establishment of the monarchy. Some senators and members of the old tribunate, composed this honest but vain society. Kosciusko was guilty of the error of opposing his intemperate contradictions to the only man who was then able to save his country, and who had really that intention. Besides previous engagements, demanded by the nobles of Warsaw, and impossible to enter into in the face of Austria, Kosciusko exacted other political conditions, altogether puerile, in a moment when it was the question to upraise Poland, before knowing what constitution should be given to it. Napoleon, seeing himself thwarted at the same time by the Poles become idealists at Paris, and by other Poles become Russian at St. Petersburg, thence conceived towards them mistrust and coldness.

In that which regarded Kosciusko, he replied to the minister Fouché, whom he had charged to make him propositions : " Kosciusko is a simpleton, who has not in his own country all the importance that he believes he has, and whom I shall very well pass by in establishing Poland, if the fortune of arms seconds me." He addressed a dry and severe letter to Murat. " Tell the Poles," he wrote him, " that it is not with such calculations and such personal precautions, that they can free their country, fallen beneath a foreign yoke. That it is, on the contrary, by a general rising altogether, headlong, without reserve, and with the resolution to sacrifice fortune and life, that they can have, not the certainty, but the simple hope of delivering themselves. I am not come hither," he added, " to beg a throne for my family, because I do not want thrones to bestow : I am come in the interest of the European equilibrium, to attempt a most difficult enterprise, in which the Poles have more to gain than any one else, since it is their national existence that is the business in hand, at the same time as the interests of Europe. If to the strength of their devotion they second me, so that I shall succeed, I will give them independence : if not, I shall do nothing, and shall leave them under their Prussian and Russian masters. I do not encounter here at Posen, in the nobility of that province, the measured views of the nobility of the capital. I find here frankness, warmth, patriotism,—that which is necessary, in fact, to save Poland, and all that I vainly seek among the grandees of Warsaw."

Napoleon, discontented, but not on that account renouncing the design of changing the face of the north of Europe by the re-establishment of Poland, took the resolution of not going to Warsaw, but of remaining at Posen, where he was the object of extraordinary enthusiasm. He contented himself by sending a Pole to Warsaw, whose spirit he much appreciated, M. Wibiski, a gentleman better

versed in the science of law and politics, than of war, but who knew the country to the bottom, and was animated with the sincerest patriotism. Napoleon laid open to him the difficulty of his position, in presence of the three old partitioners of Poland, of whom two were in arms against him, and a third ready to declare itself; and the necessity he was in of a careful management, and of finding, in a spontaneous and unanimous movement of the Poles all at once, a pretext to proclaim their independence, and succour sufficient to sustain it. His language, perfectly rational and sincere, persuaded M. Wibiski, who went to Warsaw, to endeavour to make his countrymen there, the more distinguished by their position and knowledge, partake in his own convictions.

This singular contest, between the Poles wishing that Napoleon should commence by proclaiming their independence, and Napoleon wishing that they should commence by meriting it, ought not to be a cause of blame either towards them or him, but rather a proof of the difficulty of the enterprize. The Poles avowed that they believed an existence would be little solid placed at so great a distance from the protector who had given it to them; and they demanded of him an assurance, besides a solemn engagement in the ties of blood. Napoleon, on his side, avowed that, sufficiently powerful to change the face of Europe, bold enough to dare carrying the war as far as the Vistula, he hesitated to proclaim the independence of Poland, having two of the partitionists to face, and the third upon his rear. If, however, there must absolutely be reproach against any, it will be against the Poles; at least against those who calculated after such a mode. Napoleon, in fact, owed nothing to the Poles, save on the ground of what they would do for Europe, of which he was the representative; whilst they owed all to their country, even an imprudent confidence, which confidence might draw after it the aggravation of their sufferings. When Napoleon was prudent, he did his duty; when the Poles pretended to be prudent, they were wanting in theirs, because, in the situation in which they found themselves, their duty was not to be prudent, but to be devoted even to perishing [1].

Napoleon, established at Posen, in the midst of the nobility of the grand duchy, that had assembled entire about him, employed himself in creating one of those military establishments with which he was in the habit of studding his route, in order that he might carry the war to the greatest distance. He bought grain, forage, above all, cloth, because Posen had an important manufacture of that article; he organized the preparation of provisions and of hospitals, of all, in a word, that he should want, in order to have a vast place of depôt in the centre of Poland. That place, it is true, was not fortified like Wittenberg or Spandau, it was open like Berlin. But it had for defence the affection of the inhabitants, devoted from the heart to the French cause.

Napoleon afterwards directed the movements of the army conformably to his plan of invasion. Marshal Ney had arrived at Posen. Marshals Soult and Bernadotte were moving there by short marches, after having taken, at Berlin, the repose of which their troops had need. The guard and the grenadiers marched to Posen to be round the emperor. Prince Jerome sent the Bavarians upon Kalisch, and, with the Wirtemburghers, commenced by Glogau the investment of the fortresses in Silesia.

Napoleon sent marshal Ney from Posen to Thorn, that he might attempt to take it, and surprize the passage of the Vistula. He ordered Augereau to continue his movement by the right along the Vistula from Thorn to Warsaw. He ordered marshal Lannes, who had already executed the same movement, to enter Warsaw, and replace marshal Davout, while he would re-establish the bridges of the Vistula, that united the town of Warsaw with the suburb of Prague. In ordering marshals Ney and Davout as soon as possible to cross the Vistula, over the two bridges of Thorn and Warsaw, he recommended it to them to assure themselves of a permanent passage by constructing strong works at the bridge ends. He adjourned his ulterior movements until the moment when these two bases of operation should be solidly established, and while waiting thus, he made advance leisurely the corps of marshals Soult and Bernadotte, in order that they should enter in line at the head of all his united forces. During this interval, Murat, with the reserve of cavalry, and marshal Davout, with his corps installed at Warsaw, endeavoured to execute the emperor's orders. The Russians had employed the time of their residence in the city in carrying away or destroying the provisions, in sinking all the boats, and, in fact, in leaving neither means of subsistence nor a passage of the river. Thanks to the zeal of the Poles, it supplied a great part of what was wanted. On the authority of Napoleon, who did not husband the money with which he was provided, a bargain was concluded with the commercial Jews, who showed themselves exceedingly adroit and able at drawing from their vast country the grain with which it abounded. An Austrian cordon, drawn along the length of Gallicia, hindered the exportation of provisions. But the Jews were charged to get over this difficulty by paying well the Austrian revenue officers, and for the money paid them, and for the abandonment to them of all the salt found in the Prussian magazines, they promised to convey by the Pilica, into the Vistula, and by the Vistula into Warsaw, wheat and oats, and to bring there besides a considerable quantity of live cattle.

They then considered about the passage of the great river, which cut the capital in two parts. The weather, alternately rainy or cold, remained uncertain, which was the very worst state of the atmosphere in such a country, because the Vistula, without being frozen, carried along enormous masses of ice, which did not permit the throwing

[1] Marshal Davout, a strong advocate for the re-establishment of Poland, wrote under date of the 21st of December: "The levies of men are made very easily, but persons are wanted capable of directing their organization and instruction. They also want muskets. The spirit in Warsaw is excellent; but the grandees make use of their influence to calm the ardour which is general in the middle classes. The uncertainty of the future frightens them, and they suffer it to be well enough understood that they will not openly declare themselves, unless, when they do declare their independence, a tacit engagement shall be taken to guarantee it." *Warsaw, December* 1, 1806.

over a bridge, or passing upon the ice itself. Detachments of light cavalry had been sent along the banks of the river, to secure the boats that the enemy had not had time to sink, and in this manner a certain number had been collected in Warsaw. Not able yet to throw a bridge over because of the icebergs that the current carried along violently, some detachments were attempted to be sent over in boats. The hardihood that success had inspired in the French soldiers and generals was necessary in attempting such an operation, because the detachments transported across one after the other, might be cut off before a sufficient number had passed to defend themselves. But the Russian general who commanded the advanced guard, having seen the commencement of the passage, took the alarm, abandoned the suburb of Prague, and withdrew upon the Narew, a military line of which the direction will presently be seen, and which is found several leagues from Warsaw. They hastened to avail themselves of that event, passed the whole of one division of the corps of Davout beyond the Vistula, took Prague, and advanced as far as Jablona. The Vistula appeared a little less loaded with icebergs, the bridge of boats was re-established, thanks to the intrepidity of the marines of the guard, and the zeal of the Polish boatmen. In a few days, the construction of the bridge of boats being achieved, marshal Davout was able to pass over, with all his corps, to the right bank, establish himself at Prague, and even beyond, in a strong position on the Narew. The corps of Lannes came to indemnify itself in Warsaw for the privations it had met with in ascending the Vistula. Marshal Augereau replaced him, and took up a position below Warsaw at Utrata, opposite Modlin, that is to say, over against the confluence of the Narew and the Vistula. His corps suffered much there, and had nothing to eat except the bread that Lannes and Murat sent him from Warsaw, in the kindness of good fellowship.

While the passage of the Vistula was effecting at Warsaw, marshal Ney directed himself upon Thorn, by Gnesen and Inowraclaw. The Prussian corps of Lestocq, which remained 15,000 strong, after having furnished garrisons to Graudenz and Dantzick, occupied Thorn with a detachment. Marshal Ney approached that city, which is in a situation quite the contrary to that of Warsaw, being upon the right bank of the Vistula, and having on the left bank only a simple suburb. A vast bridge, resting upon wooden arches, and supported upon an island, united the two banks; but the enemy had nearly destroyed it. Marshal Ney advanced with the head of a simple column, and made, in company with colonel Savary, the commandant of the 4th of the line, an observation of the banks of the Vistula. Thorn is upon the frontier which separates the Sclavonic from the German country. The two populations, at all times inimical, were then much more so, and showed themselves ready to come to blows, on the arrival of the French. The Polish boatmen aided the troops of marshal Ney, and brought them boats in a sufficient number to transport some hundreds of men across. Colonel Savary, with a detachment of his regiment, some companies of the 6!9th of the line and of the 6th light, placed themselves in the boats, and ventured in the broad bed of the Vistula, navigating across among enormous icebergs, and having in their presence on the other bank the enemy awaiting them. As they approached the musketry commenced, and became the more annoying as the icebergs, thicker towards the banks than in the middle of the river, did not at first permit the boats to reach the land. The German boatmen were disposed to join their efforts to the obstacles of the position, to hinder the disembarkation of the French. But at this appearance of things the Polish boatmen, more hardy and numerous than those of Germany, threw themselves upon the Germans, repulsed them, and, entering the water up to the middle, drew the boats to the shore under the fire of the Prussians. The four hundred French, quickly on land, ran towards the enemy. Very soon the boats sent to the other side of the Vistula brought over new detachments; and the troops of Ney became numerous enough in Thorn to make themselves masters of the place. After this audacious action, so fortunately accomplished, marshal Ney employed himself in forming an establishment in Thorn, for himself and for the corps which he expected to join him. He was first pressed to repair the bridge, which was not very difficult, seeing that the destruction of it had been very incomplete. He discovered a great number of boats, because the navigation is more active in the Lower Vistula, and he collected many there, and sent them up to Warsaw and the intermediate points, particularly Utrata, where they were much required by marshal Augereau, for the transport of his provisions. Next he employed himself in making Thorn, as had been already done at Posen and Warsaw, a place for creating a manufacture of provisions, hospitals, and establishments of all kinds. Bromberg, which is situated on the canal of Nackel, at a little distance from Thorn, was able to turn over there a part of its vast resources, which was executed without delay by means of the navigation. Ney arranged the seven regiments of his own corps around Thorn, disposing them as rays around a centre, and placing his light cavalry at the circumference, in order to secure himself from the Cossacks, who are very active and inconvenient scouts.

When Napoleon had been apprised that through the zeal and hardihood of his lieutenants he was master of the course of the Vistula, on the two principal points of Thorn and Warsaw, he delayed immediately his plan of operation until the close of autumn. He knew enough of the state of the country and the action of the rain on that clayey soil, to decide him to take up his quarters for the winter. But before he did so, he wished to strike a blow at the Russians, if not decisive, at least sufficient to throw them back as far as the Niemen, and permit him to take up his winter quarters quietly along the Vistula. In order the better to effect the movements he meditated, it is necessary to have an exact idea of the places, and of the position occupied by the enemy.

The king of Prussia, repelled from the Oder, had carried himself to the Vistula, and had retired on the Pregel at Kœnigsberg. Arrived at this extremity of his kingdom, he remained there to defend, in concert with the Russians, the space comprized between the Vistula and the Pregel.

The soil presented here the same character as between the Elbe and the Oder, and between the Oder and the Vistula, that is to say, a long chain of downs, parallel with the sea, retaining the waters, and causing a succession of lakes, which extended from the Vistula to the Pregel. These lakes found their outlet, some directly towards the sea, through the small rivers that fall into it, of which the principal is the Passarge; the others in the interior of the country, by a multitude of water-courses, such as the Omulew, the Orezyc, and the Ukra, which flowed into the Narew, and by the Narew into the Vistula. This singular country, comprised between the Vistula and the Pregel, had therefore two directions; one turning towards the sea, which is German, colonized formerly by the Teutonic order, and very well cultivated; the other turned towards the interior, scantily peopled, little cultivated, covered with thick forests, and in winter almost impenetrable. On approaching the sea resources are found; all is full of obstacles, and living difficult, upon penetrating into the interior. At the mouth of the Vistula, and at that of the Pregel, two great commercial towns are met with, Dantzick on the first, Kœnigsberg on the last, full, at the time now spoken about, of immense resources, as well those drawn from the country, as those that the English had brought, and continued to bring, every day. Dantzick, strongly fortified, provided with a numerous garrison, could not fall but after a long siege. It was for the Prussians and Russians a point of support of great importance on the Lower Vistula, and rendered precarious the French establishment on the Upper Vistula, by always placing it in the power of the enemy to pass the river on the French left, and to threaten their rear. Kœnigsberg, badly fortified, but defended by its distance, enclosed the last resources of Prussia, in *materiel*, stores, money, soldiers, and officers; it was the principal depôt of the enemy, and his means of communication with the English. Between Dantzick and Kœnigsberg the Frische Haff extended, a vast lagoon, similar to the lagoons of Venice and of Holland, owing to the cause that had produced all the phenomena of the soil, to the accumulation of sands, that ranged in a long bank parallel with the shore, separated the river waters from those of the ocean, and thus formed an intermediate sea. It was the same phenomenon that is remarked at the outlet of the Oder, under the name of the Grosse Haff, and at the mouth of the Niemen, under the name of the Curische Haff. Independently of Dantzick and Kœnigsberg, other commercial towns, Marienburg, Elbing, and Braunsberg, are situated around the Frische Haff, presenting a girdle of rich and populous cities. It was there the last wrecks of the Prussian monarchy remained to Frederick William. This monarch, personally placed at Kœnigsberg, had his troops spread between Dantzick, and that place joined to the Russians on the side of Thorn. They thus defended the slope towards the sea with 30,000 men, comprising the garrisons. The Russians had 100,000 occupying the interior slope, backed by thick forests, and covered by the Narew and Ukra, rivers which unite before falling into the Vistula, describing an angle, of which the point rested upon the larger river a little below Warsaw.

Two combinations were possible on the part of the coalesced powers. They were able to unite in a mass towards the sea, to profit from the numerous points of support which they possessed on the shore, above all at Dantzick; and, passing the Lower Vistula, to oblige the French to repass the higher, if they would avoid being turned; and they were yet able, abandoning to the Prussians the care of guarding the sea, and communicating between them by some detachments placed on the line of the lakes, to carry the Russians in advance of the region of the forests, in the angle described by the Ukra and the Narew, to form thus a sort of corner, and to direct the point upon Warsaw. Napoleon was prepared for either the one case or the other. If the Prussians and Russians operated in a body towards the sea, his design was to ascend the Narew, by the roads that passed through the interior region, and then drawing back to the left, to throw the enemy into the sea, or into the Lower Vistula. If, on the contrary, leaving the sea, between Dantzick and Kœnigsberg, the Russians advanced along the Narew, and from the Ukra upon Warsaw, then penetrating by Thorn between the one and the other, Napoleon decided to pivot on the right, the extremity resting upon Warsaw, and to ascend by his left, in such a manner as to separate, by this change of movement, the Prussians from the Russians, and drive back these last upon the chaos of marshes and woods in the interior. He should thus deprive them of their resources by sea, and of succour from England, and oblige them, flying in disorder, to pass across a frightful labyrinth. This separation completed, the maritime region defended by some thousand Prussians it was easy to conquer, and with that would be captured all the rich *materiel* of the coalition.

Between the two combinations thus described, the coalesced powers seemed to have adopted the second. The Prussians occupied the maritime region, and joined themselves to the Russians by a detachment placed in the environs of Thorn. The Russians were arranged in a mass in the interior region, on the Narew and its tributaries. General Bennigsen, who commanded the first Russian army, composed of four divisions, had fallen back from the Vistula on the Narew, at the approach of the French, and had taken up a position in the interior of the angle formed by the Ukra and the Narew. General Buxhoeden, with the second army, also four divisions strong, was in the rear, on the Upper Narew and Omulew, in the environs of Ostrolenka. General Essen, with the two divisions of reserve, had not yet arrived on the theatre of war. In the desire to flatter the passions of the old Russian soldiers, they had given them for a commander-in-chief general Kamenski, the former lieutenant of Suwarrow, possessing the energetic rudeness of that illustrious Muscovitish soldier, but none of his talent. After having at first retrograded before the French, the Russians, regretting their lost ground, would have moved in advance. But at the aspect of the French army, so well prepared for their reception, they had retaken their last position, behind the Ukra and the Narew.

Informed of the situation of the Prussians and Russians, the first established along the sea, the

second assembled in the interior region, the one and the other weakly connected together towards Thorn, Napoleon resolved to apply towards them the manœuvre he had adopted for such a circumstance, that is to say, to issue from Thorn with his left reinforced, to separate the Prussians from the Russians, and to throw the last into the inextricable difficulties of the interior. He had already directed marshal Ney upon Thorn; he marched marshal Bernadotte there again with the first corps, and the division of Dupont. He carried the corps of marshal Soult intermediately, by Sempolno upon Plock, ordering him to pass the Vistula between Warsaw and Thorn, and recommending it to him to join himself by his left with marshals Ney and Bernadotte, and marshal Augereau with his right. The dragoons, mounted at Potsdam, having rejoined the army, Napoleon united them to a portion of the heavy cavalry which had rested at Berlin, and composed of it a second cavalry reserve, which was entrusted to the command of marshal Bessières, taken for a moment from the command of the imperial guard. He sent this second reserve to Thorn. This was a force of 7000 or 8000 horse, which, joined to the corps of marshals Ney and Bernadotte, would compose, on the extreme left of the French army, a column of 40,000 or 45,000 men, fully sufficient to operate in the change of movement he had proposed. Marshal Soult, at the head of 25,000 men, formed the centre; the marshals Augereau, Davout, and Lannes, formed the right, designed to support itself upon Warsaw. All these corps were drawn near enough to each other to co-operate, and present, in a few hours, 70,000 men assembled upon that point, wherever it might be that the enemy was encountered in force. Napoleon proposed then that his left should advance itself by rapid marches, whilst his right pivoted itself slowly, he would thus be able to drive the Russians together while on the march, and, after separating them from the Prussians, throw them back from the Ukra on the Narew, and from the Narew on the Bug, far from the sea, and ruined, into the interior of Poland. If the weather favoured these designs, and rendered marching easy, it was possible that the Russians would be driven so far from their base of operations, and the country where they obtained provisions, that their retreat would prove a real disaster.

Wishing to pivot on Warsaw, but wishing also to have the power of withdrawing himself, if needful, if he should be obliged to follow the movement of the left, and advance with that, Napoleon ordered great outworks to be executed around the suburb of Prague. He ordered it to be first fortified by means of earth ramparts, provided with a wood revêtement, which would serve for an escarpment in masonry. This suburb, thus fortified, would answer for a defence of the end of the bridge towards Warsaw. He ordered marshal Davout, who had gone from the Vistula upon the Narew, to establish a bridge upon this river, and to place it in a state of defence. He prescribed to marshal Augereau, who was preparing to pass the Vistula at Modlin, to establish there, in like manner, a permanent bridge, and to render it unattackable on both banks. He ordered general Chasseloup to trace out the works ordered. He recommended it to him to employ wood and earth exclusively, and to place upon the works the heavy artillery taken from the enemy; and to attract thither for pay a great number of Polish workmen. Napoleon wished that the fortifications of earth and wood, raised to the value of permanent defences, should suffice of themselves, leaving there the Poles newly levied, and some French detachments, while the army advanced, if the consequences of the operations undertaken should come to demand it.

The orders of Napoleon were always punctually executed, at least short of absolute impossibility, because he watched their execution with continual attention, and an inflexible pressing forward of his objects. General Chasseloup pushed on the work very actively, but he had great trouble to procure workmen. The outrages committed by the Russians, making them fear the same violence on the part of the French, had caused the peasantry to fly with their families, their cattle, and all their means of carriage, into Austrian Poland, of which the frontier, nigh at hand, and closed to the two belligerent armies, offered a near and safe asylum. Entire villages had fled, with their priests leading them, in order to get away from the horrors of the war. Even with high payments it was not possible to procure many hands. They had obtained nearly all in Warsaw, but the construction of ovens, the organization of the military establishments, which were to be proportioned to an army of 200,000 men, absorbed nearly all these, and there remained no others to be employed. They were therefore made up of soldiers; unfortunately these had begun to suffer from their fatigues, but above all from the influences of the season, that had so far been more wet than cold. They suffered also from privations. The provisions ordered in Gallicia were yet awaited, and even in Warsaw they found some difficulty to live. Marshal Lannes was encamped there with his two divisions. Marshal Davout was encamped beyond, that is to say, on the bank of the Narew, which falls into the Vistula a little below Warsaw. There was from Warsaw to the Narew a distance of about eight leagues, much heath, and little of culture or habitation. The soldiers of Davout, reduced to eat pork, for want of beef and mutton, were attacked with dysentery. They had no bread but what was sent to them daily. Marshal Davout had his head-quarters at Jablona, and the head of his column on the same side of the Narew towards Okunin, opposite the confluence of the Ukra and Narew. Marshal Davout, despite the advanced guard of the Russians, had passed the Narew, thrown a bridge over that river, by the aid of some boats which he had collected, and had set to work to complete the defences at the two extremities of the bridge. He would then be able to manœuvre on both banks of the Narew. Still he had only passed below the point where the Ukra unites with it, and it remained to cross that river higher up, or even to pass the Ukra itself, to penetrate to the angle occupied by the Russians. But they were numerous there, and solidly intrenched on elevated ground, woody, and defended by artillery. It was not possible to go and attack them without passing the Ukra in full strength. To attempt it would be to engage in a contest which

could not be undertaken save under the eyes of Napoleon himself.

The workmen of marshal Davout had nearly reached those of marshal Augereau, who were actively employed in his establishment on the Vistula, towards Modlin, at the point where the Vistula and the Narew mingled. But he was deprived of all necessaries; the Russians having wasted every thing as they retired. Twelve boats, collected above and below Modlin, had served him for sending over that river one detachment after another. He laboured to construct a vast bridge at Modlin, with defensive works on both banks. His troops, in the midst of the sands which prevailed in this part of the country, lived yet worse than those of marshal Davout. He hastened to carry himself to Plonsk, beyond the Vistula, opposite Ukra, in a more fertile country. Marshal Soult had executed the marches ordered by the emperor, and had begun to pass at Plock, from whence he was in a state either to join marshal Augereau at Plonsk, or to unite with marshals Bernadotte and Ney at Biezun, according to circumstances. As to the corps which had Thorn for its base of operation, that wanted for nothing.

Those rapid conquerors, who had so promptly invaded Austria the preceding year, and Prussia in the preceding month, found themselves suddenly stopped in their triumphant march, by a climate melancholy and humid, by a moving soil, alternately sand and mud, and by the dearth of provisions, that became more rare in proportion as the population and culture disappeared. They were surprised, not downcast; they had a thousand suitable jokes on the attachment of the Poles for such a country, and only demanded that they might encounter the enemy of Austerlitz, to avenge upon him the discomforts of the soil and the heavens.

On seeing the Russians advance and retire by turns, then withdraw a last time with all the appearance of a definitive retreat, Napoleon believed that they would ultimately withdraw on the Pregel, there to take up their winter quarters. He therefore ordered Murat and Bessières to pursue them at the head of 25,000 horse, the one issuing from Warsaw with the first reserve of cavalry, the other from Thorn with the second. But soon more exact accounts from marshal Davout, who, placed at the confluence of the Narew and Ukra, saw the Russians solidly established behind these two rivers, the reports of marshal Augereau, and of marshal Ney above all, who had the habit of observing the enemy very close, undeceived him, and proved that he had time to march upon the Russians, and that he even must do so, if he would not leave him to winter in a position too near to the French army. Besides, the bridges on the Vistula, which he proposed to make points of support, were completed, provided with the commencement of defensive works, and capable of a sufficient resistance, if some troops were placed in them.

Napoleon left Posen, therefore, in the night of the 15th and 16th of December, after remaining there nineteen days, passing by way of Kutno and Lowicz, every where ordering provisions and ambulances, in case of a retrograde movement, little probable, but always contemplated by his prudence; watching, in fine, the march of his columns on Warsaw, and employing himself, above all, in urging the arrival of the guard and grenadiers of Oudinot [1].

He entered the capital of Poland in the night, in order to avoid any boisterous demonstrations, because it was not agreeable to him to repay popular acclamations by imprudent engagements. The Pole Wibiski had preceded him, and had employed all his efforts to persuade his compatriots that they must devote themselves before exacting that Napoleon should devote himself for them. Many of them were convinced by the sound reasons which he gave them. Prince Poniatowski, nephew of the last king, a young prince brilliant and brave, a species of hero slumbering in effeminacy, but ready to awaken at the first clash of arms, was of the number of those who had offered to second the views of Napoleon. Count Potocki, the old Malakouski, marshal of one of the last diets, and others, came to Warsaw, and united themselves around the French authorities, to concur in forming a government. They had composed a provisional administration, and all had begun to go on smoothly, except in the inevitable differences among those of small experience, much inclined to be jealous. They levied men, and they organized battalions, both at Warsaw and Posen. Napoleon, in order to aid the new Polish government, had acquitted it of all contributions for furnishing provisions, so urgently wanted. For the rest, the higher class of society in Warsaw showed towards him an extraordinary excitement. All the Polish nobility had quitted their mansions, eager as they were to see and to salute the great man, as well as the liberator of Poland.

Arriving in the night of the 18th and 19th, Napoleon wished to mount his horse on the last-mentioned day, to go and reconnoitre himself the situation of marshal Davout on the Narew. But a thick fog hindered him. He made his dispositions to attack the enemy from the 22nd to the 23rd of December. "It is time," he wrote marshal Davout, "to take up our winter quarters; but that cannot take place until we have driven back the Russians."

The four divisions of general Benningsen first

[1] The following letter is cited, well indicating his situation at the moment in question in this recital.

"To general Clarke.

"*Lowicz, December* 18, 1806—*7 o'clock in the evening.*

"I have arrived at Lowicz. I write you to take away every species of disquietude from your mind. There is nothing new here. The armies are in presence of each other. The Russians are on the right bank of the Narew, and we on the left. Independently of Prague, we have two *têtes de pont:* one at Modlin, the other on the Narew, at the entrance of the Ukra. We have Thorn, and an army twenty leagues in advance, that manœuvres upon the enemy. All the intelligence is in our favour. It is possible that within eight days there will happen an affair that will finish the campaign. Take your precautions, that they have not a musket, either in Berlin or the country; that Spandau and Custrin be kept in a good state of defence, and that every where proper duty be performed.

"Write to Mayence and Paris, solely to say that you write that there is nothing new; this should be done in general every day, when one of my couriers does not pass by; that will allay false rumours.

"NAPOLEON."

presented themselves. The division of count Tolstoy, posted at Czarnowo, occupied the summit of the angle formed by the union of the Ukra and the Narew. The division of general Sedmaratzki, placed in the rear towards Zebroszki, guarded the banks of the Narew. That of general Saken, placed also in the rear towards Lopaczym, guarded the banks of the Ukra. The division of prince Gallitzin was in reserve at Pultusk. The four divisions of general Buxhoewden were at a great distance from those of general Benningsen, and little in a condition to support him. Two, cantoned at Popowo, observed the country between the Narew and the Bug. Two others were encamped yet further off, at Makow and Ostrolenka. The Prussians, repelled from Thorn, were on the superior course of the Ukra, towards Soldau, connecting the Russians with the sea. As has been said, the two divisions of reserve of general Essen were not yet arrived. The total mass of the coalesced troops designed to enter into action was 115,000 men.

It is easy to discover that the distribution of the Russian troops was not happily combined in the angle of the Ukra and the Narew, and that they had too little concentrated their forces. If, in place of having one sole division at the point of the angle, and one on each side, at too great a distance from the first, in fact, five out of bearing, they had distributed them with skill over a ground so favourable for acting upon the defensive, and they had strongly occupied at first the confluence of the two rivers, the Narew from Czarnowo to Pultusk, and the Ukra from Pomichowo to Kolozomb; that they had placed in reserve, in a central position, at Nasielsk, for example, a principal mass, ready to go to the threatened point, they would have been enabled to dispute the ground to advantage. But generals Benningsen and Buxhoewden, not having much love for each other, did not seek each other's vicinity, and the old Kamenski, arrived near his end, had neither the spirit nor the will necessary to prescribe to them a different disposition from that which they had adopted, in each following his own inclination.

Napoleon, who only saw the Russian position from without, judged rightly that those troops were entrenched behind the Narew and Ukra to guard the banks, but without knowing how they were established and distributed. He thought it was first necessary to possess himself of the point of confluence, where it was probable that they would defend themselves with energy, and that point carried, proceed to the execution of his plan; that consisted in throwing the Russians, by a change of movement from the left to the right, into the marshy and woody country of the interior of Poland. In consequence, after having reiterated to marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, forming his left, the order to carry themselves rapidly from Thorn to Biezun, on the upper course of the Ukra; to marshals Soult and Augereau, forming his centre, the order to march from Plock and Modlin, to reunite at Plonsk, on the Ukra; he placed himself at the head of his right wing, composed of the corps of Davout and Lannes, of the guard and reserves, and resolved immediately to force the position of the Russians at the confluence of the Ukra and Narew. He left in the works of Prague the Poles of the new levy, with a division of dragoons, a force sufficient to guard against accident, the army not being about to proceed far from Warsaw.

Arrived in the morning of the 23rd of December at Okunin on the Narew, in humid weather, over muddy roads nearly impassable, Napoleon went to the ground, to watch in person the dispositions for the attack. That general, who, according to some critics, while directing an army of 300,000 men, knew not how to lead a brigade into fire, went himself to reconnoitre the enemy's positions, and to place all the troops on the ground, even to the companies of voltigeurs.

They had already crossed the Narew at Okunin, below the confluence of the Ukra and Narew. In order to penetrate into the angle formed by the two rivers, it was necessary to pass either the Narew or the Ukra, above their point of union. The Ukra being the least broad, it was preferred to attempt to cross that river. They had availed themselves of an island, which divided it into two arms, near its mouth, in order to lessen the difficulty. They had established themselves in that island, and it remained to pass the second arm, and to land on the point which the Russians occupied between the Ukra and Narew. This point of land, covered with tree, thicket, and marsh, was very dense. Beyond that point the wood became a little cleared; then the ground arose, and presented a scarped front, which extended from the Narew to the Ukra. At the right of this natural steep, the village of Czarnowo on the Narew was seen, and to the left the village of Pomichowo on the Ukra. The Russians had advanced guards of *tirailleurs* in the underwood, with seven battalions and a numerous artillery on the elevated part of the ground, two battalions in reserve, and all their cavalry in their rear. Napoleon, reaching the island, mounted the roof of a farm-house by a ladder, and with a glass having studied the position of the Russians, ordered immediately the following disposition. He spread a great number of *tirailleurs* all along the Ukra, much above the point of crossing. He ordered them to engage briskly, and to make large fires of wet straw, to cover the bed of the river with a cloud of smoke, and thus give the Russians fear of an attack above the confluence, towards Pomichowo. He even directed to that side the brigade of Gauthier, of Davout's corps, in order the more to attract there the attention of the enemy. While these orders were executing, he united together at the close of the day all the companies of the division of Morand on the point designed for crossing, and ordered them to fire from one bank to the other, across the tufts of wood, to drive away the enemy's posts, while the marines of the guard brought up the boats collected in the Narew. The 17th of the line and the 13th light were in column, ready to embark by detachments, and the rest of Morand's division was in a body in the rear, with the object of passing when the bridge should be established. The other divisions of the corps of Davout waited at the bridge of Okunin the moment to act. Lannes advanced at a great pace from Warsaw upon Okunin.

The marines of the guard soon brought up some boats, and by their aid several detachments of

voltigeurs were carried from one bank to the other. These plunged into the wood, to drive off the enemy, while the pontonniers and the marines of the guard were employed in throwing over, with all speed, a bridge of boats. At seven o'clock in the evening the bridge was practicable, and the division of Morand crossed in close column, and marched in advance, preceded by the 17th of the line, the 13th light, and a cloud of *tirailleurs*. They advanced, covered by the woods and the night. The sappers of the regiments opened through the thick underwood a passage for the infantry. Scarcely had they overcome these first obstacles, than they found themselves in front of the elevated ground, which extended from the Narew to the Ukra, and which was defended either by *abattis*, or by a numerous artillery. The Russians, in the obscurity of the night, opened upon the French columns a well-sustained fire of grape and musketry, which did some mischief. While the voltigeurs of Morand's division and the 13th light advanced as *tirailleurs*, colonel Lanusse, at the head of the 17th of the line, formed a column of attack on the right, to take the Russian batteries. He had carried one, when the Russians, sending a body of men on his left flank, obliged him to retrograde. But the rest of Morand's division, arriving to sustain the two first regiments, the 13th light, having emptied its cartridge-boxes, was replaced by the 30th, and it marched anew, by the right, to attack the village of Czarnowo, whilst, towards the left, general Petit went, with 400 chosen men, to assail the Russian entrenchments placed against the Ukra, opposite Pomichowo. In spite of the night, they manœuvred in the most perfect order. Two battalions of the 30th, and one of the 17th, attacked Czarnowo; the one proceeding along the bank of the Narew, the two others climbing directly up the height on which the village is situated. These three battalions carried Czarnowo, and, followed by the 51st and 61st regiments, formed on the summit of the ground, and repulsed the Russians as far as the plain which extends itself beyond. At the same instant general Petit assailed the extremity of the enemy's intrenchments towards the Ukra, and, seconded by the fire of the artillery that the brigade of Gauthier opened from the opposite bank, they were taken. At midnight the French were masters of the position of the Russians from the Narew to the Ukra. But from the slowness of their retreat, as far as it was possible to see in the obscurity, it was believed that they would return to the charge, and from this motive marshal Davout sent as succour to general Petit, who was the most exposed, the second brigade of Gudin's division. As had been foreseen, the Russians, during the night, returned three times to the charge, with the intention of retaking the position which they had lost, and of driving the French to the bottom of the elevation, towards that woody and marshy point on which they had disembarked. Three times they were suffered to approach within thirty paces, and three times their attack was answered by a fire close up, which stopped them, and then they attacked with the bayonet, and were repulsed. Finally, the night being far advanced, they set themselves in full retreat upon Nasielsk. Never was a night combat supported with more order, precision, and boldness. The Russians left in dead, wounded, and prisoners, about 1800 men, and much artillery. On the side of the French there were 600 wounded and about 100 killed.

Napoleon, who had not quitted the place of combat, congratulated general Morand and marshal Davout on their fine conduct, and hastened directly afterwards to draw his consequences from the passage of the Ukra, giving the orders which the circumstances demanded. The Russians, deprived of the point of support which they possessed at the confluence of the Ukra and Narew, would not attempt to defend the Ukra, of which the line had been forced at the mouth. But in the ignorance which the French found themselves of the true situation of the Russians, it was to be feared that they were in force at the bridge of Kolozomb, on the Ukra, opposite Plonsk, the point towards which they would encounter the corps of marshals Soult and Augereau. Napoleon ordered the reserve of cavalry, commanded by general Nansouty in the absence of Murat, who had been taken ill at Warsaw, to ascend the Ukra on both banks, to beat up the shores as far as Kolozomb, to give a hand to marshals Augereau and Soult, and aid them in passing the Ukra if they found any difficulty in doing it; in fine, to connect them with marshal Davout, who had marched in advance, traversing in its centre the country comprised between the Ukra and Narew. He ordered marshal Davout to march directly upon Nasielsk, and supported him with the guard and reserve. Finally, he gave instructions to marshal Lannes to cross the Ukra, were he even obliged to force a passage, and to ascend to the right of the corps of Davout in following the Narew as far as Pultusk. This town became a place of great importance, because the Russians, driven from the Ukra on the Narew, had only the bridges of Pultusk by which to cross this last river. The order was already sent to marshals Soult and Augereau to march upon Plonsk, there to pass the Ukra; the order to marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, to advance rapidly on Biezun, towards the sources of the Ukra, was naturally confirmed.

Napoleon, continuing to keep himself near marshal Davout, would march the same morning of the 24th upon Nasielsk, in spite of the fatigues of the night. He had only taken the precaution to place at the head of all the division of Friant, in order to procure some hours of repose for Morand's division, fatigued with the combat of Czarnowo. They arrived, towards the close of the day, at Nasielsk, and they found there in position the division of Tolstoy, the same which they had driven from Czarnowo. It showed an intention to oppose some resistance, in order to give the detachments sent upon the Ukra time to rejoin.

It has been said, that the four divisions of general Benningsen were the division of Tolstoy at Czarnowo, to defend the confluence of the two rivers; the division of Saken, at Lopaczym, to watch over the Ukra; the division of Sedmaratzki, at Zebroszki, to guard the Narew; and, finally, the division of Gallitzin, at Pultusk, to serve there as the reserve, although very far away from the Ukra, having also upon that river a strong advanced guard, commanded by general Barklay de Tolly; the whole was a mixed and confused dis-

position, denoting a very feeble direction of the operations of the Russian army. The natural movement of these divisions, surprised by a vigorous attack on the Ukra, was to recall their detachments, to withdraw them upon the Narew. This was in effect the movement to which they had yielded, and which their general-in-chief left to be executed before he ordered it. Count Tolstoy commanded the division fallen back upon Nasielsk, holding on there until the moment when he should see return the detachment set as a guard over the Ukra towards Borkowo, which was pursued by the French cavalry reserve. Still, general Friant, having formed his division in face of the Russians, and having marched upon them, obliged them to retire in haste. The dragoons started after them, killed or took several hundred men, and gathered up cannon and baggage.

On this day, the 24th, marshal Augereau, having arrived on the banks of the Ukra, wished to force his passage over. He ordered the bridges of Kolozomb and of Sochoczyn to be attacked at once. The 44th of the line, under colonel Savary, the same who had crossed the Vistula at Thorn on the 6th of December [1], threw himself on the wrecks, scarcely repaired, of the bridge of Kolozomb, and passed heroically across under a horrible fire of musketry. This brave officer fell on the other bank, pierced with many thrusts of a lance. At Sochoczyn, the attack of the bridge not having succeeded, they directed themselves towards a neighbouring ford, and there operated a passage. The corps of Augereau found itself thus transferred, on the 24th, to the other bank of the Ukra, and advanced, pushing before it the detachments of the different Russian divisions left to guard that river. The reserve of cavalry, under the orders of general Nansouty, pursued them as well. They marched on Nowemiasto, in the direction from the Ukra to the Narew, in such a manner as to connect themselves with the corps of marshal Davout. At the left of the corps of Augereau, marshal Soult disposed himself so as to pass the Ukra towards Sochoczyn. The left, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, continued to ascend, by a rapid movement from Thorn, upon Biezun and Soldau.

The 25th, in the morning, Napoleon directed his columns upon Strezegocin. The weather had become frightful for an army which had to manœuvre, and, above all, to execute numerous reconnoitrings, in order to discover the enemy's intentions. A complete thaw, accompanied by sleet and rain, had so broken up the ground, that in some places they sank up to their knees. Some men had even been found half buried in the soil suddenly changed into a marsh. It was requisite to double the artillery draught, to draw along a few pieces. There were gained, it is true, the capture, at every step, of cannon and baggage belonging to the Russians, many of the laggers behind, and wounded,—and, finally, a good number of Polish deserters, who voluntarily remained in the rear, in order to deliver themselves over to the French army. But there was lost the inappreciable advantage of celerity, the concurrence of artillery, which could not be longer conveyed, and the means of information, which are always proportioned to the facility of communication. It is but to imagine immense plains, by turns covered with mud, or thick forests, commonly very ill peopled,—worse still, since the general emigration of the inhabitants,—armies searching for each other, or flying in, this desert of mire; and an idea may be had, scarcely exact, of the spectacle that the French and Russians exhibited at this moment in that part of Poland.

Napoleon, finding it difficult traversing a flat, woody country, to discover the movements of the enemy, was unable to acquire the information he could not obtain by means of increased reconnoitrings, and was thrown into the most embarrassing uncertainty. It appeared to him, that the Russian columns in retreat went in a direction from his left to his right,—from the Ukra towards the Narew. Thus he had sent Lannes towards Pultusk, and, having thought that he perceived a part of the enemy proceeding after Lannes, he detached the division of Gudin, of the corps of Davout, to follow it, and prevent its attacking Lannes in the rear. But a large assemblage was discovered before him in the direction of Golymin. It announced the presence there of numerous forces come to that point from the rear of the Russian army. It was said that a corps of 20,000 men retreated from the Ukra upon Ciechanow and Golymin. In the midst of this chaos, Napoleon, wishing to proceed immediately towards the nearest point that the enemy had approached, towards which, besides, all the others seemed to converge, left Lannes, escorted by the division of Gudin, to march right upon Pultusk; and as to himself, he went directly upon Golymin, with two of the three divisions of Davout, with the entire corps of Augereau, with the guard, and the reserve of cavalry. He further ordered marshal Soult, who had passed the Ukra, to go himself to Ciechanow. He prescribed to marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, departing from Thorn, to continue their movement of conversion by Biezun, Soldau, and Mlawa, which would carry them on the flank, and nearly on the Russian rear.

They thus marched, with great labour, all the day on the 25th, and the morning of the 26th. Sometimes they took two hours, sometimes three, to go over a league of ground.

Still the different corps of the Russian army had not taken the exact direction that Napoleon supposed. The four divisions of general Benningsen had nearly fallen back entire upon Pultusk. The

[1] Those readers who remember to have seen the 14th of the line figure with its colonel, Savary, at the passage of the Vistula at Thorn, under the orders of marshal Ney, will have difficulty to explain how this same regiment should be found, on the 24th of December, under marshal Augereau, at the passage of the Ukra at Kolozomb. The explanation is easy; it is, that this regiment, left at Bromberg by marshal Augereau, when he ascended the left bank of the Vistula from Thorn as far as Modlin, remained, for a moment, at the disposal of marshal Ney, and operated, under his orders, the passage of the Vistula at Thorn.

We should not add this note, which might appear useless, if some critics, little attentive, little instructed, had not accused us of making corps figure in different actions that took no part in them. These are attacks which can give but little concern; still, out of respect to the impartial reader, we feel bound to prove to him, that we have neglected nothing to secure the most rigorous exactness.—*Note of Author.*

division of Tolstoy, repelled from Czarnowo to Nasielsk, and from Nasielsk to Strezegocin, had followed the route that divided in the middle the country between the Ukra and the Narew. Arrived at Strezegocin, it was driven to the right towards Pultusk, where they had been able to rally their scattered detachments. The division of Sedmaratski, placed the preceding days at Zebroszki, on the bank of the Narew, having only a short distance to pass to gain Pultusk, had immediately proceeded there. The division of Gallitzin, that having its head quarters at Pultusk, had posts upon the Ukra, was concentrated at Pultusk. But the detachments of this division which guarded the Ukra, divided by the French cavalry from each other, had sought a refuge in Golymin. Finally, the division of Saken, which more particularly guarded the Ukra, and had its head quarters at Lopaczym, pursued by the French cavalry, had retired part to Golymin and part to Pultusk. Thus the two divisions of Gallitzin and Saken in part were found on the 26th at Pultusk. The remainder of the divisions of Gallitzin and Saken taking refuge at Golymin, had met there one of the divisions of Buxhoewden, the division of Doctorow, which had been carried in advance, and had thus given ground for the rumour of an assemblage of troops in the rear of the Russian army. Lastly, the Prussians, in flight before marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, had abandoned the Ukra, and retired by Soldau on Mlawa, endeavouring continually in their retreat to connect themselves with the Russians.

On the 26th, in the morning, Lannes arrived in sight of Pultusk. He discovered there a mass of force very superior to that of which he was able to dispose. The four Russian divisions, although two were incomplete, did not count less than 43,000 men [1]. Lannes, with the dragoons of general Becker, did not possess much above 17,000 or 18,000. There arrived on the left 5000 or 6000 men, of the division of Gudin. But Lannes was not very clearly made acquainted with it; and in the state of the roads, this reinforcement, although at a very inconsiderable distance from Pultusk, was not able to reach the field of battle until very late. Lannes was not a man to be intimidated. Neither he nor his soldiers feared to front the Russians, whatever might be their number, and however tried their bravery. Lannes arrayed his little army in battle order, having taken care to send to marshal Davout information of the unexpected encounter which he was about to have at Pultusk, which would place him in a very critical situation.

A vast forest covered the environs of Pultusk. In passing out of this forest, an open space of ground was discovered, here and there marked with thickets of wood, broken up by the rains, like all the rest of the country, and rising, by little and little, to the form of table-land, and then terminating all at once in a sudden slope upon Pultusk and the Narew. General Benningsen had drawn up his army on this ground, having his back turned upon the town, one of his wings supported on the river, the other on a clump of wood. A strong reserve served to sustain his centre. His cavalry was placed in the intervals of his line of battle, and a little in advance. Although they had lost a part of their artillery, the Russians carried with them so great a quantity after the campaign of Austerlitz, that it sufficed to cover the front of their line with guns, and to render access to that front extremely formidable.

Lannes had not more than a few pieces of light calibre to oppose to them; these he had drawn through the mud, with great effort, by applying to them all the artillery horses. He disposed the division of Suchet in the first line, and kept the division of Gazan in reserve on the border of the forest, in order to have wherewith to meet events, which threatened to become serious with the uncertainty in which every body was plunged. A few men, well conducted, would suffice to hold that position, having the advantage of presenting a less mark to the formidable Russian artillery. Lannes, therefore, opened from the front with the sole division of Suchet, formed in three columns,—one to the right, under general Claparède, composed of the seventeenth, and the light cavalry of general Treilhard: the one in the centre, under general Vedel, composed of the sixty-fourth of the line, and of the first battalion of the eighty-eighth; that to the left, under general Reille, composed of the second battalion of the eighty-eighth, of the thirty-fourth of the line, and of the dragoons of general Becker. The design of general Lannes was to attack by his right, and towards the Narew; because if he succeeded in penetrating as far as the town, he should make the whole position of the Russians fall at a blow, and even place them in a very disastrous situation.

He took his three columns in advance, boldly coming out of the wood, and ascending to the level ground above, under a shower of grape. Unfortunately, the ground, softened and slippery, did not permit that impetuosity of attack which would have redeemed the disadvantage of want of numbers and a good position. Still, all advancing with difficulty, they joined with the enemy, and repulsed him towards the abrupt slopes that terminate the ground in a species of fall on the side of the Narew and of Pultusk. They marched with ardour, going to throw into the river the Russian troops of general Bagowout, when the general-in-chief, Benningsen, sent with all speed a part of his reserve to the aid of general Bagowout, and made an attack on the flank of the brigade of Claparède, which formed the head of the French column of attack. Lannes, who was in the thickest of the battle, answered this manœuvre by carrying his centre towards the right of the brigade of Vedel, composed, as already stated, of the sixty-fourth, and the first battalion of the eighty-eighth. He himself took in flank the Russians who had come to the aid of general Bagowout, and pushing them one and the other towards the Narew, he would have terminated the contest of this point, and perhaps the battle, if, in the midst of a storm of snow, the battalion of the eighty-eighth, surprised by the Russian cavalry before being able to place itself in a square, had not been broken and overturned. But this brave battalion rallied immediately by one of the officers, of whom the danger disclosed the character, named Voisin, immediately recovered, and availing

[1] The historian Plotho, an officer of the Russian army, and an eye-witness, himself sanctions the total of 43,000.—*Author's Note.*

itself in turn of the embarrassment of the Russian cavalry, killed with the bayonet the horsemen, plunged, as well as the infantry, into a sea of mud.

Thus at the right and centre, the combat, although less decisive than it might have been, nevertheless turned to the advantage of the French, who left the Russians driven back to the extremity of the ground, and exposed, at a dangerous descent, towards the town and river. At the left, the third column, composed of the thirty-fourth of the line, of the second battalion of the eighty-eighth, and of the dragoons of general Becker, had to dispute with the enemy the dense thicket which supported the Russian centre. The thirty-fourth, led by general Reille, and received by unmasked batteries on a sudden, suffered cruelly. Still he carried the wood, seconded by the charges of the dragoons of general Becker; but some battalions of general Barclay de Tolly retook it. The French made themselves masters of it again, and sustained, during three hours, an obstinate and unequal combat. Finally, on that point as on the others, the Russians, obliged to give way, were reduced to back themselves nearer the town. Lannes, disengaged from the contest on the right, then went to the left, to encourage his troops by his presence. If at that moment he had been less uncertain of what passed elsewhere, and more sure of being supported, he would have been able to make the division of Gazan act, and then the Russians would have been undone, precipitated down the steep from the high ground, and drowned in the Narew. But Lannes saw beyond his left, and at the extremity of the Russian right, the division of Tolstoy, on the border of the ravine of Moczyn, forming a bend in the rear to cover the extremity of the position. He believed it, therefore, wiser not to engage all his troops; and by his order the brave division of Gazan remained immovable on the edge of the forest, receiving at three hundred paces' distance the enemy's balls, but doing the service of restraining the Russians, and preventing them besides from engaging with all their forces.

The day was closing when the division of Gudin at length arrived upon the French left, hid from that army by the woods, but seen by the cossacks, who soon informed general Benningsen of it. Of all its artillery, the division of Gudin only brought two pieces painfully dragged to the place of combat. It was planted against the extreme right of the Russians, and on the point of the angle that their retired line presented. General Daultanne, who that day commanded the division of Gudin, after several rounds of cannon formed in *échelons* by the left, and marched resolutely upon the enemy, and thus acquainted marshal Lannes of his entrance into action. His attack had a decisive effect, and forced the Russians to fall back. But this division, already separated by the wood from the corps of Lannes, increased in advancing the interval that divided them. A gust of wind, that carried the rain and snow into the faces of the French soldiers, blew at the instant. The Russians, through a superstition of the people of the north, who saw in the storm a favourable augury, ran forward with savage cries. They threw themselves into the interval left between the division of Gudin and the corps of Lannes, forcing back one and outflanking the other. Their cavalry dashed into the opening; but the thirty-fourth, on the side of Suchet's division, and the eighty-fifth on that of Gudin, formed into a square, and cut short this charge, which was more, on the part of the Russians, a demonstration to cover their retreat than a serious attack.

The French had, therefore, on all the points, conquered the ground which commanded Pultusk, and there only remained to them a last effort to precipitate the Russians into the Narew, when general Benningsen, availing himself of the cover of the night, drew off his army, and led it over the bridges of Pultusk. While he gave his orders for a retreat, Lannes, full of ardour, and re-assured by the arrival of the division of Gudin, deliberated whether he should immediately make a second attack, or defer it until the morrow. The time advanced; the difficulty of communicating in the chaos of mud, rain, and obscurity, decided him in postponing the combat. On the following day, the sudden retreat of the Russians took from the French the merited prize of their audacious and obstinate conflict.

This obstinate battle, in which 18,000 men had been the whole day in presence of 43,000, might certainly be called a victory. Thanks to their small number, and to the superiority of their tactics, the French had scarcely lost 1500 men, killed and wounded: this is spoken after authentic statements. The loss of the Russians, on the contrary, rose, in killed and wounded, to more than 3000. They left behind 2000 prisoners, and an immense quantity of artillery.

Nevertheless, general Benningsen, re-entering Pultusk, wrote to his sovereign that he had gained a signal victory over the emperor Napoleon, commanding in person three *corps d'armée*,—those of marshals Davout, Lannes, and Suchet,—and, further, the cavalry of Murat. But there was not, as has been seen, any *corps d'armée* of marshal Suchet, than general Suchet commanding simply a division of marshal Lannes' corps. There were upon the ground at Pultusk two divisions of marshal Lannes, one only of marshal Davout, none of the cavalry of prince Murat, and, still less, the emperor Napoleon commanding in person.

They have often spoken of the lying bulletins of the empire,—more correct, however, than any of the European publications of that period; but what must be thought of such a mode of recounting their own actions? The Russians were, most assuredly, brave enough to tell the truth.

On the same day, the 26th, the two divisions remaining with marshal Davout, as well as the two divisions composing the corps of marshal Augereau, arrived in front of Golymin. This village was surrounded by a girdle of wood and marsh, intermingled with some hamlets, behind which the Russians were established, with a strong reserve even in the village of Golymin.

Marshal Davout opening out by the right, that is to say, by the road to Pultusk, ordered the road to be attacked that formed on his side the obstacle to be overcome to enter Golymin. Marshal Augereau opening on the left, that is, by the road of Lopaczym, had to cross the marshes, studded with

clumps of wood, and in the midst of them a village to carry, that of Ruskovo, by which ran the only practicable road. The brave infantry of marshal Davout repelled, but not without loss, the Russian infantry, consisting of detached corps from those of Saken and Gallitzin. After a lively fire of musketry, they met them with the bayonet, and constrained them, by a contest body to body, to abandon the wood upon which they supported themselves. At the right of the wood thus disputed, marshal Davout forced the road from Pultusk to Golymin, and sent upon the Russians a part of the cavalry reserve under the command of Rapp, one of his intrepid aides-de-camp, that Napoleon kept under his hand to employ upon trying occasions. Rapp overthrew the Russian infantry, turned the woods, and overcame every obstacle that covered Golymin. But exposed to a hot fire, he had his arm broken. On the left, Augereau crossed the marshes, in spite of the enemy's force placed upon that point, carried the village of Ruskovo, and marched on his side upon Golymin, the common object of the continual attacks of the French. They penetrated into the place towards the end of the day, and made themselves masters of it, after a very warm engagement with the reserve of Doctorow's division. As at Pultusk, the French took a good many pieces of artillery, some prisoners, and strewed the ground with Russian bodies. For, fighting against the Russians, the French made fewer prisoners of their enemies, but killed more.

This day, the 26th, the French columns were every where engaged with the Russian, over a space of twenty-five leagues. Through the effect of a chance impossible to guard against when the communications are difficult, while Lannes had before him two or three times more Russians than he had of French, the other corps scarcely encountered their own equivalent, for marshals Augereau and Davout at Golymin had no enemy to combat, as was the case with marshal Soult in his march on Ciechanow, and marshal Bernadotte in his march on Biezun. However, marshal Bessières, endeavouring to keep clear the left wing with the second cavalry reserve, had met the Prussians at Biezun, and had made a good number of prisoners. Marshal Ney, who formed the extreme left of the army, had marched from Strasburg to Soldau and Mlawa, pushing before him the corps of Lestocq. Reaching Soldau on the 26th, at the same moment Lannes was fighting at Pultusk, when marshals Davout and Augereau were fighting at Golymin, he had given a direction to the division of Marchand on Mlawa, in order to turn the position of Soldau,—a necessary precaution, because there might be discovered there difficulties that were insurmountable. In fact, the town of Soldau was situated in the midst of an impracticable marsh, that could be crossed by one causeway only, 600 or 700 fathoms long, carried sometimes on the ground, sometimes on the bridge, which the enemy had taken care to cut down: 6000 Prussians, with cannon, guarded this causeway. One battery swept along its whole length, and a second, fixed upon a spot in the marsh, well chosen, commanded it angularly. Ney, with the 69th and 76th, marched rapidly; threw beams of timber over the portions of the bridges cut away, raised batteries as they went on; overturned with the bayonet the infantry arranged in column upon the causeway, and entered with the fugitives into the town of Soldau. There a warm action took place with the Prussians. It was necessary to take Soldau house by house. The French did not succeed until after unequalled efforts at the close of day. But the brave general Lestocq rallied his columns behind Soldau, and made his soldiers swear to retake the post lost. The Prussians, treated by the Russians after Jena as the Austrians after Ulm, desired to avenge their honour, and prove that in bravery they were inferior to none: they kept their word. Four times, from seven o'clock in the evening until midnight, they attacked Soldau with the bayonet, and four times they were repulsed. Their courage had all the rage of despair. They finished at last by retiring after an immense loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Thus in this day, for a space of twenty-five leagues, from Pultusk as far as Soldau, there had been obstinate fighting; and the Russians, every where defeated where they had attempted to resist, were only saved by abandoning their artillery and baggage. Their army was weakened 20,000 men out of 115,000. Many of them were wounded, killed, or prisoners. A great number of old Poles had deserted. The French had taken eighty pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, and a considerable quantity of baggage. The French had not lost a single prisoner, nor had one deserter, but the fire of the enemy had killed or wounded from 4000 to 5000 men.

The design of Napoleon, intended to separate the Russians from the sea, and to throw them, by a change of movement, from the Ukra upon the Narew,—from the rich shore of Old Prussia, into the woody, marshy, uncultivated part of Poland, had succeeded on every point; although on none had he fought one of his great battles, which will ever be a striking sign of the skilful manœuvres of that immortal captain. The heroic action of Lannes at Pultusk was a defeat for the Russians,—but a defeat free from disaster,—which was as novel a thing for them as for the French. Still, if there had been a means of marching the next day, or the next day but one, the Russians would have been obliged to deliver up the trophies, which they were not able to dispute very long with French bravery and skill. Thrown beyond the Ukra, the Orezyc, and Narew, into an impenetrable forest of more than fifteen or even twenty leagues in extent, included in the space between Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Ortelsburg, their complete destruction had been the inevitable effect of the profound combinations of Napoleon, and of the nullified or unlucky combinations of their generals. But it was impossible to march a step without falling into inextricable embarrassment. Some of the men remained buried to the middle in those frightful quagmires, and were not able to extricate themselves but when others came to help them out; many died in such places for want of help.

Napoleon, whose plans had never been better conceived, whose soldiers had never been more brave, was obliged to halt, after having made one or two marches in advance, in order to be well assured of the route of the Russians and of their flight towards the Pregel. A great loss of men

and guns caused to the enemy, and winter quarters ensured in the centre of Poland, terminated worthily this extraordinary campaign, commenced upon the Rhine and terminated upon the Vistula. The state of the heavens and of the ground sufficiently explains why the results obtained near its conclusion had neither the greatness nor the rapidity to which Napoleon had accustomed the world. Doubtless, the Russians, surprised not to have succumbed as quickly as the Prussians at Jena, the Austrians at Ulm, and they themselves at Austerlitz, grew puffed up with pride at a defeat less prompt than customary, and dilated with fable on their pretended success. They should not boast here. They had not been more fortunate this time than at Austerlitz, if, as at Austerlitz, the lakes had been found frozen in place of impracticable sloughs. But the season, altogether unusual, that in place of a frozen soil offered one of mud, saved them from disaster. It was a caprice of fortune, which had, so far, too much favoured Napoleon, for him not to have pardoned her for this slight inconstancy. But he would have gained by what he reflected upon there, and by all of which he attained a knowledge. Moreover, his soldiers encamped upon the Vistula, his eagles planted in Warsaw, were an extraordinary spectacle with which he was satisfied ; for Europe remained peaceable, Austria affrighted and restrained, and France confident.

He remained two or three days at Golymin, with the intention to procure some little rest for his army ; and on the 1st of January, 1807, he returned to Warsaw, in order to arrange the establishment of his winter quarters.

If one would better appreciate the situations of which he made choice for the cantonment of his troops, it is needful to retrace the site of the places beyond the Vistula. That succession of lakes, of which mention has several times been made, and which here separates Old Prussia from Poland, or the Slavonic from the German country, the region rich and maritime from the region interior and poor, turns the greater part of the water-courses towards the interior of the country, by a succession of rivers, such as the Omulew, Orezyc, and Ukra, which fall into the Narew, and by the Narew into the Vistula. And while by the Omulew, the Orezyc, and the Ukra, the Narew receives the waters of the lakes which are not able to empty themselves in the sea, descending from the west, it receives by the Bug the waters which descend from the east and from the centre of Poland, it confounds itself with the Bug at Sierock, and, swelled by all these influxes, takes its course, in a single bed, to the Vistula, which it joins at Modlin.

The Narew offers then a common trunk, which supports itself on the Vistula, and around which the Bug to the right, the Ukra, Orezyc, and Omulew to the left, are attached, like so many ramifications. It is between these different ramifications, and by supporting itself on the principal trunk towards Sierock and Modlin, that Napoleon distributed the different corps of his army.

Napoleon quartered Lannes between the Vistula, the Narew, and the Bug, in the angle formed by the water-courses, guarding Warsaw at the same time with Suchet's division, Jablona, the bridge of Okunin, and Sierock by the division of Gazan. The head quarters of Lannes were at Sierock, at the confluence of the Bug and Narew. The corps of marshal Davout was quartered in the angle described by the Bug and the Narew, his head quarters being at Pultusk, and his posts extending as far as Brok on the Bug and Ostrolenka on the Narew. The corps of marshal Soult was established behind the Orezyc, having his head quarters at Golymin, uniting with his corps the reserve of cavalry, and having thus the means of covering the vast extent of his front by the numerous squadrons placed at his disposal. The corps of marshal Augereau was lodged at Plonsk, behind marshal Soult, occupying the angle opened between the Vistula and Ukra, having his head quarters at Plonsk. The corps of marshal Ney was placed at the extreme left of Augereau, towards Mlawa, at the head of the Orezyc and Ukra, near the lakes, protecting the flank of the four corps that radiated around Warsaw, and connecting himself with the corps of marshal Bernadotte, who defended the Lower Vistula. Bernadotte, cantoned very near the sea, in advance of Graudenz and Elbing, had the task of guarding the Lower Vistula, and of covering the siege of Dantzic, which it was indispensable to undertake to ensure the position of the army. This siege was, besides, destined to form the interlude of the campaign which was about to finish, and that which was to open in the spring.

At the first appearance of an enemy each corps had orders to concentrate itself, that of marshal Lannes at Sierock, of marshal Davout at Pultusk, of marshal Soult at Golymin, of marshal Augereau at Plonsk, of marshal Ney at Mlawa, and that of marshal Bernadotte between Graudenz and Elbing towards Osterode; the four first ordered to defend Warsaw, the fifth to connect his quarters on the Narew to those of the sea-shore, and the last to protect the Lower Vistula and the siege of Dantzic.

To this able disposition of his cantonments were joined the precautions of an admirable forecast. The soldiers, not having ceased to bivouac from the commencement of the campaign, that is, from the preceding month of October, were at last to be lodged in the villages, and to live there, but in such a manner as always to be able to unite at the first moment of danger. The light cavalry of the line, and heavy cavalry, arranged one behind the other, and supported by some detachments of light infantry, formed a curtain in advance of the cantonments, to keep away the Cossacks and prevent surprises, by means of frequent reconnoitrings. The troops devoted to this very hard service during the winter, were sheltered by cabins, of which the timber, so abundant in Poland, furnished the materials.

Orders were given to ransack the country to discover the corn and potatoes, hidden underground by the inhabitants who had taken flight, to collect the dispersed cattle, and to create magazines with what could be gathered up, which, established near each corps and regularly delivered out, would thus prevent all spoliation and waste. The corps, which were not advantageously placed in regard to alimentary resources, were to receive from Warsaw supplies of grain, forage, and meat.

This, when it was sent to them, embarked upon the Vistula, descended that river as far as the point which approached nearest each corps, and was there landed and carried on by the army waggons, or by those organized in the country. Napoleon had ordered all the services to be paid for in money, either on account of the Poles, whom he wished to manage, or on account of the inhabitants, whom he hoped to bring back through the expectation of profit.

It must be observed, that each corps being quartered in a manner so as to be able to carry itself rapidly to the place of danger, had a base on the Vistula or on the Narew, in order to avail itself of water carriage. Thus marshal Lannes at Warsaw, marshal Davout at Pultusk, marshal Augereau at Wyszogrod, marshal Soult at Plock, marshal Ney at Thorn, and marshal Bernadotte at Marienbourg and Elbing, had each a base on this vast line of navigation. It was upon the different points that they were to find their depôts, their hospitals, their manufactures of food, and the workshops for repairs, because it was there that they were able to bring with the most facility all the materials necessary to such establishments.

There is only seen in the ordinary recitals of war, armies formed and ready to enter upon action; no one imagines what it costs in labour to place at his post the man armed, equipped, fed, instructed, and, in fact, cured, if he has been sick or wounded. All these difficulties increase in proportion as the climate changes, or he is removed from the point of departure. The greater part of generals or governments neglect this species of care, and their armies melt away in the twinkling of an eye. Those alone who apply themselves with steadiness and ability succeed in preserving their numerous troops in good order. The operation that is here described is the most admirable example of this kind of difficulty completely conquered and surmounted.

Napoleon wished, that after having chosen the places proper for each cantonment and collected the necessary stores, or brought from Warsaw those which were wanting, they should construct ovens and repair the mills destroyed. He ordered that when they had ensured the regular provisions for the troops, and that they came to surpass in the confection of food, the quantity indispensable for the daily consumption, they should form a reserve store of bread, biscuit, and spirit, not in the place where the depôt was fixed, but in the place named for the assemblage of each *corps d'armée*, in case of attack. His motive was easily divined. He desired that if a sudden appearance of the enemy obliged them to take arms, each corps should have enough to support itself during a march of seven or eight days. There was not more time necessary in general to accomplish a great operation and to decide a campaign.

With the money contributions collected in Prussia, that were united at first on the Oder, and afterwards transported to the Vistula by means of the artillery cars, Napoleon furnished the pay duly, and more, he granted extraordinary aid to the *masses* of the regiments. By the *masses* is understood the portions of the pay devoted in common to feed, clothe, and warm the soldier. It was a mode of adding to the support of the troops, proportioned to the difficulty of living, or to the more rapid consumption of the objects of equipment.

The first days of their establishment in the midst of the marshes and forests of Poland, and during the rigour of winter, were painful. If the cold had been sharp, the soldier, warmed at the expense of the Polish forests, had suffered less from the frost than from that penetrating humidity, that softened the ground, rendered carriage nearly impossible, the fatigues of service greater, saddened the sight, mollified the body, and abated the courage. There could not be in such a country a worse winter than a rainy one. The temperature varied without ceasing from frost to thaw, never reaching more than one or two degrees of cold, and falling soon towards the humidity and softness of autumn. Thus frost was wished for here, as in the finer climates they wish for the sun, or the verdure of spring.

However, in a few days their situation became better. The corps lived in the villages abandoned by the inhabitants; the advanced guards constructed cabins of pine-branches. They found a good many potatoes, and a sufficiency of animal food; but they longed for bread, being soon tired of potatoes. By little and little they discovered corn concealed in the woods, and collected it into the magazines. They also received, by the Vistula and Narew, those stores which the activity of the Jews contrived to embark and send down to Warsaw, across the military cordon of Austria. A shrewd corruption, practised by those able traders, set to sleep the vigilance of the guardians of the Austrian frontier. The contractors, well paid either in salt taken from the Prussian stores, or in hard cash, executed the orders given with sufficient punctuality. The ovens and mills destroyed were re-established. Magazines of reserve began to be organized. The wine necessary for the soldier's health and good humour, drawn from all the towns of the north, where trade had attracted it in abundance, and transported by the Oder, the Warta, and the Netze, as far as the Vistula, arrived as well, though brought with more difficulty. Every corps did not enjoy the same advantage. The corps of marshals Davout and Soult, more advanced in the woody country, and far away from the navigation of the Vistula, suffered most from privation. The corps of marshals Lannes and Augereau, established nearer the great river of Poland, suffered less. The indefatigable Ney opened abundant resources by his industry and hardihood. He was very close to the Germanic part of the Prussian territory, which was extremely rich, and he further adventured himself as far as the banks of the Pregel. There he made bold expeditions, setting his soldiers at work when the ground got hard frozen, and thus he foraged as far as the gates of Kœnigsberg, which at one time he could fain have surprised and taken.

The corps of Bernadotte being on the Vistula, was well placed for obtaining provisions. But the vicinity of the Prussian garrisons of Graudenz, Dantzick, and Elbing much incommoded him, and prevented his enjoying the resources of the country so much as he might have done without their vicinity.

After several encounters with the Cossacks, they were forced to leave the French cantonments in peace. It was found that the light cavalry was sufficient to keep watch, and that the heavy cavalry suffered greatly in the advanced cantonments. Thus Napoleon, enlightened by an experience of some days, made a change in his dispositions. He recalled the heavy cavalry towards the Vistula. The cuirassiers of general Hautpoul were cantoned about Thorn; the dragoons of all the divisions from Thorn as far as Warsaw; the cuirassiers of general Nansouty, behind the Vistula, between that river and the Pilica. The light cavalry, reinforced by some brigades of dragoons, remained at the advanced posts; but it came alternately, two regiments at a time, to refresh upon the Vistula, where forage was abundant. The division of Gudin, of Davout's corps, the most ill-treated of the whole army, because it had taken part in two hard-fought battles, those of Auerstadt and Pultusk, was sent to Warsaw, to indemnify itself there for its past fatigues and combats.

Most assuredly the army was not as well treated at the very bottom of Poland as it had been at Boulogne camp, where all the means of France had been devoted to provide for its wants. But it had what was necessary, and sometimes more. Napoleon answered Fouché, the minister, who made known to him the rumours spread abroad by the malevolent, concerning the sufferings of the soldiers, in this way—"It is true that the magazines of Warsaw are not well provisioned, and the impossibility of collecting there, in a short time, a great quantity of grain, has rendered food scarce; but it is as absurd to think that corn, wine, meat, and potatoes can be wanting in Poland, as it would be to say they were wanting in Egypt.

"I have at Warsaw a manufacture which gives me 100,000 rations per day; I have also one at Thorn; I have magazines at Posen, at Lowicz, on the whole line; I have enough to feed the army for more than a year. You will remember that, during the expedition to Egypt, letters from the army said that they were dying of hunger. Let articles be written to this effect. It is plain enough that the army might have wanted something at the moment when it expelled the Russians from Warsaw, but the productions of the country are such, that there is no reason for any fear upon the subject." (*Warsaw, Jan.* 18, 1807.)

There were, however, a considerable number of sick, more than was accustomed to be seen in this brave army. They were attacked with fevers and severe pains, in consequence of their continual bivouacs, in a cold atmosphere, and upon wet ground. It was easy to judge of this by what occurred to the chief officers themselves. Several of the marshals, and those in particular denominated the "Italians," and the "Egyptians," because they had served in Italy and Egypt, found themselves seriously indisposed. Murat could not join in the later operations on the Narew. Augereau, suffering from the rheumatism, had been obliged to exclude himself from contact with that cold and humid air. Lannes, fallen ill at Warsaw, had been obliged to separate from the fifth corps, which he was no longer able to command.

Napoleon completed the general care of his soldiers by the particular care, not less pressing, for the sick and wounded. He had 6000 beds prepared at Warsaw: he also had a number got ready proportionably considerable at Thorn, Posen, and the rear between the Vistula and Oder. They took, at Berlin, the wool from the domains of the crown, and the tent-cloth, in order to make mattresses for the hospitals. Having Silesia at his disposition, which prince Jerome had occupied, and which abounded in cloth of all kinds, Napoleon ordered a large quantity to be bought and converted into shirts. He specially confided the direction of the hospitals to M. Daru, and prescribed himself a particular organization for these establishments. He determined to have in every hospital an infirmary governor, always provided with ready money, ordered, under his own responsibility, to procure for the sick all of which they had need; and they were watched over by a Catholic priest. This priest, at the same time that he exercised a spiritual ministry, would also exercise a species of paternal vigilance, giving an account to the emperor, and making him acquainted with the least negligence towards the sick, of whom he was thus constituted the protector. Napoleon desired that this priest should have a regular appointment, and that each hospital should in some sort become a moving cure, following after the army.

Such were the endless cares to which that great captain gave his mind, that the hatred of party spirit represented at the time of his fall as a barbarous conqueror, pushing men forward to butchery, without making himself anxious about food for them when they marched, or about the cure of those whom he had led to mutilation when they were wounded; caring no more for them than for the animals that drew his cannon and baggage.

After having thus been employed in taking care of his men, with a zeal which was not less noble for being interested, because there were not wanting generals and sovereigns, who abandoned to misery the soldiers who were the instruments of their power and their glory, Napoleon directed his attention to the works undertaken on the Vistula, and to the punctual arrival of his reinforcements, in such a manner that in the spring his army would present itself to the enemy more formidable than ever. He had ordered, as has been seen, the works at Prague, wishing that Warsaw should be able to support and defend itself, with a simple garrison, in case he should place himself in advance. After having examined all with his own eyes, he resolved to establish eight redoubts, closed at the gorge, with scarp and counterscarp, faced with wood, (a species of revêtement of which the siege of Dantzic soon made the value appreciated,) and thus enclose within their circuit the large suburb of Prague. He added a work, that, placed in the rear of these eight redoubts, and in advance of the bridge of boats which connected Prague with Warsaw, should serve, at the same time, as a support to this species of strong fortress, as well as a *tête de pont* to the bridge of Warsaw. He commanded at Okunin, where they had thrown bridges over the Narew and Ukra, a series of works to cover them, and guarantee their exclusive possession to the French army. The same thing was ordered at

the bridge of Modlin, which had been thrown over at the confluence of the Vistula and Narew; making use of an island upon which to place the materials for the passage and for the construction of an offensive work of the greatest strength. Thus, between the three points of Warsaw, Okunin, and Modlin, where it was necessary to carry so much over such great water-courses, Napoleon secured all the passages for himself, and interdicted them to the Russians, in such a manner that these great natural obstacles, converted into facilities for himself, and into insurmountable difficulties for the enemy, became, in his possession, powerful means for manœuvring, and, above all, able to take care of themselves, if the necessities of the war should oblige him to ascend towards the north yet more than he had yet done. Napoleon completed his system by a work of the same kind at Sierock, at the confluence of the Narew and Bug, with the timber that abounded in those places; for with the ready money which he had at his disposal, he was certain to have, at the same time, materials, and hands to use them.

Napoleon had drawn from Paris two regiments of infantry, the 15th light and 58th of the line, a regiment of fusileers of the guard, and a regiment of the municipal guard; he had drawn a second regiment from Brest, and one each from St. Lô and Boulogne. These seven regiments were on the march, as well as the provisional regiments intended to conduct the recruits of the battalions of depôt to the battalions of war. Two among them, the 15th light and 58th, had advanced before the others and joined the corps of marshal Mortier, that, raised up to eight French regiments, independently of the Dutch and Italian regiments, completed his effective force. Napoleon, profiting by this reinforcement, which at that moment went beyond the necessary strength of the 8th corps, because, thus far, no undertaking seemed likely to threaten the shores of the Baltic, detached from it the 2nd and 15th light, forming 4000 good French infantry. He added to these the Baden contingent and the eight Polish battalions raised at Posen,—the legion of the north, full of old Poles, for a long time engaged in the French service,—the four fine regiments of cuirassiers arrived from Italy,—and, finally, two of the five regiments of light cavalry that had also arrived from thence—the 19th and 23rd chasseurs. He composed a new *corps d'armée* with these troops, to which he gave the name of the 10th corps,—the Germans, who were in Silesia under prince Jerome, having already received the title of the 9th corps. He gave the command of the 10th corps to old marshal Lefebvre, whom he had brought with him to the grand army, and placed, for the time, at the head of the infantry of the guard. He ordered him to invest Colberg, and commence the siege of Dantzick. This last city was of great importance, from its relation to the position which it occupied on the theatre of war. It commanded the Lower Vistula, protected the arrival of the enemy by sea, and contained immense resources, which would afford abundance to the army if they were able to make themselves masters of it. Besides, when it was not taken, any offensive movement of the enemy towards the sea, pushed beyond the Lower Vistula, would oblige the French to quit the Higher Vistula, and retrograde towards the Oder. Napoleon was, therefore, determined to make the siege of Dantzic the great operation of the winter.

Napoleon, thus devoting the bad season to taking the fortresses, wished not only to besiege those of the Lower Vistula, which were placed on the left, but also those of the Higher Oder, which lay upon the right. His brother Jerome, seconded by general Vandamme, as has been seen, had to achieve the submission of Silesia, by acquiring successively the fortresses of the Oder. These, constructed with care by the great Frederick, to ensure completely that precious conquest which was the glory of his reign, presented great difficulties to surmount, not only by the extent and beauty of the works, but by the garrisons to which their defence was committed. The reduction of Magdebourg, Custrin, and Stettin, had covered with shame the commandants, who had delivered them up under the influence of the general want of moral feeling. This soon produced a reaction in the Prussian army, at first so much discouraged after the battle of Jena. Indignant honour had appealed to the hearts of all the military, and they were determined to die honourably, even when destitute of the hope of conquering. The king had threatened with terrible punishments the governors who gave up the fortresses committed to their care, before having done all that, according to the regulations of the art of war, constitutes an honourable defence. Before all they had began to understand, that the strong towns remaining on the left and right of Napoleon had acquired a real importance, because they were so many points of support that were wanting to his bold line of march, and that seconded the resistance of his enemies. The resolution to defend themselves energetically was, therefore, well taken by all the governors of the Prussian garrisons.

Prince Jerome had with him only the Wirtemberghers and Bavarians, and with these auxiliary troops, a single French regiment, the 13th of the line, with some French squadrons of light cavalry besides. The German auxiliaries had not yet acquired the military value which they exhibited afterwards on more than one occasion. But general Vandamme, commanding the ninth corps under prince Jerome, general Montbrun commanding the cavalry, and the assistance of a young French staff full of ardour, inspired them, in a little time, with the spirit which then animated the French army, and communicated to all the troops in contact with it. Vandamme, who had never directed a siege, possessed none of the knowledge of an engineer officer; but he supplied all by a happy instinct for war, and undertook to make short work with those places in Silesia, although he knew that the governors of them were determined to make a good defence. He wished to employ the means which had succeeded at Magdebourg,—that of intimidating the inhabitants, in order to dispose them to surrender in spite of the garrisons. He began with Glogau, the place in Silesia nearest to the Lower Oder, and the military routes followed by the French troops. The garrison was not numerous, and demoralization still prevailed in its ranks. Vandamme had placed in battery a number of cannon and mortars of large calibre, and after some threats, followed up effectively, brought

the place to capitulate on the 2nd of December. They discovered there great resources in artillery, and warlike stores of all kinds. Vandamme then ascended the Oder, and commenced the investment of Breslau, situated on that river, about twenty leagues above Glogau.

It was with the Wirtemberg soldiers that Glogau had been taken. They were not numerous enough to besiege Breslau, the capital of Silesia, a town of 60,000 souls, provided with a garrison of 6000 men, with numerous and solid works, and a good governor. Prince Jerome, who had pushed as far as the environs of Kalisch, while the French army made its first entrance into Poland, had returned on the Oder; since Napoleon, firmly established on the Vistula, had no more need of the presence of the ninth corps towards his right. Vandamme, therefore, to undertake the siege of Breslau, had the Wirtemberg force, two Bavarian divisions, with some French engineers and artillery, besides the 13th regiment of the line. To execute the approaches of so extensive a fortress by a regular siege, seemed to him long and difficult. In consequence, as at Glogau, he endeavoured to intimidate the population. He selected in the suburb of St. Nicholas a place to establish incendiary batteries. A warm fire, directed at the interior of the town, did not attain the proposed object, owing to the vigour of the commandant. Vandamme, therefore, began to consider about a more serious attack. Breslau had for its principal means of defence a bastioned outwork, having a deep ditch filled with water from the Oder. But the French engineers perceived that this work had not every where a revêtement, and that in some places it only showed a scarp of earth. Vandamme conceived the idea of assaulting the work,—that not consisting of a wall of masonry, but a simple grassy slope, could be scaled by intrepid soldiers. It was necessary, first, to pass on rafts over the ditch inundated by the Oder. Vandamme prepared all that was necessary for this bold enterprise. Unfortunately, the preparations were discovered by the enemy,—an inconvenient moonlight shone on the night of the execution of the design, and from different causes the attempt failed. In the interim, the prince of Anhalt-Pless, who commanded the province, having united detachments from all the fortresses, and raised a levy of peasantry, which procured him altogether about 12,000 men, gave the garrison reason to hope for succour from without. Nothing could have happened more fortunately for the besiegers, than to have to settle in the open country the question of the capture of Breslau. Vandamme attacked the prince of Anhalt with the Bavarians and the 13th of the French line, beat him twice, and put him completely to the rout, and then returned before the fortress, deprived of all hope of succour. In the mean while a strong frost took place, and he resolved to pass the ditch upon the ice, and afterwards to scale the earthworks. The commandant, seeing himself exposed to a capture by assault,—a fearful danger for a rich and populous city,—consented to treat, and gave up the place on the 7th of January, after a resistance of a month, on the same conditions as Magdebourg, Custrin, and the other Prussian fortresses.

This conquest was not only brilliant, but singularly useful in the resources which it procured for the French army,—and, before all, by the command it assured the French of Silesia, the richest province of Prussia, and one of the richest in Europe. Napoleon congratulated Vandamme, and after Vandamme his brother Jerome, who had exhibited the intelligence of a good officer, and the courage of a brave soldier.

Some days afterward, the ninth corps made again a conquest,—that of Brieg, a place above Breslau, upon the Oder. All the centre of Silesia being conquered, there only remained to be taken Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Niese, which closed the doors of Silesia on the side of Bohemia. Napoleon ordered the siege of one after the other, and determined on a rigorous act, conformable to the rights of warfare, which was to destroy the works; and in consequence, he ordered that the fortifications of those already in his power should be blown up. He acted thus for a double reason—one of the present, the other of the future. He did not then wish to disseminate his troops by multiplying posts around him which it would be necessary to guard; and, in respect to the future, no more reckoning upon Prussia as an ally, and perceiving every day that he must not flatter himself about attaching Austria to his cause, he had nothing to hope from the misunderstanding that divided those two courts. Silesia, dismantled on the side of Austria, would become an object of uneasiness to Prussia, a cause of expense, and a reason why she should be enfeebled as much as possible.

Thus, in the rear of the army, on the left as well as on the right, the visible progress of the French operations attested that the enemy had it not in his power to trouble them, because of his suffering them to be completed. Some partizans alone who sallied out from the fortresses of Colberg and Dantzic, recruited by the Prussian prisoners, infested the roads. Several detachments were employed in their pursuit. A slight accident, which had nothing in it serious, for an instant, however, caused some fear for the tranquillity of Germany. Hesse, of which the sovereign had been dethroned, the fortresses dismantled, and the army disbanded, was naturally the most ill-disposed towards France of all the German provinces. 30,000 unlicensed men, idle, deprived of pay and the means of living, were, although disarmed, a dangerous leaven, that prudence counselled not to leave in the country. It had been thought wise to enlist a part of them, without stating where they would be made to serve. The intention was to employ them in Naples. The secret having been divulged through some indiscretion committed at Mayence, the newly enrolled men rose, saying that they were going to send the Hessians to perish in the Calabrias. General Lagrange, who commanded in Hesse, had very few troops at his command. The insurgents disarmed a French detachment, and threatened to make all Hesse revolt. But the foresight of Napoleon had provided the means to balance this vexatious event. Provisional regiments, sent from the Rhine, an Italian regiment marching to join the corps of marshal Mortier, the fusileers of the guard drawn from Paris, and one of the regiments of chasseurs coming from Italy, were not far away. They were marched in all

haste towards Cassel, and the insurrection was immediately quelled.

The immense country which extends from the Rhine to the Vistula, and from the mountains of Bohemia to the North Sea, had, therefore, submitted. The fortresses surrendered one after another to the French troops, and their reinforcements marching peaceably, did the duty of police as they proceeded towards the theatre of war to recruit the grand army.

The Russian general, Benningsen, had showed so much audacity in styling himself victorious, that the emperor Alexander at Petersburg, and the king of Prussia at Kœnigsberg, had received and accepted congratulations. Although the material results, such as the retreat of the Russians to the Pregel, the tranquil establishment of the French on the Vistula, and the sieges undertaken on the Oder, should have been an answer to all these wild fancies of an enemy who believed Benningsen was victorious, because he had not undergone a disaster as complete as that of Austerlitz or Jena, such persons affected the exhibition of a certain degree of pleasure. This pleasure broke out more particularly at Vienna, in the heart of the imperial court. Emperor, archdukes, ministers, grandees,—all equally congratulated each other on the event. Nothing was more natural or legitimate. It is only needful to return to the language held by the cabinet of Vienna in its recent communications with Napoleon,—language which, perhaps, surpassed the limits of dissimulation permitted under any circumstances. For the rest, the error which caused such pleasure to the enemies of the French was not of long duration. M. Lucchesini, who had quitted the court of Prussia at the same time as M. Haugwitz, passed through Vienna, to return to his native country of Lucca. He was no longer under any illusion himself, nor had he any interest in prolonging the illusion of others, and he in consequence told the truth respecting the sanguinary conflicts of which the Vistula had become the scene. The quagmires of Poland, he said, had paralysed victor and vanquished, and permitted the Russians to withdraw themselves from the pursuit of the French. But the Russians, beaten every where out and out, had no chance of keeping ground against the formidable soldiers of Napoleon. It was necessary to wait until the spring, perhaps only till the first frost, when he would make an irruption upon the Pregel, and terminate the war by some striking action. The French army was not, added M. Lucchesini, either demoralized or deprived of resources, as it was pretended; it lived well, accommodating itself to the humid cold climate of Poland, as it had formerly accommodated itself to the dry and burning sky of Egypt; it had, in fact, a blind faith in the genius and fortune of its chief.

This information, from a calm, disinterested observer, cooled the delusive joy of the Austrians. The court of Vienna, as much to obviate the doubts of Napoleon by an amicable movement, as to have from the French head-quarters correct information, requested authority to send the baron Vincent to Warsaw. The ministers of the foreign courts, who had wished to follow M. de Talleyrand to Berlin, some even to Warsaw, had been politely refused, as it was inconvenient, and they were often false-speaking. It was agreed, however, to receive M. Vincent, for the purpose of showing a wish of accommodating Austria, and of furnishing her with a direct means to become acquainted with the truth, which the French had more interest in letting her know than in concealing. The baron Vincent arrived at Warsaw towards the end of January.

Napoleon employed the month of January, 1807, either in consolidating his position on the Vistula and Oder, in increasing his army by reinforcements from Italy and France, or in endeavouring to raise up the east against Russia. He held himself ready to meet an immediate attack, but did not much believe the Russians were preparing one yet more formidable in spite of the severities of the season. After the affair of Pultusk, general Benningsen, beaten, although he had not said it, because people do not retire in all haste when they are victorious, had passed the Narew, and found himself in that country of heath, of marsh, and of wood, which extends itself between the Narew and the Bug. He had received two of Buxhoewden's divisions, uselessly left by him at Popowo, on the Bug, during the last engagements. He ascended the Narew with these two divisions, and those of the army which had fought at Pultusk. At the same moment, the two demi-divisions of general Benningsen, which had not been able to rejoin him, joined the two divisions of general Buxhoewden, which were at Golymin and Makow, and remained on the other bank of the Narew, the bridges of which had been carried away by the ice. The two portions of the Russian army, thus reduced to the impossibility of communicating with each other, ascended the banks of the Narew, easy enough to have been destroyed, thus isolated, if the French had known their situation, and if the state of the roads, in addition, had permitted them to be overtaken. But a knowledge of every thing in war is not to be reached easily. The most able general is he, who, by the aid of his own sagacity, attains the point of a little less ignorance than customary of an enemy's designs. In every other circumstance, Napoleon, by his prodigious activity, and with his art of profiting by a victory, would have soon discovered the perilous situation of the Russian army, and would infallibly have destroyed the portion which he pursued. But plunged into the sloughs, deprived of bread and artillery, he was reduced to the most complete immobility. Having brought his soldiers from the extremity of Europe, he considered it a sort of cruelty to try their devotion by longer proof.

General Benningsen and general Buxhoewden made some attempts to unite; but the bridges, several times replaced, were as often carried away, and they found themselves obliged to ascend the Narew slowly, living as they were best able, endeavouring to form a junction by reaching some spot where it should be practicable. However, they succeeded in having a personal interview, meeting at Novogorod. Although little disposed to come to an understanding, they settled upon a plan, which was nothing less than to continue hostilities in spite of the state of the country and the season. General Benningsen, who by the strength of styling himself victorious at Pultusk had concluded by believing it, absolutely desired to under-

take the offensive, and by his influence decided the question of an immediate continuation of military operations, and of following a march altogether different from that which had first been adopted. In place of skirting the Narew and its tributaries, placing the woody country at their backs, which fixed the point of attack upon Warsaw, they resolved to take a great circuit, to turn, by a rear movement, the vast mass of forest; to traverse afterwards the line of lakes, and to march towards the maritime region by Braunsberg, Elbing, Marienburg, and Dantzic. They were certain of provisions while operating on this route, owing to the richness of the soil along the sea-shore. They besides flattered themselves that they should surprise the extreme left of the French cantonments, perhaps rout marshal Bernadotte, who was posted on the Lower Vistula, pass that river easily on which they had so many points of support, and, by marching beyond Dantzic, at a single blow destroy the position of Napoleon in advance of Warsaw. In casting the eye on the line that is described by the Vistula and Oder, in their course towards the Baltic, it will be remarked, that they run at first to the north-west, the Vistula as far as the environs of Thorn, the Oder to the vicinity of Custrin,—and that they turn back suddenly afterwards to run to the north-east,—thus forming a marked elbow, the Vistula towards Thorn, and the Oder towards Custrin. From this direction it results, before all in what concerns the Vistula, that the Russian corps that passed the river between Graudenz and Thorn, found itself much nearer Posen, the base of the French operations in Poland, than the French army encamped at Warsaw. The difference was nearly one-half. It was, therefore, a design well conceived to pass the Vistula between Thorn and Marienburg, supposing the perfect execution of the operation, upon which always depends the fate of the best plans. It has been already effectively demonstrated, more than once, that without exactness in the calculation of distance and time, without promptitude in marching, vigour in encounters, and firmness in following up an idea to its perfect accomplishment, every bold manœuvre would become as unfortunate as it might have been happy. Here in particular, if it failed, they were overreached by Napoleon, separated from Kœnigsberg, driven back upon the sea, and exposed to a real disaster,—because, to repeat another truth, already elsewhere expressed, people run, in every great combination, into as much danger as that which they would cause to an adversary.

The two Russian generals were scarcely in agreement on the plan to be followed, when a resolution, taken at St. Petersburg in consequence of the false statements of general Benningsen, conferred upon him the order of St. George, nominated him general-in-chief, and freed him from the military supremacy of old Kamenski, and the rivalry of general Buxhoewden. These two officers were, by the same resolution, recalled from the army.

General Benningsen remained alone at the head of the Russian troops, and naturally persisted in carrying out his own plan, hastening to put it in execution. He ascended the Narew as far as Tykoczyn, passed the Bober, near Goniondz, at the same place where Charles XII had crossed a century before, traversed the line of lakes, near the lake of Spirding, by Arys, Rhein, Rastenburg, and Bischoffstein. The names of the places indicate that he had reached the German country, in other words, oriental Prussia. On the 22nd of January, a month after the last actions at Pultusk, Golymin, and Soldau, he arrived at Heilsberg on the Alle. It was not at this rate he should have marched to surprise a vigilant enemy. Nevertheless, concealed by that impenetrable curtain of lakes and forests which separated the two armies, the movement of the Russians remained entirely unperceived by the French.

At this time general Essen had at last brought up his two divisions of reserve, so long before announced, which carried up the total number of divisions of the Russian army to ten, independently of the Prussian corps of general Lestocq. These two new divisions, composed of recruits, designed to guard, besides the Bug and the Narew, the position that the two divisions of general Buxhoewden had occupied before them, remained strangers to the operations of December. The division of Sedmaratzki was posted at Goniondz, on the Bober, to watch the line of lakes, to maintain the communications with the corps of general Essen, and to make the French apprehensive on the right. Of ten divisions general Benningsen only kept seven, to carry with him to the sea-shore and the Lower Vistula. After the losses of December, they might represent a force of 80,000 men, and of 90,000 [1], at least, with the Prussian corps of Lestocq.

It has already been remarked, that the waters of the lakes run some inwards by the Omulew, Orezyc, and Ukra, into the Narew and the Vistula,—that others run outwards, by small streams going directly to the sea, of which the principal is the Passarge, which falls straight into the Frische-Haff. The French corps spread, the right over the Narew and its tributaries, and the left over the Passarge, covered the line of the Vistula from Warsaw to Elbing. Marshals Lannes and Davout had their cantonments, as already said, along the Narew, from its entrance into the Vistula as far as Pultusk and above, forming the right of the French army, and covering Warsaw. The corps of marshal Soult was established between Omulew and Orezyc, from Ostrolenka to Willenberg and Chorzellen, giving a hand on one side to the troops of marshal Davout, and on the other to those of marshal Ney, and thus forming the centre of the French army. Marshal Ney, more in advance, at Hohenstein, on the Upper Passarge, connected himself with the position of marshal Soult at the sources of the Omulew, and with that of marshal Bernadotte behind the Passarge. This last, protected by the Passarge, occupying Osterode, Mohrungen, Preuss-Holland, and Elbing, formed the left of the French army towards the Frische-Haff, and covered the Lower Vistula as well as Dantzic.

[1] This is the statement of the narrator, Plotho himself, who, to enhance the merit of the Russian army, diminishes that of his government by always endeavouring to reduce the amount of the forces employed. It was strange, in fact, not to be able, upon his own frontier, to present to an enemy who came so far more than 90,000 men capable of fighting.

Marshal Ney, who had the most advanced position, added again to the distance which separated him from the main body of the army by the hardihood of his expeditions. When the frost began to render the soil of some consistence, he placed his light troops in carriages, and went as far as the environs of Kœnigsberg to search for provisions for his soldiers. He had in this way made some lucky captures, which had singularly contributed to the comfort of his corps. The Alle, the shores of which he scoured to its sources, near those of the Passarge, in a group of lakes between Hohenstein and Allenstein, then separates at a right angle, and while the Passarge runs towards the sea or Frische-Haff, the Alle runs direct towards the Pregel, in such a manner, that the Passarge and Alle, the Pregel and the sea, present, so to say, four sides of a long square. Marshal Ney, placed at Hohenstein, at the summit of the angle that the Alle and Passarge describe before they separate, having to his right, in the rear, the cantonments of marshal Soult; to his left, in the rear, those of marshal Bernadotte, descending and ascending by turns the water of the Alle in its course as far as the Pregel, could not fail to encounter the Russian army in its movement.

Napoleon, fearing that he would compromise himself, had several times reprimanded him, but the bold marshal persisting in going further than he had been authorized, encountered the Russian army, which had passed the Alle, going to pass the Passarge, at the environs of Deppen. It advanced in two columns, that of the two which was to cross the Passarge at Deppen was ordered to penetrate towards Liebstadt, to approach the Lower Vistula, and surprise the cantonments of marshal Bernadotte.

Marshal Ney, whose untractable temerity had at least the advantage of giving his friends timely notice, an advantage which should not encourage disobedience, because it has rarely such fortunate results,—marshal Ney hastened to fall back to acquaint marshal Bernadotte on his left, and marshal Soult on his right, of the danger which threatened them, and to send intelligence to the head-quarters at Warsaw of the sudden appearance of the enemy. He took at Hohenstein a well-chosen post, from whence he was able to go either to succour the cantonments of marshal Soult at Omulew, or of marshal Bernadotte behind the Passarge. He indicated to the last the situation of Osterode, a fine position on the elevated level ground, behind the woods and the lakes, where the first and sixth corps united, would be in a state to present themselves about 30,000 strong to the Russians, on a site nearly impregnable.

But the troops of marshal Bernadotte, scattered as far as Elbing, near the Frische-Haff, had great distances to march in order to assemble; and if general Benningsen had marched rapidly, he would have been able to surprise and destroy them before they could concentrate themselves. Marshal Bernadotte sent orders to the troops on his right to march directly upon Osterode, and to the troops of his left to unite on the common point of Mohrungen, which is on the road of Osterode, a little in the rear of Liebstadt, that is to say, very near the Russian advanced guard. The danger was pressing, because, the evening before, the advanced guard of the enemy had very roughly treated a French detachment left at Liebstadt. General Markoff, with about 15,000 or 16,000 men, formed the head of the right Russian column. It was the 25th of January, in the morning, at Pfarrers-Feldchen, having three battalions in the village, and in the rear a strong mass of infantry and cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte arrived on the spot, a short distance from Mohrungen, towards mid-day, with his troops, that, departing in the night, had already accomplished ten or twelve leagues of distance. He made his dispositions immediately, and threw a battalion of the 9th light into the village of Pfarrers-Feldchen, to take from the enemy that first point of support. This brave battalion entered with the bayonet at the charge, under a warm fire of musketry from the Russians, and sustained an obstinate conflict in the interior of the village. In the midst of the struggle the enemy captured an eagle, but it was soon retaken. Other Russian battalions came up to join those which were fighting, and marshal Bernadotte sent two battalions to the aid of the 9th, that, after a contest of extreme violence, remained masters of Pfarrers-Feldchen. Beyond he saw, upon elevated ground, the main column of the enemy, supported, the one side on a wood, the other on the lakes, and his front protected by a numerous artillery. Marshal Bernadotte, after having formed in line of battle the 8th, 94th of the line, and the 27th light, marched straight to the Russian position, under a murderous fire. He approached them boldly; and the Russians defended themselves with firmness. Fortune willed that general Dupont, arriving from the banks of the Frische-Haff, by the road of Preuss-Holland, showed himself with the 32nd and 96th, across the village of Georgenthal, on the Russian right. The last were not able to resist this double attack, and abandoned the field of battle, covered with dead bodies. This combat cost them 1500 or 1600 men killed and taken. It cost the French 600 or 700 killed or wounded. The dispersion of the troops and a great number of sick, were the cause that marshal Bernadotte was not able to unite at Mohrungen more than 8000 or 9000 men, to fight 15,000 or 16,000.

This first encounter had for a result to inspire the Russians with extreme circumspection, and to give to the troops of marshal Bernadotte time to assemble at Osterode, a position in which, joined with the troops of marshal Ney, they had nothing to fear. The 26th and 27th of January, in fact, marshal Bernadotte reached Osterode, and closed with marshal Ney, awaiting with a firm foot the ulterior enterprises of the enemy. General Benningsen, whether he was surprised at the resistance opposed to his march, or whether he wished to concentrate his army, united the whole at Liebstadt, and there halted.

It was the 26th or 27th of January, that Napoleon, successively informed, by tidings from different points, of the movement of the Russians, was completely aware of their intentions. He had at first thought the expeditions of marshal Ney had tempted the Russian commander to make reprisals, and at the first moment he expressed great discontent. But he was soon enlightened as

to the real cause of the appearance of the Russians, and could not mistrust its being, upon their side, an effort at some serious enterprise, having a very different object than that of disputing about their cantonments.

Although this winter campaign interrupted the rest of which the troops had need, Napoleon passed rapidly from regret to satisfaction, above all when he considered the new state of the temperature. The cold had become severe. The great rivers were not yet frozen, but the standing waters were entirely covered with ice, and Poland showed itself one vast frozen plain, in which cannon, horses, and men no more ran any risk of being ingulfed. Napoleon had recovered the freedom of manœuvring, and conceived an idea of terminating the war by striking a decisive blow.

His plan was taken at the instant, and was conformable to the new direction followed by the enemy. When the Russians threatened Warsaw, following the banks of the Narew, he had thought of opening out by Thorn with his left, reinforced in order to separate them from the Prussians, and to throw them into the chaos of woods and marshes presented by the interior country. This time, on the contrary, seeing them determined to follow the sea-shore to pass the Lower Vistula, he adopted the opposite course, that was, to ascend the Narew, which they abandoned, and, marching sufficiently high to overreach them, to return sharply upon them, in order to push them to the sea. This manœuvre, in case of success, was decisive; because, if, in the first place, the Russians fell back again towards the interior of Poland, they were exposed in a very difficult and dangerous situation; in the second case, thrown back towards the sea, they would find themselves, as the Prussians were at Prenzlow and Lubec, reduced to capitulate.

In consequence, Napoleon resolved to assemble his whole army on the corps of marshal Soult, taking that corps for the centre of his movements. While marshal Soult, uniting his divisions on those of the left, should march by Willenburg on Passenheim and Allenstein; marshal Davout, forming the extreme right of the army, was to go to the same point by Pultusk, Myszniec, and Ortelsburg; marshal Augereau, forming the rear-guard, would come there from Plonsk by Neidenburg and Hohenstein; marshal Ney, forming the left, would come there by Osterode. At the town of Allenstein, taken by Napoleon as the common rallying-point, the Passarge and Alle approaching each other, for a moment begin to separate. Once arrived at this point, if the Russians persisted in endeavouring to pass the Passarge, they were already upon their flank, and nearly passing beyond them. It was, therefore, at the town of Allenstein, that it was of moment to bring up in time the four corps of marshals Davout, Soult, Augereau, and Ney.

Murat was scarcely recovered from his indisposition, but his ardour supplied his want of strength. He mounted his horse the same day, and, after having received the verbal instructions of the emperor, he immediately assembled the light cavalry and dragoons, in order to lead at the head of marshal Soult's corps. The heavy cavalry, quartered on the Vistula towards Thorn, was as soon as possible to rejoin him.

Napoleon, informed of the presence of general Essen on the Bug and Narew, consented to send towards him the corps of marshal Lannes, which was the fifth; and ordered him to place himself at Sierock, to make a front to the two Russian divisions posted on that side, and fall upon them, on the first movement they might attempt to make upon Warsaw. Marshal Lannes being wholly incapable of taking the command of the fifth corps, on account of the state of his health, Napoleon replaced him by his aide-de-camp Savary, in whose intelligence and resolution he had entire confidence.

He directed his foot and horse-guards upon the rear of marshal Soult, and as to the reserve of grenadiers and voltigeurs, that had taken up its quarters behind the Vistula, between Warsaw and Posen, he deprived himself of it this time in order to make it occupy the environs of Ostrolenka, and form an intermediate *échelon* between the grand army and the fifth corps, left upon the Narew. This reserve was charged to succour the fifth corps, if the divisions of General Essen should threaten Warsaw; in the contrary case, it would rejoin the head-quarters.

These dispositions, arranged towards the right, Napoleon took on the left precautions still more deeply calculated, which showed the vast bearing which he hoped to give to his movement. He ordered marshal Bernadotte, who was at Osterode, to fall back slowly on the Vistula, in case of need even to fall back as far as Thorn, in order to draw the enemy there; then to steal away, covering himself with an advanced guard as with a curtain; and to go, by a forced march, and connect himself with the left of the grand army, in order to render the manœuvre more decisive, by which he would fling back the Russians upon the sea and the Lower Vistula.

Yet Napoleon did not confine himself alone to these precautions. Fearing that the Russians, if he succeeded in turning them, would imitate the example of general Blucher, who, separated from Stettin, had retreated upon Lubec; and that they would betake themselves from the Vistula to the Oder; he provided for this danger by an able employment of the tenth corps. This corps, designed to undertake the siege of Dantzic, under the command of marshal Lefebvre, was not entirely assembled, marshal Lefebvre having only the 15th of the line and the 2nd light regiments, the cuirassiers of general d'Espagne, and the eight Polish battalions of Posen. Napoleon ordered him to remain with his troops along the Vistula, above Graudenz. The fusileers of the guard, the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, the legion of the north, two of five regiments of the chasseurs of Italy, already arrived in Germany; finally, the corps of Baden, that were to unite at Stettin under general Ménard, and to ascend towards Posen, were to join marshal Lefebvre, who would go to them or leave them to come to him, according to circumstances, in such a manner as to fall all together on the Russian corps that should go from the Vistula to the Oder. Finally, marshal Mortier had orders to quit the blockade of Stralsund, placing there, in good lines of circumvallation, the troops indispensably necessary to the blockade, then to join with the remainder of his troops those assembled under general Ménard,

and, taking the command, if this assemblage, in place of ascending as far as the Vistula to reinforce marshal Lefebvre, should, by the circumstances attendant upon the pursuit, be remanded towards the Oder.

Napoleon left Duroc at Warsaw, in order to have a person there in whom he felt confidence. Prince Poniatowski had organized some Polish battalions. Those which were most advanced in their organization were, with the provisionary regiments arriving from France to guard the works of Prague, under the orders of general Lemarrois. Napoleon ordered away from Prague all the carriages which he had at his disposal laden with bread and biscuit, hoping that the frost would facilitate the transport, and thus his soldiers be in want of nothing. In virtue of these orders, issued on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of January, the army would be united at Allenstein on the 3rd or 4th of February. It must be remarked, that the reinforcements, brought with so much foresight out of France and Italy, were still on their march; that the 2nd light, the 15th of the line, and the four regiments of cuirassiers borrowed from the army of Naples, were all yet arrived on the Vistula; that the other corps had not reached the line of the Elbe; that Napoleon had scarcely received the first detachments of the recruits drawn from the depôts on the day after the battle of Jena, which had procured a few more or less than 12,000 men, which was insufficient to fill up the void produced by the fire of the enemy or the diseases of the season; that the greater part of the corps were reduced a third or a quarter; that those of Lannes, Davout, Soult, Augereau, Ney, and Bernadotte, adding to them the guard and the division of the grenadiers of Oudinot and the cavalry of Murat, did not make more than a few thousand beyond 100,000 men [1]; and that, leaving Lannes and Oudinot on the right, having only a very uncertain chance of bringing Bernadotte towards the left, he would have remaining about 75,000 men, more or less, to give battle to general Benningsen, who, with the Prussians, had 90,000.

In despite of this numerical superiority, Napoleon, calculating upon his soldiers and the road, which seemed to admit of rapid concentration, entered upon the campaign, his heart full of hope. He wrote to the archchancellor, Cambacérès, and to M. de Talleyrand, that he had broken up his quarters, "to profit by a fine frost and good weather;" that the roads were excellent; that he must say nothing to the empress, "in order not to cause her any useless anxiety;" but that he was in full movement, and "that it should cost the Russians dear if they did not change their minds."

Leaving Warsaw on the 30th, Napoleon was in the evening, at Prasznitz, and on the 31st at Willenberg. Murat, having moved forward, had assembled in all haste his regiments of cavalry, except the cuirassiers dispersed along the Vistula, and formed the advanced guard of marshal Soult, already concentrated on Willenberg. Marshal Davout had performed forced marches to reach Myszniec, and marshal Augereau to reach Neidenburg. During this time marshal Ney had assembled his divisions at Hohenstein, ready to carry himself in advance, while the main body of the army had passed his right. Marshal Bernadotte, slowly retrograding, had established himself in the rear to the left of Ney, at Loebau, then at Strasburg, and finally, in the environs of Thorn. Thus far, all had passed as was desired. The enemy had, with his right column, followed step by step the movement of marshal Bernadotte, and by that of his left was little advanced towards Allenstein. An unwarrantable state of inaction retained him some days in this position. General Benningsen, full of hardihood when he conceived a great manœvre on the Lower Vistula, hesitated now, when it became a question to engage in the audacious movement, which it was very much above his capacity and that of his army to perform. It is necessary, in order to run a hazard in such enterprises, to possess the confidence inspired by the habit of being victorious, and furthermore, the experience of different and sudden chances, in front of which one is condemned to pass before arriving at success. General Benningsen, who had neither this confidence nor this experience, floated amid a thousand uncertainties, alleging to others and to his own mind pretexts altogether false, to cover his irresolution, sometimes saying that he awaited provisions and ammunition, sometimes affecting to believe, perhaps really believing, that the retrograde movement of Bernadotte was common to the whole French army, and that they had obtained the result desired when Bonaparte got ready to quit the Vistula. For the rest, his hesitation, although ridiculous enough after the vain-glorious announcement of a vast offensive operation, secured his safety, because the more he might have engaged himself upon the Lower Vistula, the deeper he would go into the abyss in which he was falling. However, this hesitation itself, being still prolonged to three or four days more, would ruin him as certainly as a more decided movement, because, in that interval, Napoleon continued to ascend upon the left flank of the Russian army.

On the 1st of February Murat and marshal Soult were at Passenheim, marshal Davout advanced upon Ortelsburg, Augereau and Ney approached by Hohenstein to the main body of the army. Napoleon was with the guard at Willenberg. In twenty-four or forty-eight hours more they were about to be, to the number of 75,000 men, upon the left flank of the Russians. Napoleon, always

[1] The real strength of the corps was as follows, established by comparison with numerous authentic returns:

	men.
Marshal Lannes	12,000
„ Davout	18,000
„ Soult	20,000
„ Augereau	10,000
„ Ney	10,000
„ Bernadotte	12,000
General Oudinot	6,000
The Guard	6,000
Cavalry of Murat	10,000
Total,	104,000

If there be subtracted from the total of 104,000 men 12,000 with Lannes and 6000 under Oudinot, left in the environs of Warsaw, together with 12,000 under Bernadotte, which would remain between Thorn and Graudenz, the sum is 30,000. There would thus be left 74,000 disposable troops, united under the immediate orders of Napoleon.

careful to direct his lieutenants step by step, had addressed to Bernadotte a new despatch, in order to explain to him, for the last time, the character he was to play in this great manœuvre; indicating the mode in which he was to steal away promptly from the enemy and rejoin the army, which would render the effect of the actual combination more decisive and certain. This despatch had been entrusted to a young officer recently appointed to the staff, who had orders to go with it in all haste towards the Lower Vistula.

They marched on the 2nd and 3rd of February. The 3rd, in the evening, after having passed Allenstein, they opened upon an elevated position, which extended from the Alle to the Passarge, well flanked right and left by these two rivers, and by woods. This was the position of Jonkowo. Napoleon, who had pushed on the 3rd as far as Gettkendorf, not far from Jonkowo, went to the advanced guard to reconnoitre the enemy. He found them in greater force than he expected, and drawn up on the ground as if they wished to give battle. Napoleon made his dispositions for engaging the next day in a general action, if the enemy persisted in awaiting him at Jonkowo.

He pressed forward the arrivals of marshals Augereau and Ney, who were nearly ready to join him. He had already under hand marshal Soult at Gettkendorf, the guard, Murat, and, at some distance on his right, marshal Davout, who hastened his steps in order to reach the borders of the Alle. Wishing to ensure success on the day following, Napoleon ordered marshal Soult to file to the right, along the course of the Alle, to follow the sinuosities of that river, to enter an angle which it formed behind the Russian position, and to pass with full strength to the bridge of Bergfried, whatever resistance he might encounter. This bridge taken, the French possessed an opening upon the rear of the enemy, by which he would be placed in the utmost peril. Two of the divisions of marshal Soult were directed upon that point, in order to render the result infallible.

The evening of that same day marshal Soult executed the order of the emperor, and had the village of Bergfried carried by the division of Leval, and then the bridge over the Alle, and the heights beyond. The combat was short, but warm and sanguinary. The Russians lost 1200 men, the French 500 or 600. The importance of the post merited such a sacrifice. In the course of the evening, the cavalry of Murat and the corps of marshal Soult gave each other the hand along the Alle. They were in presence of the Russians, who were deprived of a support on their left, threatened even in their rear, and only separated from the French by a small stream, a tributary of the Alle. The following day was awaited as one of importance; and Napoleon asked himself how it was possible that the Russians should be already assembled in so great a number, and concentrated so opportunely upon that point. He had difficulty to explain this to his own satisfaction, because, after calculating the distance and time, they could not have been so well instructed in the movements of the French army as to take so prompt a determination, little in accordance with their first design to march offensively upon the Lower Vistula. In any case, whatever was the motive that had united them there, they were in danger of losing a battle, and of losing it in such a manner as to be cut off from the Pregel, if they only waited until the day following. On that day, in fact, the French troops, full of ardour, advanced upon the position. They had hopes in an instant of meeting the Russians; but they saw by little and little their lines move and disappear. Soon they perceived that they had before them only an advanced guard, placed like a curtain to delude them. Napoleon at that moment would have had ground to regret his not having attacked them the evening before, if his army had been then assembled, and sufficiently early in possession of the bridge of Bergfried. But the concentration, which was completed on the 4th in the morning, was not so in the evening of the 3rd; he had not therefore to blame himself for any delay. It only remained for him to march and penetrate into the secret of the enemy's resolutions.

That secret soon became known to him, because the Russians, in their joy to have been miraculously saved from certain ruin, made it known themselves on their route. The young officer sent to marshal Bernadotte had been taken by the Cossacks with his despatches, which he had not the presence of mind to destroy. General Benningsen, aware by these despatches forty-eight hours sooner than he would have been if the movement of the French army had possessed time to concentrate it behind Allenstein, and seeing the preparations of Napoleon at Jonkowo, had decamped in the night of the 3rd or 4th, either judging it imprudent to fight in a position where he ran the hazard of being turned, or that it did not enter into his views to accept a decisive battle. Thus this enterprising general, who would, by a single manœuvre, take Warsaw and Poland from the French, was already on his retreat towards Kœnigsburg. He took the road towards the Pregel, by the way of Arensdorf and Eylau, parallel with the course of the Alle.

But Napoleon, whom fortune, twice inconstant in a very short space of time, had deprived of the fruit of the finest combinations, would not quit his cantonments at a complete loss of labour, and without making those repay him for their bold attempt, who had thus broken in upon his rest. The frost, although not very strong, was sufficient to make the road hard, without rendering the temperature insupportable. He therefore determined to put the celerity of his soldiers to the proof, and again to attempt to outflank the Russians, in order to give them, in a well-selected position, a battle that should terminate the war. In all haste he took the road to Arensdorf, marching in the centre and principal road with Murat, marshal Soult, marshal Augereau, and the guard, having on his right towards the Alle the corps of marshal Davout, and on his left towards the Passarge the corps of marshal Ney. Foreseeing, with marvellous sagacity, that the Russians, although united so successfully by a fortunate accident, had still been acting too much without due calculation, not having left detachments in their rear, he pushed marshal Ney a little on the left towards Passarge, and ordered him to destroy the bridge of Deppen, which foretold to him he should make a good prize of them if he were able to get possession of the roads which led from the Pas-

sarge to the Alle. He finally ordered marshal Bernadotte to quit immediately the banks of the Vistula, and when he had finished his *ruse* with the enemy, to rejoin the grand army as soon as possible.

He advanced to carry out the order given as above. On the same day, the 4th of February, the Russians halted for a moment at Wolsdorf, at an equal distance between the Alle and the Passarge, in order to obtain a little rest, and see if the Prussian corps of general Lestocq, which had been delayed on its march, could succeed in rejoining them. But that corps was as yet too far off to be able to form a junction; and, pressed by the French, the Russians continued their march, abandoning Guttstadt, the resources which they had collected there, their sick, wounded, and 500 men who were made prisoners.

On the following day, the 5th of February, they marched in the same order, the French having their right upon the Alle, and the Russians their left; the one endeavouring to outvie the other in speed. During this time Ney advancing by the bridge of Deppen beyond the Passarge, in order to delay the retreat of the enemy's troops, encountered the Prussians upon the road to Liebstadt. General Lestocq, not hoping for an outlet by passing through the corps of Ney, resigned himself to a sacrifice which had become necessary. He presented to the French a strong rear-guard of 3000 or 4000 men, and whilst he gave that over to their attack, he endeavoured to effect his escape by descending the course of the Passarge, in order to cross it lower down. This calculation, which is often one of the cruel necessities of warfare, saved 7000 or 8000 Prussians by the sacrifice of 3000 or 4000. Ney attacked those who opposed him at Waltersdorf, sabred a part and took the rest prisoners. At the close of the action 2500 prisoners remained in his hands. The ground was covered with 1000 killed and wounded, a numerous artillery, and an immense quantity of baggage. Napoleon, who attached much more value to beating the Russians with all his united forces than to collecting Prussian prisoners on the road, recommended marshal Ney not to be too persevering in his pursuit of general Lestocq, and to take care he did not separate himself from the grand army. In consequence of these instructions, marshal Ney abandoned the pursuit of the Prussians, and thenceforth only took care to keep them in sight, in order to impede their junction with the Russians.

On the 6th of February, the Russians, by a forced march, reached Landsberg, unceasingly harassed by the French, abandoning on the Alle the little town of Heilsberg, where they still had magazines, sick, and wearied men. Their rear-guard having attempted to support itself there, marshal Davout pushed it warmly, and, as he advanced, occupying the two banks of the Alle, the division of Friant encountered this rear-guard, which escaped by the right bank, but he took or killed some hundreds of its men, and dispersed it.

The Russians wished to halt during the night between the 6th and 7th at Landsberg. They covered themselves, in consequence, by a large detachment placed at Hoff. In the midst of an irregular country, a strong mass of infantry having a village on its right, and a wood on its left, and protected by a numerous cavalry, barred the route. Murat, the first who came up, charged with his hussars and chasseurs, and sent his dragoons upon the Russian cavalry, that was at once overthrown, but he was not able to break the solid Russian infantry. The cuirassiers of general Hautpoul, arriving at the moment, were ordered to the attack in their turn. The first regiment charged, but in vain, its shock was weakened in the midst of its charge by one from the Russian cavalry. Murat then rallied the division of cuirassiers and flung it entire upon the Russian infantry. A cry of "Long live the emperor!" burst from the ranks, accompanying and exciting the movement of these brave horsemen. They broke the enemy's line, and sabred a great number of the Russian infantry that got under the feet of their horses. At the same moment Legrand's division of the corps of marshal Soult appeared. One of his regiments marched upon the village on the left and captured it. The Russians, attaching much value to that position, which would have ensured them quietness for the night, made an effort to retake the village. Surprised in the midst of their contest with the French infantry by a new charge of the cuirassiers, they were finally routed, and beat their retreat after the loss of 2000 men, sacrificed in this rear-guard combat.

General Benningsen, pursued in this way, could not think that he was secure passing the night in the village of Landsberg, and retreated upon Eylau, which he entered during the day on the 7th of February.

He drew up a numerous rear-guard upon a level which they call the plain of Ziegelhoff, the front of which is reached upon leaving the woods with which the road from Landsberg to Eylau is covered. Generals Bagowout and Barclay de Tolly were drawn up in order of battle upon the plain, ready to renew the combat of the preceding evening. General Benningsen, well aware that he was too closely pressed to evade giving battle, made a point of occupying a level upon which he would be able to receive the French army at an advantage, as it issued from among the woods. He was yet more induced to hold that ground, in order to protect the arrival of his heavy artillery, which he had ordered to make a circuit. From all these motives his resistance upon that point would probably be most obstinate.

The cavalry of Murat, seconded by the infantry of marshal Soult, issued from the woods with their accustomed boldness, and advanced upon the plain of Ziegelhoff. The brigade of Levasseur, composed of the 46th and 28th regiments of the line, followed them resolutely, while the brigade of Vivies, filing to the right, endeavoured to cross the frozen lakes to turn the position. The brigade of Levasseur, that the fire of a numerous artillery excited to a brisk attack, hastened forward. The 1st line of the enemy's infantry was repulsed with the bayonet. But the Russian cavalry, charging at the exact moment upon the left of the brigade, overturned the 28th before it had time to form into a square. It sabred a great number of the French infantry, and captured an eagle.

The combat, soon renewed, was continued with

obstinacy on both sides. Still the brigade of Viviès, having outflanked the Russian position, the enemy quitted it in order to retire to the very town of Eylau itself. Marshal Soult penetrated into it at the same time as he did. Napoleon did not wish that they should keep the town of Eylau in the uncertain but probable case of a great battle. The French therefore entered the town with bayonets at the charge. The Russians defended it street by street. The town was turned, and one of their columns was found stationed in a burying-ground, that afterwards became renowned for terrible recollections, situated beyond the town on the right hand. The brigade of Viviès took this burying-ground after a rough contest. The Russians then fell back further beyond Eylau. Of all the conflicts of the rear-guard this had been the most sanguinary, and had caused considerable loss to the corps of marshal Soult. It caused some disorder too in the town of Eylau, the soldiers dispersing themselves for quarters, and finding in the houses a good many Russians, who had not time to save themselves by flight.

The first idea that Murat conceived, and which he transmitted to Napoleon, was, that the Russians, having lost Eylau as a point of support, would go to seek one further off. But some officers, who had gone furthest in the confusion of the skirmish, had perceived the Russians drawn up a little beyond Eylau, and lighting their fires in order to pass the night there. This observation, confirmed by new reports, did not permit a doubt as to the importance of the following day, the 8th of February; and it did, in fact, acquire an importance which assured it an immortality in future ages.

It became evident, that the Russians, thus halting after the conflict of the evening, and not availing themselves of the night to march onwards, had resolved to fight a general battle the next day. The French army was harassed with fatigue, much reduced in number by the rapidity of its marches, pained with hunger, and benumbed with cold. But it was necessary to give battle, and it was not on such an occasion that the soldiers, officers, and generals, had been accustomed to feel their sufferings.

Napoleon hastened on the same evening to dispatch several officers to marshals Davout and Ney, to recall them, the one to his right and the other to his left. Marshal Davout had continued to follow the course of the Alle to Bartenstein, and he was thus found no more than three or four leagues off. He replied, that he should arrive about the break of day towards the right of Eylau (the right of the French army), ready to fall on the flank of the Russians. Marshal Ney, who had gone to the left in such a mode as to keep the Prussians at a distance, and to be able to fall upon Kœnigsberg in case the Russians should throw themselves behind the Pregel, was in march upon Kreutzburg. He was sent after, but without the expectation of his being brought up in time to the field of battle, in the same way as marshal Davout was about to appear on the opposite side.

Deprived of the corps of Ney, the French army amounted to about 50,000 men, or a few thousand more, although the Russians raised it in their statements to 80,000, and a French historian, in ordinary cases worthy of credit, to 68,000[1]. The corps of marshal Davout, the effective force of which at Awerstädt amounted to 26,000 men, sensibly diminished by the subsequent combats, by the sick, by the last march from the Vistula to Eylau, and by detachments left on the Narew, was about 15,000 strong. The corps of marshal Soult, the most numerous in the army, equally reduced by dysentery, marches, and conflicts with rear-guards, could not be estimated at more than 16,000 or 17,000 men. That of marshal Augereau, enfeebled by a number of lingerers and marauders, who had dispersed themselves to subsist, did not count more than 6000 or 7000 at the bivouac of Eylau on the evening of the 7th of February. The guard, better provided for, and more restrained by discipline, had left no one behind. However, that did not amount to more than 6000 men. Lastly, the cavalry of Murat, composed of one division of cuirassiers and of three divisions of dragoons, did not show more than 10,000 men in line. This was, therefore, a total force of 53,000 or 54,000 combatants, capable of every thing, it is true, although worn down with fatigue and spare with hunger. If marshal Ney arrived in time, it would be possible to oppose 63,000 men to the enemy present under fire. It was not possible to expect the arrival of Bernadotte, who was at a distance of thirty leagues.

Napoleon, who during the night slept scarcely three or four hours in a chair at the house of the postmaster, placed the corps of marshal Soult in Eylau itself, a part within, and portions to the right and left of the town, the corps of Augereau and the imperial guard a little in the rear, all the cavalry on the wings, waiting until daylight appeared to make his dispositions.

General Benningsen had, in fact, determined to give battle. He found himself on a plain, or on what was very nearly a level, being excellent for his infantry, which were little capable of manœuvring but extremely firm, and also well adapted for his numerous cavalry. His heavy artillery, which he had made to take a circuitous movement, that it might not impede his movements, had rejoined him. It was a precious reinforcement, the more as he found himself closely pursued, and saw himself forced to interrupt his march in order to make head against the French. It is necessary for any army that beats a retreat to be a little in advance, in order that it may be able to eat and sleep. It is also necessary that it have not the enemy too close; because to suffer an attack on the route, with the back turned to the foe, is the most dangerous mode of receiving battle. Such, therefore, is the moment when he who is wise will choose his ground, and halt upon it to fight, and such was the resolution taken by general Benningsen on the 7th, in the evening. He halted beyond Eylau, resolved to support an obstinate conflict. His army, which had been raised to 78,000 or 80,000 men, and with the Prussians to 90,000, on the resumption of hostilities, had suffered considerable losses in the later combats, but very few on the march; because an

[1] In presence of the false statements, both of foreign and French historians, this would not be ventured as truth, had it not been sustained upon the most authentic documents.—*Author's note.*

army retiring without confusion, is kept together by the army in pursuit,—while the pursuing army, not having the same motives to keep in compact order, always leaves a portion of its effective force in the rear. In reckoning the losses sustained at Mohrungen, Bergfried, Waltersdorf, Hoff, Heilsberg, and even at Eylau itself [1], it might be safely said the army of general Benningsen was reduced to 80,000 men, or thereabouts, of which there were 72,000 Russians and 8000 Prussians. Thus awaiting the arrival of general Lestocq and marshal Ney, 72,000 Russians had to fight 54,000 French. The Russians had the most formidable artillery, reckoned at 400 or 500 pieces of cannon. The French amounted only to 200, comprising that of the guard; but it is true that the French was superior to every European artillery, even to that of the Austrians. General Benningsen, therefore, determined to make the attack at break of day. The character of his soldiers was as energetic as that of the French, but conducted by very different moving causes. There was not with the Russians either that confidence of success or that love of glory which the French exhibited, but they displayed a certain fanaticism of obedience which prompted them blindly to brave death. As to the degree of intelligence belonging to the one and the other, it is unnecessary to make any comment upon the difference.

When they reached Eylau, the face of the country appeared level and open. The little town of Eylau, itself situated upon a small eminence, and surmounted by a Gothic spire, was the sole salient point upon the ground. To the right of the church, the ground declining a little was occupied in one place by a cemetery. In front it sensibly arose; and on this rise, marked by some mounds of earth, the Russians were seen in a deep mass. Several lakes, filled with water in the spring, dry in the summer, frozen in winter, and now actually effaced by the snow, were in no way distinguishable from the rest of the plain. A very few farm-houses united into hamlets, and barrier-fences serving to fold the cattle, formed a point of support, or an obstacle, on that melancholy field of battle. A grey sky, concealed at intervals by a thick snow-shower, added its sadness to that of the place,—a sadness which struck all eyes and hearts, as the break of day, very tardy at that season, rendered objects visible.

The Russians were ranged in two lines very near the one to the other, their front covered by 300 pieces of cannon, which had been disposed of along the projecting points of the ground. In their rear two close columns supporting, like two buttresses, this double line of battle, seemed designed to sustain and to hinder them from giving way, under the shock of the French attack. A strong reserve of artillery was placed at some distance. The cavalry was partly in the rear and partly in the wings. The cossacks, commonly scattered, were at this time attached to the body of the army. It was evident, that to the energy and dexterity of the French, the Russians wished, on open uncovered ground, to oppose a compact mass, defended in front by a numerous artillery, strongly supported in the rear,—in fact, a real wall, pouring forth a shower of fire. Napoleon, on horseback, at the break of day placed himself in the cemetery on the right of Eylau. There, scarcely protected by some trees, he saw the Russian position perfectly well, while they had already commenced the battle, opening with a heavy cannonade, which every moment became more lively. It was to be foreseen that artillery would be the arm most used on that terrible day.

Thanks to the position of Eylau, which was prolonged in front of the Russians, Napoleon was thus able to give less depth to his line of battle, and, in consequence, offer a less mark for the enemy's artillery. Two of the divisions of marshal Soult were placed at Eylau, the division of Legrand in advance, and a little to the left; the division of Leval was placed partly on the left of the town, and partly on an eminence surmounting a mill, and somewhat to the right of the cemetery itself. The third division of marshal Soult, that of St. Hilaire, was placed yet more to the right, at a considerable distance from the cemetery, at the village of Rothenen, which formed the prolongation of the position of Eylau. In the interval which separated the village of Rothenen from the town of Eylau, an interval was left open for the rest of the army to form. The corps of Augereau was drawn up in two lines, consisting of the divisions of Desjardins and Heudelet. Augereau, tormented with fever, his eyes red and inflamed, but forgetting his sufferings at the sound of the cannon, mounted his horse to place himself at the head of his troops. Further, in the rear of the same opening, were the infantry and cavalry of the imperial guard, and the divisions of the dragoons and cuirassiers, ready, both the one and the other, to attack the enemy by the same outlet, and, while waiting, a little sheltered from the Russian cannon by the sinking of the ground. Finally, at the extreme right of the field of battle, beyond and in advance of Rothenen, at the hamlet of Serpallen, the corps of marshal Davout would enter into action in such a manner as to attack the flank of the Russians.

Napoleon had his army, therefore, formed in an order slight in depth, and his line had the advantage of being covered on the left by the buildings of Eylau, and on the right by those of Rothenen; the conflict of artillery, by which he wished to demolish the species of living wall which the Russians opposed to him, was, therefore, much less formidable for him than for them. He had drawn from the different corps, and placed in activity, all the cannon of his army, and had joined to them the forty pieces belonging to the guard, and thus replied to the formidable artillery of the Russians by an artillery very inferior in number, but very superior in skill.

The Russians commenced the fire. The French answered it nearly as soon by a violent cannonade, given at half-cannon shot distance. The earth trembled under this terrible detonation. The French artillery-men, not only more adroit, but firing into the living mass for a target, caused the most dreadful ravages. The French balls took off entire files. The balls of the Russians, on the contrary, shot with less correctness of aim, striking the buildings, did not cause an injury equal to that

[1] The Russians had lost at Mohrungen 1500 men; at Bergfried, 1000; at Waltersdorf, 3000; at Hoff, 2000; at Heilsberg, 1000; and at Eylau, 500: in all 9000 men.

which the enemy sustained. Very early the town of Eylau took fire, and the village of Rothenen. The light of the flames added their horrors to the horrors of the carnage. Although there fell many less of the French than the Russians, still there fell enough, above all in the ranks of the imperial guard, that remained immoveable in the cemetery. The projectiles passing over the head of Napoleon, and sometimes very close to him, pierced the walls of the church, and broke off the branches of the trees, at the foot of which he had placed himself to direct the operations of the battle.

This cannonade lasted a long time, and both armies supported it with heroic tranquillity, not making the least movement, and confining themselves to closing up in their ranks the vacancies made by the cannon-shot. The Russians first appeared to exhibit symptoms of impatience [1]. Desiring to hasten the result by the capture of Eylau, they moved forward to take the position of the mill, situated on the left of the town. A part of their right formed into column and came to the attack. The division of Leval, composed of the brigades of Ferey and Vivies, boldly repulsed them, and by its bearing forbade the Russians any hope of success if they renewed their efforts.

As to Napoleon, he attempted nothing decisive, and would not compromise himself by carrying in advance the corps of marshal Soult, which did sufficiently well to hold Eylau under such a frightful cannonade; he would not risk either the division of St. Hilaire or the corps of Augereau, against the enemy's centre, because it was exposing them to be shattered against a burning rock. He awaited before acting until marshal Davout, whose corps, arrived upon the right, should make himself felt upon the Russian flank.

This lieutenant, as punctual as he was intrepid, had, in fact, arrived at the village of Serpallen. The division of Friant marched at its head. It formed first, encountered the cossacks, whom it soon drove back, and occupied the village of Serpallen, with some companies of light infantry. Scarcely was the division established in the village and the ground to the right, when one of the masses of cavalry that were placed on the wings of the Russian army detached itself to come to the attack. General Friant, using with coolness and judgment the advantages that the chances of the position offered, arranged the three regiments of which his division was composed, behind the long and solid wood fences employed to fold the cattle. Sheltered behind this natural entrenchment, he fired, at musket length, upon the Russian squadrons, and obliged them to retire. They very soon returned upon him, accompanied by a column of infantry of 9000 or 10,000 men,—one of the two columns which served to buttress the Russian line of battle, and that had now marched to the left for the purpose of retaking Serpallen. General Friant had not 5000 men to oppose to them. Continuing sheltered behind the wooden barriers which covered him, and able to form without fear of the cavalry, he received the Russians with a fire so well directed and sustained, that he caused them very considerable loss. Their squadrons wishing to turn his position, he formed the 33rd into a square, and stopped them by the unshaken countenance of his infantry. Not being able to make use of his cavalry, which only consisted of some chasseurs, he supplied their place with a cloud of tirailleurs, that, availing themselves with much address of the unevenesses of the ground, attacked the Russian flanks with a fierce fusillade, and obliged them to retire towards the heights in the rear of Serpallen, between that place and Klein-Sausgarten. On retiring upon these heights, the Russians covered themselves with a numerous artillery, of which the plunging fire was, unhappily, most murderous. The division of Morand, in its turn, had arrived on the field of battle. Marshal Davout, taking the first brigade, that of general Ricard, placed it below, and to the left of Serpallen; then he disposed of the second, composed of the 51st and 61st, on the right of the village, in such a manner as to sustain either the brigade of Ricard or the division of Friant. The last had gone to the right of Serpallen, towards Klein-Sausgarten. In the same moment the division of Gudin hastened its steps to enter the line. Thus the Russians, by the movement of the French right, had been forced to throw back their left from Serpallen upon Klein-Sausgarten.

The effect upon the flank of the enemy's army waited for was thus produced. Napoleon, from the position which he occupied, had distinctly seen the Russian reserves direct themselves towards the corps of marshal Davout. The time for acting had arrived,—because if he did not interfere, the Russians would be enabled to throw themselves in a mass upon marshal Davout, and thus crush him. Napoleon instantly gave orders to the division of St. Hilaire, which was at Rothenen, to proceed in advance, in order to give a hand towards Serpallen to the division of Morand. He ordered the two divisions of Desjardins and Heudelet, of the corps of Augereau, to open out by the interval which separates Rothenen from Eylau, to join the division of St. Hilaire, and the whole together to form an oblique line from the cemetery of Eylau to Serpallen. The result of this movement would be to overthrow the Russians, flinging back their left upon their centre, and thus beating, commencing at the extremity, the long living wall which they had before them.

It was ten o'clock in the morning. General St. Hilaire moving, quitted Rothenen, and formed obliquely on the plain under a terrible fire of artillery,—his right at Serpallen, his left towards the cemetery. Augereau moved at the same time, not without a sad presentiment of the lot reserved for his corps, which he saw was exposed to be broken against the Russian centre, solidly supported upon several elevations. While general Corbineau delivered him the orders of the emperor, a ball pierced the side of that brave officer, the first-born of an heroic family. Marshal Augereau immediately marched. The two divisions of Desjardins and Heudelet came out between Rothenen and the cemetery in close columns; then, the defile passed, they formed in order of battle, the first brigade of each division deployed, the second in square. As they advanced, a gust of wind and snow suddenly blew in the faces of the soldiers, and deprived them of all view of the field of battle. The two

[1] The expression of Napoleon, in the recital which he himself gave of the battle.

divisions, in the midst of this species of cloud, missed the proper direction, giving a little to the left, and leaving at their right a large space between themselves and the division of St. Hilaire. The Russians, little incommoded by the snow which fell on their backs, and seeing the two divisions of Augereau advancing towards the mounds upon which they supported their centre, suddenly unmasked seventy-two pieces of cannon which they had kept in reserve. The grape vomited by this formidable battery was so thick, that in a quarter of an hour half the corps of Augereau was destroyed. General Desjardins, commanding the 1st division, was killed; general Heudelet, commanding the 2nd, received a wound which was nearly mortal. Soon the whole staff of the two divisions was placed *hors de combat*. While they sustained this terrible and destructive fire, obliged to form again while marching, so much were their ranks thinned, the Russian cavalry threw itself into the space which separated them from the division of Morand, and fell upon them in a mass. These brave men, however, still resisted, but they were obliged to fall back towards the cemetery of Eylau, giving ground without breaking, under the repeated attacks of numerous squadrons. All of a sudden, the snow ceasing to fall, permitted a view of the melancholy spectacle. Of 6000 or 7000 combatants, about 4000, killed or wounded, were stretched upon the earth. Augereau, himself wounded, but more affected at the disaster of his corps than at the danger to himself, was carried into the cemetery of Eylau to the feet of Napoleon, to whom he complained, not without bitterness, of not having been succoured in time. A sullen sadness prevailed on the visages of the imperial staff. Napoleon, firm and calm, imposing upon others that impassiveness which he had imposed upon himself, addressed some words of consolation to Augereau, and then sent him to the rear, taking measures to repair the mischief which had been done. Sending on at first the chasseurs of the guard, and some squadrons of dragoons which were within reach of his orders, to drive back the cavalry of the enemy, he ordered Murat to be called, and requested him to make a decisive attempt on the line of infantry that formed the centre of the Russian army, and that profiting by the disaster of Augereau, had begun to move in advance. At the first order Murat came up at a gallop. "What," said Napoleon to him, "will you abandon us to be swallowed up by these gentry?" He then ordered this heroic chief of his cavalry to unite the chasseurs, dragoons, and cuirassiers, and to fall upon the Russians with eighty squadrons; to attempt all that was possible with the shock of such a mass of cavalry, charging with fury an infantry that was reported immoveable. The cavalry of the guard was carried in advance, ready to join its shock to that of the other cavalry of the army. The moment was critical; because if the Russian infantry was not stopped it might carry the cemetery, the centre of the position, since Napoleon had no more than six infantry battalions of the imperial guard to defend it.

Murat departed at a gallop, and having united his squadrons, made them pass between the cemetery and Rothenen, crossing the very same opening by which the corps of Augereau had already marched to nearly certain destruction. The dragoons of general Grouchy charged first to clear the ground and drive off the enemy's cavalry. That brave officer, dismounted under his horse, got up, and placing himself at the head of the 2nd brigade, succeeded in dispersing the groups of horse that preceded the Russian infantry. To overturn the last, it was necessary to have no less than the squadrons of general Hautpoul, all clad in iron. That officer, who had distinguished himself by consummate ability in the art of managing a numerous cavalry, presented himself with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers, followed by the whole mass of dragoons. The cuirassiers were formed in several lines; they moved forward and precipitated themselves on the Russian bayonets. The first lines, stopped by the fire, could not penetrate, but fell back right and left, and reformed behind those that followed, in order to charge anew. Finally, one of these lines charging with more force, overthrew at one point the enemy's infantry, and opened a breach across which cuirassiers and dragoons penetrated in emulation of excelling each other. As a river which has commenced breaking the dike that confines it, soon sweeps it entirely away, so the mass of the French squadrons, having once got in among the Russian infantry, in a few moments achieved the overthrow of their first line. The French cavalry then dispersed to sabre their enemies, and a dreadful scene took place between them and the Russians. They rode backwards, forwards, and on all sides, hewing down that obstinate infantry. While the first line of infantry was thus routed and cut up, the second fell back upon a wood, which lay towards the bottom of the field of battle. There remained a last reserve of artillery on that spot, and the Russians placed it in battery, and fired confusedly upon their own men and upon the French, giving themselves little uneasiness whether they poured their grape-shot upon friends or foes, provided they could but get rid of those formidable horsemen. General Hautpoul was mortally struck by a grape-shot. While the French cavalry was thus engaged with the second line of the Russian infantry, some portions of the first here and there prepared to renew their fire. Seeing this, the horse-grenadiers of the guard, led on by general Lepic, one of the heroes of the army, moved forward in their turn to second the efforts of Murat. They set off at a gallop, charging the different groups of infantry, which they perceived collecting round about, and, in fact, sweeping the ground, thus completing the destruction of the centre of the Russian army, of which the wrecks succeeded in flying towards the woody clumps which served them for an asylum from the horse.

During this scene of confusion, a branch detached from this vast line of infantry had advanced nearly up to the cemetery. Three or four thousand Russian grenadiers, marching straight before them, with the blind courage of a body more brave than intelligent, came up to shipwreck themselves upon the church of Eylau, threatening the cemetery occupied by the imperial staff. The foot-guard, which until then had remained there immoveable, had sustained the cannonade without returning the fire with a single musket. It was with satisfaction that they saw an occasion arise to

join in the combat. One battalion was called for, and two disputed the honour of marching. The first in orders, led by general Dorsenne, obtained the advantage of measuring their strength with the Russian grenadiers; they came up to them without firing a musket; they met them with the bayonet, they drove them back one upon the other; while Murat, perceiving what was going forward, sent upon them two regiments of chasseurs, under general Bruyère. The unfortunate Russian grenadiers, compressed between the bayonets of the grenadiers of the guard and the sabres of the chasseurs, were nearly all taken or killed under the eyes of Napoleon, and but a few paces from him.

This action of the cavalry, the most extraordinary perhaps in the greatest wars of the French, had for its result the overturn of the Russian centre, and its being repulsed to a good distance. It would have been needful to have had at hand a reserve of infantry, in order to complete the defeat of a body, that, after having laid itself on the ground, arose again to commence its fire. But Napoleon would not venture to part with the troops of marshal Soult, reduced to one half of their effective force, and necessary for the protection of Eylau. The corps of Augereau had been nearly destroyed. The six battalions of the foot-guard alone remained for a reserve ; and in the midst of the varied chances of that day, very far yet from its close, it was a reserve which it was needful to preserve as precious. On the left, marshal Ney, marching for several days parallel with the Prussians, might yet be able to advance or was now advanced near the field of battle, and 8000 or 10,000 men, brought up to either of the two armies, would perhaps be a decisive reinforcement. On the right, marshal Davout found himself engaged with the left of the Russians in an obstinate conflict, of which the result was yet unknown.

Napoleon, immoveable in the cemetery, where the dead bodies of a great number of his officers had accumulated, more serious than ordinary, his countenance tranquil and as much under command as his mind, the guard behind him, and before him the chasseurs, dragoons, and cuirassiers, re-formed ready to show their devotion anew,—Napoleon awaited events before he took a definitive determination. Never had he himself or his soldiers been in an action so contested.

But the time of defeat had not yet come; and fortune, rigorous for a moment to this extraordinary man, still treated him as her favourite. At that moment, general St. Hilaire with his division, and marshal Davout with his corps, justified the confidence which Napoleon reposed in them. The division of St. Hilaire, received, as the corps of Augereau had been at the same moment, by a terrible fire of grape and musketry, had also cruelly suffered. Blinded, too, by the snow, it had not perceived a mass of cavalry coming upon it at full gallop; and a battalion of the 10th light, assailed before it had the power to form, had been overturned under the feet of the horses. The division of Morand, on the extreme left of Davout, uncovered by the accident which had happened to the 10th light, was forced two or three hundred paces to the rear. But Davout and Morand soon brought it forward again to the front. During this interval, general Friant sustained an heroic combat at Klein-Sausgarten, and seconded by the division of Gudin, he finally occupied that advanced position upon the Russian flank. He had even pushed detachments as far as to the village of Kuschitten, situated in their rear. It was at that moment when, the day being nearly over, and the Russian army one half destroyed, that the battle seemed to terminate decidedly in favour of the French.

But the event, of which Napoleon had an apprehension, was realized. General Lestocq, pursued to the utmost by marshal Ney, appeared upon the field of carnage with 7000 or 8000 Prussians, zealous to avenge themselves for the contempt which the Russians had exhibited towards them. General Lestocq was in advance of the corps of marshal Ney scarcely more than an hour or two, having just had time to strike a blow before being smitten himself. He entered upon the field of battle at Schmoditten, passed behind the double line of the Russians, now broken by the fire of the French artillery, and by the sabres of their cavalry, and placed himself at Kuschitten, in front of Friant's division, that, passing Klein-Sausgarten, had already driven back the left of the enemy upon his centre. The village of Kuschitten was occupied by four companies of the 108th and by the 51st, which had been detached by Morand's division in order to sustain the division of Friant. The Prussians rallied the Russians around them, fell impetuously upon the 51st and the four companies of the 108th, and, not succeeding in breaking them, forced them back far in the rear of Kuschitten. The Prussians, after this first advantage, advanced beyond Kuschitten, in order to retake the positions held in the morning. They marched in two lines. The Russian reserves rallied, forming upon their wings two close columns. A numerous artillery preceded them. Thus they advanced up the rear of the field of battle in order to regain the lost ground, and force back marshal Davout upon Klein-Sausgarten, and from Klein-Sausgarten upon Serpallen. But generals Friant and Gudin, having marshal Davout at their head, hastened forward. The divisions of Friant entirely, the 12th, 21st, and 25th regiments, belonging to the division of Gudin, placed themselves in advance, covered by all the artillery of the 3rd corps. Vainly the Russians and Prussians endeavoured to overcome this formidable obstacle ; they were unable to succeed. The French, supported on the woods, the marshes, and hillocks, here formed in line, there dispersed as tirailleurs, opposed an invincible resistance to the last efforts of the allies. Marshal Davout went along the ranks down to the close of the day, saying to them, "Those who are wanting will die in Siberia, the brave will die here, men of honour!" The attack of the Russians, thus rallied, was arrested; the ground lost upon their flank was not reconquered. The corps of marshal Davout remained firm in the position of Klein-Sausgarten, from whence it threatened the rear of the enemy.

The two armies were worn out with fatigue. The day so sombre became every moment more gloomy still, and hastened its termination in a dark and frightful night. The carnage had been

horrible. Nearly 30,000 Russians, struck down by the projectiles or sabres of the French, were stretched upon the earth, part dead, and the rest wounded more or less grievously. Many of their soldiers began to go off straggling [1]. General Benningsen, surrounded by his lieutenants, deliberated whether or not they should resume the offensive, and make a new effort. But of an army of 80,000 men, there remained to him no more than 40,000 in a state to renew the conflict, the Prussians included. If he succumbed in such a desperate engagement, he would not have had means to cover his retreat. Nevertheless, he hesitated, until a serious and last event was announced to him. Marshal Ney, who had so closely followed the Prussians, arriving in the evening on the French left, as marshal Davout had arrived in the morning upon the right, had at last appeared towards Althof.

Thus the combinations of Napoleon, retarded by the weather, had not the less brought upon both the Russian flanks the troops that were to decide the victory. The order to retreat could not, from that circumstance, be deferred, because marshal Davout, having kept his ground at Klein-Sausgarten, would have had little to do to meet marshal Ney, who had advanced as far as Schmoditten, and the junction of those two marshals would have exposed the Russians to be enveloped. The order to retreat was given at that same instant by general Benningsen. However, in order to secure his retreat, he wished to restrain marshal Ney, and endeavoured to take the village of Schmoditten. The Russians marched upon the village in the night with great silence, in order to surprise the troops of marshal Ney, arrived late on the field of battle, and which they had scarcely had time to discover. But they were upon their guard. General Marchand, with the 6th light and the 39th of the line, suffered the Russians to approach, and then receiving them with a fire, when at the muzzles of their pieces, stopped them at once, and attacking them with the bayonet, made them give up every serious attempt. From that instant they set themselves to retreat in good earnest.

Napoleon seeing from the direction of the fires of marshals Davout and Ney, the real state of things, knew himself to be master of the field of battle, but still he was not certain he should not have a second battle to fight in the night or on the morrow. He occupied the plain, slightly elevated, which extends beyond Eylau, having before him and towards the centre his cavalry and his guard, to the left, in advance of Eylau, the two divisions of Legrand and Leval, of the corps of marshal Soult, and to the right the division of St. Hilaire, which was connected with the corps of marshal Davout, carried beyond Klein-Sausgarten. The French army thus described an oblique line on the ground which the Russians had possessed in the morning. Much beyond, on the left, marshal Ney, isolated, was stationed in the rear of the position the enemy was abandoning in all haste.

Napoleon, certain of being victorious, but his heart melancholy, remained in the midst of his soldiers; he ordered that they should light fires, and should not quit the ranks even to go in search of sustenance. A little bread and brandy was distributed to them, and although there was not enough, they were not heard to complain. Less joyous than at Austerlitz or Jena, they were still full of confidence, proud of themselves, and ready to recommence the terrible contest, if the Russians had the strength and courage to do so. Whoever at that moment could have supplied them with the bread and brandy which they needed, would have found them as gay as usual. Two artillerymen of the corps of marshal Davout, having been absent from their company, and arriving too late to take a part in the battle, their comrades assembled in the evening at the bivouac fire, passed judgment upon them, and not admitting their excuses, inflicted upon them on the frozen and gory ground the burlesque chastisement which the soldiers call the *savate* [2].

There was nothing to be found in great abundance but ammunition. The service of the artillery, executed with unexampled activity, had already replaced the ammunition consumed. The service of the *ambulances* was executed with no less zeal. They had collected a great number of the wounded, and had administered aid to others upon the ground, awaiting their turn as soon as it was possible to remove them. Napoleon, worn down with fatigue, bestirred himself every where, overlooking the attention paid to his soldiers.

In the rear of the army there was no such appearance of a bold countenance. Many of the laggers behind, who had been wanting from the effective force in the morning in consequence of the rapidity of the marches, having heard the sound of this frightful battle, having also heard the hurras of some of the Cossacks, had fallen back and spread over the roads the most vexatious news. The bravest men hastened to arrange themselves by the sides of their comrades, the others went back in the different directions over which the army had passed.

The following day, when the light dawned, this dreadful field of battle was disclosed to the view. Napoleon himself was deeply moved, and to such a pitch as to let it appear in the bulletin which he published. Upon this frozen plain, thousands of dead and dying lay cruelly mutilated; thousands of horses struck down; an innumerable number of dismounted cannon; carriages broken; scattered missiles; and hamlets in flames; "all this detaching itself from a foundation of snow [3]," presented a picture striking and terrible. "That spectacle," exclaimed Napoleon, "is given to inspire princes with the love of peace and a horror of war!" a singular reflection in his mouth, sincere at the moment when he allowed it to escape him.

One peculiarity struck all eyes. Whether from an inclination to return to bygone things, whether out of economy, it had been wished to give the troops the white uniform. The attempt had been made with several regiments, but the sight of blood upon the white uniform settled the question. Napoleon, full of distaste and horror at the sight, declared that he would only have the blue uniform, whatever it might cost.

[1] It is the assertion of their own narrator, Plotho.

[2] This incident is borrowed from the military memoirs and manuscripts of marshal Davout.—*Author's note.*

[3] Expression of Napoleon in one of his bulletins.

The aspect of this field of battle abandoned by the enemy gave the army the consciousness of its victory. The Russians had retreated, leaving upon the ground 7000 dead and more than 5000 wounded, that the generosity of the victor hastened to upraise with his own men. Besides the 12,000 dead or dying abandoned at Eylau, they took away with them about 15,000 wounded, who were more or less seriously injured. They had had therefore, in consequence, 26,000 or 27,000 men put *hors de combat*. The French made 3000 or 4000 prisoners, and took 24 pieces of cannon and 16 stand of colours. Their total loss, therefore, was about 30,000 men. The French had about 10,000 put *hors de combat*, of which number 3000 were killed and 7000 wounded [4], a loss very inferior to that of the Russians, which explains itself by the position of the French troops, arranged in an order of little depth, and by the aptitude of their artillerymen and soldiers. Thus, on that fatal day, nearly 40,000 men, including both sides, had been injured by fire or iron. This is the entire population of a large city destroyed in one day! Melancholy consequences of the passions of nations; those terrible passions which, while it is requisite to direct aright, it would be improper to endeavour to extinguish!

Napoleon, on the 9th, in the morning, carried his dragoons and cuirassiers in advance, in order to follow the Russians, throw them upon Kœnigsberg, and compel them to remain for the whole winter behind the Pregel. Marshal Ney, who had taken little part in the battle of Eylau, was ordered to sustain Murat. Marshals Davout and Soult were to follow at a short distance. Napoleon himself remained at Eylau, to look after the wounds of his brave army, to feed it, and to place every thing in order in the rear. This was of more importance than the pursuit, that his lieutenants were as well capable of managing themselves.

In marching in pursuit, there was a yet more complete conviction acquired of the disaster sustained by the Russians. In proportion as the French advanced, they found the towns and villages of Eastern Prussia filled with wounded; they learned, too, the disorder, confusion, and finally the bad state of the entire fugitive army. Still the Russians, in comparing this battle to that of Austerlitz, were proud of the difference. They admitted their defeat, but they indemnified themselves for the avowal by adding that the victory had cost the French dear.

They did not halt, except on the banks of the Frisching, a small river which runs from the line of the lakes to the sea; and Murat pushed on his squadrons as far as Kœnigsberg. The Russians took refuge in all haste, part beyond the Pregel, and part at Kœnigsberg itself, making a countenance of defending themselves there, and levelling from the walls a very numerous artillery. The inhabitants, alarmed, demanded whether or not they were to share the fate of Lubeck. Happily for them, Napoleon wished to put an end to offensive operations. He had sent the horse of Murat as far as the gates of Kœnigsberg, but he had no intention of conducting his army there himself. It would not have required a less force than the whole army, to attempt, with hopes of success, an attack by main force upon a city, provided with defensive works to some extent, and defended by all that remained of the Russian and Prussian forces. An attack, even if it turned out a fortunate one, upon this rich city, was not worth the risk to be run under the chances of the miscarriage of the attempt. Napoleon having pushed forward his corps as far as the borders of the Frisching, determined to remain there some days, in order to give good proof of his being victorious, and then he thought of retiring in order to return to his old quarters. He had not obtained, it cannot be denied, that immense result which he had flattered himself he should obtain, and which would most assuredly not have escaped him, if an intercepted dispatch had not revealed his design to the Russians; but he had driven them fighting for fifty leagues, had destroyed 9000 of their men in rear-guard combats, and finding them at Eylau formed

[4] It is rarely that it is possible to state the loss sustained in a battle with so much precision as we are enabled to give that of the battle of Eylau. I have given myself up, in order to succeed, to an attentive examination of facts, and the following is the truth, as much so at least as it is possible to attain it in a similar case. The inspector of hospitals stated the same evening at Eylau, the existence of 4500 wounded, and on the morrow having made the round of the neighbouring villages, he carried the number up to 7094. His report has been preserved. The reports of the different corps presented, on the contrary, a cipher much more considerable, which made the total amount to 13,000 or 14,000, the number of men injured more or less grievously. This difference explains itself by the manner in which the authors of those reports understood the word "wounded." The commanders of corps reckoned even the slightest contusion as a wound, each of them naturally endeavouring to make the most of the sufferings of his men. But one half of the men designated as wounded did not consider it needful to apply for surgical aid, and the proof is in the report of the director of the hospitals. Besides, a month afterwards, a very curious controversy took place by letter between Napoleon and M. Daru. The last found no more than 6000 wounded in the hospitals of the Vistula. This appeared to Napoleon a statement to be contested, for he believed there were more, above all, reckoning in this number the wounded in the battle of Eylau and those of the combats which had preceded it, since they had broken up from quarters. Nevertheless, after a careful examination, they could not find more than 6000 and some hundreds, and less than 6000 for Eylau itself, which, reckoning the intervening deaths, agreed perfectly with the statement of 7094 furnished by the director of hospitals. We believe, therefore, that we are correct in stating 3000 killed and 7000 wounded as the French loss in the battle of Eylau. Napoleon, in speaking in his bulletin of 2000 dead and 5000 or 6000 wounded, had, as has been seen, little altered the fact in comparison with that which the Russians did. It may be supposed, too, on the evening of the battle, it was founded on his supposition that the loss was no greater. As to the loss of the Russians, I have adopted their own totals and those that were stated by the French. These last found 7000 bodies, and in the surrounding places 5000 wounded. The Russians had taken away a much greater number. The German, Both, said that they brought back 14,900 wounded to Kœnigsberg, nearly all of whom died from the cold. He admits besides, that they had 7000 dead, and left 5000 wounded on the field of battle. Add to these 3000 or 4000 prisoners, and there is a total loss of 30,000 men, which cannot be easily disputed. General Benningsen, never exact, avowed in his own report a loss of 20,000 men. —*Note of Author.*

in a compact mass, covered with artillery, resolute even to despair, strong, for they numbered with the Prussians 80,000, upon a plain where manœuvring was impossible, he had attacked them with 54,000, had destroyed them with cannon-shot, and had repaired all the accidents of the day, with unshaken coolness, while his lieutenants pressed forward to rejoin him. The Russians, on that day, had every thing they could desire for realizing their own peculiar advantages, their firmness, and immoveable character under fire. Napoleon had not all his upon his side, for he was upon ground where it was impossible to manœuvre; but he had opposed to their tenacity invincible courage, and a moral force above the horrors of the most frightful carnage. The spirit of his soldiers had shown itself that day as great as his own. Most assuredly he might have been proud of that proof of it. Besides, for 12,000 or 13,000 men, whom he had lost during those eight days, he had destroyed 36,000 of the enemy. But it is necessary to recollect that, at this moment, the influence of the climate, of the soil, and of distance was such, that, possessing in Germany more than 300,000 men, he had not been able to unite more than 54,000 on the spot of decisive action. After such a victory, it became needful to make grave reflections, to reckon more with the elements and fortune, and to calculate for the future upon the invincible nature of circumstances. He made such reflections, and they inspired him, it will be soon easy to judge, with the best calculated action and the most admirable foresight. Would to Heaven that they had but remained constantly engraved upon his memory!

Although victorious and secure for many months to come from any attempt upon his cantonments, he still had one thing of which to be apprehensive. This was the lying statements of the Russians, and their effect upon Austria, France, Italy, Spain, in a word, upon all Europe, that, seeing in the space of three months, his march twice stayed, whether by the mud or by the frost, would be led to believe him less irresistible, less fatally fortunate, would be holding as doubtful a victory the most incontestable, the most painfully effective, and would finally be tempted to undervalue his fortunes.

He resolved, therefore, to show that character which he had displayed during the day of Eylau, and, certain of his strength, to wait until Europe felt it as well as he did himself. After having passed some days at Frisching, the enemy not moving out of his lines, he determined to retire in order to enter his former cantonments. The temperature of the atmosphere was always cold, but without descending more than two or three degrees below the freezing point. He availed himself of this in order to carry his wounded in carriages. More than 6000 submitted without any ostensible degree of suffering to this singular journey of forty or fifty leagues, as far as the Vistula. An extreme degree of care in searching all the surrounding villages, allowed a correct statement of the number to be taken. It was conformable to that which has already been given. When all had left, wounded, sick, prisoners, and artillery taken from the enemy, Napoleon commenced his march on the 17th of February, upon his retrograde movement. Marshal Ney, with the 6th corps, and Murat with the cavalry forming the rear-guard. The other corps preserved their accustomed position in the order of march, marshal Davout on the right, marshal Soult in the centre, marshal Augereau on the left; lastly, marshal Bernadotte, who had rejoined, formed the extreme left along the Frische-Haff.

Napoleon having ascended the Alle so far as to approach the lakes, whence that river flows, and whence also the Passarge derives its origin, he changed his direction, and in place of taking the route of Warsaw, he took that of Thorn, Marienburg, and Elbing. He wished thenceforth to support himself upon the Lower Vistula. The recent events had modified his ideas as to the choice of his base of operations. The following are the motives of this modification.

The position between the branches of the Ukra, of the Narew, and of the Bug, which he had at first adopted, was a consequence of the occupation of Warsaw. It had the advantage of covering that capital, and if the enemy proceeded along the sea-shore, it permitted him to outflank them, to turn them, and to drive them into the sea, which Napoleon had attempted, and which he would have certainly executed but for the capture of his despatches. But this manœuvre once discovered, it was not probable that the Russians, aware of it, should expose themselves to a danger from which they had escaped by a sort of miracle. The position chosen in advance of Warsaw did not, therefore, possess the same advantage, and it had a serious inconvenience, that of obliging the army to extend itself beyond proper limits, in order to cover the siege of Dantzick, a siege which had become an operation of the utmost necessity, and to which it was necessary to devote the leisure from active operations which the period of winter afforded. In effect, by placing himself at Warsaw he had been obliged to leave the corps of Bernadotte at a great distance, with but a small chance of joining it to the main body of the army; and if it marched in advance, he was forced besides to leave the 5th corps, that of Lannes, to guard Warsaw. He therefore acted without two corps of his army. The distance of the corps of Bernadotte would become in future more to be lamented, in that he should be constrained to add more troops to his existing forces, in order to second and cover the siege of Dantzick.

Napoleon, therefore, resolved to keep at a distance from Warsaw, to confide the security of that capital to the 5th corps, to the Poles, and to the Bavarians, the submission of the fortresses of Silesia rendering the last-mentioned troops disposable, and he determined with the larger part of his forces to establish himself in advance of the Lower Vistula, behind the Passarge, having Thorn upon his right, Elbing on his left, Dantzick in his rear, his centre at Osterode, and his advanced posts between the Passarge and the Alle. In this position he himself covered the siege of Dantzick, without being under the necessity of sending away any part of his troops for that purpose. If in effect the Russians, wishing to succour Dantzick, should come to seek battle, he should be able to oppose them with all his united corps, comprising that of Bernadotte as well, and even a part of the

troops of Lefebvre, that nothing could hinder him from drawing to his main body in any pressing conjuncture; just as he did in 1796, when he raised the siege of Mantua to proceed against the Austrians. There would not be wanting to him on the day of battle any of his forces but the 5th corps, which in whatever manner he might operate, was indispensable on the Narew, in order to defend Warsaw. This new position, besides, gave room for clever combinations, pregnant with great results, of which the enemy would be ignorant, while those which would have Warsaw for their base were known to them. Quartered behind the Passarge, Napoleon would be only fifteen leagues from Kœnigsberg. On the supposition that the Russians, drawn by the apparent state of isolation in which Warsaw had been left, would advance upon that capital, the French could make a forced march in their rear upon Kœnigsberg, capture that city, and then, drawing back by a movement to the right upon their rear, throw them upon the Narew or the Vistula, among the marshes of the interior country, with as much certainty of destroying them as in the case of their movement being towards the sea. If, on the contrary, they attacked the front of his cantonments on the Passarge, he had, as has been said, besides the natural strength of the cantonments, the entire mass of the army to oppose to them. The position, therefore, was excellent for the siege of Dantzick, and excellent as well for future operations, because it gave birth to new combinations, of which the secret was not discoverable.

It is, assuredly, both an instructive and an imposing spectacle, to find that impetuous general, in a way not natural to himself, tell his detractors, that to the offensive war carried at one rebound only from the Rhine to the Vistula, halting suddenly before the difficulties of localities and seasons, shutting himself up in a narrow space, carrying on the war there, coldly, slowly, and methodically,—disputing, foot to foot, the smallest rivers, after having passed the largest without stopping; reducing himself finally to cover a siege, and placed at a vast distance from his own empire, in presence of Europe astonished at this new manner of proceeding, on which doubt had begun to take hold, preserving an invincible firmness, not being seduced even by the desire to strike a blow that should make a sensation, knowing how to adjourn that blow until the nature of things rendered it possible and certain. This is, it may truly be said, a spectacle worthy of attracting interest, surprise, and admiration; it is a valuable occasion for the study and the reflection of all who are able to feel and comprehend the combinations of great men, and have a pleasure in making them a subject of meditation.

Napoleon then placed himself between the Passarge and the Lower Vistula. The corps of marshal Bernadotte to the left on the Passarge, between Braunsberg and Spanden; that of marshal Soult the centre, between Liebstadt and Mohrungen; the corps of marshal Davout on the right, between Allenstein and Hohenstein, at the point where the Alle and the Passarge approximate the closest; the corps of marshal Ney as the advanced guard, between the Passarge and the Alle, at Guttstadt; the head-quarters of the guard at Osterode, in a central position, where Napoleon would be able to unite all his forces in a few hours. He placed general Oudinot at Osterode, with the grenadiers and voltigeurs, forming a reserve of infantry of 6000 or 7000 men. He spread the cavalry over his rear, between Osterode and the Vistula, from Thorn as far as Elbing,—a country which abounded in all kinds of forage.

In the enumeration of the corps quartered behind the Passarge, that of Augereau has not been included. Napoleon had declared for its dissolution. Augereau had quitted the army, annoyed at what had happened at the battle of Eylau, imputing preposterously his own check there to the jealousy of his comrades, who, according to himself, had not the desire to give him support, styling himself fatigued, ill, and worn out. The emperor sent him back to France, with testimonies of his satisfaction which were of a nature to afford him consolation. But fearing that in the 7th corps, one-half destroyed, there might remain something of that discouragement which its chief had manifested, he ordered it to be dissolved, after having loaded it with recompenses. He divided the regiments of which it was composed between marshals Soult, Davout, and Ney. Of the 12,000 men of which the 7th corps was composed, there had been 7000 present in the battle of Eylau, and of that 7000, two-thirds had been put *hors de combat*. The survivors, joined to those who had remained behind, would furnish 7000 or 8000 men, to reinforce the different existing corps of the army.

Napoleon placed the 5th corps on the Omulew, at some distance from Warsaw. Lannes being continually ill, he had recalled, with regret to deprive Italy of his services, but with great satisfaction to possess him in Poland, that first of all his generals, Massena, who was not able to keep upon a good understanding with king Joseph. To him Napoleon gave the command of the 5th corps. The sieges in Silesia advanced, owing to the energy and fertility of mind of general Vandamme. Schweidnitz having been taken, Neisse and Glatz alone remained to take. Napoleon availed himself of this circumstance to bring upon the Vistula the Bavarian division of Deroy, about 6000 or 7000 strong, and tolerably good troops, which were quartered at Pultusk, in the position of the 5th corps on the Omulew and in Warsaw. The Polish battalions of Kalisch and Posen had been sent to Dantzick. Napoleon assembled those of Warsaw, organized by prince Poniatowski at Neidenburg, in such a manner as to maintain the communication between the head-quarters and the troops encamped on the Omulew. They were under the orders of general Zayonscheck. He commanded besides that a corps of cavalry should be organized, consisting of Poles, to the number of 1000 or 2000, in order to follow up the Cossacks. These different Polish troops, designed to connect the position of the grand army on the Passarge with that of Massena on the Narew, were not capable, it is clear, of stopping a Russian army which should take the offensive, but they were sufficient to prevent the Cossacks from penetrating between Osterode and Warsaw, and of keeping a continual and active watch over all that vast extent of surface. Concentrated thus behind the Passarge, and in advance of the Lower Vistula, cover-

ing in an unassailable position the siege of Dantzick, which was about finally to commence,—being able, by threatening Kœnigsberg, to stop every offensive movement upon Warsaw, Napoleon was in a situation in which he had nothing to apprehend. Rejoined by the tardy soldiers who had been left in the rear, and by the corps of Bernadotte, reinforced by the grenadiers and voltigeurs of Oudinot, he was able in forty-eight hours to assemble 80,000 men upon one of the points of the Passarge. This situation was imposing, above all, if it were compared to that of the Russians, who would not have been able to place 50,000 men in line. But it is a remark worthy of repetition, although made here before, that an army of more than 300,000 men, spread from the Rhine as far as the Vistula, and managed with a degree of ability that no captain had ever equalled, found it impossible to furnish more than 80,000 combatants on the same field of battle. There were 80,000 or 90,000 men capable of acting offensively between the Vistula and Passarge, 24,000 on the Narew, from Ostrolenka to Warsaw; comprehending in these the Poles and Bavarians, 22,000 under Lefebvre before Dantzick and Colberg, 28,000 under Mortier, Italians, Dutch, and French, spread out between Bremen and Hamburg, as far as Stralsund and Stettin; 15,000 in Silesia, Bavarians and Wertemberghers; 30,000 in the fortresses from Posen as far as Erfurt and Mayence; 7000 or 8000 employed in the artillery parks; 15,000 wounded at different times from the commencement of the campaign; 60,000 sick or marauding; lastly, 30,000 or 40,000 recruits on the march to join. This would make very nearly 330,000 men belonging to the grand army, of which number 270,000 were French, and about 60,000 auxiliaries, Italians, Dutch, Germans, and Poles.

That which in the present case appears singular, is the enormous number of 60,000 sick or marauding,—a number, it is true, only approximating to the real fact[1], difficult to settle, but worthy the attention of statesmen who study the secret resources of national strength. There were not in these 60,000 absentees rated as sick, one-half in the hospitals, the others were marauding. It has been observed already, that many of the soldiers were wanting from the ranks in the battle of Eylau, in consequence of the rapidity of the marches; and that the impressions produced by this terrible battle spread so far, that the cowards and servants belonging to the army fled at full speed, crying out that the French were routed. Since then others were added to the number of the foregoing, who, under the pretext of slight wounds, requested to enter the hospitals, but took care not to go to them, because there they would be detained, watched over, and attended upon, even until it was wearisome to themselves. They passed the Vistula, and lived in the villages to the right and left of the high road, in such a manner as to escape the general superintendence which was exercised by order in all parts of the army. They lived thus at the expense of the country, which they did not spare,—some real cowards, of which every army, even the most heroic, has always a certain number in its ranks; others, on the contrary, brave enough, but plunderers by nature, fond of licence and disorder, but ready to return to their corps when they heard of the resumption of operations. Napoleon, aware of this state of things from the difference between the number of men reported to be in the hospitals and those who were really there, gave his most serious attention to the abuse. He employed for its repression the police of the Polish authorities, and then the select gendarmerie of his guard, the only body which was sufficiently respected to exact obedience. Still they could never completely destroy this leprosy afflicting great armies upon the line of operations. Moreover, the army which behaved thus was that of the camp of Boulogne,—the most solid, best disciplined, and bravest that ever existed! In the campaign of Austerlitz, marauders were scarcely seen at all. But the present rapidity of movement, the distance, climate, season, and, lastly, the carnage, relaxed the bonds of discipline. These vermin, the sad effect of their sufferings among a great body of men, began to increase. Napoleon met it this time by amazing foresight, and by the victories which he soon obtained. Through inducing evils of a similar nature, defeat is capable, in a few days only, of causing the dissolution of an army. Thus amidst the fine yet terrible campaign of 1807, some of the symptoms appeared of the campaign of 1812,—a campaign for ever fatally memorable.

The return of the French army to winter quarters was signalized by certain movements on the part of the Russians. Their ranks had been singularly thinned, not more than 50,000 men remaining who were capable of active service. Nevertheless, general Benningsen, arrogant at not having lost his last man at Eylau, according to his custom called himself the conqueror, and wished to give his boast the semblance of truth. He therefore quitted Kœnigsberg as soon as he heard that the French army was returning towards the Passarge. He exhibited strong columns along that river, above all on its superior course towards Guttstadt, in front of the position of marshal Ney. But he managed very ill; since this intrepid marshal, deprived of the honour of engaging at Eylau, and impatient to indemnify himself for his absence, gave a vigorous reception to the corps which advanced upon him, and caused it considerable loss. At the same moment, the corps of marshal Bernadotte, wishing to establish itself on the Lower Passarge, and on that account finding it necessary to occupy Braunsberg, took that town, where it made 2000 Prussians prisoners. It was to the division of Dupont that the merit of this brilliant exploit belonged. The Russians, notwithstanding, continued in motion, appearing desirous of gaining the Upper Passarge. Napoleon, in the beginning of March, determined to undertake an offensive movement on the Lower Passarge, so as to make general Benningsen uneasy for the safety of Kœnigsberg. It was with regret that he decided on such a movement, because it revealed to the Russians the danger they ran in ascending upon his left to threaten Warsaw. Well knowing that an unmasked manœuvre is a lost resource, Napoleon did not wish to act upon it at all, or else

[1] The emperor could never fix the number exactly, in consequence of the continual movement of the effective part of the different corps.

to act in a decisive manner by marching to Kœnigsberg with all his forces. But on the one side he was necessitated to oblige the enemy to remain quiet, that he might be himself at peace in his winter quarters, and, on the other, he had neither provisions nor ammunition to carry out so long an operation. He therefore limited himself to a simple movement, executed on the 3rd of March by the corps of Soult and Bernadotte, who passed the river, while marshal Ney, at Guttstadt, rudely repulsed the enemy's troops directed upon the Upper Passarge. The Russians lost in these simultaneous movements about 2000 men, and finding their line of retreat on Kœnigsberg compromised, they hastened to retire, and thus gave tranquillity to the French quarters.

Such were the last acts of that winter's campaign. The cold, long retarded, began to be felt; the thermometer had fallen eight or ten degrees below the freezing point. They were about to experience in March the weather which had been expected in December and January.

Napoleon, who had decided in spite of himself to order the last operations, wrote to marshal Soult: "It is one of the inconveniences that I have felt under existing movements, that I enlighten the Russians on their position, but they press too much upon my right. Resolved to suffer the bad weather to pass away, and to organize the sustenance of the troops, I am not otherwise annoyed at this lesson given to the enemy. Under the presumption with which I see he is animated, I believe it only requires patience to make him perceive his great errors."—(*Osterode, March* 6.)

If Napoleon at that moment had possessed sufficient provisions, and means of transporting enough in order to support the army for some days, he would have immediately terminated the war, having to oppose an enemy sufficiently ill-conducted to come and throw himself on the right of his quarters. Thus the whole question consisted, in his eyes, of raising the necessary supplies which should permit him to recruit his soldiers, weakened by privation, and to assemble them for some days without being liable to see them die of hunger, or to leave half of them behind, as he had been compelled to do at Eylau. The towns on the sea-coast, particularly that of Elbing, might furnish him with provisions for the first moments of his establishment, but such resources were not sufficient. He wished them brought in great quantities, and to be made to descend from Warsaw, by the Vistula, to the different quarters of the army on the Passarge. He gave the most precise orders to amass directly at Bromberg and Warsaw the supplies needful, and for creating the means of transport which should serve to terminate the conveyance from the Vistula to the borders of the Passarge. His intention was to begin by furnishing daily the entire rations to his soldiers, and then to form at Osterode, the centre of his cantonments, a general magazine, which should inclose some millions of rations in bread, rice, wine, and brandy. He wished to make the zeal of the Poles serve to produce this effect. They had then rendered him few military services, and he wished at least to draw from them some ministering assistance. As M. Talleyrand was at Warsaw, he desired he would confer with the provisionary government that directed the affairs of Poland; and he therefore wrote him the following letter, giving him full power to conclude the different bargains at whatever price they might cost.

"*Osterode, March* 12th, 10 P. M.

"I received your letter of the 10th of March at 3 P. M. I have 300,000 rations of biscuit at Warsaw. It will take eight days to bring them from Warsaw to Osterode. Perform miracles, that you may send me daily 50,000 rations. Try also to send me daily 2000 pints of brandy. At present the fate of Europe and the greatest calculations depend upon provisions. To conquer the Russians, if I have but bread, is mere child's play. I have millions. I do not refuse to give them. All that you do will be well done; but it is absolutely necessary that, on the receipt of this letter, you convey to me by land, and by Mlawa and Zakroczin, 50,000 rations of biscuit and 2000 pints of brandy. It is the work of eighty carriages a day, paying in sterling gold. If the patriotism of the Poles cannot make this effort, they are not good for much. The importance of the business with which I here charge you is greater than all the negotiations in the world. Call the contractors, the governors, general Lemarrois, and the most influential men in the kingdom, give them money, and I will approve all you do. Biscuit and brandy is all we require. In these 300,000 rations of biscuit, and these 18,000 or 20,000 pints of brandy, you behold that which will derange the combinations of all the powers."

M. de Talleyrand assembled the members of the Polish government, for the purpose of endeavouring to obtain the victuals and the carriages of which they stood in need. Provisions were not scarce in Poland, for with ready money given to Jews they were sure to have sufficient, but the means of transporting them were difficult to organize. They first proposed procuring them in the same country by paying an immense price; at last they ended by buying carts and horses, and thus they were enabled to establish relays from the borders of the Vistula to those of the Passarge. The provisions were conveyed in boats on the Vistula, and disembarked at Warsaw, Plock, Thorn, and Marienwerder, whence they were transported to Osterode, the centre of the cantonments, either in the waggons belonging to the regiment, in the vehicles of the country, or in those they had themselves bought and provided with horses. They sought for cattle throughout Silesia, and, paying for them, had them driven on foot to Warsaw. They endeavoured to procure wines and spirits from the northern coasts, where they were brought in large quantities for trade, and of superior quality. They were obtained at Berlin, Stettin, and Elbing, and brought by water to Thorn. Napoleon much wished to procure 200,000 or 300,000 bottles of wine to stimulate the hearts of his soldiers. He had near him a valuable resource of this kind, but it was inclosed in the town of Dantzick, which contained many millions of bottles of excellent wine, sufficient to supply the army for several months. This was not a mean stimulant to the taking of that fortress.

These active measures for providing the army with food could not produce an immediate effect; but in the interval they lived on the Nogath, on

Elbing, and even on the districts they occupied, and the industry of the soldiers supplied what was wanting, having succeeded in procuring themselves necessaries. Many hidden stores of provisions had been discovered, and thus they were enabled to await the regular arrivals from the Vistula. They were lodged in the villages, and no longer bivouacked, which was a great relief to troops which had done this for five succeeding months, from October to February. As to the advanced guard and outposts, they lived in barracks, the materials for which the forest country furnished in abundance. Some wine and a little brandy met with at Elbing, even rendered the soldiers gay. The first days passed, they were far better off, and healthier, than on the Narew; the country was better, and they hoped, at the return of the fine season, to recompense themselves for present troubles, and terminate in one day's battle the terrible work of carnage in which they were engaged.

The provisionary regiments designed to bring the recruits began to arrive on the Vistula. Many among them, already at the theatre of the war, had been reviewed, and placed in the regiments for which they were allotted. Thus the soldiers beheld their ranks filling, heard of the numerous reinforcements preparing on the background of the army, and confided more and more in the supreme vigilance which foresaw and provided for all their wants. The cavalry continued to be the object of the most anxious solicitude of Napoleon, who had formed foot detachments of all the dismounted horsemen, and had sent them to Silesia to seek horses, with which that country abounds.

Immense works were executed on the Passarge and the Vistula, for the purpose of securing the position of the army. All the bridges on the Passarge had been destroyed, two excepted,—one for the use of the corps of marshal Bernadotte at Braunsberg, the other for the convenience of marshal Soult at Spanden. Two vast defences were added to each bridge end, so that they should be able to pass over. Napoleon constantly repeated to his lieutenants, that a line was not easy of defence but when it was in a state to be passed in turn, in order to adopt the offensive against the attacking party [1].

Two bridges over the Vistula, one at Marienburg, the other at Marienwerder, made a safe communication with the troops of marshal Lefebvre, who was charged with the siege of Dantzick. They were thus able to join his forces, or summon them to their own aid, presenting every where to the enemy a compact mass. Marshal Lefebvre approached Dantzick. He only awaited the heavy artillery from different towns in Silesia to commence that great siege which was to be the occupation and the glory of the winter. The works of Sierock, Praga, and Modlin, destined to consolidate the position of Warsaw, continued to proceed equally well.

It was from the little town of Osterode that Napoleon commanded all. His soldiers, provided with bread, potatoes, meat, brandy, thatch to cover them, and wood to warm themselves, no longer suffered. But the officers, who were only able to obtain the food and lodging of a common soldier, even with their regular pay, were exposed to many privations. Napoleon, wishing to give them an example of resignation, remained with them. The officers of each corps sent to Osterode were able to say that they had not found Napoleon better housed than the meanest in rank among themselves. Thus it was, that, replying to his brother Joseph, who complained of the sufferings of the army at Naples, he rallied him on his complaints, censured his feebleness of soul, and painted to him the following picture:—

"The staff-officers have not undressed for a period of two months, and some not for four. I myself have not taken off my boots for a fortnight. We are in the midst of snow and clay, without wine, without brandy, and without bread; eating potatoes and meat, making long marches and counter-marches without any sort of indulgence, generally fighting at the bayonet's point, or under grape-shot, the wounded obliged to be withdrawn in sledges, in the open air, for fifty miles." (Here he alluded to the march which followed the battle of Eylau, for at Osterode they were better lodged.) "It is, then, but a sorry joke to compare the place where we are to the lovely country of Naples, where you have wine, bread, covering for your beds, society, and even woman.

"After having destroyed the Prussian monarchy, we fight the rest of the Prussians, the Russians, the Calmoucks, the Cossacks, and all the colonies of the north, who in ancient times invaded the Roman empire. We make war in all its energy and all its horrors. In the midst of these great fatigues, every one has been, more or less, ill; as to myself, I was never stronger, I have grown stout.—*Osterode, March* 1st."

The situation of which Napoleon here draws the picture, was already much ameliorated at Osterode, at least for the soldiers. But if the French suffered much, the Russians suffered more, for they endured the greatest misery. Their battalions, which at the commencement of operations contained 500 men, were gradually reduced to 300, 200, and 150. They could muster ten battalions together that presented only the last number. If the Russians had continued to make head against Napoleon, it would have been followed with the destruction of all their army; thus they would not have been able to appear again in the open field. They had communicated with St. Petersburg in the name of all the generals, to the effect, that if the forces which remained were not doubled at least, they could do nothing thenceforth but fly before the French. As to the rest, all the Russian officers, full of admiration for the French army, feeling that in the end they fought much more for England and Prussia than for Russia, desired peace, and even loudly demanded it in pressing terms.

Their troops, which were not supplied with provisions like those of Napoleon, through a superior

[1] "No river, nor any line whatever," he wrote to Bernadotte (March 6th, Osterode), "will be able to defend itself without offensive points; because when it can do nothing but defend itself, it runs the risk of obtaining no advantage. But when it is possible to combine a defensive with an offensive movement, the enemy is made to run greater hazard than he can make those run whom he attacks. Work, therefore, day and night, at the *têtes de pont* of Spanden and Braunsberg."

forecast, perished of hunger, and, weary of war, had ceased to fight with the French. They met the latter very near on marauding parties without attacking. It seemed, indeed, as if there was an instinctive agreement not to add to the sufferings of each other in such a situation. It sometimes happened that the unfortunate Cossacks, pressed by hunger, asked bread by signs of the French soldiers, avowing, that for several days they had found nothing to eat; and the French soldiers, always open to pity, had given them potatoes, of which they had a great abundance,—a singular spectacle, this relapse into humanity in the midst of the cruelties of war!

Napoleon was well aware, that if he had sustained great loss, he had caused much greater loss to his enemies. But he had to combat false reports, in this regard, that were believed at Warsaw, at Berlin, and, above all, at Paris. His prodigious glory alone repressed the independent spirits of France, as well as the ill-disposed throughout Europe; and he could already divine that, on his first serious reverse, he should see both fall off from him. He had, in consequence, never such great efforts to make, nor required greater energy of character than now, in order to govern public opinion. Young auditors, sent from Paris to bring the reports of the different ministers to head quarters, and little accustomed to the scenes they witnessed, officers discontented, or more than ordinarily affected by the peculiar horrors of this war, wrote letters to France filled with exaggerations. "Arrange with M. Daru," said Napoleon to M. Maret, in one of his letters, "for the auditors to quit this, as they are useless, only lose their time, and, being little accustomed to the events of war, only write nonsense to Paris. For the future I will have all reports brought to me by the officers of the staff." As for the recitals emanating from particular officers, relative to the battle of Eylau, and which the minister Fouché pointed out to him as the source of the false reports spread in Paris, Napoleon replied, that he must believe nothing of them. "My officers," said he, "know what is passing in my army just as much as the loungers who walk in the garden of the Tuilleries know of what is discussing in the cabinet [1]; besides, exaggeration pleases the human mind. The darkened pictures which have been drawn of our situation to you, have the babblers of Paris for their authors, who are adepts at description. The position of France was never so fine, never so grand. As for Eylau, I have said, and I repeat it, that the bulletin had exaggerated our loss; and what are 2000 or 3000 men killed in a great battle? When I lead back my army to France and to the Rhine, it will appear that not so very many will be wanting off its roll. At the time of our expedition to Egypt, the correspondence of the army, intercepted by the British cabinet, was printed, and caused the expedition of the English, which was stupid, which ought to have miscarried, which succeeded only because it was in the course of fate that it should succeed. It was then said that we were in want of every thing in Egypt, the richest country in the universe; it was said that the army was destroyed, and yet I brought back to Toulon eight-ninths of them! . . . The Russians claim the victory, so did they also after Pultusk, after Austerlitz. On the contrary, they have been driven, at the sword's point, close up to the cannon of Kœnigsberg. They have had fifteen or sixteen generals killed. Their loss has been immense. We have made a perfect slaughter of them."

Some fragments of letters from major-general Berthier had been printed, in which he spoke of the dangers Napoleon had run. "They publish," he sent word to the archchancellor Cambacérès, "that I command my outposts, which is folly . . . I have desired nothing to be inserted in the *Moniteur* but the bulletins. If there be, you will hinder me from writing any thing, and then you will have greater uneasiness Berthier writes in the midst of the field of battle, fatigued, and not expecting that his letters will be printed"—(*Osterode, March* 5th.)"

Napoleon was thus unwilling that his personal courage should be vaunted, for such courage would become a danger. It was discovering too openly that this military monarchy, without as yet a past or a future, was at the mercy of a cannon-ball.

From the transports caused in France by the wonders of Austerlitz and of Jena, the people had fallen into a sort of disquietude. Paris was sad and deserted; for the emperor, the chiefs of the army, of whom great part of the higher society of this reign was composed, were absent. Industry suffered. Napoleon enjoined it on his sisters, the princes Cambacérès, and Lebrun, to give fêtes. He wanted them thus to fill the void caused by his absence. He ordered that surveys should be made of the moveables of the crown at Fontainebleau, Versailles, Compiègne, and St. Cloud, and that several millions, saved out of his own personal income, should be devoted to the purchase of the manufactures of Lyons, Rouen, and St. Quentin. The assistance granted in this way he directed should be proportioned, not according to the necessities of the imperial residences, but to the wants of the manufacturing classes. Although he in general strove to restrain the taste of the empress and of his sisters for extravagance, he now recommended prodigality to them. He desired that a million a month should be dedicated from the sinking-fund,—that is to say, the treasury of the army,—to loans to the principal manufacturers, upon deposits of merchandize, and he formed a project so as to convert this accidental measure into a permanent institution, having for its object, not, as he said, a fund for the assistance of bankrupts, but one destined to sustain those manufacturers who employed a great number of workmen, and who might be obliged to discharge them, unless they could be furnished with facilities for paying their wages.

He conceived in the end an extraordinary means of drawing capital to commerce, by bringing about a considerable improvement in the management of the finances. The sum total of the taxes was then, still more than at present, behind-hand in receipt within the year. The bonds or obligations of the receivers-general which represented the taxes, did not fall due, in part at least, for three or four months after the year had run out,—that is to say, in the March, April, or May of the following

[1] April 13th.

year. It was, therefore, necessary to discount them,—a task, in undertaking which the managers of such business contrived to give themselves up to very active stock-jobbing. It was the floating debt of that day, which was met by the obligations of the receivers-general, instead, as at present, by royal bonds. This discount required on the part of the capitalists of Paris a principal of 80,000,000f. Napoleon's idea was to establish, in 1808 for example, that the portion of the obligations which would not fall due till 1809, should be applied to the service of 1809 itself, and so on for the future, so that each service should have for its use only the obligations falling due in the same year. It remained to provide for 1808 the deficiency answering to the portion of obligations which would be thrown in upon 1809. There was thus a sum of 80,000,000f. to procure. Napoleon proposed to furnish this by means of a loan, which the state treasury should make to the army chest, at a moderate interest. "By this means," he wrote, "my obligations would all become due in twelve months; the public treasury would save 5,000,000f. or 6,000,000f. in the expense of negotiation; our manufactures and our commerce would gain immensely, since 80,000,000f. which lay unemployed in the treasury would be applicable to the uses of trade."—(*Osterode, April* 1st. *Note to prince Cambacérès.*)

In Paris itself he ordered the manufacturing of considerable quantities of shoes, boots, materials of harness, and artillery-carriages, to employ the workmen of the capital. The articles made in Paris were of a better quality than those made elsewhere. The only point was how to transmit them to Poland. Napoleon had invented an expedient for this end as simple as it was ingenious. At this epoch a company had contracted for the transport of all army stores, and furnished, at a fixed price, the chests which carried the bread, the baggage, and, in short, all that must be carried in the rear of troops, even of those most lightly equipped.

Napoleon had been struck in the midst of the bogs of Pultusk and of Golymin, with the want of zeal in these carriers, enrolled by private parties, and with their want of courage in danger; and as he had organized the drivers of artillery in a military manner, so he determined also to organize these baggage drivers, thinking that as the danger was nearly equal for all those who contributed to the various services of an army, so should all be drawn within the same bond of honour, and treated as soldiers, in order to impose the duties of soldiers upon them. He had, therefore, ordered battalions of the train to be successively formed in Paris, charged with the management of stores, to construct caissons, to buy draught-horses, and, when the *personnel* and *materiel* of their battalions should be organized, to set them on the road towards the Vistula. Instead of travelling empty, these new military equipages were to carry the articles of equipment manufactured at Paris. These things might arrive in time, as only two months was necessary for their transport, and it was possible the war might still last five or six. By this course of measures Napoleon proposed to remedy the momentary stagnation of commerce, and to apply the sinews of war in this way to the wants of peace. One, in fact, consumes no less than the other; and when money is not wanting, a clever government can furnish workmen with that work to which peace always helps them, and thus husband the means of gaining their livelihood in the midst even of the difficulties of war.

Such was the multitude of objects with which he occupied himself in the town of Osterode, living in a sort of barn, from whence he restrained Europe and governed France. But a more convenient dwelling was found for him at Finkenstein, which was a country-house belonging to one of the officers of the crown of Prussia, in which he with his staff and military household could be lodged. There, as at Osterode, he was in the centre of his cantonments, and ready to repair to wherever his presence might be necessary. The portfolios of his several ministers were sent to him weekly, and he devoted his attention to the least as well as the greatest affairs. Even the theatres at this distance did not escape his active surveillance. Some verses and music had been composed in honour of him which he thought bad. By his order others were composed instead, in which he was less lauded, but in which more elevated sentiments were expressed in more suitable language. The authors of these were thanked and rewarded by his order, and these fine words addressed to them in his name: "The best manner of praising me is by writing such things as will inspire the nation, its youth, and the army, with heroic sentiments." He read attentively the public journals, and following up the sittings of the French Academy, directed the bad tendencies of the writers to be corrected, and that the discourses delivered at the Academy should be watched. He considered the attacks which the "Journal de l'Empire" and the "Mercure de France" made against the philosophers as hurtful. "It is necessary," said he, "to have a clever man at the head of these journals. These two *affect* religion even to bigotry. Instead of attacking the excesses of the exclusive system of some philosophers, they attack philosophy and human knowledge. Instead of keeping within bounds the productions of the age by a healthy criticism, they discourage them, depreciate and disparage them . . . I speak not of political opinions; one need not be extraordinarily cunning to see, that, if they dared, theirs would not be more sound than those of the 'Courrier Français.'"

The French Academy had held a sitting for the reception of cardinal Maury, who was recalled to France, and replaced in possession of the chair he had formerly occupied. The abbé Sicard, on receiving cardinal Maury, had expressed himself in unbecoming terms in relation to Mirabeau. The replaced cardinal had replied in the same strain, and this academical sitting had become an occasion for a sort of declamation against the revolution and revolutionists. Napoleon, unpleasantly affected by this, wrote to Fouché the minister: "I recommend to you that there should be no reaction of opinion. Let Mirabeau be spoken of with praise. Many things in the sitting of the Academy do not please me. When shall we become wise? . . . When shall we be animated with true Christian charity, and when will our actions cease to have

for their aim the humiliation of others? When shall we abstain from reviving remembrances which go to the hearts of so many people?"—(*Finkenstein, May* 20th.)

Another time he learnt from his correspondence of all kinds, for which he paid liberally, and which he read carefully, that the management of the opera was divided by intestine quarrels; that one of the machinists was persecuted for some change of decoration that had failed. "I will have no trickery any where," he writes to M. Fouché; "I will not allow Mons. —— to be the victim of an unavoidable accident; it is my custom to assist the unfortunate; whether the actresses appear in the clouds or not, I will not allow that to be an occasion for intrigues."—(*April* 12th.)

He evinced at the same time the most extreme solicitude for the establishments of education, and particularly for that of Ecouen, where the daughters of poor soldiers were brought up. He wrote to M. de Lacépède that he desired they should be made artless and chaste women, worthy of being united to men who may have served him well either in the army or the government. In order to render them so, it was necessary, according to his idea, that they should be brought up with feelings of solid piety. "I have only attached a secondary importance," said he, "to religious institutions for the school of Fontainebleau. There young officers are to be formed; but at Ecouen it is quite another thing. There women, wives, mothers of families are to be reared. Let us make believers rather than reasoners of such. The weakness of brain in women, the instability of their ideas, their destination in social order, the necessity of inspiring them with constant resignation, with sweet and yielding charity, all tends to render the yoke of religion indispensable for them. My wish is, that virtuous rather than agreeable women may be brought out thence, that their qualities be those of the heart rather than of the mind." He consequently recommended that they should be taught history and literature, be spared the study of ancient languages and of the deeper sciences, taught enough of physics to enable them to dissipate from around them popular ignorance, instructed a little in common medicine, botany, music, and dancing,—*but not that of the opera*; that they be taught cyphering, and all sorts of useful work. "Their apartments," adds he, "should be furnished with the work of their own hands; they should make their own chemises, stockings, gowns, and caps, — and be able, as occasion requires, to prepare the baby-linen for their children. I wish to make of these young girls useful women, assured that in so doing I shall make them agreeable. If I aim only at making them agreeable women, I shall have them soon become *petites maîtresses*."—(*Finkenstein, May* 15th.)

This prodigious activity was sometimes changed from that beneficent watchfulness to the dark mistrust which cannot but obtain under a new and absolute ruler. Napoleon, applying himself to affairs of police, knew who entered and who went from Paris. He had learnt that Mad. de Staël had returned there; that she had already visited at several country-houses in the environs, and had held more than one hostile discourse. Upon pretence that if he did not interfere she might compromise good citizens, whom he should afterwards have to punish, he had ordered, in spite of many solicitations to the contrary, that she should be expelled Paris. As he distrusted his minister Fouché, who treated influential persons tenderly, he prescribed to him to oblige her to depart instantly, and recommended the archchancellor Cambacérès to see to the execution of this order (*March* 26th). At the same time he was informed that the police had sent out of Paris an old member of the convention named Ricord. For this latter no one had solicited, no great personage had interfered on his behalf, for reaction had taken place with every body; there was neither favour nor humanity for those who were called "revolutionists." "Why," writes Napoleon to his minister Fouché, "drive out of Paris the conventionalist Ricord? If he is dangerous, he ought not to have been suffered to re-enter it contrary to the law of the year VIII. But since he has been permitted to return, he ought to be left undisturbed. What he has formerly done matters little. He conducted himself under the convention like any man wishing to live; he merely fell in with the times. He is in easy circumstances; he will not throw himself into any bad affairs for the sake of subsistence. Let him be tolerated then in Paris, at least till strong reasons arise for hindering his remaining there."—(*March* 6th.)

By this same care of acquainting himself with every thing, he learnt from Messrs. Monge and Laplace, that a scholar, whom he honoured and loved in a particular degree, M. Berthollet, had experienced some reverses of fortune. "I learn," he writes, "that you are in want of 150,000f. I have given orders to my treasurer to place this sum at your disposal, glad to find this opportunity of being useful to you, and of giving you a proof of my esteem."—(*Finkenstein, May* 1st.)

He then addressed fresh advice to his brothers, Louis and Joseph, on the art of government, one at Naples the other in Holland. He reproached Louis for favouring, from the vanity of an upstart monarch, the party of the ancient *régime*, the orange party; for creating marshals without having an army; for instituting an order which he distributed to all comers, to Frenchmen whom he knew not, and to Dutchmen who had not rendered him any service. He reproached Joseph for weakness and negligence; for being more busied with specious reforms than with the submission of the Calabrians; for preceding the suppression of the monks,—a measure which he strongly approved,—by a preamble which seemed concocted by philosophers, and not by statesmen. "Such a preamble," said he, "ought to have been written in the style of an enlightened pontiff, who was suppressing the monks because they were useless to religion and burdensome to the church. I entertain a bad opinion of any government, the actions of which are directed by the folly of wits."—(*April* 14th.) "You live too much," said he to him, "with lettered men and scholars. They are coquettes, with whom one may keep up an intercourse of gallantry, but among whom one must not think of choosing a wife or a minister." He reproached him for cherishing illusions as to his

situation at Naples, for flattering himself that he was beloved, when he had only, at most, reigned there one year. "Ask yourself," said he to him, "what would become of you, if there were no longer 30,000 French at Naples? When you have reigned twenty years, and have made yourself feared and esteemed, then you may believe your throne consolidated." He then painted to him the situation of the French in Poland. "You are now eating green peas at Naples, and perhaps are already seeking the shade: we, on the contrary, are still as if in the month of January. I have opened the trenches before Dantzick. A hundred pieces of cannon, and 200,000 lbs. of powder, are beginning their business there. Our works are but sixty toises from the place, which has a garrison of 6000 Russians and 20,000 Prussians, commanded by marshal Kalkreuth. I hope to take it in a fortnight Rest easy about what may follow."—(*Finkenstein, April* 19th.)

Such, in the midst of the snows of Poland, were the various occupations of this extraordinary genius, embracing all things, watching over every thing, aspiring to govern not only his soldiers and his agents, but even men's minds; wishing not only to act, but to think also for every body; carried generally towards good, but sometimes, in his incessant activity, allowing himself to be drawn into evil, as must happen to any one who is all powerful, and finds no obstacles to his own impulses; preventing by turn reactions and persecutions, and then, in the blaze of his greatest glory, sensible to the shafts of an unfriendly tongue, so far as to descend from his greatness to persecute a woman, even on the same day that he could defend a member of the convention from the momentary spirit of reaction. Let us, then, congratulate ourselves that we are at last become subjects to the law,—a law equal for every one,—and which does not expose us to dependence on the good or bad emotions of the souls even of the greatest and most generous. Yes, the law is by far more worth than any human will, be it what it may! Let us, however, be just towards the will which knew how to accomplish such prodigious things,—which did accomplish them by our hands,—which employed its fertile energy to re-organize French society, to reform Europe, to carry our power and our principles throughout the world, and which of all it effected for us, if nothing remains to us of power which passeth away, has at least left us glory which passeth not away; and glory sometimes brings back power.

BOOK XXVII.

FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT.

EVENTS OF THE EAST DURING THE WINTER OF 1807.—THE SULTAN SELIM, AFFRIGHTED BY THE THREATS OF RUSSIA, RE-ESTABLISHES THE HOSPODARS IPSILANTI AND MARUZZI.—THE RUSSIANS CONTINUE THEIR MARCH NEVERTHELESS TOWARDS THE TURKISH FRONTIER.—ON LEARNING THE VIOLATION OF HIS TERRITORY, THE PORTE, EXCITED BY GENERAL SEBASTIANI, SENDS HIS PASSPORTS TO THE RUSSIAN MINISTER, M. ITALINSKI.—THE ENGLISH, IN AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS, DEMAND THE RETURN OF M. ITALINSKI, THE EXPULSION OF GENERAL SEBASTIANI, AND AN IMMEDIATE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST FRANCE.—RESISTANCE OF THE PORTE, AND RETIREMENT OF THE ENGLISH MINISTER, MR. CHARLES ARBUTHNOT, ON BOARD THE ENGLISH FLEET AT TENEDOS.—ADMIRAL DUCKWORTH, WITH SEVEN SAIL OF THE LINE AND TWO FRIGATES, FORCES THE DARDANELLES WITHOUT SUSTAINING DAMAGE, AND DESTROYS A TURKISH NAVAL SQUADRON AT CAPE NAGARA.—TERROR AT CONSTANTINOPLE.—THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, DIVIDED, IS ABOUT TO YIELD.—GENERAL SEBASTIANI ENCOURAGES SULTAN SELIM, AND ENGAGES HIM TO FEIGN A NEGOTIATION IN ORDER TO AFFORD TIME TO ARM IN CONSTANTINOPLE.—THE ADVICE OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS FOLLOWED, AND CONSTANTINOPLE IS ARMED IN A FEW DAYS WITH THE HELP OF FRENCH OFFICERS.—CONFERENCES CARRIED ON BETWEEN THE PORTE AND THE BRITISH SQUADRON MOORED AT PRINCE'S ISLANDS.—THE CONFERENCES END BY A REFUSAL TO CONCEDE THE DEMANDS OF THE ENGLISH LEGATION.—ADMIRAL DUCKWORTH PROCEEDS TO CONSTANTINOPLE, FINDS THE CITY DEFENDED BY 300 PIECES OF CANNON, AND DECIDES UPON REGAINING THE DARDANELLES.—HE PASSES IT AGAIN, BUT WITH MUCH DAMAGE TO HIS SQUADRON.—GREAT EFFECT PRODUCED IN EUROPE BY THIS EVENT, TO THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OF NAPOLEON.—ALTHOUGH VICTORIOUS, NAPOLEON, STRUCK WITH THE DIFFICULTIES THAT NATURE OPPOSES TO HIM IN POLAND, RETURNS TO THE IDEA OF A GRAND CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE.—HE MAKES NEW EFFORTS TO PENETRATE INTO THE SECRET OF THE AUSTRIAN POLICY.—THE COURT OF VIENNA, IN REPLY TO HIS QUESTIONS, OFFERS HER MEDIATION WITH THE BELLIGERENT POWERS.—NAPOLEON SEES IN THIS OFFER A MODE OF HER INTERMEDDLING IN THE QUARREL, AND OF HER PREPARATION FOR WAR.—HE IMMEDIATELY CALLS OUT A THIRD CONSCRIPTION, DRAWN FROM THE NEW FORCES OF FRANCE AND ITALY, CREATES WITH EXTRAORDINARY PROMPTITUDE AN ARMY OF RESERVE OF 100,000 MEN, AND MAKES A COMMUNICATION OF HIS MEASURES TO AUSTRIA.—FLOURISHING STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY ON THE LOWER VISTULA AND PASSARGE.—WINTER, FOR A LONG TIME RETARDED, IS SHARPLY FELT.—NAPOLEON PROFITS BY THE TIME OF INACTION TO UNDERTAKE THE SIEGE OF DANTZICK.—

MARSHAL LEFEBVRE CHARGED WITH THE COMMAND OF THE TROOPS, AND GENERAL CHASSELOUP WITH THE DIRECTION OF THE ENGINEERS.—LONG AND DIFFICULT LABOURS IN THAT MEMORABLE SIEGE.—THE TWO SOVEREIGNS OF PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA DECIDE UPON SENDING POWERFUL SUCCOURS TO DANTZICK.—NAPOLEON ON HIS SIDE DISPOSES OF HIS CORPS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO BE ABLE TO REINFORCE MARSHAL LEFEBVRE AT ANY MOMENT.—FINE COMBAT UNDER THE WALLS OF DANTZICK.—LAST WORKS OF APPROACH.—THE FRENCH ARE READY TO GIVE THE ASSAULT.—THE CITY IS SURRENDERED.—IMMENSE RESOURCES IN CORN AND WINE FOUND IN DANTZICK.—MARSHAL LEFEBVRE CREATED DUKE OF DANTZICK.—THE RETURN OF SPRING DECIDES NAPOLEON ON RESUMING THE OFFENSIVE.—THE RENEWAL OF OPERATIONS FIXED FOR THE 10TH OF JUNE, 1807.—THE RUSSIANS PRECEDE THE FRENCH, AND ON THE 5TH OF JUNE MAKE A GENERAL ATTACK AGAINST THE FRENCH CANTONMENTS ON THE PASSARGE.—MARSHAL NEY, AGAINST WHOM TWO-THIRDS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY PRESSES, MAKES HEAD AGAINST THEM BETWEEN GUTTSTADT AND DEPPEN WITH HEROIC INTREPIDITY.—THE MARSHAL GIVES TIME TO NAPOLEON TO CONCENTRATE THE WHOLE FRENCH ARMY ON DEPPEN.—NAPOLEON IN HIS TURN TAKES A VIGOROUS OFFENSIVE MOVEMENT, AND PRESSES THE RUSSIANS CLOSELY.—GENERAL BENNINGSEN RETIRES PRECIPITATELY TOWARDS THE PREGEL, DESCENDING THE ALLE.—NAPOLEON MARCHES IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO INTERPOSE BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND KŒNIGSBERG.—THE ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMY ENCOUNTERS THE RUSSIAN ARMY ENCAMPED AT HEILSBERG.—SANGUINARY CONFLICT ON THE 10TH OF JUNE.—NAPOLEON, REACHING HEILSBERG IN THE EVENING WITH THE MAIN BODY OF HIS FORCES, PREPARES TO GIVE A DECISIVE BATTLE ON THE MORROW, WHEN THE RUSSIANS DECAMP.—HE CONTINUES TO MANŒUVRE IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CUT THEM OFF FROM KŒNIGSBERG.—HE SENDS THE LEFT, UNDER MARSHALS SOULT AND DAVOUT, UPON KŒNIGSBERG, AND WITH THE CORPS OF MARSHALS LANNES, MORTIER, NEY, BERNADOTTE, AND THE GUARD, HE FOLLOWS THE RUSSIAN ARMY ALONG THE ALLE.—GENERAL BENNINGSEN, FEARFUL OF THE FATE OF KŒNIGSBERG, WISHES TO HASTEN TO THE SUCCOUR OF THAT PLACE, AND IN HASTE PASSES THE ALLE AT FRIEDLAND.—NAPOLEON SURPRISES HIM ON THE 14TH, IN THE MORNING, AT THE MOMENT WHEN HE PASSED THE RIVER.—MEMORABLE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.—THE RUSSIANS, BEATEN, RETIRE UPON THE NIEMEN, AND ABANDON KŒNIGSBERG.—TAKING OF KŒNIGSBERG.—ARMISTICE OFFERED BY THE RUSSIANS AND ACCEPTED BY NAPOLEON.—MOVEMENT OF THE FRENCH HEAD-QUARTERS TO TILSIT.—INTERVIEW BETWEEN ALEXANDER AND NAPOLEON, ON A RAFT PLACED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIEMEN.—NAPOLEON INVITES ALEXANDER TO PASS THE NIEMEN, AND FIX HIS SOJOURN AT TILSIT.—A PROMPT INTIMACY TAKES PLACE BETWEEN THESE TWO SOVEREIGNS.—NAPOLEON MASTERS THE MIND OF ALEXANDER, AND OBTAINS HIS ACCEPTANCE OF HIS VAST DESIGNS, WHICH CONSIST IN CONSTRAINING EUROPE TO TAKE ARMS AGAINST ENGLAND, IF SHE WILL NOT CONSENT TO AN EQUITABLE PEACE.—THE PARTITION OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE WAS TO BE THE PRICE OF ALEXANDER'S COMPLIANCE.—CONTEST ON THE SUBJECT OF CONSTANTINOPLE.—ALEXANDER FINISHES BY ADHERING TO ALL THE DESIGNS OF NAPOLEON, AND APPEARS TO CONCEIVE FOR HIM A WARM FRIENDSHIP.—NAPOLEON, OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR ALEXANDER, CONSENTS TO RESTORE TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA A PART OF HIS DOMINIONS.—THE KING OF PRUSSIA COMES TO TILSIT.—HIS CHARACTER BETWEEN ALEXANDER AND NAPOLEON.—THE QUEEN OF PRUSSIA ALSO VISITS TILSIT, TO ENDEAVOUR TO OBTAIN FROM NAPOLEON SOME CONCESSIONS FAVOURABLE TO PRUSSIA.—NAPOLEON, RESPECTFUL TOWARDS THIS UNHAPPY QUEEN, REMAINS INFLEXIBLE.—CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.—PATENT AND SECRET TREATIES OF TILSIT.—SECRET CONVENTIONS REMAINING UNKNOWN IN EUROPE.—NAPOLEON AND ALEXANDER AGREE ON ALL THE POINTS, AND QUIT, GIVING EACH OTHER STRIKING TESTIMONIES OF FRIENDSHIP, AND MAKING EACH OTHER PROMISES TO MEET AGAIN SOON.—RETURN OF NAPOLEON TO FRANCE, AFTER AN ABSENCE OF NEARLY A YEAR.—HIS GLORY AFTER TILSIT.—CHARACTER OF HIS POLICY AT THIS PERIOD.

WHILE Napoleon, quartered on the Lower Vistula, was awaiting in the midst of the snows of Poland for the return of fine weather to permit him to resume the offensive, and was employing the time of this apparent inaction in besieging Dantzick, in recruiting his army, and governing his vast dominions, the east, recently drawn into the quarrels of the west, brought useful aid to his side, and procured a brilliant triumph for his policy.

The sultan Selim, the nobleness of his character, and his mental acquirements, have already been made known; also the embarrassment of his situation has been shown between Russia and England that he disliked, and France, which from taste, instinct, and foresight, he loved; for he knew well enough that the latter, even in her wildest ambition, would never covet Constantinople. It remains for us to detail what happened while the French army fought in December the battle of Pultusk, and in February that of Eylau.

The sultan Selim, it has been seen, had begun by deposing the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, Maruzzi and Ipsilanti, notorious partisans of Russian policy. But M. d'Italinski, shortly threatening him with an immediate rupture, if he did not re-establish them in their governments, he had yielded to the threats of the Russian representative, and had given up the government of the provinces of the Danube to these two avowed enemies of his empire. Russia had, to force this concession, urged the treaty of Cainardgé, which gave her a certain right of interference in the government of Moldavia and Wallachia. Scarcely had the sultan obeyed, more in deference to the will of his ministers than his own, than he wrote to Napoleon, to solicit his indulgence, and to assure him that the act to which he had allowed himself to be driven, was not an abandonment of the French alliance, but rather a measure of prudence enforced by the frightful disorganization of the Turkish forces. Napoleon had replied to him forthwith; and, far from discouraging him by any manifestations of discontent, pitied, flattered, and revived him, offering him the double assistance of the French army of Dalmatia, which could operate through Bosnia upon the Lower Danube, and of the French fleet at Cadiz, which was ready to sail from the coasts of Spain towards the Dardanelles. This fleet, as soon as it had passed the Bosphorus, being protected by the straits, would become mistress of the Black Sea, and give from thence great support to the Turks. While in expectation of this assistance, Napoleon had dispatched several artillery and engineer officers from Dalmatia, to

second the Turks in their defence of Constantinople and the Dardanelles.

General Sébastiani, making skilful use of the means at his disposal, had incessantly stimulated the sultan and his divan, so as to bring them to declare war against the Russians. He vaunted to them the prodigious success of Napoleon in the plains of the north, his daring march beyond the Vistula, his grand project for the re-establishment of Poland; and he promised, in the emperor's name, that if the Porte would take up arms, he would procure for her the revocation of those treaties which placed her in dependence on Russia, and perhaps even the restitution of the Crimea.

The sultan Selim would have willingly followed the counsels of general Sébastiani, but his ministers were divided; half of them, bought over to the Russians and the English, were openly traitors; the other half trembled at the consideration of the powerless state into which the Ottoman empire had fallen. Although this empire still counted more than 300,000 soldiers, for the greater part barbarians, and some half-civilized, and a fleet of twenty sail, well enough for show; these forces, as badly organized as they were badly officered, could scarcely be opposed to the Russians and the English, unless, indeed, French officers, being admitted into the ranks of the Turkish army, were at length to communicate European tactics to the troops, who were, doubtless, brave enough, but whose fanaticism, cooled by time, could not, as formerly, be opposed to the resources of military science. While the Porte was involved in these perplexities, the Russians put an end to all uncertainty by crossing the Dniester, even after the re-establishment of the two hospodars. The invincible attraction which drew them on towards Constantinople had silenced all considerations of prudence. It was, in fact, a great fault to employ 50,000 men against the Turks, while they had upon their hands the French army, to which they could scarcely oppose 200,000. But in the course of the vicissitudes of this age, the idea of profiting by any opportunity to take what was convenient to it, seems to have been the predominant idea of every government. The Russians, therefore, conceived, that the moment was come when they might possess themselves of Wallachia and Moldavia. The English on their side were not sorry of any pretext for again making their appearance in Egypt. If neither of them as yet contemplated immediately dividing the Turkish empire,—a subject which might appear very difficult for them to agree upon,—they were at least agreed on snatching the Porte from the influence of France, and tearing her away from this influence by force. The Russians were to pass the Dniester, and the English the Dardanelles. At the same time a fleet was to attack Alexandria.

This explains how the Russians could have passed the Dniester, even after the re-establishment of the hospodars. They had marched in three bodies,—one directed on Choesim, another on Bender, and the third upon Yassi. Their project was to advance upon Bucharest, there to join the revolted Servians. Their active forces amounted to 40,000 men, and to 50,000, reckoning the reserves left behind.

While the Russians were in action on their side, the English admiralty had ordered vice-admiral Louis to betake himself with three vessels towards the Dardanelles, to pass them without committing any hostile act, which he could do, as the Turks at that epoch permitted the passage of armed vessels belonging to Russia and to England, simply to take observations of the places, to gather the families of the English merchants who might wish not to remain at Constantinople during the events with which it was threatened, and afterwards return to Tenedos, and wait for two divisions, one that admiral sir Sidney Smith was bringing from the Levantine seas, and the other that admiral Duckworth was bringing from Gibraltar. The three divisions, eight ships in strength, with several frigates, corvettes, and bomb-vessels, were to be placed under the command of admiral Duckworth, and to act upon the requisition of Mr. Arbuthnot, the ambassador of England at Constantinople.

When this display of forces by land and by sea was known to the Turks, both by the march of the Russians beyond the Dniester, and the appearance of vice-admiral Louis at the Dardanelles, they looked on war as inevitable, and they accepted it, some with enthusiasm, others with terror. Although Russia protested strongly that her intentions were harmless, and declared that her troops were about to take peaceable occupation of the Danubian provinces only to insure the execution of treaties, the Porte would not suffer itself to be deceived, and furnished passports to M. d'Italinski. The two straits were immediately closed to the armed flag of all powers. The pachas situated in the frontier provinces received orders to unite their troops; and Mustapha Baraïctar, at the head of 80,000 men, was charged to punish the Russians for their contempt of the Turkish army, since it was so far shown as that they had invaded the empire with less than 50,000.

M. d'Italinski had departed, but Mr. Charles Arbuthnot, the English minister, remained at Constantinople, as it was not as yet resolved to dismiss him, since no act of hostility had been committed by the British forces. Mr. Arbuthnot, in his turn, assumed a menacing attitude, and demanded the recal of Italinski, the expulsion of general Sébastiani, the immediate adoption of a hostile policy towards France, a renewal of the treaties by which the Porte was bound to England and Russia, and, in short, the free passage of the straits to the British flag. It was not possible under the existing state of things to push the arrogance of language further. Mr. Charles Arbuthnot even declared, that if his conditions were not instantly accepted, his withdrawal should follow close upon that of M. d'Italinski, and that he should repair on board the English squadron, then united at Tenedos, to bring it in full force under the walls of Constantinople. This threat cast the divan into the most profound consternation. The Turks could scarcely reckon upon the fortifications of the Dardanelles, for so long a time neglected, and the Dardanelles passed, they shuddered at the idea of an English squadron, in possession of the sea of Marmora, overwhelming with its fire the seraglio, St. Sophia, and the arsenal of Constantinople.

Thus the inclination to yield was general. But

the skilful ambassador who then represented France at Constantinople, and who had the advantage of being at once a soldier and a diplomatist, sustained the failing courage of the Turks. He pointed out to them all the bad results which would in such circumstances attend a pusillanimous conduct. He brought before their eyes the coincidence of the projects of England and of Russia; the agreement of their endeavours to invade the Ottoman territory by land and by sea; the approaching junction, under the very walls of the capital, of a Russian army and an English fleet; the danger of a total partition of the empire, or at least of its partial dismemberment by the simultaneous occupation of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Egypt. He exalted highly the name of Napoleon, his victories, his presence on the Vistula, and the advantages which they must find in his alliance. He announced the sending of considerable assistance with the least delay, and promised the restoration of the ancient Ottoman power, if the Turks would but for a time display their wonted courage. These exhortations reaching the sultan and divers members of the government, sometimes by direct and sometimes by well chosen indirect means, seconded besides by the evidence of danger, and by news arriving from time to time of the triumphant march of Napoleon, produced the effect which might have been looked for; and the divan, after numberless alternatives of better or worse terms, terminated the negotiation by refusing to accede to the demands of Mr. Charles Arbuthnot, and showing the long deferred determination of letting him depart.

The English minister quitted Constantinople on the 29th of January, and embarked on board the Endymion to join the squadron commanded by sir John Duckworth, which was moored at Tenedos, without the Dardanelles. Mr. Charles Arbuthnot did not for a whole fortnight cease to threaten the Porte with the thunders of the British squadron, and thus employed in negotiation the time that admiral Duckworth was employed in waiting for a favourable wind. On his part, general Sébastiani, after having brought the Porte to an energetic resolution, had a still more difficult task to fulfil towards her, to awaken her from apathy, to conquer her negligence, to induce her, in short, to raise batteries, both on the straits and at Constantinople. This was no easy matter with an incapable government, long since fallen into a sort of imbecility, and paralyzed at that moment much more by the fear of the English vessels than by that of the Russian armies. However, pressing by turns the sultan and his ministers, and assisted by his aides-de-camp M. de Lascours and M. Coigny, he got them to commence an armament, which, though very imperfect, yet, nevertheless, caused some apprehensions to the English admiral, who wrote to his government, that the operation, without being impossible, would yet be much more difficult than was supposed in London.

At length, all the correspondence between Mr. Arbuthnot and the reis-effendi having led to no end, and the long wished for wind from the southward beginning to blow, admiral Duckworth set sail, on the morning of the 19th of January, towards the castles of the Dardanelles.

There is no position in the world better known, even to men the least versed in geographical knowledge, than that of Constantinople, situated in the middle of the sea of Marmora, which is a close sea, and to which there is no access but by forcing the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus. On approaching from the Mediterranean, it is necessary to go up the strait of the Dardanelles for a dozen leagues,—a strait which, from its close shores and continual current, resembles a large river, and through it, to open out into the sea of Marmora, twenty leagues in width and thirty in length. There, seated on a fine promontory, washed on one of its sides by the sea of Marmora itself, and on the other by the river, is seen the immortal city which was Byzantium under the Greeks, Constantinople under the Romans, and under the Turks Stamboul,—the metropolis of Islamism. Seen from the sea, it presents an amphitheatre of mosques and of moorish palaces, among which are distinguished the domes of St. Sophia; and all at once, at the end of the promontory which it occupies, the seraglio is seen, where the descendants of Mahomet, plunged in effeminacy, slept beside the dangers of a bombardment, since their cowardly incapacity no longer knew how to defend the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, those two gates of their empire which it was so easy, nevertheless, to keep shut.

When the Dardanelles are cleared, the sea of Marmora traversed, and the promontory passed upon which Constantinople is seated, a second strait discovers itself more narrow and more defensible than the Dardanelles, only seven leagues long, the shores of which so closely approach each other, that a squadron would be certainly destroyed if it were well defended. This strait is that of the Bosphorus, and leads into the Black Sea. The Dardanelles are for the Turkish empire, the gate opening on the side towards England, the Bosphorus the gate opening towards Russia. But if the Russians have against them the narrow dimensions of the Bosphorus, the English have the tide against them, for it continually runs from the Black Sea towards the Mediterranean.

Admiral Duckworth, having under his command the two vice-admirals Louis and sir Sidney Smith, with seven vessels of the line, two frigates, and numerous corvettes and bomb-vessels, ascended, in one column, the straits of the Dardanelles. They had the night before lost a vessel, the Ajax, by fire. The wind favourable, they soon passed the first part of the channel, which flows from the west to the east, and which is so extensive that the inhabitants of the surrounding shores never thought of defending it. From Cape Barbierre to Sestos and Abydos, the channel deviates to the north, and then becomes so straight that it is extremely hazardous to encounter the cross fire from the shore. It there turns again to the east, and presents an elbow, on which are two formidable batteries, the fire from which takes vessels longitudinally (rakes them), in such a manner that a squadron sufficiently bold to attempt forcing the passage is exposed right and left to the batteries of Europe and Asia, and in front to those of Sestos, while sailing, for more than the space of a league. It is at the entrance and the end of this straight channel that the castles of the Dardanelles, properly so called, are situated, constructed of old

masonry, and armed with large, heavy, and almost unmanageable artillery, which discharges enormous masses of stone, and was anciently the terror of Christian mariners.

The English fleet, despite the efforts made by general Sébastiani to excite the Turks to the defence of the Dardanelles, had not much danger to encounter. Not one of their masts was destroyed. Their only misfortune was a few torn sails, and about sixty men killed or wounded. Arrived at Cape Nagara, at the entrance to the sea of Marmora, they came upon a Turkish squadron at anchor, which was composed of a vessel of sixty-four guns, four small frigates, and two corvettes. It was impossible to place this division in a worse position, or more unserviceably than there. It could not have been useful, unless, well placed and well directed, it had joined its force to that of the batteries on shore. But inactive during the passage and after it, confined to an anchorage without defence, it was a prey spared to the English to indemnify them for the fire they had been forced to endure without being able to make a return. Sir Sidney Smith was ordered to destroy it, which was not difficult, as the greater part of the crew were on shore. In a few moments the Turkish vessels ran aground. The English followed them in their boats, and not being certain of taking them back, on their return they chose rather to burn them immediately, with the exception of a single corvette, which was left at anchor. This last operation, nevertheless, cost them thirty men.

On the morning of the 21st of February they appeared before the city of Constantinople, the inhabitants of which were terrified at beholding an enemy's fleet, from whose fire they could not remove nor offer it resistance. One part of the trembling population demanded an agreement with the terms of the English, the other half, indignant, exclaimed with rage against such a measure. The women of the seraglio, who were the first to be exposed to the bullets of admiral Duckworth, troubled with their wailings the imperial palace. The alternatives of weakness and courage reappeared in the bosom of the divan. The sultan Selim wished to resist; but the clamours with which he was assailed, the counsels of some unfaithful ministers, brought forward to induce him to yield, a want of resources, of which they were themselves the guilty authors,—all contributed to shake the resolution of a heart more noble than energetic. But the French ambassador flew to Selim, made him, his ministers, and all those who surrounded him, blush at the idea of surrendering to a fleet which was possessed of no land forces, and which could at most burn a few houses, or pierce the roof of an edifice, and which would soon be obliged to retire after committing useless and odious ravages. He advised them to resist the English, to gain time by means of a feigned negotiation; to send the women, the court, all who trembled, all who lamented the state of things, to Adrianople, and to make use of the courageous portion of the people for raising batteries at the seraglio point, and, that done, to treat with the British fleet protected by their own guns.

The pretensions of the English were of a nature to sustain, by their severity and arrogance, the counsels of general Sébastiani. Mr. Arbuthnot, to whom the admiral found himself subordinate in all political matters, had wished to address a previous summons to the Porte, demanding the expulsion of the French legation, an immediate declaration of war against France, the entire surrender of the whole of the Turkish fleet, and the occupation of the forts of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by the English and Russians. To grant such requests was to place the empire, its navy, and the keys of the capital, at the discretion of their enemies by sea and land. Whilst awaiting the answer, the English cast anchor at the Prince's Isles, situated near the coast of Asia, at some distance from Constantinople.

General Sébastiani did not fail to point out to the sultan and his ministers the shame and danger to which they would expose themselves in submitting to such conditions. Happily, a courier from the borders of the Vistula arrived at the very moment, bringing a letter from Napoleon full of warm expostulations with the sultan. "Generous Selim," he wrote, "show yourself worthy the descendants of Mahomet. The hour is at hand for freeing yourself from treaties which oppress you. I am near you, occupied with the reconstitution of Poland, your friend and ally. One of my armies is ready to descend the Danube, and to take the Russians in the flank while you attack them in front. One of my fleets is about leaving Toulon to guard your capital and the Black Sea. Courage, then, for never will you find a similar occasion of raising your empire, and making your memory illustrious!" These exhortations, although not new, could not have arrived at a more fitting time. The heart of Selim, reanimated by the words of Napoleon, and the pressing solicitations of general Sébastiani, was filled with the noblest sentiments. He spoke energetically to his ministers. He convoked the divan and the ulemas; he communicated to them the proposals of the English, which filled the hearts of all with indignation, and it was unanimously resolved to resist the English fleet, whatever attempts it might make, but always to observe the able advice of general Sébastiani,—that is to say, to endeavour to gain time by conferences, and to employ the time gained in raising formidable batteries around Constantinople.

They instantly commenced by replying to Mr. Arbuthnot, that without examining the grounds of his proposals they would not hear them, unless the English fleet should take up a less threatening position, as it did not suit the dignity of the Porte to deliberate under the cannon of the enemy. A day at least was necessary to reach the Prince's Isles from Constantinople and to return. A few slight communications sufficed, therefore, to gain the desired number of days. When the reply of the Porte arrived, Mr. Arbuthnot had been suddenly taken ill, but his influence continued to preponderate among the staff of the English fleet. The admirals felt as he did, that to bombard Constantinople was a barbarous enterprise, as having no land forces, they would be obliged, should the Turks resist, to retire after committing useless ravages; still more, that they would be obliged, in retreating again, to force the Dardanelles with a fleet perhaps disabled, and to pass batteries most probably better defended the second time than they had been the first. They therefore judged it

wisest to endeavour to obtain by intimidation, without attempting a bombardment, all or part of their demands. The remission of the Turkish fleet was the trophy which they the most desired. In consequence, admiral Duckworth, replacing Mr. Arbuthnot on account of the indisposition of the latter, replied to the Turks that he was ready to remove to a place better fitted for negotiations, and he demanded the immediate appointment of one, in order that he might send an officer there. The Porte did not hasten to answer this communication; and the next day, Kadikoï, the ancient Chalcedon, was proposed, situated above Scutari, and opposite Constantinople. In the state of exasperation in which the Turks then were, that place was neither the most secure nor the most convenient for the English officer who should be charged with the duties required. Admiral Duckworth remarked this, and claimed another spot, menacing them with instant action if they did not speedily open the negotiation.

Several days had been gained by means of these illusory conferences, and they had been employed at Constantinople in the most active manner. Some officers of artillery and of engineers detached from the army of Dalmatia had arrived. General Sébastiani, seconded by them, encamped himself in the midst of the Turks. The entire legation had followed. Those belonging to it versed in the language served as interpreters. With the concurrence of the population and the French officers, formidable batteries rose, as by enchantment, at the point of the seraglio, and that part of the city which coasts the sea of Marmora. Nearly 300 cannon, drawn by an enthusiastic people who at that moment looked upon the French as saviours, were placed on the batteries. The sultan Selim, delighted at the sight of the preparations so promptly executed, ordered a tent to be pitched for himself beside that of the French ambassador, and commanded his ministers to place themselves each in one of the batteries. Constantinople appeared every hour more imposing, while the English saw fresh embrasures opening, in the midst of which the muzzles of cannon were exhibited. After seven or eight days spent in this manner, the fear that at first restrained the English, that of a useless devastation, perhaps a dangerous one, followed by a second passage of the Dardanelles more difficult than at first, appeared every instant better founded. Perceiving that he gained nothing by waiting, admiral Duckworth sent a last summons, in which, taking care to reduce his demands, and increase his threats, he contented himself with exacting the remission of the Turkish fleet, and declared that he would bring the English fleet before Constantinople if they did not immediately appoint a fit place for negotiation. At this time, the preparations being nearly terminated at Constantinople, they returned for answer to the English admiral, that in the existing state of affairs they did not know a single place sufficiently secure to guarantee the life of the negotiators that might be sent there.

After such an answer, nothing remained but to commence the cannonade. But admiral Duckworth's squadron only numbered seven vessels and two frigates: he beheld levelled against him a fearful mass of artillery, and he was warned that the passes of the Dardanelles, owing to the care of the French, bristled with cannon. He had, therefore, the certainty of committing upon Constantinople a barbarous act without any object or excuse, and to arrive, with a disabled fleet, before straits become much more dangerous to pass. In consequence, after remaining eleven days in the sea of Marmora, he weighed anchor on the 2nd of March, presented himself in battle order under the walls of Constantinople, ran his broadsides almost within cannon-shot range, and after having found that he did not intimidate the Turks, well prepared to defend themselves, he cast anchor at the entrance of the Dardanelles, intending to pass them on the morrow. If vexation and confusion reigned on board the English fleet, the most lively joy pervaded Constantinople at the sight of the enemy's sails disappearing on the horizon in the direction of the Dardanelles. The French and Turks congratulated each other on the happy result of a courageous moment with all the enthusiasm of success. The Turkish fleet, which had been promptly equipped, wished to set sail and follow the English. General Sébastiani endeavoured in vain to prevent this imprudence, which might furnish occasion to admiral Duckworth for rendering his retreat brilliant by the destruction of the Ottoman fleet. But the cries of the people and the animation of the crews were such, that the government was as incapable of resisting the effects of courage as it had been those of cowardice, and was obliged to consent to its departure. The captain pacha weighed anchor, whilst the English, hastening their retreat, were, without being aware of it, leaving behind the triumph which was seeking them.

The next day, the 3rd of March, the English fleet arrived in the narrowest and most dangerous part of the Dardanelles. The few French officers which it had been possible to send there, had aroused the zeal of the Turks with as much success as at Constantinople. The batteries were repaired and well served. Unhappily, the artillery, heavily mounted on bad carriages, was very unmanageable in the hands of clumsy artillerymen. Notwithstanding, they discharged a number of marble blocks, more than two feet in diameter, upon the English fleet, which, had they been well directed, might have done great mischief. The English, thanks to the north wind, were only an hour and a half in passing the straight part of the channel, from Cape Nagara to the Cape Barbierre. They behaved with the valour common to their navy, but they received great damage. Some of their ships were pierced by these immense missiles, which would certainly have sunk them had they been hollow and charged with powder, as those used in similar circumstances are now. The greater part of their vessels, on leaving the strait, were in a state that required prompt repairs. This second passage cost the English more than 200 men dead or wounded, a small loss compared to the carnage of great land battles, but not without importance if put in comparison to that usual in sea-fights. While the English division was leaving the Dardanelles, admiral Siniavin arrived at Tenedos with a Russian squadron of six vessels. He made the most pressing entreaties to admiral Duckworth to induce him to recommence

operations. But after the check he had just received, a new attempt would have been extravagant; for six Russian vessels would not have sensibly changed the situation of affairs, nor lessened the difficulty [1].

Such was the end given to this enterprise by the insufficiency of means and the scruples of humanity, then very uncommon in English politics. England appeared singularly affected by the result. Napoleon experienced a very natural joy, as, independently of the moral effect produced in Europe by this affair of Constantinople, which was all to his credit, the contest his enemies were engaged in with the Turks became a most useful diversion to his arms.

Europe was at that time much excited by the terrible battle of Eylau, commented upon in such diverse ways. Some applauded those who were able to resist the French for an instant, others were terrified at the condition which had produced such a resistance, though only for an instant,—a terrible condition, as they had been obliged to give the French an army for their prey, by placing it before them as a material for destruction. For the first time, it is true, the success obtained by the French had not been so decisive as usual, above all in appearance; but the Russian army on that bloody day had not lost less than a third part of its effective force,—and, if general Benningsen, to cover his defeat, made some presumptuous movements in face of the winter-quarters of the French, he found it impossible to attempt any thing of moment, or to make a single effort to oppose the sieges undertaken before his eyes. Napoleon, who now began to be joined by his reinforcements, had to oppose to the Russians 100,000 men under arms, without counting the French troops and allies, that, protected by the grand army, executed on the left the siege of Dantzick, and on the right the conquest of part of Silesia. The only obstacle which hindered Napoleon from terminating a campaign already so prolonged, was, as has been seen, that of the difficulty of transport. If it had frozen hard the carriages could have travelled, and the French been able to carry with them sufficient food to nourish the army during an offensive operation. But the constant freezing and thawing rendered it impossible to carry provisions even for a few days. It was, therefore, necessary to wait for different weather. M. de Talleyrand, who remained at Warsaw, had been obliged to employ solicitations, promises, and threats, to secure the transportation of the necessary provisions even from the Vistula to the Passarge.

In this situation, which was to be prolonged for some months, there was time for negotiation,—since natural obstacles had been felt by Napoleon, and, above all, since he had observed Poland more closely, and found that the intoxication which had accompanied him upon the Vistula was a little dissipated. He had discovered, that the Russians, little formidable to the French soldiers, if they did not seek them above the Danube and the Elbe, would become, aided by the climate, an enemy difficult and requiring time to subdue. Struck with the enthusiasm manifested at Posen, Napoleon had fancied that the Poles would furnish him at least with 100,000 men. He soon perceived that the country people little cared about a change of dominion, which would leave them, as before, the slaves of the soil under any master. He saw them flying into Austrian Poland to avoid the horrors of war. The people of the cities were enthusiastic, and ready to devote themselves without reserve, but the nobility, more cautious, sought conditions which could not be accepted without imprudence. The Polish officers who had served in the French army agreed badly enough with the nobles who had not quitted their chateaux; each by their susceptibility added to the difficulty of the military organization of the country; even the levies which should have amounted to 100,000 men, were reduced to 15,000 young soldiers, organized in twenty battalions, and destined one day to cover themselves with glory under the brave Poniatowski, but they were as yet little accustomed to war, and provoked the merriment of the French soldiery. Napoleon had seen all this, and he was less ardent to reconstitute Poland, and less disposed, since he became personally acquainted with it, to overturn the continent for its re-establishment. Without doubting his own power, he entertained, from the obstacles which nature could oppose to the most heroic army, a more just idea, and a less favourable opinion of the work which called him to the plains of the north. He was, therefore, a little more inclined to listen to proposals of peace, without on that account departing from any of his pretensions, because he was convinced, on the return of the fine season, of the facility of passing over all the obstacles that might oppose him. He only saw in a treaty which had peace for its aim an economy of time and blood, because, as for perils, he believed himself capable of surmounting all, whatever might be their character.

Since the battle of Eylau, several negotiators had come from Kœnigsberg to Osterode. Under the impression produced by the battle, Napoleon had, through general Bertrand, announced to Frederick-William that he was ready to render him back his territory, but only as far as the Elbe,—an arrangement which would cost him one-quarter of his dominions, but at the same time secure to him the restitution of the other three parts. Napoleon had added, that, full of personal esteem for the monarch that reigned over Prussia, he would rather make him this restitution through himself alone than by the intervention of Russia. The unfortunate Frederick-William, though the sacrifice was great, and his soldiers had conducted themselves honourably at the battle of Eylau, although he found himself considerably raised in the sight of his allies, yet did not in the least deceive himself. This battle of Eylau, which the Russians were nearly calling a victory, was to him only a sanguinary defeat, of which the sole difference from Jena and Austerlitz, consisted in its costing the French more blood, and, thanks to the season, not showing such decisive results. He was firmly persuaded that in the ensuing spring the French would put a speedy and disastrous termination to the war. But the queen and the war

[1] From entering the Dardanelles to clearing them on their return, storming some of the batteries included, the English losses were, 42 killed, 235 wounded, and 4 missing.—*Translator.*

party, excited by the last military events, and by the influence of the Russians, to whom they unhappily approximated too much at Kœnigsberg, did not appreciate the situation of things with as impartial a judgment as the king, and by dictating an evasive answer to the amicable message that general Bertrand had been commissioned to transmit, prevented their profiting by the disposition of Napoleon, for the moment pacifically inclined.

Thus the obstinacy of the conflict with Russia had for an instant drawn Napoleon towards Prussia. It had been fortunate if, returning to her entirely, he had given her, not only her provinces below the Elbe, but all he had taken, and had sought to attach her definitively to his cause, by an act as generous as it would have been politic. But finding king Frederick-William feeble, unstable, and governed by his ministry, he was convinced anew of the impossibility of counting upon Prussia, and from that day thought of her only to disdain, ill-treat, and render her harmless. Still, a little less intoxicated than after the battle of Jena, he was more assured that to govern the continent, to exclude the English influence, and also to vanquish the sea by the land, he must have, not only victories, but a strong alliance. He believed it after Marengo and Hohenlinden; he believed it after Austerlitz and before Jena; the day following Jena, without less belief in it, he had only ceased to think of it for a moment, but he again saw its necessity after Pultusk and Eylau: thus, always meditating upon his situation, in the midst of the dangers and difficulties of the war, he sought for whichever alliance he could secure. Prussia put aside, there remained Russia, with which he was engaged in hostilities, and Austria, that, under the appearance of neutrality, assembled armies in his rear. Although the court of Petersburg, excited by the suggestions of England and by the boasting of general Benningsen, appeared more animated than ever, its generals, officers, and soldiers, who supported the weight of this fearful war, and were reduced one half by the days of Czarnowo, Pultusk, Golymin, and Eylau, and who, thanks to a barbarous commissariat administration, lived upon a few potatoes, discovered under the snow by the use of their bayonets, differed greatly in opinion and expressed far other sentiments than those of the courtiers of St. Petersburg. Full of admiration for the French army, not entertaining towards it any of the national hatred which neighbourhood or even a common origin sometimes inspires in a people, they demanded why their blood was required for the profit of the English, who did not hasten to their assistance, and of the Prussians, who could not.

The idea, that France and Russia, at the distance they are placed from each other, could have nothing about which to dispute, presented itself to the minds of those of the Russian soldiery who reasoned among themselves, and was heard in all their conversations. Many of the French officers who were made prisoners and had been exchanged, had gathered upon this subject the most significant phrases, even from the mouth of the bravest of the Russian generals, prince Bagration, who by turns commanded the Russian advanced or rear-guard; the advanced guard when attacked, the rear-guard when fighting in retreat.

These details, carried to Napoleon, caused him much reflection. He thought, even in the midst of the horrors of the present war, that it would be Russia in the end with which he must finish all by coming to an understanding that should enable him to shut the ports and cabinets of the continent against England. But if such an alliance could be thought about, it was not between two battles, when they were obliged to communicate with the advanced posts through a trumpeter, that means could be found to prepare and conclude such a treaty. The actual impossibility obliged him to turn towards Austria. Remembering the words of the archduke Ferdinand to himself at Wurtzbourg, he was still more strongly induced to think of an alliance with the court of Vienna, in spite of the armaments with which she menaced him, knowing that he had the power of doing what a half century before would have filled her with joy, of returning her Silesia, that Lombardy of the north, of which she had so regretted the loss, and which she had made so many efforts to recover, conditionally becoming, for thirty years, the ally of France. Removed from the bivouac of Osterode to the chateau of Finkenstein, there scouring his encampments on horseback, riding thirty leagues a day, corresponding with his agents in Poland about the provision for his army, with his ministers at Paris upon the administration of the affairs of Europe, and in the midst of the long nights of the north ruminating upon plans of general politics, he ended, after having considered of every alliance, by confining himself to two, and determining that a choice must be made between Austria and Russia. In corresponding with M. Talleyrand at Warsaw, who directed from thence the exterior relations of France, he wrote thus: "All must finish by a treaty with Austria or Russia. Think well of it, and oblige Austria to explain herself definitively towards us."

But Austria had covered herself with an impenetrable veil. Whilst general Andréossy, the French ambassador at Vienna, related every day hostile actions on the part of Austria, such as levying men, purchasing horses, and forming magazines, Baron Vincent, on the contrary, sent to Warsaw by the court of Vienna, constantly affirmed, with the greatest appearance of frankness, that Austria, so crushed as she had been, was incapable of making war; that she was determined not to break the peace, unless she received such treatment as was impossible to be supported; that if she took some little precautions, they were not to be looked upon as preparations hostile or menacing to France, but as measures of prudence demanded by a frightful war, which embraced the entire circle of her frontiers, and, above all, by the state of Gallicia, so much agitated by the rebellion of Poland. M. Talleyrand allowed himself to be so far persuaded that he censured general Andréossy incessantly to Napoleon as a dangerous agent, observing and judging ill of all that passed around him, and capable, if attended to, of inflaming the two courts by false and injurious reports.

Napoleon, who, though he was as easily led as others to believe what gave him pleasure, and was

fond of thinking that Austria could not recover the losses sustained at Ulm and Austerlitz, that she would never dare to break her word given him at the bivouac of Urchitz; yet Napoleon, enlightened by the danger, gave more credit to the words of general Andréossy than to those of Baron Vincent. "Yes," he wrote to M. Talleyrand, "general Andréossy is an obstinate spirit, an indifferent observer, probably exaggerating what he sees; but you are credulous, as much inclined to be led by others as to lead them. It is sufficient to flatter in order to deceive you. M. Vincent abuses you by his courtesies. Austria fears, but she also hates us; and she arms herself to profit by any reverse on our part. If we gain a great victory in the spring, she will conduct herself as M. d'Haugwitz did the day following Austerlitz, and you will be right; but if the war is only doubtful, we shall see her in arms in our rear. We must make her explain herself. She is in fault not to come directly to an understanding with us, not to profit by the moment when we are masters of Prussia, to recover by our hands that of which Frederick has deprived her. She can, if she will, retrieve in one day all that she has lost in half a century, and restore the fortunes of the house of Austria, so much weakened at one time by Prussia, at another by France. But it is necessary that she explain herself. Does she require indemnities for her losses? I offer her Silesia. Does the state of the East make her uneasy? I am ready to make her easy about the fate of the Lower Danube by disposing according to her wishes of Moldavia and Walachia. Is our presence in Dalmatia a subject of offence to her? I am ready to make sacrifices in this respect by means of an exchange of territory. Or, lastly, is this a war that she is preparing in order to try for the last time the power of her arms, profiting by the union of the continent against us? Be it so; I accept this new adversary. But let her not hope to surprise me. Only women or children can imagine that I am going to bury myself in the deserts of Russia without having taken due precaution. She will find in Saxony, in Bavaria, and in Italy, armies ready to oppose her. She will see me, by a retrograde march, fall upon her with all my force, bear her down, and treat her worse than any of the powers I have before vanquished. I will make a terrible example of her breach of faith, of which the actual state of Prussia can give her no idea. Let her then explain herself, that I may know what to think of her intentions."

Napoleon recommended M. Talleyrand to allow M. Vincent no repose, and to sound again and again the depths of Austrian politics. M. Talleyrand, stimulated by the emperor, divided his time between exhortations to the Polish government to obtain provisions and carriages, and conversations with M. de Vincent to obtain from him, by trying a hundred different means, the secret of the Austrian court.

He sought for this secret in the least significant words of the Austrian envoy, and in the slightest movements of his countenance. At one moment he was confiding in and humouring him, trying to provoke his frankness by an unbounded openness of conduct; at the next he endeavoured to surprise and agitate him by rudely, and in feigned anger, presenting him with the pictures of the armaments received from Vienna. M. de Vincent, whether from artfulness or sincerity, always repeated the same words, that at Vienna they could not and would not make war, and that they were contented with defending themselves, without thinking of attacking others. Notwithstanding, when M. Talleyrand went further, and spoke of Silesia, of the provinces of the Danube, and of Dalmatia as the price of her alliance, the Austrian minister replied that he had not instructions for such important affairs, and begged to refer to his court, which he did by communicating directly to M. de Stadion the overtures of M. Talleyrand.

M. de Stadion managed the foreign affairs of Austria in a feeling still more hostile to France than that of M. Cobentzel; but, to do him justice, concealing those hostilities less under an appearance of cordiality. For the rest, although entertaining great hatred towards France, he knew how to hold back his opinions, and to observe a convenient silence. The secret of M. Stadion and his court it was easy to discover, provided agreeable appearances were laid aside, in order to return to those which were not quite pleasing. Austria permitted herself to profit by the reverses of the French, which, on her part, was but natural; and it was a great error to suppose that the most brilliant offers could attach that vindictive power to the cause of France. She was in reality animated by a hatred which prevented her proper appreciation of the real and solid advantages offered to her; in good reason insufficient advantages, because a portion of Silesia, Moldavia, and Dalmatia were but inferior advantages obtained, compared to her losses for the preceding fifteen years. But she might doubtless have accepted them, insufficient as they were, if she had believed that in the existing state of the world any thing solid and durable could be given. But in the continual disturbances of the European states, she believed nothing to be stable, and was not disposed to take as a recompense for hereditary provinces anciently attached to her house, provinces tendered through the views of momentary policy, perhaps to be retaken with as little consideration as they were given, and which she would be forced to buy at the price of a war against her usual allies, to the profit of one whom she accused as the author of all her misfortunes. Thus, on the side of Napoleon, there was nothing to attract or inspire the confidence of Austria. Her refusal, therefore, of all offers emanating from him was very certain. But, pressed by questions, she could not hold back, either by maintaining an absolute silence, or giving a general refusal to listen to each proposition. She then thought of a proceeding which furnished her with a convenient reply, and assured her besides the means of profiting by after events, whatever they might be. Her idea in consequence was to offer France her mediation with the belligerent powers. Nothing could be better calculated for the present and future. For the present she proved that she desired peace by working for it herself. For the future she could labour frankly for peace, taking care to have the conditions in a sense conformable to her own politics if Napoleon were fortunate. If, on the contrary, Napoleon were vanquished,

or only half victorious, she could pass from a modest to an imposing mediation. She could moderate or burthen it according to circumstances. She gave herself, in a word, the power of entering into the quarrel at will, and, when once entered, of conducting herself as fortune might direct.

M. de Stadion ordered M. Baron Vincent to reply to M. Talleyrand that they had a full sense at Vienna of the value of the offers of the emperor of the French, but that, advantageous as those offers were, they could not accept them, as they would necessarily involve a war either with the Germans, whose compatriots they were, or the Russians, with whom they were allied; and that they did not desire war under any circumstances, nor with any power, for they declared themselves incapable of sustaining one (not a very dangerous avowal when Austria was making the most imposing military preparations); that they sought peace and peace only, which they preferred to the greatest acquisitions; that, as a proof of their love for peace, they offered to interfere for the negotiation of it, and that, if France consented, they would bring the cabinets of Berlin, St. Petersburg, and London, to assent; that already M. de Budberg, minister of the emperor Alexander, consulted upon the subject, had welcomed the good offices of the court of Vienna, and that at London, another cabinet having taken the direction of affairs (that of Castlereagh and Canning), there was a chance of finding pacific dispositions in these new representatives of English politics, who would, in all probability, be delighted at the opportunity of making themselves popular by giving peace at their accession. M. de Stadion added, that they should esteem themselves happy if the all-powerful emperor of the French saw in this offer a pledge of the sentiments of disinterestedness and concord which animated the emperor of Austria.

The all-powerful emperor of the French had not less penetration than power; and from the time this reply from Warsaw reached him at Finkenstein, he no more deceived himself. He seized its meaning with the promptitude which he would have employed to discover the movements of a hostile army on the field of battle. "This," he replied instantly to M. de Talleyrand, "is the first step of Austria; the beginning of an interference in events. Resolved not to mix in the conflict sustained by England, Russia, Prussia, and France, she will not even risk compromising herself in bearing the messages of one to the other. Her offer to become a mediatrix is preparing herself for war, is managing for herself a decent means of taking a part in it; a means which she requires after the declarations from cabinet to cabinet, after the oaths from sovereign to sovereign, by which she promised to remain for ever neuter. It is unfortunate for us," added Napoleon, "as it presages to us the presence of an Austrian army on the Oder and the Elbe; whilst we shall be on the Vistula. But to refuse this mediation is impossible; it would be a contradiction to our general language, which has ever consisted in showing ourselves disposed for peace. It would, above all, dispose us to hasten the determinations of Austria by a peremptory refusal, which would wound her, and force her to take an immediate resolution. We must therefore gain time by replying that the offer of mediation is too indirect to be positively accepted; but that in all cases the good offices of the court of Vienna will be ever received with gratitude and confidence."

M. Talleyrand, directed by Napoleon, made the answer which had been prescribed, to M. de Vincent, and showed a slight disposition to accept the mediation of Austria; but, at the same time, appeared to doubt whether this offer of mediation was serious. M. de Vincent affirmed that it was perfectly sincere, and declared besides that he would refer to the court of Vienna. He therefore wrote to M. de Stadion, who, on his side, did not allow his answer to wait. In a very few days the court of Vienna announced that it was ready to pass simple conferences for a formal proposal, and that it was certain of having their mediation accepted at Petersburg and London; that furthermore, it addressed the offer at the same time as much to France as to Russia, Prussia, or England; and that it awaited the precise intentions of the emperor Napoleon on the subject.

This prompt and clear answer, strengthened by armaments which could no longer be doubted, appeared to Napoleon an extremely serious act, the meaning of which it was impossible for him to misunderstand, and to which, unhappily, they could give no other reply than an acceptance; though it was needful for him to provide against the consequences by means of immediate and imposing precautions. He wrote in this sense to M. Talleyrand, and sent him from Finkenstein the draft of a note, of which the following is a copy. He told him at the same time that he was about to add to this note new preparations more formidable than ever, and of which Austria must be immediately informed, that she might know in what manner her intervention would be received, amicable or hostile, diplomatic or warlike.

The answer to the offer of mediation was couched in these terms:

"The undersigned, minister of foreign affairs, has laid before his majesty the emperor and king, the note which he received from M. de Vincent. The emperor accepts for himself and his allies the amicable intercession of the emperor Francis II. for the re-establishment of peace, so necessary to the happiness of all the nations. He has but one fear, which is, that the power which, until now, appeared to have made itself a system to found its strength and greatness on the divisions of the continent, may endeavour to find, through these means, fresh sources of bitterness and new pretexts for dissension. Nevertheless, any method which may lead to a hope of a cessation of bloodshed, and carry consolation among so many families, ought not to be neglected by France, that, to the knowledge of all Europe, was drawn against her wishes into the last war.

"The emperor Napoleon finds besides in this circumstance a natural and favourable occasion for testifying to the sovereign of Austria the confidence he reposes in him, and the desire he feels to see those bonds strengthened between the two nations which, in earlier times, contributed to their mutual prosperity, and which would now, above all things, tend to consoldiate their tranquillity and happiness."

These conferences had occupied the whole of

the month of March. The season had now set in with severity. The cold weather, which had been expected during the winter, showed itself in the spring. Military operations were, therefore, of necessity, still further adjourned. Napoleon resolved to profit by the delay, and to give to his forces such an immense development as should be not less formidable in appearance than reality. His intention was, without weakening Italy or France too much, to increase his active army by one-third at least, and to form on the Elbe an army of reserve of 100,000 men, so as to be prepared to crush both the Russians and Prussians in the very commencement of the campaign, and in case of necessity to turn upon Austria, should she decide on taking part against him in the war.

To attain this double result he resolved on calling out a fresh conscription, that for 1808, although it was only now March, 1807. Already had he called out that of 1807 in 1806, and that of 1806 in 1805, with the intention of giving the young conscripts twelve or fifteen months apprenticeship, and keeping his depôts always full. The effective strength of the French army, which had been carried up from 502,000 to 580,000 men, by the conscription of 1807, would be raised to about 650,000 by that of 1808, without including the allies. By the skill with which he husbanded his resources, Napoleon found means, from this increase of his strength, of providing for all his wants, and of being ready to face all contingencies.

But there might be some difficulty, after having called out in November, 1806, the conscription for 1807, in calling out so early as March, 1807, that of 1808. It was making two levies in five months, and raising 150,000 men at once. Napoleon himself drew out the decree, and sent it immediately to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, that he might transmit it to the head of that branch of the government, M. Lacuée, who was charged with the levies; and he wrote to both, that he knew and foresaw the objections to which such measures would give rise, but that there must be no hesitation about it; for a single objection, started in the council of state or in the senate, would bring Austria on his hands, and that then they would find themselves obliged to decree not one or two conscriptions, but three or four, perhaps uselessly, and finish by being conquered. "It will not do," continued he, "to look at things in a single point of view, but in an extended light; above all, they must be regarded in their political bearings. A conscription declared and resolved on without hesitating, a conscription that I may not perhaps call out, and which I certainly shall not send to my active army, for I do not mean to carry on war by means of children, will at once strike her arms out of the hands of Austria. The least irresolution, on the contrary, will encourage her to resume them, and make use of them against us. No objections," he repeated, "an immediate and punctual execution of the decree I send you, is alone the means of attaining a peace, and of procuring one early and honourable."

After having dispatched this decree to Paris, Napoleon acquainted M. de Talleyrand with it at Warsaw, and desired him to communicate it to M. de Vincent, with the express recommendation to unfold to the latter the new display of force which was preparing in France, and to lay before him the picture of the consequences that would result from it to all the belligerent powers, and to Austria in particular; to declare to him without disguise, that he had divined the motive of the mediation, that he had accepted this mediation, knowing well what it intended; that to offer peace was all very well, but that peace should be offered with the olive-branch in hand; that the armaments of Austria, no longer possible to be denied, was an accompaniment little in accordance with an offer of mediation; that for the rest, he explained himself with this frankness, to prevent misfortunes, to spare Austria herself from them; that if she would send Austrian officers into France and Italy, he would undertake to show them all our depôts, camps of reserve, and divisions on the march; and that they would see that, independent of 300,000 Frenchmen already in Germany, a second army of 100,000 was about crossing the Rhine to repress any hostile movement on the part of the court of Vienna.

These communications were made in good season. M. de Vincent could not conceal his emotion at hearing of the new increase of the French forces, and still protested a thousand times the most pacific intentions on the part of his government. The movement of troops of which complaint was made, were only, he said, the symptoms of a work of reorganization undertaken by the arch-duke Charles, to render the Austrian army less expensive, and to introduce into it certain improvements borrowed from the French armies. If some corps appeared to be approaching the frontiers of Poland, it was but on account of precautions to be taken in regard to Gallicia, which was much agitated by what was occurring in its neighbourhood. The offer of mediation ought not to be looked upon as other than a proof of a desire to put a stop to the war which was desolating the world, and in it ought not to be seen any desire of being mixed up in that war, but a free and hearty wish of putting an end to it. In short, that the French would be able to judge from the results, and would then be assured of the sincerity of Austria, by her persisting in remaining neuter.

The demands of Napoleon at Paris did not come less out of season than his communications at Vienna. Although his star still shone in all its glory, although the wonders of Austerlitz and of Jena had not yet lost any of their prestige, though all were sensible, as they must be, of the grand and prodigious spectacle of a French army wintering quietly on the Vistula, certain detractors, obsequious enough in Napoleon's presence, but willing gainsayers in his absence, whispered many bitter observations upon the bloody carnage of Eylau, and the difficulties of carrying on a war at such a distance. It might be possible, too, for some minds, always ready in France to seize the weak side of things, to go on substituting blame for the continued admiration of which Napoleon had never ceased to be the object, since he had held in his hands the destinies of France. The prudent Cambacérès perceived such symptoms, and, in shielding the imperial government from all that might injure it, would have disarmed such censures by sparing the country these new charges. M. Lacuée, taking a meaner view of the matter,

and only seeing the physical sufferings of the people, feared that two requisitions of 80,000 men made immediately on each other, one in November, 1806, the other in March, 1807, above all, after those which had preceded in 1805, requisitions which called men forth to the army, without returning one back, would produce an injurious effect, by depriving agriculture of its labourers, and families of their support. Cambacérès and Lacuée were thus both disposed to present objections, and to ask for at least some delay in regard to these levies. The feelings were honest and wise which inspired in them this desire. It would have been desirable that Napoleon had found many more such with courage to make him listen, before he fell, to the cry of desolate mothers; a cry which was certainly not yet threatening, but which at times, on the news of some great carnage, like that of Eylau, arose secretly in their hearts. However, in telling Napoleon the truth, as a profitable lesson for the future, the better course for the moment was to execute his will, for nothing could be more useful for the interests of peace itself, than the fresh display of power which he had just decreed. The objections, therefore, of Cambacérès and Lacuée, sent in writing to head-quarters, but soon nullified by subsequent letters, one after another, did not cause any delay in the presenting, adopting, or executing the decree which called out the conscription of 1808.

Napoleon hastened to make use of the new resources, which were thus necessary to his vast designs. He had, as has been seen, drawn from France, since his entrance into Poland, seven regiments of infantry; from Paris the 15th light infantry, the 58th of the line, the first regiment of fusileers of the guard, and a municipal regiment; from Brest the 15th of the line; from Saint Lô the 31st; from Boulogne the 19th. From Italy he had drawn five regiments of *chasseurs à cheval* and four regiments of cuirassiers. The greater portion of these corps had just arrived in Germany. The 19th, 15th, and 58th of the line, and the 15th light infantry, were approaching Berlin, and going to co-operate in the siege of Dantzick. The first regiment of fusileers of the guard and the regiment of the municipal guard were on their march. The four regiments of cuirassiers from Italy were already on the Vistula, under the orders of an officer of the highest merit, general d'Espagne. Of the five regiments of chasseurs, two, the 19th and the 23rd, had joined general Lefebvre before Dantzick. The 15th were remounting in Hanover. The two others were arriving with all speed.

The provisional or marching regiments had already traversed Germany to the number of twelve of infantry and four of cavalry. They had been passed in review on the Vistula, dissolved, and sent to the corps encamped on the Passarge, a most satisfactory result at all times for the army, which thus saw its ranks filled up, and was hearing daily reports of the numerous reinforcements that were coming up to join it. Whilst in the earlier days of the establishment on the Passarge, from 75,000 to 80,000 men were all that the French could command at that point, they could now oppose 100,000 to any sudden attack. The provisions brought from all points to the Vistula, and transported thence to the different cantonments by means of carriages constructed on the spot, sufficed for the daily rations, and they began to form stores in reserve, in case of any unforeseen movements. The army, well supplied with food and fuel, was in an excellent mood of body and spirit. The heavy cavalry and the cavalry of the line had been conducted to the lower Vistula, to take advantage there of the abundance of forage which was to be obtained towards the mouths of that river. The regiments of light cavalry left in observation in front of the encampments, went by turns to take rest and enjoy plenty on the banks of the Vistula. Napoleon, who wished, in the first instance, to increase the cavalry from 54,000 to 60,000, and then to 70,000, had just issued orders to augment it to 80,000 horsemen. The campaign had already used up 16,000 horses, for 3000 or 4000 troopers put *hors de combat*. Besides the horses which had been captured from the Prussian and Hessian armies, Napoleon had purchased 17,000 in Germany, and he now directed the purchase of 12,000 in France, to recruit the depôts. The works of Prague, of Modlin, and of Sierock, entirely finished, presented wooden fortifications as solid as those of masonry. The cantonments on the Passarge were provided with strong *têtes de pont*, which admitted of repulsing or assaulting an enemy, as the case might require. The position was not only secure but good, at least as much so as the country and the season allowed it to be.

The corps on march, thanks to the depôts of infantry and cavalry which were established on the route, in which those horses and men which were fatigued were left behind, and others that had been left behind previously by preceding corps were taken forward in exchange, these corps on march thus numbered at the end of their route the same strength as at its commencement. The regiments of cuirassiers from Naples had arrived entire upon the Vistula. For the troops which were coming from Italy, Parma, Milan, and Augsburg; for those coming from France, Mayence, Wurtzburg, and Erfurth, and for both, Wittemberg, Potsdam, Berlin, Custrin, Posen, Thorn, and Warsaw, had relays where they might find all they were in need of, provisions, arms, and accoutrements, manufactured every where at Paris as well as at Berlin, in the conquered alike as in the conquering capital, for Napoleon desired to maintain the people of both. It was at the price of his continual watchfulness that the providing of necessaries, and the maintenance of strength at 400 or 500 leagues distance was supplied to a regular army of 400,000 men, a chimerical number where antiquity gives it to us (at least when it does not speak of an emigrating population), never even alleged to be equalled in modern history, and reached, and even exceeded, for the first time, at the epoch of which the remembrance is now retraced.

Profiting by the presence of the numerous conscripts in the depôts, Napoleon busied himself in bringing from France and Italy fresh troops, with the double intention, as has been said, of augmenting his active army on the Vistula, and of creating an army of reserve on the Elbe. Able to draw from the depôts conscripts thoroughly drilled, he ordered marshal Kellermann to bring up the number of provisional infantry regiments to twenty, and that

of the provisional cavalry regiments to ten. But only those conscripts who were perfectly taught and disciplined were to enter these regiments. He conceived another method of making use of the conscripts whose military education had scarcely commenced, which was by organizing battalions, called garrison battalions, composed of men not yet taught, and not even in uniform, and sending them to Erfurth, Cassel, Magdeburg, Hameln, and Custrin, where they would have time to be drilled, and render available the old troops left in those places. He fixed the total strength of these battalions at about 10,000 or 12,000 men.

After having occupied himself with the provisional regiments destined to recruit the corps established on the Vistula, Napoleon wished to add some other regiments to the seven of infantry and the nine of cavalry, already drawn from France and Italy, which was only possible by having recourse to many combinations, of which he alone was capable. There was in garrison at Braunau a superb regiment, the 3rd of the line, reckoning three war battalions, and three thousand four hundred men under arms. This Napoleon directed upon Berlin, replacing it at Braunau by the 7th of the line, borrowed from the garrison of Alexandria, and replacing the 7th at Alexandria by two regiments of Naples, which had been beaten at Saint Euphemia, and were in need of re-organization. Desiring to leave only dragoon regiments in Italy, he ordered the 14th *chasseurs à cheval*, which was still there, to set out thence. This would bring up to ten the number of regiments of cavalry taken from Italy. He ordered the formation at Paris of a second regiment of fusileers of the guard, which could be done, as they could choose the picked men of two conscriptions, that of 1807 and that of 1808. He withdrew the 5th light infantry from Saint Lô, which was not absolutely indispensable there. He directed a regiment of dragoons of the guard, then in camp at Meudon, to march from Paris to the Rhine, intending them to come on to Potsdam. He gave the same orders relative to the 26th chasseurs, which was at Saumur, and which the profound tranquillity of La Vendée rendered disposable. He commanded a battalion of the marines of the guard to be put in march, as they would be very useful for the navigation of the Vistula. There were consequently three French infantry and three French cavalry regiments, besides a battalion of marines, drawn from France and Italy, and destined either to complete the existing corps, or to form a new corps for marshal Lannes. This marshal, falling ill at Warsaw, had been replaced by Massena in the command of the fifth corps, but was now recovering. Napoleon, the siege of Dantzick being finished, wished with a portion of those troops that had taken it, and the new regiments brought out of France, to form a corps of reserve, which he proposed to give to Lannes, and to attach to the active army. The 8th corps, under marshal Mortier, composed of Dutchmen, Italians, and French, spread among the Hanseatic towns to Stralsund, and from Stralsund to Colberg, had hitherto been employed in guarding the coasts of Germany. The Dutch division in the Hanseatic towns, one of the two French divisions showing front to the Swedes at Stralsund, and the other at Stettin, were ready to concur either in the blockade of Stralsund or in the siege of Dantzick. The Italian division was blockading Colberg. When these sieges were concluded, Napoleon resolved to unite all the troops that were French in this 8th corps, and to join it to the active army. Besides the corps of Massena on the Narew, and the corps of marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, Bernadotte, and Murat, on the Passarge, he would thus have two new corps under Mortier and Lannes, placed between the Vistula and the Oder, connecting him with the second army which he proposed to organize in Germany.

The elements of the second army he formed in the following manner. In Silesia, under Prince Jerome and general Vandamme, a part of the Bavarians, and all the Wirtemburghers were employed on the sieges of Silesia. Upon the shores of the Baltic were the Dutch, belonging actually to the corps of Mortier, and the Italians, equally belonging to his corps, the one established, as has been just observed, in the Hanseatic towns, and the other before Colberg. These were firm allies, faithful to France hitherto, and beginning to learn warfare in the French school. Napoleon sought to increase the number of these auxiliaries, and to give them, as means of support, forty thousand good and old French troops, so as to form upon the Elbe an army of more than a hundred thousand men.

Founding his demand upon the suspicious armaments of Austria, he first required of the confederation of the Rhine a new portion of the contingent which he had a right to exact, and which, though to the extent of twenty thousand, might procure him fifteen thousand men. This might be displeasing to the German governments, the allies of France, but actual war, if such should result from the intervention of Austria, would put their recent acquisitions in so much danger, that France might feel authorized to demand of them such an effort. Besides, it was much more the people than the governments that would be dissatisfied, and this consideration alone rendered such an exigence the more to be regretted. Napoleon determined also to demand from the new kingdom of Italy two of its regiments of infantry and two of cavalry. It was not in Italy that the Italian troops were likely to find any opportunity of learning war, but in the north, in the school of the grand army; and if the Germans might, in some certain degree, complain of being called on to serve interests that were foreign to their own, the Italians could have no complaints of that nature, for the interests of France were especially those of Italy, and, in teaching them to fight, they were teaching them how to defend, at a future time, their national independence.

Napoleon conceived another idea, which at the time had much the appearance of malice, it was to demand troops from Spain. On the eve of the battle of Jena, the prince of Peace, always in treason, secret or open, had published a proclamation, by which he called the Spanish nation to arms, under the strange pretext that the independence of Spain was menaced. It was asked in Spain, in France, and throughout Europe, by whom this independence could be threatened! The answer was easily made. The prince of Peace had trusted, as all the enemies of France had done, in

the superiority of the Prussian army; he had expected from that army the destruction of what was termed the common enemy. But the victory of Jena having disappointed him, he had dared to aver that his proclamation had only for its object the raising the Spanish nation, and conducting it to the assistance of Napoleon, in case he should be in need of it. The falsehood was too gross to blind any one. Napoleon had contented himself with smiling at it, and had deferred that quarrel for a future time. All along the Pyrenees lay some thousands of good Spanish troops, who could have nothing to do there if they were not destined to act against France. There were also some thousand Spaniards at Leghorn, to guard that place in the kingdom of Etruria, who were more likely to give it up to the English than to defend it. Napoleon pretended to take in earnest the explanation that the prince of Peace had given of his proclamation, thanked him for his zeal, and asked him to furnish him with a fresh proof of it by assisting him with fifteen thousand men, quite useless either at the Pyrenees or at Leghorn. Napoleon added, that he proposed to put into their hands Hanover, a territory of England, as a pledge for the restitution of the Spanish colonies. Reasons so skilfully arranged were not in truth wanting for the baseness of the Spanish government of that epoch. Scarcely had the despatch of Napoleon reached Madrid, than the order to march was sent to the Spanish troops. About 9000 or 10,000 men set out from the Pyrenees, and 4000 or 5000 from Leghorn. Napoleon forwarded the necessary instructions every where for their reception, as well in France as in the countries dependent upon his arms, in the most amicable and hospitable manner, and that they should be furnished abundantly with provisions, clothes, and even money.

He was about to have upon the Elbe Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and Dutchmen, to the number of 60,000 men at least. The Bavarians and Wirtemburghers, united with the new contingent required from the confederation of the Rhine, would form about 30,000 men. The Dutch, increased by some troops, would be 15,000, the Spaniards 15,000, and the Italians 7000 or 8000. That these auxiliaries might become good troops, it would suffice that they were joined by a certain amount of French. Napoleon devised means of procuring 40,000 such, of the best, by still drawing from Italy and France. A long time before he had taken the precaution of ordering the army of Italy to be placed on its war footing. Five divisions of infantry were fully organized in Frioul and in Lombardy. Napoleon resolved to call from Brescia and from Verona, the two divisions of Molitor and Boudet, excellent divisions, worthy of their leaders, who afterwards proved what they were capable of at Esling and at Wagram. These presented a force of 15,000 or 16,000 men, almost all old soldiers of Italy, recruited with some conscripts of the late levies. These divisions received orders to pass the Alps, and to repair, by way of Augsburg, one to Magdeburg, and the other to Berlin. A month and half would suffice for this march.

Napoleon was thus weakening himself in Italy, but Italy was then of far less importance than Germany. Well protected in his rear while he remained in Poland, certain of the power of throwing himself by Silesia or Saxony upon Bohemia, and of prostrating Austria by a single backhanded blow of his sword, he was always assured of disengaging Italy, in case she were invaded unexpectedly. He therefore calculated very skilfully in preferring to render himself strong in Germany rather than Italy. Besides, it was not without some compensation that he weakened the latter, for he had prescribed that 20,000 of the conscripts taken from the classes of 1807 and 1808 should be sent there, and he ordered, moreover, that the picked companies of the battalions in depôt should be selected to form two new active divisions in Lombardy, which his foresight rendered the more easy by keeping the depôts in Italy, as well as those in France, always filled and well drilled. He would therefore soon have, as heretofore, 60,000 men on the Adige, 72,000 with the corps of Marmont, and 90,000 by moving a strong detachment from Naples towards Milan.

But 15,000 French were not sufficient on the Elbe to serve as a bond and support to the 60,000 auxiliaries which he was about to unite there. Napoleon still thought of drawing away from France a valuable resource. He had formed at Boulogne, St. Lô, Pontivy, and Napoleonville, four camps, composed of a certain number of his oldest regiments, of those which were in need of rest and recruiting, and he had abundantly provided them with every thing that could be necessary in men and material. These regiments presented a force of nearly 36,000 men. They were, as has been seen, to be seconded by some detachments of national guards, of which 6000 men were at St. Omer, 3000 at Cherburg, 3000 between Oleron and Bourdeaux, 10,000 marines of the Boulogne flotilla, 3000 artificers embodied at Antwerp, 8000 at Brest, 3000 at Lorient, 4000 at Rochfort, 12,000 coast-guard, and 3000 of the gendarmerie, who were at any time to unite by calling out on any given point this militia for twenty-five leagues around. Here was a force of nearly 90,000 men along the coast, of which 25,000 or 30,000 men could be brought upon any part of the coast which might be attacked. Napoleon thought of replacing the regular troops in the camps of Boulogne, St. Lô, Pontivy, and Napoleonville, by a new creation. He ordered the formation of five legions, composed of officers taken from the army, and conscripts drawn from the two last conscriptions, commanded by five senators, each legion six battalions, and 6000 men in strength, the five forming thirty battalions, and 30,000 men. These would acquire their practice by being stationed upon the sea-coasts. The permanent state of warfare France had been in from 1792, had furnished such a quantity of officers, that a staff was never wanting for the formation of new corps. The elements of these five legions could not, it is true, be assembled for two or three months, which would bring on the end of May or the beginning of June, but the troops in the encampments were not immediately to quit the shores. If in May or June the English were not found directing their attacks on the French coasts; but if, on the contrary, they were found making sail towards the coasts of Germany, 25,000

of the old soldiers of these camps were to follow the movements of the English squadrons, to pass at the same time along the borders of the Channel, the North Sea, and the Baltic, by way of Normandy, Picardy, Holland, Hanover, and Mecklenburgh, and unite themselves in Germany with the two divisions of Boudet and Molitor. They had orders to execute this march the sooner if the conduct of Austria should render it necessary ; and in any case they were to leave behind them the five new legions, whose presence would be useful even before their organization could be accomplished.

By means of this combination Napoleon was about to have, with the divisions of Boudet and Molitor, with the 25,000 men drawn out of Normandy and Britany, and with the 60,000 or 70,000 German, Italian, Spanish, and Dutch auxiliaries, a second force of more than 100,000 men upon the Elbe, independently of the two corps of marshals Mortier and Lannes, whose task would be to connect this army of reserve with the grand active army of the Vistula. Endowed with the admirable talent of moving his large masses, he could, by bringing up his rear to his front, or by moving his front back on his rear, by throwing his left towards his right, or his right towards his left, bring the main body of his forces in advance upon the Niemen, or in the rear upon the Elbe, towards his right upon Austria, or his left towards the sea-shore. With all those he had just brought up, and those that were still to come up, he would not reckon less than 440,000 men in Germany, of which 360,000 were French and 80,000 their allies. Never before had such means been collected together with equal power, vigour, and promptitude.

Of all these reinforcements, there were as yet arrived only the new regiments drawn out of France and Italy, the provisional regiments which were coming up daily to recruit the ranks of the grand army, the Bavarians and Wirtemburghers who were acting in Silesia, the Dutch on the Baltic, and Mortier's troops that were spread about around Stralsund, Colberg, and Dantzick. Orders had been dispatched for Boudet and Molitor's divisions, and for the other Italian, German, and French troops.

Marshal Brune, who commanded in chief in the camps at Boulogne, and of whom the recollections of the Helder were a sufficient recommendation, was called to Berlin, to be put at the head of the second army thus assembled in Germany.

The sieges were all this time carrying on. But before relating the vicissitudes of the most important of all these sieges, and of that which filled the winter with memorable events, it will be proper to mention a circumstance which might have seriously compromised the security of the French rear. Marshal Mortier commanded the 8th corps, and having, after the departure of king Louis, four divisions under his orders,—one Dutch, one Italian, and two French,—had posted the Dutch division towards the mouths of the Elbe, leaving the French division of Grandjean before Stralsund, and the French division of Dupas at Stettin, the Italian division he had stationed before Colberg, to restrain the inconvenient incursions which the garrison of that place made between the Vistula and the Oder. It must be observed, that of the six regiments composing his two French divisions, four had been called away,—the 2nd light infantry to assist before Dantzick, the 12th light infantry had been dispatched to Thorn, and the 22nd and 65th of the line to reinforce the army on the Passarge. To compensate for these, the 58th, arrived from Paris, had been put under marshal Mortier, and several of the regiments which were coming from France were besides intended for his corps. He, however, had only been able to leave with general Grandjean two French regiments, the 4th light infantry and the 58th of the line. He had with himself the 72nd in support of the Italians in front of Colberg.

At this moment the Swedes chose to make an attempt on the French rear. They were in occupation of Stralsund, a maritime place of importance in Swedish Pomerania, which was their ordinary place of disembarkation in Germany. This place would have been worth a siege, if Dantzick had not better deserved a conquest of that nature. The king of Sweden, whose mind was but ill regulated, and who lost the throne for his family, and Pomerania and Finland for his country, had undertaken to move out from Stralsund with an army composed of Russians, English, and Swedes, and, like another Gustavus Adolphus, to make essay of a brilliant descent on the continent of Germany. But Napoleon, being wholly master of that continent, had obliged the Swedish forces to shut themselves up in Stralsund instead, where they found themselves as completely blockaded as if in a *tête de pont*. The king of Sweden, as quick with his friends as with his enemies, showed great dissatisfaction with Russia, and, above all, with England, which did not send him a single soldier, and only doled out to him her subsidies very parsimoniously. Thus shut up in person within his own territories, since he was restrained from overrunning the continent, he lived on at Stockholm, sad and isolated, leaving general Essen at Stralsund with a body of 15,000 excellent troops. General Essen, informed of what was going on before him, could not resist the temptation of forcing the line of blockade which the French were now keeping up with too few forces. He sallied forth in the very beginning of April, at the head of his 15,000 Swedes, against general Grandjean, who had scarcely 5000 or 6000 men to oppose to him, and of which only half at most were French. General Grandjean, after valiantly defending himself before the place, finding himself in danger of his flanks being turned, was obliged to fall back, first upon Aucklam, and then on Unkermunde and Stettin. He effected his retreat in good order, seconded by the bravery of the French and Dutch, and lost only a few of his men on the field of battle, but he lost a great quantity of military stores, and some isolated detachments which could not be called in, particularly those on the islands of Usedom and Wollin, which closed the Grosse-Haff.

This surprise produced some excitement in the rear of the army, particularly at Berlin, where an adverse population, deeply chagrined, and looking eagerly forward to events, sought to feed their hopes on every unforeseen circumstance. But the fortune of France, as yet so dazzling, only allowed her enemies a brief success. At that moment some of the regiments arrived from France, among them the 15th of the line and several of the provisional

marching regiments, had reached the Elbe and the Oder. General Clarke, who governed Berlin with wisdom and firmness, instantly dispatched the 15th of the line to the assistance of general Grandjean at Stettin. He united with these a provisional regiment and some squadrons of cavalry, which were available from the grand depôt at Potsdam. Marshal Mortier, on his side, put himself in march, at the head of the 72nd, and of several Italian detachments from before Colberg. These troops, being joined to Grandjean's division, would suffice to punish the Swedes for their attempt. Marshal Mortier distributed them in two divisions, under generals Grandjean and Dupas, ranged the 72nd, the 15th of the line, and the Dutch, in the first, and the 4th light infantry, the 58th of the line, and some Italians in the second, left the provisional regiments to cover his left and rear, and marched towards the enemy with that quiet resolution that characterized him. He drove the Swedes from position to position, chased them to the Peene, passed that river in spite of them, and drove them back into Stralsund with a loss of many hundreds killed and 2000 prisoners. The career of the Swedes, which began with the commencement of April, was finished by the 18th of that month. General Essen, fearing that the whole of Pomerania would soon be torn from him, now sought to save himself by an armistice. An envoy was sent on his behalf to marshal Mortier, offering to suspend all hostilities, and to declare the province neuter. Since it was impossible for the French to besiege Stralsund, nothing could suit them better than to shut up this inlet, by which the English might penetrate into Germany, and at the same time to render disposable for the siege of Dantzick those troops which must otherwise be left in Swedish Pomerania. Marshal Mortier, aware of the intentions of Napoleon on this subject, consented to an armistice, by virtue of which the Swedes promised to observe a strict neutrality, not to open Pomerania to any enemy of France, and not to furnish assistance either to Dantzick or to Colberg. Any resumption of hostilities was to be preceded by ten days' notice beforehand. The armistice was then sent to Napoleon for his approval.

Napoleon could not reason otherwise than his lieutenant had done, for the same motive which had already made him reduce the troops before Stralsund to the least possible number, disposed him to the acceptance of an armistice which nullified Stralsund without employing any portion of his troops in its blockade. He therefore agreed to the armistice, on condition that the notice for resumption of hostilities should be extended from ten days to a month.

General Essen signed the armistice thus modified, and sent it to Stockholm for the royal ratification. Marshal Mortier in the meanwhile remained on the Peene with his forces, and afterwards transported them towards Colberg, Stettin, and Dantzick, leaving behind only the Dutch in observation of the neutralized province.

At the same time, if the Swedes had served French interests by adopting this armistice, they had not the less benefited themselves by so doing, for the French forces kept accumulating at Berlin. The 3rd of the line, drawn from Braunau and 3400 strong, four or five provisional regiments on march from the Rhine to the Elbe, the 15th chasseurs having been remounted in Hanover, and the 19th of the line from the camp at Boulogne, were just preparing to fall on Pomerania. The Swedes, by their complete destruction, would have dearly paid for the lost time they might have caused the French troops.

Amidst all this, Dantzick had been invested and the works of the siege had commenced. Napoleon at first thought of only blockading this place. The war being prolonged, he resolved now to employ the winter in its capture. It was worth the trouble. Dantzick, in fact, commands the Lower Vistula, and all the fertile plains through which that river flows towards its discharge; it incloses a spacious harbour, and then contained the wealth of all the northern trade. Once master of Dantzick, Napoleon could be no longer assailable in his position on the Lower Vistula; he would deprive the coalition of the means of turning his left, and would obtain possession of an immense depôt of corn and wine, sufficient to maintain his army for more than a year. It was, therefore, impossible to make use of the winter better than by effecting this conquest. But it would require a long siege, as much owing to the works of the place as the strong garrison charged with its defence. If, in the commencement of the campaign, Napoleon could have undertaken such a siege, it is possible that the defences of Dantzick, which were of earth, and had been neglected, might have yielded to a sudden attack. But Napoleon had then no disposable troops or heavy artillery, and found himself reduced merely to the blockading of Dantzick with some German and Polish auxiliaries, supported by a single regiment of French, the 2nd light infantry. The king of Prussia, being thus put on his guard, had therefore found time to put into a good state of defence a place which was the last bulwark of his kingdom, the greatest depôt of his wealth, and which, while in his possession, must be a serious danger to Napoleon. He had placed 18,000 men in garrison there, of which 14,000 were Prussians and 4000 Russians. The celebrated marshal Kalkreuth, who at that time was idling and reviling at Kœnigsberg, was appointed governor, and he was well qualified for such a command. There was no fear that this old warrior, who had just condemned to death the governor of Stettin for having yielded the post confided to his keeping, would offer only a feeble resistance to the French. Marshal Kalkreuth had scarcely arrived, when he completed the conflagration of the rich faubourgs of Dantzick that his predecessor had begun to give up to the flames; he then set himself to repairing the works, and raising the spirits of the garrison, and intimidating whoever might be tempted to surrender.

Dantzick, by March, 1807, was no longer a ruined and neglected place, which it was possible to take by surprise. Besides having an excellent governor, a powerful garrison, and immense and solid works, it presented a site extremely difficult of access. Like all great rivers, the Vistula has its delta. A little below Mewe, at about fifteen leagues from the Baltic, it divides itself into two arms, which inclose a rich and fertile country called the island of Nogath. One of these arms, that to the right, proceeds, under the name of the

Nogath, to throw itself into the gulf called Frische-Haff; the other, that to the left, which retains the name of the Vistula, flowing directly to the north, to within a league of the sea, there suddenly meets a bank of sand, turns to the west, and after having skirted this bank of sand for seven or eight leagues, turns again to the northward, and at length falls into the Baltic. At the mouth of this last arm of the Vistula, in the midst of a level country, extremely fertile, often inundated, and at the foot of some sandy heights, the city of Dantzick is situated, at some thousand paces from the sea.

The long bank of sand in front of which the Vistula turns to flow westward, is called the Nehrung. At one end it ceases before Dantzick; at the other, after stretching for twenty leagues, and forming one of the shores of the Frische-Haff, it would join Kœnigsberg unbroken, except for an opening at Pillau, a natural gap, which the waters of the Nogath, of the Passarge, and the Pregel, have caused in order to discharge themselves out of the Frische-Haff into the Baltic. In short, it is by Pillau that the Baltic is reached from the Frische-Haff, and by which the navigation of the important town of Kœnigsberg passes.

Provided, therefore, that the narrow strait at Pillau could be crossed, it would be possible to communicate by land from Kœnigsberg to Dantzick by following this bank of sand. The Nehrung is a league wide at most, but much less for the greater part, and about twenty-five leagues in length, without a tree, except just close to Dantzick, and only dotted here and there with fishermen's huts.

Dantzick, situated on the left arm of the Vistula, that which preserves its name, is 2300 toises from the sea, that is, about a league. The fort of Weichselmünde, regularly constructed, closes the mouth of the Vistula. In order to shorten the passage from the place to the sea, a canal, called the canal of Laake, has been cut. The ground between the river and this canal presents an island which is called the Holm. Numerous redoubts on this island command the river and the canal which form the two outlets to the sea. In short, the place itself, situated on the banks of the Vistula, traversed by a small rivulet, the Motlau, surrounded by their joint waters, and inclosed within a fortified wall, presenting twenty bastions on its face, is of the most difficult approach, for it is subject to inundation all around, not artificially, but naturally; so as that the besiegers cannot stop it by drains, and that even the inhabitants cannot defend themselves from it at certain times of the day and periods of the year. Dantzick thus inclosed to the north and east, and with the land under water to the southward, where no trenches can be opened, would be then unassailable but for the sandy heights which command it, and which just cease by rapid descents at the foot of its walls towards the western face. Of course possession of these heights was not wanting to aid in its defence, and they were crowned by a series of works which presented a double fortified line. By these heights it is that Dantzick has been generally attacked. In fact, the double line of fortification which occupies their summit once taken, the city might be overwhelmed with such a destructive fire as it would be scarcely possible to withstand. Of course this double *enceinte* can but be most difficult to attack. The works of Dantzick are of earth, presenting, instead of escarpments of masonry, slopings of turf. But there was found at the foot of these slopes a range of the strongest palisading, of enormous dimensions (fifteen inches in diameter), close together and deeply sunk into the earth. Shot might rend them, and sometimes break off the tops, but could not altogether tear them away. On the slopes behind, enormous beams, suspended by ropes, could at a moment of assault be rolled down from top to bottom upon the besiegers. Moreover, at all the receding angles of the *enceinte* strong wooden block-houses had been constructed, covered with earth, and rendered almost impenetrable to bullet or to bomb. The timber of the northern plains, of which Dantzick is the great entrepôt, had been profusely used, in all its forms, to fortify it; and its defensive properties, not then duly appreciated, were soon evident after the execution of this memorable siege. Munitions of war in immense quantity, provisions enough to support the whole population and the troops also for more than a year, continual communication with Kœnigsberg, either by sea or by the Nehrung,—communications which gave the besieged garrison assurance of assistance, and the means of retreat when they might choose,—all added to the chances of defence, and to the difficulties of attack.

Marshal Lefebvre, charged with the command of the troops that were to carry on the siege, possessed none of the knowledge requisite for such an operation. There was not in the whole army a more ignorant nor a braver soldier. To all the questions of skill raised by the engineers, he never could offer any solution but that of rushing on to the assault at the head of his grenadiers. If, in spite of this insufficiency, Napoleon still chose him, it must have been either with the view, as has been elsewhere seen, of employing the senators, or that he did not care to leave such an old soldier in Paris, who, though submissive and devoted enough, still could not control his tongue; in short, it might have been that he wished, without confiding to him a *corps d'armée*, to afford him some opportunity of earning a rich reward. The brave Lefebvre, who redeemed his ignorance by a little natural sense, could do himself justice, and exhibited real fear on learning the task Napoleon had just imposed on him. Napoleon had reassured him, promising to send him every resource he could need, and to direct him himself from his camp at Finkenstein. "Take courage," he said to him; "you ought, as well as the rest of us, when we return to France, *to have something to relate in the halls of the senate.*"

Overcome by these gracious words, the marshal hastened to obey. Napoleon had appointed two officers of the first merit to direct him,—Chasseloup, of the engineers, and the artillery general Lariboissière,—knowing that it is by these two arms of engineering and artillery that the walls of the strongest places are to be knocked down. It is true they are likely to differ in their counsels; for one is charged with the determining what and how attacks shall be made, the other with the carrying by cannon-ball such attacks into execution, and they are too closely brought into contact toge-

ther in this difficult work not to frequently contradict each other. The part of the general-in-chief is to reconcile these differences. But Napoleon was within thirty or forty leagues of Dantzick; he could always resolve difficulties by his daily correspondence, and dispatch one of his *aides-de-camp*, general Savary or General Bertrand, to put an end in his name to any differences which marshal Lefebvre might be incapable of comprehending and judging of. This he did more than once during the siege.

Napoleon had resolved to begin the first works with his auxiliaries and one or two French regiments borrowed from the corps of marshal Mortier, and then, as the regiments coming up from France should pass near the Vistula, to keep them momentarily under the walls of Dantzick in support of the besieging troops. Marshal Lefebvre, therefore, had at his commencement 5000 or 6000 Poles, lately levied and scarcely drilled; 2500 men of the legion of the north, composed of Poles, German and Russian deserters, having spirit enough, but no steadiness, for want of sufficient organization; 2200 Baden troops, little accustomed to fire or the fatigue of trenches; 5000 Saxons, good soldiers enough, but who, having fought by the side of the Prussians at Jena, might not be very well affected towards the French; and 3000 French,—that is to say, the 2nd light infantry, the 23rd and 19th regiments of chasseurs arrived from Italy, and 600 engineers, an incomparable body, who, furnishing every thing that was wanting during this famous siege, covered themselves with glory. It appears, then, that with 18,000 men at the utmost, of which only 3000 were French, they were about to undertake the regular attack of a place which contained a garrison of 18,000 men.

The heavy artillery, of which at least 100 pieces would be needed, with an immense provision of powder and projectiles, could only be brought from the arsenals of Silesia. The transport by water being interrupted, the French were obliged to drag them with great labour, over very bad roads, from the Oder to the Vistula. These were expected in March. But before beginning to bombard the place, the first thing to be done was to shut it up, so as to deprive the garrison of the reinforcements and encouragement they were receiving from Kœnigsberg. To succeed in this, it was necessary on one hand to cut it off from the fort of Weichselmünde, and on the other to intercept the communication by the Nehrung, this long bank of sand which extends, as has been said, all the way from Kœnigsberg to Dantzick, except at the single opening at Pillau.

Being arrived by the sandy heights which command Dantzick on the west, in front is the outward *enceinte* constructed on these heights, below is the city, the Vistula on the left throwing itself into the Baltic, beyond the works of the fort of Weichselmünde; on the right the vast extent of ground inundated by the Motlau, and opposite, as far as the eye can reach, the Nehrung, bathed on one side by the sea, and on the other by the Vistula, and burying itself in the horizon in the direction of the Frische-Haff. Here was a circuit of seven or eight leagues, which it was impossible to embrace with 18,000 men. True, the investment might be sufficient by the occupation of certain points. Thus, by taking post on the Vistula, between the fort of Weichselmünde and Dantzick, the communications by sea would be interrupted. By establishing a position on the Nehrung, all communication by land would be cut off. But to gain possession of these principal points, it would be necessary first to crown the heights, and then to descend to the left and carry the works of fort Weichselmünde on both banks of the Vistula; and failing in this operation, at least to bar that river, cross over to the island of Holm, and take possession of the canal of Laake. It would be further necessary, after having thus descended on the left, to descend also towards the right, into the inundated plain, to traverse it by the dykes, to cross the Vistula above Dantzick as it had been crossed below, to enter the Nehrung, to entrench there, and to cut off the road by land as well as by sea. These first difficulties overcome, the trenches might be opened before the place. But to do that, the besiegers ought to possess 8000 or 10,000 of the best troops, and the French had not such. By the advice of the engineer in command, Chasseloup, it was thought best to choose between the divers preliminary operations that which seemed most urgent and least difficult. To pass the Vistula below Dantzick, between the city and the fort of Weichselmünde; to penetrate into the island of Holm under the fire of its well-armed redoubts, this in spite of sorties which might be made either from Weichselmünde or Dantzick, seemed too dangerous. It was therefore resolved to pass above Dantzick, a league or two higher up, towards a place called Neufahr, there to form a small encampment, and thus to intercept the Nehrung, so as to obtain means of reinforcing this encampment, and to approach Dantzick for the purpose of aiding the troops which would be subsequently charged with the passage of the Vistula, between the place and the fort of Weichselmünde.

This operation was confided to general Schramm, with a body of about 3000 men, composed of a battalion of the 2nd light infantry, of some hundreds of Saxon grenadiers, a detachment of Polish infantry and cavalry, and a squadron of the 19th chasseurs. On the morning of the 19th of March, these troops were embarked as high up as Neufahr, two leagues above Dantzick, on board some boats that had been procured, and crossed the Vistula, which is narrower here, since it divides itself into several branches, assisted as they were in this operation by an island situated near the opposite bank. General Schramm reaching the Nehrung in consequence of this passage, divided his little force into three columns; one on the left, to fall on the hostile troops which defended the position on the side of Dantzick; one on the right, to repulse those who might approach from the side of Kœnigsberg, and the third in reserve. At the head of each of these columns he had placed a French detachment to show them an example.

Scarcely had the troops of general Schramm disembarked, led by the battalion of the 2nd light infantry, than, turning to the left, they encountered and overthrew some Prussians, in spite of a very warm fire. While the principal column, taking to the left, pursued these towards Dantzick, the second remained in observation on the road to

Kœnigsberg. The third, kept in reserve, served to reinforce the first. The enemy, taking advantage of the obstacles of the ground to renew their resistance,—for the Nehrung, as it approaches Dantzick, presents hillocks and woods,—the first column, with the support of the third, again repulsed them, killed some, and took several prisoners. The Saxons on this occasion rivalled the French. Both together drove back the enemy to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, from whence the troops had come out to the defence of the Nehrung.

The affair seemed over, when towards seven o'clock in the evening, a column of 3000 or 4000 Prussians was seen to march out from Dantzick, and up the Vistula, with drums beating, and colours flying. The 2nd light infantry, by a true and well-sustained fire, stopped this column, then charged it with the bayonet, and drove it back upon Dantzick, into which it hurried, to secure itself. This day, by which the French obtained possession of a passage across the Vistula, above Dantzick, and a position which intercepted the Nehrung, cost the enemy 200 or 300 men put *hors de combat*, and 500 or 600 prisoners. Captain Girod, of the engineers, who directed the expedition, distinguished himself by his intelligence and self-possession. The operation being effected, he cut down some timber, threw up breastworks, and established a bridge of boats across the Vistula, with the accompaniment of a strong *tête-de pont*. The French troops were lodged behind these defences, and guarded by means of cavalry posts, which on one side extended nearly to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, and on the other along the Nehrung, in the direction of Kœnigsberg.

General Schramm, who commanded this detachment, endeavoured on the succeeding days to descend as far as Heubude, to invest the place more closely, and to possess himself of a sluice, that materially influenced the inundation. But this sluice, surrounded by the water, was inaccessible on every side. To obtain possession of it was therefore given up, and the French were contented with advancing a bridge of boats as far down as Heubude. This post on the Upper Vistula, however, even after it was carried down to Heubude, had still to keep up six leagues of communication with the head-quarters, across overflowed grounds and along dykes. By desiring to cut off the communications of the besieged, the French were thus themselves exposed to the loss of their own communications.

On the 26th of March the enemy attempted two sallies, one from the place itself, by way of the gates of Schidlitz and Oliva, on the French advanced posts, with the intention of fully completing the burning of the faubourgs, and the other from the exterior works of Weichselmünde, directed towards the left of the French head-quarters, by way of Langenfurth. Both were warmly repulsed. An officer of the Polish cavalry, captain Sokolniki, distinguished himself greatly on this occasion, by his bravery and skill. The baron of Kakow, a celebrated Prussian partisan officer, was taken prisoner.

The French troops, in following up the enemy to the very foot of their works, approached the place nearer than they had hitherto done, and were able better to make out its configuration. General Chasseloup settled the plan for attack with the glance of an engineer, as intelligent as he was skilful.

The exterior works, constructed on the confines of the heights, presented two lines, which, though connected with each other, were still distinct, and separated by a small valley, in the bottom of which stood the faubourg of Schidlitz. The first line, that on the right (the right of the besieging army), was called Bischoffsberg, and the second, that to the left, Hagelsberg. This latter it was that general Chasseloup chose for the object of his principal attack, reserving to himself the making a feint attack upon Bischoffsberg. The motives which decided him were as follow [1].

The works of Hagelsberg seemed less carefully guarded than those of Bischoffsberg. Hagelsberg was confined and little calculated for the movement of troops, either for the besieged to make sallies or to repulse assaults, while Bischoffsberg, being large and well laid out, would allow of 3000 or 4000 men being ranged in battle array, and thrown out in mass upon the besiegers. Hagelsberg could be attacked on its rear by way of Stolzenberg, one of its outward positions; Bischoffsberg could not be so from any quarter. Hagelsberg was reached by continually undulating ground. In approaching Bischoffsberg a deep ravine was met with, through which it was not easy to force a way, and into which the risk of being precipitated was to be incurred by any who might attempt clearing it to make an assault. Besides that Hagelsberg was more easy of capture than Bischoffsberg, its position after it was taken was the better of the two. From one, as well as the other, the place was equally commanded, and it might be overwhelmed by the firing of artillery. But if this firing did not suffice to reduce it, and the French were obliged to descend from the heights to force the second *enceinte*, on coming down from Hagelsberg, a salient front from the bastion of Heilige-Leichnams to the bastion of Saint Elizabeth would be found, which, not being flanked from any other side, would offer but small difficulty to the besiegers. On the contrary, on descending from Bischoffsberg from the bastion of Saint Elizabeth, as far as the bastion of Saint Gertrude was to be found a receding angle, flanked on all sides, and exposed, moreover, to the fire of several cavaliers still higher up. In fact, reasons thus drawn from the general situation existed to decide upon the attack on Hagelsberg. This attack would be nearer to the principal point of the French strength on the Lower Vistula, and it was, in fact, by the Lower Vistula that the besiegers proposed investing the place, by drawing upon this point the detached corps of general Schramm, and by assisting him to

[1] We have thought fit to relate, with some detail, the siege of Dantzick, because it was a fine specimen of a regular siege, and the most remarkable of our age; because examples of regular sieges, which were so frequent and so perfect under Louis XIV., have become very rare in late times, because that of Dantzick had the signal honour of being covered by Napoleon himself, at the head of 200,000 men; and because it forms the necessary episode which binds together the campaign of the winter with that of the summer, in the immortal warfare of Poland.—*Author's note.*

cross over into the island of Holm, thus to cut Dantzick off from the fort of Weichselmünde. These reasons were convincing, and convinced Napoleon himself. General Kirgener, commanding under general Chasseloup, had formed the idea of fixing the point of attack still more to the left, towards the gate of Oliva, in the low ground lying between Hagelsberg and the Vistula, over against the island of Holm. This idea was not adopted, for the French would have had to carry the first *enceinte* under the fire on the left of the island of Holm, and then to attack the second, sustaining on the right the fire of Hagelsberg. Such a mode of going to work was inadmissible.

General Chasseloup being called away for some days to Thorn, in order to project some defensive works there, left, on his setting out, his plan of attack, and orders for the commencement of the works.

There was no longer any excuse for delay, as marshal Lefebvre had just received part of the reinforcements which had been promised him. The 44th of the line, taken from the corps of Augereau, arrived at this time from the banks of the Vistula; it consisted of but 1000 men, but of the very best kind. The 19th, that had set out from France two months before, also arrived at Stettin, with a train of artillery in its escort. These were sufficient, while waiting for the other appointed regiments, to commence the works, and to set the example to the auxiliary troops.

Without being versed in that noble science which immortalized Vauban, every one knows the precautions with which approaches must be made to fortified towns. It is by burying oneself in the earth, by opening trenches, and throwing to the side of the enemy the contents of those trenches, that advances are slowly made under the fire of heavy artillery. Thus are the lines traced which are called parallels, because they are in fact parallel to the front to be attacked. These are then armed with batteries, so as to reply to the fire of the besieged. After having traced a first parallel, they approach, working underground by zigzags, to the distance where it is judged fit to trace a second parallel, which is armed in battery, like the first. They arrive successively at a third, from whence they reach the bank of the ditch, in which is what is called the covered way. Thence they descend into the ditch with fresh precautions, overthrow, by breaching batteries, the escarpments, fill up the ditch with the ruins, and upon these ruins mount up to the assault. Sorties of the enemy, to destroy these difficult works, constant firing of heavy artillery, and mines by which both besiegers and besieged are blown up into the air, add animated scenes, and often terrible ones, to this frightful subterranean warfare, in which science disputes with heroism in the attack or defence of great cities, whose riches or geographical position, or whose military strength, render them worthy of such efforts.

These complicated methods must be resorted to when a place cannot be suddenly captured. That was the case in this instance, for the reasons before adduced, and in the night between the 1st and 2nd of April the trenches were opened in front of Hagelsberg, which was the point designed for the attack. They had taken position on the plateau of Zigankenberg. According to custom, it was endeavoured to conceal this first operation from the enemy, and at daybreak the French soldiers were covered by a breastwork of earth for an extent of 200 toises. The besieged directed a very warm fire on them, but they could not hinder them from finishing the work during the following day. In the night between the 2nd and 3rd of April, they moved forward from the first parallel by the transversal trenches called zigzags, and thus gained ground. While part of the French soldiers were busy in this manner, they endeavoured to carry a work which would soon become annoying to their progress.

This was the redoubt known by the name of Kalke-Schanze, situated on their left, on the very bank of the Vistula, and consequently in the low land through which the river flowed. Besides, being placed below the point they were gaining by their works, it enfiladed the trenches, a sufficient motive for seeking to get rid of it. Some soldiers of the legion of the north, a bold body, as has been remarked, but not very steady, threw themselves bravely into the work, and carried it. During the same night the enemy made a sortie upon the first trenches, and upon the redoubt which had just been taken from him. He was at first repulsed, but he retook the redoubt of Kalke-Schanze, whence he drove out the soldiers of the legion of the north, as well as the Badenese. He had scarcely established himself in it, before he filled all the ditches with the waters of the Vistula, surrounded the earthen escarpments with strong palisading, and rendered himself almost impregnable there. The French were therefore compelled to continue their approaches, notwithstanding this inconvenient neighbour, from which they were obliged to protect themselves by traverses, a sort of breastworks of earth, opposite to the fires on their flank, and which, by imposing so great an increase of works, could but prolong the operations of the siege.

During the nights and the days which followed, from the 4th to the 7th of April, the French pursued the works of approach, under the fire of the place, without being able to reply to it, the heavy artillery not having yet come up. They had only some field pieces placed in redoubts, with which they could pour grape on the enemy in case of sortie. The works presented greater difficulties than the generality of regular sieges. The soil in which they were working was a fine sand, loose and shifting, crumbling away at the stroke of the balls; and the wind, becoming violent at the approach of the equinox, blew it into the faces of the soldiers. The weather was bad, snowy and rainy by turns. In fact, the only good labourers were the French, who were few in number, and overcome with fatigue.

During the night from the 7th to the 8th of April, the French opened a parallel opposite Bischoffsberg, with the double motive of distracting the attention of the enemy by a false attack, and of establishing batteries to take Hagelsberg in reverse, and even of firing on the city itself. On the following days the works were continued, as well for the real as for the false attack. The besieged, on their side, had undertaken works of counter-approach, intending thereby to possess themselves of a mound, from whence they could command the

French trenches. In the night between the 10th and 11th, general Chasseloup, who had returned to the camp, made the necessary dispositions for the destruction of these works. At 10 o'clock at night four companies of the 44th of the line, with 190 soldiers of the legion of the north, commanded by the chief of battalion Rogniat, crossed a kind of ravine which separated the left of the first parallel from the position occupied by the Prussians, sprung upon them, overthrew them, took thirteen prisoners, and obliged the others to take to flight, throwing their muskets away. The soldiers of the north immediately set to work filling in, with their shovels, the trenches the besieged had begun. But this destruction of the enemy's works was carried on at forty toises' distance from the place, and under a murderous fire of grape and howitzer shot. The workmen of the legion of the north, after standing this for some time, at length took to flight one after another, and the Prussians were enabled to regain their abandoned works before they could be completely destroyed. At one o'clock in the morning, general Chasseloup and marshal Lefebvre, perceiving the return of the enemy, resolved to drive them away again. Four hundred men of the 44th darted in upon the works, and, finding a strong detachment of Prussian grenadiers there, attacked them with the bayonet, killing or wounding fifty of them, making nearly as many prisoners, and capturing many muskets and tools. A company of Saxons remained until daybreak filling in the enemy's trenches with shovels, but, by that time, although seconded by the French riflemen, they could no longer withstand the firing from the place, and were obliged to retire.

The Prussians reoccupied the works in the course of the day of the 12th, and they erected, in great haste, a sort of redoubt of palisades on the mound, to the possession of which they had attached such value. It was not possible to suffer them to remain thus peaceably established on the left of the trenches. It was resolved that on the following night this position should be carried for the third time, and that it should be connected with the second parallel which had been opened during the day. On the 12th, at nine o'clock in the evening, the chief of battalion, Rogniat, and general Puthod, at the head of 300 Saxon grenadiers of Bevilacqua, a company of carbineers of the legion of the north, and a company of grenadiers of the 44th, commanded by the chief of battalion, Jacquemard, assaulted the work with determination. The resistance of the enemy was most obstinate. Under cover of the palisades, they kept up such a fire as caused a momentary hesitation among the French troops. But the grenadiers of the 44th marched straight forward to the palisades, while the Saxon grenadiers of Bevilacqua, led on by a brave drummer, finding a way of turning the work by the left, gained entrance, and decided the success. The French remained masters of the redoubt, and hastened to connect it with the second parallel.

In the mean time, daylight appearing, the enemy resolving to dispute to the last a position which must have stopped the approaches if he had succeeded in retaining it, attempted a grand sortie, and directed a strong column upon the point that was so warmly contested. The whole fire of the place supported their efforts. They threw themselves upon the redoubt in which the Saxons remained; overwhelmed them by numbers, notwithstanding the most courageous resistance on their part; and, having conquered the work, they marched resolutely towards the trenches, to attack and destroy them. They had already entered, when marshal Lefebvre, who, at the first noise of this sortie, had promptly assembled a battalion of the 44th, sprung upon the Prussians, sword in hand, and, in the midst of a shower of bullets, hurled them out of the trenches, driving them at the bayonet's point as far as the glacis of Hagelsberg. But, arrived there, he was forced to retire under a storm of grape. The Prussians lost in this action about 300 men. It cost the French fifteen officers and 100 soldiers, as well Saxons as French.

From this time, the mound on the left was abandoned by the enemy. It was finally connected with the French trenches, and they then proceeded with new works beyond the second parallel. Their labours were continued in the same way on that traced out in front of Bischoffsberg, the object of which has already been pointed out.

These three days of fighting had greatly retarded the works of the siege, inasmuch as the trenches being incessantly threatened, they were forced to employ their best soldiers in guarding them. The following days were occupied in finishing the second parallel, in enlarging it, establishing in it a *place d'armes* for the lodgement of the troops on guard, and preparing for fixing the batteries, while waiting the arrival of the heavy guns; and the same cares were bestowed on the parallel for the false attack undertaken in front of Bischoffsberg. Two fresh regiments having come up by order of Napoleon, were very attentive to the operations of this great siege. These were, one the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, and the other the 12th light infantry, which had been momentarily detached from Thorn and sent to Dantzick. At the same time, Napoleon had commanded marshal Mortier, who had just terminated the affair of the armistice with the Swedes, to lead his troops on by Stettin to Dantzick, and he was to unite in the island of Nogath the elements of the infantry reserve, which was to be under command of marshal Lannes. There was thus every expectation of strong support.

The besieging army being provided with two new French regiments, it was now able to invest the place completely, and to continue the projected operations on the Vistula, by moving general Schramm forward from the heights of Heubude to the island of Holm, which was becoming the more urgent, as the enemy communicated daily through the fort of Weichselmünde with the sea, and thereby received supplies of men and stores. Consequently, on the 15th April, general Gardanne, who had assumed the command of the troops posted on the Nehrung, descended the course of the Vistula with these troops and some reinforcements which had been sent to him, and took up a position alongside the canal of Laake between Dantzick and the fort of Weichselmünde, at 700 toises' distance from the glacis of that fortress. He was posted in such a manner as to

intercept at once the navigation of the canal and that of the Vistula itself somewhat later, when the troops at head-quarters should join their fire to his, on coming down by their left, along the bank of the river. At first this operation met with no opposition, except from the redoubts on the island of Holm. But marshal Kalkreuth, soon perceiving the importance of the enterprise, resolved to make the utmost efforts to keep up his communications with the sea. The 16th April, 3000 Russians with 2000 Prussians sallied out at the same time, the former from the fortress of Weichselmünde, and the latter from Dantzick, to the attack of the French troops, who had not yet had time to establish themselves firmly in the Nehrung and at the entrance of the canal. A most vehement struggle commenced on the side of Weichselmünde with the Russians, and fortunately a little before the Prussians had issued from Dantzick. They were driven back to the glacis of the fort, after sustaining considerable loss. Scarcely had the French finished with these than they had to begin afresh with the Prussians, which was neither a long nor difficult task ; for the French auxiliaries behaved most valiantly. The enemy lost in all 500 or 600 men killed or prisoners. The besiegers losing about 200.

After the battle, the French establishment upon the Lower Vistula and in the Nehrung seemed secured. They nevertheless applied themselves in consolidating it. They raised a double breastwork of earth, so as to shelter themselves at once from the fort as well as the place, and extended it so far as to join it on one side to the river, and on the other to the woods which covered this part of the Nehrung. Large stockades rendered these woods almost inaccessible. A strong blockhouse was placed in the midst of the French intrenchments. To these precautions was added a guard of small vessels on the canal and on the river, which was to obstruct any embarkation of the enemy, either for ascending or descending the Vistula. While these works were in execution on the right bank, the troops at head-quarters on the left bank, coming down from the heights to the banks of the Vistula, had constructed some redoubts there, so as to cross their fire with that of the troops established in the Nehrung. On this side they were protected by a bulwark of gabions 200 toises in length. A brave officer, named Tardiville, was posted with 100 men in a house on the bank of the Vistula, and maintained himself there, in spite of the projectiles of the enemy, with such obstinacy, that the house went by his name during the whole of the siege. It remained now to conquer the island of Holm, in order to render the investment complete and final. But in the meanwhile the enemy's ships came up as far as Dantzick only with difficulty. Several barks had, in fact, been captured, and a corvette having tried to come up the Vistula, was stopped by the fire from both banks. The soldiers, led on by an engineer officer, Lesecq, had leaped the intrenchments, openly showed themselves on the river's bank, and by pouring in on her their musketry fire, compelled her to retire. Captain Lesecq had his sword carried away by a shot, without being struck himself.

The 20th of April had arrived. The French had now been six weeks before the place, and the trenches had been opened for the last twenty days. The heavy artillery had just arrived, part from Breslau, part from Stettin, and part from Thorn and Warsaw. Ammunition in sufficient quantities was still wanting. The French were, however, able to open a fire from the batteries of the first and second parallels. Every thing was arranged for commencing on the 20th, when a frightful equinoctial gale, bringing torrents of snow, filled the trenches and interrupted the works. Two days were necessary to get rid of this, and the soldiers obliged to bivouac in the open air in so rude a climate, rendered more than usually so by the long winter, had to undergo great suffering. At last, on the night of the 23rd, fifty-eight pieces of cannon, consisting of mortars, howitzers, and twenty-four and twelve pounders, opened their fire at once, and continued to play upon the place during the whole of the 24th. The enemy's artillery, which had reserved itself to make head against the French, replied briskly and with accuracy. But after some hours of this mutual cannonading, that of the French being directed in a superior manner by general Lariboissière, a great number of the enemy's embrasures were ruined, many of his guns dismounted, and a violent conflagration, caused by the howitzer shot from the batteries of the false attack, broke out in the interior of the city. Columns of smoke, rising to the height of the largest edifices, gave evidence of the sad ravages the French had made. Marshal Kalkreuth, nevertheless, succeeded in extinguishing the fire by means of the water with which the city was abundantly supplied. He did not appear in the least daunted. Next day, the 25th, marshal Lefebvre, to sound his intentions, gave notice that he was about to fire with red-hot shot. To this no answer was given. The fire was then recommenced from all the guns with greater energy, and another fire was kindled, but again extinguished by the efforts of the garrison and the inhabitants. The violent fire from the artillery drawing upon itself nearly all the enemy's projectiles, had produced a diversion favourable to the works of approach, which, becoming thus more easy, advanced more rapidly. By dint of the devotion of the corps of engineers, digging away the sand in the midst of the balls, which were overturning the sappings and carrying away the gabions and bags of earth, they pushed the zigzags as far as the third parallel, and at length opened their flying sap in the night between the 25th and 26th.

On that between the 26th and 27th a great portion of this last parallel was traced under cover of the combat going on between the batteries. Unfortunately, the French did not possess a sufficiency of cannon and ammunition. They were scarcely firing 2000 shot a day, while their adversaries were discharging 3000. They had many iron pieces, which were nobly handled by the artillerymen, and did as much injury as the enemy's projectiles. The soldiers, however, made up all their inferiority by the accuracy of their aim. The enemy, on the 27th, again resolved on the offensive by making sallies. Taking advantage of the still unfinished state of the third parallel, he determined to destroy those works; and all at once, towards seven in the evening, he ceased his

fire. This indicated to the French some undertaking on the side of the besieged. Several companies of the 12th light infantry, which had recently joined, were posted to the right and left behind breastworks which concealed them. Six hundred Prussian grenadiers, followed by a working party of 200 men, advanced upon the parallel, still imperfect as it was, and easy of access. A picquet couched on the ground, having perceived them, retired so as to suffer them to advance into it. The companies of the 12th light infantry then sprang upon them suddenly, charged them with the bayonet in the ditch, and engaged in a hand-to-hand combat. The struggle was a murderous one; but they were driven out, 120 of their number remained on the ground killed or wounded, some were taken prisoners, and the remainder driven at the point of the bayonet to the very glacis of the place.

Marshal Kalkreuth demanded a suspension of arms for two hours, to carry off his killed and wounded. Marshal Lefebvre granted this by the advice of the engineers and artillery, who were glad of this suspension of arms, as it would enable them to make some reconnoissances. Generals Lariboissière and Chasseloup immediately repaired beneath the walls of the place to look out for positions from which they might with more certainty destroy the works of the besieged. Their observations being finished, they again went to work, and busied themselves in establishing new batteries on the points they had made choice of, taking care to connect them with the trenches.

On the night from the 28th to the 29th, the enemy made another sally with a column of 2000 men divided into three detachments. As on the evening before, he marched right upon the third parallel, the works of which he seemed resolved at any rate to interrupt. Two companies of the 19th of the line, at sight of the first detachment, threw themselves on it with the bayonet, and drove it close up to the glacis of Hagelsberg; but being received there by a very brisk fire from the covered way, and being surrounded by the second detachment, which they had not perceived, they lost forty men. Nevertheless, they were supported and fortunately rescued in time. The enemy, on being driven back, left 70 killed and 130 prisoners.

These strong attempts on the third parallel did not hinder the besiegers from finishing the work, prolonging it to the right and to the left, and mounting the batteries upon it. Fresh convoys, just arrived, enabled them to place more than twenty-four pieces of heavy calibre in battery. Thenceforth the fire of the artillery was redoubled, and at length outlets were commenced from the third parallel so as to bear on the salient angles of Hagelsberg. This work was composed of two bastions, between which was a half moon. The approach was made towards the left hand bastion, and towards the projection of the half moon. The works of advance were now become dreadfully murderous. The enemy, who had reserved the greatest resources of his artillery for the end of the siege, directed the larger part upon the works. The engineers saw their sappings overturned, and the loose sand which they threw up driven back into the trenches by the force of the numerous projectiles hurled against them. Their constancy, working in the midst of all these dangers, was invincible. The infantry, on their side, underwent great fatigue; for the nearer they approached the place, the more requisite it became to guard the trenches by the most experienced soldiers. Of every forty-eight hours they passed twenty-four either in working themselves or in protecting those at work. The besiegers, therefore, advanced at this period with great slowness. Marshal Lefebvre, who began to lose patience, found fault with every one; with the engineers, whose combinations he did not understand, with the artillery, whose efforts he did not appreciate, and, above all, with the auxiliaries, who rendered him much less service than the French did. The Saxons fought well enough, but did not evince much good-will, particularly at work. The Badenese were neither good at work nor under fire. The Poles of the new levies had zeal enough, but no warlike habits. The soldiers of the legion of the north were ready enough in any attack, but quailed at the least resistance. As all these auxiliaries were inclined to desertion, care was taken to provision them from the magazines at head-quarters, so as not to allow them to stray into the neighbouring villages; by which means they were necessarily much better fed than the French, although they were far from being equally serviceable. Marshal Lefebvre spoke of them in most outrageous terms, declared incessantly they were fit for nothing but to eat, and treated the arguments of the engineers as gibberish, averring that he could do more with the shoulders of his grenadiers. He wanted absolutely to put an end to the siege by means of a general assault.

This project was rash, for the French were still far from the works of the place, and in leaping into the ditch they would have to encounter those redoubtable palisades which at Dantzick took the place of escarpments of masonry. The engineers, as is common in sieges, did not accord with the artillery. They accounted for the tardiness of their approaches by the shifting nature of the soil, the insufficient protection they received from the artillery, and the small number they had of good workmen. The artillery rejoined that they had too few guns, and were too short of ammunition to equal the fire of the enemy, and that they could not do better than they did. The marshal, consequently, in order to put them all into agreement together, proposed to finish it by making an assault, even before the completion of the works of approach. The engineers, who had lost many men in these works, replied, that if the artillery would, by a ricochet battery, overthrow a certain portion of these palisades, they would willingly lead the infantry to the assault of Hagelsberg. But as the Russians had, by their impatience, in 1724, lost 5000 men in an attempt of the same kind, before Dantzick, no one dared rashly to risk any similar undertaking without the orders of the emperor.

He was, fortunately, thirty leagues away, and his reply could not reach in less than forty-eight hours. He might even have gone to give it in person, had not the presence of the king of Prussia and the emperor of Russia, at their head-quarters

at Bartenstein, given him cause to apprehend some enterprise on their parts against his winter quarters. As soon as he received the letter of marshal Lefebvre, he hastened to moderate the ardour of that old soldier by addressing him a strong reprimand. He reproached him keenly for his impatience, and his contempt of a science he was ignorant of, and for the bad terms in which he had spoken of the auxiliaries. "You only know," he wrote to him, "how to complain, to abuse our allies, and to change opinion with the taste of every new-comer. You want troops: I have sent you some. I am preparing to send you more, and, ungrateful as you are, you keep complaining, without ever dreaming of thanking me. You treat the allies, particularly the Poles and the Badenese, without any consideration. They are not accustomed to fire, but that usage will come to them. Do you think we were as brave in 1792 as we are at present, after fifteen years of war? Feel, then, old soldier as you are, some indulgence for young soldiers, just breaking in, who have not yet learned your coolness in the midst of danger. The prince of Baden, who is with you, (this prince had put himself at the head of his troops, and was assisting at the siege of Dantzick,) has quitted the luxuries of his court to lead his troops to battle. Show regard, therefore, towards him, and let him see you appreciate a zeal which but few of his equals imitate. The breasts of your grenadiers, which you want to exhibit every where, will not throw down walls. You must leave that to your engineers, and listen to the counsels of general Chasseloup, who is a clever man, and from whom you should not withdraw your confidence upon the report of the first little critic who presumes to meddle with what he cannot comprehend. Reserve the courage of your grenadiers for the moment when science points out that it can be usefully employed, and in the mean time learn to have patience. The loss of a few days, which I cannot, besides, at this time make any use of, are not equal to the loss of some thousands of men, which you would cause, and whose lives should be economized. Show that calmness, reflection, and steadiness, befitting your age. Your glory is to be found by capturing Dantzick; take that place, and you shall be satisfied with me!"

More than this was not necessary to calm the marshal. He therefore resigned himself to letting the operations of the siege be continued according to the rules of art. Although the encampment had been advanced from the Nehrung to the Lower Vistula, and the passage of the canal and of the river had been barred, yet the investment could not be complete but by taking the island of Holm, and it was also by the capture of that island alone that a crowd of redoubts could be destroyed, particularly that of Kalke-Schanze, which took the French trenches in reverse, incommoded them with its fire, and slackened their progress, on account of the traverses which they were obliged to add to their works. Without having such a sufficiency of troops as was desirable to push the siege on rapidly, the French had nevertheless enough to make an attempt on the island of Holm. The night of the 6th of May was dedicated to this undertaking. Orders were given to general Gardanne to concur on his side, by bearing towards the canal of Laake, and passing it on rafts. Eight hundred men, coming down the banks of the Vistula from the left of the head-quarters, would have to cross the river twice, and to execute the chief attack. At ten o'clock at night twelve barks were brought opposite the village of Schellmühl, without being descried by the enemy. At one o'clock at night, these barks, carrying detachments of the regiment of the guard of Paris, of the 2nd and 12th light infantry, with fifty engineers, quitted the left bank, and landed on the island of Holm. The enemy directed several discharges of grape upon this embarkation. Notwithstanding the fire, the troops jumped on shore. The grenadiers of the guard of Paris sprang on the nearest redoubt without discharging a musket, and carried it from the Russians, who defended it. At the same moment 100 men of the 2nd light infantry and 100 of the 12th, darted in like manner up to two other redoubts, one constructed on the point of the island, and the other a house called the White house. They stood a first discharge, but then marched up so quickly, that in a few minutes the redoubts were conquered and the Russians taken. The French sprang with similar rapidity on the other works, and, in half an hour, occupied half the island, and had made 500 prisoners. Whilst this operation was thus quickly achieving, the twelve barks employed in the passage of the Vistula brought over a second column, composed of the Badenese and the soldiers of the legion of the north, which took to the right and bore away for that part of the island that looks over against the city of Dantzick. These troops, animated by the example just given them by the French, threw themselves boldly on the enemy's posts, surprised them, disarmed them, and carried off in an instant 200 men and 200 horses of the artillery. General Gardanne, on his part, had crossed into the island by clearing the canal of Laake. Thenceforth this important conquest was certain.

There was now a favourable opportunity for possessing that very troublesome redoubt, Kalke-Schanze, which had been taken and lost in the commencement of the siege. This redoubt, surrounded by water, opening by a cut towards the side of the island of Holm, owed its chief strength to the support it received from that island. At the same moment that two French columns were invading the island of Holm, a detachment of Saxons and of soldiers of the legion of the north, led by the chief of battalion, Roumette, entered the ditches of the redoubt with the water up to their armpits, threw themselves on the palisades, cleared them, and, in spite of a warm fire, remained masters of the work, in which they took 180 Prussians, 4 officers, and several pieces of cannon.

This course of sudden attack gave 600 prisoners and 17 guns to the French, and cost the enemy 600 in killed and wounded, and, above all, procured possession of the island of Holm, relieving the trenches from that destructive fire. Thanks to the rapidity of the execution, the French loss was very insignificant.

The works of approach were now arrived at the projection of the half moon. A circular trench had been opened which embraced this projection,

and faced it as well to the right as to the left. The moment was come for giving orders for the attack on the covered way. By this name is known the inner edge of the ditch along which the besieged pass and defend themselves under cover of a range of lower palisades. In the night between the 7th and 8th, a detachment of the 19th of the line and of the 12th light infantry, preceded by fifty engineers, armed with axes and shovels, and under the command of the engineer officers, Barthélemy and Beaulieu, and the infantry chief of battalion, Bertrand, issued forth by the two extremities of the circular trench, and advanced sharply on the covered way. A hail-storm of bullets welcomed this detachment. The engineers, marching at their head, threw themselves, axe in hand, upon the palisades, and cut away some of them. The foot soldiers, penetrating after them into the covered way, traversed it under the showers of grape which poured from the walls of the place. They then made for the strong block-houses, which had been constructed in the receding angles of the wall. But they sustained here so brisk a fire of musketry that they were forced to retreat to the projection of the half moon. The covered way did not, however, the less remain in their possession. During this time the miners had been running about on all sides to discover if any mines had been commenced, and, according to custom, so disposed as to blow up the ground acquired by the besiegers. A sergeant of engineers having, in fact, perceived the shaft of a mine in the projection of the half moon, threw himself into it, sabre in hand, found a dozen Prussians working in the branches, and, taking advantage of the terror which his sudden appearance caused them, made the whole of them prisoners. He then destroyed all their work. The name of this brave man, which deserves to be recorded, was Chopot.

The assault of the covered way, which is always one of the most sanguinary operations of regular sieges, cost 17 killed and 76 wounded, a large loss, when the small number of men employed on so confined a space of ground is considered. Become masters of the covered way of the half moon, the French were established on the bank of the ditch. They had still to descend afterwards to overthrow the range of large palisades, and then to carry by assault the turfed slopes which stood in place of escarpments of masonry. These were by no means easy tasks. They had, moreover, to execute, at the projection of the left bastion, the same operation as had just been carried out on that of the half moon, so that they might not have grape shot poured in upon them from this bastion, when they should attack the half moon itself.

Being thus established in the ditch, they covered themselves by precautions in the ordinary manner, and continued their underground ways towards the left, to approach the projection of the bastion. The 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th days of May were employed in this labour, which was become fearfully dangerous, for, at such a proximity, the balls of the enemy overturned the sappings, penetrated the trenches, carried away men, and often crushed them with the very breastworks they had so laboriously raised. Musketry was scarcely less terrible at this distance than artillery. The sand the soldiers threw out was scattered every moment, and they had repeatedly to recommence the same works. The nights becoming shorter in May, as every body knows that the nearer an approach is made to the pole the longer are the nights in winter and the shorter in summer, they were at length left scarcely four hours for working out of the twenty-four. Marshal Lefebvre increasing in his impatience, instantly demanded that the assault should be rendered practicable by the demolition of the line of palisades in the bottom of the ditch. The engineers said, that that was the business of the artillery by their ricochet firing. The artillery, fearing lest the ground should be undermined, replied, that there was not space enough for their batteries. The difficulty met with here was a proof of the defensive properties of timber, for, having reached the bank of the ditch, if they had found in front a wall of masonry instead of a range of palisades, they might have established a breaching battery, have battered down such a wall in forty-eight hours, filled the ditch with its wreck, and mounted to the assault. But ball merely shattered the tops of some of these palisades, often scarcely splintered them, and never uprooted one. The decisive moment was approaching, and extreme was the impatience displayed. The besiegers had reached that period of a siege when the besieged are making their last efforts at resistance, and when the besiegers, to put an end to it, are disposed to attempt the most daring attacks.

But on a sudden news was spread among the besieged as well as the besiegers that a Russian army was coming to the relief of Dantzick. In fact, this assistance had long since been promised, and it was only to be wondered at that it had not arrived. The sovereigns of Prussia and Russia, then together at their head-quarters, knew what a danger Dantzick was in. They were not ignorant of what importance it was to them to hinder its conquest; for so long as they could hold this place, they were keeping the left of Napoleon in check, and were rendering his position on the Vistula precarious, obliging him to deprive himself of the assistance of 25,000 men, employed either in a blockade or siege, and, in fact, shutting out from him the greatest depôt of sustenance which existed in the north. If they intended, sooner or later, to resume the offensive, it was worth while to hasten the accomplishment of its relief from so important a motive. There were two direct means by which they could relieve Dantzick; one by attacking Napoleon upon the Passarge, so as to deprive him of the positions he occupied to cover the siege; the other was to dispatch a considerable corps, either by land, following along the Nehrung, or by sea, embarking their troops at Kœnigsberg, and disembarking them at the fortress of Weichselmünde. There was besides a third method, but which did not depend on them, this was the landing of 25,000 English,—a landing which had been a hundred times promised, and as many times announced, but never executed. It is certain, that if the English had kept faith with their allies, and instead of keeping one portion of their forces in England, to show face against the encampment at Boulogne, and sending another to

Alexandria to lay hands upon Egypt, and a third to the banks of La Plata, there to seize the Spanish colonies; they had landed an army either at Stralsund or at Dantzick, while there were scarcely three or four French regiments dispersed about Pomerania, they might have changed the course of events, or at least have caused the French great embarrassment. Napoleon would, in short, have found himself forced to detach 20,000 men from the grand army; and if he had been attacked at that moment on the Passarge, he would have been deprived of an important portion of his forces necessary to make head against the principal Russian army.

But the English did not care about coming to the assistance of their allies. Setting foot on the continent frightened them too much. To employ their troops in the capture of colonies was more convenient to them. A change of ministry besides, of which we shall show the causes and effects, rendered all resolutions uncertain at the court of London. The only assistance sent to Dantzick was that of three corvettes laden with ammunition, and commanded by intrepid officers, who were ordered to pass up the Vistula, and penetrate into the place at all risks.

Any efficacious assistance to Dantzick could therefore only be relied on from the Prussian and Russian troops. The two sovereigns, united at Bartenstein, there deliberated with their generals, and found the greatest trouble in bringing them to terms of agreement. One reason, the want of provisions, opposed that project, which would have been otherwise most suitable, and which consisted in immediately resuming active operations. The spring was not as yet sufficiently advanced for the earth to afford sustenance for men or horses. They had few magazines; at the very utmost they could furnish corn and meat for the men, but as for the horses, they were reduced to give them the thatch from the peasants' huts in Old Prussia for provender. It was determined, therefore, to wait till the grass was enough grown to feed the horses. It was the same cause which kept Napoleon on the Passarge. But he had no important place to save; every day, on the contrary, was bringing him fresh strength, that would permit him to make another step towards Dantzick.

In this situation the two allied sovereigns adopted the most paltry plan of assistance, and resolved on sending about 10,000 men, half by the tongue of land of the Nehrung, and half by sea and the fortress of Weichselmünde. The project was to force the line of investment, to carry the French camp on the Nehrung, and opening upon that encampment either from the fort of Weichselmünde or from the Nehrung itself by the road from Kœnigsberg, to penetrate thence into the island of Holm, to re-establish communications with Dantzick, to enter the place, and, succeeding in all these operations, to make a general sortie against the besieging forces, to destroy their works, and compel them to raise the siege. For all this much more than 10,000 men would be necessary, and, above all, they must be skilfully conducted.

A corps of Prussians and Russians, composed in great part of cavalry, under the conduct of colonel Bulow, were to cross in boats the strait of Pillau, to land on the point of the Nehrung, and make way along this narrow bank of sand for the twenty leagues which separated Pillau from Dantzick. Eight thousand men, for the greater part Russians, were embarked at Pillau, on board transport vessels, and escorted by English men of war as far as the fortress of Weichselmünde. They were under the orders of general Kamenski, the son of that old general who had for a time commanded the Russian army in the beginning of the winter campaign. Being arrived on the 12th of May at the mouth of the Vistula, they were disembarked upon the outer jetties under the protection of the guns of Weichselmünde. At the same time demonstrations had been made against the French winter-quarters. The passage of the Bug in front of Massena was affected, as if they were desirous of acting at the other extremity of the theatre of war. Numerous patroles were stationed all round in front of the French cantonments on the Passarge. At length the corps destined to march along the Nehrung fell rapidly upon the detached posts which the French had at one extremity of this bank of sand, and compelled them to fall back.

The assembling of the two corps at Pillau, which were by different routes to march to the assistance of Dantzick, was become known. Reports from the besieged place had confirmed the news from Pillau, and that was enough to throw marshal Lefebvre into the greatest anxiety. He hastened, without even having recourse to the emperor, to call to his aid general Oudinot, who was in the island of Nogath with the division of grenadiers, which was to form part of the corps of reserve intended for marshal Lannes. He at the same time wrote on every side for assistance from the chiefs of the troops posted in his neighbourhood.

But Napoleon, to whom twenty-four hours were sufficient to dispatch a courier from Finkenstein to Dantzick, had beforehand provided for all this. He reprimanded marshal Lefebvre, though gently, for this mode of acting. He re-assured him by news of early aid, which, being prepared long before, could not fail to arrive in time. Napoleon was but little affected by the puerile demonstrations on his right; for he knew too well how to discern between the feints and real objects of warfare to be deceived by them. He had besides soon learnt from certain sources that they were all confined to directing a strong detachment upon Dantzick, either by land or sea, and he had proportioned his precautions to the magnitude of the danger.

Marshal Mortier, become wholly disposable by the defensive conclusion of the armistice with the Swedes, had received orders to hasten his march, and for a portion of his forces to precede him to Dantzick. In consequence of this order, the 72nd of the line had just arrived at the camp of marshal Lefebvre, at the time of his greatest agitation. The reserve of marshal Lannes, prepared in the island of Nogath, was beginning to form itself, and, in the mean time, the fine division of Oudinot's grenadiers, which was its nucleus, had been posted between Marienburg and Dirschau, two or three marches from Dantzick. The 3rd of the line, drawn from Braunau, 3400 men strong, was also stationed in the island of Nogath. The

resources were therefore fully sufficient. Napoleon ordered one of the brigades of general Oudinot to march upon Furstenwerder, there to throw a bridge over and hold itself in readiness to cross that arm of the Vistula which separates the island of Nogath from the Nehrung. The cavalry being principally spread about the pasturages of the Lower Vistula, in the environs of Elbing, he ordered general Beaumont to take a thousand dragoons, and repairing to Furstenwerder, to permit the enemy's corps, which was marching along the Nehrung, to proceed, and to cut it off when it should have passed Furstenwerder, taking as many prisoners as he was able. He enjoined marshal Lannes to march upon Dantzick with Oudinot's grenadiers, and not to fatigue his troops by employing them in the works of the siege, but to keep them in reserve, to fall upon the Russians the moment they should attempt to set foot on the land in the neighbourhood of Weichselmünde.

These dispositions, made in good time, thanks to a foresight that was always prepared, had brought around Dantzick more troops than were necessary to face the danger. The Russians had begun their disembarkation on the 12th of May. From the sandy heights which the French occupied, they could distinctly see them on the landing-places of the fortress of Weichselmünde. They were not entirely landed and assembled before Weichselmünde till the evening of the 14th. Repeated despatches, addressed in the interval to marshal Lannes, made him hasten his march; and on the 14th he arrived under the walls of Dantzick with Oudinot's grenadiers, except the two battalions left at Furstenwerder. The 72nd was already in the camp. Marshal Mortier, with the rest of his corps, being a march in the rear.

Marshal Lefebvre, assured by these reinforcements, had sent to general Gardanne, who commanded the encampment of the Lower Vistula, in the Nehrung, the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris; and was waiting, before he dispatched him further assistance, to see the intentions of the Russians more clearly unfolded, for they might yet issue forth from the fort of Weichselmünde by the right bank, to attack the camp of general Gardanne, or by the left bank, to attack the French head-quarters.

On the 15th of May, at three o'clock in the morning, the Russians came out, to the number of 7000 or 8000 men, from the fortress of Weichselmünde, and marched to the attack of the French positions on the Nehrung. These positions commenced at the point of the island of Holm where the canal of Laake joins itself to the Vistula, and extended, in the form of a palisaded breastwork, as far as the wood which covered this portion of the Nehrung, being protected in that place by numbers of felled trees, and ending in the downs of sand along the sea shore. General Schramm, being now under the orders of general Gardanne, defended this line with a battalion of the 2nd light infantry, a detachment of the regiment of the guard of Paris, a Saxon battalion, a party of the 19th chasseurs, and some Polish horse, under captain Sokolniki, who, it has been already seen, distinguished himself at this siege. General Gardanne continued in the rear with the remainder of his troops, that he might repair either to the assistance of the corps in defence of the entrenchments, or ward off any sortie that might be made from the place. Marshal Lefebvre, perceiving from the heights of Zigankenberg, the movements of the Russians, had sent him early in the morning a battalion of the 12th light infantry. Shortly after marshal Lannes had himself set out, with four battalions of Oudinot's division, and had made his way along the dykes that traversed the flat country situated to the French right, the engineers not having yet been able to establish a bridge towards the left, to communicate directly with the camp of the Nehrung, by the Lower Vistula.

The Russians advanced in three columns, one directed along the Vistula, in front of the French redoubts, the second against the woods and stockades which secured the access to them, and the third, composed of cavalry, destined to skirt the sea shore. A fourth remained in reserve, to render assistance to any of the three that might need it. The English corvettes, arrived at the same time, were on their side to sail up the Vistula, to destroy the bridges supposed to exist across it, to take the French works in reverse, and to second the movements of the Russians by the fire of 60 pieces of large cannon. But the wind was against this arrangement, and the corvettes were detained at the mouth of the Vistula.

The Russian columns marched vigorously up to the attack of the French positions. The soldiers posted in rear of the earthen entrenchments awaited them with coolness, till they could pour their fire close in upon them. The Russians were not broken, and approached the very foot of the redoubts, but without being able to clear them. As each attempt was repulsed the French leaped over the entrenchments, and pursued the Russians with the bayonet. The column which had directed itself on the stockades of felled timber, having a less compact obstacle to surmount, endeavoured to penetrate into the wood, and to establish itself there. It was stopped, however, like the other, but returned to the charge, and kept up a series of combats hand to hand with the French. The struggle at this point was long and obstinate. The column of horse, which was to skirt the sea shore, remained in observation of the French detachments of cavalry, without making any important movement. The action continued during several hours, and the French troops employed in the defence of the works not numbering above 2000 men, in the face of 7000 or 8000, for general Gardanne was obliged to guard against any sallies from the place with the rest, were quite exhausted, and must have ended by yielding to these reiterated attacks, had not a battalion of the guard of Paris, sent by general Gardanne, and the battalion of the 12th light infantry, dispatched from head-quarters, brought them decisive aid. These brave battalions, directed by general Schramm, fell upon the Russians and repulsed them. The others, reanimated by this example, rushed on them again, and they were driven back to the very glacis of the fortress of Weichselmünde.

In the mean time, general Kamenski had given orders that the utmost endeavours should be made for the relief of Dantzick. He was resolved not to shut himself up in the fort without making a last attempt. To the troops which had just come from

the battle, he united the reserve, which had not hitherto been engaged, and he advanced anew towards the French entrenchments, which had been before so warmly but so fruitlessly attacked. It was, however, too late. Marshal Lannes and general Oudinot had brought up a reinforcement of four battalions of grenadiers to general Schramm. One single battalion of these was enough to put an end to the contest. General Oudinot placed himself at the head of this battalion, rallied around him the mass of the troops, and, leading them on, overthrew the Russians, once more driving them back, at the bayonet's point, as far as the glacis of the fortress of Weichselmünde, into which he compelled them to shut themselves up definitively. This action was, as it well might be, the last.

The Russians left 2000 men on the field of battle, the greater part killed or wounded, and some prisoners. The French loss was 300 men put *hors de combat*. General Oudinot had his horse killed by a shot, which, passing between him and marshal Lannes, nearly killed the latter. The moment, however, had not then come, in which this illustrious marshal was to fall, under such repeated exploits. Fate, before striking him down for ever, still had some brilliant days in store for him.

Thenceforth marshal Lefebvre felt no further uneasiness, and marshal Kalkreuth no more hope. The commanders of the corvettes sent from England to the relief of Dantzick, however, still endeavoured to fulfil their instructions. The place being in great want of ammunition, the captain of the Dauntless resolved to take advantage of a strong breeze from the north, to come up the Vistula. But he had scarcely passed the fortress of Weichselmünde, when he was assailed with a violent discharge of artillery. The troops, marching out of their entrenchments, and joining the fire of their musketry to that of the cannon, soon put the English corvette in such a condition, that she was beyond management. She ran aground upon a sand-bank, and was compelled to strike her flag. She contained a large quantity of powder, and dispatches for marshal Kalkreuth.

The place was now left entirely to itself. The operations of the siege unfortunately became day by day more difficult. The French had obtained a lodgment on the very bank of the ditch, and had already decided on undertaking its descent, but the nature of the ground, which crumbled away incessantly, and the immense force of artillery at the disposal of the enemy, which permitted his overwhelming the trenches with his shells, rendered the work as slow as it was dangerous. At any cost, however, the bottom of the ditch was now to be reached, so as to go, with axe in hand, and cut away a sufficient range of the palisading to admit of the passing through of the columns of attack. The French began, therefore, to descend the ditch by making use of blinded passages, that is, advancing under frames covered with earth and fascines. The bombs of the enemy several times burst through these blinds, and crushed those who were beneath. But nothing could discourage the corps of engineers. Out of 600 men of this arm, nearly 300 had fallen. Half its officers were either killed or wounded. Among the number of obstacles to surmount was the blockhouse, constructed in the retreating angle which was formed by the half moon with the bastion. It was determined to blow this up by mining, as it resisted shot. A mine, which had not been driven sufficiently close to the blockhouse, was sprung, and buried it with earth, but rendered it still more difficult to destroy. The French then established themselves in the tunnel of the mine, threw out the earth with which the blockhouse was surrounded, under fire of the enemy, and then set it on fire, by which means they at last succeeded in getting rid of it.

Having reached the bottom of the ditch, several of the engineers endeavoured to advance, even under the strong fire of the place, and cut down the palisades. It took them half an hour to cut down three. The operation was thus becoming still longer and more murderous. The 18th of May had arrived. For forty-eight days the trenches had been opened. Not the least reproach could be attached to the engineers, who had conducted themselves with the utmost devotion. Some slanderers were willing to lay the blame of the slow progress of the siege on general Chasseloup. General Kirgener, who was second in command in the works, and who had formed other ideas as to choosing the points for attack, did not cease repeating to marshal Lefebvre that Hagelsberg had been ill chosen, and he declared that was the only cause of all the delay which they had experienced. He repeated this so often that marshal Lefebvre ended by believing him, and wrote to the emperor, complaining of general Chasseloup, and attributing the prolonged resistance of the place to the ill choice made for the point of attack, adding that Bischoffsberg would have presented fewer difficulties.

Complaint at this time could not have remedied any thing, even had it been as well as it was ill-founded. But Napoleon, who never ceased watching the siege, did not withold his instant reply. "I thought you had," he writes to marshal Lefebvre, "more character and more opinion. Is it at the end of a siege that you will suffer yourself to be persuaded by inferiors? if you change the point of attack, you discourage the army thereby and condemn your own judgment. Hagelsberg is well chosen. By Hagelsberg it is that Dantzick has always been attacked. Give your confidence to Chasseloup, who is the most skilful and most experienced of your engineers. Take the advice of him and of Lariboissière, and drive away from your presence all petty critics."

Marshal Lefebvre was thus obliged to persist in the first choice, and await the slow but sure effects of a science to which he was a stranger. The engineers, so persevering, had reached on one side the bottom of the ditch of the half moon, and on the other that of the ditch of the bastion, and were forced, from the narrow space in which they were working, to continue their labours under the fire of bombs, and themselves to defend the works against the sorties of the place. At length, in the front of the left bastion, which they attacked at the same time as the half moon, they had, by means of burning with fascines, blowing up with bags of powder, as well as with their axes, destroyed the palisading to the extent of ninety feet. This was enough to give a passage to the columns of attack. The moment was impatiently

waited for by the troops. The evening of the 21st of May was fixed on for the assault. Several columns, to the number of 4000 men, were led into the ditch, and conducted in succession to the foot of the earth-slope, which rose beyond the palisades, so that they might perceive beforehand the work they had to scale and be taught the mode of climbing it. Filled with enthusiasm at the view, they demanded with loud cries to be permitted to rush on to the assault. Three enormous beams, suspended by ropes at the top of the earthen slopes, were ready to roll down upon the assailants. A brave soldier, whose name history gives as François Valle, a chasseur of the 12th light infantry, who had on several occasions assisted the working engineers in tearing away the palisades, offered to go and cut the ropes which kept up these beams, so that their fall might take place previous to the assault. He seized an axe, climbed up the turfy slope, cut the ropes, and was only struck by a ball just as he completed this heroic act. Let us add that he was not struck mortally.

At length the hour of assault approached, when all at once it was learnt with regret that marshal Kalkreuth had asked leave to capitulate.

In point of fact, colonel Lacoste had presented himself as envoy, to deliver to marshal Kalkreuth the letters addressed to him which had been found on board the English corvette recently captured. His arrival was just in time to give an honourable opportunity to the great Frederick's lieutenant of proposing a capitulation which was now become expedient. The marshal consulted with the colonel, acknowledged the necessity of surrendering, but claimed for the garrison of Dantzick the same conditions which the garrison of Mayence had formerly obtained from him, of not delivering themselves up as prisoners of war, but of marching out of the place without grounding their arms, and only under the engagement of not serving against France for one year. Marshal Lefebvre subscribed to these conditions, for he feared any further prolongation of the siege; but he demanded time to consult Napoleon. The latter was in no such hurry; for he was keeping the Russians in check upon the Passarge; and he would have willingly sacrificed a few days more for the purpose of making prisoners of a whole *corps d'armée*, rather mistrusting the engagement of the enemy's troops not to serve again for a year. He expressed, therefore, a certain degree of regret, but consented to the proposed capitulation, ordering marshal Lefebvre to acquaint marshal Kalkreuth, that it was out of consideration for him, for his age, for his glorious services, and for the courteous manner in which he had treated the French, that he granted him such easy terms. The capitulation was signed and executed on the 26th.

On the morning of the 28th, marshal Lefebvre entered the place. He had offered marshal Lannes, and also marshal Mortier, who had arrived some days, to enter with him; but the two latter would not dispute an honour which belonged to him, and which he had gained, if not by his knowledge, at least by his courage and his perseverance in living for two months in these formidable trenches. He therefore made his entry at the head of detachments from all the troops that had been engaged in the siege. That of the engineers naturally took the lead. This distinction they were in every respect entitled to, for out of 600 men of their body, about half had been put *hors de combat*. Napoleon himself published immediately the following order of the day:—

"Pinkenstein, May 26, 1807.

"The city of Dantzick has capitulated, and our troops entered it this day at twelve o'clock.

"His majesty expresses his satisfaction with the besieging troops. The sappers have covered themselves with glory."

This memorable siege was a long one, for the place had stood out fifty-one days after the trenches had been opened. Many causes contributed to the length of its resistance. The form of the place; its vast extent; the strength of the besieged garrison, nearly equal to that of the besieging army; the tardy arrival of the heavy artillery, and its insufficiency, which allowed the enemy to reserve his fire up to the moment of the later approaches; the small number of good workmen in a similar proportion to the small number of good troops; the nature of the soil, constantly crumbling under the projectiles; the defensive properties of the timber which could not be destroyed by breaking, and which was obliged to be torn away axe in hand; these, with frightful weather as variable as at the equinox, changing from frosts to torrents of rain,—all these causes repeated, contributed to prolong the siege, which was equally horrible for the besiegers and besieged. Marshal Kalkreuth led forth from his garrison but few of his soldiers. Of 18,320 men, only 7120 came out from Dantzick[1]. There had been 2700 killed, 3400 wounded, 800 prisoners, and 4300 deserters. The old pupil of Frederick had shown himself in this instance worthy of the great school of warfare in which he had been brought up.

Marshal Lefebvre by his bravery, general Chasseloup by his skill, Napoleon by his wonderful foresight, and the troops of the engineering corps by their incredible sacrifices, had all procured this important conquest for the army. Although there was a want of heavy artillery, it was still miraculous, that at such a prodigious distance from the Rhine, and in such a season too, there should have been drawn out of Silesia, out of Prussia, and out of Upper Poland, the materials sufficient for so great a siege. Doubtless it might have been easy for Napoleon to have put an earlier termination to the resistance of Dantzick, by detaching one of his *corps d'armée* from the Passarge or from the Vistula. But he could only have gained such an acceleration at the price of great imprudence; for, according to all probability, he would have been attacked during the siege by the Russian and Prussian armies, and had he been so, the 20,000 men detached to Dantzick would have greatly weakened him. One cannot too much admire the tact with which he chose this position on the Passarge, from whence he could at once cover the siege of Dantzick, and make head against the combined armies which might at any instant present themselves; the tact, moreover, with which he took advantage as well of the troops on

[1] These numbers are taken from statements found in the town.

march as of those returning from Stralsund, and of those of the infantry reserves preparing on the Lower Vistula, to keep up around Dantzick a sufficient force for the operations of the siege; and, above all, the tact with which he quietly awaited the result which he might have compromised in trying to hasten, and which, besides, he had no great interest in advancing; for, not intending to act offensively before June, it mattered little to him that the conquest of Dantzick should not be achieved till the end of May.

The capture of Dantzick, however, was not all that had to be accomplished. The mouth of the Vistula was to be occupied, and the approaches of the sea-shore, in other words the fortress of Weichselmünde was to be taken, which, if well defended, might have required a regular attack, and occasioned a great loss of time. But the moral effect of the conquest of Dantzick caused the surrender of the fortress of Weichselmünde forty-eight hours afterwards. Half the garrison having deserted, the remaining half delivered up the fort, only asking to capitulate on the same terms as the garrison of Dantzick. The road to Nehrung, as far as Pillau, served both for their return to Kœnigsberg. Besides the advantage of assuring to himself a firm basis for operations upon the Vistula, Napoleon acquired an immense quantity of provisions in the city of Dantzick. With much wealth, this city was found to contain 300,000 quintals of grain, and several million bottles of wine of the first quality, which could not but prove to the army in that dull climate as much a subject of rejoicing as a source of health. Napoleon instantly sent his aide-de-camp Rapp, upon whose fidelity he could rely, to take the command at Dantzick, and to prevent the misapplication of these valuables. He himself followed immediately, and passed two days at Dantzick, desirous of judging with his own eyes of the importance of his conquest, of the works which it would be necessary to add so as to render it impregnable, and, in short, of the resources which he might draw from thence for the maintenance of the army.

He at once transported 18,000 quintals of wheat to Elbing, to recruit the exhausted magazines of that city, which had already furnished 80,000 quintals of grain. He dispatched 1,000,000 bottles of wine to the quarters at the Passarge. He inspected all the besieging works, approved what had been done, praised highly general Chasseloup and the attack by Hagelsberg, distributed brilliant rewards to the officers of the army, and promised to indemnify them soon by magnificent gifts for the plunder of which he had so wisely and nobly deprived them in confiding the government of Dantzick to general Rapp. He resolved to create marshal Lefebvre duke of Dantzick, and to annex to the title a handsome estate. He wrote to M. Mollien, ordering him to purchase from the treasury of the army an estate, with proper residence, that should bring in 100,000 livres of clear rental, which should form the appendage to the new dukedom. He moreover commanded M. Mollien to make purchase of some twenty chateaux, belonging formerly to ancient families, and situated as much as possible to the westward, in order that he might present them to those generals who had shed their blood for him; endeavouring by this means to renew the aristocracy of France, as he was renewing the dynasties of Europe, by the blows of his sword, which was become in his hands a sort of magic wand, from whence sprang glory, wealth, and diadems.

He gave the necessary orders for repairing forthwith the works of Dantzick. He placed the 44th and the 19th regiments of the line, which had so much suffered during the siege, in garrison there. He desired that all the provisionary battalions, which should not have time to join the army before the re-commencement of offensive operations, should be assembled together there. To the legion of the north, whose devotion and fatigue had been most extreme, he assigned the custody of the fort of Weichselmünde. He distributed a portion of the German troops in Nehrung. The Saxons, who were good soldiers, but who wanted to serve in the French ranks to make them attached, he directed should rejoin the corps of marshal Lannes, already returned to the Vistula; and the Poles, whom he was desirous of inuring to war, he dispatched to join Mortier's corps, which was also destined for the Vistula. The Italians were left to the blockade of Colberg, the remainder of the Poles to that of the little citadel of Graudentz, points of little importance, but of which he had yet to gain possession.

Napoleon, on his return to Finkenstein, disposed every thing for resuming offensive operations with the beginning of June. The astute negotiations of Austria had only terminated in rendering a solution by arms inevitable. The offer of mediation made by this court, accepted with mistrust and regret, but with a good grace, by Napoleon, had been reported immediately to England, to Prussia, and to Russia. The new cabinet in England, although its policy was far from showing any inclination for peace, could not at its outset exhibit a too strongly marked preference for war. Mr. Canning, in his character of minister for foreign affairs, replied, that Great Britain would willingly accept the mediation of Austria, and follow in the negotiation the example of the allied courts of Prussia and Russia.

The answer of the latter was the least amicable of the three. The emperor Alexander had removed to the head-quarters of his army at Bartenstein, upon the river Alle. He had been there joined by the king of Prussia, who had come from Kœnigsberg to confer with him. The imperial guard, recently set out from St. Petersburgh, with numberless recruits drawn from the more distant provinces of the empire, had brought a reinforcement of 30,000 men to the Russian army, and thus repaired the losses of Pultusk and Eylau. The ridiculous exaggerations of general Benningsen, carried beyond what even the desire of raising the fame of his soldiers, his country, or his sovereign should permit, had deceived the young czar. He almost fancied that he had been the conqueror at Eylau, and he was carried away by the wish of again trying the fate of arms. On the contrary, the king of Prussia, who had, from private communications with Napoleon, carried on through the intermediation of Duroc, been enlightened as to the intentions, somewhat softened down, of the conqueror of Jena, seemed inclined to treat, on condition of the greater part of his kingdom being

restored to him. He could not be blinded by any successes obtained by the coalition. He had seen the principal place of his territories conquered by the French in the very face of the Russian army, reduced too much to oppose it, and he could not persuade himself that it was politic to bring back Napoleon upon the Vistula and the Oder[1]. He was, therefore, inclined for peace. But the emperor Alexander, infatuated by his pretended advantages, to which the taking of Dantzick, nevertheless, gave the most emphatic contradiction, assured king Frederick-William, that before long he should be restored to his whole patrimony without the loss of a province, and that the independence of Germany moreover should be established: that to this end a single battle gained would be enough, for such a victory would decide Austria in their favour; and thus the destruction of Napoleon, and the deliverance of Europe would be effected. Frederick-William allowed himself to be led away by these and other suggestions, similar enough to those by which he had before been seduced at Potsdam; and the mediation of Austria was in reality declined, though apparently accepted. They replied, that they would be delighted to see peace restored to Europe, and so restored by the obliging endeavours of Austria; but they desired to know in the first place upon what basis Napoleon proposed to treat with the allied powers. This evasive answer left no longer any doubt of the continuance of the war; and it gave great displeasure to Austria, who thereby lost the opportunity of making such an interference in the dispute as should terminate it to her own advantage, either by the intervention of her own arms, if Napoleon should sustain any reverse, or by a peace of which she might be the dictatress in case of his continuing successful. She would not, nevertheless, abandon her mediation so as to appear foiled; she communicated the replies she had received to Napoleon, and called upon him to clear away the doubtful points which seemed to prevent the belligerent powers from opening negotiations. M. de Vincent was charged with the conduct of these conferences; but he could only do so by waiting: for while he remained at Warsaw, M. de Talleyrand had rejoined Napoleon at Finkenstein.

This *dénouement* satisfied Napoleon, who had regarded the mediation of Austria with much apprehension. Still persisting in not taking upon himself the refusal of peace, he replied, that he was ready to enter on a course of concessions, provided equivalent restitutions to such as he was willing to make were also made to his allies, Spain, Holland, and Turkey. He added, that they had only to fix upon some place for the assembling of a congress, to which he would dispatch plenipotentiaries without any delay.

But mediation was useless; for it would take months to bring such conferences to any termination whatever; and he hoped, after a few days of fine weather, to put an end to the war.

In fact, all was ready, on both sides, to resume hostilities with the greatest energy. The two sovereigns, assembled at Bartenstein, had contracted the most solemn engagements towards each other, and had promised never to lay down arms till the cause of Europe was avenged, and the Prussian states wholly restored. They had subscribed a convention at Bartenstein, by which they obliged themselves to act in concert together, and not to treat with the enemy but by mutual consent. They asserted, that the object of their endeavours was not the humiliation of France, but the deliverance of the great and petty powers which had been humbled by France. They were going to combat for the evacuation of Germany, Holland, and even Italy, if Austria should join them; to re-establish on the ruins of the ancient Germanic confederation a new federative constitution, which should guarantee freedom to all the German states, and a reasonable influence for Austria and Prussia in Germany. Furthermore, the extent of the projected restitutions was to depend on the success of the coalition. Other conventions were signed, as well with Sweden as with England. The latter, more interested in the war than any other, and which had hitherto profited from the efforts of the powers without making any herself, now promised subsidies, and also disembarkations of troops. Her avarice, when the subject of subsidies was touched on, had so disaffected the king of Sweden, as almost to disgust him with the crusade that he had always dreamt of against France. However, by the assistance of Russia, a million sterling had been drawn from England for Prussia, an annual allowance for the Swedes employed in Pomerania, and an undertaking to send a body of 20,000 English to Stralsund. Prussia, on her part, promised to send from 8000 to 10,000 Prussians to Stralsund, which, being united to the 20,000 English and 15,000 Swedes, would form a respectable force on the rear of Napoleon, and, what was more to be feared by him, would shelter itself under cover of the armistice signed with marshal Mortier.

These conventions, though communicated to Austria, did not, however, draw her into them. The capture of Dantzick besides, which proved the real weakness of the Russians, sufficed with all that was known at Vienna of the relative situations of the belligerent armies to chain this court to its system of expectant policy.

Alexander and Frederick-William were therefore compelled to struggle against the French with the wreck of the Prussian forces, which consisted of about 30,000 men, for the most part prisoners who had escaped from the hands of the French, with the Russian army newly recruited, with the Swedes, and a promised body of English in Pomerania. General Benningsen's soldiery were already in cruel misery; and while Napoleon could draw from an enemy's country most abundant supplies, the Russian commissariat, in the midst of a friendly state, and with considerable means of navigation, could not obtain wherewith to appease the ravenous hunger of its army. This miserable army suffered and complained; but on beholding its

[1] It is very difficult to know exactly what passed between these monarchs, living continually *tête-à-tête*, and scarcely to be expected to disclose their secret opinions, even to those around them. But much of what was passing at headquarters was evolved in the communications from the court of Prussia to several of the petty German courts; and the statements here made are drawn besides from the recital of the queen of Prussia herself to one of the most noted diplomatists of the age.

young sovereign at Bartenstein, its acclamations of love were mingled with the cries of pain, and he was deceived by such acclamations, promising him more than it was possible could be done for the policy and the glory of the Muscovite empire. Ignorant though they were, they judged of the uselessness of this war; but they desired to be led onwards, if only to obtain food. Thus the two sovereigns, on the one returning to Tilsit and the other to Kœnigsberg, whither they repaired to await the issue of the campaign, had given orders to their generals to take the offensive as soon as possible.

General Benningsen was posted on the upper course of the Alle, at Heilsberg, where, in imitation of Napoleon, he had formed an entrenched camp, established some magazines but very ill supplied, and had prepared his ground so as to give defensive battle if Napoleon should first come into action. He might, perhaps, number under his command about 100,000 men. Independently of this large mass, he had on his left a body of 18,000 men upon the Narew, at first put under the command of general Essen, and afterwards under that of general Tolstoy. On his right he had about 20,000 men, composed of Kamenski's division returned from Weichselmünde, and of the Prussian corps of Lestocq. He had also some depôts at Kœnigsberg, which made up in all 140,000 men spread from Warsaw to Kœnigsberg, of which 100,000 were collected on the Alle, in front of the French cantonments at the Passarge. General Labanof was bringing up a reinforcement of 30,000 men, troops drawn from the interior of the empire. But these troops could not be brought on the theatre of war until after operations had been recommenced.

Although this army might with confidence be opposed in front of any enemy whatsoever, it could not fight with any chance of success against the French army of Austerlitz and of Jena; to which besides it had become far inferior in number, since Napoleon had had time to draw from France and Italy the fresh forces of which so long an enumeration has been given before.

Napoleon was now in reality about to reap the fruits of his incessant cares, and of his admirable foresight. His army rested, well fed, and recruited, was in condition to front all his enemies, as well those who had declared as those who were ready to declare themselves such on the first event. In his rear, marshal Brune was, with 15,000 Dutch collected in the Hanseatic towns; with 14,000 Spaniards from Lisbon, Perpignan, and Bayonne, in march towards the Elbe; with the 15,000 Wirtemberghers recently employed in conquering places in Silesia; with 16,000 French of the divisions of Boudet and Molitor, actually arrived in Germany; with 10,000 men of the garrison battalions, occupying Hameln, Magdeburg, Spandau, Custrin, and Stettin; with the new contingent called from the confederation of the Rhine, marshal Brune had an army of about 80,000 men. This army might, in case of need, be reinforced by 25,000 old soldiers from the coasts of France, which would have brought it up to 100,000 or 110,000 men.

Those French troops that were fatigued, and the allied troops on whom they could least rely, were holding Dantzick, or continuing the blockade of Colberg and Graudentz. Two new corps compensated for the disbanding of Augereau's corps on the Vistula; these were, as has been seen, those of marshals Mortier and Lannes. Marshal Mortier's was composed of the 4th light infantry, of the 15th and 58th of the line, of the municipal regiment of Paris forming the Dupas division, and of a part of the newly-levied Polish regiments. The corps of marshal Lannes consisted of the famous Oudinot grenadiers and voltigeurs, of the 2nd and 12th light infantry and the 3rd and 72nd of the line, forming the division of Verdier. The Saxons were to constitute the third division of the corps of Lannes. These two bodies were posted on the different branches of the Lower Vistula, one at Dirschau and the other at Marienburg. That of Mortier might perhaps furnish 11,000 or 12,000 men for actual battle; that of Lannes 15,000. Their nominal effective force being, however, considerably greater.

Beyond the Vistula, and in front of the enemy, Napoleon possessed five corps, besides the guard and the cavalry reserves.

Massena at once occupied the Narew and the Omulew, having his right near Warsaw, his centre at Ostrolenka, his left at Neidenburg, keeping the extremity of one line with 36,000 men, of which 24,000 were available for action. In this number 6000 Bavarians were reckoned.

A body of Poles recently raised, that of Zayonschek, about 5000 or 6000 strong, great part cavalry, belonging nominally to Mortier's corps, filled up the interval between Massena and the cantonments of the Passarge, and kept constant patrole, whether in the woods or in the marshes of the country.

At length the old corps of marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, and Bernadotte, were found all encamped in quarters behind the Passarge.

The Passarge and the Alle have been already described, rising near each other from the numerous lakes of the country, but the first flowing on the French left, right down to the sea, the second before them, straight away to the Pregel, both thus forming an angle, of which the French occupied one side and the Russians the other. Each of the two armies was ranged in a different manner upon the sides of this angle. The French rested on the Passarge throughout for about twenty leagues, from Hohenstein as far as Braunsberg. The Russians, on the contrary, in order to face them, were concentrated in the upper course of the Alle, near Heilsberg.

Marshal Ney, established on the point of this angle, irregular, as most natural angles are, at once held the Alle and the Passarge, by Guttstadt and by Deppen, with a corps of 25,000 men, furnishing 17,000 combatants, an incomparable body, and well worthy of their chief. As far upwards, but a little in the rear, was marshal Davout, like marshal Ney between the Alle and the Passarge, between Allenstein and Hohenstein, flanking marshal Ney, and preventing the army being turned, and the enemy from finding any outlet by way of Osterode towards the Vistula. His corps, a model of discipline and of firmness, in which the image of its commander was reflected, could, of 40,000 men, bring 30,000 into battle. He of all

the marshals it was, who, by his vigilance and vigour could at all times carry the best men into battle. Marshal Soult, stationed to the left of marshal Ney, guarded the course of the Passarge at Liebstadt, having intrenched posts at the bridges of Pittehnen and Lomitten. He had 43,000 men under him, and 30,000 or 31,000 under arms. Marshal Bernadotte defended the Lower Passarge from Spanden to Braunsberg with 36,000 men, of which 24,000 were ready to march. Dupont's fine division occupied Braunsberg and the shores of the sea towards the Frische-Haff.

There, between the Passarge and the Vistula, in a region covered with lakes and bogs, lay the head-quarters of Finkenstein, where Napoleon himself was encamped in the midst of his guard, which of 12,000 men could reckon 8000 or 9000 combatants. A little more in the rear, and towards the left, in the plains of Elbing, was spread the cavalry of Murat, comprehending all the cavalry of the army, except the hussars and chasseurs left to each of the corps as a means of security. Of 30,000 cavalry, there were 20,000 ready at a moment to take horse.

Such were the forces at the command of Napoleon. From the Rhine to the Passarge, from Bohemia to the Baltic, he could reckon more than 400,000 soldiers, French or allies. Either on march, or already arrived upon the theatre of war, troops guarding his rear or ready to take the offensive, soldiers in health as well as the sick and wounded, including all. If we consider only those that were about to come into action, if even we leave out Massena's corps, which was to guard the Narew, we might still say there were six corps at his command, those of marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, Bernadotte, Lannes, and Mortier, besides the cavalry and the guard, which would altogether compose a force of 225,000 men [1], of which but 160,000 were fighting men. Such are the difficulties of the offensive. The further they advance the more does fatigue, dispersion, and the necessity of leaving guards diminish the strength of armies. Let us suppose these 400,000 men led back to the Rhine, not from having been defeated, but by the prudence of calculation, and every man, except the sick, would have furnished a combatant. On the contrary, upon the Vistula less than half only were in a situation to be able to fight. Suppose they were advanced 200 leagues farther, and not more than one quarter could have faced an enemy. And, nevertheless, he who conducted these masses was the greatest master of military organization that ever existed! Let the world be thankful for the order of things which renders attack so much more difficult than defence!

But the 160,000 men which Napoleon had at his disposal, after having sufficiently covered his flanks and rear, were all to be found in the ranks. Had the same mode of reckoning been applied to the Russian army, it would most assuredly not have numbered 140,000. Napoleon's soldiers were completely refreshed, abundantly fed, commodiously clad for warfare, that is to say, with great coats and trousers, and well provided with arms and ammunition. Above all, the cavalry, renewed in the plains of the Lower Vistula, mounted on the finest German horses, and having practised its exercises for two months, presented a very superb aspect. Napoleon, desirous of seeing them all assembled on one single plain, repaired to Elbing, that they might pass in review before him there. Eighteen thousand horse, an enormous host, directed by a single leader, prince Murat, manœuvred before him during a whole day, and made such an impression on his sight, accustomed, nevertheless, as he was to great armies, that in writing an hour afterwards to his ministers, he could not help boasting to them of the magnificent spectacle that had just struck him on the plains of Elbing.

By a foresight for which he had much cause to be pleased with himself, Napoleon had required that by the 1st of May all the corps should come out from the villages in which they were cantoned, and encamp in divisions within reach of one another, on well-chosen ground and under protection of good earth-works. This was a certain method of not being surprised, for the examples of all armies that have been suddenly assailed in their winter quarters have been furnished by troops that were scattered abroad for lodging and sustenance. An army briskly attacked in such a situation, may, before there is time to rally, lose not only half its strength in number, but provinces and even kingdoms in territory. It was difficult to reconcile the officers and soldiers to the precaution of encampment, infinitely wise as it was, for they had to quit good cantonments, in which each man had contrived to establish himself according to his taste, and to look forward alone thenceforth to the magazines for the provisions, which were found more readily on the spot. Napoleon, however, required it; and in ten days or a fortnight the different corps were encamped under barracks, protected by earth-works or by strong palisading, exercising daily, and regaining, by force of their assembling in mass, all the energy of military spirit; energy which varies infinitely, and is excited or depressed, not only by victory and defeat, but by activity or repose, in short, by all those circumstances which, like a spring, brace or relax the human mind.

Nature herself invites man to action when the sun returns and gives both light and life to these climates, which, though so gloomy during the winter, are still not wholly deprived of their beauty. Abundant pastures afford keep for horses, and admit of the employment of every means of transport for the subsistence of man. The two armies thus found themselves in presence of each other within cannon-shot distance, manœuvring sometimes within each other's sight, reciprocally serving as shows to each other, and

	Real force.	Present under arms.
[1] Ney	25,000	17,000
Davoust	40,000	30,000
Soult	43,000	31,000 or 32,000
Bernadotte	36,000	24,000
Murat	30,000	20,000
The Guard	12,000	8,000 or 9,000
Lannes	20,000	15,000
Mortier	19,000	10,000
	221,000	155,000

By adding the Poles under Zayonschek, 5000 for his 7000 or 8000, we have 160,000 combatants out of an effective total of 226,000 men.

abstaining from firing only because they felt certain they should pass quite soon enough from this peaceable activity to a very bloody struggle. Both sides were looking forward to the near approach of offensive operations, and kept strict watch in order to prevent surprise. On a certain day, on the side of Braunsberg, a post occupied by the division of Dupont, a confused noise of voices was heard towards nightfall, which seemed to announce the presence of a numerous force. The officers ran forward, thinking that the attack of their quarters was at length about to commence, and that the Russians were making a beginning. But on reaching the place whence the noise proceeded, they perceived a multitude of wild swans that were sporting in the waters of the Passarge, the shores of which they haunt in numberless flocks [1].

Napoleon, in the meanwhile, having returned from Dantzick and Elbing, and having all his strength concentrated between the Vistula and the Passarge, resolved to commence his movement on the 10th of June, by skirting the Alle in its course downwards, and thereby cutting off the Russians from Kœnigsberg, taking that place before them, and throwing them back on the Niemen. He ordered that, by the 10th, each corps of the army should have fourteen days' provision in bread or in biscuit, four in the soldiers' knapsacks and ten in the caissons. But while he was thus preparing for the recommencement of hostilities, the Russians determined on taking the initiative, and accelerated the movement of the French army by five days.

It might be understood why they should brave all the dangers of the offensive while the relief of Dantzic was yet an object in view. But now that there was no very pressing interest to hurry them on to dare an attack upon Napoleon, in positions long determined on and carefully fortified, and that only because the fine weather had set in, this would seem only the act of a general operating without reflection, and obeying vague instincts rather than enlightened reason. He ought also to have been well assured, which he could not be, that his operations would be well executed in opposing Russian troops to French, and to have had a good plan for the offensive against Napoleon, established as he was on the Passarge. To make an attack by the sea-side, to endeavour to carry Braunsberg upon the Lower Passarge; afterwards to go and run his head against the Lower Vistula and Dantzick, which the French were occupying, could be nothing but a succession of stupid acts. To attack on the opposite side, that is to say, to re-ascend the Alle, to cross between the sources of that river and those of the Passarge, to turn the French right, and cross between marshal Ney and Massena's corps, into the space guarded by the Poles, was just what Napoleon himself wanted, for in such a case he could move off by his left, throw himself between the Russians and Kœnigsberg, cut them off from the basis of their operations, and fling them into inextricable difficulty in the interior of Poland. In taking the offensive, therefore, they had nothing but dangers to run, without having one single advantageous result to follow. To have waited for Napoleon on the Pregel, with their right on Kœnigsberg and their left at Vehlau, to have well defended this line, and, if it were forced, to fall back in good order on the Niemen, to have drawn the French into the heart of their empire, by avoiding pitched battles, to have thus opposed to them the most difficult of obstacles, that of distance, and to have withheld from them all the advantages of brilliant victories, would have been the only reasonable conduct on the part of the Russian general, and the only course of which experience since, unfortunately for France, showed the wisdom.

But general Benningsen, who had promised his sovereign that he would still draw brilliant consequences from the battle of Eylau, and soon procure for him an ample equivalent for the capture of Dantzick, could not prolong any further the inaction that had been kept during the siege of that place, and felt himself compelled to take the lead. He had, moreover, formed the project of throwing himself on marshal Ney, whose very advanced position offered a greater chance of surprise than that of any other marshal. Napoleon, with a view of commanding not only the Passarge up to its sources, but also the Alle itself along the higher part of its course, so as to occupy the summit of the angle described by these two rivers, had posted marshal Ney at Guttstadt on the Alle. The latter seemed quite unconscious, and as though he knew not the precautions that had been taken to remedy the apparent inconveniences of his situation. But every arrangement for a ready concentration had been matured and prepared beforehand. Marshal Ney had his line of retreat upon Deppen pointed out to him; marshal Davout upon Osterode; marshal Soult on Liebstadt and Mohrungen; and Bernadotte upon Preuss-Holland. The enemy pushing on these different divisions, they were by another march to find themselves rejoined at Saalfeld by the guard, by Lannes, Mortier, and Murat, amid a labyrinth of lakes and forests, of which Napoleon alone knew the outlets, and where he had prepared disaster for any imprudent enemy that might come thither in search of them.

Without having penetrated into any of these combinations, general Benningsen resolved to capture marshal Ney's corps, and adopted dispositions which at first sight seemed likely to succeed. He directed on marshal Ney the main body of his forces, contenting himself with making some faint demonstrations against the other marshals. Three columns, or rather four, reckoning the imperial guard, accompanied by all the cavalry, were to re-ascend the Alle, and assault marshal Ney on his front by Altkirch, on his left by Wolfsdorf, and on his right by Guttstadt, while Platoff, the Hetman of the Cossacks, scouring with his horse the space which separated the French from the Narew, and forcing with his light infantry the Alle above Guttstadt, should strive to slide in between the corps of Ney and Davout. During this time the imperial guard, under the grand-duke Constantine, was to place itself in reserve, in rear of the three columns charged with the attack on marshal Ney, and give assistance where it might be needed. A column composed of two

[1] These details are taken from the military memoirs of general Dupont, which are still in manuscript, and full of the strongest interest.

divisions under general Doctorow, had orders to come from Olbersdorf to Lomitten, to attack the bridges of marshal Soult, and hinder him from giving aid to marshal Ney. Another column of Russians and Prussians, under generals Kamenski and Rombow were directed to make a strong demonstration upon the bridge of Spanden, which was guarded by marshal Bernadotte, so that thus the whole course of the Passarge should be threatened at once. The Prussian general, Lestocq, furthermore had directions to show himself before Braunsberg, in order to increase the uncertainty of the French as to the general plan upon which all these attacks were made.

It remained to be seen if these dispositions of the Russian general, apparently so well calculated upon, would be executed with the necessary precision to ensure success to such complicated operations, and whether they would not be met by the French, as equally prepared and as equally resolved, so that it would be impossible to surprise them and to force their position. The movement of these numerous columns, hidden by the forests and lakes of this concealed country, escaped the French generals, who, while they were in doubt as to the Russians being ready, felt ready themselves, expecting orders to march every instant, and experienced neither surprise nor fear at the sight of these preparations of the enemy.

It may here be perceived that foresight is all-powerful in warfare. This formidable attack, directed against marshal Ney, must have infallibly succeeded, if the troops, while scattered in the villages, had been surprised, and obliged to fall to the rear in order to rally. But it was not so; for, thanks to the orders of Napoleon, disagreeable as they were to the corps, and the execution of which he had made most stringent, the troops encamped in divisions, covered by earth-works and palisades, were so posted that they could defend themselves for a long time, and could render assistance to one another, before they could be driven to give ground.

By break of day on the 5th of June, the Russian advanced guard, led by prince Bagration, fell rapidly and at once on the position of Altkirch, one of those which marshal Ney occupied with a division, neglecting all the small French posts spread through the woods, so as to carry them afterwards in repassing them. The French, who from being encamped lay in battle array, rather delighted than astonished at the sight of the enemy, full of coolness, and exercised daily, poured in a murderous fire on the advancing Russians, and quickly brought them to a stand. The 39th, posted in front of Altkirch, did not retire until they had strewed with the dead the foot of their entrenchments. During this, the attacks directed upon Wolfsdorf on the left and on Guttstadt upon the right, and still more to the right on Bergfried, were made with great vigour, but, fortunately, without any concert, and in such a manner as to give marshal Ney time to effect his retreat. Placing himself at the head of his troops, he perceived that the chief effort of the Russian army was directed against himself, and that it was time to take the road towards Deppen, assigned to him for his line of retreat by the foresight of Napoleon. He had one of his divisions in front of Guttstadt at Krossen, and the other in rear of it at Glottau. He united these, and allowing time to collect their artillery, baggage, and the detached posts in the woods, led them all off in safety, with the exception of 200 or 300 men, who were left in the most extreme advance in the forest of Amt-Guttstadt. He took the road from Guttstadt to Deppen by Quetz and Ankendorf, slowly traversing the small space comprised between the Alle and the Passarge, stopping now and then with singular *sang-froid* to pour in his fire in double ranks, sometimes charging at the bayonet's point those of the enemy's infantry that were pressing most closely, or forming in square and firing in upon the numerous Russian cavalry, inspiring even his enemies with an admiration which they themselves expressed a few days afterwards[1]. He would not yield all the space of four or five leagues, which at this place separates the Alle and the Passarge, and he halted at Ankendorf. In this affair he had opposed to him 15,000 foot, and the like number of horse; and if the two columns of prince Bagration and lieutenant-general Saken had acted together, and the imperial guard had been joined by them, it would have been impossible for him, in front of 60,000 men, not to have sustained a frightful disaster. He lost 1200 or 1500 of his men in killed and wounded, but he had destroyed more than 3000 of the Russians. At three o'clock in the afternoon the attacks of the enemy ceased, apparently without cause, as happens when the movements of great masses are not directed by some firm and reasoning mind.

On the same day, the Hetman Platoff, with his cossacks, had crossed the Alle at Bergfried, and had overrun the marshy and woody country that separated the grand army from the posts of marshal Massena. But it was in nowise likely that he would dare to encounter the 30,000 men under marshal Davout. The latter, hearing at a distance the noise of artillery, hastened to unite his troops between the Alle and Passarge, and took the road to Alt-Ramten, which permitted his rendering support to marshal Ney while he was nearing Osterode. By a successful *ruse-de-guerre*, he dispatched one of his officers in the direction of the

[1] The account of Plotho describes thus the retreat of marshal Ney to Deppen:—

"The French, adepts in the art of war, on this day solved the difficult problem of undertaking, in face of a much stronger enemy who were pressing them closely, a retreat that was become indispensable, and rendering it as little prejudicial as possible. They extricated themselves with the utmost skill. The calmness, the order, and at the same time the rapidity with which Ney's corps assembled on the signal of three cannon-shots; the *sang-froid* and the attentive circumspection with which he set about his retreat, during which he had to oppose a renewed resistance at every step, and to struggle for the mastery of every position, all demonstrated the talent of the captain who commanded the French; and that the practice of war was carried among them to the highest perfection, as much as the finest dispositions and the most clever execution of them in offensive operations could possibly do. To attack successfully, as well as to oppose a regular and steady resistance during a retreat, though very rare qualities, are needed, and are very difficult qualities to be practised, yet, notwithstanding, it is necessary that all these should be found united in the same person in order to form a great warrior."

enemy, so that he should be taken with dispatches which announced Davout's march, at the head of 50,000 men, to succour marshal Ney. Upon the opposite side, to the left of marshal Ney's corps, the projected attacks on marshals Soult and Bernadotte were carried into effect, in concurrence with the plan agreed on. Lieutenant-general Doctorow, advancing with two divisions by Wormditt and Olbersdorf, upon the *têtes de pont* guarded by marshal Soult, found in front of the Passarge numerous defences of felled timber and stakes, from behind which riflemen kept up a continual and well-directed fire. He was compelled to fight for several hours following, to overcome the obstacles by which the approaches of the bridge of Lomitten were defended. Scarcely had he succeeded in clearing part of these defences, than the reserve companies threw themselves on his troops, and drove them back at the point of the bayonet. Some detachments of Russian cavalry having crossed at various fording-places of the Passarge, were driven back again by the French light horse. The course of the Passarge was still at all points in possession of the valiant troops of marshal Soult. In the end, nothing had been abandoned to the Russians but the half-burnt defences which were in advance of the bridge of Lomitten. General Doctorow ceased his assaults at the close of day, worn out with fatigue, and despairing of conquering similar obstacles when defended by such soldiers. The Russians, in openly attacking their well-sheltered enemies, had had more than 2000 men put *hors de combat*, while the French had not lost 1000. Generals Ferey and Viviès, of St. Cyr's division, with the 47th and 56th of the line, and the 24th light infantry, covered themselves with glory at the bridge of Lomitten.

An action somewhat similar had taken place at the bridge of Spanden, which was in charge of marshal Bernadotte. An entrenchment of earthwork covered the bridge. The 27th light infantry guarded this post, having in its rear the two brigades of the division of Villate. In the beginning of the action marshal Bernadotte received a wound in the neck, which obliged him to give up the command to his chief staff-officer general Maison, one of the most intelligent and most energetic officers in the whole army. The Russians, joined here by the Prussians, cannonaded the *tête-de-pont* for a long time; and when they supposed the troops that defended it were shaken, they advanced to take it by storm. The soldiers of the 27th light infantry had received orders to lie down on the ground, so as not to be perceived. They allowed the assailants to approach the very foot of the entrenchment, and then, by firing close in upon them, they killed 300, wounding several hundreds more. The Russians and Prussians, struck with terror, left the ranks, and fell back in disorder. The 17th dragoons appearing at the instant from the *têtes de pont*, charged them at full gallop, and sabred a great number.

The attack was not pushed any further at this point. It had not cost the enemy less than 600 or 700 men, while the French loss was inconsiderable.

This vigorous reception of the Russians all along the Passarge, caused them a surprise that may be readily conceived, and induced an increasing hesitation in their plans, already too little reflected upon to be followed up with perseverance. The Russian and Prussian columns, under generals Kamenski and Rembow, repulsed at Spanden, now waited for ulterior orders before they undertook any further enterprise. Lieutenant-general Doctorow, foiled at the bridge of Lomitten, re-ascended the Passarge, in order to approach the main body of the Russian army. General Benningsen, surrounded at Quetz by the greatest portion of his troops, not having been able to capture the corps of marshal Ney though he had forced it to retreat, and not reckoning upon all the obstacles which he was about to meet, resolved upon a fresh effort for the next day, against the same corps, the object of his most vigorous attacks.

Six or seven hours after these simultaneous attempts upon the line of the Passarge, Napoleon received intelligence of them at Finkenstein, for he was scarcely a dozen leagues from the farthest of his lieutenants, and he had taken previous care to prepare the means of correspondence, so as to be informed of the least accidents with the greatest dispatch. His orders, which had been issued for the 10th of June, were only precipitated by five days. He was not, therefore, to be found in an unprepared state. His ideas were formed for all circumstances, without hesitation, and so perfectly that no loss of time could affect his dispositions. He approved of the conduct of marshal Ney, addressed him the praises he so deserved, bid him to retire in good order upon Deppen, where, if he could not defend the Passarge, he was to wind through the labyrinth of lakes, first to Liebemühl, and then to Saalfeld. He ordered marshal Davout to bring his three divisions together immediately upon the left flank of marshal Ney, and to bear towards Osterode, which, as has been seen, was already executed. Marshal Soult was enjoined to persist in the defence of the Passarge, with orders, that if he were forced in his position, or either of his neighbours should be in theirs, he should retreat on Mohrungen, and from Mohrungen upon Saalfeld. Similar directions were sent to the corps of marshal Bernadotte, and the road by Preuss-Holland to Saalfeld was indicated for its line of retreat.

While Napoleon was thus bringing back upon Saalfeld his lieutenants who were posted in advance, he was also bringing up to that point his lieutenants posted in the rear. He ordered marshal Lannes to march from Marienburg to Christburg and Saalfeld, and marshal Mortier, who was at Dirschau, to follow the same route, and one as well as the other to bring as much provisions as possible along with them. The light horse were to rendezvous at Elbing, the heavy cavalry at Christburg, and to direct their march thence upon Saalfeld. The three divisions of dragoons which were encamped on the right at Bischoffswerder, Strasburg, and Soldau, had orders to rally round the corps of Davout upon Osterode. They were all to bring their provisions by means of carriages, which had been prepared beforehand. Only forty-eight hours were required for the effecting of these divers concentrations, and for the assembling of 160,000 men between Saalfeld and Osterode. Napoleon besides marched his own guard from Finkenstein to Saalfeld, and prepared for quitting

Finkenstein himself the next day, the 6th, when the movements of the enemy should be more decided, and their intentions more clearly apparent. His household he sent back to Dantzick, as well as M. de Talleyrand, who was but little fitted for the fatigues and dangers of head-quarters.

In fact, on the 6th the Russian columns, charged with pursuing the attack commenced against the corps of marshal Ney, were more concentrated in consequence of their offensive movements of the evening before, and the marshal was about to have on his hands 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. After the loss he had sustained the preceding day, he had but 15,000 men that he could oppose to the enemy. But he had provided beforehand for every thing. He had sent his wounded and baggage beyond Deppen, so that the road should be clear, and that his corps might not find any obstacle on their march. Instead of decamping hastily, marshal Ney proudly waited for the enemy. The brigades which formed his two divisions were drawn up in echellons which rested on each other. Each echellon before retreating poured in its fire, and even often charged with the bayonet, after which it fell back, and left the next echellon to the same care of keeping the Russians in check. In an open country, with troops less firm, such a retreat must have become a perfect rout. But, thanks to his skilful choice of positions, and thanks to the extraordinary firmness of his soldiers, marshal Ney was enabled to employ several hours in yielding a space which was less than two leagues of ground Every moment multitudes of horsemen rode up in mass upon the very bayonets ; but all their efforts were in vain against these immoveable squares. Being arrived near a small lake, the enemy committed the fault of dividing, so as that part of them passed to the right and the others to the left. The intrepid marshal, seizing the occasion with as much resolution as presence of mind, halted, resumed the offensive against the divided enemy, charged them with vigour, repulsed them for some distance, and contrived thus to gain time to reach quietly the bridge of Deppen, beyond which he would be sheltered from any attack. On reaching that spot, he disposed his artillery advantageously in front of the Passarge, and as soon as the enemy again showed themselves, he received them with cannon-shot.

This day, while it cost the French some hundreds of men, caused two or three times their loss to the enemy, and added still more to the admiration with which both armies were inspired by the intrepidity of marshal Ney. Upon the French left, along the Lower Passarge, the Russian columns remained immoveable, awaiting the result of the engagement between Guttstadt and Deppen. On the French right, marshal Davout's corps, in march from the previous evening, had been brought, without accident, upon the flank of marshal Ney, where it could either support him or gain Osterode.

With such lieutenants and such soldiers, the combinations of Napoleon had, besides the merit of their conception, the advantage of an almost unfailing execution. On the evening of the 6th, Napoleon, after having directed every thing from the rear upon Saalfeld, repaired there in person to judge of events with his own eyes, to receive his lieutenants there in case of their repulse, or to direct the mass of his troops upon one of them should they have succeeded in maintaining their ground, so that he could take the offensive in his turn with a crushing superiority of force. On reaching Saalfeld, he learnt that complete quiet had reigned during the day upon the Lower Passarge, that on the Higher Passarge the undaunted Ney had effected the most successful retreat upon Deppen, and that marshal Davout was already on march upon the right flank of marshal Ney, towards Alt-Ramten. Nothing could have occurred better.

The next day, the 7th, Napoleon resolved to go himself to the advanced posts at Deppen, and he left orders for all the corps which were marching upon Saalfeld to follow him to Deppen. On the evening of the 7th he reached Alt-Reichau, and finding that every thing there remained quiet, he betook himself on the morning of the 8th to Deppen. There he congratulated marshal Ney, as well as his troops, on their noble conduct, and saw the Russian army inactive, like an army whose general is undecided, not knowing what part further to take. He directed a strong demonstration to be made, in order to judge of the real designs of the Russians. The Russians repulsed it in such a manner as proved that they were more inclined to retreat than to persist in their offensive march.

In fact, general Benningsen, seeing the inutility of the attempts made against Ney's corps, the little success which had been obtained on the other points of the Passarge, and, above all, the rapid concentration of the French army, quickly perceived that any more decided movement upon Warsaw with Napoleon on his right flank, could only lead him on to destruction. He determined, therefore, on a halt. After having passed the day of the 7th at Guttstadt, in the natural perplexity arising from such serious circumstances, he resolved on repassing the Alle, throwing himself into Heilsberg, and taking up there a defensive position, which he had long since prepared by means of good field-works. On the 7th, in the evening, he issued orders for the first movement of his army in retreat as far as Quetz. On the 8th, hearing of the march of the greater part of the French corps upon Deppen, he was confirmed in his determination of retreating, and enjoined all his divisions to direct their march upon Heilsberg by descending the Alle. That portion of his troops which was most in advance between Guttstadt and Deppen, was to decamp forthwith, to repass the Alle, and to gain Heilsberg by the right bank of that river. Four bridges were thrown across the Alle to render its passage more easy. Prince Bagration was charged to cover this retreat with his division and with the cossacks. The other columns, which were less engaged in this direction, were simply to reach the position of Heilsberg by Launau, and by the left bank. The farthest off of the Russian columns, that of general Kamenski, which had attacked the bridge at Spanden in concert with the Prussians, had orders to retire by way of Mehlsak, which would oblige it to pass over the base of a triangle formed by Spanden, Heilsberg, and Guttstadt. This column took with it the Prussian cavalry, only leaving the Prussian

infantry with general Lestocq. Lestocq was to remain in the rear to cover Kœnigsberg, and in great danger of being cut off from the Russian army, as, following the sea-shore while general Benningsen followed the banks of the Alle, he was about being separated from the latter by a distance of from fifteen to eighteen leagues.

By the evening of the 8th the Russian army was in full retreat. On the 9th they cleared the Passarge about Guttstadt, when the French followed them. In fact, a considerable portion of the French had already assembled around Deppen. Lannes, who had set out from Marienburg, the guard from Finkenstein, and Murat from Christburg, all arrived at Deppen on the evening of the 8th, and formed with the corps of marshal Ney a mass of 50,000 or 60,000 men. They pursued the enemy closely. Murat's cavalry, by swimming the Alle, followed the steps of prince Bagration. The cossacks put on a better face than usual; they pressed in mass around the Russian infantry, and, for partisans, most bravely received the fire of the French light artillery.

Marshal Soult in the meanwhile crossing the Passarge at Eldittен by orders of Napoleon, fell in with the corps of general Kamenski near Wolfsdorf, overthrew one of his detachments, and took many prisoners. Marshal Davout facing about, since instead of retreating there was a general advance, had approached Guttstadt. Napoleon had thus immediately under his hands the corps of marshals Davout, Ney, Lannes, and Soult, besides the guard and Murat, who never left him, and marshal Mortier, who followed a march in the rear. Here was a strength of 126,000 men [1], without comprising the corps of Bernadotte, which remained on the Lower Passarge, and which was to remain there for two or three days to watch the conduct of the Prussians. But the Prussians once left in the rear by the French advance, Napoleon could always bring up to himself the corps of marshal Bernadotte, and thus have 150,000 fighting men at his command, being only deficient of the corps of Massena, which was indispensable on the Narew. General Benningsen, on the contrary, separated like Napoleon from his corps left on the Narew (18,000 strong), and forced in descending the Alle to separate himself from Lestocq (also 18,000 strong), could only bring into contest with Napoleon the central mass of his strength, that is to say, about 100,000 men, weakened by 6000 or 7000 killed or wounded, and left lying at the feet of the French entrenchments.

Napoleon's plan was soon brought into full operation, for this plan was but the consequence of all he had foreseen, wished, and prepared during the last four months. In fact, since, by the skilful disposition of his cantonments between the Passarge and the Lower Vistula, by the occupation in strength of Braunsberg, Elbing, and Marienburg, and by the capture of Dantzick, he had rendered himself invincible upon his left towards the sea, he had compelled the Russians to attack his right, that is, to ascend the Alle and threaten Warsaw. Thenceforth his manœuvre was fully developed. In his turn he pushed himself in advance, hanging on the right of the Russians, cutting them off from the sea, throwing them back upon the Alle and the Pregel, and, by preceding them to Kœnigsberg, hoping to take that valuable depôt before their eyes, in which the Prussians had shut up their last resources, and to which the English had sent their promised aid to the coalition. The more he found the Russians engaged on the upper course of the Alle, the greater would be the result of this manœuvre. It is true, they had just suddenly paused to redescend the Alle by the right bank. But Napoleon was about to descend it by the left bank, with almost a certainty of gaining on them in speed, of arriving as soon as they could at the confluence of the Alle and the Pregel, and of inflicting on them some great disaster on the way, if they should attempt to repass this river before he did, in order to march to the relief of Kœnigsberg.

Views so deeply formed, and for so long a time previously, could easily be changed into active dispositions, and without the loss of a single instant in deliberation. Napoleon by the 9th had directed marshal Davout to join immediately the right of the army. Marshal Ney, to take a day's rest at Guttstadt after his severe struggles, and to join afterwards; marshal Soult, who was somewhat to the left near Launau, to keep the course of the Alle and to reach Heilsberg, preceded and followed by Murat's cavalry; marshal Lannes to accompany marshal Soult; and marshal Mortier to quicken his march, in order to form a junction with the main body of the army. He himself followed the movement with the guard; and marshal Bernadotte's corps, under the temporary command of general Victor, was ordered to concentrate itself on the Lower Passarge, so as to throw itself beyond, as soon as the projects of the enemy upon the French left should be more clearly unfolded.

In consequence, the army marched by the left bank of the river Alle on the 10th June upon Heilsberg. It was necessary to clear a defile near a village called Bewerniken. There they found a strong rear-guard, which was soon driven in, and they then opened out in sight of the positions occupied by the Russian army.

After so many boastful demonstrations, the enemy's general could not withstand the temptation to retreat less fast, and at length to stay and fight, above all in a position where so many precautions had been taken to render the chances of a great battle less disadvantageous. But there was little wisdom in this; for time was becoming precious, if he did not wish to be cut off from Kœnigsberg. Pride prevailing, nevertheless, above reason, general Benningsen resolved to await the French army before Heilsberg.

Heilsberg is situated on the heights around which the Alle flows. Numerous redoubts had been constructed on these heights. The Russian army occupied them, divided on both sides the Alle. This rather serious inconvenience was

[1]

Davout	30,000
Ney	15,000
Lannes	15,000
Soult	30,000
The guard	8,000
Murat	18,000
Mortier	10,000
	126,000

redeemed by four bridges, established in the more sheltered points, permitting the transport of the troops from one bank to the other. As, according to all appearances, the French would arrive by the left bank of the Alle, on that side had been accumulated the larger portion of the Russian troops. General Benningsen had only left the imperial guard in the redoubts on the right bank, and Bagration's division, which was fatigued from the fighting in which it had been engaged on the preceding days. Batteries had been so disposed as to command both banks of the river. Upon the left bank, by which the French were about to make the attack, was to be seen the main body of the hostile army under the protection of three redoubts, bristling with artillery. General Kamenski, who had rejoined on the 10th, was in advance of these redoubts. In rear and a little above, was the Russian infantry drawn up in two ranks. The first and third battalions of each regiment, fully opened out, composed the first line. Each second battalion formed in column behind the first in the intervals, composed the second line. Twelve battalions, posted a little further off, were destined to act as a reserve. At the extremity of this line of battle, and forming a curve to the right of the rear, was the whole of the Russian cavalry, reinforced by the Prussian, presenting a mass of squadrons beyond all ordinary proportion. Further still to the right, towards Konegen, were the Cossacks in observation. Some patches of wood, spread here and there in advance of the position, were occupied by detachments of light infantry. The French, on reaching Heilsberg, therefore, had to sustain the fire of the redoubts of the right bank of the river on their flank, and that of those on the left bank on their front, besides the attacks of a numerous infantry, and the charge of a still more numerous cavalry. But led on by the ardour of success, persuaded that the enemy thought of nothing but flight, and in haste to snatch some trophies from them before they had time to escape, they neither took numbers nor position into account. This spirit was common to both soldiers and generals. Napoleon not being there to restrain their ardour, prince Murat and marshal Soult, in opening upon Heilsberg, fell in with the Russians before they were followed by the remainder of the army. Prince Bagration, posted at first on the right bank, had been speedily carried across to the left to defend the defile of Bewerniken, and general Benningsen had ordered up general Uwarow to his support with twenty-five squadrons. Marshal Soult, after having forced the defile, took care to place thirty-six pieces of cannon in battery, which greatly facilitated the deploying of his troops. The division of Carra St. Cyr was the first to present itself in column by brigades, and drove back the Russian infantry beyond a ravine which runs down from the village of Lawden to the Alle. Under cover of this movement Murat's cavalry was able to open out; but harassed by fatigue, not being wholly formed, and assailed at the moment they were forming by the twenty-five squadrons of general Uwarow, they gave ground, and fell back to re-form in the rear, whence they charged afresh and regained their advantage. The division of Carra St. Cyr lined the ravine beyond the point to which it had driven the Russians. Cannonaded in front by the redoubts of the left bank, and in flank by those of the right, it could not but suffer most severely. The division of St. Hilaire came to take its place under fire, passing in close column across the intervals of the French line of battle. This brave division of St. Hilaire cleared the ravine, drove back the Russians, and followed them up to the foot of the three redoubts which covered their centre, while the cavalry of Murat fell upon that under Bagration, cut it to pieces, and killed its general, Koring. During these feats, marshal Soult's third division, under Legrand, had come up and taken post on the French left in front of the village of Lawden. It had driven in the enemy's riflemen from the clumps of wood scattered between the two armies, and had also reached the very foot of the redoubts which formed the strength of the Russian position. General Legrand immediately detached the 26th light infantry to attack that of the three redoubts which he found within reach. This undaunted regiment dashed on in double quick time, entered it in spite of the troops of general Kamenski, and remained masters of it after a bloody combat. But the officer who commanded the enemy's artillery carrying off his guns at full gallop, placed them rapidly in the rear upon ground which commanded the redoubt, and plied the 26th with grape-shot so as to cause it enormous loss. At that same moment the Russian general, Warnek, perceiving the unfortunate situation of the 26th, fell on them at the head of the regiment of Kalougn, and retook the redoubt. The 55th, which formed the left wing of St. Hilaire's division, and which was close to the 26th, flew to their assistance, but was unable to recover the lost ground, and obliged to fall back on its own division, after sustaining the loss of its eagle. The French soldiers thus remained exposed to the fire of a numerous and powerful artillery, but without the least shrinking. General Benningsen now resolved on making use of his immense cavalry, and several charges were made upon the divisions of Legrand and St. Hilaire. They received the charges of the Russian horse with admirable *sang froid*, and gave the French cavalry time to form in their rear, and charge in their turn the Russian squadrons. Marshal Soult, who was posted in the middle of one of the squares, in which French and Russians were mingled pell mell, wounded infantry and dismounted cavalry, kept every one to his duty by the firmness and energy of his attitude. Napoleon, who was yet far from the scene of combat, had, as soon as he heard the cannon, placed the young fusiliers of the guard under general Savary, that he might repair to the succour of the corps which had so rashly engaged. General Savary with the utmost speed took up a position between the divisions of St. Hilaire and Legrand. Formed in square, he withstood for a long time the charges of the Russian cavalry, which the horrible fire from the redoubts would have rendered ruinous if the men had been less firm and not well commanded. The brave general Roussel, who with sword in hand was in the midst of the fusiliers of the guard, had his head carried away by a cannon-ball. This imprudent action, in which 30,000 French without any cover fought

against 90,000 Russians, who were well protected by redoubts, continued pretty far into the night. Marshal Lannes appeared at length on the extreme right, and merely reconnoitred the position of the enemy, but would not undertake any operation without the orders of the emperor. The cannonading soon ceased to be heard, and each party endeavoured, throughout a rainy night, to obtain a little rest by sleeping on the ground. The Russians, more numerous and denser in their ranks than the French were, had sustained a greater loss. They might reckon 3000 killed and 7000 or 8000 wounded. The French had 2000 killed and 5000 wounded.

Napoleon arrived late; for he had not supposed that the enemy would have halted so soon to offer resistance. He was well satisfied with the energy of his troops, but much less so with their extreme haste to engage; and he resolved to wait till next day, and then give battle with his whole united strength, if the Russians should persist in defending the position of Heilsberg, or to follow them to the utmost if they should decamp. He bivouacked with his troops on this field of carnage, on which lay 18,000 dead, dying, and wounded Russians and French.

General Benningsen, a prey to severe bodily suffering, and in the deepest perplexity, passed the night in his bivouac, wrapped up in his cloak [1]. A strong mind is wanting to brave at once physical pain and mental suffering. General Benningsen was capable of bearing up against both. Divided between the satisfaction of having made head against the French, and the fear of having the whole of them to withstand the next day, he waited for daybreak to decide on the part he should take. The French troops, for their part, were under arms by four o'clock in the morning, collecting the wounded, and exchanging shots with the advanced posts of the enemy. The *corps d'armée* successively took up their positions. On the evening previous, marshal Lannes had posted himself to the left of marshal Soult, the corps of marshal Davout began to show itself to the left of marshal Lannes towards Grossendorf. The guard, both cavalry and infantry, deployed upon the heights in the rear, and every thing denoted a decisive attack with formidable masses. This appearance, but, above all, the sight of marshal Davout's corps, which at Grossendorf skirted the Russian army, and seemed even to be directed on Kœnigsberg, determined general Benningsen on a retreat. He resolved not to lose a day and a battle at once, nor expose himself to the chance of reaching Kœnigsberg too late, and perhaps half destroyed. General Kamenski was to commence the march in time to gain the road to Kœnigsberg, and to join the Prussians, with whom he had been in the habit of acting. After taking from Heilsberg all that it was possible to carry off, general Benningsen placed himself in march with his army by the right bank of the Alle, on the 11th of June. He marched in four columns upon Bartenstein, the first post beyond Heilsberg, and where his head-quarters had been long established.

[1] The Russian historian, Plotho, says, that general Benningsen was at that moment afflicted with the disease of the stone.

Napoleon had employed part of the day in observation of this position, and he did not set about attacking it with his accustomed promptness; for he was in no hurry to give battle on such ground, and he did not doubt but that in pushing forward his left he should oblige the Russian army to decamp by a simple demonstration. Things came about exactly as he had foreseen; that same evening he entered Heilsberg, and established himself there with his guard. He found tolerably considerable magazines, and many of the Russian wounded, of whom he directed the same care should be taken as of the French. The number proved that the enemy's army must have lost the day before 10,000 or 11,000 men.

The day of Heilsberg had not at all changed the plans of Napoleon. He was constantly endeavouring to outflank the Russians, to cut them off from Kœnigsberg, and to avail himself of the first false movement on their part to regain that important place, which was their basis of operations. They had not presented themselves this time in such a situation as to enable him to overwhelm them, but he only waited for the favourable opportunity which could not be long in offering itself. For such an occasion to have failed, it would have been essential that general Benningsen, in the difficult situation in which he was placed, should not commit a single fault.

The better to attain his end, Napoleon modified his march a little. On leaving Heilsberg, and the same at Launau, the Alle turns to the right, describing a thousand windings, and offers a very long route, if its course be followed; a route, besides, which leads further away from the sea and from Kœnigsberg. General Benningsen needing the Alle for his protection, was obliged to follow it in all its windings. Napoleon, on the contrary, who only sought to find his enemy deprived of support, and who above all things wanted to gain an intermediate position between Kœnigsberg and the Alle, from whence he might dispatch a detachment upon Kœnigsberg, without placing it at too great a distance from himself, could quit the banks of the Alle not only without inconvenience, but even with advantage. He consequently determined on taking an intermediate road, over which he had already passed during the winter previous, that from Landsberg to Eylau, which runs in a direct line towards the Pregel. On this road, beyond Eylau, that is to say, at Domnau, on the left, an army would find itself within two marches of Kœnigsberg, and on the right, within a single march of the Alle and the town of Friedland; because the Alle flowing again westward after its numerous turnings, is at Friedland nearer to Kœnigsberg than in any other part of its course. On that spot it was, that with good fortune and skill, the best chances were to be found for capturing Kœnigsberg with one hand and defeating the Russian army with the other.

With this idea Napoleon directed Murat with a part of his cavalry upon Landsberg. These he followed up by the corps of marshals Soult and Davout, destined to form the left wing of the army, and to extend themselves towards Kœnigsberg, or to fall back on the centre, if they were wanted to give battle. Napoleon left upon the Alle the remainder of his cavalry, composed of

chasseurs, hussars, and dragoons, so as to thread the banks of that river and follow up the track of the enemy. Upon Eylau, by way of Landsberg, he threw the corps of Lannes, which was immediately under himself; that of Ney, which had remained for a day's rest at Guttstadt; and that of Mortier, which was a march in the rear: and each of these he ordered to advance by different routes, so as to avoid any encumbering of each other, but so as that they might join in a few hours. The Prussians in retreat upon Kœnigsberg not requiring further attention, the corps of Bernadotte, which had been left provisionally on the Lower Passarge, had orders to rejoin the army immediately by way of Mehlsack and Eylau.

These dispositions and many others relative to the magazines, ovens, and hospitals which he wished to organize at Heilsberg, relative also to the rich stores at Dantzick, over which he never ceased to watch, and to the navigation of the Frische-Haff, of which he took care to possess himself by closing the passage of Pillau, and on which he desired the seafaring men of the guard to be kept cruising in the vessels of the country; these dispositions detained Napoleon during the whole of the 12th at Heilsberg. During that interval his corps were on their march, and it was easy enough for him to join them on horseback in a few hours.

On the morning of the 13th he repaired to Eylau. It was no longer a vast plain of snow, with that sad and gloomy aspect, as it was seen covered with blood on the 8th of February: it was now a smiling and fertile country, covered with verdant woods, with beautiful lakes, and peopled with numerous villages. The cavalry and artillery perceived with astonishment that in the great battle of Eylau they had galloped over the surface of lakes, then completely frozen. The indications that could be picked up as to the march of general Benningsen were uncertain, as also were the plans of that general. On the one hand the light cavalry had followed the main body of the Russian army along the Alle, and had been seen between Bartenstein and Schippenbeil; on the other hand, detachments of the enemy were thought to be directing themselves towards Kœnigsberg, and desirous, according to appearances, to join general Lestocq, and to defend that city. These things put together, it might be fairly concluded that the Russian army was inclined to bear away towards Kœnigsberg, for which it would quit the Alle, and in which movement it would be encountered at Domnau. Napoleon forthwith pushed on marshals Soult and Murat with half the cavalry upon Kreutzburg, and ordered them to march upon Kœnigsberg, and fall upon it while unprepared. He followed these up by marshal Davout, whom he ordered to take up such an intermediate position as would enable him in a few hours either to join marshal Soult or the main body, according to circumstances. He dispatched marshal Lannes immediately on the road from Eylau to Domnau, and reinforced him with a portion of the cavalry and the dragoons of Grouchy, with orders to send out parties as far as Friedland to ascertain what the enemy were doing, and assure himself whether they were quitting the Alle or not, and whether they were or were not on the march to relieve Kœnigsberg. Marshal Mortier, having reached Eylau, was forthwith dispatched to Domnau, so as to arrive there some hours after marshal Lannes. At the same moment, marshal Ney with his corps, and general Victor with that of Bernadotte, were entering Eylau. Napoleon awaited intelligence as to the real march of the enemy from the fresh reports of the light cavalry, before he would direct these corps with the guard and the main body of the cavalry, either upon Domnau, upon the footsteps of marshal Lannes, or upon Kœnigsberg, upon those of marshals Davout and Soult.

By the evening of the 13th, the reconnoissances of the day no longer left any doubt on the subject. General Benningsen had descended the Alle, and seemed to take the road to Friedland, either for the purpose of continuing from thence his march along the Alle, or for quitting its banks so as to reach Kœnigsberg. At Friedland, in fact, he would be most tempted to abandon the Alle, because it was at that point that the river approached nearest to Kœnigsberg. From that moment Napoleon was no longer in hesitation. He sent on all that part of the cavalry which had not followed Murat to Lannes and Mortier, giving the command of it to general Grouchy. He directed Lannes and Mortier to repair to Friedland, and to possess themselves of that town and of the bridges across the Alle, if they were able to do so. He ordered Ney and Victor to advance upon Domnau, and to follow the track of Lannes and Mortier nearer to Friedland, more or less according to events. His guard he also put in march, and resolved at break of day to set out himself on horseback, to be, on the next day, the 14th June, at the head of his assembled troops. This day, the 14th of June, the anniversary of the battle of Marengo, while recalling to his remembrance the most fortunate day of his life, filled him with a secret and happy presentiment. He had not ceased to believe in his good fortune, and this belief was still well-founded!

Lannes, who arrived at Domnau some hours before marshal Mortier, had hastened to send the 9th hussars in reconnoissance on Friedland. This regiment had penetrated into the town, but being soon assaulted by more than thirty squadrons of the enemy, who carried with them a number of light guns, they had been very roughly handled, and obliged to fly to Georgeneau, a position between Domnau and Friedland. On the news of this, Lannes dispatched the light horse and the Saxon cuirassiers to the assistance of the 9th hussars, and put himself in march to capture Friedland, to drive back the enemy's cavalry beyond the Alle, and to shut up the passage by which the Russian army seemed to intend carrying their assistance to Kœnigsberg. Towards one o'clock in the morning of the 14th he repaired thither; but fancying he perceived, through the shades of the night, a considerable quantity of troops, he halted at the village of Posthenen, after dislodging an enemy's detachment which guarded that village. He was not in sufficient strength to occupy Friedland itself, a very fortunate circumstance, for by so doing he would have prevented general Benningsen from committing a very serious error, and would have snatched from Napoleon one of his greatest triumphs.

In fact, at this moment, the whole Russian army was approaching Friedland, preceded by thirty-three squadrons of horse, of which eighteen were of the imperial guard, by the infantry of this guard, and by twenty pieces of light artillery. The main body of the army would enter in a few hours. General Benningsen, feeling that he must hasten on to save Kœnigsberg, or at least to save himself behind the Pregel, had marched the whole of the night between the 11th and 12th, in order to reach Bartenstein, had there given several hours' rest to his men, had again put them in march upon Schippenbeil, which he had reached on the 13th, and then, learning that the French had appeared at Domnau, had hastened to reach Friedland, a point where the Alle, as we have just said, approaches nearer to Kœnigsberg than in any other part of its course. He had taken care to send forward a very strong advanced guard of cavalry.

Lannes, established at Posthenen, was unable until daybreak to appreciate the importance of the event, which was in embryo. Twilight in those countries approaching the poles commences in the month of June at 2 o'clock in the morning. The sky was entirely cleared by 3 o'clock. Marshal Lannes shortly saw the nature of the ground, the troops in occupation of it, and those who were crossing by the bridges of the Alle to dispute with the French the road to Kœnigsberg.

The course of the Alle, at the place where the two armies were about to meet, exhibits numerous sinuosities. It is approached by wooded hills, on quitting which the ground slopes gradually down to the banks of the river. At this season of the year the country is covered by crops of rye of great height. On the French right was seen the Alle running far into the plain in many windings, then turning round Friedland, coming back towards the French left, and thus tracing an angle open on the French side, and of which the little town of Friedland formed the further extremity. By the bridges of Friedland placed over this portion of the Alle, the Russians were seen advancing to open upon the plain opposite to the French. The last could very distinctly see them pressing towards the bridges, traversing the town, emerging from its suburbs, and ranging themselves in battle array opposite the heights. A brook called the Mill-brook (Mühlen Flüss) flowing towards Friedland, there formed a small pond, and thence ran on to join the Alle, after having divided the plain into two unequal parts. The part that was to the French right was the least extensive. On that was seen Friedland, between the Mill-brook and the Alle, at the extreme point of the angle just described.

Marshal Lannes, in the hurry of his march, had only led on with him the grenadiers and light infantry of Oudinot, the 9th hussars, Grouchy's dragoons, and two regiments of Saxon cavalry. He had not more than 10,000 [1] to oppose to the vanguard of the enemy, which, being successively reinforced, was already triple that number, and would soon be followed by the whole Russian army. The nature of the ground was fortunately such as presented numerous resources to the courage and skill of that illustrious marshal. In the centre of the position which he had to occupy to stop the progress of the Russians, was a village, that of Posthenen, through which flowed the Mill-brook on its way to Friedland. A little in the rear of this rose an elevated spot of ground, from whence the plain of the Alle was commanded. There Lannes placed his artillery, and several battalions of his grenadiers, in order to protect it. On the right, a thick wood, that of Sortlack, jutted out, and divided the space comprised between the village of Posthenen and the banks of the Alle. Lannes posted there two battalions of light infantry, that, being scattered as riflemen, might be able for a long time to keep back any troops that were not both very numerous and very resolute. The 9th hussars, Grouchy's dragoons, and the Saxon horse, made up a body of 3000 cavalry ready to attack any column that might endeavour to pierce through this curtain of riflemen. To the left of Posthenen, the line of wooded heights extended itself, descending as far as the village of Heinrichsdorf, through which ran the high road from Friedland to Kœnigsberg. This was a point of great importance, since the Russians, in wishing to reach Kœnigsberg, would surely dispute the passage with obstinacy. This side of the field, moreover, being open, was naturally the most difficult to defend. Lannes, as yet without sufficient troops to establish himself there, had taken advantage of the woods and heights, and placed upon his left the remainder of his battalions, thereby approaching, without being able to occupy, the houses of Heinrichsdorf.

The firing commenced at three o'clock in the morning, and all at once became very warm. The French artillery, posted on the elevated ground of Posthenen under the protection of the grenadiers of Oudinot, kept the Russians at a distance, and inflicted on them a heavy loss. To the right, the French light troops, scattered along the skirts of the wood of Sortlack, kept back the Russian infantry by an incessant discharge of musketry, and the Saxon horse, led on by general Grouchy, executed brilliant charges against their cavalry. As the Russians were threatening Heinrichsdorf, general Grouchy moved himself from the right to the left, repairing thither at full gallop, in order to dispute with them the road to Kœnigsberg, which was the important point for the possession of which such streams of blood were about to be shed.

Although marshal Lannes at this early moment had but 10,000 men to oppose to 25,000 or 30,000 of the enemy, he maintained his ground by means of his skill and energy, and the skilful concurrence of general Oudinot commanding the grenadiers, and general Grouchy, who was in command of the cavalry. But the enemy was reinforced hourly; and general Benningsen, arrived at Friedland, had suddenly determined on giving battle,—a very rash design; for it would have been much more politic in him to continue the descent of the Alle, as far as its junction with the Pregel, then to cover himself by the Pregel, and to take up a position be-

[1] Oudinot 7000
Grouchy 1800
9th hussars, light horse, and Saxon cuirassiers 1200
10,000

hind that river, with his left at Wehlau and his right on Kœnigsberg. It is true that this would have made him a day longer in reaching Kœnigsberg; but he would not have risked a battle against an army superior to his own in number, in quality, in command, and in a very bad situation for him, since he had a river at his back, and he might probably be driven into the angle of the Alle by that overpowering vigour of which the French army was so capable. But after having lost so much time in reaching Kœnigsberg, that general now seemed extremely impatient to arrive there. It is said he was stimulated to this by the emperor Alexander, who had promised his friend Frederick-William to save this last wreck of the Prussian monarchy. The road by Friedland was besides much shorter, and he moreover believed he should find there only an isolated French corps, without support, and fancied he might crush that corps before he entered Kœnigsberg. He persuaded himself that here was an unexpected favour of fortune, by which it was his duty to profit, and he resolved not to allow it to escape him.

In consequence, he hastened to throw three other bridges across the Alle, one above and two below Friedland, so as to accelerate the passage of his troops, and also to serve as a means of retreat. He lined the right bank of the river, by which he arrived with artillery, in order to command the left bank; and nearly the whole of his army being opened out, he disposed it in the following manner. In the plain round about Heinrichsdorf, on his right, but on the French left, he placed four divisions of infantry under lieutenant-general Gortschakow, and the best part of the cavalry under general Uwarow. The infantry was formed in two lines. In the first two battalions of each regiment were seen drawn up in line, and a third, ranged in close column behind the two others, closing the interval which separated them. In the second line, the field of battle narrowing as it drew towards the angle of the Alle, one battalion only was opened out, and two drawn up in close column. The cavalry, being posted on the side and somewhat to the front, flanked the infantry. To the left (the French right), two Russian divisions, of which the imperial guard formed part, collected from different detachments of chasseurs, occupied that portion of the ground between the Mill-brook and the Alle. These were drawn up in two lines, but very near together for want of space. Prince Bagration commanded them. The cavalry of the guard was there under general Kologribow. Four flying bridges had been thrown over the Mill-brook to facilitate the communication between the two wings. The 14th Russian division had been left on the other side of the Alle, on the commanding ground of the right bank, to receive and rally the army in case of any misfortune, and to push forward and decide the victory in case of a successful beginning. The Russians reckoned more than 200 pieces of cannon in their front, independently of those they had in reserve or in battery on the right bank. Their army, reduced to 80,000 or 82,000 men after the battle of Heilsberg, and on this day separated from the corps under Kamenski, and some detachments of cavalry sent to Wehlau to guard the bridges of the Alle, nevertheless mounted up to from 72,000 to 75,000 men.

General Bennigsen sent forward, in the order we have just described, the mass of the Russian army; so that in emerging from the confined space formed by the course of the Alle, it might open its ranks, extend its fire, and profit from the advantage of numbers which it possessed at the commencement of the conflict.

Lannes' situation was become dangerous. He was about to have upon him the whole Russian army. Fortunately, the time that had elapsed had brought him some reinforcements. The division of heavy cavalry of general Nansouty, which was composed of 3500 cuirassiers and carabineers; Dupas' division, which was the first of Mortier's corps, and reckoned 6000 foot; and, at length, Verdier's division, which numbered 7000, and which formed the second of Lannes' corps, being put in march successively, had reached the ground in great haste. These made a force of 26,000 or 27,000 men[1] to struggle against 75,000. It was now seven o'clock in the morning, and the Russians, preceded by a cloud of Cossacks that extended their incursions up to the very rear of the French, advanced towards Heinrichsdorf, where they already had some infantry and guns. Lannes, appreciating the importance of this post, directed thither the grenadiers of Albert, and ordered general Grouchy to possess himself of it at any price. General Grouchy, just reinforced by the cuirassiers, repaired there on the instant. Without taking the difficulty into account, he flung Milet's brigade of dragoons upon Heinrichsdorf, while Carrié's brigade turned the village, and the cuirassiers advanced in support of this movement. Milet's brigade traversed Heinrichsdorf at full gallop, drove out the Russian infantry with the sabre, while Carrié's brigade, coming round, took or dispersed all those who had succeeded in escaping. They captured four pieces of cannon. At this moment the enemy's cavalry, come to the assistance of their infantry driven out of Heinrichsdorf, fell upon the French dragoons and drove them back. But Nansouty's cuirassiers charged them in turn, and threw them back upon the Russian infantry, who in the midst of this medley could not make any use of their fire-arms. The French thus remained masters of Heinrichsdorf, in which the grenadiers of Albert's brigade established themselves.

While this was going on, the division of Dupas entered into line. Marshal Mortier, whose horse was shot under him at the moment he appeared on the field of battle, posted this division between Heinrichsdorf and Posthenen, and opened upon the Russians a fire of artillery, which, directed from elevated ground upon close masses, made the most dreadful havoc in their ranks. The arrival of Dupas' division placed at disposal the battalions of grenadiers that had at first been drawn up on

[1]

Oudinot	7000
Verdier	7000
Cavalry of Lannes	1200
Dupas	6000
Nansouty	3500
Grouchy	1800
	26,500

the left of Posthenen. Lannes brought them nearer himself, so as to oppose their close ranks to the attacks of the Russians, either in front of Posthenen or in front of the wood of Sortlack. General Oudinot, who commanded them, taking advantage of every accident of the ground, sometimes of the clumps of wood spread here and there, sometimes of the marshes and water which the rains of the preceding days had left, and sometimes even of the height of the corn, disputed the ground with as much skill as ardour. By turns he concealed or showed his soldiers, dispersed them as sharpshooters, or opposed them as one bristling mass of bayonets to all the efforts of the Russians. These brave grenadiers, in spite of their inferiority of number, were obstinately maintaining their front, sustained by their general, when, happily for them, Verdier's division came up. Marshal Lannes divided it into two moving columns, so that they might be brought alternately to the right or to the left, to the centre,—every where, in short, in which danger required them. It was at the skirts of the wood of Sortlack, and the village of that name on the Alle, where the dispute now raged with the most fury. The Russians finished by remaining masters of the village; the French by holding possession of the borders of the wood. On the Russians endeavouring to penetrate into the wood, Lannes brought out of it on a sudden a brigade of Verdier's division, and repulsed them to some distance. Frightened by these sudden appearances, and fearing that Napoleon might be hidden in this mysterious wood with his army, the Russians no longer dared to approach it.

The enemy, unable to force the French right between Posthenen and Sortlack, now made a most vigorous attempt on their left in the plain of Heinrichsdorf, which presented fewer obstacles. The nature of the ground had led them to direct the major part of their cavalry to that side. They had there more than 12,000 horse, opposed to the 5000 or 6000 under general Grouchy. That general endeavoured to compensate for his inferiority of numbers by the excellence of his dispositions, and drew out into the plain a long line of cuirassiers; and on the flank of this line, behind the village of Heinrichsdorf, he placed his dragoons, the brigade of carabineers and his light artillery in reserve. These dispositions being effected, he put himself at the head of the line of cuirassiers, advanced upon the Russian cavalry as though he were going to charge them, then all at once coming about, he feigned a retreat at full trot before the mass of the enemy's squadrons. By this means he enticed them on so far after him, that in passing beyond Heinrichsdorf, they exposed their flank to the troops that were concealed in the rear of the village. Then halting and retracing his steps, Grouchy again led his cuirassiers upon the Russian cavalry, charged it, overthrew it, and obliged it to pass under Heinrichsdorf, whence a shower of grape shot poured upon it, and whence the dragoons and carabineers in ambuscade rushed out upon it, and finished by putting it into disorder. But the encounters of cavalry are not always so murderous as to prevent their renewal. The Russian cavalry returned to the charge; and the same manœuvre was repeated every time; general Grouchy drawing them beyond Heinrichsdorf, and taking them as before, both in flank and rear, as soon as they had cleared that village. After several similar contests, the plain of Heinrichsdorf remained in the possession of the French; covered with the dead bodies of men, horses, dismounted troopers, and glittering cuirasses.

Thus, although on one side the resistance that the infantry of the Russians met with on the borders of the forest of Sortlack, and on the other the attacks in flank which their cavalry suffered whenever they passed the village of Heinrichsdorf, still kept them at the foot of the French positions; yet Lannes was not in a situation to prolong the struggle between 26,000 and 75,000 men until midday. It was time that Napoleon should arrive with the remainder of the army.

Lannes, desirous of informing the emperor of all that was passing, had sent to him almost all his aides-de-camp, one after another, ordering them to kill their horses, but to find him. They met him, coming at a gallop towards Friedland, joy visible in his countenance. "To-day," said he to those he met, "to-day is the 14th of June, the anniversary of Marengo; it is a fortunate day for us!" Napoleon being on horseback, in advancing faster than the troops, passed successively, with speed, the long files of the guard, the corps of Ney, and that of Bernadotte, all in full march for Posthenen. He had saluted as he passed, Dupont's fine division, which, from Ulm down to Braunsburg, had never failed to distinguish itself, but always hitherto out of his presence. He now expressed to them the pleasure he should have in witnessing their valour under his own eyes.

The presence of Napoleon at Posthenen filled his soldiers and generals with fresh ardour. Lannes, Mortier, and Oudinot, who had been there since the morning, and they who had just come up, surrounded him in high satisfaction. The brave Oudinot, hastening forward, his clothes pierced with balls, and his horse covered with blood, said to the emperor, "Make haste, sire, my grenadiers can do no more; only give me a reinforcement, and I will drive these Russians into the water." Napoleon, sweeping over the plain with his telescope, where the Russians, pent up in the angle of the Alle, were vainly endeavouring to extend themselves, soon judged rightly of their dangerous situation, and the singularly favourable situation which fortune presented to him—governed, it must be confessed, by his genius, because the Russians committed the fault at this moment, (which it may be said he led them into committing,) by pushing them to the other side of the Alle, and thus reducing them to the necessity of passing in his front, in order to succour Kœnigsberg. The day was already far advanced. It was not possible to collect the French army together under several hours. Some of Napoleon's officers thought it would be better to delay giving battle until the next day. "No, no," observed Napoleon, "we do not surprise an enemy twice in a similar error." He immediately made his preparations for the attack, and they were worthy of his marvellous perspicuity.

To drive the Russians into the Alle was the point that every one, down to the lowest soldier, saw was the main object of the battle. The question was how to manage it so as to procure that

result, and render it as complete as possible. At the bottom of the elbow formed by the Alle, in which the Russian army was engulphed, there was a decisive point to be gained and kept possession of. This point was the little town of Friedland, situated on the right of the French, between the Mill-brook and the river Alle. The four bridges, which formed the only means of retreat for the Russian army, were situated there; and Napoleon, in consequence, purposed to direct all his efforts against that point. He appointed the corps of Ney to fulfil the glorious but difficult task of penetrating into this gulf, and of carrying Friedland at any cost, despite the obstinate resistance which the Russians would be certain to oppose to any attempt at seizing their bridges, and thus cutting them off from every means of securing their safety. In the meanwhile he resolved, during the time he was acting with vigour on his right, to suspend all efforts upon his left; to occupy the attention of the Russian army there by a feigned attack, and not to press the enemy until the bridges on the right should be secured; he would then be certain, by a strong effort, of forcing the enemy to retreat to where there was no outlet.

Surrounded by his officers, he explained, with the force and precision of language to which he was accustomed, the part which each had to take in the approaching combat. Seizing marshal Ney by the arm, he pointed out Friedland, with the bridges, and the Russians crowded in advance of them. "There," said he, "is your object; march there, and think of nothing that is going on around you. Penetrate into that dense mass, whatever be the price you pay. Enter Friedland, take the bridges, and regard not what may pass on your right, your left, or in your rear; the army and I will watch over that."

Ney, boiling with ardour, and proud of the formidable task assigned to him, started off in a gallop, in order to array his troops before the wood of Sortlack. Napoleon, struck with his martial bearing, and addressing marshal Mortier, said, "That man is a lion[1]." Napoleon had his arrangements written down on the spot, from his own dictation, in order that all his generals might have them in their minds, and none be liable to commit a mistake. He placed the corps of marshal Ney on the right, in such a manner that Lannes, bringing back the division of Verdier upon Posthenen, would present two strong lines with that and the grenadiers. He placed Bernadotte's corps, at that moment under Victor, between Ney and Lannes, a little in advance of Posthenen, partly concealed by the inequalities of the ground. The fine division of Dupont formed the van of this corps. On the level behind Posthenen, Napoleon placed the imperial guard, the infantry, in three close columns, the cavalry, in two lines. Between Posthenen and Heinrichsdorf was the corps of marshal Mortier, posted as it was in the morning, but more concentrated; augmented, too, with the young fusiliers of the imperial guard. A battalion of the fourth light infantry, and the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, had replaced in Heinrichsdorf, the grenadiers of Albert's brigade. The Polish division of Dombrowski had rejoined that of Dupas, and guarded the artillery. Napoleon left to general Grouchy the task of which he had already so well acquitted himself—that of defending the plains of Heinrichsdorf. He added to the dragoons and cuirassiers, which that general commanded, the light cavalry of generals Beaumont and Colbert, to help in keeping him clear of the Cossacks. Finally, having two other divisions of dragoons to spare, he placed that of general Latour Maubourg, reinforced by the Dutch cuirassiers, behind the corps of marshal Ney; and that of general La Houssaye, reinforced by the Saxon cuirassiers, behind the corps of Victor. The French, in this imposing array, were not less than eighty thousand men[1]. The order

[1] I had these details from marshal Mortier himself, whom I had the honour of knowing, and who often related them to me.—*Author's note.*

[1] Nothing is more difficult than to reckon with rigorous exactness the strength of an army on the day of battle. There are rarely any authentic statements; and, when statements are procurable, it is still a more rare circumstance for them to agree with the real facts. M. Derode, in an excellent description of the battle of Friedland, has used a statement extracted from the work of general Mathew Dumas,—a statement which, although it was taken from the papers in the war-office, is incorrect upon several points. In the offices of the minister in Paris, there are statements which do not always correspond with the facts which took place on the Vistula. There exist in the Louvre, in the rich depository of the Napoleon papers, memorandum-books which he made himself, had always at hand, and that, renewed monthly, contained an accurate description of each of the corps acting under his orders. These books have writing only on one side of the leaves, and on the other side there are sometimes noted in red ink the changes that happened during the month. It is in these small books, not taking them for a proper groundwork, and upon the condition of continually modifying the data so given, that an approximation to the truth must be looked for. I have not found those for May, June, and July, 1807, and have in consequence been forced to take those for March and August, though that for March is incomplete, since the army had not then received the reinforcements which were added to it in May and June, and that for August is, on the contrary, too full, as at that period a considerable number of troops upon the march during the events which took place in June had joined. But by using these statements, and comparing them together, and above all rectifying them by Napoleon's correspondence, and further, by gaining information in regard to the battle of Friedland by a note in his own handwriting, which gives the strength of several of the corps that were in that battle, the following computation, which, there is reason to believe, is very near the truth, is arrived at. I would add, that this approximation to the truth will suffice, because, to judge of a great event like Friedland or Austerlitz, it is of very small importance to discover whether eighty or eighty-two thousand men were engaged. Two or three thousand fighting men, more or less, make no change either in the character of the event itself, or in the combinations which decide it. If it is the duty of the historian not to spare any pains to arrive at the real truth, it is because he ought to make it habitual, in order that he may never suffer his scrupulous regard for truth to relax; but the thing of most importance here is the general character, not the minute details.

The most correct account, therefore, of the force of the French army in the battle of Friedland, seems to be as follows:

The guard, though increased to 9000 men, had not with it either the seamen or dragoons, and had suffered a consi-

was repeated to the left not to advance, but simply to restrain the Russians until the success of the attack on the right should be decided. The signal for which Napoleon ordered the troops to wait, before the firing recommenced, was from a battery of twenty pieces of cannon, placed above Posthenen.

The Russian general, struck at observing the mode of the French formation, discovered the error which he had committed in imagining he had to do with the corps of marshal Lannes alone. Surprised, he very naturally hesitated, and his hesitation produced a species of relaxation in the action. Occasional discharges of artillery alone indicated the continuance of the battle. Napoleon, who wished to have all his force in line, rested for a full hour. Abundantly supplied with ammunition, he was not pushed to make a commencement; and he resisted the impatience of his general officers, well knowing, that in the existing season in that country, the light continued until ten o'clock, and that he should have time to make the Russian army undergo the disaster which he had in preparation for it. At length the moment which appeared auspicious arrived, and he gave the signal. The twenty pieces of cannon at the battery of Posthenen fired all at one time; the artillery of the army answered along the whole line; and at the signal, till now impatiently expected, marshal Ney moved off his corps to the attack.

The division of Marchand issued from the wood of Sortlack in *échellons;* that division first, to the right, and Bisson's division second, to the left. Both were preceded by a cloud of sharpshooters, who, on approaching the enemy, turned about and re-entered the ranks. The whole marched resolutely upon the Russians, and took the village of

derable loss in fusiliers. There were present at most 7500

The note of Napoleon above mentioned computes Oudinot's grenadiers at	7000
Verdier's division	8000
The Saxon infantry	4000
The 9th hussars	400
The Saxon cuirassiers	600
The Saxon light horse	200
Making for the total corps of Lannes	20,200

But the Saxons had been left at Heilsberg, except three battalions, which, according to some accounts, were at Friedland. Verdier's division had suffered great loss at Heilsberg, and finally the troops had marched very fast. I think, therefore, it will be pretty nearly correct to set down the corps of Lannes as follows:

Oudinot	7000
Verdier	6500
Saxons	1200
Cavalry	1200
The artillery is included in the divisions of infantry	15,900

The corps of marshal Ney amounted to 16,000 or 17,000 men present under arms at the moment of taking the field, proved by a letter from Ney to Napoleon. He had not lost fewer than from 2000 to 2500 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the combats of Guttstadt and Deppen. Taking his marches into the reckoning, he had for his corps, say more or less . . 14,000

Marshal Mortier, according to the note of Napoleon already mentioned, had in Dupas' division	6400
In Dombrowski's division	4000
He had a detachment of Dutch horse, the description of which in the note is uncertain	1500
	11,900

Knowing from marshal Lefebvre's letters how the Poles acted, and how steadily they followed their colours, the corps of marshal Mortier cannot be counted at more therefore than 10,000

The corps of marshal Bernadotte, commanded by general Victor, had in the month of March, without the division of dragoons, about 22,000 men present under arms. It was afterwards recruited, but as it left several posts behind it, if it amounted to 25,000 men, it could not have taken to Friedland above 22,000

The cavalry included general Nansouty's cuirassiers, from which must be excepted the losses on the march, those at Heilsberg, &c.	3500
Grouchy's dragoons	1800
La Houssaye's dragoons	1800
Latour Maubourg's dragoons, six regiments	2400
Light cavalry of generals Beaumont and Colbert	2000
	11,500
Thus there stands for the total army	80,900

It may be said, therefore, that the French army was about 80,000 men at Friedland, of whom, it will be seen, 25,000 never fired a shot. There was, in addition, the corps of marshal Davout, which had not fought, and which amounted to 29,000 or 30,000 men at the commencement of the campaign, but to 28,000 if allowance is made for those left behind on the march; marshal Soult's, which had lost about 5000 men at Heilsberg, and could scarcely exceed 27,000; lastly, Murat, with about 10,000 men. The whole would make the total of the army in movement at the moment—

At Friedland		80,000
Before Kœnigsberg, or on march there	Davout	28,000
	Soult	27,000
	Murat	10,000
		145,000

This total of 145,000 men in action would well agree with the force existing on the 5th of June, and with the probable losses sustained since that date in various actions. Calculating those losses at 12,000 or 15,000 men, in killed, wounded, prisoners, or skulkers, the 160,000 men at the commencement of the campaign are thus accounted for. Although these numbers are borrowed from the sole documents worthy of credit, modified by a daily correspondence, they must be regarded as an approximation to the fact, and nothing more. If we have gone into the details, it was to give some idea of the difficulty of arriving, in things of a similar kind, at a rigorous exactness. But it must be repeated, if the historian, that he may not swerve from his duty, would aspire after correctness, posterity, which reads him, judging by his efforts to obtain it, will content itself with the general fact as to details and numbers. It is this general truth which is of importance to him, and which suffices him, because it is this which constitutes the real character both of things and circumstances.—*Author's note.*

Sortlack, so long contested. Their cavalry, in order to stay the offensive movement, charged Marchand's division, when the dragoons of Latour Maubourg, and the Dutch cuirassiers, passing through the intervals of the French battalions, charged this cavalry in their turn, drove it back upon the infantry, and pushing the Russians close to the Alle, precipitated a great number into the bed of the river, down the steep and high bank. Some saved themselves by swimming, but a great many were drowned [1]. Having his right once supported upon the Alle, marshal Ney slackened its march, and carried forward his left, composed of Bisson's division, in such a manner as to throw back the Russians into the narrow space comprised between the Mill-brook and the river Alle. When he arrived at this point, the fire of the Russian artillery redoubled. Besides the batteries which the Russians had in front, he had to sustain the fire of those which were upon the right bank of the Alle, and which it was impossible for him to get rid of by capture, because they were separated from him by the river itself. The French columns, assailed in front and flank by cannon balls, supported, with admirable coolness, that horrible convergence of fire. Marshal Ney, galloping from one end of the line to the other, sustained the fortitude of his soldiers by his heroic countenance. Still, entire files were swept away; and the fire became so hot, that the bravest troops could not have much longer supported it. At this appearance of things, the cavalry of the Russian guard, commanded by general Kollogribow, charged at a gallop, in order to throw into confusion the infantry of Bisson's division, which appeared to him to be wavering. For the first time shaken, that valiant body of infantry lost ground, and several battalions gave way to the rear. General Bisson, who from his height of stature looked over the lines of his soldiers, endeavoured vainly to restrain them. They retired, grouping around their officers. The situation of things became of the most serious character. Fortunately, general Dupont, placed at some distance on the left of Ney's corps, observed the commencement of the confusion; and without waiting for an order to march, moved his division, passed himself along its front, recalled to it the memory of Ulm, Dirnstein, and Halle, and then led it to encounter the Russians. It advanced in the finest attitude, under the balls of that frightful artillery; while the dragoons of Latour Maubourg, returning to the charge, threw themselves on the Russian cavalry, which had dispersed in pursuit of the French infantry, and was successful in forcing it back. Dupont's division continued its movement over the open space, and supporting its left on the Mill-brook, obliged the Russian infantry to halt. Its presence restored confidence and joy to the soldiers of Ney. The battalions of Bisson reformed; and the whole French line restored, recommenced its march forward. It was absolutely necessary to answer the formidable artillery of the enemy; that of Ney, consisting of too few guns, was scarcely able to remain in battery before that of the Russians. Napoleon ordered general Victor to bring together all the cannon of his divisions, and to range them in battery in front of Ney. The intrepid and able general, Senarmont, commanded that artillery. He led it forward at full trot, joined it to that of marshal Ney, took it several hundred paces in advance of the French infantry, and placing himself audaciously in front of the Russians, opened upon them a fire, rendered terrible from the number of pieces, and the accuracy of direction. Pointing against the enemy on the right bank of the river one of his batteries, he soon silenced those which the enemy had on that side; then pushing forward his line of guns, he gradually approached within grape-shot distance, and firing into the deep masses, which accumulated and retrograded into the elbow of the Alle, he made frightful ravage among them. The French line of infantry followed the movement, and advanced under the protection of the numerous artillery of general Senarmont. The Russians, always more and more crowding back into the gulf, felt a species of desperation, and made an effort to disengage themselves. The Russian imperial guard, supported on the Mill-brook, and half concealed in the ravine, which served for the bed of the stream, issued from their retreat, and marched, with the bayonet, upon the division of Dupont, which was also placed along the rivulet. The last did not wait for the Russian guard, but went straight towards it, and charging with the bayonet, repulsed it, and drove it back to the ravine. The Russians threw themselves, some beyond the ravine, and others upon the suburbs of Friedland. General Dupont, with a part of his divisions, passed the Mill-brook, drove before him all whom he encountered, and thus found himself in the rear of the right wing of the Russians engaged with the French left, in the plain of Heinrichsdorf. He turned Friedland, and attacked it by the Kœnigsberg road; whilst Ney, continuing his direct march, entered it by that of Eylau. A dreadful conflict ensued at the gates of the town. The Russians were pressed on all sides by the French, who penetrated into the streets in pursuit, and drove them on the bridges of the Alle, which the artillery of general Senarmont, that remained outside, enfiladed with his howitzers. The Russians threw themselves upon the bridges to find a refuge in the ranks of the fourteenth division, left in reserve on the other side of the Alle by general Benningsen. This unfortunate general, filled with grief, had hastened to this division, in order to march to the bank of the river, to the aid of his army in its perilous situation. Scarcely had some of the wreck of his left wing passed the bridges, when they were destroyed, having been set on fire by the French, and by the Russians themselves, in their efforts to prevent it. Ney and Dupont having executed their task, met in the centre of Friedland in flames, and felicitated each other on their glorious successes.

Napoleon had not ceased to follow with his eyes the operations of this grand spectacle, from where he had placed himself in the centre of the divisions which he had kept in reserve. While he contemplated them attentively, a shell passed above the bayonets of the soldiers, and one of them, by an instinctive movement, stooped his head. "If that shell was destined for you," Napoleon said to him with a smile, "you might have concealed

[1] Marshal Ney, in his report, stated the numbers to be 2000.—*Author's note.*

yourself a hundred feet under ground, it would have searched you out!" It was thus he wished to inculcate the useful belief, that fate strikes alike the coward and the brave; and that the cowardice which seeks safety by concealment dishonours man uselessly.

Seeing Friedland occupied, and the bridges over the Alle destroyed, Napoleon, lastly, pushed his left in advance upon the right wing of the Russian army; deprived of every means of retreat, from having in its rear a river without bridges. General Gortschakoff, who commanded that wing, perceiving the danger which threatened him, would fain avert the storm by making an attack upon the French line, which extended from Posthenen to Heinrichsdorf, formed by the corps of marshal Lannes; by that of Mortier, and by the cavalry of general Grouchy. But Lannes, with his grenadiers, made head against the Russians. Marshal Mortier, with the fifteenth regiment, and the fusiliers of the guard, opposed to them a barrier of iron. The artillery of Mortier above all, directed by colonel Balbois and by an excellent Dutch officer, M. Vanbrienen, caused them incalculable losses. Finally, Napoleon, desiring to profit by the remainder of daylight, carried his whole line in advance, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, moving forward at the same time. General Gortcshakoff, while he saw himself thus pressed, learned that Friedland was occupied by the French. He wishing to retake it, directed a column of infantry upon the gates of the town. This column penetrated into the place, and for a moment drove back the soldiers of Ney and Dupont; until these in their turn repulsed the Russian column. A new contest thus ensued in the middle of an unfortunate city, devoured by the flames, the possession being disputed by the light of the fire which consumed it. The French finally remained masters, and drove back the corps of Gortschakoff upon the plain, destitute of outlet, which had before served for the field of battle. Gortschakoff 's infantry defended itself bravely, and sooner than surrender, threw itself into the Alle. A part was fortunate enough to find fordable places and safety; another part, not so fortunate, perished in the river. All the Russian artillery remained in the hands of the French. One column, that which was farthest on the Russian right, under general Lambert, fled, descending the river together with a part of the cavalry. The obscurity of night and the disorder inevitable under a victory, facilitated their retreat, and they succeeded in escaping.

It was half-past ten at night. The victory was complete on the left and right. Napoleon in his vast career had never obtained one more splendid. He had for the trophies of his success, eighty pieces of cannon; but few prisoners it is true, because the Russians had shown they would rather drown themselves than surrender; but 25,000 men killed, wounded, or drowned, covered with their remains both the banks of the Alle. The right bank, to which great numbers had dragged themselves, presented almost as frightful a spectacle as the left. Several columns of flame, rising from Friedland and the neighbouring villages, cast an ominous light over the place; the scene of sorrow for one party, and of joy for the other. The French had to regret upwards of 7000 or 8000 men killed and wounded. Of nearly 80,000 French, 25,000 had not fired a single round. The Russian army, weakened by 25,000 fighting men, deprived besides of a great number who had wandered out of the way, was incapable of continuing the campaign. Napoleon owed this noble triumph as much to the general conception of the campaign as to the plan itself of the battle. In taking the Passarge as the base of operations for many months before, and in assuring himself thus in advance, and in any case of the means of separating the Russians from Kœnigsberg, by marching from Guttstadt to Friedland, in such a manner as to outflank them, he had reduced them to commit a serious imprudence in order to gain Kœnigsberg, and merited of fortune the lucky chance of finding them at Friedland, and of encountering them with their backs to the Alle. Always disposing his troops with rare skill, he had known, while he sent sixty and odd thousand men upon Kœnigsberg, how to present 80,000 to the enemy at Friedland; and, as has been seen, he did not need so many to overwhelm the Russian army.

Napoleon slept upon the field of battle, surrounded by his soldiers, as joyous upon this occasion as they had been at Austerlitz and Jena, crying, "Long live the Emperor!" while they had at the same time nothing to eat, but a morsel of bread brought in their knapsacks; content with the noblest enjoyment of victory—that of glory. The Russian army, cut in two, descended the Alle on a clear, transparent night, its spirit in despair, although it had fulfilled all its duty. Fortunately for that army, Napoleon had not at that moment under hand but a moiety of his cavalry. If he had had the other half, with Murat himself, the Russian corps which had descended the Alle, under general Lambert, would have been all taken.

The retreat of the Russians was so rapid, that on the following day, June 15th, they had reached the Pregel, at Wehlau. They cut away all the bridges, and on the 16th, in the morning, they were established a little beyond the Pregel, at Petersdorf, only waiting in order to retire upon the Niemen, until the detached corps of generals Kamenski and Lestocq, incapable of defending Kœnigsberg against the victorious French army, should rejoin them, in order to operate a retreat together.

Napoleon, the day after the battle of Friedland, did not lose an instant in drawing from his victory every possible advantage. After having, according to his custom, visited the field of battle, shown the strongest interest for the care of the wounded, announced to his soldiers the rewards that his great good fortune permitted him to promise and bestow, he set out for the Pregel, preceded by the whole of his cavalry, which went in pursuit of the Russians, descending both the banks of the Alle. But the Russians were twelve hours in advance. It had been impossible not to give some repose to soldiers who had marched all the preceding night to arrive on the field of battle, and who were fighting all day afterwards, from two in the morning until ten at night. The Russians had thus gained the advantage of some hours, and, retreating with the speed of an army which was only able to find safety in flight, it was not possible for the French to flatter themselves that they could reach

the Pregel before them. When they arrived there all the bridges were broken down. Napoleon hastened to restore them, and ordered the necessary dispositions to be made for securing between the Pregel and the Niemen all captures which there had not been time to make between Friedland and Wehlau.

During the time he was occupied with the Russian army at Friedland, marshals Soult and Davout, preceded by Murat, had marched upon Kœnigsberg. Marshal Soult had encountered the rear-guard of general Lestocq, had taken from him an entire battalion, and, near Kœnigsberg itself, had surrounded and taken a column of twelve or fifteen hundred men, who had not retreated quick enough from the environs of Braunsberg. He appeared, on the 14th of June, under the walls of Kœnigsberg, too well defended to render the capture possible by a brisk attack. On that side, Davout and Murat, having received orders to return upon Friedland, in case the battle should last more than one day, had both, the one and the other, quitted marshal Soult to proceed to the right upon Wehlau. A new order had met them on their way, and, having apprised them of the victory of Friedland, and the retreat of the Russians, they were directed on the Pregel, at Tapiau, an intermediate point between Kœnigsberg and Wehlau. After having got together the means for passing the Pregel, they crossed it in order to intercept as many as they could of the Russian troops who were in flight.

At the intelligence of the battle of Friedland, the Prussian and Russian detachments which guarded Kœnigsberg did not hesitate to evacuate that place, which was not in a state to sustain a siege like that of Dantzick. Already had the court of Prussia taken refuge in the small frontier town of Memel, the last of the kingdom founded by the great Frederick. Generals Lestocq and Kamenski therefore retired, abandoning immense stores, as well as the sick and wounded of the two armies that had accumulated in Kœnigsberg. A battalion, left to stipulate the terms of capitulation, delivered the city to marshal Soult, who was able to enter it immediately. There were found in Kœnigsberg wine, corn, a hundred thousand muskets sent by England, and still on board the ships which had brought them; and, lastly, a considerable number of wounded, who had been there since the battle of Eylau. The villages around contained several thousands. Generals Lestocq and Kamenski bringing back their troops in all haste by the road from Kœnigsberg to Tilsit, were able to throw themselves into the forest of Baum before marshal Davout and prince Murat had intercepted the road from Tapiau to Labiau. Still they were unable to join general Benningsen, without leaving three thousand prisoners in the hands of marshal Davout.

Napoleon arrived at Wehlau, and continued the pursuit of the Russian army without relaxing. He laid traps for detached corps so as to capture those which might be still behind. He kept marshal Soult at Kœnigsberg, to establish himself there, and immediately commence the attack of Pillau. This little fort taken, the garrison of Kœnigsberg could give the hand, by the Nehrung, to the garrison of Dantzick, and close the Frische Haff against the English, of which the seamen of the guard held the navigation. Napoleon sent his aide-de-camp Savary to take the command of the citadel of Kœnigsberg, as he had sent Rapp to Dantzick, with the intention of preventing the waste of the stores taken from the enemy, and of creating a new depôt. Marshal Davout was ordered to march upon Labian, the point where all the interior navigation of the neighbouring provinces terminates in the Baltic Sea, and gave him a corps of several thousand cavalry under general Grouchy to capture the Russian detachments left behind. He sent off Murat with the main body of the cavalry on the direct road from Wehlau to Tilsit, and detached after him immediately the corps of Mortier, Lannes, Victor, and Ney. The corps of Davout was in case of necessity to unite itself with the army by a single march. Napoleon was thus in a position to crush the Russians, if they had the presumption to halt again for the purpose of fighting. Upon the right he threw out 2000 light cavalry, hussars, and chasseurs, for the purpose of remounting the Pregel and barring the road to all that might seek to retire on that side, wounded, sick, convoys, or stragglers.

These able dispositions caused the capture of several thousand prisoners and of divers convoys of provisions, but they were not sufficient to cause a fresh battle with the Russians. Hastening to take refuge behind the Niemen, they arrived there on the 18th of June, passed that river on the 19th, and destroyed all the means of passage for a considerable space up and down the river. On the 19th the French scouts, having pursued some Kalmuck troops armed with bows and arrows, which highly amused them, not accustomed to that species of enemy, pushed forward to the Niemen, and saw the Russian army on the other side of that river, encamped behind that bulwark of the empire which it had been so impatient to reach.

There was to terminate the bold march of the French army, which departed from the camp of Boulogne in September, 1805, traversed the continent of Europe through its greatest breadth, and in twenty months vanquished all the armies of Europe. The new Alexander was about to rest at last, not through the fatigues of his soldiers, who were ready still to follow wherever he might desire to lead them, but by the exhausted state of his enemies, incapable of longer resistance, and obliged to ask of him the peace which but a few days before they had had the imprudence to refuse.

The king of Prussia had left at Memel the queen, his consort, the afflicted instigator of that unhappy war, in order to join the emperor Alexander on the banks of the Niemen. The modest Frederick William, although he did not partake of the foolish illusions to which the battle of Eylau had given birth in his young ally, suffered himself, notwithstanding, to be drawn into a refusal of a peace, and foresaw that he should have to pay for it with the greater part of his dominions. Alexander was dispirited as much as he was the day after the battle of Austerlitz. He was annoyed, on account of recent events, with general Benningsen, who had promised what he was unable to fulfil; and he felt that he no longer had strength to continue the war. His army, too, called loudly for peace. It

was not dissatisfied with itself, because it had the consciousness that it had conducted itself well at Heilsberg and Friedland, but it considered itself unable to resist the army of Napoleon, now united together since the capture of Kœnigsberg, and reinforced by Massena, who had at Durczewo repulsed Tolstoy's corps. The French were thus able to oppose 170,000 men to the 70,000 Russian and Prussian troops which were still left. The Russian army demanded for what purpose the war was carried on; was it for the Prussians, who could not defend their own country? for the English, who, after having so often announced succour, sent none, and thought only of conquering colonies? The contempt thus shown for the Prussians was unjust, because they had bravely borne themselves in the late affairs, and done all which their small numbers permitted them to attempt. The Prussians in their turn complained of the barbarity, of the ignorance, and of the devastating ferocity of their allies. They both agreed upon the subject of the English. The English might, in effect, have been able, in landing either at Stralsund or Dantzick, to have brought useful aid, and perhaps have changed, or at least retarded, the march of events. But they had shown no activity except in sending expeditions to the Spanish colonies, and in the subsidies themselves, that in place of armies constituted their sole co-operation; they had chaffered and haggled, until the king of Sweden grew cool, and became sickened of the war. It is a consolation under misfortune to have the resource of complaint left; and at this moment both the Russians and Prussians exclaimed loudly against the British cabinet. The Russian officers especially spoke out, and declared that it was for the English, and on account of their miserable ambition, that brave men were set to quarrel who had no reason for hating each other, nor even for being jealous; since, after all, Russia and France had nothing for which to be envious of one another.

The two vanquished monarchs partook in the rancour of their soldiers against England, and the more because they felt the necessity of separating from her, in order to obtain peace immediately. The king of Prussia, who could have wished it earlier, and who foresaw how dearly he should pay for having delayed it, was of the opinion, that without any complaining they should ask it of Napoleon; and he left to the emperor Alexander the care of negotiating it. He hoped that his friend, who had alone desired this unfortunate prolongation of the war, would support his cause in the negotiations better than in the field of battle. It was in consequence agreed that they should propose an armistice, and that when it was obtained the emperor Alexander should manage to obtain an interview with Napoleon. It was known by experience how sensitive he was on the morrow of his victories to the consideration of sovereigns who were enemies; and the recollection of all that which the emperor Francis obtained of him at the quarters of Urschitz, gave the hope of a peace less detrimental than there was ground to fear; if not for Russia, which had nothing but considerations to lose, at least for Prussia, which was entirely in the hands of the conqueror.

In consequence, on the 19th of June prince Bagration conveyed to Murat at the advanced posts a letter written to him by general Benningsen, commander in chief, in which, deploring the miseries of war, he offered an armistice as the means of putting an end to it. This letter, delivered to Napoleon at the moment of his arrival at Tilsit, was very favourably received, because, as has been observed, he began to perceive how much distance increased the difficulty of military operations. It was nearly a year that he had been away from the heart of his empire, and he felt the necessity that existed for returning to it, to assemble, before all things, the legislative body, of which he had deferred the assembling, and which he was unwilling to convoke in his absence. He was led to think finally in receiving the proposal of the Russian army, that he might, perhaps, find in Russia that ally of which he felt the necessity, in order to close the continent continually against England.

Napoleon, therefore, gave an amicable reply, which consisted in saying that, after so many labours, fatigues, and victories, he only desired a sure and honourable peace; and that if the proposed armistice should be the means of obtaining it, he was ready to consent. On receiving this answer, prince Labanoff went to Tilsit, saw Napoleon, acquainted him with the feeling which was manifested on all sides by those about the emperor Alexander; and after having received the assurance, that on the side of the French the wish for peace was not less strong, although not demanded by necessity, he agreed to an armistice. Napoleon demanded that the Prussian fortresses in Pomerania and Poland, which yet held out, should be delivered up to him, such as Colberg, Pillau, and Graudentz. But the consent of the king of Prussia, then absent from the Russian head-quarters, was necessary for that purpose. On his part, it was feared some resistance would be made to the proposal of giving up the last fortresses that remained in his hands. A particular armistice was therefore stipulated for between the French and Russian armies, which was signed on the 22nd of June, by prince Labanoff and by the prince of Neuchâtel, and, being carried to the head-quarters of Alexander, was instantly ratified.

Marshal Kalkreuth then appeared, to treat in behalf of the Prussian army. Napoleon received him with great respect; told him that he was the distinguished soldier, and above all, the courteous officer, who, among all his countrymen, had treated the French prisoners well; that he received and granted an armistice for that reason, without insisting that the Prussian fortresses should be delivered up. This was a pledge which it was generous to leave in the hands of Prussia, and which could not make the French army uneasy. That was too solidly established upon the Vistula by Warsaw, Thorn, and Dantzick, on the Pregel, by Kœnigsberg and Vehlau, to have any thing to fear from such points as Colberg, Pillau, and Graudentz. The armistice, therefore, was signed by marshal Kalkreuth, as it had been before with prince Labanoff. The line of demarcation which separated the two hostile armies, was the Niemen, as far as Grodno, and then returning in the rear to the right, the Bober, as far as the entrance into the Narew; and finally, the Narew, as far as Pultusk and Warsaw.

Napoleon never relaxed in his customary vigi-

lance, but organized himself behind this line, as if he should soon continue the war, and move upon the centre of the Russian empire. He drew near him the corps of Massena, and established it at Bialistok. He entrenched the Poles of Dombrowski and Zayonschek in a single corps of 10,000 men, which was to connect Massena with marshal Ney. He placed the last at Gumbinen, on the Pregel. He united, at Tilsit, marshals Mortier, Lannes, Bernadotte, Davout, and the cavalry and the guard. He left marshal Soult at Kœnigsberg. He prepared, at Wehlau, an entrenched camp, where, in case of need, he might concentrate his whole army. He gave orders, at Dantzick and Kœnigsberg, to withdraw a part of the immense stores found in those places, and to transport them on the Niemen. He finally ordered general Clarke, at Berlin, and marshal Kellermann, at Mayence, to continue the direction of the marching regiments on the Vistula, just as if the war had not met with any interruption. Of the different measures which he had taken to augment his forces in the spring, he did not suspend but one, and that was the calling out of the second part of the conscription of 1808. He wished this intelligence, accompanied by that of his triumphs, should afford France another reason for rejoicing, and applauding his virtues.

In this imposing attitude, Napoleon awaited the opening of the negotiations; and he invited M. de Talleyrand, who had gone to Dantzick to find a little security and quiet, to come immediately to Tilsit, to afford him the aid of his address, and his patient skilfulness. According to his custom, Napoleon addressed a proclamation to his army, borrowed from the doubled greatness of his soul and of his circumstances. It was conceived in the following language :—

"Soldiers! The 5th of June we were attacked by the Russian army in our cantonments. The enemy mistook the causes of our inactivity. He perceived, too late, that our repose was that of the lion; he repents of disturbing it.

"In the battles of Guttstadt, of Heilsberg, in that of Friedland ever-memorable, in a campaign of ten days, we have taken 120 pieces of cannon, seven colours; killed, wounded, or made prisoners, 60,000 Russians; taken from the enemy's army all his magazines, his hospitals, his *ambulances*, the fortress of Kœnigsberg, the 300 vessels in that port, loaded with all kinds of stores, and 160,000 muskets, that England had sent to arm our enemies.

"From the shores of the Vistula we have careered to those of the Niemen with the flight of an eagle. You celebrated, at Austerlitz, the anniversary of the coronation; you have this year worthily celebrated the battle of Marengo, which finished the war of the second coalition.

"Frenchmen! you have proved worthy of yourselves and me. You will re-enter France, covered with laurel, after having obtained a glorious peace, which carries with it the guarantee of its endurance. It is time that our country should live in peace, sheltered from the malignant influence of England. My bounties shall prove to you my acknowledgment, and all the extent of the affection I have towards you.

"The imperial camp at Tilsit, June 22, 1807."

The two conquered sovereigns were still more eager than Napoleon to open the negotiations. The prince de Labanoff, one of those Russians who most sincerely wished for harmony between France and Russia, came back to Tilsit on the 24th, to obtain an audience of Napoleon. It was instantly granted. This Russian nobleman expressed the strong desire which his master had to terminate the war; the extreme disgust which he had for the English alliance; the impatience which he felt to see the great man of the age, and explain himself cordially with him in a frank and open manner. Napoleon asked nothing better than to meet this young sovereign, of whom he had heard so much spoken; whose intellect, grace, and seductive manners, had been so much boasted. He felt considerable curiosity, and but little fear on this account, because he was more certain to win than to be won, when he entered into communication with other men. He accepted the proposed interview for the next day—the 25th of June.

Napoleon determined that a certain degree of pomp should mark this meeting of the two most powerful princes of the earth, about to terminate their sanguinary quarrel. He ordered the general of artillery, Lariboissière, to place a large raft in the middle of the Niemen, at an equal distance from, and in view of both banks of the river. With all that could be procured of rich stuffs in the little town of Tilsit, they constructed a tent, or pavilion, on one part of the raft, to receive the two monarchs. On the 25th, at one o'clock in the day, Napoleon embarked on the river, accompanied by the grand duke of Berg, the prince of Neuchâtel, marshals Bessières and Duroc, and the grand equerry Caulaincourt. At the same moment, Alexander quitted the other bank, accompanied by the grand duke Constantine, generals Benningsen and Ouwarow, the prince of Labanoff, and count Lieven. Both parties reached the raft at the same time; and the first movement of Napoleon and Alexander on disembarking, was to embrace each other. This testimony of a frank reconciliation, seen by the numerous spectators that were on the banks of the river, (for the Niemen at this place is not wider than the Seine,) excited the loudest applause. The two armies, in fact, were ranged along the Niemen; the semi-savage people of the neighbouring country had joined them; and the witnesses of this grand scene, little versed in political secrets, on seeing their masters embrace, believed that peace was concluded, and the effusion of their blood was from that time to cease.

After this first demonstration, Alexander and Napoleon entered the pavilion which had been prepared for their reception[1]. "For what cause

[1] It is very difficult to know exactly what passed during the long interviews that Napoleon and Alexander had together at Tilsit. All Europe has resounded with disputed statements upon this subject, and not only have chimerical conversations been invented, but there have been published a number of treaties purporting to be secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, that are absolutely false. The English, above all, in order to justify their after conduct towards Denmark, have put forth a great many pretended secret articles of Tilsit, some conceived after the event by the collectors of treaties, others really communicated at the time by diplomatic spies to the cabinet of London, who on this occasion gained the money lavished upon them very wrong-

have we made war?" they asked one another, on commencing the conference. Napoleon, in fact,

fully. Thanks to the authentic and official documents which I have had it in my power to consult, I shall give, for the first time, the true stipulations of the treaty, as well those which are public as the secret ones. I shall, above all, make known the substance of the conversations between Napoleon and Alexander. To this end, I shall make use of a very curious collection, condemned, it is probable, still to remain yet a long time secret, but from which I am enabled, without committing myself, to extract what relates to Tilsit. I allude to the private correspondence of Savary and Caulaincourt with Napoleon, and that of Napoleon with them. General Savary lived some months at St. Petersburg as an extraordinary envoy; M. de Caulaincourt dwelt there many years with the title of ambassador. The devotedness of the one, and the veracity of the other, do not permit a doubt as to the care which they took to make known to Napoleon the complete truth, and I am bound to say that the tone of sincerity in this correspondence is honourable to both. Fearful of substituting their own judgments for that of Napoleon, and wishing to place him in the situation to judge for himself, they took up the habit of attaching to their despatches a minute, in question and answer, of their private conversations with Alexander. Both one and the other saw him almost every day tête-à-tête, in the greatest familiarity, and in reporting, word for word, what he said, they traced, without pretending to do so, the most interesting, and certainly the truest portrait of him. Many individuals, and more particularly many Russians, in order to excuse Alexander for his intimacy with Napoleon, place it to the account of policy, and making him more profound than he was, say that he deceived Napoleon. This strange excuse would not have been even attempted if the correspondence alluded to had been perused. Alexander was a dissembler, but he was open to impression, and in these conversations he is perceived to be free at times and without restraint, saying all that he thought. It is a fact that he attached himself for some time, not to the person of Napoleon, which ever inspired him with a certain degree of apprehension, but to his policy, and that he very actively served it. He had a very natural ambition in his mind, that Napoleon suffered to grow, flattered for a time, and then finished by deceiving. It was thus that Alexander detached himself from France, detached himself before he avowed it, which for a moment constituted that dissembling which the Russians think they do him honour to ascribe to him, but which was hardly such, because it was easy to discern in his language, and his involuntary movements, the change in his disposition. I should anticipate in the recital the account of later times, if I said here what was the ambition of Alexander, which Napoleon flattered, and finished by not satisfying. That which I can explain at the present moment is, how the long sequence of the conversations of Alexander with general Savary and M. de Caulaincourt enable me to clear up the mystery of Tilsit. Here is the mode in which I succeeded. Alexander, full of the recollection of Tilsit, recalled incessantly to Savary and Caulaincourt, all which he said and did at that celebrated interview, and often related the conversations of Napoleon, the expressions by turns piquant or profound, which came from his lips, and, above all, the promises which he said he had received. All this, faithfully committed to paper the same day, was sent to Napoleon, who sometimes disputed, at other times visibly admitted, as not to be contested, that which was thus recalled to his recollection. It is from the contradictory reproduction of these recollections, that I am enabled to furnish the details, of which the authenticity cannot be doubted. I have also obtained from a foreign source, equally authentic and official, the communication of very curious despatches, containing the conversations of the queen of Prussia, on her return from Tilsit, with an old diplomatist, worthy of her confidence and friendship. It is

had only attacked Russia as the ally of England; Russia, on her part, although rightly uneasy at the continental domination of France, served the interests of England much more than her own, by obstinately continuing the contest as she had done. "If you have a ground of animosity against England, and her alone," said Alexander to Napoleon, "we shall easily come to an agreement, because I have as much ground to complain of England as you have." He then recounted his grievances against Great Britain; the avarice and selfishness which it had shown; the false promises with which he had been enticed, and the state of abandonment in which it had left him; all this, with the resentment he felt, excited by an unfortunate war, that he had been obliged to support with his forces alone. Napoleon, seeking what might be in his interlocutor the feeling most necessary to flatter, very quickly perceived that two feelings were predominant: in the first place, an ill humour with his allies, that either weighed upon him like Prussia, or were selfish like England; and in the next place, pride, sensitive and deeply wounded. He therefore attempted to prove to the young Alexander, that he had been duped by his allies; and on the other hand, that he had conducted himself with nobleness and courage. He endeavoured to persuade him that Russia deceived herself in wishing to patronise ungrateful and jealous neighbours, like the Germans; or in serving the interests of greedy merchants, like the English. He laid this mistake to generous sentiments, pushed to excess, and to misapprehensions, to which incapable, or corrupt ministers had given birth. Finally, he praised the bravery of the Russian soldiery, and told the emperor Alexander, that if they were to unite the two armies, that had fought so bravely against each other at Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland, but which having both borne themselves in these battles as true giants, combatting blindfolded, that they would be able to master the world between them, for its benefit and its repose. Then, but with great discretion, he insinuated to him, that making war with France was of the greatest injury to Russia, because she received no compensation; while, if she united with France to govern the East and West, by land and sea, she would obtain as much glory, and more profit. Without explaining himself further, he appeared to take upon himself to make the fortune of his young antagonist, much better than those who had engaged him in a career, in which, so far, he had encountered nothing but defeat. Alexander had, it was true, some engagements with Prussia; and it was necessary, on account of his honour, that he should come safe out of them. Napoleon, therefore, gave him to understand that he would restore some of the Prussian dominions, which would be necessary to disengage him from his allies with honour; after which the Russian cabinet would be at liberty to give itself up to another political system—the only true and profitable one, resembling that, in every thing, of the great Catherine.

by the aid of these different materials that I have composed the statement which I am about to give to the reader, and which I believe to be the only true one, of all those which have affected to trace out the memorable scenes of Tilsit.—*Author's note.*

This conference which endured for more than an hour, and which had touched upon all questions without going far into them, deeply moved the emperor Alexander. Napoleon had opened to him new views, such as always please a fickle mind, and, more than all, one that is discontented. More than once, besides, Alexander in the midst of his defeats, was fully sensible of the inconvenience of this obstinate war into which he had been led against France, and of the advantages of a system of union with her; and had said to himself some portion of what Napoleon had said; but not with that clearness, that force, and more than all that seduction on the part of a conqueror, who presents himself to the conquered, with the hands filled with gifts, and the mouth full of enticing words. Alexander was seduced; Napoleon saw it well, and promised himself that he would soon render the seduction complete.

After having flattered the monarch, he determined to flatter the man. "We shall understand each other better," said he, "in treating directly, than in employing our ministers, who often deceive us, or do not comprehend us, and we shall advance our affairs more in one hour, than negotiators will in many days. Between you and myself there is no necessity for a third person. It was not possible to flatter Alexander in a manner which was more agreeable, than by attributing to him a superiority above those who were round about him; a superiority similar to that which Napoleon had the right to attribute to himself over all his servants. In consequence of this, Napoleon proposed to the emperor to quit the hamlet in which he had lodged himself, and to live in the little town of Tilsit, which should be neutralized for his reception; there they might, being by themselves, treat of their affairs, personally at any hour. This proposition was accepted with eagerness, and it was agreed that M. Labanoff should come to Tilsit, during the day, to regulate the details. It still remained to speak of the unfortunate king of Prussia, who was at the head-quarters of Alexander, waiting to know what should be done with himself and his kingdom. Alexander offered to bring him to the raft on the Niemen, to present him to Napoleon, who might address to him a few consolatory words. Before passing from one system of policy to another, it was necessary Alexander should, if he would avoid dishonour, save something belonging to the crown of his ally. Napoleon had already settled matters upon this point, and feeling that it was necessary to make certain concessions, to place in security the honour of Alexander, he consented to receive the king of Prussia the next day. The two sovereigns now left the pavilion, and passing from serious business to matters of courtesy, complimented their followers. Napoleon treated in the most flattering manner the grand duke Constantine and General Benningsen, Alexander congratulated Murat and Berthier, as being the worthy lieutenants of the greatest captain of modern times. The two emperors then separated, giving each other new marks of friendship, and embarked in the view, and in the midst of the applauses, of the numerous spectators who were assembled on the banks of the Niemen.

Prince Labanoff came in the afternoon to the French head-quarters, to regulate all that was required in relation to the removal, and the establishment of the emperor Alexander in the town of Tilsit. It was agreed that the town should be neutralized; that the emperor Alexander should occupy one half, and the emperor Napoleon the other: that the Russian Imperial Guard should pass to the left bank to do duty near its sovereign; and that the change should take place on the following day, after the presentation of the king of Prussia to Napoleon.

On the next day, the 26th of June, the two emperors went, as on the day before, to the middle of the Niemen, observing the same etiquette, repaired to the pavilion, where the first interview passed. Alexander brought the king of Prussia. This prince had received no graces from nature, while grief and misfortune could not be supposed to have added any. He was an honest man, modest, sensible, and awkward. He did not humble himself before the conqueror; he was melancholy, dignified, and awkward. The conversation could not be prolonged, because he was the conquered of Napoleon, the ward of Alexander; and if there appeared any disposition to restore to him a part of his dominions (which had become probable, without being certain, after the conversation of the day before,) it was the policy of Napoleon, which granted the restitution for the honour of Alexander. Nothing was done for the king of Prussia's sake, and nothing was expected of him, therefore there were no explanations to give him. The interview consequently was short, and could not but be so. Still the king of Prussia appeared to attach great importance to proving that he had done no wrong to Napoleon, and that if after having been for so long the ally of France he had become its enemy, it was the effect of circumstances, and not through any breach of faith, which might make an honest man blush. Napoleon affirmed, on the other side, that he had nothing with which to reproach himself; and, too generous, too manly, to wound a humbled prince, he confined himself to telling him that the cabinet of Berlin, often advertised to guard against the intrigues of England, had committed the fault of not listening to friendly counsel, and that he must impute to this cause alone the misfortunes of Prussia. Napoleon added, for the rest, that France, victorious, did not pretend to draw the last consequences from her victories; and that in a few days they should probably be happy enough to comprehend the conditions of a solid and honourable peace.

The three sovereigns separated after an interview which had scarcely lasted for half an hour. It was agreed that the king of Prussia should also come at a later period to take up his residence at Tilsit, with his ally, the emperor of Russia.

The same day, at five o'clock, Alexander passed the Niemen. Napoleon went to meet him at the bank of the river, conducted him to the quarters which were destined for him, and received him at dinner with the most delicate attention. From that day it was fixed that the emperor Alexander, not having his household establishment with him, should take all his repasts with the emperor Napoleon. They passed the evenings together, talked a long time in the most confidential manner, and their new-born intimacy manifested itself on both

sides by a familiarity at the same time gracious and dignified.

On the next day, June 27th, they mounted their horses to pass in review the French Imperial Guard. Those old soldiers of the Revolution, by turns the soldiers of the republic and of the empire, and ever the heroic servants of France, exhibited themselves proudly to the sovereign whom they had vanquished. They had not to display before him the high stature and the regular and measured march of the soldiers of the north, but they displayed that ease of movement, that assured attitude, that intelligence of countenance, which explained their victories and their superiority to all the armies of Europe. Alexander complimented them greatly. They replied to his flatteries by repeated cries of "Long live Alexander!" "Long live Napoleon!"

It was forty-eight hours since the two emperors had met for the first time, and already they had arrived at such a degree of confidence that they permitted each other to speak their sentiments freely. Napoleon confided to the surprised ears of Alexander the designs in which he wished to associate him; designs which recent circumstances had suggested.

The situation of Napoleon at that period was an extraordinary one. While exhibiting the greatness of his genius conspicuously, and the prodigious height of his fortune, it discovered at the same time the weak sides of his policy, a policy variable and extravagant as the passions which inspired it.

The alliances of France at that period have often been spoken about; it has often been said that at least to realize that frightful phenomenon, happily impossible, of a universal monarchy, it was needful that Napoleon should have endeavoured to reckon in Europe something besides enemies, publicly or secretly leagued against him, and that he should endeavour to make there at least one friend. It has been said that Spain, the most ancient ally of France, and the most natural, was completely disorganized, and, until her entire regeneration, destined to be a burden to those who formed an alliance with her; that Italy was to be created; that England, then uneasy about her possession of India, alarmed to see the French established in the Texel, at Antwerp, Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, Genoa, Naples, Venice, Trieste, and Corfu, as proprietors, or as masters, was irreconcileable with France; that Austria would be implacable as long as France had not restored or made her forget Italy; that Russia was jealous of France upon the continent, as England was upon the ocean; that Prussia alone, the natural rival of Austria, a neighbour threatened by Russia, a protestant power, innovating, and enriched with the spoils of the church, was the only power of which the political interests and moral principles were not absolutely incompatible with those of France; and that in her was to be sought the friend, strong and sincere, by whose means all coalitions might be rendered incomplete or impossible. But it has been seen that Prussia, placed between the two parties that then divided the world, uncertain and hesitating, had committed faults arising from weakness; Napoleon, errors of strength, that a deplorable rupture had followed, that Napoleon had the immense military glory, the immense political misfortune to destroy in fifteen days a monarchy that was the sole ally of France possible in Europe; that, finally, the Russians, having come to the succour of the Prussians in Poland, as they had come to the succour of the Austrians in Gallicia, they had been crushed at Friedland as they were at Austerlitz.

Conqueror of the entire continent, surrounded by powers successively beaten, the one two days before, at Friedland, the other eight months before at Jena, the third eighteen months before at Austerlitz, Napoleon saw himself at will to choose, not among sincere friends, but among personages obsequious, submissive, and officious. If, by a chain of circumstances nearly impossible to break, the moment for attempting, in its turn, a Russian alliance, had not then arrived for him, he would have been able at this moment to control his destiny in a certain degree, to enter into the path of sound policy, not again to depart from it, and have found there with less strength in appearance, more real power, and perhaps an eternal duration, if not for his own dynasty, at least for the greatness of France, which he loved fully as much as his own dynasty. To that end it was needful to conduct himself like a generous conqueror, and by a sudden act, by no means odd, though unexpected, to have raised fallen Prussia, strengthened her, made her more extended in territory than before, and said to her, "you have committed a great fault, you have been wanting in candour towards me, I have punished you; forget your defeat and my victory; I will aggrandize you in place of diminishing you, that you may become my constant ally." It is certain that Frederick William, who held war in aversion, who censured himself every day for having been drawn into it, and who, in 1813, when Napoleon, half conquered, appeared a prey easy to devour, hesitated to profit by the return of good fortune, and did not take up arms until his people did so in despite of him, that king, covered with benefits after the battles of Jena and Friedland, forced to be grateful, would not have made a part in any coalition, and Napoleon, having only to combat Austria and Russia, would not have been overwhelmed. If Napoleon wished a German crown for one of his brothers,—an unfortunate and unwise desire,—he had Hesse, that Prussia would have been but too happy to abandon to him. He would have had Hanover in hand, ready to give to England as the price of peace, or to Prussia for that of an intimate alliance. As to the emperor Alexander having nothing to take from him or restore to him, Napoleon would have been left without a single complaint in reconstituting Prussia on the morrow of the joint defeat of the Russians and Prussians. He would have forced her to admire her conqueror, to sign the treaty of peace without a word, without speaking of Italy, Holland, or Germany, the usual pretexts at that time for disputes between France and Russia.

What is thus imagined was, no doubt, a Utopia, not of generosity,—because Napoleon was perfectly capable of such a dazzling and sudden generosity, which sometimes springs from a great heart eager after glory,—but a Utopia in relation with the combinations of that moment. Then, in fact, the course of events which lead men, even the most powerful, conducted Napoleon to other determina-

tions. Regarding alliances, he had, although only in the middle of his reign, tried already every kind of them. No sooner had he arrived at the consulship, the period for good, wise, and profound thoughts, because they were the first that the sight of things inspired him with, a long time before the corruption which grew out of prolonged power, he had turned to Prussia and made an ally of her. For an instant, and as an expedient, he had thought of allying himself with Russia under Paul I. For a moment, during the peace of Amiens, he had thought of an alliance with England, seduced by the idea of the advantage of joining the power of the sea with that of the land, but all this in a mere passing way, and Prussia had not then ceased to be his intimate confidant, his accomplice in the affairs of Europe. Embroiled subsequently with Prussia so far as to declare war, feeling his insulation, he had addressed overtures to Austria, which would have done little honour to his penetration, if the necessity of having an ally, even in the midst of his victories, had not justified him in seeking that which was least probable. Soon aware of the perfidious armaments of Austria, intoxicated with the brilliant victory of Jena, he imagined he was able to dispense with any alliance. Transported into Poland, and surprised after the battle of Eylau with the obstacles which nature can oppose to heroism and genius, he had again thought of an alliance with Prussia. But annoyed at the replies of that power,—replies less earnest than he had a right to expect from her,—and having found himself as victorious as ever at Friedland, while desiring to put an end to a distant war, he was necessarily brought, in turning the matter incessantly in his thoughts, to that which had not before seen the day, and which so many present circumstances favoured, to the thought of an alliance with Russia. Definitively alienated from Prussia, which had not taken the instant of a favourable return of feeling towards herself, irritated in the highest degree at the cunning conduct of Austria, discovering Russia disgusted with allies that had seconded her so ill, believing that there would be more sincerity with Russia than with Prussia, because there was less ambiguity of position with her, seduced, finally, by that novelty which, in a certain degree, deceives even the firmest minds, Napoleon imagined he could make an ally of Alexander, and a friend, by gaining an influence over his mind, by filling his head with ambitious notions, and by offering to his dazzled sight images which it was easy to create, to foster for a time, but not to make perpetual, without they were renewed by gratifications the most dangerous. The East naturally offered itself as the resource from whence the young Alexander might procure those gratifications, very easy to be conceived, much less to realize, but suddenly become more facile by a recent accidental circumstance. Thus true is it, that when the moment for a thing is come, it seems that every thing favours it, even the most unforeseen accidents.

Napoleon had engaged the Turks in his quarrel, by exciting them to dispute the provinces of the Danube with the conquerors of the Crimea, and Egypt with the possessors of India. He had promised to aid them by land against the Russians, by sea against the English; and he had commenced by helping them, through his officers, to defend the Dardanelles. He had engaged not to sign a treaty of peace but in common, and that it should be advantageous to the Ottoman empire. But the unfortunate Selim, odious to the Ulemas, whose power he wished to reduce, and to the Janissaries, whom he wished to bring into submission to the European discipline, had expiated, by a sudden fall, his wise and generous designs. The Ulemas had for a long while shown a deep mistrust of his conduct. The Janissaries saw with a species of rage his new troops known as the "Nizam-djedid;" and both the one and the other only awaited an occasion to satisfy their resentments. The sultan having required that the Janissaries in garrison in the castles of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should wear the dress of the "Nizam-djedid," the revolt broke out among them, and was propagated with lightning speed among the companies of Janissaries, whether in Constantinople or in the towns bordering on the capital. All went to Constantinople, assembled tumultuously in the place called At-Meïdan, the ancient Hippodrome, with their camp kettles reversed, the common signal of revolt, which indicated that they refused the food of a master who had become odious to them. The Ulemas united themselves together on their side, declaring that a prince who had reigned seven years without having posterity, under whom the pilgrimage to Mecca had been interrupted, was unworthy to govern. The Janissaries having been assembled several days, had successively demanded, obtained, and, in some cases, taken the heads of the ministers of the Porte, who were accused of favouring the new system of improvement; and, at last, the revolt becoming more alarming, the mufti had proclaimed the deposition of the sultan and the elevation of Mustapha to the throne. The unfortunate Selim, shut up in the seraglio, might have hoped, it is true, for the aid of the army commanded by a devoted subject, the grand vizir, Baraictar. But this aid would bring great hazards, because it was to be feared that the appearance of the grand vizir at the head of the faithful soldiery would cause the dethroned sultan to be assassinated before they were able to succour him. Such were the news that Napoleon received at his head-quarters at Tilsit on the 24th of June. According to all appearance the new government of Turkey would prove inimical to France, only because the government overthrown had been its friend. It was also certain that the anarchy which undermined that unfortunate empire placed it, with Spain, in the number of those allies from which more trouble than service was to be expected, the more when this ally, placed at the distance which separates Constantinople from Paris, could not be advised without difficulty nor succoured without delay. Napoleon, with whom the revolutions of ideas operated with the vivacity natural to his genius, saw all at once the events in the East in a new light. It had been a long while that the statesmen of Europe considered the Turkish empire as on the eve of being dismembered, and it was in this view that Napoleon had wished to seize beforehand a share for France by occupying Egypt. He had for a moment abandoned the idea, when in 1802 he thought to reconcile France with all the powers. He returned strongly to the same

idea when he saw what passed in Constantinople, and said to himself, that if the Turkish empire could not be kept alive, it was better to profit by the spoils, for the better arrangement of the affairs of Europe, and, above all, for the humiliation of England. He had with him the vanquished but still the formidable sovereign, whose young head it was easy to excite by showing him the mouths of the Danube, the Bosphorus, and Constantinople. He thought that with some of the Turkish spoils, which sooner or later could not fail to devolve upon Russia, he might obtain, not only peace, which at that moment was not doubtful, but a devoted, intimate alliance, by means of which he should overcome England, and accomplish in the thrones of the West the revolutions that he meditated.

Thus having daily at his side the emperor Alexander, whether at his reviews, or in long rides on the banks of the Niemen, whether in his writing cabinet, where the map of the world was spread out, and where he often shut himself up with Alexander after dinner, he acquired such an influence over the mind of that prince, that he completely overturned it by proposing to him, in a conversation almost continual for several days, the following views.

"A dispensation of Heaven," he said to Alexander, "has just disengaged me from all obligations to the Porte. My ally and friend, Sultan Selim, has been hurled from his throne, and is in confinement. I believed once that it was possible to make something of these Turks, to give them some energy, to teach them how to use their natural courage, but it is all an illusion. It is time to put a term to an empire which cannot longer subsist, and to prevent the spoils from increasing the power of England." Upon this Napoleon unfolded to the view of Alexander the new designs which he had conceived. Did Alexander desire to be the ally of France,—a solid and sincere ally,—nothing was more easy, nothing could be more useful to himself and his empire. But it was necessary that this alliance should be entire, without reserve, followed by a complete devotion to the mutual interests of the two powers. In the first place, this alliance was the only one convenient for Russia. Of what, in fact, was France accused?—of domineering in Italy, Holland, perhaps in Spain; of wanting to create a new system on the Rhine, which should lower the old preponderance of Austria in Germany, and stay the new-born ascendancy of Prussia there? But what concern had Russia about Italy, Spain, and Holland? Germany herself, was not she at the same time the jealous and secret enemy of Russia? Was it not rendering Russia a service to enfeeble the principal German powers? Of what, on the contrary, was England accused?—of wanting to govern the seas, which are the property of all nations; of oppressing neutral flags, of which the Russian was one; of possessing herself of the commerce of all nations, to dupe them by delivering to them colonial produce at the price she may alone fix! to place her foot upon the continent, in Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden; to take, or to threaten, the dominant points of the globe, the Cape, Malta, Gibraltar, and the Sound; to impose laws upon the commerce of the universe. Even at that moment, in place of aiding her allies, she was endeavouring to conquer Egypt; and recently, if she had seized upon the Dardanelles, what would she have done with them? But of these English desires, it cannot be said, as about the pretensions imputed to France,—what does it matter to Russia? It was the opinion of the great Catherine, and of Paul I., that such desires were of very great importance to Russia, when both had declared war against England for the rights of the neutral flag. The English engrossed the commerce of nations to such an extent, that they had secured that of St. Petersburg, all the capital of which they held, so that it became, in their hands, a formidable means of influence over Russia; because, by only withholding ready money, they could excite murmurs, and even the assassination of the emperors. A French army, conducted by a good officer, might be able to come as far as the Vistula or even the Niemen,—could it reach to the Neva? An English squadron, on the contrary, could force the Sound, burn Kronstadt, menace Petersburg, or, after having forced the Bosphorus, destroy Sevastopol and Odessa. An English squadron could shut the Russians up in the Baltic and in the Black Sea,—keeping them prisoners in those seas as within a lake. But France and Russia, not clashing at any point, having the same enemies, the English on the sea and the Germans on the land; having further a common and pressing object of solicitude, the Turkish empire; should understand each other, and act in concert, and if they chose to do that, they were of sufficient power to govern the world between them."

To these extensive views Napoleon added a system of means still more enticing than the general ideas which he had thus developed. He was accused of being fond of war for the sake of war alone. It was not so, and he could prove it at that moment. "Be you," said he to Alexander, "my mediator with the cabinet of London. That character will agree with your position as the old ally of England and the future ally of France. I think no more of Malta. Let Great Britain keep that island, as a compensation for what I have acquired since the rupture of the peace of Amiens. But let her give up in her turn the colonies taken from Spain and Holland, and at that price I will restore Hanover. Are not these conditions just—equitable perfectly? Can I accept of others? Can I abandon my allies? When I sacrifice my conquests upon the continent, a conquest like that of Hanover, to recover the distant possessions of my allies, is it possible to dispute my good faith and moderation?"

Alexander agreed that these conditions were perfectly just, and that France could not accept others. Napoleon continuing, brought that prince to acknowledge that, if England was obstinate after such propositions, it was necessary to force her to submit, because the world could not be for ever troubled on her account; and he proved to Alexander, that they had the means to make her submit by a simple declaration. "If," said he, "England refuse peace on these conditions, proclaim yourself the ally of France; announce that you are about to unite your forces to hers, to secure a maritime peace. Let England know, that, besides a war with France, she will have a war with the entire continent; with Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Swe-

den, and Portugal, which must obey when we signify our will to them; even with Austria herself, she will be obliged to speak out in the same sense, if you and I declare that she shall have war with us, in case she does not choose to have war with England on the conditions we have announced. England then exposed to a universal war, if she will not conclude an equitable peace; England will lay down her arms. All this," added Napoleon, "should be communicated to each cabinet, and the time assigned for decisions should be short, and the terms precise. If England will not yield, we will act in common, and will find indemnities sufficient to repay us for the continuation of the war. Two very important countries, one of the two, above all, so to Russia, will perhaps resist. Portugal and Sweden, whom their maritime position renders subordinate to England. I will arrange with Spain relative to Portugal," observed Napoleon. "You will take Finland as an indemnity for the war, which you will be obliged to wage with Sweden. The king of Sweden, it is true, is your brother-in-law and ally; but when he is your brother-in-law and ally, he must follow the changes in your policy, or else submit to the consequences of his own wrong will. Sweden," Napoleon often repeated, "is perhaps a relation, a momentary ally, but *it is a geographical enemy*[1]. Petersburg is too near the frontier of Finland. *The fair Russians of Petersburg must no more hear from their palaces the cannon of the Swedes.*"

After assigning Finland to Alexander, as the price of the war against England, Napoleon showed him something still more brilliant on the side of the East. "You must act as mediator with England and me, and as an armed mediator who imposes peace. I shall perform the same character for you with the Porte. I shall signify to it my mediation. If it refuses to treat upon conditions satisfactory to you, which can hardly be hoped in the state of anarchy into which Turkey has fallen, I will join you against the Turks, as you will be allied with me against the English, and then we can make a suitable partition of the Ottoman empire."

Here it was above all that the field of hypothesis became immense, and that the imagination of the two sovereigns wandered into infinite combinations. The primary wish of Russia was to obtain at once, whatever might result from a negotiation with the Porte, some portion of the Danubian provinces. Napoleon consented, in return for the assistance which Russia was to lend him in the affairs of the East. Still, as it was probable that the Turks would cede nothing, war would ensue, and after the war the partition. But what partition! Russia might have besides Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, as far as the Balkan. Napoleon would naturally desire the maritime provinces, as Albania, Thessaly, the Morea, and Candia. In Bosnia, and Servia, some indemnities might be found for Austria, either ceded to her in full, or making part of a territorial appanage of an archduke. That they would endeavour to console her for those convulsions of the world, from which she had come out every time lessened, and her rivals aggrandized.

Let the young Czar be imagined, humbled as he was the day before, coming to demand a peace in Napoleon's camp, having, there is little doubt, no great uneasiness about his own dominions, that were saved by distance from the desire of the conqueror, but expecting to lose a considerable portion of the territory of his ally, the king of Prussia, and to retreat defeated from the war;—let it be imagined that the young Czar felt suddenly transported into a species of world at once imaginary and real—imaginary by grandeur, real by possibility; seeing himself on the day after a striking defeat on the way to conquer Finland and a part of the Turkish empire, and to receive from an unfortunate, more than was formerly acquired by a successful war; as if the honour of having been conquered by Napoleon, was well-nigh equivalent to a victory, and could produce the fruit of one;—let the young Czar be imagined, greedy of glory, seeking it every where for seven years past; sometimes in the precarious civilization of his empire, sometimes in the creation of a new European equilibrium, and meeting nothing but immortal defeats; then on a sudden finding the glory so sought after in a system of alliance with his conqueror, an alliance, which would introduce him into the partition of the dominions of the world, below, but at the side of the great man who wished to partake it with him, worth to Russia the fine conquests promised by Catherine to her successors, fallen since Catherine's time into the kingdom of chimeras;—let the young Czar be imagined passing so quickly from so much dejection to such high hopes, and it is easy to comprehend without trouble his agitation, his intoxication, his sudden friendship for Napoleon, a friendship which immediately took the form of an enthusiastic affection, assuredly sincere, at least during the first moments of its existence.

Alexander, who was, as has been already said, mild, humane, intelligent, but as wavering and fickle as his father, thus threw himself at once into the new path laid open before him by his able seducer. He did not quit Napoleon once without expressing an admiration beyond all limit. "What a great man!" said he incessantly to those who came near him; "what genius! what extension of view! what a soldier! what a statesman! O that I had but known him sooner, what faults I should have been spared committing! what great things we might have accomplished together!" His ministers, who had rejoined him, his generals around him, all perceived the influence exercised over him; and they did not regret it, because they saw him getting out of a very bad position with advantage and honour, judging at least from the satisfaction which was displayed on his countenance.

During this time the unlucky king of Prussia had come to Tilsit, and brought with him his misfortunes, his melancholy, his plain reason, and modest good sense. The intoxicating secret conferences which so enraptured Alexander, were not created for him. Alexander represented his intimacy with Napoleon as the means of obtaining large restitutions in favour of Prussia. But he concealed from him the new alliance which was

[1] These were the words of Napoleon literally, repeated by Alexander, in relating to M. de Caulaincourt what had passed at Tilsit.—*Author's note.*

preparing, or suffered him only to become acquainted with the smaller part of the secret. It appeared strange in effect that one of the two conquered sovereigns should obtain such fine acquisitions, when the other was about to lose half of his kingdom. Frederick William, treated with infinite respect by Napoleon, was still left to himself. On horseback, at the head of his troops, he had none of the brilliant grace of Alexander, nor of the tranquil ascendancy of Napoleon. He remained generally in the rear, as insulated as he was unfortunate, making his crowned companions wait when he mounted on horseback or dismounted; an object, in short, of little notice, and even of less esteem than he merited, because the French believed, after the gossip of the imperial court, that Napoleon had been betrayed by Prussia, and the Russians repeated incessantly that the Prussians had fought ill. As to Alexander, all attention was directed towards him. When he returned from long excursions, Napoleon kept him, lent him even furniture and linen, and would not suffer him to lose time to go to his quarters to put on another dress. A superb dressing-case of gold, which Napoleon used, appearing to please him, was offered instantly and accepted. After dinner, which the three sovereigns took together, and which was always at the quarters of Napoleon, they separated early, and the two emperors went and shut themselves up in private, while Frederick William was excluded—a privacy that was accounted for ever in the same manner, as caused by the efforts of Alexander with Napoleon to recover the largest part possible of the Prussian monarchy.

But it was not upon that subject that these long private conferences took place, but about that immense system, by which they were going to hold the dominant power over Europe in common. The possible partition of the Turkish empire was the continual subject of conversation. The first partition had been discussed, as we have seen, but it seemed incomplete. Russia was to have the banks of the Danube as far as the Balkan. Napoleon, the maritime provinces, such as Albania and the Morea. The inland provinces, as Bosnia and Servia, were allotted to Austria. The Porte retained Roumelia, or the country south of the Balkan, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Egypt. Thus in this project, Constantinople, the key of the seas, and in all men's imagination the true capital of the East—Constantinople, so long promised to the descendants of Peter the Great by universal opinion, an opinion formed on the hopes of the Russians, and the fears of Europe—Constantinople, with St. Sophia, was to remain with the barbarians of Asia.

Alexander touched upon this point more than once, and about a more complete partition, which should give to Napoleon, besides the Morea, the islands of the Archipelago, Candia, Syria, and Egypt; but Constantinople to the Russians would have pleased him more. Napoleon, however, who believed that he had done enough, or too much, to attach the young emperor to himself, would not go so far. To give up Constantinople, no matter to whom, even to a declared enemy of England, and thus let any one make, while he was alive, the most splendid acquisition that could be imagined, did not suit Napoleon. He was able, in obedience to the natural tendency of things, to resolve many European difficulties, and to give himself a powerful alliance against England. He would permit the torrent of Russian ambition to dash against the foot of the Balkan, especially in the desire to divert that torrent from the Vistula, but he could not let it pass those tutelary mountains. He would not consent that the most striking work of modern times should be accomplished by any one before his face, or at his side. He was too jealous of the greatness of France—too jealous of solely occupying the imagination of mankind, to consent to such an infringement upon his own glory!

Thus, in spite of the desire to seduce his new friend, he would never lend himself to any other partition, than that which took from the Porte the provinces of the Danube, ill attached to that empire, and Greece, already too much awakened to submit much longer to the Turkish yoke.

One day the two emperors, on their return from a long ride, shut themselves up in the cabinet of Napoleon, where there were numerous maps spread out. Napoleon, in appearance in a brisk conversation with Alexander, asked M. Meneval for the map of Turkey, opened it, then renewing the conversation, and placing his finger suddenly on Constantinople, said several times, without regarding his being heard by the secretary, in whom he had perfect confidence,—"Constantinople! Constantinople! never! It is the empire of the world[1]."

Still Finland, the Danubian provinces, as the price of the concurrence of Russia in the designs of France, offered a perspective view quite enough to intoxicate Alexander, because his reign would be equal to that of the great Catherine, if he obtained only those vast territories.

It was agreed, in consequence, that France and Russia should form a close alliance from that moment—offensive and defensive; and should have in future the same friends and the same enemies; and upon every occasion should direct towards the same end their united forces by sea and land. They promised each other to regulate, at a later time, by a special convention, the number of men and vessels to be employed in each particular case. At the moment, Russia was to offer her mediation to the British cabinet for the re-establishment of peace with France; and if this mediation was not accepted according to the conditions fixed by Napoleon, she was bound to declare war against England. Immediately afterwards, all Europe was to be constrained, including Austria, to declare war against the same power. If Sweden and Portugal, as it was easy to foresee, should resist, a Russian army was to go and occupy Finland, and a French army Portugal. As to the Turks, Napoleon engaged to offer his mediation, to place them in a state of peace with Russia. If they refused the mediation, it was stipulated that the war between them and Russia should be in common with France; and that the two powers should then do with the Ottoman empire that which they judged fit, only that they should stop in the dismember-

[1] I had these particulars from M. Meneval himself, an ocular witness; and besides the veracity of so respectable a witness, I have for a guarantee of their exactitude the correspondence of Savary and Caulaincourt, which proves that the limit of the Balkan was never passed, despite all the efforts of Alexander.—*Author's note.*

ment at the limits of the Balkan, and the gulf of Salonica.

These resolutions, once adopted in substance, Napoleon undertook to draw up, under his own hand, the treaties, patent and secret, which should include them. It was requisite, too, that they should come to some understanding in reference to that unfortunate Prussia, which Napoleon had promised not utterly to destroy, but for the honour of Alexander, to suffer to subsist, at least in part. There were two fundamental conditions that Napoleon laid down, and from which he would not wander; one was, to take, for the purpose of different combinations, all the German provinces that Prussia possessed on the left of the Elbe, and also the Polish provinces that she had received in the different partitions of Poland. This was not less than half of the Prussian state, in territory and population. With the provinces of Westphalia, Brunswick, Magdeburg, and Thuringia, anciently or recently acquired by Prussia, Napoleon wished these to be united, together with the Grand Duchy of Hesse, to compose a German kingdom, which he would call the kingdom of Westphalia, and which he proposed to give to his brother Jerome, to introduce one of his family into the confederation of the Rhine. He had already crowned two of his brothers, of which one reigned in Italy and one in Holland. He would thus establish a third in Germany. As to Hanover, which had belonged for a moment to Prussia, Napoleon intended to keep it as a pledge of peace with England. In regard to Poland, his intention was to commence its restoration by means of the provinces of Posen and Warsaw; these he would constitute an independent state, in order to repay the services of the Poles, who had as yet been of little service to him, but might become of greater, when they joined to their natural courage the advantage of organization—in fine, to abolish also, in overturning the principal labour of the great Frederick, the most damnatory of his works—the partition of Poland. Napoleon did not then know that the time would come that would permit him to take from Austria, by exchange or by force, the Polish provinces retained by that power. Meanwhile he revived the kingdom of Poland by the creation of a Polish state of considerable extent and importance. In order to facilitate this restoration, he had the idea of returning to another thing of the past, and of giving Poland to Saxony. Thus, in destroying Prussia, one of the great monarchies of Germany, he would substitute two new allied monarchies, Westphalia, composed of fragments, for the benefit of his younger brother; and Saxony, aggrandized almost double, and destined both, according to all appearances, to remain faithfully attached to him. He intended, in this mode, to re-form a sort of new German equilibrium, and replace, by two alliances, the powerful alliance of Prussia, which he had lost. He assigned, therefore, for the limits of the confederation of the Rhine, the Inn towards Austria, the Elbe towards Prussia, and the Vistula on the side of Russia.

Russia had not many objections to make against these combinations when she had once determined to ally herself with the policy of France. Except in the sacrifices imposed upon Prussia, and the restoration of Poland, she had little interest in these creations, these dismemberments of German states. But the sacrifices imposed upon Prussia were embarrassing for the emperor Alexander; above all, when he recalled the oaths sworn on the tomb of the great Frederick, and the avowals of chivalrous devotion lavished upon the queen of Prussia. The nine millions and half of inhabitants of the Prussian monarchy reduced to five millions, and a hundred and twenty millions of francs in revenue reduced to sixty-nine millions, it was impossible Alexander could consent to, on the part of an ally, without some objections. He offered them to Napoleon, who only listened to them coolly. Napoleon answered that it was only out of consideration for him that he left Prussia so many provinces as he did leave; that but for the wish to please him, he would have reduced her to a third-rate power. He would have taken as far as Silesia from her, and given it either to Saxony, for the purpose of imparting to that power all the consequence that Prussia had possessed, or have given it to Austria, in order to obtain the Gallicias.

This double combination would have certainly been the better of the two. The determination to sacrifice Prussia once taken, it was better at once to destroy her altogether, than to do it by halves. In all cases it is a bad system to overturn old states in order to create new ones, because the old are apt to revive, the new ones to die, unless the action be operated in a manner consistent with the march of things and events. The march of events had progressively augmented Prussia, and progressively destroyed Poland and Saxony. All that was done in this sense had the chance of being durable, while that which was done in a contrary sense had little chance of lasting. To give some consistence to the new work, it was necessary to render Prussia so feeble, and Poland and Saxony so strong, that the first should have but a small chance of being renewed, and that the other two states should have the means of sustaining themselves. Thus in not entirely reconstituting Prussia, a reconstruction which would have been every way preferable, Napoleon had better to have destroyed it entirely. He himself thought as much, and said so to the emperor Alexander. He went so far as to offer him a part of the spoils of the house of Brandenburg, if he could lend himself to his design of the now complete re-establishment of Poland. But Alexander refused, because it was clearly impossible for him to accept of the spoils of Prussia. It was pretty well already not to have defended her cause better, and to become through interest the ally of the conqueror who had despoiled her. Independently of the fate inflicted upon Prussia, Alexander could not see with pleasure the restoration of Poland. But Napoleon tried to demonstrate that Russia ought to stop towards the west, at the Niemen; and that in passing it to approach the Vistula, as she had done in the last partition of Poland, she had rendered herself suspected and distasteful to the rest of Europe, gained subjects, a long while, perhaps for ever insubordinate, and placed herself, through insecure conquests, in dependence upon the neighbouring powers, always ready to ferment an insurrection in her dominions; that it was needful to seek her aggrandizement elsewhere; that she should obtain it in the north, towards Finland, or in the east, towards Turkey;

in the last direction, above all, she opened to herself a road to true greatness—greatness without limit, when India itself was in the perspective; that in seeking to aggrandize herself upon that side, she would encounter on the European continent friends and allies, France particularly, and she would have no adversary but England, which power, reduced to that of its navy, would not be able to dispute with her the banks of the Danube.

The reasons of Napoleon were powerful; but, had they been otherwise, Alexander was in no condition to contradict them. It was necessary to choose, either to have no part nor to aggrandize himself upon any side, without being able to prevent the renewal of Poland, the fall of Prussia, or to take the great aggrandizement pointed out by Napoleon. Alexander did not hesitate. Moreover, he was so seduced, so charmed, that he had not need of force to decide upon the matter. But he was anxious to know how to render his misfortune endurable to Frederick William, who, in seeing the two emperors so intimate, had flattered himself that he was the cause of this intimacy, and should obtain the advantage of it. Alexander took upon himself, however embarrassing the character, to make the first overtures; and after having communicated to Frederick William the resolutions which concerned him, to leave to him the task of making himself directly understood by the supreme arbitrator, who traced out the frontiers of every power. Frederick William received coolly the overtures of Alexander, and promised to confer upon the subject with Napoleon. The unhappy king of Prussia, whom fortune favoured so little, but whom she afterwards so amply compensated, was incapable of treating himself about his own affairs. He was neither skilful nor imposing; and if sometimes his mind, shaking off its weight of unhappiness, gave itself up to some involuntary movements, those movements were splenetic and testy, little fitting a monarch without a state and without an army. The town of Memel, where the queen of Prussia passed her nights and days in tears, and the 10,000 or 15,000 men under general Lestocq, were all that remained to the sovereign of Prussia. The monarch, in consequence, had a long explanation with Napoleon, and as at the first interview, he endeavoured to prove to him that he had not merited his misfortune, because the origin of the difference with France went back to the violation of the treaty of Anspach, and that in traversing the province, Napoleon had violated the sovereignty of Prussia. That question was of small importance at the point to which things were then arrived; but upon that subject Napoleon had a conviction as powerful as that of the king himself. In traversing the province of Anspach, he had acted with perfect good faith, and he was as anxious to appear as right upon this point as if he had not then been the stronger party. The two sovereigns grew warm, and the king of Prussia, in his despair, delivered himself over to a loss of temper to be regretted, on account of his dignity, not at all useful to his cause, and embarrassing to Napoleon. Importunate in his complainings, Napoleon referred him to his ally Alexander, who had induced him to continue the war, when, on the day after the battle of Eylau, peace would have been possible and advantageous for Prussia.

"For the rest," said Napoleon, "the emperor Alexander has the means of indemnifying you,—namely, to sacrifice for you his relations the princes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, whose estates would be a fine indemnity for Prussia towards the north and towards the Baltic. He can thus also give up to you the king of Sweden, from whom you may take Stralsund and the portion of Pomerania of which he makes so bad a use. Let the emperor Alexander consent to these acquisitions in your behalf, not equal to the territories taken from you, but better situated, and I will make no objection." Napoleon had good reasons for sending Frederick William to Alexander, who could have effectually procured those compensations for Prussia. But Alexander was already in sufficient trouble through the grievance of his Prussian allies, without adding to them complaints from his own family, reproaches, and stern visages. Frederick William would not dare to make such a proposal, and he took the offer as a mere evasion. He was, therefore, obliged to resign himself to the sacrifice of one half of his kingdom. Still it was possible to afford him some slight consolation in his sorrow, which had, in a certain degree, lessened his chagrin. They had left him old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia, but they had taken from him the provinces on the left bank of the Elbe; and it was necessary, in taking away these large portions of his estates, not to insulate him too much from those which remained. It was by successive encroachments on Poland, that Frederick had joined together old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia. It now became the question, what portions of Poland should be left to Prussia to bind these provinces to themselves; and, finally, and before all, it was needful to settle, whether, in assigning to Prussia the frontiers of the Elbe in Germany, she should be granted the fortress of Magdeburg, which is on the Elbe, more important still than that of Mayence or of Strasburg on the Rhine.

Napoleon consented that the limits of Poland should be traced in such a manner as to unite her as much as possible with old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia; but in conceding the lower Vistula to Frederick William, he would reserve Dantzick and constitute it a free town, like Bremen, Lubeck, and Hamburg. As to Magdeburg he was inflexible. Mayence and Magdeburg formed the main points of his power in the north, and it was not possible for him to renounce it. He was, therefore, most decided in his resolutions regarding Dantzick and Magdeburg.

The king of Prussia was resigned to the loss of Dantzick, but he still clung to Magdeburg, because it was situated in the bosom of Germany, and was a considerable point of support, as well as the key of the Elbe, which had become his frontier. He valued it the more, not from a political motive, but from old affection. In fact, the inhabitants of the duchy of Magdeburg, spread over the right and left of the Elbe, were of the number of the older subjects and the most attached of the monarchy. Still he gained nothing by this argument. As he was very pressing, sometimes with Napoleon, sometimes with Alexander, the latter conceived the idea of operating upon Napoleon, by bringing the queen of Prussia to Tilsit, that she

might make an effort upon the conqueror of Europe by the influence of her spirit, her beauty, and her misfortunes. The calumnious reports to which the admiration of Alexander for this princess had given birth, had prevented her from making her appearance at Tilsit. Still recourse was now had to her intervention as a last means, not to move the passions of Napoleon, but to touch his most delicate feelings by the presence of a queen handsome, accomplished, and unhappy.

It was rather late to attempt such a resource, because the ideas of Napoleon were definitively settled, and for the rest it was not very likely that Napoleon would sacrifice a part of his designs under the influence of any woman, however interesting she might be.

Frederick William, therefore, invited the queen to Tilsit. She agreed to comply, and the negotiation, which had already lasted twelve days, was run out in order to give the princess time to arrive. She came on the 5th of July. An hour after her arrival, Napoleon anticipated her, and paid her a visit. The queen of Prussia was then thirty-two years old. Her beauty, formerly so brilliant, appeared to be slightly affected by age, but she was still one of the finest women of her day. With a superior mind she joined a certain habit of business, which she had learned from taking an indiscreet part in it, and with this a perfect nobleness of character and attitude. Still a too evident desire to produce a successful effect upon the great man on whom she was dependent, was injurious to her success. She spoke of the greatness of Napoleon, of his genius, of the unhappiness of having mistaken him, in terms that were not simple enough to affect his feelings. But the energy of her character, and the strength of mind she displayed in conversation, soon appeared to such a degree as to cause Napoleon some embarrassment, who, while lavishing upon her his attention and respect, was very cautious not to let one word escape him by which he might commit himself.

She came to dinner with Napoleon, who received her at the door of the imperial residence. During dinner, she set herself to overcome him, to draw from him at least one word from which she could obtain hope, above all in regard to Magdeburg. Napoleon, on his side, always respectful, courteous, but evasive, made her despair by a resistance which seemed a perpetual flight. She perceived the tactics of her powerful adversary, and lamented much in parting, that he would not leave in his mind a recollection which permitted her to join to her admiration for the great man, an inviolable attachment for the generous conqueror. Perhaps, if Napoleon, less pre-occupied with the care to aggrandize ungrateful royalties, or to create ephemeral kingdoms, had yielded upon the present occasion, he would not only have conceded that which was thus demanded, but what he would have been able further to grant without prejudicing his other objects; perhaps he might have attached to himself the ardent heart of this queen and the honest heart of her husband. But he resisted the solicitations of the princess by opposing to them an invincible respect.

Embarrassed at this contest with one against whom it was difficult to hold out, pressed to terminate his new work, and to enter his own territory, Napoleon desired to terminate all within twenty-four hours. He had fixed with his immutable will all that related to Prussia, Poland, and Westphalia. He had consented to a line of demarcation between Poland and Pomerania, which, following the banks of the Netze and the canal of Bromberg, would join the Vistula below Bromberg. He made the concessions, regarding Magdeburg, that in case Hanover remained with France, from peace not being concluded with England, or whether it was concluded without giving up Hanover, there should be given up to Prussia on the left bank of the Elbe, and in the environs of Magdeburg, a territory of 300,000 or 400,000 souls, including the restitution of the fortress itself.

Napoleon would grant nothing more. M. de Talleyrand had orders to confer with M. Kourakin and prince Labanoff, and to terminate all the disputed points on the 7th of July, in such a way that the queen, ordered to Tilsit to ameliorate the fate of Prussia, only accelerated the result which she endeavoured to prevent through the embarrassment which she caused to Napoleon, by the success that she had nearly obtained by her solicitations, at once delicate and persevering. The Russian and Prussian negotiators, seeing themselves ordered to consent or refuse in a peremptory manner, ended by giving way. The treaty, concluded on the 7th, was signed on the 8th of July, and had the title, which remains so celebrated, of the "Treaty of Tilsit." It had three kinds of stipulations:—

A patent treaty of France with Russia, and another between France and Prussia.

Secret articles added to their double treaty.

Finally, an occult treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Russia, which both parties were to keep a perfect secret, until both should agree to its publication. The two treaties between France and Russia, and Russia and Prussia, contained the following stipulations:

The restitution to the king of Prussia, in consideration of the emperor of Russia, of old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Upper and Lower Silesia.

The abandonment to France of all the provinces on the left bank of the Elbe, to compose with the grand duchy of Hesse a kingdom of Westphalia, for the advantage of the youngest brother of Napoleon, prince Jerome Bonaparte.

The abandonment of the duchies of Posen and Warsaw, to form a Polish state, which, under the title of the grand duchy of Warsaw, should be bestowed on the king of Saxony, with a military road across Silesia, affording a passage from Germany into Poland.

The acknowledgment by Russia and by Prussia, of Louis Bonaparte as king of Holland; of Joseph Bonaparte as king of Naples; of Jerome Bonaparte as king of Westphalia; of the confederation of the Rhine, and in general of all the states created by Napoleon.

The re-establishment in their sovereignties, of the princes of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg, but the occupation of their territory by French troops, for the execution of the continental blockade.

The mediation of Russia to establish a peace between France and England.

The mediation of France to establish peace between the Porte and Russia.

The secret articles contained the following stipulations :—

The restitution of the mouths of the Cattaro to France.

The abandonment of the Seven Islands, which were in future to belong entirely to France.

The promise in regard to Joseph, already recognized as king of Naples, in the patent treaty, to acknowledge him also as king of the two Sicilies, when the Bourbons of Naples should have been indemnified by means of the Balearic Isles or Candia.

The promise, in case of the union of Hanover to the kingdom of Westphalia, to restore to Prussia on the left bank of the Elbe, a territory with three or four hundred thousand of inhabitants.

Lastly, life annuities secured to the dispossessed heads of the houses of Hesse, Brunswick, and Orange-Nassau.

The occult treaty, the most important of all signed at that time, and which it was promised should be kept inviolably secret, contained the engagement between France and Russia, to make a common cause under all circumstances, to unite their forces by sea and land in every war in which they might engage ; to take arms against England, if she would not subscribe to the conditions which have been before mentioned, and against the Porte if it should not accept the mediation of France, and in the last case of the non-acceptance of the mediation, to "withdraw" so the text stated, "the provinces of Europe from the vexations of the Porte, except Constantinople and Roumelia." The two powers engaged to summon in common, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Austria herself, to concur in the designs of France and of Russia, that is to say, to shut their ports against England, and to declare war against her [1].

The two states were unable to ally themselves in a more intimate and complete manner. The change of policy on the part of Alexander could not be more sudden nor more extraordinary.

The signature given by the Russians deciding that of the Prussians, produced among the last the strongest feeling. The queen of Prussia desired to depart immediately. After dining, as was customary, with Napoleon, on the 8th of July, and addressing him some complaints full of haughtiness ; and some to Alexander full of bitterness, she went away, accompanied by Duroc, who had never ceased to feel a strong attachment towards her ; and threw herself weeping into her carriage. She departed for Memel, where she went to grieve over her past imprudence, her political passions, the mischievous influence they had exercised in public affairs, and the fatal confidence which she had placed in the fidelity of the heads of empires, in their word, and their friendship. Fortune was to change for her country and her husband ; but this unfortunate princess died before she could see that change take place.

Alexander, having got rid of his unhappy friends, whose sadness annoyed him, delivered himself up entirely to enthusiasm about his new projects. He was vanquished, but his armies were honoured ; and instead of sustaining losses as the consequence of a war in which he had met with nothing but reverses, he quitted Tilsit with the hope of soon realizing the great designs of Catherine. The thing depended upon himself, for he could turn to peace or war the mediation of Russia with the British cabinet, and the mediation of France with the divan. The one would procure him Finland ; the other, all, or part, of the Danubian provinces. He was enchanted with his new ally. They promised inviolable attachment to each other ; to conceal nothing from one another ; to meet again soon, and to continue those direct relations which had brought forth such good fruit. Alexander did not venture to propose to Napoleon to come and see him so far as the bottom of the North, in the capital of an empire yet too young to merit his notice ; but he would go to Paris, to visit the capital of the most civilized empire in the world ; where the spectacle was offered to him of the grandest government succeeding the most perfect anarchy, and where he hoped, he said, to learn, in attending the sittings of the council of state, the great art of reigning, that the emperor of France exercised in so superior a manner.

On the 9th of July, the same day with the signature of the treaties, there took place the solemn exchange of the ratifications, and the separation of the two sovereigns. Napoleon, wearing the grand cordon of St. Andrew, went to the quarters of Alexander. He was received by that prince, who wore the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour, and who had around him his guard, under arms. The two emperors, having exchanged the ratifications, mounted on horseback, and went to show themselves to their troops. Napoleon requested that they should order out of the ranks the bravest soldier of the imperial Russian guards, and he bestowed upon him himself the cross of the Legion of Honour. Then, after a long conference with Alexander, he accompanied him towards the Niemen. They embraced each other for the last time, in the midst of the applauses of the surrounding spectators, and then separated. Napoleon remained on the banks of the Niemen, until he had seen his new friend disembark on the other side. He only then retired ; and after having bid adieu to his soldiers, who by their heroism had rendered so many miracles possible, he departed for Kœnigsberg, where he arrived the next day, being the 10th of July.

Napoleon regulated in that city all the details for the evacuation of Prussia, and ordered prince Berthier to make them the subject of a convention, which should be signed with M. de Kalkreuth. The banks of the Niemen were to be evacuated on the 21st of July ; those of the Pregel on the 25th ; those of the Passarge on the 20th of August ; those of the Vistula on the 5th of September ; those of the Oder on the 1st of October ; and those of the Elbe on the 1st of November ; on the condition that the contributions due from Prussia, as well ordinary and extraordinary, should be wholly paid in specie, or in bills accepted by the intendant of the army. The amount was five or six hundred millions, imposed on the Hanseatic towns, on the German estates of the dispossessed princes, on

[1] I am not giving the text, but a strict analysis of the treaty, the precise words of which have continued unknown to this day.—*Author's note.*

Hanover, and lastly, on Prussia, properly so called. In this sum was at the same time included, what the French troops, or their allies, had consumed in kind, and what was to be paid in money. The treasury of the army, begun at Austerlitz, would thus receive a considerable augmentation, and possess resources sufficient for recompensing the devotion of heroic soldiers to the most munificent of all masters.

Napoleon divided the army into four commands, under marshals Davout, Soult, Massena, and Brune. Davout, with the third corps, the Saxons, Poles, and several divisions of dragoons and light cavalry, would form the first command, and occupy Poland until the country was organized. Marshal Soult, with the fourth corps, the reserve of infantry, which had belonged to marshal Lannes, a part of the dragoons, and light cavalry, would form the second command, occupying old Prussia, from Kœnigsberg to Dantzick, and take upon himself the details of the evacuation. Marshal Massena, with the fifth corps, with the troops of marshals Ney and Mortier, and with the Bavarian division of Wrede, would form the third command, and occupy Silesia, until the general evacuation. Lastly, marshal Brune, forming the fourth command, with all the troops left in the rear, was ordered to watch the coasts of the Baltic, and if the English appeared there, to receive them as he had formerly done at the Helder. The guard, and the corps of Victor, formerly Bernadotte's, were marched upon Berlin.

Napoleon left Kœnigsberg on the 13th of July, and went straight to Dresden, to pass some days with his new ally, the king of Saxony, created grand duke of Warsaw, in order to concert with him about the constitution to be given to the Poles. This good and wise prince, little ambitious, but flattered, as well as his people, at the greatness conferred upon his family, received Napoleon with transports of joy and gratitude. Napoleon left him to go to Paris, which impatiently awaited him, and which he had not seen for nearly a year. He arrived there on the 27th of July, at six o'clock in the morning. Never did more lustre surround the name and person of Napoleon; never had greater power been apparently obtained for the imperial sceptre. From the Strait of Gibraltar to the Vistula, from the mountains of Bohemia to the North Sea, from the Alps to the Adriatic, he ruled, directly or indirectly, either by himself or by the princes, that were some his creatures, others his dependants. Beyond, were allies or enemies subdued—England alone excepted. Thus the entire continent was under his direction; because the Russians, having for a moment resisted him, now adopted his plans warmly; and Austria found herself constrained to see them accomplished, and was even threatened to be made to concur. Lastly, England, secured from this vast domination by the ocean, was just about to be placed between the acceptance of peace or war with the universe.

Such was the external appearance of this gigantic power, which had sufficient about it to dazzle the world, and did in effect dazzle it, but of which the reality was less solid than it was brilliant. A moment of cool reflection would be sufficient to have shown this. Napoleon, turned from his contest with England by the third coalition, drawn from the shores of the ocean to the banks of the Danube, had punished the house of Austria by taking from it, in consequence of the campaign of Austerlitz, the Venetian states, the Tyrol, and Suabia, and had thus completed the Italian territory, aggrandized the allies of France in the south of Germany, and thrown the Austrian frontier to a distance from France. So far it was well, because to achieve the territorial freedom of Italy it was necessary to cultivate friends in Germany. To place new spaces between Austria and France was assuredly conformable to a sound policy. But intoxicated by the astonishing campaign of 1805, to change arbitrarily the face of Europe, and in place of limiting himself to modify the past, which is the greatest triumph given to the hands of man, willing its destruction; in place of continuing, to the advantage of France, the old rivalry between Prussia and Austria, by advantages granted to one over the other, to snatch away the sceptre of Germany from Austria without giving it to Prussia; to convert their antagonism into a common hatred against France; to create, under the title of the Confederation of the Rhine, a pretended French Germany, composed of French princes with an antipathy to their subjects, of German princes little thankful for French favours, and after having rendered by this unjust displacement of the limit of the Rhine a war with Prussia inevitable,—a war as impolitic as it was glorious; to suffer himself to be drawn on by the torrent of victory as far as the shores of the Vistula; arrived there, to attempt the restoration of Poland, and having on the rear Prussia vanquished but fuming, Austria secretly implacable: all this, admirable as a military undertaking, was, as a political undertaking, imprudent, extravagant, and chimerical.

By the aid of his genius Napoleon sustained himself in these perilous extremities, triumphed over all obstacles of distance, climate, mud, cold, and achieved on the Niemen the defeat of the continental powers. But, at bottom, he was anxious to put an end to so audacious a course, and all his conduct at Tilsit exhibits this as his situation. Having for ever alienated the heart of Prussia, which he had not the sound idea of attaching to himself by a noble act of generosity; enlightened respecting the sentiments of Austria, proving, however victorious he might be, a necessity for making an alliance, he accepted that of Russia, which offered itself at the moment, and conceived a new political system, founded on the sole principle of the concurrence of two ambitions, a French and Russian ambition, to do as they pleased in the world; an unhappy concurrence, because it became France not to permit Russia to do every thing, and, above all, not to permit herself to do every thing. After having added, by the treaty of Tilsit, to the deep dissatisfaction of Germany, by creating in her territory a French royalty, which must cost a heavy expense in men, money, and an animosity to overcome, vain counsels, all that those of Holland and Naples had already cost; after having reconstituted one-half of Prussia, in place of destroying or restoring it entirely; after having reconstituted half of Poland, and done all in an incomplete manner, because at these distances time pressed, and strength began to fail, Napoleon acquired enemies never to be reconciled,

and doubtful or powerless friends; elevated, in short, an immense edifice, one in which all was new from the base to the summit, an edifice constructed with such haste, that the foundation had not time to settle, nor the mortar to harden.

But if every thing is to be censured, in our opinion, in the political work of Tilsit, however brilliant it may appear, all, on the contrary, in the military operations is most admirable. That army of the camp at Boulogne which carried from the Strait of Calais to the sources of the Danube with incredible dispatch, enveloped the Austrians at Ulm, drove back the Russians upon Vienna, and succeeded in crushing both one and the other at Austerlitz, rested afterwards some months in Franconia, recommenced soon again its victorious march, entered Saxony, surprised the Prussian army in its retreat, broke it with one blow at Jena, followed it in retreat without ceasing, turned it, and took it to the last man on the shores of the Baltic; that army which, turning from North to East, went to meet the Russians, drove them back on the Pregel, and did not stop until impracticable bogs restrained them; that army then gave the unexampled spectacle of a French force encamped quietly on the Vistula. Troubled on a sudden in its quarters, it sallied forth to punish the Russians, reached them at Eylau, fought, though perishing with cold and hunger, a sanguinary battle; returned after the battle to its quarters, and there encamped anew upon the snow in such a manner that even in its repose alone it covered a great siege, fed, and recruited during a long winter, at distances which set all administration at defiance; it took arms in the spring, and this time, nature aiding genius, it placed itself between the Russians and their base of operation, and reduced them, in order to reach Kœnigsberg to pass a river before it, threw them into it at Friedland, terminating thus by an immortal victory, and on the shores of the Niemen, the longest and boldest of expeditions, not an expedition through Persia or India, like that of the army of Alexander, but across Europe, covered with brave and disciplined soldiers; here was that operation unexampled in the annals of ages,—here was that work worthy of man's everlasting admiration,—here was that combining all qualities, promptitude and slowness, audacity and prudence, the art of fighting and that of marching, the genius of war and of administration; and these things so diverse, so rarely united, always ready at the moment when they were needful to secure success. Every one will be inclined to inquire, how it was possible to display so much prudence in war and so little in politics? The answer is easy, it is, that Napoleon in war was under the guidance of his genius,—in policy, of his passions.

It may be added, in conclusion, that the colossal edifice raised at Tilsit might, perhaps, have endured for some time, if new weights accumulated on its over-burthened foundations had not hastened its ruin. The fortune of France, although compromised at Tilsit, was not therefore inevitably lost, and her glory was immense.

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Lately published,

UNIFORM WITH THE PRESENT VOLUMES,

THE

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OF THE


FRENCH REVOLUTION.

BY

M. A. THIERS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE LAST PARIS EDITION,

WITH NOTES.


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